G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967 Everything went well since then.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and
Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its
Civil Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and
ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros
Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife under the terms of
the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal,
Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in
the barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province,
being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased
Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said
minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their
lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila,
Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423,
22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403
and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left
his share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's
wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two
sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew anä nieces® The
usufruct oæ the fishponä situateä iî barrio Saî Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan,
above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî
the meantime¬ Maria Gerardo was appointeä administratrix. By virtue thereof,
she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf
and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The
distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed
forthwith. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the
issuance of new titles in her own name.
irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo
died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had
executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros,
both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the
same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the
later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented
by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court
held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her
husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court,
which affirmed the same.1
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of
the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his
widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion,
thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir,
and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly
attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of
the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired
the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire
any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court
declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable)
because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now
appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria
Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the basis of
Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being
so, has been included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that
since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate
under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim
Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as
defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled
to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the
Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of
Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that property
acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real
owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not
only dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the
properties received under the project of partition previously mentioned as
prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied
defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both
plaintiffs and defendant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code
has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is
obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void
under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children,
or descendants, but of heirs(without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the
testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his
testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his
estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud
impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be
a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller
than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was
here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri
vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case
involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator's
former marriage.
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on
the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This
view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a
controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889,
Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of
Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while untrue, was at no
time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. There can be
no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over civil
status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over
the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name
implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may
accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate
and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is
entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90,
Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree
of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was
erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same should
have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its
binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of
distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the
estate of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition
executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for
herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence
was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law
made, the decree of distribution can have no greater validity than that of the
basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature of a
judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil.
426, is invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the
proposition that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of
mistake or fraud, upon petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was
filed before the compromise agreement a proceeding, was consummated"
(cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us, however, the agreement of
partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased were
cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before the
decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were
shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of
partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was
in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions
whereof no objection had been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so.
Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939, provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed,
the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration
with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and
expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will,
so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall
be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in these
Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or
country. (Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court
distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court
was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like
issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and
742:
 If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the
proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of
the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47
Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265)
and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through
the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any
order that any be entered therein is binding against all of them." (See
also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution
of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of
Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy,
these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the
better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper
motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent
action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant
case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order
already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes
vs. Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she
signed the partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially
appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as
guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The
mere statement in the project of partion that the guardianship
proceedings of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the
court, does not mean that the guardian had not yet been appointed; it
meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated,
and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a
guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she
signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or
defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the record of the
testate proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or
authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia
Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention
that the order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and
void and may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings.
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only
made a party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the
proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the
jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father's
estate.
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria
Gerardo) could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child,
the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was
a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is
no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and
distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she
was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was committed, it was the widow,
Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor
children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the second
placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained
within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had
elapsed long ago.
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old
(Exhibit 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her
cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree
distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation started to
run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros
only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her
action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was already
barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case
contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced
evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by
verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife,
Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which rests
exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact,
the trial court made no mention of such promise in the decision under appeal.
Even more: granting arguendo that the promise was made, the same can not
bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the real parties in
interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and
void as to them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma
Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros
Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto
duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case
No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the,
Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition
and decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that
her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and
should account for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud
Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the plaintiffs'
action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have
been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under
appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to
reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in
said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said
appellee to accounting. Let the records be returned to the court of origin, with
instructions to proceed with the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4,
Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof, as prayed for in
the complaint No costs.
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee,
vs.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
J. Salonga and L. M. Abellera for oppositor and appellee.
Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for executor-appellee.
M. R. Sotelo for appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines,
died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28,
1954. In that same decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen
Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the
deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed in its
decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484).
In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the trial
court approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the
provisions of the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of
California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order of approval, and this Court,
on January 31, 1963, reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the
provisions of the will should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the
case to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as
provided by said law (G.R. No. L-16749).
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order
approving the project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30,
1964, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria
Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney,
and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had
expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia,
who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was
based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the
will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the
properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving
only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have
been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on the
sole question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should
pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance
of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire
estate.
The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following
clauses which are pertinent to the issue in this case:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (Now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency, the
same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of
One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now residing, as
aforesaid, at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all
the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which
may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime;
Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at
anytime prior to her decease having living issue, then and in that event, the
life interest herein given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give,
devise, and bequeath to my daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY the rest, remainder and residue of my property with the same force
and effect as if I had originally so given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and
provided, further, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die
without living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all
the rest, remainder and residue of my property one-half (1/2) to my well-
beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124,
Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the
children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs.
Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond
Christensen, of Manhattan Beach, California, U.S.A., share and share alike, the
share of any of the three above named who may predecease me, to go in
equal parts to the descendants of the deceased; and, provided further, that
should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton die before my own decease, then,
and in that event, the share of my estate devised to her herein I give, devise
and bequeath to her children, Elizabeth Borton de Treviño, of Mexico City
Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and Richard
Borton, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to the heirs of any of them who
may die before my own decease, share and share alike.
The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been
preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the
annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but
is governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir
to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to
him may demand that the same be fully satisfied." Appellant also suggests
that considering the provisions of the will whereby the testator expressly
denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless
although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively
disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which reads:
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause
the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those
set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and legacies and other
testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the
legitimate.
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is
entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of
Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and
Article 906 of Article 815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:
Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse ignorancia o
falta de memoria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso
no. Este no se encuentra plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido por
cualquir titulo una porcion de los bienes hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a
completar la legitima, pero que influeye poderosamente en el animo del
legislador para decidirle a adoptar una solucion bien diferente de la señalada
para el caso de pretericion.
El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado
bienes; pero haciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de
extraños o en favor de otros legitimarios por via de legado donacion o mejora
mayor cantidad de la que la ley de consentia disponer. El heredero forzoso no
puede perder su legitima, pero tampoco puede pedir mas que la misma. De
aqui su derecho a reclamar solamente lo que le falta; al complemento de la
porcion que forzosamente la corresponde.
... Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en testamento por
titulo de herencia legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna
cantidad o porcion de bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la misma. Tal
sentido, que es el mas proprio en al articulo 815, no pugna tampoco con la
doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el testamento se deja algo al heredero forzoso,
la pretericion es incompleta: es mas formularia que real. Cuando en el
testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay verdadera pretericion. (6 Manresa,
7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right to ask
for completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:
La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la pretericion puede
serlo pero se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste en cuanto olvida
o no atiende el testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del derecho a la
legitima del heredero forzoso preterido, prescindiendo absoluta y totalmente
de el y no mencionandole en ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o
no instituyendole en parte alguna de la herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni
por el de legatar o aunque le mencionara o nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos
bienes. Si le dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e insuficientes para cubrir su
legitima, ya no seria caso de pretericion, sino de complemento de aquella. El
primer supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el articulo 814, y produce
accion de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de
complemento de legitima por el 815 y solo original la accion ad suplementum,
para completar la legitima. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131.)
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not
instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to
him some part of the properties. Manresa continues:
Se necesita pues (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso; (b) Que
la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.
xxx xxx xxx
B. Que la omision sea completa — Esta condicion se deduce del mismo Articulo
814 y resulta con evidencia al relacionar este articulo con el 815. El heredero
forzoso a quien el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su testamento, no
se halla propiamente omitido pues se le nombra y se le reconoce participacion
en los bienes hereditarios. Podria discutirse en el Articulo 814 si era o no
necesario que se reconociese el derecho del heredero como tal heredero, pero
el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda. Aquel se ocupa de privacion completa o
total, tacita este, de la privacion parcial. Los efectos deben ser y son, como
veremos completamente distintos (6 Manresa, p. 428.)
La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial.
Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al legitimario,
despojarle de ella por completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814. Privar
parcialmente de la legitima, es menguarla o reducirla dejar al legitimario una
porcion, menor que la que le corresponde. A este caso se refiere el articulo
815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla general, y las consecuencias del que
brantamiento de esta regla se determina en los articulos 814 y 815. (6
Manresa p. 418.)
Again Sanchez Roman:
QUE LA OMISSION SEA TOTAL. — Aunque el articulo 814 no consigna de modo
expreso esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e
institucion o disposicion testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y
absoluta, asi se deduce de no hacer distincion o salvedad alguna empleandola
en terminos generales; pero sirve a confirmarlo de un modo indudable el
siguiente articulo 815, al decir que el heredero forzoso a quien el testador
haya dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que la corresponda,
podria pedir el complemento de la misma, lo cual ya no son el caso ni los
efectos de la pretericion, que anula la institucion, sino simplemente los del
suplemento necesario para cubrir su legitima. (Sanchez Roman — Tomo VI,
Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.)
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be
limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the
institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will
"by any title," as by legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is,
a titulo de heredero? In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in
the will as heir? This question is pertinent because in the will of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned as an heir — indeed her
status as such is denied — but is given a legacy of P3,600.00.
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative
answer to the question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436)
and Sanchez Roman (Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937), that view was changed by
Article 645 of the "Proyecto de Codigo de 1851," later on copied in Article 906
of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the citation given above, comments as
follows:
RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. — Se inspira el Codigo en
esta materia en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero con
alguna racional modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales al
heredero forzoso, a quien no se le dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de su
legitima, la accion para invalidar la institucion hecha en el testamento y
reclamar y obtener aquella mediante el ejercicio de la querella de inoficioso, y
aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro titulo que no fuera
el de heredero, sino al honor de que se le privaba no dandole este caracter, y
solo cuando era instituido heredero en parte o cantidad inferior a lo que le
correspondiera por legitima, era cuando bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad
suplementum para completarla, sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones
de heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.
El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica
necesidad que le inspira cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero
forzoso, a quien por cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le
corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo el derecho de pedir el complemento de la
misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las disposiciones testamentarias, que
se reduciran en lo que sean inoficiosas conforme al articulo 817, cuya
interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la sancion de la jurisprudencia
(3); siendo condicion precisa que lo que se hubiere dejado de menos de la
legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento, o sea por
disposicion del testador, segun lo revela el texto del articulo, "el heredero
forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado, etc., esto es por titulo de legado o
donacion mortis causa en el testamento y, no fuera de al. (Sanchez Roman,
Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 — p. 937.)
Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
January 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one
of those cases the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth
less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even
as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons. It was held
that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs
be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed. (6 Manresa, pp.
438, 441.)
The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed
wishes of the testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly
from the provisions of his will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his
natural daughter, and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that
she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to
assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective
attitude towards her would have undergone any change and that he would
have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was
expressly recognized by him.
The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by
appellees in support of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here
applicable, because it referred to a will where "the testator left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, and (that) without
expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to
them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the testator did not
entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of
P3,600.00.
The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares
of stocks in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash.
One-fourth (1/4) of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime.
Since she became the owner of her share as of the moment of the death of the
decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code), she is entitled to a corresponding
portion of all the fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing. These
include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The contention of Lucy
Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms of the will
cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of
Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has
been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute
heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die
without living issue. This substitution results in effect from the fact that under
paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate,
unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she
would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other
relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this, point, since it
is not one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the
limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that
which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which
means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.
Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the
project of partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside;
and the case is remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate
anew as indicated in this decision, that is, by giving to oppositor-appellee
Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no more than the portion corresponding to her
as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4) of the hereditary estate, after
deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the
will of the decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil Code. Costs
against appellees in this instance.
Concepcion, C.J., J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar
and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
July 30, 1967
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Oppositor-appellant has filed an ex-parte petition dated July 11, 1966, making
reference to an alleged oversight and asking for the corresponding correction,
in the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision, which reads
as follows:
One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has been
made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substituted
heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die
without living issue. This substitution results in effect from the fact that under
paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate,
unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she
would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other
relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this point, since it
is not one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the
limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that
which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864, Civil Code), which
means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.
(Decision, June 30, 1966, pages 14-15; emphasis ours).
Oppositor-appellant points out that the matter of substitution of heirs was
taken up and discussed in her brief particularly in pages 28 and 32 thereof.
This is indeed quite true, but the reference to and discussion of the rights of
the substitute heirs (called American heirs in the brief) appears to be merely
for the purpose of refuting the theory advanced by appellees and not for the
purpose of having the rights of said heirs defined in so far as, under the terms
of the will, they may affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant. This point of
course was not and could hardly have been squarely raised as an issue
inasmuch as the substitute heirs are not parties in this case. We have
nevertheless called attention "to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind
of substitution," because in the brief for oppositor-appellant, at page 45, she
makes the conclusion "that the Last Will and Testament of Edward E.
Christensen are valid under Philippine Law and must be given full force and
effect;" and to give them full force and effect would precisely affect the
legitime of oppositor-appellant.
Wherefore, the last paragraph before the dispositive part of our decision
quoted above is amended by eliminating the following phrase in the first
sentence: "although no reference to it has been made in the brief for
oppositor-appellant."
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-
SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the
nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for
probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et
al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy
Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
98–90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent
Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of
petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the
petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full
command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power
of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the
most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of
Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic
will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a
will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced
by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence
over SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence
and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted,
as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St.,
Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay
tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay
kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si
Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa
akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya
at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa
China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng
babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at
stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga
custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak
ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at
hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo
Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa
harap ng tatlong saksi.
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP.
Proc. No. 99–93396 were consolidated.
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783
of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the
will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it
is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination
of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic
and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not
apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to
the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition
for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow
Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would
amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position
clear: "for … respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void
… would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its
probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order
dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10
AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3
AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE
FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY
BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED
RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A
DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE
TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL
THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY
AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and
place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the
allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs,
legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but
rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in
the decedent’s will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.
None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in
the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will
that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was
mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work
injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners
was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the
ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards
the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his
estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited
by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the
same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by
Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a
whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance
of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of
children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against
the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which
the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has
been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage
with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and
need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition
of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory
heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s
opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory
heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness
to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and
that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person
to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are
set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-
93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the

testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must
be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it
cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned
in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more
liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention
of the testator.

In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form
of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be
given effect.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court
of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo,
p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591
ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying
respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial
Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby
ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late
Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29),
on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which petitioner and
his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina
and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio
Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a
translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites,
payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G.
Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the
testator's property, the will provided:
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and
money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by
me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and
presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother
Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses
there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be
given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina,
laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo
who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the
oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain
filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no
legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir
and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p.
158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower
court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition
and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of
Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985
(Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p.
146).
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
(Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986
(Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29,
1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the
intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate;
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers
to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to
private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their
omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests
that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so
instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of
the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what
matters and should be in violable.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file
the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain
and
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been
pretirited.
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil
Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving
spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from
the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however,
the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez,
whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner
(.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the
adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot
be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator
and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no
hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in
Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]).
The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and
devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except
insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil
Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra.
No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of
the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and
sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the
opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that
proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in
the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited
by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in
the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or
real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under
Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the
provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution
of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v.
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573
[1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and
Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner
has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118
SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the
dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals,
125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by
respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17
SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984];
and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v.
Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton The probate court
acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and
dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court
said:
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before
us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste
of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on
the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the
petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal
capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court
upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to
dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its
face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge
should have denied its probate outright. Where circumstances demand that
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the
extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the
issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the
following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the
trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds
for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing
on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32).
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void
as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of
the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies
of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable,
the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing
the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the
existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the
broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained,
particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
(Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Sepaate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result on the basic proposition that preterition in this case was
by mistake or inadvertence.
To my mind, an important distinction has to be made as to whether the
omission of a forced heir in the will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence,
or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or inadvertence, there is true
preterirton and total intestacy results. The reason for this is the "inability to
determine how the testator would have distributed his estate if none of the
heirs had been omitted or forgotten (An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).
The requisites of preterition are:
1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);
2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.
3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will.
(111 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical
addendum supplied).
On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a
defective disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case
the institution of heir is not wholly void but only insofar as it prejudices the
legitime of the person disinherited. Stated otherwise. the nullity is partial
unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.
Pretention is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if the
testator had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the
execution of the will, he would have instituted such heir. On the other hand, if
the testator attempts to disinherit a compulsory heir, the presumption of the
law is that he wants such heir to receive as little as possible from his estate.
(III Tolentino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition, pp. 174-175).
In the case at bar, there seems to have been mistake or in advertence in the
omission of the adopted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result that
total intestacy ensued.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result on the basic proposition that preterition in this case was
by mistake or inadvertence.
To my mind, an important distinction has to be made as to whether the
omission of a forced heir in the will of a testator is by mistake or inadvertence,
or voluntary or intentional. If by mistake or inadvertence, there is true
preterirton and total intestacy results. The reason for this is the "inability to
determine how the testator would have distributed his estate if none of the
heirs had been omitted or forgotten (An Outline of Civil Law, J.B.L. Reyes and
R.C. Puno, Vol. III, p. 54).
The requisites of preterition are:
1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);
2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.
3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will.
(111 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1973 Edition, pp. 224-225) (Parenthetical
addendum supplied).

On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a

defective disinheritance covered by Article 918 of the Civil Code in which case
the institution of heir is not wholly void but only insofar as it prejudices the
legitime of the person disinherited. Stated otherwise. the nullity is partial
unlike in true preterition where the nullity is total.

Pretention is presumed to be only an involuntary omission; that is, that if the

testator had known of the existence of the compulsory heir at the time of the
execution of the will, he would have instituted such heir. On the other hand, if
the testator attempts to disinherit a compulsory heir, the presumption of the
law is that he wants such heir to receive as little as possible from his estate.
(III Tolentino, Civil Code, 1973 Edition, pp. 174-175).

In the case at bar, there seems to have been mistake or in advertence in the
omission of the adopted daughter, hence, my concurrence in the result that
total intestacy ensued.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single,
without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers
and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that
said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will
annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the
legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their
opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending
line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and
objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preterition.
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to
dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this
Court on appeal.
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The
case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to
be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of
the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1
A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the
meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But
petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on
the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And
for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before
us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste
of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical
considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on
the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all,
there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.
2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the
conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study
of the disputed will and the applicable statute.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath
all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios
Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I
have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and
fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which,
in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction
of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein
copied, thus —
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law
becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa comments:
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le
nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya
heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los
bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el
testamento omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su
muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que
la omision sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el
testamento.
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear
perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of
the word annul:
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A.
342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony
provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to
nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to
nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs.
Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va.
283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga
Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither
were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such
preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de
heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-sentence will here
institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific
legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say
that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says
Manresa:
En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de
existir, en todo o en parte? No se añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo
851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto
prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la
anulacion es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que
le motiva rige con preferencia al 817.
The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —
La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de
la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete
la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de
herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula,
porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al
determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de
heredero." ...
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no
escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of
such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition
in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the
fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual
del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion
expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:
... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la
institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no
significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha
realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de
otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en
legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en
materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia,
con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si
esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha
exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion
arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero
cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a
la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para
modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos
y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca
mejor una cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para
convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y anulando por este
procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer.
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that,
annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when
they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests
that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of
preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to
him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate
from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two
component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference
to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras
disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa
puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado,
mejora o donacion.
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the
institution of petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and
void. And, intestate succession ensues.
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective
disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the
conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument
fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la
legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se
denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by
stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other
hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be,
the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced
heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled
ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer
from preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally
different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil
Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form
of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the
same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put
only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language,
in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on
the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde
un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso.
instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general
from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only
provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the
institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from
legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only because
they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are
in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed
by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be
taken as a legacy.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete
nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of
heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.
Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under
review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are

entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not
invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
extent of said legitimes.

This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran
in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of
the children by the second marriage should be treated
as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of
Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may
be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the
bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding
total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and
will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained
in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments
would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus,
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA
PALACIOS, Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate
of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge
Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives
in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain.
Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she
submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co..............................................................................................
2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
MENOS:
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de
edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su
sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre
ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca
Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados,
en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del
otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33,
Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada
Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo
Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante,
a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St.
Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran
en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin
intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part
shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the
other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with
the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in
favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that
the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with
respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the
first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions
for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are
not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as
provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over
real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien,
violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta)
Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's
express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court
approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order
which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the
estate in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired
his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only
survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is
entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904, par.
2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question
and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in
favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of
one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to
one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more
than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional
share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to
the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her
legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of
another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir
originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of
substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal,
and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although
the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two principal classes of
substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are merely
variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the
heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or
should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator
has otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or
first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit
to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take
effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the
heir originally instituted, and provided further that the fiduciary or first heir
and the second heir are living at time of the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of
the legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con
sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto,
con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da.
Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate
given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because
as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in
connection with Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda
survived the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the
testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar
substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance
as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution
is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are
correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not
go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as
follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution,
or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this
construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or
substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,
Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. by
providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir
originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a
parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or
degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to
the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the
appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the
naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in
favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against
the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the
ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law
but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional
provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and
meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda

because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby

ordered distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-50402 August 19, 1982
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and THE MANILA
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF),
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (REGIONAL BRANCH NO.
IV) ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates and Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez &
Castillo Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC.
Villaruz, Padilla & Amansec Law Offices, for respondent National Mines and
Allied Workers Union.
Luis M. Ermitano for respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation.
& herein respondent on April 20, 1979 was encashed on April 23, 1979 and the
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari filed on April 23, 1979 to annul and set aside the order of
April 18, 1979 of the National Labor Relations Commission issued in N.L.R.C.
Case No. RB-IV-3322-75, thru Labor Arbiter Manuel H. Lorenzo, praying at the
same time that this Court order the said respondent Commission to stop
delivery of the check of P4,298,307.77 of private respondent Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development and/or for Us to stop payment to the
respondent Union on the ground that the issuance of said order of April 18,
1979 was a grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of the Commission's
jurisdiction.
On May 4, 1979, We issued the following resolution:
On December 22, 1975 the National Mines & Allied Workers' Union obtained in
NLRC Case No. RB-VI-3322-75 a judgment ordering the Philippine Iron Mines,
Inc. to pay the union P4,298,307.77 as severance pay, etc. The judgment
became final and executory on January 6, 1976.
On April 18, 1979 the NLRC, through a Labor Arbiter, granted the union's ex
parte motion of April 16, 1979 for the garnishment of the amount of
P4,298,307.77 due from Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation to the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and the Manila
Banking Corporation, as part of the price for which the mining machinery and
equipment of the Philippine Iron Mines (acquired under foreclosure sale by the
two banks) was sold by the two banks to Atlas. (The total price was thirty
million pesos.)
On that same date, April 18, Atlas complied with the writ of garnishment and
delivered to the sheriff a check for P4,298,307.77.
The order of garnishment and Atlas' compliance with it are assailed in this
certiorari proceeding on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the two banks
were not parties in the labor case and the funds garnished were not due to the
judgment debtor, Philippine Iron Mines.
After deliberating on these facts, the Court Resolved (1) to REQUIRE the
respondents within ten (10) days from notice to ANSWER the petition (not to
file a motion to dismiss) and (2) to ISSUE a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION after the petitioners had filed a satisfactory bond in the sum of
one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000). It should be specified in the writ that
Atlas is directed to stop payment on the said check, that respondent Union is
enjoined from cashing the check and, if the check has not yet been delivered
to the union, then respondent sheriff is directed to return the check to Atlas. If
the check has been delivered to the Union, the latter is enjoined from
distributing the proceeds thereof to its members and to return the check to
Atlas. (Vol. 1, Record.) with the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction
after the required bond was filed on May 9, 1979, after petitioners filed their
supplemental petition of April 24, 1979 and Urgent Motion of April 30, 1979.
It appears, however, as stated in the answer of respondent Union dated
October 10, 1979, that "the check turned over by the Sheriff of the NLRC to
proceeds thereof were duly distributed to its members/claimants on the same
day (April 23, 1979) and everyday thereafter, until the distribution was
finished on May 5, 1979. In fact, on May 10, 1979, respondent union filed with
the Labor Arbiter a "Report of Compliance and Motion for Admission and
Approval of Schedule of Distribution" dated May 10, 1979, a copy of which is
herewith attached and made part hereof as Annex "18". A corresponding order
approving the aforesaid distribution was issued by Labor Arbiter Manuel B.
Lorenzo on May 12, 1979, a copy of which is herewith attached and made part
hereof as Annex "19". Under the present circumstances, respondent union can
only invoke the following legal principle:
The established principle is that when the events sought to be prevented by
injunction or prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be
enjoined or prohibited because nothing more could be done in reference
thereto. (Aragones vs. Subido, L-24303, Sept. 23, 1968, 25 SCRA 95) (Pp.
442- 443, Vol. II, Record.)
Thus, in the light of the prayer of the petition herein which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that:
1. This Petition is given due course;
2. Pending determination of the merits of this Petition, a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction upon such bond as this Honorable Court may fix, be
issued ordering the Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation to
stop payment of the check delivered to the NLRC Sheriff, the National Labor
Relations Commission (Regional Branch No. IV), particularly the Sheriff
thereof, from delivering said check to the Union, and the National Mines &
Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU-MIF) from distributing the proceeds of the
said check to its members; and to return the proceeds of the chock for
P4,341,290.84 to the petitioners;
3. After appropriate proceedings, judgment be rendered making the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction permanent and setting aside the NLRC Order
dated 18 April 1979.
Petitioners likewise pray for such other relief as may be deemed just and
equitable under the premises. (Page 18, Vol. I, Record.)
it would seem that this case is now moot and academic, the prohibitory
injunction prayed for being already impossible of enforcement, the acts sought
to be enjoined having been already consummated.
But it is obvious from the allegations of the petition that the main and real
remedy aimed at by petitioners is for them to be considered as in no way
liable for the money paid to the laborers of respondent Philippine Iron Mines
by virtue of the writ of execution and garnishment in question and that the
obedience or compliance thereto by respondent Atlas was uncalled for, hence
Atlas should be held still liable to them for the amount aforementioned it had
delivered to the Sheriff in order to complete the P30 M purchase price of the
PIM properties sold by them to Atlas.
To complete the material facts summarized in our abovequoted resolution of
May 4, 1979, We have only to add the following:
1. That the judgment obtained by the respondent Union from the NLRC on
December 22, 1975 was the result of an unfair labor practice case filed by said
Union against PIM because of its failure to comply with the condition imposed
upon it by the Minister of Labor when it was granted clearance to shut down
its operation and lay off all its personnel due to its bankruptcy to the effect
that said clearance was "subject to such rights and benefits accruing to the
workers and employees of your company under (the) existing collective
bargaining agreement and relevant provisions of the Labor Code."
2. That PIM was a mortgage debtor separately of the Development Bank of the
Philippines and of herein petitioners,
3. On account of the failure of PIM to pay its obligations just referred to, PCIB
and Manila Bank foreclosed all mortgages in their favor on December 20, 1975
and as they were the only bidders at the auction sale, they eventually secured
final conveyances in their favor of said properties.
4. To be sure, respondent Union had already been able to levy on certain
properties of PIM which allegedly were not covered by the mortgages to
petitioners, and so there are now in the lower courts suits wherein petitioners
and the Union are contesting as to who of them have the superior right over
said properties. Additionally, there is a proceeding for contempt pending in the
NLRC because petitioners' men would not allow the Sheriff to enforce
execution of some of said properties.
We do not see any need to clutter this opinion with the details of those suits
and contempt proceedings, considering the view We are taking of the
primordial issue as to whether or not petitioners, as auction purchasers of the
properties of PIM mortgaged to them and as sellers thereof to Atlas are
subject to the claims of the Union finally adjudged by the NLRC.
There are, to Our mind, at least two indubitable grounds why petitioners are
liable to the Union for the judgment against PIM.
a. The deed of Sale (Annex M, Petition) by which petitioners conveyed their
rights to Atlas, contains the following unequivocal and unambiguous
warranties:
1. Warranties of Sellers. — Sellers (the petitioners in the case at
bar) warrant that (1) they have full and sufficient title over the PROPERTIES
and that (2) the PROPERTIES are free from all liens and encumbrances, (3)
the BUYER (Atlas) being hereby saved free and harmless from all claims in
incidental actions of National Mines & Allied Workers' Union (NAMAWU)
including its action for annulment of the Sheriffs sale with respect to the
contents of a certain bodega (Civil Case No. 2727 of Branch II of the
Camarines Norte CFI); (4) the SELLERS have full rights and capacity to convey
title to and effect peaceful delivery of these properties their authority to do so
having been obtained from the government of the Republic of the Philippines,
copy of which is enclosed and made an integral part hereof; and taxes and
charges thereon have been fully paid and should any be accrued on the plate
of these presents, the same shall be for SELLERS account. (Emphasis
supplied.) (Page 789, Vol. 11, Record.)
As Atlas very aptly puts it in its reply-memorandum dated June 13, 1980:
To the extent of being repetitious but if only to bring home the point, under
the above-quoted Deed of Sale unconditionally and unqualifiedly protective of
Atlas, the petitioners, as the sellers, legally and validly warranted unto Atlas,
as the buyer, (1) full and (2) unencumbered title to the subject properties, (3)
that they have full rights and capacity to convey title to and effect peaceful
delivery of these properties to Atlas, and, very importantly, (4) that they shall
hold Atlas "free and harmless from all claims and incidental actions of National
Mines & Allied Workers Unions (NAMAWU)" inclusive of NAMAWU's action for
annulment (Civil Case No. 2727, Branch 11, CFI-Camarines Norte).
The above warranties of the petitioners in favor of Atlas need no further
interpretation. With due respect, this Honorable Court must instead apply and
enforce these warranties against the petitioners, pristinely and unequivocally
clear as these warranties are.
Clearly, the facts of the instant petition viewed vis-a-vis the above- quoted
legal and contractual warranties, guarantees and duties of the petitioners in
favor of Atlas show that the former have no cause of action against the latter.
(Page 790, Vol. II, Record.)
b. We cannot but agree with the Solicitor General that:
Fourthly, since the decision of December 22, 1975 in the aforementioned NLRC
case was brought about by the cessation or shutdown of business by PIM, its
workers enjoy first preference as regards wages due for services rendered
prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation, as against other creditors, like herein
petitioners, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. Thus, Article
110 of the New Labor Code, as amended, as well as Section 10, Rule VIII,
Book II, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the New Labor Code
provide:
Art. 110. Worker Preference in case of bankcruptcy. — In the event of
bankcruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy
first preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the
period prior to the bankcruptcy or liquidation, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding. Unpaid wages shall be paid in full before other
creditors may establish any claim to share in the assets of the employer. (New
Labor Code)
Section 10. Payment of wages in case of bankcruptcy. — Unpaid wages
earned by the employees before the declaration of bankcruptcy or judicial
liquidation of the employer's business shall be given first preference and shall
be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to a share in the
assets of the employees. (Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code, Book III, Rule VIII)
It must be noted that the word 'wage' paid to any employee is defined as "the
remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in
terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable
by an employer to an employee under a written contract of employment for
work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and
includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of
Labor, of board, lodging or other facilities customarily furnished by the
employer to the employees." (Art. 97, par. f, Title II, Chapter I, New Labor
Code). Stated differently, 'wages' refer to all remunerations, earnings and
other benefits in terms of money accruing to the (employees or workers for
services rendered.
Thus, all benefits of the employees under a Collective Bargaining Agreement,
like severance pay, educational allowance, accrued vacation leave earned but
not enjoyed, as wen as workmen's compensation awards and unpaid salaries
for services rendered, fan under the term 'wages' which enjoy first preference
over all other claims against the employer. As such, therefore, even if the
employer's properties encumbered by means of a mortgage contract, still the
workers'wages which enjoy first preference in case of bankcruptcy or
liquidation are duly protected by an automatic first lien over and above all
other earlier encumbrances on the said properties. Otherwise, workers'wages
may be imperilled by foreclosure of mortgages, and as a consequence, the
aforecited provision of the New Labor Code would be rendered meaningless.
(Pp. 760-762, Vol. II, Record
under the Constitution of the Philippines above referred to the NLRC decision
was only confirmatory of such right, not unlike the juridical effect of the
issuance of a Torrens title over a piece of land already covered by a legitimate
Spanish title. And so, when petitioners acquired the properties of PIM in the
foreclosure sales, those properties were already encumbered in favor of the
Union members/claimants by force of law. Worse, petitioners were well aware
they were foreclosing on properties of a mortgage debtor who had already
secured from the Ministry of Labor a corresponding clearance for shutdown
due to liquidation, and, needless to say, petitioners are presumed to know the
law on the matter already referred to above.
Indeed, from whatever point of view We try to look at the situation of
petitioners, it always comes out that they cannot cheat the Union
claimants/members of what is due them by law for work actually done by
them and other benefits. They bought the properties in question with open
eyes.ït¢@lFº They sold the same knowing they were saddled with the rights of
the laborers of PIM under the clearance of the Ministry of Labor. The deed of
sale included, as it should, a warranty that the properties are free from all
liens and encumbrances. ATLAS had the right to receive the properties free
from any lien and encumbrance, and when the garnishment was served on it,
it was perfectly in the right in slashing the P4,298,307.77 from the P30M it
had to pay petitioners in order to satisfy the long existing and vested right of
the laborers of financially moribund PIM, without any liability to petitioners for
reimbursement thereof.
With this declaration of the respective rights of the parties, it follows that all
proceedings or suits pending in the lower courts are subordinated to such
declaration, if they may not be deemed already moot and academic.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petition
and settling the respective rights of the parties hereto as above declared, with
costs against petitioners.

The reason behind the provisions of the Labor Code giving preference to claims
of labor in the liquidation of a business or industrial concern is patent and
manifest. It is but humane and partakes of the divine that labor, as human
beings, must be treated over and above chattels, machineries and other kinds
of properties and the interests of the employer who can afford and survive the
hardships of life better than their workers. Universal sense of human justice,
not to speak of our specific social justice and protection to labor constitutional
injunctions dictate the preferential lien that the above provisions accord to
labor.

Petitioners are trying to make much of the circumstance that the foreclosure
sale in their favor antedated by two days the judgment of the NLRC. In this
connection, We hold that the right of the Union members over the properties
or assets of PIM became vested from the date the Minister of Labor approved
PIM's application for clearance on May 7, 1975. In the most legal sense and,
again, consonant with the principles of social justice and protection to labor