G.R. No. 197802, November 11, 2015 a.
"ZYNAPSE" is the registered trademark of [respondent], and that
ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS ARAIN, M.D. DBA
ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v. NATRAPHARM, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the April 18, 2011 Decision2 and July 21, 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in the petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103333
granting a permanent injunction in favor of respondent Natrapharm, Inc. and against
petitioner Zuneca Pharmaceutical.
The facts follow:
Respondent is an all-Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures and sells
a medicine bearing the generic name "CITICOLINE," which is indicated for heart and
stroke patients. The said medicine is marketed by respondent under its registered
trademark "ZYNAPSE," which respondent obtained from the Intellectual Property
Office (IPO) on September 24, 2007 under Certificate of Trademark Registration No.
4-2007-005596. With its registration, the trademark "ZYNAPSE" enjoys protection
for a term of 10 years from September 24, 2007.4
In addition, respondent obtained from the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) all
necessary permits and licenses to register, list and sell its "ZYNAPSE" medicine in its
various forms and dosages.5
Allegedly unknown to respondent, since 2003 or even as early as 2001, petitioners
have been selling a medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan bearing the generic
name "CARBAMAZEPINE," an anti-convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the brand
name "ZYNAPS," which trademark is however not registered with the IPO. "ZYNAPS"
is pronounced exactly like "ZYNAPSE."6
Respondent further alleged that petitioners are selling their product "ZYNAPS"
CARBAMAZEPINE in numerous drugstores in the country where its own product
"ZYNAPSE" CITICOLINE is also being sold.7
Moreover, respondent claimed that the drug CARBAMAZEPINE has one documented
serious and disfiguring side-effect called "Stevens-Johnson Syndrome," and that the
sale of the medicines "ZYNAPSE" and "ZYNAPS" in the same drugstores will give rise
to medicine switching.8
On October 30, 2007, respondent sent petitioners a cease-and-desist demand letter,
pointing out that:
as such owner, it has exclusive trademark right under the law to
the use thereof and prevent others from using identical or
confusingly similar marks, and that [petitioners] must stop the use
of "ZYNAPS" for being nearly identical to "ZYNAPSE"; and
b. Because there is confusing similarity between "ZYNAPSE" and
"ZYNAPS," there is a danger of medicine switching, with the
patient on "ZYNAPSE" medication placed in a more injurious
situation given the Steven-Johnson Syndrome side effect of the
"ZYNAPS" CARBAMAZEPINE.9
Petitioners refused to heed the above demand, claiming that they had prior use of the
name "ZYNAPS" since year 2003, having been issued by the BFAD a Certificate of
Product Registration (CPR) on April 15, 2003, which allowed them to sell
CARBAMAZEPINE under the brand name "ZYNAPS."10
On November 29, 2007, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for
trademark infringement for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, or
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IPC), with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. To justify the
TRO/writ of preliminary injunction, respondent cited Section 12211 of R.A. No. 8293,
under which the registration of "ZYNAPSE" gives it the exclusive right to use the said
name as well as to exclude others from using the same.12 In addition, respondent
argued that under Sections 13813 and 147.114 of the IPC, certificates of registration
are prima facie evidence of the registrant's ownership of the mark and of the
registrant's exclusive right to use the same.15 Respondent also invoked the case
of Conrad and Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals16 where it was ruled that an invasion
of a registered mark entitles the holder of a certificate of registration thereof to
injunctive relief.17
In their answer, petitioners argued that they enjoyed prior use in good faith of the
brand name "ZYNAPS," having submitted their application for CPR with the BFAD on
October 2, 2001, with the name "ZYNAPS" expressly indicated thereon. The CPR was
issued to them on April 15, 2003.18 Moreover, petitioners averred that under Section
15919 of the IPC their right to use the said mark is protected.20
In its December 21, 2007 Order,21 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied
respondent's application for a TRO, ruling that even if respondent was able to first
register its mark "ZYNAPSE" with the IPO in 2007, it is nevertheless defeated by the
prior actual use by petitioners of "ZYNAPS" in 2003.
In its March 12, 2008 Order,22 the RTC denied the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, reiterating the reasons stated in the order denying the
application for a TRO:
In this Court's objective evaluation, neither party is, at this point, entitled to any
injunctive solace. Plaintiff, while admittedly the holder of a registered trademark Hence, this petition for review.
under the IPC, may not invoke ascendancy or superiority of its CTR [certificate of
trademark registration] over the CPR [certificate of product registration of the BFAD] On December 2, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision27 on the merits of the case. It
of the defendants, as the latter certificate is, in the Court's opinion, evidence of its found petitioners liable to respondent for damages. Moreover, it enjoined the
"prior use". Parenthetically, the plaintiff would have been entitled to an injunction as petitioners from using "ZYNAPS" and ordered all materials related to it be disposed
against any or all third persons in respect of its registered mark under normal outside the channel of commerce or destroyed without compensation.28
conditions, that is, in the event wherein Section 159.1 would not be invoked by such
third person. Such is the case however in this litigation. Section 159 of the IPC Respondent moved to dismiss the present petition in view of the December 2, 2011
explicitly curtails the registrant's rights by providing for limitations on those rights as RTC Decision which functions as a full adjudication on the merits of the main issue of
against a "prior user" under Section 159.1 xxx.23 trademark infringement. Respondent contended that the present petition is moot and
academic, it only involving an ancillary writ.29
Via a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary
Petitioners, on the other hand, opposed the motion to dismiss arguing that the
injunction, respondent questioned before the CA the RTC's denial of the application
December 2, 2011 RTC Decision had not yet attained finality, thus, the present
for a writ of preliminary injunction.
petition had not yet been rendered moot.
On June 17, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution24 denying respondent's application for
The two issues which need to be addressed are:
TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of merit. The CA found no compelling
reason to grant the application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction because there
1) Whether the decision on the merits rendered the issues in this case moot and
was no showing that respondent had a clear and existing right that will be violated by
academic? and
petitioners. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA in its
July 31, 2008 Resolution.25
2) Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a petition
cralawred

for certiorari against the denial of an application for a preliminary injunction issued
However, contrary to its earlier resolutions denying the application for a
by the RTC?
TRO/preliminary injunction, the CA, in its April 18, 2011 Decision, upheld the
allegations of respondent that it is entitled to injunctive relief on the basis of its IPO
We hold that the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered moot and
registration and permanently enjoined petitioners from the commercial use of
academic given the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on the merits of the case.
"ZYNAPS." The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for both preliminary and permanent
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The injunction. Section 1, Rule 58 provides for the definition of preliminary injunction:
assailed Omnibus Order dated 12 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93
of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-07-61561 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. — A preliminary injunction is an
one is entered permanently ENJOINING defendants-respondents, their employees,
order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
agents, representatives, dealers, retailers, and/or assigns, and any and all persons
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
acting in their behalf, from manufacturing, importing, distributing, selling and/or
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts,
advertising for sale, or otherwise using in commerce, the anti-convulsant
in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis
drug CARBAMAZEPINE under the brand name and mark "ZYNAPS," or using any
supplied)
other name which is similar or confusingly similar to petitioner's registered
trademark "ZYNAPSE," including filing of application for permits, license, or
certificate of product registration with the Food and Drug Administration and other On the other hand, Section 9 of the same Rule defines a permanent injunction in this
government agencies. wise:

SO ORDERED.26 (Underscoring and additional emphasis supplied)
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
July 21, 2011.
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. — If after the trial of the action it appears that
the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined,
the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)

A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence.30 The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a sampling is needed to
give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending
the decision of the case on the merits.31 As such, the findings of fact and opinion of a
court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature
and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated. 32
By contrast a permanent injunction, based on Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
forms part of the judgment on the merits and it can only be properly ordered only on
final judgment. A permanent injunction may thus be granted after a trial or hearing
on the merits of the case and a decree granting or refusing an injunction should not
be entered until after a hearing on the merits where a verified answer containing
denials is filed or where no answer is required, or a rule to show cause is equivalent
to an answer.33
As such a preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any interlocutory
order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident; because an ancillary
writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect after the decision in the main
petition.34
In Casilan v. Ybañez,35 this Court stated:
As things stand now, this Court can no longer interfere with the preliminary
injunctions issued by the Leyte court in its cases Nos. 2985 and 2990, because such
preliminary writs have already been vacated, being superseded and replaced by the
permanent injunction ordered in the decision on the merits rendered on 21 March
1962. And as to the permanent injunction, no action can be taken thereon
without reviewing the judgment on the merits, such injunction being but a
consequence of the pronouncement that the credits of Tiongson and Montilla are
entitled to priority over that of Casilan. Since the court below had the power and
right to determine such question of preference, its judgment is not without, nor
in excess of, jurisdiction; and even assuming that its findings are not correct,
they would, at most, constitute errors of law, and not abuses of discretion,
correctible by certiorari . The obvious remedy for petitioner Casilan was a
timely appeal from the judgment on the merits to the Court of Appeals, the
amount involved being less than P200,000. But the judgment has become final and
unappealable and can not be set aside through certiorariproceedings. (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, this Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by issuing a
permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety of the denial of an
ancillary writ. But with the RTC's December 2, 2011 Decision on the case for
"Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages and Destruction," the issues raised in
the instant petition have been rendered moot and academic. We note that the case
brought to the CA on a petition for certiorari merely involved the RTC's denial of
respondent's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, a mere ancillary writ.
Since a decision on the merits has already been rendered and which includes in its
disposition a permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an appeal36 from the
decision in the main case.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for being
moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin,* Leonen,** and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 182042 : July 27, 2011]
THUNDER SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY/ LOURDES M. LASALA,
PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY (REGION I) AND NFA REGIONAL
BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE (REGION I), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision[2] dated July
18, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93642, which set aside the
Orders[3] dated August 27, 2003 and December 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 6846.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in September 2002, petitioner Thunder Security and Investigation Agency,
owned and operated by petitioner Lourdes M. Lasala as sole proprietor, entered into
a Contract for Security Services[4] with respondent National Food Authority (NFA),
Region I. The contract provided that Thunder Security will provide 132 security
guards to safeguard the NFA's personnel, offices, facilities and properties in Region I
for a period of one year from September 15, 2002 to September 15, 2003.
Subsequently, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184[5] was enacted on January 10, 2003, and
took effect on January 26, 2003. Said law expressly repealed, among others, Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 40, Series of 2001[6] which governed the bidding procedure of
service contracts in the Government.
Since petitioner's contract with the NFA was about to expire on September 15, 2003,
the NFA caused the publication of an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid on
May 11 and 18, 2003, intended for all private security agencies.[7] Petitioner paid the
bidding fee of P 1,000.00 on May 21, 2003 to signify its intention to participate in the
bidding process. However, on June 9, 2003, the NFA, through Assistant Regional
Director Victoriano Molina, chairman of respondent NFA-Regional Bids and Awards
Committee (NFA-RBAC), notified petitioner to submit the required documents not
later than June 19, 2003 in order to qualify for the bidding.[8] On June 26, 2003, the
NFA-RBAC informed petitioner that its application to bid had been rejected due to its
failure to submit the required documents.[9] Aggrieved, petitioner sent a letter of
protest to the NFA on July 10, 2003, contending that until the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9184 can be promulgated, no bidding should take
place.[10] Notwithstanding, respondents rejected petitioner's application.
Respondents defended their position, citing an instruction coming from then NFA
Administrator Arthur C. Yap which directed that in the absence of the said IRR and
due to the exigency of the service, respondents' projects would be temporarily guided
by the provisions of E.O. No. 40, among others, provided the same are consistent with
R.A. No. 9184.[11]
Unfazed, petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition[12] for Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction, with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) plus Damages, seeking, among others, to enjoin respondents from
awarding the contract to another security agency. On August 8, 2003, the RTC issued
a TRO against respondents.[13] Correlatively, in its Order[14] dated August 27, 2003,
the RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioner and directed
respondents to desist from terminating petitioner's services until further orders from
the RTC. The RTC held that the composition and the orders of the NFA-RBAC were
void because the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 has not yet been promulgated. The RTC also
found that no observers from the private sector were present in the bidding process
as required by law. The RTC ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] let [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction [be
issued] against respondents National Food Authority Region I and the Regional Bid
and Awards Committee (RBAC) enjoining and restraining said respondents and all
persons acting in their behalf from awarding the contract for security services in NFA
Region I and from terminating the services of petitioner until further orders from the
Court, upon payment of an Injunction Bond in the amount of Php50,000.00 in the
name of the respondents to answer for any and all damages which the respondents
may suffer in the event that the Court should finally decide that petitioner is not
entitled to the issuance thereof.
Let the Pre-trial Conference of this case be set on September 22, 2003 at 2:00 o'clock
in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[16] on September 23, 2003,
contending that per Minutes of the Meeting[17] for public bidding held on July 16,
2003, three independent observers were actually present, namely, Floriano S.
Gallano, Jenny Lilan and Antonita S. Hagad. On October 8, 2003, IRR Part A[18] (IRR-
A) of R.A. No. 9184 also took effect. Nonetheless, the RTC denied respondents' motion
for reconsideration in its Order[19] dated December 1, 2005. Thus, respondents
sought recourse from the CA by way of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, charging the RTC of grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the said orders.[20]
On July 18, 2007, the CA granted the petition. It held that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it issued the writ of preliminary injunction against respondents
despite the utter lack of basis and justification for its issuance. The CA highlighted
that while IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 took effect on October 8, 2003,[21] and thus could
not have been applied by the RTC in its August 27, 2003 Order, its failure to consider
the said IRR-A in resolving respondents' motion for reconsideration amounted to
grave abuse of discretion. The CA added that contrary to the trial court's ruling, there
were three observers present during the bidding process, as shown by the Minutes of
the Meeting for public bidding held on July 16, 2003. The CA further opined that
petitioner did not appear to possess a clear legal right to enjoin the awarding of the
contract considering that petitioner's right to participate in the bidding was itself
dubious as petitioner failed to submit the necessary documents required by
respondents. However, the CA clarified that its decision was merely focused on the
issue of the impropriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and not
on the issues of the propriety of the award of the contract and damages. Thus, the CA
held that the latter issues should still be heard by the RTC.[22] The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant PETITION is hereby GRANTED.
The Orders issued by Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La
Union dated August 27, 2003 and December 1, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6846 are hereby
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution[25] dated March 5, 2008.
Hence, this petition which raised the following issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it held that the
respondents did not err in applying E.O. 40 in the conduct of the bidding[;]
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it held that there
was no irregularity attending the questioned bidding[; and]
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it reversed the
Orders of [the RTC] granting injunctive relief to herein petitioner[.][26]
Petitioner emphasizes that R.A No. 9184, which expressly repealed E.O. No. 40, was
already in force at the time the bidding was conducted in this case on July 16, 2003;
hence, it was error for the NFA and the NFA-RBAC to conduct the public bidding in
accordance with E.O. No. 40. Petitioner also abandons its initial stance regarding the
need for implementing rules and regulations, and now argues that even without its
IRR, R.A. No. 9184 can be understood and enforced. Petitioner adds that there is no
provision of law or jurisprudence which requires that there must first be an IRR
before a law takes effect, and adds that NFA Administrator Arthur C. Yap and his
subordinates cannot suspend the operation of R.A. No. 9184 and order that bidding
be conducted in accordance with E.O. No. 40 which was already repealed. Petitioner
also insists that there was an irregularity in the bidding process as the observers
presented by respondents were allegedly not independent and cannot be relied upon
to observe the process diligently. Petitioner further insists that the presence or
absence of observers in the bidding process is a question of fact which the CA cannot
tackle in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As such, the CA should have
remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the question of fact.[27]
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), counter that petitioner failed to present any evidence before the RTC
and the CA to substantiate its claim that the NFA-RBAC was not constituted in
accordance with R.A. No. 9184. Having alleged a violation of law, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove by sufficient evidence that there was indeed such violation.
The OGCC points out that unlike petitioner, respondents were able to prove
sufficiently that there were actually three observers present during the bidding
process, which fact the RTC failed to consider. Moreover, the OGCC argues that
respondents' reliance on E.O. No. 40, pending the promulgation of the IRR of R.A. No.
9184, was allowed by Section 77[28] of IRR-A. There was likewise no violation of any
clear and unmistakable right of petitioner as to warrant the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. The OGCC points out that the rejection of petitioner's
application was actually petitioner's own fault because petitioner failed to submit the
necessary documents despite several notices. Finally, the OGCC stresses that the trial
court judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction in violation of the law and with
grave abuse of discretion because it effectively and indefinitely renewed and
extended the contract between the parties contrary to jurisprudence that no court
can compel a party to agree to a contract through the instrumentality of a writ of
preliminary injunction.[29]
Essentially, the sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred in setting aside
the RTC orders which granted injunctive relief to petitioner.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides the
grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. -- A preliminary injunction
may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Based on the foregoing provision, we held in Philippine Ports Authority v. Cipres
Stevedoring & Arrastre, Inc.,[30] to wit:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's
substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A
plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or
extraordinary situation which should be avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a
litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
At times referred to as the "Strong Arm of Equity," we have consistently ruled that
there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate and which calls for greater
circumspection than the issuance of an injunction. It should only be extended in cases
of great injury where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate
remedy in damages; "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear;
where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor;
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest
and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing
relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation."
For the writ to issue, two requisites must be present, namely, the existence of the
right to be protected, and that the facts against which the injunction is to be directed
are violative of said right. It is necessary that one must show an unquestionable right
over the premises.[31]
Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction,
be it mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and

(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.[32]

In this case, it is apparent that when the RTC issued its December 1, 2005 Order,
petitioner has no more legal rights under the service contract which already expired
on September 15, 2003. Therefore, it has not met the first vital requisite that it must
have material and substantial rights that have to be protected by the courts.[33] It
bears stressing that an injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent,
abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may
never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There
must exist an actual right.[34] Verily, petitioner cannot lay claim to an actual, clear
and positive right based on an expired service contract.

Moreover, well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that no court can compel a party to

agree to a contract through the instrumentality of a writ of preliminary
injunction.[35] A contract can be renewed, revived or extended only by mutual
consent of the parties.[36] By issuing the assailed orders most particularly its
December 1, 2005 Order, the RTC in effect extended the life of the parties' expired
contract in clear contravention of our earlier pronouncements.

In sum, we find that the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the assailed
decision which would warrant the modification, much less, the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision
dated July 18, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93642 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Del Castillo, JJ.,
concur.