136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

*
G.R. No. 146823. August 9, 2005.

SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO,

petitioners, vs. FABELLA ESTATE TENANTS
ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; Well-entrenched

is the rule that the mistake and negligence of counsel to introduce,
during the trial of a case, certain pieces of evidence bind his client.
—In this jurisdiction, well-entrenched is the rule that the mistake
and negligence of counsel to introduce, during the trial of a case,
certain pieces of evidence bind his client. For sure, in Aguila vs.
Court of First Instance of Batangas, we even ruled that the
omitted evidence by reason of counsel’s mistake or negligence,
cannot be invoked as a ground for new trial.
Same; Any act performed by counsel within the scope of his
general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded
as the act of the client himself and consequently, the mistake or
negligence of the client’s counsel may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment against him.—A counsel has the implied
authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental
to the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
client. And, any act performed by counsel within the scope of his
general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded
as the act of the client himself and consequently, the mistake or
negligence of the client’s counsel may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment against him. A contrary rule would be
inimical to the greater interest of dispensing justice. For, all that
a losing party will do is to invoke the mistake or negligence of his
counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment
adverse to him, thereby putting no end to litigation.
Same; Due Process; In cases where the counsel’s mistake is so
great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day
in court or when he is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
client’s deprivation of his property without due process of law, the
client is not bound by his counsel’s mistake and the case may be
remanded in
_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

order to give the client another chance to present his case.—

Admittedly, the rule thus stated admits of exceptions. Thus, in
cases where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the
client is prejudiced and denied his day in court or when he is
guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation of
his property without due process of law, the client is not bound by
his counsel’s mistakes and the case may even be reopened in
order to give the client another chance to present his case.
Unfortunately, however, petitioners’ case does not fall under any
of the exceptions but rather squarely within the ambit of the rule.
Same; Same; A client cannot be said to have been deprived of
his day in court and there is no denial of due process as long as he
has been given an opportunity to be heard.—As it is, petitioners
were given full opportunity during the trial of the main case to
adduce any and all relevant evidence to advance their cause. In no
sense, therefore, may it be argued that they were denied due
process of law. As we said in Antonio vs. Court of Appeals, a client
cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court and there
is no denial of due process as long as he has been given an
opportunity to be heard, which, we emphasize, was done in the
instant case.
Same; Evidence; Formal Offer of Evidence; Pleadings and
Practice; The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.—With the reality that those documents were
never presented and formally offered during the trial of the main
case, their belated admission for purposes of having them duly
considered in the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 would
certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court,
which reads: SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence.—The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is basic in the law of evidence
that the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for
which it was offered.—To stress, it was only during the hearing of
the motion for execution pending appeal that said documents
were presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court
admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose for
which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETA’s
motion for execution pending appeal. It is basic in the law of
evidence that the court shall consider

138

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered. While the
said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the
case for purposes of the incidental issue of execution pending
appeal, they do not have that same right insofar as far as the
main case is concerned, and ought not be considered in the
resolution thereof.
Land Titles; Prescription; Lands covered by a title cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.—It is not disputed
that at the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered
under the Torrens system. In a long line of cases, we have
consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia
Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of
acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No.
1529).
Same; Same; Laches; If the claimant’s possession of a land is
merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latter’s right to recover
possession is never barred by laches.—To start with, the lower
court found that petitioners’ possession of the subject lot was
merely at the tolerance of its former lawful owner. In this
connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals teaches that if the
claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful
owner, the latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by
laches: As registered owners of the lots in question, the private
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioner’s occupation of the property,
and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners
have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at
all. This right is never barred by laches.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Laserna, Cueva-Mercader & Associates Law Offices
for petitioners.
     Jimmy Lacebal for respondent.

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51230, to wit:
1
1. Decision dated 19 July 2000, affirming with
modification an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court at Pasig City, Branch 155, in an action
for recovery of possession thereat commenced by
the herein respondent against the petitioners; and
2
2. Resolution dated 29 January 2001, denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The facts may be briefly stated, as follows:

Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong
City with an area of 6,825 square meters (hereinafter
referred to as the Fabella Estate), which formed part of the
estate of the late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized
themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants
Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said
property and distributing it to its members.
Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the
property from the heirs of Don Dionisio M. Fabella, FETA
applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the latter’s
Community Mortgage Program.
However, as a pre-condition for the loan, and in order
that specific portions of the property could be allotted to
each tenant who will have to pay the corresponding price
therefor, NHMFC required all tenants to become members
of FETA.
Accordingly, all the tenants occupying portions of the
Fabella Estate were asked to join FETA. While the rest did,
the

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (now ret.), with

Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Elvi John S. Asun-cion,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 13-20.
2 Rollo, p. 23.

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140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were

occupying the lot subject matter of this controversy,
consisting of about 105 square meters of the Fabella
Estate, refused to join the Association. Consequently, the
portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De
Guzman, a qualified FETA member.
Later, and with the help of the city government of
Mandaluyong, FETA became the registered owner of the
entire Fabella Estate, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 2902 issued in its name by the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong in 1989.
To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo from the
portion in question which they continued to occupy despite
the earlier award thereof to Mrs. Miriam de Guzman,
FETA filed against them a complaint for unlawful detainer
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City.
In a decision dated 6 August 1990, the MeTC dismissed
the unlawful detainer case on the ground that it was an
improper remedy because the Ragudos had been occupying
the subject portion for more than one (1) year prior to the
filing of the complaint, hence the proper action should have
been one for recovery of possession before the proper
regional trial court. FETA appealed the dismissal to the
Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, which affirmed the
same.
FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for
recovery of possession against the Ragudos. In their
Answer, the spouses interposed the defense that they have
already acquired ownership of the disputed portion since
they have been in occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner for more than forty (40) years. They further argued
that FETA’s title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake
because as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it was originally
registered as OCT No. 13, a title which has been previously
adjudged null and void by RTC-Pasig in a much earlier
case involving different parties. Finally, they insist that
FETA’s right to recover has been barred

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

by laches in view of their more than 40-year occupancy of

the portion in question. 3
Eventually, in a decision dated 29 July 1994, the trial
court rendered judgment in FETA’s favor, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered:

1) ordering [spouses Ragudo] to vacate the premises in

question and to turn over possession thereof to [FETA];
2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the
month of November 1981 and every month thereafter until
they vacate the premises;
3) to pay [FETA] attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
4) to pay [FETA] the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
5) to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.”

Therefrom, the spouses Ragudo went on appeal to the

Court of Appeals, whereat their appellate recourse was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51230.
Meanwhile, pending resolution by the appellate court of
the Ragudos’ appeal, FETA filed with the trial court a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, to which the Ragudos interposed an Opposition,
followed by FETA’s Reply to Opposition. Then, on 11
October 1994, the Ragudos filed with the trial court a
Rejoinder to Reply With CounterMotion to Admit Attached4
Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident.
Attached thereto and sought to be admitted therein were
the following documents and photographs, to wit:

_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 104-106.

4 Rollo, pp. 149-169.
 142

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

5
1. Letter dated 21 November 1989 of the spouses
Ragudo’s son, Engr. Aurelio Ragudo, addressed to
FETA, stating therein that the Ragudos were
willing to become FETA members;
2. Joint Affidavit, dated 07 October6
1994, of three (3)
residents of the Fabella Estate;
3. Photos of three (3) alleged houses of7
Miriam de
Guzman located at the Fabella Estate;
4. Photos of two (2) alleged houses of the sons 8 of
Miriam de Guzman located at the Fabella Estate;
5. Photo of a lot allegedly awarded by FETA to its
president,
9
Amparo Nobleza, located at the Fabella
Estate; and
6. Photo of a three (3)-storey house of Nobleza’s
relative named10Architect Fernandez located at the
Fabella Estate.

In an order dated 25 November 1994, the trial court

admitted in evidence the attachments to the Ragudos’
aforementioned Rejoinder With Counter-Motion, etc., and
ultimately denied FETA’s motion for execution pending
appeal.
Later, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, the Ragudos filed with
the appellate court a Motion To Admit Certain
Documentary Evidence11
by Way of Partial New Trial, In the
Interest of Justice, thereunder seeking the admission in
evidence of the very documents earlier admitted by the
trial court in connection with the then pending incident of
execution pending appeal, and praying that said documents
be made part of the records

_______________

5 Rollo, pp. 180-181.

6 Rollo, pp. 170-172.
7 Rollo, pp. 173-175.
8 Rollo, pp. 176-177.
9 Rollo, p. 178.
10 Rollo, p. 179.
11 Rollo, pp. 107-118.

143
 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 143
Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

and considered in the resolution of their appeal in CA-G.R.

CV No. 51230.
This time, however, the Ragudos were12
not as lucky. For,
in a Resolution dated 19 May 1997, the appellate court
denied their aforesaid motion and ordered expunged from
the records of the appealed case the documents they sought
admission of, on the ground that they could not be
considered as newly discovered evidence under Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court. Dispositively, the Resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, the instant motion to admit certain documentary

evidence by way of partial new trial is DENIED for lack of merit.
ACCORDINGLY, the Joint Affidavit dated October 7, 1994 of
Honesto Garcia III and Miguela L. Balbino and the latter of
Aurelio Raguo to Atty. Cesar G. Untalan dated November 21,
1989 are ordered EXPUNGED from the records of this case.
SO ORDERED.”

The Ragudos moved for a reconsideration, invoking

“liberality in the exercise of judicial discretion” and the
“interest of equity and substantial justice.” Unmoved, the
appellate court denied their motion13
in its subsequent
Resolution of 24 September 1997.
Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated 19 July
2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Ragudos’ appeal
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 and affirmed with modification
the RTC decision in the main case, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is

hereby AFFIRMED, except for the second clause of the dispositive
portion which should be MODIFIED, as follows:
“2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month
of November, 1989 and every month thereafter until they vacate
the premises.”

_______________

12 Rollo, pp. 120-121.

13 Rollo, p. 136.

144

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.
SO ORDERED.”

With their motion for reconsideration having been denied

by the appellate court in its equally challenged Resolution
of 29 January 2001, the Ragudos are now with us via the
instant recourse, commending for our resolution the
following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE INTRODUCED
BY RAGUDO AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL ON
THE GROUND OF “LIBERALITY OF
PROCEDURAL RULES,” “EQUITY AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE”, THE “MISTAKE AND
EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE” ON THE PART OF
THEIR FORMER COUNSEL, AND THE “SOCIAL
JUSTICE AND PARENS PATRIAE CLAUSE” OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT “ACQUISITIVE
PRESCRIPTION AND EQUITABLE LACHES”
HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE CONTINUED
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT BY
RAGUDO AND WHETHER THE SAME
PRINCIPLES HAD CREATED A “VESTED
RIGHT” IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO TO CONTINUE
14
TO POSSESS AND OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.

Informed of Mr. Ramon Ragudo’s death on 26 March 15

2001,
the Court, in a resolution dated 14 January 2002, allowed
his substitution by his other heirs.
The recourse must fall.
Relative to the first issue, it is petitioners’ submission
that the appellate court committed an error when it
refused admission as evidence in the main case the
documents earlier admitted by the trial court in connection
with FETA’s motion for execution pending appeal.
Appealing to this Court’s sense of judicial discretion in the
interest of equity and substantial justice, petitioners
explain that the documents in question were not presented
and offered in evidence during the trial of

_______________

14 Rollo, p. 46.
15 Rollo, pp. 244-245.

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

the main case before the RTC due to the honest mistake
and excusable negligence of their former counsel, Atty.
Celso A. Tabobo, Jr.
We are not persuaded.
In this jurisdiction, well-entrenched is the rule that the
mistake and negligence of counsel to introduce, during the 16
trial of a case, certain pieces of evidence bind his client.17
For sure, in Aguila vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas,
we even ruled that the omitted evidence by reason of
counsel’s mistake or negligence, cannot be invoked as a
ground for new trial:

On the effects of counsel’s acts upon his client, this Court has
categorically declared:

It has been repeatedly enunciated that ‘a client is bound by the action of

his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A
client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be
admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to
a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and
show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced
or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness,
the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce certain
evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case are not proper
grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great
that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his
case.’ (Vol. 2, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220,
citing Rivero v. Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500, 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89
Phil. 279; Montes v. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167;
U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151, 1164).
In the

_______________

16 E.g., Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470 (1992);

Alabanzas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 304, (1991); and
Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).
17 160 SCRA 352 (1988).

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146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.
1988 case of Palanca v. American Food, etc. (24 SCRA 819, 828), this
principle was reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304).
[Citations in the original; Emphasis supplied].

This is, as it should be, because a counsel has the implied

authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least,
incidental to the prosecution
18
and management of the suit
in behalf of his client. And, any act performed by counsel
within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in
the eyes of the law, regarded as the act of the client himself
and consequently, the mistake or negligence of the client’s
counsel may result in 19
the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against him.
A contrary rule would be inimical to the greater interest
of dispensing justice. For, all that a losing party will do is
to invoke the mistake or negligence of his counsel as a
ground for reversing or setting aside a judgment adverse to
him, thereby putting no end to litigation. Again, to quote
from our decision in Aguila:

Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent

proceedings and recognize his earlier claims to the disputed
property on the justification that his counsel was grossly inept.
Such a reason is hardly plausible as the petitioner’s new counsel
should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to
do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the
part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse
judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were
allowed as every shortcoming of counsel could be the
subject of challenge by his client through another counsel
who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be
disowned by the same client through another counsel, and
so on ad infinitum. This would render court proceedings
indefinite, tentative and subject to reopening at any

_______________

18 Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of First Instance of Ri-zal, 208 SCRA 523
(1992).
19 Salonga vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 514; 269 SCRA 534 (1997).

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. (Emphasis

supplied).
Admittedly, the rule thus stated admits of exceptions.
Thus, in cases where the counsel’s mistake is so great and
serious
20
that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in
court or when he is guilty of gross negligence resulting in
the client’s
21
deprivation of his property without due process
of law, the client is not bound by his counsel’s mistakes
and the case may even be reopened in order to give the
client another chance to present his case.
Unfortunately, however, petitioners’ case does not fall
under any of the exceptions but rather squarely within the
ambit of the rule.
As it is, petitioners were given full opportunity during
the trial of the main case to adduce any and all relevant
evidence to advance their cause. In no sense, therefore,
may it be argued that they were denied due 22
process of law.
As we said in Antonio vs. Court of Appeals, a client cannot
be said to have been deprived of his day in court and there
is no denial of due process as long as he has been given an
opportunity to be heard, which, we emphasize, was done in
the instant case.
Petitioners further argue that the documents which
their former counsel failed to adduce in evidence during
trial of the main case must be allowed to stay in the records
thereof and duly considered in the resolution of their
appeal because they were duly admitted in the trial court
during the hearing on the incidental motion for execution
pending appeal.
Again, we are not persuaded.
With the reality that those documents were never
presented and formally offered during the trial of the main
case, their belated admission for purposes of having them
duly

_______________

20 Boyer-Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, supra.

21 Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
22 167 SCRA 127 (1988).

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148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

considered in the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230

would certainly collide with Section 34, Rule 132, of the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence.—The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Emphasis
supplied).

To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for

execution pending appeal that said documents were
presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court
admitted them, but the admission was only for the purpose
for which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to
FETA’s motion for execution pending appeal. It is basic in
the law of evidence that the court shall consider23
evidence
solely for the purpose for which it was offered.
While the said documents may have the right to stay in
the records of the case for purposes of the incidental issue
of execution pending appeal, they do not have that same
right insofar as far as the main case is concerned, and
ought not be considered in the resolution thereof.
Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription
and equitable laches had set in, thereby vesting them with
a right to a continued possession of the subject lot.
The contention holds no water.
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a
parcel of land registered
24
under the Torrens system. In a
long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty
Corporation vs. Vallez,

_______________

23 Vol. II, Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, p. 677

(1995), citing People vs. Abalos, [CA], 58 O.G. 5446.
24 E.g., Tuason vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106 (1954); Vda. de Recinto vs.
Inciong, 77 SCRA 196 (1977); and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 146 (1979).

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

25
et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is
baseless when the land involved is 26a registered land
because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation27to Act
496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 ):
Appellants’ claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless.
Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of
ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration
Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act
No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of
possession by the defendants is both immaterial and
inconsequential. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners would take exception from the above settled

rule by arguing that FETA as well as its predecessor in
interest, Don Dionisio M. Fabella, are guilty of laches and
should, therefore, be already precluded from asserting their
right as against
28
them, invoking, in this regard, the rulings
of this Court to the effect that while a registered land may
not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the
registered owner’s inaction and neglect, his right to recover
the possession thereof may have been converted into a stale
demand.

_______________

25 173 SCRA 534 (1989).

26 ARTICLE 1126. Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property,
ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to
the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also
recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
As to land registered under the Land Registration Act, the
provisions of that special law shall govern. (Emphasis supplied)
27 SECTION 47. Registered land not subject to prescription.—No title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
28 E.g., Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 (1956); Miguel vs.
Catalino, 135 Phil. 229; 26 SCRA 234 (1968); etc.

150

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners’

posture, a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their
submission.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners’
possession of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of
its former lawful29
owner. In this connection, Bishop vs.
Court of Appeals teaches that if the claimant’s possession
of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the
latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by
laches:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private

respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be
supposed that they were aware of the petitioner’s
occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of
that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand
the return of their property at any time as long as the
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
This right is never barred by laches. (Emphasis supplied).

To the same effect

30
is our pronouncement in Urquiaga vs.
Court of Appeals, to wit:

We find no reversible error committed by respondent Court of

Appeals. We sustain private respondents’ ownership of Lot No.
6532-B. As between the verbal claim of ownership by
petitioners through possession for a long period of time,
which was found by the court a quo to be inherently weak,
and the validly documented claim of ownership of
respondents, the latter must naturally prevail. (Emphasis
supplied).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the

assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

_______________

29 208 SCRA 636 (1992).

30 361 Phil. 660; 301 SCRA 738 (1999).

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Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez and

Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
     Corona, J., On Official Leave.

Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution

affirmed.
 Notes.—A document, or any article for that matter, is
not evidence when it is simply marked for identification—it
must be formally offered. (Candido vs. Court of Appeals,
253 SCRA 78 [1996])
A party is not deemed to have waived objection to
admissibility of documents by his failure to object to the
same when they were marked, identified, and then
introduced during the trial—objection to documentary
evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered,
not earlier. (Macasiray vs. People, 291 SCRA 154 [1998])
If the negligence of counsel be admitted as a reason for
opening a case, there would never be an end to litigation so
long as there is a new counsel to be hired every time it is
shown that the prior one had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced or learned. (Boaz International Trading
Corporation vs. Woodward Japan, Inc., 418 SCRA 287
[2003])

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