DALURAYA VS OLIVA
Doctrine: Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.
ART. FACTS APPLICATION OF LAW
29
 Daluraya was charged for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death of
Marina Oliva sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when
a Nissan Vanette, traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.
 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually died,
prompting her daughter, Marla to file a criminal case against Daluraya, the purported driver of the
vehicle.
 The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages
sustained by her family as a result of her mother's death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented
his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c)Police Senior Inspector
Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that
Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.
 After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) asserting,
inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the
vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the incident
transpired.
 MeTC granted Daluraya's demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to
sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him.
 Aggrieved, Marla appealed
 RTC, insisting that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, which finding
was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of the case.
 RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC's ruling, declaring that "the act from which the
criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist."
 CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision
 In so ruling, the CA held that the MeTC's Order showed that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not
exonerated from civil liability.
 In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state
"whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist."
 A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the RTC sustained, will
show that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC
declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely
committed the crime charged against him."
 Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC's Order acquitting
Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the prosecution was not
able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which
bumped Marina Oliva" and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which
proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina
Oliva."
 Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as
affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya's acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt,
which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the
reception of Daluraya's evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that
Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution
to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him.
Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of
such acquittal.
COJUANGCO v CA
DOCTRINE: To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must
prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held
liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
ART. 30 FACTS
 Petitioner Cojuanco owns several racehorses which he entered in the
sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to
September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won.
 He then sent letters of demand to respondents PCSO and Carrascoso. Their
consistent reply was that the prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG
Commissioner Diaz.
 Petitioner then filed a case before the RTC of Manila. Before receipt of
summons, the PCGG advised the respondents that it poses no more
objection to the remittance of the prize winnings. Petitioner’s counsel,
however, refused to accept the prizes reasoning that the matter had
adready been brought to court.
 The RTC ruled for the petitioner. It held that PCSO and its Chairman,
Carrascoso, had no authority to withhold the winning of petitioner as no
writ of sequestration had been issued by the PCGG. It also found that
Carrascoso acted in bad faith by not paying petitioner his winnings. It
ordered a) PCSO and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his
winnings plus interest and income, and b) Carrasocoso to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.
 Defendants appealed to the CA. While this appeal was pending, petitioner
moved for partial execution pending appeal praying for the payment of the
principal amount of his winnings. Defendants interposed no objection and
thus, a writ of execution was issued and respondent PCSO delivered the
amount.
 The issues raised in the appeal are a) w/n defendants acted in bad faith in
withholding the prizes, and b) w/n the award of damages was proper.
 The CA held that there was no bad faith on the part of Carrascoso. It also
dismissed the case entirely.
 Petitioner now challenges the decision of the CA questioning its
jurisdiction and the deletion of the award of damages
APPLICATION OF LAW
ISSUE and RULING1: W/N W/N Carrascoso perfected his appeal despite non-filing of his
brief? YES
 (The argument here was that Carrascoso while he was serving as PCSO chair was
represented by the OGCC. He was already separated from government at the
time of appeal and thus, he cannot be represented by the OGCC, which in fact,
only appealed the award of damages which does not affect the PCSO.)
 Upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to
the legal services of the government corporate counsel, this development does
not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of appeal of the RTC
Decision. The filing of an appellants brief is not an absolute requirement for the
perfection of an appeal. Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court
is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal
of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, at its
sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction.
Issue and RULING 2: W/N the CA was correct in ordering the dismissal of the entire case?
NO:
 The SC found that what was appealed was only the award of damages, and not
the grant of winnings. The appellate court has no power to resolve unassigned
errors except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter or those that
are plain or clerical errors.
 As such, the RTC judgment as regards the award of the winning had become final
and no longer subject to appeal
ISSUE and RULING: W/N the award of damages was proper? NO, only nominal damages
is warranted.
 The SC found that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith in withholding the
winnings. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence.
It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. It found that there was sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that he did not act in bad faith, such as:
  Carrascoso letter’s to the PCGG chairman requesting clarification on
whether the winnings are subject to the order of sequestration and
instructions if they are so included.
 The fact that he was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG
when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize for
the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered saying he was
under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such payment. But the
moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize
winnings of plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he
immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to
the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off
all the winnings due the plaintiff.
 Carrascoso’s decision to withhold petitioners winnings could not be
characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice.
He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage
of the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner. He had
acted upon the PCGGs statement that the subject prizes were part of those
covered by the sequestration order
 The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear
showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. As such,
these awards by the RTC must be deleted.
However, the SC still found Carrascoso liable under Article 2221 in relation to
Article 32 of the New Civil Code.
 It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision (Article 32)
is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to
violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or
of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield
-- borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee -- to the law
of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves
that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our
commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels
us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression
 of the will of the predominant power in the community. Democracy
cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is
respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now
this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On
going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us
a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but
which reason nevertheless controls.
 To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional
rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of ones duties.
 While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGGs
instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis
therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there
was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse
winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ
covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order
requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process.
 Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages
to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not
for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
MERCED v  On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced, already married to Eufrocina
DIEZ Tan, filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with
Elizabeth Ceasar on the ground that he was threatened and
intimidated into signing an affidavit that he and Elizabeth had been
(BIGAMY)
living as husband and wife which was used by the Elizabeth in
securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for
(PREJUDICIAL
marriage license; that he was again threatened by Elizabeth and her
relatives to enter into the marriage on August 21, 1957; and that he
QUESTION) never lived with her. Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and
for moral damages in the amount of P2,000.
(ART. 31,  In her answer to the civil case, Elizabeth Ceasar denied the allegations
of the complaint and avers that neither she nor her relatives know of
NCC)
plaintiff’s previous marriage. According to her, it was Merced who
insisted on the marriage. As a counterclaim she asked for P50, 000
for moral damages. She later on filed a criminal complaint for bigamy
against Merced.
 Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance
until final termination of the civil case on the ground that the latter
involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the
accused. This motion was granted, but upon a motion for
reconsideration by the fiscal, the order for suspension was set aside
and denied on the ground that in People vs Mendoza, judicial
declaration of nullity of a second and bigamous marriage is not
necessary.
The civil case presents a prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the
criminal case. The elements of prejudicial question are the following: (1) it must be
determinative of the case before the court; (2) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.
 For the first element, in order that the Merced be held guilty of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth
Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the
civil action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy
can proceed. In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy,
the second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of a
valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. One of the
elements is consent, without it, a marriage would be illegal and void. Since
Merced claims that he was forced into the marriage, the validity of the second
marriage is determinative of the guilt of Merced in the crime of bigamy.
 For the second element, Spanish jurisprudence, requires that the essential
element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by
another court. This requirement is due to the fact that Spanish courts
jurisdictions’ are exclusively divided into civil or criminal. In the Philippines,
where our courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the
principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only
one courtbefore which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated.
But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for
the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from
itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy. (NOTE: IN THIS CASE, THE CIVIL
CASE AND THE CRIMINAL CASE WERE BOTH FILED IN THE SAME COURT)