CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CLASS NOTES )

CONSTI: INTRODUCTORY PRINCIPLES

I. Definition of Key terms

a. Constitutional law v. political law

Case: Marcariola v. Asuncion, case no 133 J

When the new sovereignty takes over a state, the public law are abrogated but the private laws
do not change. So, if you owed money will person and the next day, your countries are taken over
by the Chinese, it does not extinguish obligation to pay, the person you owe money to because it
does not change the relationship of individuals.

abrogated law, it needs to reenacted by an affirmative act of the new sovereign.

- Public law deals with matters affecting the state and its agencies and the protection of the
state’s interests. Examples, political law, criminal law, in public international law. It is the
relationship of the Government or the state with its inhabitants
- Private law is it a regulation of the conduct of private individuals with another. Examples,
civil law and commercial law. Deals for the regulation of the conduct of the individuals

b. Constitution vs Laws

- The laws need to adhere to the Constitution, and if they do not than they are
unconstitutional, and therefore declared null and void, the supremacy clause. The
Constitution is deemed present in all contracts and statues.

II. The 1987 Philippines Constitution

a. Classification of constitutions; Qualities of a good written constitution ;

essential parts of a Written constitution

Kinds ( Written or Unwritten, Conventional or Cumulative, Elastic and In Elastic )

1. Written - written in a legal document by a constitutional convention
2. Unwritten - product of political evolution, mass customs and judicial precedents.
Although it is call unwritten, the contents/precepts of this constitution can be found
in separate works or found in various sources( SC decision, statutes of
fundamental character, opinions of Jurists )
3. Conventional / Enacted - enacted by the people there is deliberate process and
action from individuals to which the constitution was created . We have a
conventional constitution because it we created in a constitutional convention.
Each legislative district Will have a representative for the amendment of revision of
a constitution.
 4. Cumulative - developed through cultural or customary developments through time.
5. Inelastic or Rigid - rigid process of amending or making changes, changeable
through a burdensome process, more burdensome than statutes.
6. Elastic or Flexible - changes are easy made.

Qualities according to civilists “ the Constitution is not supposed to be exhaustive and

because it is not exhaustive a lot of the things in the constitution may sound vague.
Example, prohibition against political dynasties, this prohibition is not self-executory ,
these provisions have to be given the effect buy an implementing legislation.

1. Written - it must not only cover all person and things inside the territory state and
it must be able to provide for future contingencies
2. Brief - It must confine its self to the fundamental principle, leaving for the details to
be supplanted by laws to be enacted by congress.
3. Definite - the provisions should as much as possible, be stated in simpler terms, so
that the same may be easily understood by the people

“ The constitution should be like a swim suit, brief enough to be exciting but broad enough
to cover the bare essentials “ - Speaker on the second day.

The Amendments or Revision to the constitution

1. Amendment - normal referee to changes that are minor or isolated
2. Revision - usually entails a rewriting or overhaul of the constitution

Lambino Vs. COMELEC

“ The supreme court rules that even when the proposed change seems too isolated in
character, but if any such change would drastically alter the underlying principles by which
our government operates then that is already considered a revision”
Article 2 Sec 2” the Philippines is a democratic state “ if you change that to communistic
state then that would be a major change.

b. How to amend or revise the 1987 constitution; substantive requirements and procedure

SUGGESTED ANSWER

(a) The constitution may be amended or revised by the vote of at least three-fourths of all
the Members of Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, by way of a proposal ( Article
XVII,Sec.1(1) of the 1987 Constitution ).
Any amendment or revision under this provision shall be valid upon ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than 60 days or
later than 90 days after the approval of the amendment or revision . ( Article XVII, Sec.4 of
the 1987 Constitution ).
The Constitution may also be amended or revised by a Constitutional Convention.
Congress may, by the vote of at least two-thirds of all of its members, call a Constitutional
Convention, or by a Majority vote of all of its Members subject to the electorate the calling
of a Constitutional Convention ( Article XVII, Sec.3 of the 1987 Constitution) . Any
amendment or revision under this provision shall be valid in the same manner as in Article
XVII,Sec1(1) of the Constitution.

Amendments to the constitution may be directly proposed by the people ( People’s

Initiative ) through initiative upon potion of at least 12% of the registered voters, and at
least 3% of the registered voters in every legislative district must be represented ( Article
XVII,Sec.2 of the 1987 Constitution).

The people cannot propose revisions and may propose only amendments. the potion must
be signed by the required number of people, and the full text of the proposed amendments
must be embodied in the petition ( Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 174153 &174299,
October 25, 2006, 503 SCRA 1650)
Any amendment under Arctic XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission of Elections
of the sufficiency of the petition ( Article XVII,Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution).

Other Requirements to read :

1. Article XVII, 1987 Constitution - Amendments to the constitution.

2. Initiative Referendum Act - Act, allowing the direct opposition of legislation and
ordinances, does not have subtitles for the amendments for the constitution. Therefore
inadequate and insufficient.
3. Defensor Santiago v. Commission on Elections G.R No.127325, March 1997

“ The supreme court said that there is no SPECIFIC SUBTITLE for the ways to amend the
constitution through people’s Initiative when it comes to R.A.6735, and because there is a lack of
subtitle the part of the Act pertaining to the Constitutional amendment, therefore this inclusion in
the act is only an AFTERTHOUGHT. Even if there is not enabling law is is inadequate and
deficient.

“supreme court should've known that they were encroaching on another branch of government,
the legislative branch, because they're questioning whether the latest in branch granted the
people the power to initiate, people's initiative and it is not a question of legality of the law or its
consistency with the constitution , but the wisdom of the Law “ political question “ . In the Philippine
government supreme court should not question the wisdom of the law should only ask if it is
consistent with the constitution. And it's the direct grant of the legislative department the power
it Is fundamentally encroaching this specific area or province of the legislature. in 2006 they
realized that they were wrong.

CASE: Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No 174153

The 3 issues

1. Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people’s initiative.
2. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
3. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Group’s petition.

Requirements for the amendment proposal to be of the people( Form)

1. it needs to be written and signed by the people directly, it cannot be signed on their
behalf or through an agency or representative.
2. it is an initiative upon a petition. the proposal must be embodied on the petition

Requirement for the content of the petion

1. the people must first see the full text post amendment before they sign to ratify their
consent. Before you sign anything that will amend your right you have to see the full text.

The Supreme Court stated that you cannot let people sign something that they have not read,
and then delfin said that an attachment was made on August, the 6.3 million people did not really
see what they we signing, assuming that they saw the legislation, it will still not be valid because
it does not comply with section 2 of Article 17 because it is not amendment it is a revision.

Revision vs. Amendment

A revision is a rewriting or overhaul of the constitution, meaning the change or alteration or
addition of many provisions thereof. While an amendment, is a minor change of a specific
provision or law that does not affect other provisions.
There are the quantitative test and the quantitative test to determine, if the change is a revision
or on amendment. The quantitative test, will indicate how many amendments are going to be
change added or altered in the proposal of the constitutional change. Like in the case of Lambino
105 provisions will be changed because he was to alter the whole of article 6 and 7 to change the
form of government that we have.

The qualitative test, is to show the degree of change because even a small change of one word
in the constitution can be a revision if it changes the fundamental or basic principles of our
government or state.

Political law that branch of public law which deals with organizational and operations off to
governmental organs of the state and defines the relations of the states with its inhabitants of its
territory. (people vs. perfecto). Another definition, it regulates the relationship between the
government in certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges( marcariola vs.
asuncion this)

The reason people are only allowed to amend the Constitution through people's initiative……
is since the revision of the Constitution affect basic principles or several provisions of a
constitution, a deliberative body with regard to proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only the several provisions but also the
altered principles and with those that remained unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally
authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or Constitutional conventions to
undertake revisions and since revision includes a lot of provisions in the constitution, a
legislative body is knowledgeable of all the provisions of the Constitution are in the best
position to make the massive change in congress because it does not trust people to do
that.

The plebiscite rule, any amendments or revisions to the constitution under Section 1 when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite. The date with the new constitution is
enforced is not the day when the final votes are counted or when its approval has been
promulgated and cleared, but it is effective on the day the voting for the amendment in a
plebiscite concluded.

should Congress votes separately or jointly?

The fundamental principle of the state, is that we are a bicameral state, with a Senate and
House representatives, the framers did not intend in there deliberation that they would be
a bicameral state because their intention was to remain a unicameral state, so for them it
was not necessary indicate if they were voting separately or jointly because it is a sure
they would vote jointly because there's only one legislature. The Senate and Congress are
supposed to be a co-equal body and equal powers.
The senate because they are only 24 seem to vote on more logical laws because they are
under the scrutiny of the media and the heat from the public. The House of rep shielded
from this heat and pressure. If the voice jointly the House of representatives would
overwhelm the Senate because of their. So, in cases of of Amendments and revisions to
the constitution the the Senate is powerless. They vote jointly when they are going to war.
Explanation

Delfin and lagbino both asked the Comelec to help them conduct a plebiscite.

END OF

SECOND WEEK ( monday)

CASE :MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

Characters: Manila Hotel Corporation , GSIS, Renong berhad

Issues :

- WON, the Filipino First Policy is self executory Sec 10 Article 12. “In the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos. “
- WON, Manila Prince Hotel forms part of the national patrimony of the Philippines

Arguments :

CONSTI: A Filipino who is qualified should be preferred over a foreigner, in this case as long as
the Filipino matches the highest bid of the Foreigner.

GSIS : The Filipino First policy is not self-executory. national patrimony.

GSIS : it does not form part of the national patrimony.

MHC : The Manila prince hotel forms part of the national patrimony of the Philippines because
Included in patrimony is Cultural Heritage because of its historical significance.
SC: they say that the constitution is deemed self-executory if it is complete within itself, and unless
otherwise stated. They stated that it was self executing.

Constitutional supremacy ( Minor premises ) :

Any law that is inconsistent with the constitution is null and void.
The constitution is deemed written in all contracts and statues.
That is why contracts can be short, because the constitution is already deemed written.

Decision :
Yes, it the Filipino first policy is Self executing
Yes , the manila hotel forms part of the National Patrimony because of cultural heritage.

CASE: Francisco Vs. HoR

Characters: Fr. Bernas,Estrada & Chief justice Hilario davide

Issues:
1.What is the meaning of the term “initiate” with regard initiating an impeachment
proceeding?
2.In using the said definition, W/N the “second “ Impeachment case was valid.
LAWS :
- Art. XI, Sec.3 of the 1987 Constitution “ The power of the House or representatives to
initiate all impeachment cases
- Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to
wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member;
or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House.
- Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) Article XI says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin.

Difference between Impeachment case and Impeachment proceeding

Impeachment case meant the entire process of impeachment from the HoR to the Senate.
Impeachment proceeding is when the role of congress ends and the senate starts the trial, there
are already articles of impeachment.

Another definition on Impeachment cases and proceedings

The term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Abovemquoted first provision provides that the House,
by a vote of one third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House
has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to
arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word
initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps:

CASE: Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 83896

Facts:
Pres. Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 284, allowing appointive officials to hold not more than 2
positions on the government and government owned corporations and receive corresponding
compensation, provided they follow the provisions under the said executive order.

Aquino attempted to add exemptions to Sec. 13, Art. VII by means of an executive order.

Issue:
Is E.O. No. 284 unconstitutional and in violation of Sec. 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution?

Provisions Concerned:
E.O. NO. 284
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that
this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
which the President is the Chairman.

Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive

official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof,
they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

SEC. 13, ART. VII

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Ruling:
Yes. E.O. No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Sec. 13, Art. VII makes it clear that President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies are prohibited from holding any other office or employment in other government
organizations/corporations during their tenure except those that are provided in the constitution
itself and posts held without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity.

“Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution”, as stated in Sec. 13, Art. VII must be
understood using its ordinary meaning. This part of the provision refers to (1) Sec. 3, Art. VII,
Vice president as member of the cabinet and (2) Sec. 8, Art. VIII, Sec. of Justice as ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

JUDICIAL REVIEW CHARACTERIZED

● Art. VIII, Sec. 1
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

● Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2)

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.

Judicial Power v Judicial Review:

Judicial Power - Power to settle controversies between parties involving demandable legal rights
through the application of law, statute, or constitution. Here, there is no judgement on the validity
of governmental acts.

Judicial Review - Whether there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It was not originally part of the Philippine constitution because it encroaches on
political questions. Traditionally, the court can only settle inconsistencies with laws or statutes
(Judicial power). However, after 1986 revolution, a need for a provision that will settle issues on
grave abuse of discretion was realized to prevent what happened during the Martial Law and to
prevent individuals from having too much power.

-----

Certiorari under Art. VIII, Sec 1 - the expanded power of the Supreme Court to determine whether
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

How do you know when you are exercising a certiorari provision?

In actions that seem discretionary, the courts may intervene and determine whether the
discretionary power has been exercised consistently with the constitution.

Is this intervention by the court unfair to the 2 other co-equal branches of the government?
No. When the Supreme Court declares that an executive or legislative act is
unconstitutional, it is not exercising its “supremacy” over the branches. It is exercising the
supremacy of the constitution.

In the exercise of this power, the court interprets the laws using:
1. Verba legis - wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. We look to the
language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails.
2. Ratio legis est anima - where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat - The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary

Facts:
The Philippine government decided to declare R.A. No. 8180 or the Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1996. Court struck down the law as invalid because the three key provisions
intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite result; contrary to its
intent, R.A. No. 8180s inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered
with the free interaction of market forces.

Congress responded by enacting a new oil deregulation law, R.A. 8479. This time, Congress
excluded the offensive provisions found in the invalidated law. Nonetheless, petitioner Garcia
again sought to declare the new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it violated
Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution.

Issues:
1. Is R.A. 8479 unconstitutional for violating Art. XII, Section 19?
2. Is Garcia’s petition a non-justiciable matter precluding the court from exercising its power
of judicial review?
3. Is Art. XII, Secion 19 self-executing?

Ruling:
1. No. Read correctly, Art. XII, Section 19 does not declare an outright prohibition of
monopolies. It simply allows the State to act when public interest so requires; even then,
no outright prohibition is mandated, as the State may choose to regulate rather than to
prohibit. Two elements must concur before a monopoly may be regulated or prohibited:
a. There in fact exists a monopoly or an oligopoly, and
B. Public interest requires its regulation or prohibition.

2. Yes. Garcia’s petition failed to meet the first requisite of Judicial Review.
a. An actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

The existence of conflicting rights is not enough to trigger judicial review. The case
must not be moot or academic. Stripped to its core, Garcia’s issue revolves on the
propriety of immediately and fully deregulating the oil industry. This becomes a
political question and is not for the court to resolve. The court cannot rule on
when and to what extent deregulation should take place without passing upon the
wisdom of the policy of that the Congress has decided upon.

3. No, Art. XII, Section 19 is not self-executing. Even if the court was allowed to exercise
judicial review on the matter, there would still be a need for an enacting law.
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commision

Facts:
Pres. Noynoy Aquino created a “fact finding body” in the form of a Truth Commision (E.O. No. 1)
dedicated to investigate the cases of graft and corruption in the previous Arroyo administration.

Issues:
1. Does the president have the power to create new public offices by means of Book III,
Chap. 10, Sec. 31 of the Administrative Law?
2. Was this “reorganization” constitutional?

Ruling:
1. No, the president can only reorganize exising offices in his administration, not create
new public offices.
2. No. It violated equal protection clause by making the Arroyo administration the sole focus
of the investigation when in fact, graft and corruption charges are also present in the other
administrations before Gloria’s presidency.

Other learnings:
The court has the ability to declare, not only laws, but also executive orders as unconstitutional.

Functions of Judicial Review

Salonga v. Pano

Facts:
Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was
implicated, long with 39 accused, by key witness Victor Lovely. He was tagged by Lovely as part
of the series of bombings in Metro Manila and as the leader of two subsersive organizations for
two reasons, (1) his house in Manila was used as a contact point, and (2) because of his remarks
about Philipinne politics in Raul Daza’s birthday party in Los Angeles.

Issues:
1. Whether there case presented evades judicial review for being moot and academic.

Ruling:
1. Yes, the case is moot but does not evade judicial review as it is the court’s symbolic
function to educate the bar, the bench, and the public.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency. On
the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP No. 1017 by virtue of Art. VII, Section
18, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless
violence."

So many violations to the constitution were made upon the issuance of above mentioned
provisions which led Arroyo to issue PP 1021 revoking PP 1017.

Issues:
1. Did PP 1021 render PP 1017 moot and academic despite all the violations to the
constitution committed while the latter was operational (freedom of expression, of the
press, and to assemble, illegal raids and arrests) making it evasive of review?

State of National Emergency - When the president receive threats against the current
administration, he may exercise his power to call the armed forces or his “calling out power”.

Ruling:
1. Yes, however judicial review is still necessary to discuss the violations done while PP 1017
was operational. This case is evasive of review but capable of repetition.

Requisites to exercise Judicial review on moot and academic case in pursuance of the
court’s symbolic function:
a. There must be grave violation of the constitution
b. The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest in involved
c. When the constitutional issue raised becomes a guiding principle to bar, the bench,
and the public
d. Case is capable of repetition, yet evading review

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC

Facts:
COMELEC receives information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN and other broadcasting
companies will conduct exit polls during the national elections. COMELEC issued a resolution
banning said polls as such project might confuse/sway the public’s decision and conflict with
COMELEC’s final vote count.

ABS-CBN got a hold of a copy of the resolution only one week before the elections, not giving the
petitioner ample time to move for a reconsideration. By the time, ABS-CBN filed a petition, the
election had already been done with.
Issue:
1. Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in banning the exit polls?
2. Because the petition for reconsideration was filed after the election, is the case moot and
academic?

Ruling:
1. Yes, as it violated the petitioner’s right of freedom of expression and of the press which is
a fundamental and preferred right.
2. No, it is not totally moot because the results of the polls may hold necessary research
value in the future. The case is also capable of repetition yet evading review.

Who may exercise Judicial Review?

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (now CA)

Facts:
Past Pres. Marcos issued E.O. No. 626 banning the relocation of Carabaos and Carabeef from
one municipality to another. Ynot transported six Carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. Upon arrival,
all his Carabaos were confiscated by the police by virtue of E.O. No. 626.

Issues:
1. Is the said executive order encroaching on the duties of the Judiciary insofar as it withholds
the owner’s right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by
due process?

Ruling:
1. Yes, only courts of justice, even the lower courts, can exercise Judicial review. “This Court
has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction
under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or rules of court may provide.”
Garcia v. Drilon

Facts:
Charges were filed against petitioner Garcia under R.A. 9262 (VAWC). Garcia contested the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as it violates equal protection clause, but failed to raise the issue at
his earliest opportunity with Bacolod Family Court.

Issues:
1. Should Garcia have contested the issue on constitutionality of said R.A. with the family
court?

Ruling:
1. Yes, Family courts share the same jurisdiction as RTCs which means Garcia should have
raise the question of constitutionality at the first instance, instead of raising it in the CA.

Spouses Mirasol v. CA

Facts:
Spouses Mirasol were sugar landers financed by PNB. The Mirasol’s signed a Chattel Mortgage
on standing crops, Real estate mortgage, and other credit arrangements. Marcos issued PD 579
authorizing PHILEX to purchase sugar allocated for export, and authorized PNB to finance
purchases to be made by PHILEX. Whatever profit PHILEX might make has to be remitted to the
government.

Mirasols were under the impression that their proceeds were enough to cover their debt, they
asked PNB for accounting, which was refused twice.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without
notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue for the
resolution of the Trial Court.

Facts:
1. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
Funa v. Executive Secretary
Facts:
Following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, of MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.

Funa, as concerned citizen, taxpayer, and lawyer, filed a petition challenging the constitutionality
of Bautista’s appointment, which is prohibited by Sec. 13, Art. VII.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Funa has locus standi.
2. Whether or not petitioned case was made moot and academic by Bautista’s resignation
from her previous position.

Ruling:
1. Yes, Funa’s filing as a concerned citizen gives him sufficiently confers him with standing
Standing to sue may be accorded provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators

2. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, it is capable of repetition yet evading

review. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. If not
resolved, such issue will arise in every unconstitutional appointment made in the future.

Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-terrorism Council

Facts:
Six petitioners contest the validity of R.A. 9372 (the Human Security Act of 2007) for its vague
definition of “terrorism” which will leave law enforcers with no official standard for alleged terrorist
and sunsersive acts.

Petitioners also claim that members of their organizations are being harassed and put under
surveillance.

Issues:
1. Can the constitutionality of Human Security Act of 2007 be facially challenged on the
grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines?
 2. Do petitioners have standing in their alleged harassments?

Ruling:
1. No. Invalidation of statutes under vagueness and overbreadth are only applicable in free
speech cases.
2. No. Petitioners do not have locus standi because all of their accusations do not have
enough evidence and are all presumed. In fact, the act has been operational for three
years, and yet no arrests have been made.

“POST PRE-MIDTERMS”

SOVEREIGNTY
Cruz: The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a state by which the state is governed.

KINDS:
Legal sovereignty - Authority which has the power to issue final commands
Political sovereignty- The power behind the legal sovereign, or sum of the influences that
operate upon it.
Internal sovereignty - The state’s power to control its domestic affairs
External sovereignty - The state’s power to direct relations with other states, also known as
independence.

Laurel v. Misa

Laurel, a Filipino citizen, who was accused of treason for adhering to the enemy by giving the
latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation, now comes before the court with a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus under the contention that he cannot be charged of treason
because (1) sovereignty of the Philippines government was suspended which in turn
suspends corresponding allegiance of Filipino citizens; and (2) that there was a change of
sovereignty over the country from Commonwealth to the Philippine Republic.

Issue:
W/N sovereignty can be suspended in the midst of foreign rule and occupancy.

Ruling:
Sovereignty is permanent, exclusive, comprehensive, absolute, indivisible, inalienable,
imprescriptible. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation. Since the sovereignty of the government is not transferred to the occupier,
then it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.
However, sovereignty must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights of sovereignty as the
latter may be destroyed or transferred to the occupant. Meaning, sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence. What can be suspended is the temporary control of
the inherent government on exercise of the rights of sovereignty over the territory occupied by the
enemy, as it is passed temporarily to the occupant.

The allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

Peralta v. Director of Prisons

Peralta was prosecuted for robbery. He was found guilty under the Court of Special and Executive
Criminal Jurisdiction of the so-called Republic of the Philippines created by the Japanese
occupants. Peralta was then sentenced with life imprisonment.

After the Japanese regime and the restoration of the Commonwealth, Peralta petitioned for the
writ of habeas corpus and questioned the validity of Court of Special and Executive Criminal
Jurisdiction and the severity of his penalty.

Issues:
1. W/N the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction is valid to render judgment
2. W/N his penalty still stands after the Japanese occupancy

Ruling:
1. Yes, the creation said court is valid. “There is also no question as to the power or
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such
procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the
occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not
forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends
the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any
one doing such acts."
2. Public laws are abrogated when there is a change in sovereignty. Peralta’s offense, being
governed by a public law, should have been abrogated after the restoration of the
Commonwealth.

“All judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased
to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of
postliminium. We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although
good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces,
ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government.”

Peralta’s petition has been granted.

Tiamco v. Diaz

People v. Perfecto

Sec. of the Philippine Senate discovers that several documents regarding witness testomonies in
an investigation of oil companies are missing from his office. The following day, La Nacion
published an article edited by Gregorio Perfecto against the senate. Perfecto was said to be in
violation of Art. 256 of the Spanish Penal Code that pusnishes anyone who insults the crown.

Issue:
W/N Art. 256 of the Spanish PC is still valid and enforceable.

Ruling:
Not anymore. First, Art. 256 was made to protect the king and his representatives during the
Spanish government. In the current case, there are no longer kings or representatives to protect
under the said law. Second, Art. 256 of the SPC is political in nature and is deemed abrogated
after the change of sovereignty from Spanish to American. Thus, the SPC is no longer in force
and the respondednt is acquitted.

GOVERNEMENT

KINDS:
Co Kim Cham v. Tan Keh

Co Kim Cham had a pending civil case in the CFI of Manila since since the Japanese occupation.

Judge Dizon, respondent, refused to continue hearings on cases initiated during the japanese
occupancy in pursuance to Gen. MacArthur’s proclamation that “All laws, regulations, and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without any legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control.”

Any judicial proceedings and court judgments were said to be invalidated by the above
proclamation and the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent, also
alleges that there was no de facto government established under the Japanese occupation.

Issue:
1. W/N the laws and processes during the Japanese military occupation remain valid and
should be ruled over by courts

Ruling:
1. Judicial acts and proceedings of the court are valid. The Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese occupancy were considered de
facto governments. It follows that the judicial proceedings and legislative acts of those de
 facto governments, which are not political in nature, remain valid even after the
reoccupation of the American and Filipino forces.

Well known doctrines of international law should also be taken into consideration - certains
laws and proceedings not political in nature were valid under the de facto govenment
during the time of the occupancy shall remain valid after the occupied territory has
reclaimed power.

Lawyer’s League for a Better Philippines v. Corazon Aquino

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
W/N the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

RULING:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

● The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;
● It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
● The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

FUNCTIONS:
Shipside Inc. v. CA
People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. v. CIR
Agricultural Credit v. Confederation of Unions in Govt. Corp

CONCEPT OF PARENS PATRIAE (Parent of the people):

Govt. of Phil. Islands v. El Monte de Piedad

After a devastating earthquake in the Philippines, Spanish dominions donated $400,000 for the
relief of the victims. A portion of the donated amount was took over by the Central Relief Board
which was appointed to distribute the amount to the victims. $80,000 was left from the donation.
Respondent El Monte de Piedad, a charitable organization, petitioned to have the remaining
amount transferred to their bank as a loan. Loan was granted however, the Dept. of Finance
asked for the amount back.

Respondent bank refused since the debt was made to the Governor General of the Philippine
Islands not the Dept. of Finance.

A suit was brought to El Monte de Piedad by the attorney general of the Phil. Islands for the
recovery of said amount plus interest. Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Respondent
questioned the validity of the suit, alleging that the petitioner did not have standing and only the
supposed beneficiaries of the said amount can bring the matter to court.

Issue:
1. W/N Govt. of Philippine Islands’ suit was valid

Ruling:
1. SC upheld the suit. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state may act as a
representative of the direct claimants.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City

SPARK, an organization of young adults and minors, assailed the constitutionality of the local
legislations declared by Manila, Navotas, and Quezon City in pursuance to the national curfew
for minors under the age of 18 issued by President Rodrigo Duterte. They contend that said
legislation violates several inherent rights of both parents and minors.

Issues:
1. W/N said legislation contravenes parents’ rights to the rearing of their children (Sec. 12,
Art 2)
2. W/N said legislation violates due process

RULING:
1. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.

Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state takes it as its duty to aid the parents in the
rearing of the youth. It is the state’s inherent right to intervene on the parents’ right to rear
their children when it comes to the general welfare and security of its minor citizens. When
the state exercises this right, it is not stripping the parents of their right, instead the state
is takes on a supporting role for the fullfilment of parental obligations.
2. There is no violation of due process. Police men who catches alleged curfew violators are
tasked to ask for valid IDs or any supporting document to prove the age of the accused minor
before they can be taken into police custody.

DOCTRINE OF NON SUABILITY

BASIS
Sec. 3, Art. XVI - The State cannot be sued without its consent.

BERNAS: Regalian Doctrine: The state can do no wrong

“There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends.”

NACHURA:
“When we agreed to the creation of the state, we waived parts of our sovereignty to have a fully
functional government. Part of that waived right is the right to sue the government. When the
government is no longer fulfilling the waiver of our right, we sue them to take it back.”

Republic v. Villasor

Case was filed by Republic of the Philippines against Respondent Judge Villasor when he
declared final and executory an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner alleged said judge acted with GAD amounting to lack of
jurisdiction by issuing the notices of garnishment.

Prior to the above petition, Judge Villasor rendered a decision in a Special proceeding in favor of
P.J. Kiener Co. Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and Int. Construction Corporation, granting the arbitration
award of P1, 712, 396.4 and directed the sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City, and Manila to
execute the said decision in pursuance to the Alias Writ of execution.

Sheriff of Rizal then issued several notices of garnishment for the fnds of the AFP deposited in
PNB and Philippine Vetrans Bank to be appropriated for the payment of pensions of retirees,
military and civilian personel allowances, and maintenance and operations of the AFP.

Issues:
1. W/N state is suable in the present case
2. W/N notices of garnishment are valid

Ruling:
1. No, it is not. To sue the sate will be a violation of Sec. 3, Art. XVI. The said provision
recognizes the sovereign character of the state making it innacessible to the jurisdiction
of the courts of justice.
 "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends."

Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines: “The doctrine of non-
suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private
parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and
the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.”

2. Notices of Garnishment are invalid.

Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego: "The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution' and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law."

In other words, government funds are not subject to garnishment. That is the general rule.
However, an exeption is made when a law or ordinance is passed specifically for payment
of a certain governmental obligation.
IMMUNITY OF OTHER STATES & INTERNATIONAL ORGS

Minucher v. CA

Arthur Scalzo is an agent of a US Drug Enforcement Agency tasked to consuct surveillance of

suspected dealers in the Philippines. He is to report suspects to Philippine authorites once targets
have been identified. Scalzo proceeded with a buy-bust operation against Minucher, and then
became the principal witness against the alleged drug dealer.

Minucher filed for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of
drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. He alleged that Scalzo acted out of the scope of his duty
and should not be granted immunity as he is merely an agent not awarded with diplomatic
immunity.

Issues:
1. W/N Scalzo may be cloaked with diplomatic immunity

Ruling:
1. Yes, he may. A foreign agent operating in another territory can be cloaked with immunity
for suit so long as it can be proven that he is acting within the duties specified by his
sending state. Thought it is true that agent Sclazo does not have diplomatic status, it is
clear that he was merely following the directives of his state. Moreover, the Philippines
has consented to the activities of the US Drug Enforcement Agency within the country.
Such can be implied from the following facts:
1. Official exchanges of both governments,
2. Certification of officials by the DFA and US Embassy, and
3. Participation of Filipino authorities during the buy-bust operation

Arigo v. Swift

Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration

UN specialized subsidiary organ, UNRFNRE, conducted an exploration on Dinagat Island wherein

petitioners were dismissed from their employment. Subsequently, petitioners filed petitions on
illegal dismissal and damages to the NLRC.

Respondent wished to dismiss charges against it invoking diplomatic immunity pursuant to the
1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Apart from this, DFA also
acknowledged UNRFNRE’s immunity from suit.

However, petitioners contend that mining exploration and exploitation of resources in Dinagat
Island are out of the official functions of an international agency and that respondents waived its
immunity the moment it entered into a contract of employment.
Issue:
1. W/N UNRFNRE can be granted immunity from suit

Ruling:
1. Yes, UNRFNRE can be granted immunity. The Philippines adhere to the UN and 1946
Convention on Priveledges and Immunities. Therefore, we have agreed to grant the UN
and its specialized agencies diplomatic immunity.

Moreover, the SC ruled that UNRFNRE did not waive its immunity when in entered into
employment contracts in the Philippines because their presence in the country was not
due to a commercial venture but because of a joint project entered into by the Philippine
Govt and the UN for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. This exploration was not for
profit but to help improve the quality of life of the people including the petitioners.

Needless to say, the UNRFNRE was exercising acts in line with its duty.

SEAFDEC v. Acosta

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a

department of an international organization, organized through an agreement entered into in
Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country.

Juvenal Lazaga, probationary research associate was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer,
and later he was once again appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head
of External Affairs Office.

On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao the Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD, sent a notice of termination to
private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints, his services shall be
terminated and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to 1 month of his basic salary
for every year of service plus other benefits.

Later, Lazaga filed for non-payment of separation benefits, moral damages, and attorney’s fees
to the NLRC. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the NLRC over them as they are an international
organization immune for suits without its consent.

Issue:
1. Does NLRC have jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD?

Ruling:
1. SEAFDEC-AQD, as an international, intergovernmental organization is beyond the
jurisdiction of NLRC. It enjoys functional independence from control of its host state. In so
far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct
 juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated.
As such, according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species
of international personality of their own."

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local

jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals
of the country where it is found. Besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair
the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states.

Callado v. IRRI

Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged
with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to
start because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued
a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process
by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic
immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not
having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued
by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity,"
and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the
case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its
immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint
dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench
inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?

Held: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the
Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at
bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion
by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-
General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such
waiver is discretionary on its part.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUIT AGAINST A STATE

Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA

TESDAs Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public biddings for
the printing and encoding of PVC cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both instances since only
two (2) bidders PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp. submitted proposals. Due to the failed bidding,
TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with PROVI.
Under this Contract Agreement, PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and equipment
compliant with the specifications defined in the Technical Proposal. In return, TESDA would pay
PROVI the amount of P39,475,000 within fifteen (15) days after TESDAs acceptance of the
contracted goods and services. TESDA in turn undertook to pay PROVI thirty percent (30%) of
the total cost of the supplies within thirty (30) days after receipt and acceptance of the contracted
supplies, with the balance payable within thirty (30) days after the initial payment.

However, TESDA failed to comply, leaving an outsanding balance of P35,735,500.00 which

prompted PROVI to file a complaint to the RTC for the sum of money with damages against
TESDA. PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment/garnishment. RTC granted PROVI’s petition which led TESDA to file a Motion to
Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment, arguing mainly that public funds cannot be the subject
of garnishment.

Issue:
1. W/N TESDA was under taking a governmental finction and be cloaked with immunity
2. W/N TESDA’s funds can be the subject of garnishment

Ruling:
1. Yes, TESDA was under taking governmental functions. It is an unincorporated
instrumentality of the government, operating without its own charter. This means it is
equipped with both expressed and implied powers of the state’s immunity. Although
petitioners argue that TESDA waived its immunity the moment it entered into a contract
with PROVI, it must be noted that the subject of the agreement still falls under TESDA’s
governmental function - to establish a standardized system for vocational skills.

The PVC cards are to be handed out to the passers of TESDA’s training. Although trainees
will be charged a certain amount for their respective PVC card, it is only to recover the
cost of the ID card, not to earn a profit.

Further, TESDA’s funds cannot be the garnished as it is public in nature. Disbursements

of public funds must be covered by an appropriation by law. Diversion of these funds
without an enabling law will paralyze the affected governmental institution, the state
cannot allow that to happen.

Republic v. Feliciano

The appeal was made by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the
Philippines to dismiss the complaint by respondent Pablo Feliciano on the ground that the state
cannot be sued without its consent.

Prior to this appeal, Feliciano filed a complaint with the court of first instance against the Republic,
represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land consisting four lots. The trial court made a decision declaring lot 1 to be the private property
of Feliciano, while lots 2, 3, and 4, was reverted as public domain.

Case was eventualy reopened due to the motion to intervene filed by the 86 settlers, alleging that
they have been occupying the said lot for more than 20 years however, they failed to provide
evidence on the day it was required. Feliciano, on the other hand, was able to add another piece
of evidence. Again, the court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

Before the settlers could file a motion for reconsideration, Feliciano filed a motion of execution
which promted the settlers to file a motion to dismiss under Sex. 3, Art. XVI.

Issue:
1. W/N state can be sued for recovery of a parcel of land

Ruling:
1. No. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Phils. as a party in the case, bringing
the state to court just like any other private person who claimed to have usurped a piece
of land. A suit for recovery of a property is not an action in rem but an action in personam.
It is an action filed directly to a specific party and any action binds only such parties. The
complaint is clearly a suit against the state, which is not permitted except when their is
express or implied consent to be sued. In no way does Proclamation No. 90, reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), express consent. Proclamations do not waive
immunity, only a legislative act can.

Tan v. Director of Forestry

Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for logging license operations in a public forest in
Olonggapo. After a month, Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued order no. 46 which
gave power to the Director of Forestry to grant new timber licenses not more than 3000 hectares
and extension of ordinary licenses for areas not exceeding 3000 hectares. However, this authority
was revoked, subsequently, Tan’s license was revoked too, marking the day he could no longer
cut trees.

Tan alleged that Director of Forestry "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking
a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the equal
protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process
of law, and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts"

Issue:
1. W/N petitioners action is a suit against the state

Ruling:
 1. Yes. Petitioner’s action is a suit against the state. Sec. Agriculture and Natural resources,
as well as the Director of Forestry were acting within the scope of their duty as officers of
the state. Further, protection of public welfare and protection of inhabitants in the vicinity
of the forest are property, rights, and interest of the state.

State immunity from suits cannot be circumvented by directing the suit to officials who are
in the exercise of their duty.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

RA 7654 was enacted followed by the issuance of RMC (Revenue Memorandum Circular) 37-93,
reclassifying Hope, More, and Champion as local brands subject to foreign ad valorem tax of
55%.

Fortune Tobacco Corp. received a letter from BIR Deputy Commissioner demanding them to pay
over P9.5M ad valorem tax deficiency to be paid within 10 days of receipt. Fortune filed a review
before CTA who ruled in their favor. After which, Fortune sued for damages against petitioner in
her private capacity before the RTC.
Petitioner claimed the she acted merely as an agent of the RP, thus the state shall be responsible
for her actions. Moreover, the complaint mentions no allegations about her acting in bad faith or
with malice.

Issue:
1. W/N suit against petitioner in her private capacity is a suit against the state

Ruling:
1. When a public official is exercising his duty to the public, an idividual cannot have a cause
of action for damages, even though he is injurred by the action or inaction of the public
officer. Individuals may only file against a public official when their is a special injury
sustained due tot he improper performance or non-performance of an official duty in his
public capacity.

As for the case at bar, there is no proven malice or bad faith in the claims of the respondent
against the petitioner. Also, any monetary amount charged to her in the accord of ther
public duty must be assumed by the RP. This constitutes a suit against the state without
its consent. Therefore, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is granted.

SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos

Spouses Ramos discovered that their land is being used as part of the runway in Loakan Airport
operated by ATO. Respondents agreed to be paid P778,150.00 for the said land but ATO failed
to deliver. ATO asserted that proclamation no. 1358 reserved certain lots for the use of Loakan
Airport and that the RTC has no jurisdiction over them as they are a government agency
performing governmental functions. RTC denied the motion.

Issue:
1. W/N ATO is engaged in governmental functions

Ruling:
1. There is a need to distinguish unincorporated government agencies performing
governmental functions and those performing proprietary functions. ATO is not engaged
in purely governmental functions. It is involved in the management and maintenance of
Loakan Airport, activities that are not incidental to the government’s sovereign function.

Immunity also cannot be exerted to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from
taking without just compensation, without proper expropriation proceedings. It cannot be
used to perpetrate injustice among citizens. Therefore, ATO is not vested with immunity
from suit.

Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme

A collision between a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand truck, and a dump truck of the
municipality of San Fernando which led to the deaths fo several passengers of the jeepney and
some who were injured. Court, through Judge Firme, ordered the municipality to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the deceased.

Issue:
1. Can the municipality of San fernando be held liable for damages?

Ruling:
1. No. When municipalities are engaged in governmental functions, they are vested with
immunity from suit. However, they may still be sued if their charter says so. However,
municipalities are genrally not liable for torts when engaged in governmental functions. A
suit can only be held if it can be proven that the act done is proprietary in nature and not
incidental to its givernmental functions.

Suability does not make the state liable. When the state allows itself to be sued, it is giving
the claimant the right to show evidence that the state was acting out of its original function.
Failure to do so will not hold the state liable.

In this specific case, the the truck diver insists that he was on his way to collect sand and
gravel to be used to repair the roads of San Fernando. Due to the lack of evidence to
prove the contrary, the suit against the municipality must not be granted.

Natl’ Electrification Administration v. Morales

Farolan v. CTA

The vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others, 80 bales of
screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay). Said importation was declared
through a customs broker which was classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the Tariff and
Customs Code at 35% ad valorem. Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment
reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxes due which was paid through
the Bank of Asia. Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty.

Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of
nylon, the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment which
revealed that the shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a
total of 1,600 rolls. The value of the shipment was re-appraised. Furthermore, the Collector of
Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic (polyethylene) woven fabric
classifiable under Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading
was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in question. Since the
shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the
subject shipment in favor of the government which was also affirmed by the Commissioner of
Customs.

However, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner declaring that the
latter erred in imputing fraud upon private respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus
concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question was not in accordance with law. As a
consequence, several motions were filed and private respondent demands that the Bureau of
Customs be ordered to pay for damages

Issue:
W/N Collector of Customs may be held liable.

Ruling:
Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages sustained by Bagong Bayan as it will violate
the doctrine of state immunity. Since the state will have to answer the cost to be incurred by
customs, this is technically a suit against the state.

Customs is an unincorporated agency without separate juridical personality from the state, thus it
is granted immunity.

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA

Simke slipped on a 4-inch elevation in Manila International Airport, and broke his thigh bone. After
recovery, filed a claim for damages against CAA, the government entity of the airport. CAA
invoked immunity as a government entity peforming govenment functions.

Issue:
 1. Is CAA liable for damages

Ruling:
1. As per National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, CAA is not immune from suit being engaged in
proprietary functions not incidental to the government. Whether corporate or non-
corporate immunity is determined by the character of objects in which the entity was
organized.
See also: ATO v. Spouses Ramos

DOH v. Phil. Pharmawealth

Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for
additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified
bidders can transact business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil.
Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional
items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic ―Penicillin G Benzathine.
Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of
Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealth‘s
request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, the latter submitted its
bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid thereof. . In view, however,
of the non-accreditation of respondent‘s Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was
awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories‘ (YSS).

Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the
Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court ―nullify the award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners DOH et al. to declare
Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that
they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company‖ and ―adjudge defendants Romualdez,
Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed
a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state
immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA)
denied DOH‘s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City denying petitioner's‘ motion to dismiss the case.

Ruling:
1. Suability of a government official depends on whether or not the official was acting within
his official function, resulting to a funding from government. DOH defense is not granted
despite being unincorporated since the petitions filed were injunction and mandamus.
Immunity does not apply to causes of action which do not require an answer from the
state.

Immunity does not apply when public official is charged in his individual capacity for acts
injurious to others.
Sanders v. Veridiano
7. LEGISLATIVE DEPT: STRUCTURE

A. Composition of Congress
1. 24 Senators
2. Not more than 250 Members of the House of Representatives, unless otherwise
fixed by law
a. 20% of the total number of reps including the party list

QUALIFICATIONS AND TERM OF OFFICE

Requirement for Senators:

1. Natural born citizen
2. Atleast 35 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 2 years immediately preceding the day of the
election

Term of Senators:
1. 6 years
2. Will commence, unless otherwhise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next
following their election
3. Cannot serve for more than 2 consecutive terms
4. Voluntary renunciation for any length of time shall not be considered as an interuption to
the continuity of his full term for which he was elected

Requirement for House of Representatives:

1. Natural born citizen
2. Atleast 25 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Except party-list reps, registered voter in the district where he shall be elected
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election

Term of Memebers of HoR:

1. 3 years
2. Will commence, unless otherwhise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next
following their election
3. Cannot serve for more than 3 consecutive terms
4. Voluntary renunciation for any length of time shall not be considered as an interuption to
the continuity of his full term for which he was elected

Notes on cases:

Residency Requirement
a. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
Minor Issue: Imelda’s alleged honest mistake of writing “seven months” in her certificate
of candidacy

SC:
A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry
for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the
constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and
Seven Months.

The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and
the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

Three Kinds of domecile:

- Domicile by birth
- Domicile of Spouse
- Domicile of choice

Acquires a new domicile by choice, there must concur:

- residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
- intention to remain there (animus menendi)
- intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi - not to return)

Domicile v. Residence
“for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution
reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence,
a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution”

- Domicile
Habitual residence orpermanent home. A place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return. Includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
- Residence
 Factual relationship between a person and an idividual. It is the physical presence
of a person in a given area, community or country. It is whwere one may go to for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health temporarily. One may have
multiple residences, but only one domicile.

b. Macalintal v. COMELEC

Art. 5, Sec. 1 - Requirements to vote:

1. All citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise diaqualified by law
2. At least 18 years old
3. Have resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year
4. Resided in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceeding election

Art. 5, Sec. 2(1) - Congress shal provide for a system for securing the secrecy and the
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for ansentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified
from voting under this Act:
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under
this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another
country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

In this case, Congress allowed immigrants or permanent residents to vote through Section
5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189. This raises a constitutional question of whether the act of
leaving the Philippines constitute to relinquishment of your residency. COMELEC wanted
to cure this possible relinquishment by requiring absentee voters to submit an affidavit
stating the absentee voters’ intention to return within three years and that they have not
applied for citizenship in another country.

On green card holders:

In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may still
be considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad upon fulfillment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of
suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
 from approval of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have
not applied for citizenship in another country.

Term and Tenure:

Term - Time during which an officer may claim to hold office as a right.
NOTE: Atty. Cesista does not agree with the definition. According to him, it is a privilege to hold
a position as a public servant. You can be removed from office anytime if you are holding office
in violation of the constitution. Term is the maximum allowable time that you hold office, provided
you do so in accordance with the law.

Tenure - Actual holding of office. May be shorter than one’s term

It is important to know the difference between the two because when a public official is remived
from office, those who will succeed him will only hold the office for the remainder of the term. They
wyill not be given a renewed term. This is done to protect rotation in office.

Gaminde v. COA
Gaminde’s term as Civil Service Commission Chairmain was set to expire on Feb. 2, 1999 as
detailed in her agreement. However, upon consulting the President, she was notified that her term
will end on Feb. 2, 2000. She was questioned for receieving her salary when her term has, in
fact, ended. This same question was raised to COA. It was eventually decided that she may validly
claim her compensation as she is a de facto officer excercising her function in good faith.

Socrates v. COMELEC
Sec. 8, Art. 10 - Term of office of elective local officials, except brgy officials which will determined
by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall be allowed to serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms.

312/528 Brgy. officials called for a recall election against Puetro Princessa incumbent mayor,
Soctrates. Recall was granted by COMELEC. Ex-mayor, Hagedorn ran for the recall (and
evetually won.) The validity of his candidacy however was contested by other candidates on the
gorunds that he has already served 3 consecutive terms, thus, violating Sec. 8, Art. 10.

It has been ruled that Hagedorn did not violate Art. 8, Sec. 10. Involuntary severance counts as
an interruption to the terms of service of an official. His inability to run for mayor in 2001 (when
his 3rd term ended) counted as involuntary severance. Therefore, his being elected into office by
virtue of the recall election in 2002 shall not be considered a continuation of his 3rd term that
ended in 2001.

Also, what the constitution prohibits is the candidacy for a regular election. Not a special election
such as this one.

Ex: Sen. Coco Pimentel replacing Sen. Zubiri, PGMA replacing Erap
Discussion by Atty: In real life, it is very common for winning candidates to not be declared as
winners. These candidates are not able to serve their supposed term. If by any chance, they get
the chance to serve because another official stepped down, will your term be affected by the fact
that you were not able to serve that particular term that you should have won?

According to the SC, even if you really won the election but was only found out after another
person has been declared winner, we cannot count it eaither as a term or a tenure against thesse
supposed winning officials because obviously, they did not serve.

Simply, whether term or tenure, that person must have served for either to be counted against
him. Otherwise, it will not be counted against him, for purposes if term, tenure, or the three term
limit.

Eelection

3. Salaries
Q: Congress passed a law increasing their salaries by 30%, effective after publication of the law
in the Official Gazatte. Is it constitutional?

A: No, it is not.
Sec. 10, Art. VI - “The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until ater the expiration
of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase.”

4. Parliamentary Immunity/Privileges
Sec. 11, Art. 6 - A senator or member of the HoR, shall in all offenses punishable by not more
than 6 years imprisonment, be privilged from arrest while congress is in session. No member shall
be questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in congress or in any
committee thereof.

Freedom from arrest

Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel
Trillanes, who was at the time Junior officer of AFP, led the coup d’etat in Oakwood Suites. 4
years later, while in detention, he was elected senator. He then requested Judge Pimentel to grant
him the privilege to, among others, join the senate during sessions. His many requests were
denied.

He argues that his case should not be compared to the Jolosjos case as his charge is merely a
political offense while Jalosjos’ offenses are considered acts of moral terpitude.
SC: The nature of the offense does not make a significant defference because regadless of the
nature of the crime, both offenses are punishable by reclusion perpetua. Privilege is only granted
to offenses punishable by less that 6 years.

Trillanes was only able to peform his function as senator by receiving his staff and constituents in
his office while in detention.

People v. Jalosjos
Jalosjos, Congressman, convictied of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness, resquested to be
permitted to fully discharge duties of a congressman despite being charged of a non-bailable
crime. He contends that if he will not be permitted to fully discharge his functions as a
congressman, it will frustrate the sovereign mandate of the people. He also argued that if he will
stay in jail without disbursing his duties as a Congressman, it is as if he is removed from office.

SC: There is no frustration of sovereign mandate of the people who elected Jalosjos because
when they voted for him, they already knew that they run the risk of having a representative whose
excercise of functions may be limited because of his conviction.

Further, his conviction does not result to removal because he was actually able to discharge his
function while in jail. “He is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North
Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full
complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also
provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where
he attends to his constituents. Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he
has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and
other monetary benefits.”

Privilege of Speech and Debate

Osmena v. Pendatun

Congressman Osmena, in his privilege speech indirectly accused Pres. Garcia of bribery. Other
members of the house filed Resolution No. 59 ordering him to submit evidence supporting
hisallegations. He was unable to produce evidence, instead he argued that conress has no power
to suspend him for 15 months because his utterances were done during a privilege speech
cloaked with parliamentary immunity.

SC: “The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and
white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.”

Jimenez v. Cababang

Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago

“I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots.”

Judicial Bar Council sent out nominations to fill the impending vacancy of the the Chief Justice
position only to declare that only incumbent justices are qualified for such position. Defensor-
Santiago delievered a privilege speech to expose what she believed was an unjust decision by
the JBC.

Pobre, knowing that under Art. 8, Sec. 5, the court can punish erring lawyers, asked that
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against Defensor-Santiago as her
acts constituted grave disrepect to the SC and Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban. He wanted to
punish her as a lawyer.

SC: Courts do not have the jurisdiction to interfere into how the legislature punish disorderly
behavior of its members. Her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. However, the court reminds her that parliamentary immunity
is not for the legislator’s benefit but for public good and the effective exercis of the lawmakers’
function.

5. Restrictions (Art. 6, Sec. 12, 13, 14, 20)

Sec. 14, Art. VI: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear
as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial or other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government- owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.”

Sec. 12, Art. VI: Upon assumption of office, must make a full disclosure of financial and business
interests. Shall notify House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
Q: May Congress issue resolutions which pose conflict of interest?
A: Sec. 12, Art. 6. It is therefore not, per se, prohibited. They are however notify Congress of any
possible conflict for purposes of good faith.

Adaza v. Pacana
Adaza - incumbent Governor of Mis. Or.
Pacana - incumbent vice-governor of Mis. Or
Both of their terms will end on March 3, 1986

Adaza and Pacana ran for Batasan Pambansa On March 1984. Adaza won and started his duties
in BP. Pacana lost and assumed the office of the Governor of Mis. Or.

Adaza sued Pacana for assuming the office of the governor because according to him, when
Pacana lost the BP elections, he returned to being a private citizen. Adaza further argues that he
is still the rightful Governor of Mis. Or. as his term has not yet ended.

SC: Sec. 10, Art. 8 of 1973 consitution clearly prohibits holding of two positions or offices except
for the Prime Minister or cabinet members.

Puyat v. de Guzman (WILL COME OUT IN THE EXAM)

Puyat group was elected and IPI Directors as opposed to the Acero group. Acero Acero alleged
that the votes were not counted properly and filed a case with SEC. Before the filing of the case,
member of BP, Fernandez, entered himself as counsel for the Acero group. Puyat said his
representation of the Acero group is unconstitutional for a member of the BP may not appeare as
counsel to anyone before an administrative body like the SEC. This made Fernandez withdraw
his appearance. Instead, he bought 10 shares of IPI and filed a motion to intervene.

SC: Fernandez may not appear even as an intervenor. In doing so, he is hiding under the guise
of a shareholder. Seeing as though the very minimal amount of shares was bought after the filing
of the case, it is clearl that it was an attempt to circumvent the restrictions set by the law.

Liban v. Gordon
Petioners were officers of the Board of Directors of PNRC filed to the court a petition to declare
Richard Gordon as having forfieited his seat in the senate, who was elected Chairman of PNRC
during his incumbency as Senator. According to petitioners, Gordon’s acceptance of the
chairmanship of PNRC constitutes to his ceasing of his membership in the Senate by virute of
Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the 1987 Consti.

SC: Sec. 13, Art. 6 of the 1987 Consti prohibits holding of ohter offices unless it is by ex officio
capacity. Gordon’s chairmainship in PNRC is not an ex officio capacity as PNRC was created
through a speacial law, RA 95. Congress, however, cannot make a special law to create an
organization, unless in it a public corporation. Therefore, PNRC is automatically a public agency.
Taking these facts alone, there is indeed conflict between the 2 positions of Gordon. However,
the CS ruled that PNRC is on a class of its own. It cannot be considered a public corporation
since it does not get its funds from Congress. It is private in nature, being controlled by SEC. But
PNRC, being privately funded, is sui generis. Gordon’s charimanship is therefore, not a
government office.

Villgas v. Legaspi
Consolidated cases involving the issue on W/N a member of congress may appear in court and
regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants. In 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against the
spouses Vera Cruz before the CFI. Spouses were represented by Valentino Legaspi, member of
BP. Villegas asserted that Legaspi’s appearance is unconstitutional. Art, 8, Sec. 11, 1973 consti:
“No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction”

Asemblymen, Estanislao and Villegas submitted and signed a pleading without appearing in court.
According to them, this is not prohibitted because it does not amount to appearing in court.

SC: The prohibition extends to legislators signing pleadings even without appearing in court as
they will still be able to influence impartiality during the trial.

Quorum
Avelino v. Cuenco

Tanada invoked his right of privilege speeach but was frequently stalled by Senate President
Avelino and his followers. It came to a point that Avelino and his allies walked out leaving only 12
Senators in session. The remaining senators voted for a new senate President and elected
Cuenco. Avelino said the election of the new senator was not valid since there was no quorum.

SC: There was quorum. Only those senators who are within the jurisdiction of the Senate may be
called in counting the vote. At the time, only 23 were in the Philippines as 1 was abroad. Therefore,
having 12 senators participating in the elction of the new senate president, they valildly constituted
a quorum.

Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
Senators voted for the Senate president. Miriam and Tatad wanted to take over as minority
leaders because they lost in the elction of the senate president.

SC: Defeat in the election of senate presidency does not automatically conote being the minority
group. When we speak of minority/majority groups, we are speaking of the number of elected
officials from political parties. Example, in the Philippines at the moment, minority group is LP and
majority is PDP-LABAN.

Therefore, in electing the minority leader senate should base it on the party affiliation of the
candidate and not whether he/she lost in the election of senate officers.

Arroyo v. de Venecia

Q: Who makes the rules for each house?

A: Each house. Senate for senate rules. HoR for HoR rules.

Q: When a house is not able to follow their own rules, say in implementing a resolution, can a
member of that house go to the court and assail the constitutionality of that law/resolution?
A: No. If a house refuses to follow these internal rules, the house cannot be faulted if the house
as a group signed it. The HoR or the Senateis at liberty to follow their own internal rules or not,
privided that their acts have been consented to by their members.

Q: Is it requireed for the internal rules of the Senate to be published?

A: No, it is not.

Q: May members of the HoR be punished as members of the bar for the discharge of their
functions as a committee of such house?
A: No, only your specific house may hold you liable.

Q: What is the meaning of Enrolled Bill?

A: A bill that has been signed by the Senate President, Speaker of the House, and bouth
secretaries of the houses.

An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the
proper officers of each, and approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
Court is bound under the doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated
measure of the legislature [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1; Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No.
127255, August 14, 1997], If a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by Congress and approved by the President, the remedy is amendment or corrective legislation,
not a judicial decree [Casco (Phil) Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347].

Q: What is its validity? Is it binding?

A: Not yet.
Q: Why is there a need to have a specific name for it?
A:
Q: What are the bills that are required to originate from the house?
A: Congress (senate and HoR) generally makes laws and bills. However, there are specific bills
that must come solely from the lower house because the Senate is supposed to look at the country
in a bigger scale while the HoR is clsoer to the grass roots granting them exclusive rites to create
these certain bills. These bills are found in Art. 6, Sec. 24: appropriation, revenue, tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, and private bills

Q: Say HoR submitted GAA 2019 to the Senate for consurrence or ammendments. Senate totally
quashed it and made another appropriations bill. Constitutional?
A: According to the Tolentino case, it is okay for the Senate to overhaul the appropriations bil.
Even if the appropriation, revenue, tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills must come exclusively from HoR, and it gets completely replaced
when it reahes the Senate, it is okay so long as there was an intiation from the HoR.

In fact, Senate is not the only house with the power to amend bills under Sec. 24, Art 6. The third
house, the bicameral conference committee may do so as well. When Senate and HoR cannot
agree, they create a bicameral committee which is actually the most powerful house becasue they
can create, modify, or change bills.

FIN - Oct 1, 2018

Finals
Transcipts

TOPIC IX. Executive Department: The President (Art. VII)

SEC. 1 - Executive Power

Q: VP Leni Robredo ordered the DFA Secretary Teddy Boy Locsin to review some documents
pertaining to a possible treaty between the Philippines and China. According to Robredo, the
review by Locsin would be necessary for her to make an informed decision whether to enter
into a treaty with China or not. Locsin approaches you for advice to seek for advice to see if
there is any irregularity with Robredo’s request.

A: Robredo committed a faux pas, and possibly an unconstitutional act by vesting executive
power upon herself. Sec. 1, Art. VII. Only the president may enter into treaties as executive
power is vested in him alone. The vice president, under the constitution, does not have any
other role apart from succeeding the president in the event of inability.

SEC. 2 - Qualifications
Q: Who may be president?
A: Those who meet the following qualifications (NARRA)
1. Natural born citizen
2. Able to read and write
3. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceeding the day of
the elections
4. Registered voter
5. Age - at least 40 years old on the day of the elections

SEC. 3 - The Vice-president

Q: In this first year in power, president Duterte decided to appoint VP Robredo as member
of his cabinet. Discuss the steps the president must take in order for this position to
materialize.
A: The president may be appointed by the president as member of the cabinet without the
need of confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.

SEC. 4 - Term
Q: How long does the term of the president and the vice-president last and when does it
begin?

A: It shall begin at noon of June 30 following the day of the election. Both officials shall then
serve for six years thereafter.

Q: Arroyo took over the presidency after Estrada was ousted. Discuss why Arroyo was unable
to run for another term.

A: The president is prohibited from participating in another election if he has served for more
than four years as this already counts as one full term.

Discussions: Coco Pimentel and Miguel Zubiri

Q: Ferdinand Topacio filed a disqualification case against Coco Pimentel claiming that he
cannot run for Senate again. In 2007, Pimentel ran as senator. Upon counting, he lost and
ranked 13th. Zubiri placed 12th. Eventually, Pimentel filed an election protest to disqualify
Zubiri on the ground of fraud in the counting of votes. He claimed that he is the rightful 12th
placer and not Zubiri.

4 years after the protest, SC declared Pimentel as the actual winner. Zubiri stepped down
and Pimentel took over his unexpired term of 1 year and 10 months. In the 2013 elections,
Pimentel ran again and won. With his current term nearing its expiry, he filed his COC to run
for the next senatorial race in 2019.

Considering the a senator can serve two consecutive terms, may Coco Pimentel be elected
once more?

A: Yes, he can. Coco Pimentel, technically, did not serve the full term of his first election. It
would be so unfair to consider the unexpired term that was served as one full term of six
years. The intent of the framers was to make sure that senators will only be deducted a full
term when a term has really been completely rendered.
Further, Pimentel’s supposed term has not been served due to an involuntary act which,
under the constitution, is considered an interruption to an official’s term. Otherwise,
candidate with reason to believe that they should have won will no longer file electoral
protests for fear that they might win at the tail end of their supposed term.

Although there is no existing case on electoral protests in the Congress that clarifies when
exactly a congressional term is to be considered 1 full term, the SC has ruled that there must
be no distinction of a “full term” in Congress and in local governments. The framers intended
for “term” to mean the same thing in Congress and in local governments (only full when
served completely - beginning to end.) The same does not apply to the president as the
constitution itself has provided for the metric of his full term, that is upon reaching four
years.
SEC. 4 (4) - Election
Q: Who shall canvass the votes for president and vice-president?

A: Congress will sit as the National Board of Canvassers as one body.

Process:
1. Returns of every election for pres and VP must be certified by the board of canvassers
of each province/city then transmitted to Congress, directed to the senate president
2. Once senate president receives certificate of canvass, he must, within 30 days after
the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the Senate and HoR in
joint public session
3. Congress, upon authenticated and due execution in the manner provided by law,
must canvass the votes.

SEC. 4 (5)
Q: What happens if there is a tie?

A: Congress, by majority vote of both houses, voting separately, shall choose the winner.

SEC. 4 (7)
Q: Who shall decide on cases of of election, returns, and qualifications contests involving
the president and the vice-president?

A: SC, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge and may promulgate its own rules for this
purpose.

Discussions: En banc decisions are in some instances weightier than those made by divisions.
Though SC in division decisions are deemed to have been decided en banc, only SC en banc
can reverse a principle of law established by either SC en banc or by a division. Furthermore,
only SC in division does not have the power to rule election protests. All 15 justices will now
sit not as the SC but as Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).

FPJ v. Arroyo
Facts: GMA was declared winner of the presidential election. FPJ, with reason to believe that
he was the rightful winner, filed a case before the PET. However, during the pendency of the
case, he died. His widow, Susan Roces, now comes as a substitute of her late husband to
continue the pending suit. According to her, she is aware that she cannot assume the
supposed presidency of FPJ but she will nonetheless continue the suit as it is a matter of
public concern to know who was the true winner of the presidential race.

Issues: W/N the widow may substitute the pending suit of the deceased before the PET

Ruling: No. Only real parties in interest may continue the suit. According to Rule 14 of PET
Rules, only the 2nd and 3rd placers of the presidential race may contest within 30 days since
the election.

The rules are silent on matters of substitution an interventions however, Rules of Court allow
for analogous application. Rule 3, Sec. 16 allows substitution by legal representative. Public
office is personal, but protests are not such that the death of eother parties will not hinder
its resolve. However, substitution may only be done by a real party in interest or those who
will directly be benefited or injured by the resolve of the suit. It wouldn’t have been beneficial
for any party for Susan Roces to continue the suit because she will not be able to assume
office should her husband be declared winner.She will not be directly affected by the suit.

Macalintal v. PET
Facts: Petitioner alleges that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec. 4, Art. VII does
not call for its creation and thata it was a separate body from the SC. According to him PET
is beyond the jurisdiction of the SC because PET is capable of hiring and assigning its own
employees to discharge its function. He further argues that PET violates Sec. 12, Art. VIII.

Issues:
1. W/N PET is constitutional
2. W/N PET is a separate body from the SC
3. W/N PET exercises quasi-judicial power

Ruling:
1. SC ruled that petitioner is now estopped from assailing the constitutionality of PET
since it is no longer his earliest opportunity to do so. Macalintal has represented
Arroyo in a suit against the same tribunal before and yet did not raise the issue of
constitutionality.
2. No. Con Com merely constitutionalized what was statutory as Judicial power is
plenary. Additionally, under the rules of stat con, the doctrine of necessary
implication applies. Sec. 4, Art. VII implies the creation of a body that will be necessary
to perform the consitutionally mandated function. The same provision also states
 that only the SC en banc has jurisdiction over all contests regarding election, returns,
and qualifications of the pres and VP. Thus, PET is not a separate body.
3. No. The constitution characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as an exercise
of judicial power. Therefore, when SC sitting en banc as PET, resolving a case between
two parties assailing a justiciable controversy, is performing what is essentially a
judicial power. PET merely added to the jurisdiction of the SC.

SEC. 6
Privilege and Salary
Q: Assuming Congress passes a law increasing the salary of the President, will it benefit him?

A: No. Sec. 6, Art. VII states no increase shall take effect during the term of the incumbent.

Q: Assuming President GMA approves the increase during the time when she only served for
less than 4 years, that term was not counted against her. Considering that she won the next
presidential election, will the increase benefit her?

A: No, under the same provision.

Soliven v. Makasiar
Facts: Beltran and other petitioners were charged with libel by then president Cory Aquino.
According to the petitioners, Cory cannot file a complaint against them because it would
defeat her immunity from suit. He said, if the president initiated a suit, it would make her
open to counter suits, and thus violating her consitutionally granted immunity. He further
claimed that President Cory may not appear in court as a witness for herself as she will be
liable for contempt.

Issues:
W/N presidential immunity may be invoked by a person other than the president

Ruling:
No. Immunity was granted to the president himself by virtue of his office and may only be
invoked by the holder himself. The accused may not invoke immunity as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against him. Further, the law does not say that a President may
not waive such immunity. Waiver is solely upon the prerogative of the president.
Estrada v. Desierto
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the HoR and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more
serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President
Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd
at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this
election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the
presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left
Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
“confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. W/N Estrada resigned as President.
2. W/N Arroyo is only an acting President by virtue of Sec. 11, Art. VII
3. W/N the President enjoys immunity from suit.
4. W/N the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Yes. Resignation need not be written formally. It can be implied through words words
and acts. As for Estrada’s case, the elements of valid resignation are present:
a. an intent to resign
b. acts of relinquishment
 Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence—
bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned—
constructive resignation.

SC declared that his resignation of President Estrada confirmed by his leaving

Malacañan Palace and in the press release containing his final statement:
a. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
b. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any
kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as
the disability disappears);
c. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
d. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in
the same service of the country;
e. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

2. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President and H.R. 178 that confirmed the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that
both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President and that the inability of
Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of
inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress. Even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

3. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery
and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
 the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing
as any trespasser.
4. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned
and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity.
The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the
publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to
perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent
effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice
and less with prosecution.

Saez v. Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data w/ TPO for inspection
of place and production of documents. He feared he would be abducted and killed. He then
asked the military to cease from conducting further surveillance of his activities and to be
excluded from the order of battle and other govt records. Petitioner likewise charged then
President and CIC Arroyo for neglect of duty

Issues: W/N President should immediately be taken taken as party respondent by virtue of
immunity

Ruling: No. Under the doctrine of Command Responsibility when the following requisites are
present:
a. Superior-subordinate relationship between accused and perpetrator
b. Superior knew or had reason to know that a crime was or will be committed
c. Superior failed to take necessary and reasonable steps to prevent crime or punish
the perpetrator

On knowledge requirement:
International tribunals require actual knowledge but the Philippines simple require
constructive knowledge. Under EO 226, knowledge is presumed when:
a. Acts are widespread
b. Acts are repeatedly committed within the area
 c. Immediate staff and subordinates are involved

PGMA was impleaded for neglect of duty but was not held liable because Saez was not able
to present substantial evidence.

Almonte v. Vasquez
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum
was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous
activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces
tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
W/N Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual
interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot
enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting
the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other.

Sereno v. CTRM
Facts: CTRM recommended to PGMA to lift the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule
on petrochemicals and certain plastic products. APMP requested for a copy of the minutes
of meeting to understand the basis for CTRM’s recommendation that according to the
petitioners caused loses to their industry. CTRM continued to refuse to the delivery of the
documents. APMP brought the petition to the RTC.

Issue: W/N CTRM may be compelled to produce documents by virute of right to information
on matters of public concerns.

Ruling: No. Right to info is not absolute and is limited to matters of public concern and
subject to limitations provided by law and matters of public interest. 2 requisites for right to
information:
1. Must be in relation to matters of public concern or interest. There is so strict definition
and must be decided on a case to case basis
2. Must not be excluded by law from the constitutional guarantee. Said right does not
cover national security matters and intelligence information, tade secrets and
banking transactions. Also excluded from the coverage are diplomatic matters,
closed-door cabinet meetings and executive sessions HoR, Senate and SC.

SEC. 12 - Succession
Q: If the president slipped in coma, may the cabinet members visit him?

A: Yes, but not all. Only members of the cabinest in charge of national security and foreign
relations, Chief of Staff of AFP shall not be denied access to the president.

Q: If the president has fallen seriously ill, should the public be informed?

A: Yes, the public must be informed according to the same provision.

SEC. 7 (inability before the term)
Q: President dies, who takes over?

A: See below:
a. VP becomes Pres
- death/permanent disability
b. VP acts as president until one if elected and qualified
- failure to elect
- failure to qualify

Q: VP dies, who takes over?

A: Senate president or if unable, Speaker of the House shall act as Pres until the Pres or VP
shall have been elected and qualified.

SEC. 8 (inability during incumbency)

a. VP becomes Pres in 4 exclusive instances under the provision
- Death
- Permanent disability
- Removal
- resignation

SEC. 11 - Disability
Scenarios:
1. President writes a declaration to Senate Pres AND Speaker of the House that he is
unable to discharge his powers and duties, VP will be Acting President, until the
president writes another letter declaraing the contraty.
2. Majority of the members of the Cabinet writes a declaration to Senate Pres AND
Speaker of the House that he is unable to discharge his powers and duties, VP will
immediately be Acting President.
3. Thereafter, President writes a declaration to Senate Pres AND Speaker of the House
that such inability does not exist, he shall reassume power and duties of presidency.
However, if Majority of the members of the Cabinet writes within 5 days to Senate
Pres AND Speaker of the House that Pres is still unable to discharge power, Congress
will decide on the issue. Congress shall for that purpose, convene, if not in session,
within 48 hrs in accordance with its rules without the need for a call.
 4. If Congress, within 10 days of receipt of last written declaration, or if not in session,
within 12 days after last required assemble, determines by ⅔ votes of both houses,
voting separately, that Pres is indeed unable, VP shall act as President. If Congress
decides that Pres is able, Pres will continue.

SEC. 10 - Vacancy
Congress, at 10 am of the 3rd day of the vacancy of Pres and VP, shall convene according to
its rules without need of a call, and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election.

Prohibitions - SEC. 13
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Doromal, commisioner of PCGG was involved in a business through the Doromal
International Trading Corp. It is a family corporate where he is the president. The company
participated in biddings with DepEd and Culture and Sports. They submitted bids worth
P61M worth of equipment. The Tanodbayan, then filed an information against Doromal
about such violation which prompted them to conduct preliminary investogation. However,
SC said Tanodbayan did not have jurisdiction to do so without orders from the Ombudsman,
because of this, the prelim investigation and information were anulled. In response,
Tanodbayan submitted another information duly approved by the Ombudsman. Doromal
said the 2nd information was null and void as there was no new prelim investigation that
took place after the filing of the new information.

Issues:
1. W/N Doromal violated the constiution amounting to a valid suspension
2. W/N pre-lim investigation is necessary
3. W/N infor is invalid bc of lack of preliminary investigation

Ruling:
1. Yes. The signed document by doromal shows that he can be charged for participating
in a business prohibited by Sec. 13, Art. VII. Because DITC is a family corporation, he
has indirect interest over its activities. However, SC said that his suspension should
already be lifted as it already exceeded the 90 day period given by CSC.

Discussion: Difference of prohibition between Pres and Congress:

Congress: They may still sponsor bills that could possibly raise issues of conflict if
interest provided that they disclose possible conflict. Ex. Manny Villar sponsered a bill
creating a high way that will pass by his subdivision
 Pres, VP, memebrs of the cabinet, their deputies or assistants: They absolutely
cannot, whether directly or indirectly, by virtue of Sec. 13, Art. VII. “They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest.”

2. Yes. Right to preliminary investigation is a substantial right. Denial amounts to

accused’s loss of life, liberty, property without due process. Because the first
information was anulled, the pre-lim investigation is also void. Thus, new preliminary
investigation is in order.
3. No. Absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the validity of the
information filed. But if defendants are able to call the court’s attention as to its
absence, courts shall not dismiss it but order the fiscal to do so or remand it to the
lower court.

Civil Liberties Union v. Exec. Sec.

Facts: Pres. Cory Aquino issued EO 284 which allowed cabinet members, their secretaries,
usecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold more than 2 government offices apart from
their primary positions. CLU assailed the constitutionality of such appointments as it added
exemptions to Sec. 13, Art. VII.

Issue: W/N EO 284 is constitutional

Ruling:
No. The constitution prohibits Pres, VP, memebrs of the cabinet, their deputies or assistants
from holding other offices aside from their primary position and those held in an ex-officio
capacity.

“Unless other provided” under the said provision must be understood to only mean the
following:
1. VP as member of the cabinet
2. Secretary of Justice as member of Judicial Bar Council
3. Those held in ex-officio capacity

Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma

Elma was appointed chairman of PCGG. He was then appointed as CPLC. He accepted the
2nd appointment but waived compensation. PICI argues the constitutionality of both
appointments as violations of Sec. 13, Art. VII and Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B. Further, he contends
that both posts are incompatible with each other. Elma claims that Sec. 13, Art. VII does not
apply to her case and that it should be the latter provision that should apply.

Issues:
1. W/N as PCGG Chairman, he can also hold CPLC position
2. W/N stricter provision Sec. 13, Art. VII applies to both appointments
3. W/N Inability will render both appointments void
4. W/N Sc needs to sit en banc to rule over the issues

Ruling:
1. No. Appointments violate Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B as they are incompatible offices. CPLC
must gives impartial legal advice to executive heads including the chairman of PCGG.
Elma will not be able to review his own actions while holding both positions.
2. Provision in Art. VII is inapplicable to both positions since neither of the two fall under
those classfied under said provision: secretary, usec, and asst. Waiver of
compensation will also not justify the appointments. The fact that an appointment
had to me made proves that he is not holding the 2nd position in an ex-officio
capacity.
3. Incompatibility does not render both appointments void. Elma was deemed to have
vacated chairmanship when he accepted his post as CPLC.
4. No. Questions of application of laws do not require the SC to sit en banc.

ART. XI
Q: Who may be impeached?

A: Sec. 2. President, VP, Members of SC, Members of Con Com, and the Ombudsman, on the
following grounds: culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, and other high crimes.

Q: Was Serena impeached?

A: Not exectly. She was removed via quo warranto.

Q: Is Sec. 1 self-executing?

A: No, it is not. It is defficult to characterize the words stated in Sec. 1. Although, it a very
strong guiding principles, most laws are derived from it.
Funa v. Agra
Facts: Agra appointed Agra as Acting Sec. of Justice and Acting Solicitor General. Petitioner
argues that appoinents runs counter to Sec. 13, Art. VII. However, Agra claims a different set
of facts. He said he then a Govt. Corporate Counsel when Arroyo designated him as Acting
SG. He said he resigned as GCC before he was apointed as Acting SG.

Issues: W/N appointments are constitutional

Ruling: No. 2 positions mentioned are covered by the prohibition under Sec. 13. Agra cannot
hold any other office while sitting as Acting SG since the consitution does not so provide.
Temporary holding of post is immaterial. Framers wanted to impose a stricter prohibition of
the Pres and his close subordinates. The privion does not distinguish as to the nature of
appointments, therefore it applies to any and all kinds. This is to prevent concentration of
powers in the executive dept.

Nov. 19, 2018

Executive, Hour 2

Probation Law of 1976 (as amended)

- Explains what probation is
- Tells the process by which one can be granted probation

RA 10707
- Executive Clemency - general term refering to reprieve, absolute pardon,
conditional pardon, commutation of sentence
- Amensty
- a form of executive clemency but is not enumerated as one of the items
falling under executive clemency because amnesty requires another
positive act which is concurrence of Congress by majority vote.
- Shared power by executive and legislative

Pardon
In re: Torres v. Director, Bureau of Corrections
FACTS:
Torres was granted pardon for 2 counts of Estafa with the condition to not commit
anymore offenses against the state. Pardon was signed by Secretary of Justice,
Neptali Gonzales. However, he committed 20 more counts of estafa and sedition.
Conditional pardon was revoked. His wife and children filed a habeas corpus
proceeding saying that he was illegally detained because a conditional pardon has
already been granted.

Essentially, Torres’ family wanted the court to order the President to show the body
of Torres and argue before the court W/N there was justification in holding him.

Note: An approved Writ of Habeas Corpus will order public officer concerned to bring the body in
court or in any other manner and show cause as to why that particular body is being held.

RULING:
The nature of pardon:
The grant of pardon, the determination of terms and conditions of the pardon, the
determination of the occurrence of the breach as the case may be, as well as the
corresponding sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts that are not
subject to judicial scrutiny. It is a political question.

Might come out in the exam: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract
between the sovereign power of the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal that
the former will release the latter subject to the conditions that if he does not comply
with the terms, he will be recommitted to jail and serve the unexpired person of the
sentance or an additional one. Upon acceptance of the pardon, the pardonee has
placed himself within the supervision of the President or his delegate who is tasked
to see to it that the pardonee complies with terms previously agreed upon.

Judicial Determination of Guilt required:

There is no amount of judicial determination of guilt required because in the first
place, the judiciary cannot do anything about it. Once information has been passed
regarding a pardonee’s alleged breach, the President need not wait for Judicial
proclamation of guilt for the subsequent crime should he choose to proceed with his
conviction. But pardon still has its limits: when the accused has not been convicted.
One cannot be pardoned without asking for forgiveness by admission of a wrong
doing, otherwise, there is nothing to pardon.

This ruling by the SC however, presents an alarming scenario where the president
can simply revoke conditional pardon even without an alleged breach.

2 options of the executive department to proceed against pardonee:

1. Sec. 64(i), Revised Administrative Code
2. Art. 159, Revised Penal Code

However, an easier choice would be:

1. Simply revoke the pardon and order the executive secretary to issue a
withdrawal and apply for recommission to jail. SC will then issue a warrant of
arrest.

Again, above choices purely rely on the President’s prerogative.

Antonio Trillanes Case

Judge Soriano, Makati RTC Judge, was tasked to decide on the warrant of arrest case
because apparently there was no valid amnesty. Thus, Trillanes is continuing to
breach the law of the land. However, in Judge Soriano’s order, it was not explained
as to whether there really was a certificate of amnesty. Soriano simply admitted into
evidence documents produced by Trillanes.

Pardon Amnesty

Granted only AFTER conviction Anytime

Usually granted to an individual Usually granted to groups of people (i.e.

rebels)

Usually private offenses Applicable to public offenses

Does not extinguish civil aspect of the Abolishes the crime and its
offense consequences altogether. Accused
 stands as if he has not committed a
crime at all.

No need for congressional concurrence Congress must concur (majorityof its

members)

Note: Amnesty was created, not only in the Philippines, to accomodate rebels. It is highly unlikely
for rebels to give up arms. Amnesty is basically a bargaining chip, where the military can negotiate
with rebels to give up arms in exhange for amnesty. If the offer was pardon, being solely reliant
on the prerogative of the president, rebels will most likely decline.

On Amnesty as a shared power:

If the executive branch and the legislative branch decide on someting, neither of them
should have the right to withdraw the decision without the consent of the other branch.
The same is true when we enter into treaties. Otherwise the process by which the decision
was made will simply be circumvented.

Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
“In view hereof, and pursuant to the authority vested on me, I hereby grant executive
clemency to Joseph Estrada convicted with plunder and imposed with a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.”

This case was brought up not when Erap ran for President, only when he ran for
mayor of Manila in 2012. On June 24, 2013 Risos-Vidal filed a petition for
disqualificaton. His petition was anchored on the theory that Erap has been
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder by the
Sandiganbayan, sentencing him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification.

According to Risos-Vidal, the grant of pardon was conditional. The condition was for
Estrada to no longer seek any elective position or office. She wanted to interpret the
requirements under Arts. 36 and 41 of the RPC against Erap and concurrently against
the President. According to the petitioner, whenever there is doubt, the
requirements must be strictly, not liberally, construed.
Art. 36. Pardon, its effects: A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.

Art. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal - Their accessory penalties. - The
penalties RP and RT shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during
the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Issue:
May Erap validly file a COC despite the guilty verdict of the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling:
Yes. The pardon extended to him restored his political and civil rights. Erap was
granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all this civil and political rights which
naturally includes the right to seek public office.

Statues must not be taken as a way to limit the power of the president to grant
pardon. Everytime there seems to be an apparent conflict between statutes and the
presidential power to grant pardon or amnesty, these must be interpreted against
the legislature and not against the President. The president’s pardoning power
cannot be diminished by a congressional edict. The same is true with the above
mentioned provisions. They cannot serve to abridge the exclusive power and
prerogative of the president to pardon person convicted of violating penal statutes.

Lagman v. Medialdea
President Duterte declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao. Prior to the said declaration, the President first
exercised his calling out power alone, one of the military powers of the president, by
virtue of Proclamation 55 to suppress lawless violence. However, Duterte found that
it was insufficient to simply call out the armed forces as the infestation of the ISIS
and the Maute was so pervasive and integrated into the community of Marawi that
it truly called for a suspension of the privilege of the writ. Otherwise, 2 things may
happen:
1. In a perfect society, it will be difficult to purge the terrorists
2. However in our imperfect society, civilian rights will be unduly crossed. This is
true because the military, knowing the terrorists are present, will no longer
take the Bill of Rights into consideration in taking out the ISIS.

After the declaration of Proclamation No. 55, President Duterte declared Martial Law
and suspended the privilege of the writ of HC. This was done all the way from Russia.

Factual basis of the declaration:

Based on verified intelligence, the maute group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of
263 members, fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims.
Reports came on how the Maute group was prepared to invade Marawi, the biggest
Islamic region in the country.

Factual predicates:
At 2pm, members of the Maute group and the Abu Sayyaf Group along with their
sympathisers commenced their attack in various areas of Marawi City. By evening of
May 23, at least 3 bridges in Lanao fell under these groups. Actual invasion began on
this same day. May 24, members of the Maute group were seen guarding the entry
gates of Amai Pakpak Hospital, held employees of the hospital hostage, and took
over the PhilHealth office located there. They also put ablaze certain hospitals and
other buildings. The military had to wrestle control over Marawi.

Upon the declaration of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of HB,
both houses of the Congress issued resolutions of support. Here, a constitutional
question may be raised. According to the constitution, Congress can only affirm (then
extend) or revoke said declaration which cannot be set aside by the president. Mere
support is uncalled for.

Issues:
1. May the Court, in lieu, of Congress’ power to affirm or revoke, simply exercise
judicial review under Sec. 1, Art. VIII?
 Congressional oversight Judicial review

The revocation of Congress cannot

be set aside by the President

Congress may take into The court considers only the

consideration not only data available
prior to, but likewise supervening
the declaration. This makes
congress more powerful that the
Court in cases like these because it
is a shared power between Congress
and Executive.
information and data available to
the President prior to or at the time
of the declaration; it is not allowed
to “undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings”

Congress could probe deeper and The court which does not look into
further; it can delve into the the absolute correctness of the
accuracy of the facts presented factual basis
before it

Congress’ review mechanism is The Court’s review power is passive,

automatic in the sense that it mat be it is only by the filing of a petitioner
activated by Congress itself at any “in an appropriate proceeding” by a
time after the proclamation or citizen
suspension was made

The Court is limited as to whether

there is sufficiency of factual basis
test

2. May the Court determine which on the President’s military powers should
have been exercised?

SC said, among the 3 military powers, the calling out power is the most benign.
It is the least dangerous and least restrictive. The function of the armed forces
is not the subject of judicial review.
 In the suspension of the PWHB and declaration of martial law, there must be
actual invasion or rebellion. The judiciary, in this case, had no other choice left.
The president has made the declaration, Marawi has fallen, and both houses
of Congress has already issued their resolutions of support.

3. Will the withdrawal of declaration of martial law withdraw the calling out
powers?

4. What are the parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the writ of HB?
There is an absolute need for factual basis, even the constitution requires it.
The constitution requires actual invasion or rebellion, not merely perceived
invasion or rebellion.

PADILLA VS CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUMMARY:
Petitioners contended the validity of the recent declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao because they erroneously
require the congress to convene in joint session to review such based on Article VII.
Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The SC said, that the constitutional provision is
exclusive for the revocation of the proclamation and not to convene in joint session
to review it.

DOCTRINE: Article VII Sec. 18 “xxx The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least
a majority of all its members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President.xxx”

TRANSCRIPT:
● The constitution states that congress should only convene when they want to
revoke the suspension or martial law (which is vague). The constitution does
not say that you should convene when you want to affirm, extend, revoke or
deny these presidential acts.
 ● The SC ruled that they do not need to convene, if they do not want to revoke
the declaration or suspension.
● The SC in the case divided section 18 Article 7 into, 4 parts.

1. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. (CHECK IN THIS CASE)
2. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President ( NOT DONE )
3. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
(NOT DONE)
4. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call. (NOT DONE)

SC said that even if during the time the immediate petition was submitted to the
court ( b,c & d ) were not yet complied with then the supreme court cannot intercede
for the reason that the b,c, & d are political questions or political in nature therefore
they cannot intervene.

FACTS:
1. In May 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state
of martial law and the suspension of the writ in Mindanao on the grounds of
rebellion and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. Duterte within 48 hours after the declaration transmitted is report to the
Senate President and Speaker of the house, the report stated that there was
lawless violence (armed attacks and atrocities) in Mindanao related tor cause
by the Abu - Sayyaf and Maute Terrorist groups in complicity with ISIS to
establish an independent muslim Mindanao.
 3. The speaker and the SP invited the security officials from the executive military
and the other departments of the government to assess the report given by
DU30
4. They voted to support his proclamation of martial law, but they did not extend
or revoke the declaration which makes it kind of vague.
5. The petitioner contested that Congress needs to convene in a joint session as
stated in Article 18 section 7, it is the right of the people to have them convene.
Whether they are going to revoke or affirm.

ISSUES AND RULINGS:

1. Does congress need to convene in a joint session every time when the
president declares martial law? NO
They only need to convene when they vote for whether or not they should revoke
the suspension or the declaration of the president, and they do not need to convene
just to review the declaration or report.

2. What are the safeguards ?

● Congress may revoke the declaration by a majority vote of all its members.
● the court may inquire into legitimacy of the declaration even during the
declaration
● the declaration will only last 60 days

CASE: AMPATUAN v. PUNO ( REVIEW)

June 7, 2011 | En Banc | Military Powers
PETITIONER: Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et. al
RESPONDENTS: Ronaldo Puno, in his capacity as Sec. of the DILG

FACTS :
1. the Maguindanao Massaccer occurs where 57 people where killed
2. On the same day gloria put of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City
of Cotabato under a state of emergency in PD 1946.
 3. Directed the armed force the suppress lawless violence in those areas , within
constitutional mandates.
4. GMA delegated to the DILG to power to supervise the condition or the state in
the areas put under a state of emergency. under AO 273.
5. Petitioner stated that it is against local autonomy, the DILG head was given
power of control to dismiss and suspend local officials. Also , there is no
violence in sultan fkudarat and Cotabato City.
6.

ISSUES AND RULINGS :

1. WON PGMA invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the
AFP and PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.

There is no arrogation by the president because anyway she is acting within her
power for purposes of the calling out power because there is no law and there is no
state of state of national emergency as declared by congress so all these acts by the
president are not in pursuance of an emergency that is supposed to be granted by
the congress.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that
the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.

2. What is the relevant law here ?

Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

3. Was putting the ARMM under the supervision of the DILG unconstitutional
because it goes against the autonomy of the region ( local autonomy ) ? ( CONSTI 3
TOPIC ) DOES NOT MATTER NOW )

- The president cannot delegate a power that she does not have, she does not have
the emergency powers.

4. whether the supreme court can inquire into the proper use or factual basis of the
use of calling out powers ? YES

● The issue in this case was why were the other 2 cities included when there
were no lawless violence occurrence in those areas.
● There is a divide between the government and the local people of the places
where the military will now be present because there is always harassment
when the military in present, it is for this reason that the presence of the
military in any should always be a last resort. To prevent any possible conflict
, and their presence in the areas where they are not supposed to be invites
firefights .
● SC said with respect to the calling out power to quell lawless violence in an
area, the president has discretion but the Scan inquire into their discretion.

● Yes the court can inquire into the factual basis of the of the declaration of the
president, however the court will have to defer its judgement to the presidents
judgement

Kulayan v. Tan
On Jan. 15, 2009, several members of the International Committee of the Red Cross
were kidnapped in Sulu. The victims were 2 foreigners and 1 Filipino. In response,
Gov. Tan wanted to call the AFP and the PNP and declared a state of emergency.
On March 2009, Gov. Tan issued Proclamation No. 1 declaring state of emergency in
the province of Sulu. According to him, such kidnapping was a terrorist act pursuant
to the Human Security Act (RA 9372), and thus, can be used as basis for his
declaration. The same proclamation also invoked Sec. 465 of the Local Government
Code which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out measures
during manmade and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disoirder and
lawlessness.

Side note: Chief executives declare state of emergency/state of calamity as soon as they can
because of the allotted emergency/calamity funds. These are discretionary funds to used to
help the people in need.

The proclamation provided for the implementation of the ff:

1. Setting up checkpoints and chokepoints in the province
2. Imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to guidelines as may be
imposed by authorities
3. Conduct general search and seizure including arrests in the pursuit of
kidnappers and supporters
4. Other actions or police actions necessary for public safety

Side note: The problem really is that when the local government gave the military and the
police too much power, individuals will be harassed, privacy will be invaded because now,
they are granted the power to do so.

Issue:
W/N Sec. 16 in relation to Sec. 465 of LGC authorizes the Governor to declare a state
of emergency and exercise enumerated under Proc. No. 1, especially those that
authorize general search and seizure

Side note: You cannot simply search or frisk a person when there is no emergency. Neither
can motorists be stopped and be asked to open the trunk.

Ruling:
Generally, the power to call out the armed forces exclusively granted to the President
himself. As opposed to the President’s emergency power which is balanced only by
legislative act of Congress as seen in Sec. 23(2), Art. VI.

In the LGC, there is an implied power to exercise emergency powers provided that
there is a manmade calamity or disaster. These powers include: 1) call uopn
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless
violence, rebellion, and sedition.

Gov. Tan was under the impression that one of the national law enforcement
agencies refered to by the LGC inludes the AFP.

However, according to the SC, Tan cannot simply rely on Sec. 465(1), LGC as said
provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether manmade or not.
Gov. Tan is certainly empowered to enact or declare state of emergency, however,
kidnapping cannot be considered as a calmity or disaster. It is an unfortunate event,
but not a calamity or disaster that can be used a grounds to exercise such power. If
it were otherwise, such power will simply be exercise over ordinary crimes.

Further, AFP does not fall under the category of national law enforcement agency.
They are no longer under the chain of command and is now under the DILG, which
is civilian in nature.

Writ of Habeas Data

It is the remedy available to those whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or security, is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission by a public official or employee
or a private individual.

Who may avail of it?

Those whose privacy in life, liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission.

By who?
Public official or private individuals
Private individuals without intervention of public officials who violate privacy under
the above stated circumstances may also be impleaded unlike in the writ of amparo
where there must be governmental intervention. The writ of amparo cannot prosper
when there is no proof of government intervention in the impairment of the privilege
of the said writ.

Who may file?

Assuming the the party directly affected can no longer be found, any other aggrieved
party may file. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances,
the petition may be filed by any member f the immediate family - spouse, children,
and parents. Ascendants, descendants, and collateral relatives of the aggrieved
party, within the 4th civil degree.

Where to file?
When filed with the RTC, it must be within the jurisdiction of where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information was gathered, stored, at the option of the petitioner. Here, one must
ensure that the RTC has jurisdiction of the place, otherwise the RTC will not be able
to order individuals within that jurisdiction.

May also be filed in the SC, CA, or Sandiganbayan. The SC and CA can order
individuals regardless of where they are by virtue of their national coverage.

Vivares v. STC
STC students posted bikini pictures online. Those pictures were said to be against
STC policy and code of conduct. As a punishment, those students were not allowed
to march during their graduation. A case was raised by the students against STC to
the RTC and then the CA. In both courts, the students won claiming child abuse. STC
was ordered to allow the students to march.

When the case was brought to the SC, Atty. Largo, in behalf of STC filed a case of
habeas data. The issue now is: W/N STC can be held liable for simply exercising their
right found in the student manual.
Ruling:
It must be noted that STC was able to exercise that right because the pictures were
seen without a violation of the student’s right to privacy. The photos were posted
online and classmates themselves showed the nuns the pictures. Thus, there cannot
be a writ of habeas data case against STC because in the first place, they were not
prying into the privacy of the students.