CASE DIGEST: BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, vs. they submitted their cause voluntarily.
d their cause voluntarily.

Here, what respondent was
COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO, Respondents.
FACTS: In this case, petitioner called the Court’s attention to the fact that
respondent’s motion to dismiss questioning the trial court’s jurisdiction was
filed more than six years after her amended answer was filed. According to
petitioner, respondent had several opportunities, at various stages of the
proceedings, to assail the trial court’s jurisdiction but never did so for six
straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in another case, petitioner claimed
that respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier stage
bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in
the proceedings conducted by the trial court.

 limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. Also, subject to the provisions of
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the
concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over
the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction
over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.

 Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised anytime, even for the
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result
of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, in the case
relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the authority of the then Court
of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a sum of money in the
amount of 1,908 pesos which amount was, at that time, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the municipal courts. The jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject matter of the case was likewise the issue in subsequent cases
citing that ruling.

For example, in Spouses Gonzaga versus Court of Appeals,
the issue for consideration was the authority of the regional trial court to hear
and decide an action for reformation of contract and damages involving a
subdivision lot, it being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board pursuant to the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree. Another example is the case of Lee
versus Presiding Judge. In that case, petitioners argued that the respondent
municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment
because the issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People
versus Casuga, accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of
which she was charged, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal
courts or city courts and the then courts of first instance, and that the judgment
of the court of first instance, to which she had appealed the municipal court's
conviction, should be deemed null and void for want of jurisdiction as her
appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In all of these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction
of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based
on estoppel by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly
adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which
questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s
jurisdiction over the person of defendant. Thus, the principle of estoppel by
laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to
jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.
The Rules of Court provide in Rule 9, Section 1 and Rule 15, Section 8 that
defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived.

Based on the foregoing citations, the
"objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in
a motion to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived. This is
subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches.
Since the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those
defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such
defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in
order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first
sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals,
in this case, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its
questioned decision, stating that any issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding, even for the first time on appeal and that, therefore,
respondent timely raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is,
consequently, not estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction. As the
question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant,
the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss.
In any case, respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction
over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can only
be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence."
(JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON)
Facts:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses
Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March
1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-
defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result, petitioner
filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is
of Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel solidary.
be substituted by his children as party-defendants. This motion was granted The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and
by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000. 13 respondent’s husband, on the other, states.

On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was
cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for
herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a
demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) **********;
(2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) ******
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to
pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable
provision in this matter.

The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time,
citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved,
respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court
seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion. CA
granted the petition.

Issue
W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person?

Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired

through a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.
Citing the case of Sarsaba:

“The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense

which is personal to the person claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible
for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death.Neither can petitioner
invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of
having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. “

BOSTON EQUITY V CA

Facts: ----- supra-----

Issue: W/N the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party?
Held:
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties-in-interest

without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the
estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS V. HON. AGNES DEVANADERA
G.R. NO. 193253, 08 SEPTEMBER 2015, EN BANC (PERALTA, J.)
The CA's original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was
necessarily transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and
such petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The Bureau of Customs (BOC) informed the President of OILINK International,
Inc. (OILINK) that the Post Entry Audit Group of the BOC will be conducting a
compliance audit. Thus a pre-audit conference was held, whereby OILINK
made a partial submission of the required documents.
OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the production
of additional documents, but claimed that it was hampered by the resignation
of its employees from the Accounting and Supply Department. The Audit Team
informed OILINK of the adverse effects of its continuous refusal to furnish the
required documents.
An administrative case was filed against OILINK before the Legal Service of
the BOC, which found OILINK guilty and imposed an administrative fine. A
Hold Order was thereafter issued against all shipments of OILINK, for failure
to settle its outstanding account with the BOC and to protect the interest of the
government.
UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. (UNIOIL) requested for permission to
withdraw base oils from OILINK’s temporarily closed terminal, citing its existing
Terminalling Agreement with OILINK for the storage of UNIOIL’s aromatic
process oil and industrial lubricating oils. This request was granted.
A Warrant of Seizure and Detention was issued by the District Collector,
directing the BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of OILINK
located in Bataan. Despite said Warrant, UNIOIL was allowed to withdraw oil
according to its earlier request.
A complaint-affidavit was filed against OILINK and UNIOIL, esaccusing both
companies of unlawful importation and fraudulent practice against customs
revenue. The State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause.
The BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition outright due to procedural defects, namely: (a) it
contained no explanation why service thereof was not done personally; (b) it
had no proper verification and certification against forum shopping; and (c)
docket and other lawful fees were not fully paid. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Issues:
1) Does the CA have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?
2) Is there a need to relax the strict compliance with procedural rules on
verification and certification against forum shopping in this case?
3) Was there probable cause in the complaint-affidavit filed against
OILINK and UNIOIL?
Rulings:
1. No, it is the Court of Tax Appeals that has jurisdiction over this case.
Although the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised by
either of the parties, the Court deemed it proper to address such question
before delving into the procedural and substantive issues of the instant
petition.
The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of
the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on
the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, with the passage of RA
9282, amending RA 1125, enlarging the membership of the CA and elevating
its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer
clear which between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a
petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary investigations involving
tax and tariff offenses.
Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory
R.A. No. 9282, let alone in the Constitution, that the CTA has original
jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari. The Court declared that the CA's
original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in
a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily
transferred to the CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282, and that such
petition shall be governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has jurisdiction over the petition
for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the BOC's complaint-
affidavit against private respondents for violation of the Tariffs and Customs
Code of the Philippines (TCCP).
2. Yes, the procedural rules on verification and certification against forum
shopping in this case.
As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. As to certification against
forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial
compliance” or presence or “special circumstances or compelling reasons.”

The Court cannot simply ignore the CA's perfunctory dismissal of the petition
on such sole procedural ground vis-à-vis the paramount public interest in the
subject matter and the substantial amount involved. While the rule on
perfection of appeals cannot be classified as a difficult question of law, mistake
in the construction or application of a doubtful question of law, as in this case,
may be considered as a mistake of fact, excusing the BOC from the
consequences of the erroneous filing of its petition with the CA.

3. No, there was no probable cause in the complaint-affidavits against OILINK

and UNIOIL.

The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in

court is essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance,
with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The
settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion
requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.

Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such

facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held
for trial.

A careful reading of the BOC's complaint-affidavit would show that there is no

allegation to the effect that OILINK and UNIOIL committed undervaluation,
misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent
(30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or quantity declared in the
entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement which constitute
prima facie evidence of fraud. Nor is there an allegation that they intentionally
committed undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration
in the import entry.

Since the allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit fall short of the acts or
omissions constituting the various fraudulent acts against customs revenue
under Section 3602 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice correctly
ruled that there was no probable cause to believe that they committed such
crime/s.
VALENTIN A. FERNANDO vs. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ Judge
Presiding Branch V, Court of First Instance of Manila; PELAGIA
FERNANDO SANTOS and PABLO G. SANTOS G.R. No. L-26417 | January
30, 1970 | SANCHEZ, J.
DOCTRINE: Only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, are
entertainable in a petition for certiorari; that will not lie where an appeal may
be taken or is lost through petitioner's fault; and that moot questions are not
decided by this Court.
FACTS:
Lessees of market stalls in Folgueras Remnants Center could not agree on
who was the lawful owner and the one to receive their rents. They filed an
interpleader with CFI against Valentin A. Fernando and his children Pelagia
Fernando Santos, respondent, and Urbana Fernando Cruz. The court ruled in
favor of Fernando which the CA affirmed. MRs to question the ruling were
denied even at the SC.
Respondents Pelagia Fernando and Pablo G. Santos had all the while been
occupying the second floor of the building standing on the property involved.
Fernando asked them to vacate the premises both orally and in writing but the
Spouses Santos refused to leave. An unlawful detainer complaint was initated
against them which led to the order for them to vacate the premises and to pay
rent.
Spouses Santos filed a petition for prohibition saying that the court had no
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case since they had been in adverse
possession more than a year before the complaint was instituted. The CFI then
issued a restraining order. The decision by Judge Vasquez stated that spouses
Santos had been unlawfully withholding possession for more than one year
prior to the filing of the complaint. The proper action was accion publiciana, not
unlawful detainer so the proceedings under the unlawful detainer complaint
were nullified, including the writ of execution.
Fernando filed a petition for certiorari regarding Judge Vasquez’s decision with
the SC. However, counsel for Sps Santos advised the court that the parties
had already amicably settled the issue (spouses vacated) through a CA
decision so the issue should be rendered moot. Fernando opposed this
because he feared that Judge Vasquez’s decision “under review” would be
made final and permanent.
ISSUE: WON Judge Vasquez erred in ruling that the CFI had no jurisdiction
over the unlawful detainer case – No
HELD:
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders an order or judgment
void or voidable. Errors of jurisdiction are reviewable on certiorari;
errors of judgment, only by appeal. Let us not lose sight of the true
function of the writ of certiorari - "to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." And, abuse of
discretion must be so grave and patent to justify the issuance of the writ.
Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 271, where we find the following passage:
"The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects
of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. It is truly
an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly
extraordinary cases…”
In this case, if error there was, it was simply an error of judgment in his
appreciation of the facts and the law. Petitioner does not convince us that when
the judge so decided, he acted in grave abuse of discretion and/or exceeded
or acted without jurisdiction. The judge concededly had the jurisdiction to
render the judgment under review. If ever he committed a mistake on the
merits of the case, it was in the exercise of such jurisdiction. The error
being one of judgment, not of jurisdiction, petitioner's remedy is appeal,
not certiorari. Conversely, where another such remedy like an appeal may be
taken, certiorari does not lie. And, it is by now abundantly clear
that certiorari may not be utilized to offset the adverse effect of failure to
appeal.
Here, petitioner had the remedy of appeal from the judgment of respondent
judge. In fact, he did attempt to appeal. But his appeal was dismissed by this
Court for failure to pay the docket fee on time. He cannot revive his appeal. He
had lost it through his own fault. Certiorari is no substitute for appeal. In this
case, there is no compelling reason for the Court to entertain the petition.
The amicable settlement, in the nature of a judicial compromise, has the effect
and authority of res judicata. We are then faced with a situation whereby all
the judicial proceedings relative to the controversy between petitioner and
respondent spouses have become moot and academic. These are the
ejectment case in the city court, the prohibition case in the Court of First
Instance, and the present certiorari proceedings before this Court. To nullify
the decision of Judge Vasquez would be an idle ceremony.
Surely, it is not the function of this Court to furnish an answer to a purposeless
question that no longer exists. Because of the supervening circumstance of an
amicable settlement between the parties, this Court has no alternative but to
dismiss the present petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998
RENATO CUDIA, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.
CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, Respondents.
If the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar to subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment
that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
 deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
Facts:
Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga allegedly for possessing an
unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Angeles City, where he was detained.
The City Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The Information states that he
committed the crime in Angeles City. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 60,
Angeles City. Cudia pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-
trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the
information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in
Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the
judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving
crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of
the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed
outside of the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the
Angeles City RTC.

However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also
filed an information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was likewise raffled to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in the first
criminal case to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, it appearing
that the apprehension of the accused was made in Mabalacat, Pampanga,
within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The trial court
granted the motion.

Cudia then filed a Motion to Quash the second criminal
case on the ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had been arraigned in the
first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition would
violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash. CA affirmed that there was
no double jeopardy on the ground that the petitioner could not have been
convicted under the first information as the same was defective.


Issue:
Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in
the criminal charges against her


Held:

It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no
authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.

It is thus the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should
prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of
Angeles City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting
officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or presented by the
prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not
acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the
lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in filing the information in question is
petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a
waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of
Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid
information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites,
confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein
petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this
view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer
signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express
consent.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or
information in the former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information
was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the
conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to
file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a
defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed
by the prosecution. (Cudia vs. CA, G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998)
[G.R. No. 136588. July 20, 2000.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PILAR ESTIPULAR (AQUIESCENCE
OF THE COURT)
Petitioner, Pilar Estipular, filed a Petition for Reconstitution before the Regional
Trial Court of La Union. She declared that she [was] the only surviving legal
heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who died intestate in Caba, La Union.
"On June 15, 1994, the RTC ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published
for two successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at the
main entrance of the Municipal Building of Caba, La Union at least thirty
(30) days from the initial hearing set for September 8, 1994 (Records, p. 8).
However, the National Printing Office advised the lower court to reschedule its
original date of hearing as it could not meet the schedule of publication.
"The initial hearing materialized on December 7, 1994. The petitioner and the
public prosecutor appeared [i]n such hearing. The case was called to invite
private oppositors to come forthwith, but nobody registered his/her opposition.
Due to the absence of the counsel for the petitioner, the latter was allowed to
establish jurisdictional facts at the next hearing date, January 24, 1995. On the
latter date, the petitioner presented the jurisdictional facts with the
corresponding documentary requirements prescribed by law. When the
Exhibits were offered in evidence, the Public Prosecutor never interposed any
objection, hence, all the exhibits were admitted.
The RTC rendered it’s decision finding the petition to be well-taken and
supported by evidence. Hence, granting the petition.
The petitioner appealed to the CA contending that respondent failed to the
comply with the requisites provided by Republic Act No. 26 as it requires the
posting of the Notice of Hearing at the main entrance of the provincial building,
not just on municipal building.
However, the CA rendered it’s decision affirming in toto the decision of the
RTC. The CA ruled that it is a settled rule that proceedings for judicial
reconstitution of certificates of title are proceedings in rem. Thus, Notice of
Hearing by proper publication is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction.
The purpose of such publication is to apprise the whole world that such a
petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause
may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing
the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world
as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it. Since there was a valid publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official
Gazette, then it is sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the court to hear and
determine the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not supposed substantial compliance with the requirements of
Republic Act No. 26 is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court over the
case."
RULING:
No. Requirements for Reconstitution of Title Are Mandatory and Jurisdictional.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by
the Constitution or by law. It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the
parties; (2) acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of
the parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts. 10 Republic
Act No. 26 11 lays down the special requirements and procedure that must be
followed before jurisdiction may be acquired over a petition for reconstitution
of title.
In Section 13 of said Act, it provides among others that the Court shall cause
a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at
the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette,
and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of
the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated,
at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
These requirements are mandatory and compliance with them is jurisdictional
as provided in Republic v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127969, June 25, 1999.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of Hearing of respondent’s
Petition for Reconstitution was not posted at the main entrance of the
provincial building. Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.
It must be emphasized that under the law, the publication of a notice of hearing
in the Official Gazette is not enough. The posting of said notice at the main
entrances of both the municipal and the provincial building is another equally
vital requisite. The purposes of the stringent and mandatory character of the
legal requirements of publication, posting and mailing are to safeguard against
spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested
parties of the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to
intervene in the proceeding. 17
The publication of the Notice of Hearing in the Official Gazette does not justify
the respondent’s failure to comply with the legal requirement of posting the
Notice at the main entrance of both the municipal and the provincial buildings.
The principle of substantial compliance cannot be applied to the present
case, as the trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the Petition
hinged on a strict compliance with the requirements of the law.ch
True, the root of this failure may be traced to the June 15, 1994 Order of the
trial court, which failed to include a directive that the Notice of Hearing be
posted at the main entrance of the provincial building. However, this oversight
cannot excuse noncompliance with the requirements of RA No. 26. Under the
circumstances, it is clear that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case because of its own lapse, which respondent failed to cure.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION, HLURB
CADIMAS V. CARRION
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 180394 September 29, 2008
TINGA, J.:
POINT OF THE CASE: Regular courts have jurisdiction over a complaint
filed by an ordinary seller of property (emphasis supplied).
The complaint must sufficiently describe the lot as a subdivision lot and sold
by the defendant in his capacity as a subdivision developer to fall within
the purview of P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 and thus within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB (emphasis supplied).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------The HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
Meaning: If buyer is complaining against a seller for unsound real estate
practices, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction.
If seller is complaining, it is the RTC which holds jurisdiction (such as in this
case).
FACTS:
Petitioner Cadimas, through her attorney-in-fact, Rosales, filed the
complaint for accion reivindicatoria and damages against respondents Carrion
and Hugo.
In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent Carrion were
parties to a Contract to sell, wherein petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a
town house to be paid in instalments. According to petitioner, Carrion had
violated said contract when she transferred ownership of the property to
respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which
authorized the latter to manage and administer the property for and in behalf
of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent Carrion in
writing to explain the alleged violation but the latter ignored petitioner’s letter,
prompting petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo vacate the
property and to cancel the contract.
Then, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant Carrion In Default,
alleging that despite the service of summons and a copy of the complaint,
Carrion failed to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
Respondent Hugo filed a Motion to Dismiss on her behalf and on behalf of
respondent Carrion, citing the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to hear the case
on the part of the RTC and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner.
Respondent Hugo argued that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint because ultimately, the sole issue
to be resolved was whether petitioner, as the owner and developer of the
subdivision on which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing
unsound real estate business practices.
RTC: issued an Omnibus Order, which denied the motion to dismiss. The RTC
held that the court’s jurisdiction is not determined by the defenses set up in the
answer or the motion to dismiss.
Respondent Hugo sought a reconsideration of the omnibus order.
The RTC issued an order, upholding its jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint.
The RTC set the pre-trial conference of the case.
***However, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a
special civil action for certiorari, praying that the Omnibus Order be reversed
and set aside and that the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
CA: set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Also, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint.
HELD: Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint.
RATIO:
The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was
commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an
action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court
which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of an action.
Reading Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344 which enumerates
the regulatory functions of the HLURB together with its preamble shows that
the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts
between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and
statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.
Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that petitioner is the
proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There is nothing in the
allegations in the complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to
sell that would suggest that the nature of the controversy calls for the
application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D. No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the RTC of its jurisdiction over actions for breach of contract and damages which
powers and duties of the HLURB is concerned. has been conferred to it by law.

Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as worded,
where the HLURB’s jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and
estate practices," the logical complainants would be the buyers and customers in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or condominium Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
builders and realtors), and not vice versa.
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer. The
contract to sell does not contain clauses which would indicate that petitioner B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
has obligations in the capacity of a subdivision lot developer, owner or broker condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
or salesman or a person engaged in real estate business. From the face of the salesman; and
complaint and the contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller of an interest
in the subject property who is seeking redress for the alleged violation of the C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
terms of the contract to sell. Petitioner’s complaint alleged that a contract to filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
sell over a townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner and developer, dealer or salesman.
respondent Carrion and that the latter breached the contract when Carrion
transferred the same to respondent Hugo without petitioner’s consent. Thus,
petitioner sought the cancellation of the contract and the recovery of
possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the complaint is well
within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

On Respondent’s contention:

Respondents claim that the resolution of the case ultimately calls for the
interpretation of the contract to sell and the determination of whether petitioner
is guilty of committing unsound real estate business practices, thus, the proper
forum to hear and decide the matter is the HLURB. The argument does not
impress.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost
entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the
court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the matters to be consulted. Thus, the allegations in respondents’
motion to dismiss on the unsound real estate business practices allegedly
committed by petitioner, even if proved to be true, cannot serve to oust the
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as successor-in-interest of Far East
Bank and Trust Company, Petitioner, EDUARDO HONG, doing business
under the name and style SUPER LINE PRINTING PRESS and the COURT
OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision[1] dated
September 27, 2002 and Resolution[2] dated January 12, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64166.
The EYCO Group of Companies (“EYCO”) filed a petition for suspension of
payments and rehabilitation before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 09-97-5764. A stay order was issued on
September 19, 1997 enjoining the disposition in any manner except in the
ordinary course of business and payment outside of legitimate business
expenses during the pendency of the proceedings, and suspending all actions,
claims and proceedings against EYCO until further orders from the SEC.[3] On
December 18, 1998, the hearing panel approved the proposed rehabilitation
plan prepared by EYCO despite the recommendation of the management
committee for the adoption of the rehabilitation plan prepared and submitted
by the steering committee of the Consortium of Creditor Banks which appealed
the order to the Commission.[4] On September 14, 1999, the SEC rendered its
decision disapproving the petition for suspension of payments, terminating
EYCO’s proposed rehabilitation plan and ordering the dissolution and
liquidation of the petitioning corporation. The case was remanded to the
hearing panel for liquidation proceedings.[5] On appeal by EYCO, (CA-G.R.
SP No. 55208) the CA upheld the SEC ruling. EYCO then filed a petition for
certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 145977,which case was
eventually dismissed under Resolution dated May 3, 2005 upon joint
manifestation and motion to dismiss filed by the parties. [6] Said resolution had
become final and executory on June 16, 2005.[7]
Petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), filed with the Office of the Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, a petition for extra-judicial
foreclosure of real properties mortgaged to it by Eyco Properties, Inc. and Blue
Star Mahogany, Inc. Public auction of the mortgaged properties was
scheduled on December 19, 2000.[8]
Claiming that the foreclosure proceedings initiated by petitioner was illegal,
respondent Eduardo Hong, an unsecured creditor of Nikon Industrial
Corporation, one of the companies of EYCO, filed an action for injunction and
damages against the petitioner in the same court (RTC of Valenzuela City).
After hearing, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss[10] arguing that by plaintiff’s own
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction over the reliefs prayed for belongs to
the SEC, and that plaintiff is actually resorting to forum shopping since he has
filed a claim with the SEC and the designated Liquidator in the ongoing
liquidation of the EYCO Group of Companies. In his Opposition,[11] plaintiff
(respondent) asserted that the RTC has jurisdiction on the issue of propriety
and validity of the foreclosure by petitioner, in accordance with Section 1, Rule
4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the suit being in the
nature of a real action.
On January 17, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.[12] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.[13] Petitioner challenged the validity of the trial court’s ruling before the
CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss. It held
that questions relating to the validity or legality of the foreclosure proceedings,
including an action to enjoin the same, must necessarily be cognizable by the
RTC, notwithstanding that the SEC likewise possesses the power to issue
injunction in all cases in which it has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 6 (a) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. Further, the CA stated that an action
for foreclosure of mortgage and all incidents relative thereto including its
validity or invalidity is within the jurisdiction of the RTC and is not among those
cases over which the SEC exercises exclusive and original jurisdiction under
Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the trial court in issuing the assailed orders.
ISSUE: WON the RTC can take cognizance of the injunction suit despite the
pendency of SEC Case No. 09-97-5764
HELD: The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear and decide
a case.[14] A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
conferred only by the Constitution or by statute.[15] The nature of an action and
the subject matter thereof, as well as which court or agency of the government
has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of
the complaint in relation to the law involved and the character of the reliefs
prayed for, whether or not the complainant/plaintiff is entitled to any or all of
such reliefs.[16] And jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement
of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. [17]
Perusal of the complaint reveals that respondent does not ask the trial court to
rule on its interest or claim -- as an unsecured creditor of two companies under
EYCO -- against the latter’s properties mortgaged to petitioner. The
complaint principally seeks to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings initiated by
petitioner over those properties on the ground that such properties are held in
trust and placed under the jurisdiction of the appointed Liquidator in SEC Case
No. 09-97-5764. Thus, Civil Case No. 349-V-00 is one for injunction with
prayer for damages.
An action for injunction is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or
continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a
particular act. It has an independent existence, and is distinct from the
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as a
part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. In an action for
injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or
mandatory, may issue.[18]
As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the jurisdiction of the
RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as
the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7691.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising x xx judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds
Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00). (Italics
supplied.)
On the other hand, Sec. 6 (a) of P.D. No. 902-A empowered the SEC to “issue
preliminary or permanent injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all
cases in which it has jurisdiction.” Such cases in which the SEC exercises
original and exclusive jurisdiction are the following:
(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of
the board of directors, business associates, its officers or
partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the
stockholder, partners, members of associations or
organizations registered with the Commission;
(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or
partnership relations, between and among stockholders,
members or associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and the
state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to
exist as such entity; and
(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of
directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations,
partnerships or associations.[19]
Previously, under the Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, the SEC
upon termination of cases involving petitions for suspension of payments or
rehabilitation may, motuproprio, or on motion by any interested party, or on the
basis of the findings and recommendation of the Management Committee that
the continuance in business of the debtor is no longer feasible or profitable,
or no longer works to the best interest of the stockholders, parties-litigants,
creditors, or the general public, order the dissolution of the debtor and the
liquidation of its remaining assets appointing a Liquidator for the
purpose.[20] The debtor’s properties are then deemed to have been conveyed
to the Liquidator in trust for the benefit of creditors, stockholders and other
persons in interest. This notwithstanding, any lien or preference to any
property shall be recognized by the Liquidator in favor of the security or
lienholder, to the extent allowed by law, in the implementation of the liquidation
plan.[21]
The SEC finally disposed of said case when it rendered on September 14,
1999 the decision disapproving the petition for suspension of payments,
terminating the proposed rehabilitation plan, and ordering the dissolution and
liquidation of the petitioning corporation. With the enactment of the new law,
jurisdiction over the liquidation proceedings ordered in SEC Case No. 09-97-
5764 was transferred to the RTC branch designated by the Supreme Court to
exercise jurisdiction over cases formerly cognizable by the SEC.
There is no showing in the records that SEC Case No. 09-97-5764 had been
transferred to the appropriate RTC designated as Special Commercial Court
at the time of the commencement of the injunction suit on December 18, 2000.
Given the urgency of the situation and the proximity of the scheduled public
auction of the mortgaged properties as per the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale,
respondent was constrained to seek relief from the same court having
jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceedings – RTC of Valenzuela City.
Respondent thus filed Civil Case No. 349-V-00 in the RTC of Valenzuela City
on December 18, 2000 questioning the validity of and enjoining the
extrajudicial foreclosure initiated by petitioner. Pursuant to its original
jurisdiction over suits for injunction and damages, the RTC of Valenzuela City,
Branch 75 properly took cognizance of the injunction case filed by the
respondent. No reversible error was therefore committed by the CA when it
ruled that the RTC of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 had jurisdiction to hear and
decide respondent’s complaint for injunction and damages.

Lastly, it may be mentioned that while the Consortium of Creditor Banks had
agreed to end their opposition to the liquidation proceedings upon the
execution of the Agreement[24] dated February 10, 2003, on the basis of which
the parties moved for the dismissal of G.R. No. 145977, it is to be noted that
petitioner is not a party to the said agreement. Thus, even assuming that the
SEC retained jurisdiction over SEC Case No. 09-97-5764, petitioner was not
bound by the terms and conditions of the Agreement relative to the
foreclosure of those mortgaged properties belonging to EYCO and/or other
accommodation mortgagors.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision

dated September 27, 2002 and Resolution dated January 12, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64166 are AFFIRMED.
ANNIE GERONIMO, SUSAN GERONIMO AND SILVERLAND ALLIANCE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH*, PETITIONERS, VS. SPS. ESTELA C. CALDERON
AND RODOLFO T. CALDERON, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
On May 15, 2006, respondents spouses Estela and Rodolfo Calderon
(respondents, for brevity) filed a verified complaint5 before the HLURB
Regional Office against Silverland Realty & Development Corporation,
Silverland Village I Homeowners Association, Silverland Alliance Christian
Church (SACC), Joel Geronimo, Annie Geronimo, Jonas Geronimo and Susan
Geronimo, for specific performance and for the issuance of cease and desist
order and damages.
Sometime in May 2005, a building was erected beside the house of Joel and
Annie. Jonas Geronimo directed the construction. When respondents asked
about the building, Susan Geronimo told them that her son, Joel, had bought
the adjacent lot to build an extension house in order to create a wider playing
area for the Geronimo grandchildren because their two-storey house could no
longer accommodate their growing family. When the construction was finished,
the building turned out to be the church of petitioner SACC.
The noise allegedly affected respondents’ health and caused inconvenience
to respondents because they were forced to leave their house if they want
peace and tranquility. Respondents sought assistance from the President of
the homeowners’ association. SACC, through Atty. Alan Alambra promised
that it will take steps to avoid church activities beyond 10:00 p.m. However,
the intolerable noise still continued.
SACC, Joel Geronimo, Annie Geronimo, Susan Geronimo and Jonas
Geronimo averred that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the case which
primarily involves abatement of nuisance, primarily lodged with the regular
courts. They also alleged lack of privity with respondents and that they are not
real parties-in-interest with respect to the subject matter of the complaint.
Silverland Realty & Development Corporation and Silverland Village 1
Homeowners Association did not respond to the complaint.
The HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision6 on October 22, 2007 and ordered
petitioners not to use the property at #46 Silverlane Street for religious
purposes and as a location of a church.
The CA agreed with the OP that the case involves the failure of a developer of
a subdivision project and the homeowners’ association to ensure that the
construction of structures inside the subdivision conforms to the approved
plan. The CA said that the Development Permit issued for the subdivision
project clearly indicates that the subject lot’s use is residential. Petitioners,
however, succeeded in constructing a church thereon, and the developer and
the homeowners’ association failed to maintain the residential usage of the lot.
CA also dismissed petitioner’s MR.
Issue: Whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over the present controversy
Held:
We deny the petition and affirm the CA ruling.
We agree with the CA that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the present
controversy. We have ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and
decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject
matter or property involved and the parties.12
We explained the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction in Christian General
Assembly, Inc. v. Spouses Ignacio13 in this wise:
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating
or empowering such agency. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344,
"EMPOWERING THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT
OF EXECUTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS DECISION UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957," clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial
dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in the following specific
terms:
SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi- judicial authority
must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.D. No. 957, "THE
SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE."
Section 3 of this statute provides:

x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. – The National Housing

Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.

In Maria Luisa Park Association,Inc. (MPLAI) v. Almendras,14 we also ruled

that:

The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions
regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The business of developing
subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare,
any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to
the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the exercise
of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary
power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular
courts. (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, respondents are buyers of a subdivision lot from

subdivision owner and developer Silverland Realty & Development
Corporation. Respondents’ action against Silverland Realty & Development
Corporation was for violation of its own subdivision plan when it allowed the
construction and operation of SACC.16 Respondents sued to stop the church
activities inside the subdivision which isin contravention of the residential use
of the subdivision lots. Undoubtedly, the present suit for the enforcement of
statutory and contractual obligations of the subdivision developer clearly falls
within the ambit of the HLURB’s jurisdiction. Needless to stress, when an
administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or
body.17
SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C. ERORITA, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195477, January 25, 2016
FACTS:
Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T-53000 in which San Mariano Academy
structures are built.
On April 25, 1990, Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale when Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita (Spouses
Erorita) former owners, failed to redeem it. With the consent of Spouses
Dumlao, it however allowed Spouses Erorita to continue to operate the school
and to appoint Hernan and Susan Erorita as the school’s administrators.
On December 16, 2002, Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the
property for they had failed to pay monthly rent of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) since 1990. The Spouses Erorita however countered that the
Dumlaos allowed them to continue to run the school without rental out of
goodwill and friendship.
On March 4, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of
possession before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the defendants
Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita.
On June 4, 2007, the RTC ruled in favour of spouses Dumlao. It ordered the
defendants (1) to immediately vacate the property and turn it over to the
Spouses Dumlao, and (2) to pay accumulated rentals, damages, and
attorney’s fees. The RTC also prohibited the defendants from accepting
enrolees to the San Mariano Academy.
The defendants Erorita then appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint is
a case for unlawful detainer in which the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
THE CA RULING
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
The CA ruled that in civil actions involving a real property’s title or possession,
jurisdiction depends on the property’s assessed value and location – if the
assessed value exceeds fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in Metro Manila,
and twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside of Metro Manila, the RTC
has jurisdiction. If the assessed value does not exceed these amounts, then,
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction.
In the case, because the tax declaration showed that the assessed value of
the property and its improvements exceeded P20,000.00, the CA concluded
that the RTC had jurisdiction.
Petitioner’s Argument in SC
Spouses Erorita argued that: (a) the RTC had no jurisdiction because the
complaint shows a case for unlawful detainer; and (b) Hernan and Susan were
improperly impleaded as parties to this case.
Respondent’s Argument inSC
The respondents argued that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction because the case
involves issues other than physical possession; (b) even assuming the RTC
initially had no jurisdiction, the petitioners’ active participation during the
proceedings bar them from attacking jurisdiction; (c) Hernan and Susan are
real parties in interest as the lease contract’s primary beneficiaries; and (d) this
last issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or the not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.
HELD:
No. The court held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the
complaint shows a case for unlawful detainer.
The petition is partly meritorious.
We hold that: (1) the MTC had jurisdiction; and (2) the second issue was not
raised before the lower courts; thus, it cannot be considered in the present
case.
Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the complaint.
On the first issue, the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an
action and jurisdiction over the case. [5] Jurisdiction does not depend on the
complaint's caption.[6] Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other
issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction.[7]
To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a)
initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract
or by plaintiffs tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right
of possession is terminated; (c) the defendantremained in possession and (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand to vacate (February 12,
deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within 2004).
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property.[8] A
complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under
jurisdictional facts is omitted.[9] RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.
A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses
Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners to continue operating the school on
the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the
Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the
respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed
the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand to vacate
(February 12, 2004).

Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under
RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC's exclusive
jurisdiction regardless of the property's assessed value.[10]

The CA incorrectly applied our ruling in Barbosa. In that case, the complaint
did not state that (i) possession was unlawfully withheld and (ii) the complaint
was filed within a year from the last demand. Because these special
jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case were lacking, we held that the
case should be accion publiciana over which the RTC has jurisdiction.

In the present case, however, the complaint clearly contained the elements of
an unlawful detainer case. Thus, the case should have been filed with the
MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this case.

Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, [11] the RTC's
decision is void.

To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a)
initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract
or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right
of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and
deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property.

In the case, the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao,
agreed to allow the petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed
property; (b) in a demand letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao
told the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the property; (c) the respondents
refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
FACTS:
In 1958, Senator Tamano married private respondent Zorayda Tamano in civil
rites. Prior to his death, particularly in 1993, Tamano also married petitioner
Estrelita Tamano in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
In 1994, private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib Tamano filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrelita on the
ground that it was bigamous. Private respondent claimed that Tamano and
Estrelita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus
making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.
Estrelita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action
alleging that “only a party to marriage” could file an action for annulment of
marriage against the other spouse. Petitioner likewise contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the shari’a courts
pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim.
The lower court denied the petition and ruled that it has jurisdiction since
Estrelita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not
exclusively under PD. No. 1083. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Petitioner referred the case to the Supreme Court where a resolution was
issued to refer the case to the CA for consolidation. Respondents Zorayda
however filed a motion, which the CA granted, to resolve the Complaint for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of other consolidated cases.
The CA ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
shari’a courts only when filed in places where there are shari’a courts. But in
places where there not shari’a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could
properly be filed before the Regional Trial Courts.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Shari’a Court and not the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature of action?
RULING:
The Court held that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject
case. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and
marital relations. There should be no question by now that what determines
the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.
The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration
that Estrellita and Taman were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is
because a court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses
set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
reconsideration, but only upon allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of
the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action.
Further, the court held that assuming that indeed the petitioner and Tamano
were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the
general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts
are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to
marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Detailed Version:
I. Established Facts
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married
private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their
marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May
1994. Prior to his death, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur. On 23 November 1994
private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on
the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making
the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent. Private respondents
alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single
when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage
with Romeo C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance
with publication requirements. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage"
could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence,
it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage.
Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both
Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant
case was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws and not the Regional Trial Court.
II. Complaint/Petition
a. ZORAYDA TAMANO AND ADIB TAMANO - filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of
Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. They contended that Tamano and
Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and
single, respectively, thus making the entries in the
marriage contract false and fraudulent. Private
respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced
Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single when she
married Tamano as the decision annulling her
previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never
became final and executory for non-compliance with
publication requirements.
b. ESTRELITA TAMANO - filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of
the action. She alleged that "only a party to the
marriage" could file an action for annulment of
marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only
Tamano who could file an action for annulment of
their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that
since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and
married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try
the instant case was vested in the shari'a courts
pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws.
III. RTC/MTC/Quasi-Judicial Agency Resolution
c. LOWER COURT - Denied the motion to dismiss and
ruled that the case was properly cognizable by the
RTC of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano
were married in accordance with the Civil Code and
not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 or the
Code of Muslim Personal laws.
d. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION – DENIED.
IV. Appeal/Petition (ex. Ordinary Appeal, Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, etc)
e. PETITIONER, ESTRELITA TAMANO FILED THE
INSTANT PETITION WITH THE SUPREME COURT-
seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of
respondent presiding judge of the RTC- Br. 89,
Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
and the order denying reconsideration thereof.
i. SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION - referred
the case to the Court of Appeals.
f. COURT OF APPEALS RESOLUTION – It affirmed
the decision of RTC, Quezon City.It ruled that the
instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of shari'a courts only when filed in places where there
are shari'a courts. But in places where there are no
shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could
properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court.
g. PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI - The
petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court
reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a
court and not the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
It seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br.
89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as
well as the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
V. Supreme Court Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that, As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Contrary to the
position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable herein. Assuming that indeed
petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same
would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a
courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to
marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Also, Under Sec. 19,
par. (6) of BP Blg. 129, “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .”

The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the
instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that
Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because
a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the
answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only
upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action.

The petition herein was denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City denying the
motion to dismiss was affirmed.
CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
FACTS:
Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of
Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the
Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said judgment became
final, a writ of execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made
on September 21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 9138 registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta
Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action,
interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of
land described in this title. " The Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial
Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor of Independent Mercantile
Corporation also stated that the sale referred only to the rights and interest of
Manuel Magali over the land described in TCT No. 9138. Manuel Magali is one
of the several children of Domingo Magali who had died in 1940 and herein
petitioner Modesta Calimlim.
However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963,
it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel
of land described in this title".
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to
compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in
order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of
the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in
his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court
directing him to surrender the said title.
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT
No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition
was granted by the respondent Court and in its Order dated July 13, 1967, it
directed the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Independent
Mercantile Corporation.
Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon
learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled,
filed a petition with the respondent Court, for cancellation of the title issued to
Independent Mercantile, but the same was dismissed.
Petitioners did not appeal the dismissal. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they
filed the complaint praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales
that had been made with respect to the property. Named as defendant in said
civil case was herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to
have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation on July 25,
1967. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title
over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim
annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss the case on
the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of
limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated
April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment. Thus, the petition before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Res Judicata applies.
HELD:
It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner
in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by
prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of
the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment
in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment
or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an
adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar
by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently
considered.
The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an
apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land
registration court, Although the said petition did not so state, that reliance was
apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been
settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance, acting
as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As
such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to
an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real
property.
In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the
second motion for reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29, to uphold the view that the petitioners are deemed estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance
of the petition for cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones who
invoked the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed
for therein. We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may
not be applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of the
doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar.
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them.
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In
by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492
doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.
principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the
departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not
as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not
lost by waiver or by estoppel.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered

the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled
that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to
dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As
defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they
learned that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and
illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or person
who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It
is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the
authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity
as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name
of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the
respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given
for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing,
and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the
parties which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility that such
dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as
a cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it
does a highly controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the
petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two
and one-half years after the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No.
39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the
[GR No. 221047, Sep 14, 2016 ]
MICHAEL A. ONSTOTT v. UPPER TAGPOS NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION
Facts:
Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an approximate area of 18,589 square meters, covered by OCT No. (-2645-)
M-556[5] situated in the Province of Rizal (subject property). Due to non-
payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of Rizal sold the subject
property at public auction to one Amelita A. De Serra (De Serra), the highest
bidder, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale[6] dated June 29, 2004.[7]
Respondent UTNAI, an association representing the actual occupants of the
subject property, subsequently redeemed[8] the same from De Sena.
Thereafter, or on March 31, 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint[10] for cancellation
of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 and for the issuance of a new title in its name
before the RTC against Albert and Federico M. Cas (Cas), the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal.[11] It alleged, among others, that it became
the owner of the subject property upon redemption thereof from De Sena and
that, consequently, it must be issued a new title. Moreover, Albert was an
American citizen who, under Philippine law, is not allowed to own a parcel of
land in the Philippines.
Efforts to serve summons upon Albert proved futile as he was not a resident
of the Philippines. Thus, summons was served through publication.[13]
Nonetheless, Albert still failed to file his answer. Hence, upon the motion of
UTNAI, Albert was declared in default and UTNAI was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.
The RTC found that UTNAI was able to prove, by a preponderance of
evidence, that it is the owner of the subject property after having legally
redeemed the same from De Serra, the highest bidder at a public auction.
The RTC Decision lapsed into finality. As a consequence, TCT No. B-9655
was issued in favor of UTNAI.
On August 26, 2009, herein petitioner Michael Onstott (Michael), claiming to
be the legitimate son19 of Albert with a certain Josephine Arrastia Onstott
(Josephine) filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment (Petition for
Relief),20 alleging that UTNAI, in its complaint, impleaded only Albert,
notwithstanding knowledge of the latter's death.21 He averred that, as parties
to the case, UTNAI fraudulently and intentionally failed to implead him and
Josephine in order to prevent them from participating in the proceedings and
to ensure a favorable judgment.22 He contended that his mother Josephine
was an indispensable party to the present case, being the owner of half of the
subject property, which he claimed to be conjugal in nature.23 Moreover, he
argued that UTNAI had no legal personality to redeem the subject property as
provided for in Section 26124 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known
as the "Local Government Code of 1991."
Later, Michael filed an Omnibus Motion:26 (1) to recall and/or set aside the
Certification of Finality of Judgment; (2) to set aside the Order dated June 16,
2009; and (3) to cancel TCT No. B-9655 and reinstate OCT No. (-2645-) M-
556.
He maintained that, based on the records, the Decision dated March 30, 2009
of the RTC was not served upon the defendant, Albert, by publication, as
required under Section 9,27 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court; hence, the same
has not yet attained finality.28 Accordingly, the Certification of Finality of the
said Decision was prematurely issued and must therefore be set aside. 29 In
addition, TCT No. B-9655 in favor of UTNAI must be cancelled and OCT No.
(-2645-) M-556 in the name of Albert should be reinstated.

Treating the Petition for Relief as a motion for reconsideration30 of its Decision,
the RTC, in an Order31dated January 3, 2012, denied the same and ruled that
UTNAI, having legal interest in the subject property and having redeemed the
same from the highest bidder in a tax auction, must be issued a new title in its
name. It added that the matters raised by Michael are best ventilated in a
separate case for reconveyance. However, while the RTC denied the petition,
it found that its March 30, 2009 Decision never attained finality for not having
been served upon Albert by publication in accordance with Section 9, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court. Thus, the issuance of the certificate of finality was
erroneous. Consequently, the cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 in
Albert's name and the issuance of TCT No. B-9655 in UTNAI's name were
premature; hence, it directed the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. B-9655
and to reinstate OCT No. (-2645-) M-556.
Dissatisfied, both parties separately appealed33 to the CA. In its appeal, UTNAI
ascribed error to the RTC in finding that its March 30, 2009 Decision never
attained finality for failure to publish the same and that it also erred in declaring
that the cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 in Albert's name and the
issuance of TCT No. B-9655 in its name were premature.34
On the other hand, Michael insisted that at the time of the filing of the instant
case in 2008, Albert was already dead, which means that the ownership of the
subject property had already devolved to his compulsory heirs. Consequently,
the latter should have been impleaded as defendants, failing which, the
Decision rendered by the RTC was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, he asserted that his mother Josephine was an indispensable party
to this case, being a compulsory heir and the owner of the half portion of the
subject property, which he claimed was conjugal in nature. He reiterated that
UTNAI had no legal interest to redeem the subject property. 35
The CA found UTNAI's appeal meritorious. Although it found that the March
30, 2009 Decision of the RTC did not attain finality, not having been served
upon Albert by publication, the CA also held that UTNAI was entitled to the
issuance of a new title in its name as a matter of right. It concurred with
UTNAI's contention that the cancellation of Albert's OCT No. (-2645-) M-556
is the direct legal consequence of UTNAI's redemption of the subject property
from the highest bidder at the public auction sale. Thus, as the absolute owner
of the subject property, UTNAI has the right to be placed in possession thereof
following the consolidation of ownership in its name and the issuance of the
corresponding title.37chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, the CA dismissed Michael's appeal and rejected his theory
that his mother Josephine was an indispensable party to the complaint filed by
UTNAI against Albert. It found that the subject property was registered in the
name of "Albert Onstott, American citizen, married to Josephine Arrastia"
which is merely descriptive of the civil status of Albert and does not show that
Josephine co-owned the subject property. Hence, contrary to Michael's
stance, the subject property was not conjugal in nature and it cannot be
presumed to be conjugal in the absence of evidence showing that it was
acquired during their marriage.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI
notwithstanding (a) the lack of jurisdiction over the person of Albert, the
registered owner of the subject property who has been dead prior to the
institution of UTNAI'S complaint; (b) the failure to implead his mother,
Josephine, as an indispensable party, since the subject property was allegedly
conjugal in nature; and (c) the lack of legal interest on the part of UTNAI to
redeem the subject property.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious. The Court is not convinced.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi,45 it
was ruled that "[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative
relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by
reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of
motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the
court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a p who makes a special appearance
to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding
from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:


(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance;


(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution."46
In this case, records show that Albert, the defendant in UTNAI's
complaint, died in the United States of America in 2004.47 Thus, on the
strength of his right as Albert's compulsory heir who has an interest in
the subject property, Michael filed the Petition for Relief before the RTC,
assailed the proceedings therein for failure to implead him and his
mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party, and sought affirmative
relief, i.e., the reversal of the RTC's March 30, 2009 Decision and the
reinstatement of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556.48 The RTC, holding that its own
Decision never attained finality for failure to publish the same, treated
the Petition for Relief as a motion for reconsideration and after due
proceedings, ruled upon its merits.

Based on the foregoing factual
milieu, the Court finds that although it may be true that jurisdiction was
not initially acquired over the person of the defendant,49i.e., Albert in this
case whose death, notably, was never brought to the attention of the RTC
until after it rendered judgment the defect in the lack of jurisdiction over
his person was effectively cured by the voluntary appearance of his
successor-in-interest/compulsory heir, Michael, who sought affirmative
relief before the RTC through the filing of the Petition for Relief which the
RTC treated as a motion for reconsideration of its judgment. Michael
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when, without any
qualification, he directly and squarely challenged the RTC's March 30,
2009 Decision as aforementioned. Having sought positive relief from an
unfavorable judgment, the RTC, therefore, acquired jurisdiction over his
person, and the due process requirements of the law have been satisfied.
That the RTC Decision was null and void for failure to implead an
indispensable party, Josephine, on the premise that the subject property
is conjugal in nature, is likewise specious. Michael posits that Josephine,
being Albert's wife, was entitled to half of the portion of the subject
property, which was registered as "Albert Onstott, American citizen,
married to Josephine Arrastia."


Article 160 of the New Civil Code[50] provides that all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the p who invokes
this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove
the said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there
is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.[51]

As Michael invokes the
presumption of conjugality, he must first establish that the subject property was
acquired during the marriage of Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the
presumption cannot stand. Indeed, records are bereft of any evidence from
which the actual date of acquisition of the subject property can be ascertained.
Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no
showing when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,[52] the subject
property is therefore considered to be Albert's exclusive property.
Consequently, Michael's insistence that Josephine who, the Court notes, has
never personally appeared in these proceedings to directly challenge the
disposition of the subject property sans her participation is a co-owner thereof
and necessarily, an indispensable party to the instant case, must therefore fail.


With respect, however, to the question of whether UTNAI has legal interest to
redeem the subject property from the highest bidder at the tax delinquency
public auction sale, the Court finds that the CA erred in its disquisition. Section
261 of RA 7160 provides:
 the property subject of the public auction in the appropriate proceeding
Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold. - Within one (1) year from the
date of sale, the owner of the delinquent real property or person having
legal interest therein, or his representative, shall have right to redeem
the property upon payment to the local treasurer of the amount of the
delinquent tax, including the interest due thereon, and the expenses of sale
from the date of delinquency to the date of sale, plus interest of not more than
two percent (2%) per month on the purchase price from the date of the sale to
the date of redemption. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of sale
issued to the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent real property or person
having legal interest therein shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption
which shall be issued by the local treasurer or his deputy.

From the date of
sale until expiration of the period of redemption, the delinquent real property
shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest
therein who shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof.

The local
treasurer or his deputy, upon receipt from the purchaser of the certificate of
sale, shall forthwith return to the latter the entire amount paid by him plus
interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month. Thereafter, the property
shall be free from the lien of such delinquent tax, interest due thereon and
expenses of sale. (Emphasis supplied)
"Legal interest" is defined as interest in property or a claim cognizable at
law, equivalent to that of a legal owner who has legal title to the property.[53] It
must be one that is actual and material, direct and immediate, not simply
contingent or expectant.[54] Moreover, although the taxable person who has
actual and beneficial use and possession of a property may be charged with
the payment of unpaid realty tax due thereon, such assumption of liability does
not clothe the said person with the legal title or interest over the property.[55]


In this case and based on the above-given definition, UTNAI, whose members
are the occupants of the subject property, has no legal interest to redeem the
same. Mere use or possession of the subject property alone does not vest
them with legal interest therein sufficient to clothe them with the legal
personality to redeem it, in accordance with Section 261 above-quoted. To rule
otherwise would be to defeat the true owner's rights by allowing lessees or
other occupants of a property to assert ownership by the simple expedient of
redeeming the same at a tax delinquency sale. Consequently, UTNAI's
redemption of the subject property as well as the issuance of a Certificate of
Redemption[56] in its favor was erroneous. Since the redemption is of no legal
effect, the said Certificate of Redemption must therefore be cancelled, without
prejudice to the right of UTNAI to recover the full amount of the redemption
price paid by it in the appropriate proceeding therefor.

As things stand,
UTNAI's redemption should be deemed void for being contrary to law. As a
result, all proceedings springing from the redemption ought to be
nullified[57] and the status quo prior thereto should revert. Thus, as previously
stated, UTNAI may recover the full amount it had paid for the redemption of
therefor. In the same vein, De Sena and the Provincial Government of Rizal,
who have not been impleaded as parties in this case, may commence the
appropriate proceedings to assert their rights under the law consequent to this
disposition.


WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Certificate of
Redemption issued by the Provincial Treasurer of the Provincial Government
of Rizal in favor of respondent Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Association, Inc.
is hereby declared VOID and of no legal effect, and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. B-9655 issued in the latter's name shall be permanently CANCELLED.


SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128803. September 25, 1998
ASIAVEST LIMITED, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
ANTONIO HERAS, Respondents
Facts:
1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio
Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the
amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong
Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal
guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be
recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to
overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.
3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award
of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full
payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed
the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA.
4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the
state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him
personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally served
on Heras in Hong Kong,
Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been
repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to the
party
Ruling:
YES.
1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the
time since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon
City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person
was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not
a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam,
summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong.
The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not
confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the
Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the
Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee, hence, he should have
been served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found
in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for
extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in
personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial
service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country,
because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the
undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for
good.
The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the
Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of HERAS.
This involves the issue of whether summons was properly and validly served
on HERAS. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon the defendant are governed by the lex
fori or the law of the forum,7 i.e., the law of Hong Kong in this case. HERAS
insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was presented as an
expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid service of summons on him.
In his counter-affidavit,8 which served as his direct testimony per agreement of
the parties,9 Lousich declared that the record of the Hong Kong case failed to
show that a writ of summons was served upon HERAS in Hong Kong or that
any such attempt was made. Neither did the record show that a copy of the
judgment of the court was served on HERAS. He stated further that under
Hong Kong laws (a) a writ of summons could be served by the solicitor of the
claimant or plaintiff; and (b) where the said writ or claim was not contested, the
claimant or plaintiff was not required to present proof under oath in order to
obtain judgment.
On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich testified that the
Hong Kong court authorized service of summons on HERAS outside of its
jurisdiction, particularly in the Philippines. He admitted also the existence of an
affidavit of one Jose R. Fernandez of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez &
Gatmaitan law firm stating that he (Fernandez) served summons on HERAS
on 13 November 1984 at No. 6, 1st St., Quezon City, by leaving a copy with
HERASs son-in-law Dionisio Lopez.10 On redirect examination, Lousich
declared that such service of summons would be valid under Hong Kong laws
provided that it was in accordance with Philippine laws.11
We note that there was no objection on the part of ASIAVEST on the
qualification of Mr. Lousich as an expert on the Hong Kong law. Under Sections
24 and 25, Rule 132 of the New Rules of Evidence, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority, tribunal, official body, or public officer may
be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof, which must be accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. The certificate may be issued by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer.
Nevertheless, the testimony of an expert witness may be allowed to prove a
foreign law. An authority12 on private international law thus noted:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above
rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal,13 that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme
Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code
and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were
contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law.
Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al.,14 upheld the Tax Court in considering the
pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents witness. In that case,
the counsel for respondent testified that as an active member of the California
Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State
of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California
law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited
Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as
published in Derrings California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co.,
Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was
offered in evidence by respondents. Likewise, in several naturalization cases,
it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the
prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered.15 Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate
General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law.16
There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the
specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in
rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a resident or
nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong
law on this particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-
called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed
that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.17
As stated in Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals,18 it will be helpful to determine first
whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem because the rules
on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
apply according to the nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his
personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead
of against the person.19 An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the
person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can
be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons
within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with
Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the
following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth
in Section 8;21 (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3)
service by publication, also with leave of court; 22 or (4) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.23
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-
residentwho does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court,
personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person.24 This method of service is possible if such
defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly
try and decide the case against him.25 An exception was laid down
in Gemperle v. Schenker26 wherein a non-resident was served with summons
through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his
representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover,
the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case.
On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court
provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless,
summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting
the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.27 Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found
in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the
Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action
seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located
in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in
the Philippines -- service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service
out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court;
or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 28

In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in
personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of
the principal debtor. Before we can apply the foregoing rules, we must
determine first whether HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong.
Fortunata de la Vega, HERASs personal secretary in Hong Kong since 1972
until 1985,29 testified that HERAS was the President and part owner of a
shipping company in Hong Kong during all those times that she served as his
secretary. He had in his employ a staff of twelve.30 He had business
commitments, undertakings, conferences, and appointments until October
1984 when [he] left Hong Kong for good.31 HERASs other witness, Russel
Warren Lousich, testified that he had acted as counsel for HERAS for a
number of commercial matters.32 ASIAVEST then infers that HERAS was a
resident of Hong Kong because he maintained a business there.
It must be noted that in his Motion to Dismiss,33 as well as in his Answer34 to
ASIAVESTs complaint for the enforcement of the Hong Kong court judgment,
HERAS maintained that the Hong Kong court did not have jurisdiction over him
because the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over non-
resident defendants, so as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon
personal service of summons within the state which renders the judgment.35
For its part, ASIAVEST, in its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 36 contended:
The question of Hong Kong courts want of jurisdiction is therefore a triable
issue if it is to be pleaded by the defendant to repel the foreign judgment. Facts
showing jurisdictional lack (e.g. that the Hong Kong suit was in personam,
that defendant was not a resident of Hong Kong when the suit was filed or that
he did not voluntarily submit to the Hong Kong courts jurisdiction) should be
alleged and proved by the defendant.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Reply (to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss),38 HERAS argued that the
lack of jurisdiction over his person was corroborated by ASIAVESTs allegation
in the complaint that he has his residence at No. 6, 1st St., New Manila, Quezon
City, Philippines. He then concluded that such judicial admission amounted to
evidence that he was and is not a resident of Hong Kong.
Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations
of facts, among which was that the residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is
New Manila, Quezon City.39
We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement
of the Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in issue. He never
challenged the service of summons on him through a security guard in his
Quezon City residence and through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his
Motion to Dismiss, he did not question the jurisdiction of the Philippine court
over his person on the ground of invalid service of summons. What was in
issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was concerned. We
therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS is a resident of New
Manila, Quezon City, Philippines refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction
over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation
of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong
at the time.
Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action
against him was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the
Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment
cannot be given force and effect here
in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no
longer so in November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of summons was
attempted to be made on him. As declared by his secretary, which statement
was not disputed by ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in October 1984 for
good.40 His absence in Hong Kong must have been the reason why summons
was not served on him therein; thus, ASIAVEST was constrained to apply for
leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable action
on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law
firm to serve the summons here in the Philippines.
In Brown v. Brown,41 the defendant was previously a resident of the
Philippines. Several days after a criminal action for concubinage was filed
against him, he abandoned the Philippines. Later, a proceeding quasi in
remwas instituted against him. Summons in the latter case was served on the
defendants attorney-in-fact at the latters address. The Court held that under
the facts of the case, it could not be said that the defendant was still a resident
of the Philippines because he ha[d] escaped to his country and [was] therefore
an absentee in the Philippines. As such, he should have been summoned in
the same manner as one who does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines.
Similarly, HERAS, who was also an absentee, should have been served with
summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong.
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service
will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we
apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant
who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if HERAS be
considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he
left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING
the petition in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29513.