REPUBLIC V. CA
Cabangis, the Court annulled the registration
FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent
application on a parcel of land, which was
approved and issued an original certificate of
title. Both the free patent and title specifically
mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor
encumbered within 5 years from the date of the
issuance of the patent. The District Land Officer,
acting upon reports that Morato had
encumbered the land and upon finding that the
subject land is submerged in water during high
tide and low tide, filed a complaint for
cancellation of the title and reversion of the
parcel of land to the public domain. RTC
dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free
patent condition prohibiting encumbering the
land within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?
HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides
that…lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of
approval of the application and for a term of 5
years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant…The contracts of lease and
mortgage executed by Morato constitute an
encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of
the Public Land Act because such contracts
impair the use of the property.
2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly
foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of
the tide. When the sea moved towards the
estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded
property became foreshore land and passed to
the realm of the public domain. In Government
v.
of land subject of cadastral proceedings when
the parcel subsequently became foreshore land.
In another case, the Court voided the
registration decree of a trial court and held that
said court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore
land to any private person or entity. The subject
land in this case, being foreshore land should
therefor be returned to the public domain.
SARMIENTO v. AGANA
FACTS:
Before Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo
wed, Rebecca’s mother offered a lot in
Paranaque that they could build their house on.
In 1967, they finally built their home which cost
about PhP8,000-10,000, thinking that someday,
the lot would be transferred to them in their
name. It turns out, though, that the lot was
owned by the Spouses Santos who , in turn, sold
the same to Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A year
later, Sarmiento ordered the Valentinos to
vacate their lot, then eventually filed and
Ejection Suit against them.
The lower court ruled in Sarmiento’s favor and
ordered her to pay 20,000 as the value of the
house. But the case was then elevated to the CFI
of Pasay (w/ Agana as Judge), and pursuant to
Art.448 of the CC (March 1979), the Court
ordered Sarmiento to exercise the option in 60
days to pay Ernesto 40,000 as the value of the
house or to let them purchase the land for
25,000. Sarmiento was not able to exercise this
option, and the CFI allowed Ernesto to deposit
the 25,000 purchase price with the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land owner is compelled to
exercise either option: to buy the building or to
sell the land?
HELD: B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a
proper remedy
Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good
C. Whether or not respondent can opt to
faith as they believed that Rebecca’s mother has
demolish the structure without exercising the
the capacity to eventually transfer the title of the
option to sell the land to the petitioner and the
land to them. In line with this, Sarmiento (LO)
latter cannot do buy the same
was required to exercise only 2 options: To
purchase the house or to sell the land to them, RULING: Petition was granted.
in this case, based on the value decided by the
Good faith or Bad Faith – No such doctrinal
courts. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the
statement that supports that the knowledge of
option within the allotted period, and based on
metes and bounds of a land due to the Torrens
Art. 448, the LO is compelled by law to exercise
system would amount to bad faith if there was
either option. Not choosing either is a violation
encroachment on the land of another.
of the law.

TECHNOGAS PHIL. v. CA
A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the
FACTS wall was already built. Even the respondent did
not knew about the encroachment until he has
Petitioner bought a lot together with the
hired a surveyor.
building and improvements including the wall
which encroached that of the defendant. Upon
learning of such encroachment, petitioner B. Where one derives title to the property from
offered to buy the land but defendant refused. another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the
After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner
property, is evidence against the former. And
agreed to demolish the wall (but the case did not
possession in good faith does not lose this
state what happened to this agreement, my
character except when the possessor is aware of
assumption is that it did not happen due to
this impropriety.
conflicts that arose after)

C. The encroachment was very narrow which can

Defendant dug a canal along the wall which
be considered as a mere error. Remedy –
caused a portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed
the petitioner, despite being a purchaser of the
a supplemental complaint re the action and a
original builder, can compel the landowner to
separate criminal action of malicious mischief
either buy the property or sell the piece of land
(which the wife was convicted of)
because:

1. He was really unaware of the

RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA
encroachment basing on the fact
reversed. Note that respondent wants to have
presented by both sides.
the wall demolished.
2. When the petitioner bought the land, he
ISSUES:
has stepped into the rights of the original
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad owner (hence, the right to compel the
faith because it is 'presumed to know the metes LO to buy or sell is also transferred)
and bounds of his property.'
 FACTS:
Estoppel – Petitioner is not considered in
The case involves Petitioner Florencio Ignao and
estoppel only because it has previously agreed to
his Uncles Juan and Isidro Ignao as Respondents.
demolish a part of the wall. Rather, it was to be
Both Petitioner and Respondents co-owned land
negotiated by the parties concern. In the
with 534 sqm (about the size of an Olympic
meantime, petitioner has to pay the rent for the
swimming pool.) in Cavite. The parties had a
property occupied by its building only up to the
falling out (maybe the uncles had bad breath)
date when respondent serves notice of their
and so attempted to partition the land, with 133
option. Case remanded back to the trial court for
going to the uncles and 266 going to Petitioner.
determination of the value of the land and the
The attempt failed. Later, Petitioner discovered
number of days to allot for the respondent to
that the two houses of Respondent uncles
choose an option.
encroached his land. Juan ate 42 sqm and Isidro
SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. OBESIA ate 59 sqm… for the grand total of 101 sqm. He
complained.
FACTS:

An
The RTC said that uncles built in good faith
action of partition was filed by the plaintiffs.
therefore that exempts them from damages. Art
Together with the
448 therefore applies But things didn’t go to well
defendants, they were owners pro-
for the Petitioner. The RTC said that if Petitioner
indiviso of a parcel of land. In the survey
opted to appropriate the sections of the
conducted by the trial court it was found that the
encroaching houses, the Uncles will be left with
defendant’s house encroached on the lot of
worthless hovels. Hence, RTC ordered Petitioner
plaintiff.
to just sell his land which was encroached. “No
Good!” cried Petitioner and he appealed to the
IAC. He lost again. Petitioner trooped to the SC
HELD: for vindication

When a co-ownership is terminated by the

partition and it was found that
the house of defendants overlaps a portion
of land of plaintiffs, which defendants built in
good faith, Article 448 can still be applied
IGNAO V. IAC
When co-ownership is terminated by division of
land, Art 448 applies to parties in good faith. The
party whose land is encroached upon has the sole
right to choose whether to sell his land
encroached or to appropriate that which
encroaches his land.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner has the right to
choose whether to appropriate the house
encroaching his land or to sell his land.
2. Whether or not the courts and respondents
can rob Petitioner of the options provided for
under Art 448.
HELD:
Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate
the houses or to sell his land! The ruling of the
RTC and IAC contravened the explicit provisions
of Art 448 which granted him the explicit right to
choose. The law is clear when it bestows choice reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art.
upon the aggrieved land owner and not upon the 1678 (NCC) which provides that, ” if the lessee,
builders or the courts. makes, in good faith, useful improvements which
are suitable to the use for which the lease is
BALUCANAG VS. FRANCISCO122 SCRA 344
intended, without altering the form or substance
of the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2
FACTS: The petitioner bought a lot owned by of the value of the improvements at the time.
Mrs. Charvet which was then previously leased Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
by the latter to one Richard Stohner. The said amount, the lessee may remove the
lease contract provided that the lessee may improvements even though the principal thing
erect structures and improvements which shall may suffer damage thereby. He shall not.
remain as lessee’s property and he may remove However, cause any more impairment upon the
them at any time. It further provided that should property leased than is necessary.”
the lessee fail to remove the same structures or
improvements within two months after the
expiration of the lease, the lessor may remove
them or cause them to be removed at the
expense of the lessee. Stohner made fillings on
the land and constructed a house. When he
failed to pay the rent, the petitioner, through
counsel, sent Stohner a demand letter ordering
him to vacate the lot. The lessee contended that
he is a ‘builder in good faith.’

ISSUE: Is the lessee a builder in good faith?

HELD: No, the lessee cannot be considered a

builder in good faith. The provision under Art.
448 of the New Civil Code (Philippine) on a
builder of good faith applies only to the owner of
the land who believes he is the rightful owner
thereof, but not to a lessee who’s interest in the
land is derived only from a rental contract.
Neither can Stohner be considered a ‘possessor
in good faith’. A possessor in good faith is a party
who possesses property believing that he is its
rightful owner but discovers later on a flaw in his
title that could indicate that he might not be its
legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because
he knows right from the start that he is merely a
lessee and not the owner of the premises. As a
mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the
property at his own risk such that he cannot
recover from the owner the reimbursements nor
he has any right to retain the premises until