Republic of the Philippines Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has

SUPREME COURT interposed this appeal.

Manila
Without need of discussing the various questions raised, We have to uphold the order of
EN BANC dismissal, not necessarily on the same ground as found by the lower court; but for the
simple reason that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the subject
G.R. No. L-20213 January 31, 1966 matter, it being a money claim against the government.

MARIANO E. GARCIA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF and THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE
CHAIRMAN, PHILIPPINE VETERANS BOARD and/or THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
Tiangco and Millosa for the plaintiff-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for the defendants-appellees.
This Court has already held (New Manila Lumber Co. Inc. vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-14248,
April 28, 1960) that a claim for the recovery of money against the government should be
filed with the Auditor General, in line with the principle that the State cannot be sued
without its consent. Commonwealth Act 327 provides:
SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other
than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the
same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their
presentation. . . .

REGALA, J.:
SEC. 2. The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the
settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal. decision, take an appeal in writing:

It appears that on December 1, 1961, the plaintiff-appellant, Mariano E. Garcia, filed x x x x x x x x x.

with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money
against the Chief of Staff and the Adjutant General of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chairman of the Philippine Veterans Board and /or the Auditor General.
The complaint alleged: that sometime in July, 1948, the plaintiff suffered injuries while
undergoing the 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga; that sometime
thereafter he filed his claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April, 1957, he submitted
some papers in support of his claim to the Adjutant General's Office upon the latter's
request; that on May 2, 1957, he received a letter from the said Adjutant General's
Office disallowing his claim for disability benefits; that on November 24, 1958, after
further demands of the plaintiff, the Adjutant General's Office denied the said claim,
alleging that Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by Republic Act 610 which
took effect on January 1, 1950; that by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff he
was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and that by
reason of the unjustified refusal by defendants of plaintiff's claim, the latter was
deprived of his disability pension from July, 1948 totalling no less than P4,000 at the
rate of P20 a month and suffered thereby moral damages and attorney's fees the amount of
P2,000.00.
(c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, if the appellant is a private
person or entity.
The well established rule that no recourse to court can be had until all administrative
remedies had been exhausted and that actions against administrative officers should not
be entertained if superior administrative officers could grant relief is squarely
applicable to the present case.
In view therefor, the order dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P.,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces filed
separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no
cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations.1äwphï1.ñët

Acting on the said motion, the court, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the action has prescribed.