PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR FELONIES

 Article 16. Who are criminally liable. – The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.

The following are criminally liable for light felonies:

1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.

 Article 17. Principals. – The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished.

PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION
There are two ways of becoming a principal by induction under the second paragraph of Article 17, namely:
1) By directly forcing another to commit a crime, and
2) By directly inducing another to commit a crime.

US vs Maharaja Alim (GR No. L-13312, April 1, 1918)

Facts:

About a year prior to the commission of the crime, Maharaja Alim had proposed to Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung to kill Tantung and
later, about one month prior to its commission, Maharaja Alim again made to them the same proposal, offered them P100, and advanced on that
same occasion P10, which sum was received by Munagil. Said proposal was accepted by all three of them. On the morning of March 16, 1917, while
Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung were on a piece of land belonging to the first of them, Maharaja Alim appeared, again spoke to them of the
proposal to kill Tantung, and advised them that the latter would go fishing on the afternoon of that day. At noon, all the defendants separated from
each other and withdrew to their respective homes. That afternoon, Maharaja Alim again saw Lahaman, in the latter's house, for the purpose of
again talking to him about the killing of Tantung. On that same afternoon, Salatung saw Munagil in a coconut grove and told him that they should
hasten to go because Maharaja Alim had told Salatung that Tantung was already out on the sea. On that same afternoon, Salatung also went to see
Lahaman to tell him that at nightfall they would go in search of Tantung. When night came, Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung met on the seashore,;
Salatung was carrying a lance belonging to Maharaja Alim, which he had taken from the house of Pancalan. Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung then
embarked in a vinta and went out to sea in the direction of the vinta in which Tantung was engaged in fishing. On the way, Salatung suggested that,
on their drawing up alongside Tantung's vinta, he would ask the latter for some bait and when Tantung was in the act of giving it to them Munagil
should thrust him with the lance. Salatung steered the vinta. When they had drawn up alongside of Tantung's vinta, Salatung took hold of the edge
of the vinta to keep the two boats together, and asked for the bait; and when Tantung stretched out his arm to give bait, Munagil pierced him with
the lance below the armpit, after which Lahaman took the same lance and gave the wounded man another thrust in the breast. Tantung fell into the
water. Salatung then rowed towards the place where Tantung was and when the latter was near the vintaMunagil struck him on the back with a
bolo, and Tantung disappeared. Munagil, Lahaman, and Salatung returned to the shore and, after disembarking, dispersed, whereupon Munagil
went to seek Maharaja Alim in order to report to him that they had already killed Tantung. After Maharaja Alim had learned of the killing, he looked
for and found Lahaman that same night and they both went out to sea in search of Tantung's body, for the purpose, as Maharaja Alim testified, of
preventing the discovery of the crime. Later, Tantung's body, bearing several wounds, having been found floating on the water the authorities
proceeded to investigate the cause of his death. They were aided by the Moro Barahama, to whom Munagil and Lahaman had confessed that they,
accompanied by Salatung and acting under Maharaja Alim's orders, had killed Tantung.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant Maharaja Alim is guilty as co-principal by inducement.

Held:
Yes. The foregoing facts determine Maharaja Alim's liability as the author of the crime by inducement, and this inducement was
completely efficacious, not so much on account of the influence of the authority he exercised over his co-defendants, as it was of the assurances he
made to them that he would take care of them, should the crime be discovered, and above all, because of the price that he promised and delivered
to them and which caused them to decide upon the killing of their victim. They were relatives of the deceased, and, as for themselves, had no
reason whatever to kill the latter. They killed him only because they had been induced to do so by Maharaja Alim.
Hence, defendant Maharaja Alim is guilty as co-principal by inducement.
*Additional info:
The liability of Munagil and Lahaman as principals, being the actual perpetrators of the crime, is evident.
As regards Salatung, although he did not assault the deceased, he is equally liable as principal. He plotted the commission of the crime
with his co-defendants; he carried the lance with which the deceased was to be wounded; he suggested the treacherous manner in which the
assault was to be effected;. he steered the vinta in which he and his companions were embarked to the place where the boat of the deceased was,
in accordance with the plan suggested by him; he asked the deceased for the bait, in order that the latter might be assaulted when he (the latter)
should stretch out his arm to give the bait; when the deceased, after being struck twice with the lance, fell into the water and was swimming, this
defendant Salatung steered the vinta to him, thus enabling Munagil to strike him on the back with the bolo, causing him to disappear. All those acts
tended directly to the execution of the crime, were as effective as the assault itself, and, it may properly be said that they formed an integral part of
the assault.
As a price and reward were offered by Maharaja Alim to the other defendants, this circumstance classifies the crime as murder. As all the
defendants contributed toward the attendance of this circumstance, it should affect each and all of them.

People vs Caimbre, et al., (GR No. L-12087, December 29, 1960)

Facts:
After trial upon a plea of not guilty, Edilberto Justimbaste and Vicente Caimbre were convicted, as co-principals by inducement, of the
crime of murder. From said decision, only Edilberto Justimbaste interposed an appeal.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 4, 1956, Angel Olimpo and Fausto Broa arrived at the house of Esteban Caimbre at Sitio
Cabaluran, Dagami, Leyte, and sat themselves on a mortar. Shortly thereafter, Demetrio Caimbre arrived, sat on the same mortar and then, without
any provocation, slashed Angel Olimpo with a bolo. Olimpo ran to a nearby palay seed bed pursued by Demetrio up to border of the ricefield where
he was overtaken by his pursuer who slashed him again several times with his bolo and then left him in the ricefield. During the pursuit appellant
told Demetrio: "You had better killed him". Upon the suggestion of Fausto Broa, the victim was removed from the ricefield and taken to higher
ground. When Vicente Caimbre noticed that he was still alive, he told his brother, Demetrio: "Finish him, finish him". Whereupon, Demetrio cut
Olimpo's neck saying: "He would be lucky if he could still survive"

Issue:
Whether or not appellant Edilberto Justimbaste is guilty as co-principal by inducement.

Held:
No. In determining the acts or utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must be shown
that the inducement was of such a nature and made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime, and that such inducement was
offered precisely with the intention of producing the result. In other words, it must appear that the inducement was made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement was the determining cause thereof. In the present case, there is
nothing to show that appellant had any reason at all to have Angel Olimpo killed. On the other hand, even before he allegedly uttered the words
attributed to him, Demetrio Caimbre had already boloed his victim several times and when the latter ran away he pursued him until he overtook
him in a nearby palay seed bed where he slashed him again several times with his bolo. Obviously he needed no exhortation from appellant to
persuade him to kill his victim. To this we must add the circumstance that there is no evidence to show that appellant had sufficient moral influence
over Demetrio Caimbre as to make the latter obey him blindly.
Therefore, appellant Edilberto Justimbaste is not guilty as co-principal by inducement and is hereby acquitted.

People vs Canial et al., (GR Nos. L-31042-43, August 18, 1972)

Facts:
Janet and her sister Clarita arrived at their mother's place in a white Toyota car with Canial and Edwards to attend a birthday party; that
after staying in the house for a while, Canial, Edward and Vicente Lladoc came out and sat at the front seat to the parked car; that there were then
men standing and drinking at the store in the street corner; that some of the men walked towards the car, Galang going to the left side of the
vehicle where Canial was seated, while Navasca took to the right side.
The deceased were coming from the opposite direction and their approach was properly noticed by the trio who were seated inside the
car. It is likewise admitted that Canial had then an unlicensed 45 cal. pistol placed on the seat beside him. Certainly, a man who carries with him
unlicensed firearms, including a carbine would not have allowed himself to become a sitting duck to any group of supposedly armed men. Canial
and his group, who must have been accustomed to violent encounters with armed persons (witness the presence of unlicensed pistol and carbine in
the car), would have readily sensed that the approaching men were not there for a friendly talk. So, before the men could reach them, Canial must
have gotten out of the car, as testified for the prosecution, and opened fire at Navasca who was within his direct view. This is clear from the
downward direction or trajectory path of the two wounds sustained by Navasca on the left chest almost close to each other, indicating that his
assailant was at his front, and the absence of gunpowder around the bullet holes, showing that the gunwielder was more than one yard away when
the wounds were inflicted. After Navasca fell face down, and Canial had emptied his pistol, he went to the back of the car and took the carbine from
the baggage compartment. He shot the sprawled Navasca once more, hitting him at the left pre-auricular region (near the cheekbone), the bullet
coming out on the right side of the neck. The direction of this wound indicates that the gunwielder was situated overlooking the body of the victim.
It is, of course, understandable that Edwards was not able to fire at Galang at once and he had to grapple first with the latter for
possession of his (Edwards) gun. It must be remembered that this accused was seated at the middle with Canial and Lladoc at his sides. In fact,
Lladoc had to get out of the car and run. Galang, who appears from the records to be an alert, aggressive person, must have tried to grab Edward's
gun before the latter could make use of it. Nevertheless, after a scuffle, Edwards was able to rid himself of Galang and shot him. This is evident from
the absence of gunpowder burns on the bullet hole in Galang's garment, establishing that Edwards was more than one yard away when he fired at
Galang. Then, after firing more shots at Galang, Edward shot Felarca who was coming from behind the vehicle.
Janet pointed to Edwards the deceased Felarca, who rushed to the aid of his friends, despite the gunfire, from behind the car of the
accused, and that Edwards promptly shot the latter. But considering the situation that Edwards had already hit Navasca, and Canial on the other
side of the car was using and firing a carbine, it is unlikely that Janet's statement — "Iyan pa ang isa dumarating" — was taken and obeyed by
Edwards as an order to shoot.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant Janet Clemente is guilty as co-principal by inducement.

Held:
No. From all indications, Edwards then did not need prodding or instigation from anybody to fire at anyone who would rush towards him,
as Felarca had imprudently done. Janet's statement partook more of a warning to Edwards of an impending threat than an inducement to shoot.
For the utterances of an accused to make him a principal by inducement, it is necessary that the words be of such nature and uttered in
such a manner as to become the determining cause of the crime, and that the inducement precisely was intended to serve such purpose. In other
words, the inciting words must have great dominance and influence over the person who acts; they ought to be direct and as efficacious or
powerful as physical or moral coercion or violence itself. Thus, where the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer necessary to
incite the assailant, then the uttered can not be held accountable for the crime as a principal by inducement. Her statement do not, therefore,
make Janet Clemente incur criminal liability for the killings effected by her co-accused.
Therefore, defendant Janet Clemente is not guilty as co-principal by inducement and is hereby acquitted.

*Additional info:
Accused Marlo Canial is found guilty of homicide for the killing of Irineo Navasca.
Accused Alfredo Edwards is found to have caused the death of Benjamin Galang and Zosimo Felarca. However, said accused, having died
pending this appeal, on July 19, 1972, at the National Penitentiary, his criminal liability for the wrongs he had committed is declared to have been
legally extinguished.

People vs Fronda (GR Nos. 102361-62, May 14, 1993)

Facts:
The trial court made a lengthy enumeration of established facts and circumstances which was made the basis of the conviction of
appellant, to wit :
1)appellant and Roderick Padua, and NPA member were the ones who pointed the house where the brothers Balaan were to be found, 2)
appellant and Roderick Padua accompanied the members of the armed group to said house, and tied the victims' hands, 3) appellant was handed a
hunting knife by one of the armed men when they left the house, 4) appellant joined the members of the armed group in bringing the victims to a
forested area in the mountains, 5) it was appellant who provided the spade and crowbar used in digging the hole where the Balaan brothers were
buried, 6) appellant was the one who pointed the location where the victms' bodies buried, 7) appellant, for a period of more than three (3) years,
failed to report the incident to the authorities, and 8) appellant did not in any way object, when he was ordered to tie the hands of the victims.
Furthermore, prosecution witnesses Freddie Arevalo and Gilbert Viernes testified that the members of the armed group were accompanied by,
aside from appellant, another barriomate, Roderick Padua, known to be a member of the NPA (Tsn p. 8 & 76). Undoubtedly, ever without appelant's
participation, the assailants could have easily located the Balaan brothers thru the assistance of Roderick Padua. Taking account of the number of
the assailants alone, it is apparen that the armed men could have nevertheless committed the crime easily without the appellant abetting the
commission thereof.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant could be convicted as a principal by indispensable cooperation.

Held:
No. The acts performed by appellant are not, by themselves, indispensable to the killing of the brothers Balaan. As aforesaid to be
considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, there must be direct participation in the criminal design by another act without which the
crime could not have been committed. We note that the prosecution failed to present any evidence tending to establish appellant's conspiracy with
the evil designs of the members of the NPA armed group. Neither was it established that appellant's acts were of such importance that the crime
would not have been committed without him or that he participated in the actual killing.
Hence, accused-appellant is not convicted as a principal by indispensable cooperation but instead as an accomplice.
*Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a principal, "cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts". Under this provision, a person is considered as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the crime is
of a minor character. To be convicted as such, it is necessary that he be aware to the criminal intent of the principal and thereby cooperates
knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.

Article 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.

People vs Pastores, et al., (GR No. L-29800, August 31, 1971)

Facts:
Complainant MINDA V. REYES testified that in the evening of August 5, 1966, she attended the coronation ceremony held at the St. Mary's
College in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya where she was then a 4th year BSE student. The affair ended at about 11:30 in the evening, and she left the
school with her boy friend, Augusto Brillantes, at past 12 midnight. As there were no more jeepneys that would take her to her hometown, Solano,
she and Augusto agreed to just stroll along the streets of Bayombong in the moonlit night.
They walked from the school up to the capitol ground. There, they sat on one of the benches and conversed for about 2 hours. Then, they
decided to walk around, because they did not want people to see them still together at that late hour. They walked through the streets until they
came to the Perez grandstand in the Clisoc Field. They were seated in the grandstand and had been conversing for about 30 minutes when the three
accused appeared and approached them. Edmund Magat and Boy Villar took her by the hands, while the third one, Carlos Pastores, held Augusto at
bay with a bolo. Then, Magat and Villar started embracing and kissing her, and touch her breast and private parts. She struggled and cried for help.
Augusto tried to come to her aid twice, and twice Pastores boxed him, and Augusto was weakened. Then, accused Magat dragged her up the
grandstand, and forced her to lie down. But she struggled and was able to get up. Magat dragged her down from the grandstand. Carlos Pastores
then held her by the hand and ordered Magat and Villar and Augusto to follow them to the dike. They walked, Pastores still holding her hand and
threatening her with a knife, followed by Magat and Villar who had Augusto between them.
When they reached the dike, which was about 200 meters away from the grandstand, Pastores ordered Magat and Villar to take Augusto
away, which the two did. The witness and Pastores had walked a little farther when the latter started kissing and embracing her. She resisted him,
but Pastores covered her mouth, and laid her on the ground; he slapped her face and boxed her sternum. And when she kept on shouting, Pastores
strangled her; he removed her blouse, forcibly took away her bra, her skirt and her panties. She was nervous and frightened, and Pastores was able
to have sexual intercourse with her. She kept on struggling and moving and Pastores' organ was removed. He tried to insert it again, but desisted.
Then, she felt a sticky substance between her legs. Although feeling weak, she grabbed her clothes and put them on. Pastores threatened to kill her
if she would report to the authorities. He also threatened to call his two companions and she pleaded him not to. As Pastores would not let her go
home, she decided to go along with him and pretended that she liked him. Pastores brought her to the house of one Mrs. Bongcad to whom she
was introduced as Pastores' sweetheart. She kept her peace because she was afraid. Later, when she reiterated to Pastores her desire to go home to
change her clothes, he consented. She took a tricycle and dropped first at the residence of Augusto and informed his mother about the incident.
Then, she proceeded to the municipal building and reported what happened to the police. Later in the day, she was brought to the provincial
hospital where she submitted to a physical examination.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants Magat and Villar could be convicted as co-principals by indispensable cooperation.

Held:
No. That Villar and Magat were aware of Pastores' criminal design to rape Minda Reyes is apparent under the circumstances. Upon
returning home Magat advised his father of what transpired at the river dyke, and thereafter the father informed patrolman Bulaya that Minda had
been raped. 21 Considering that appellant Edmund Magat had not seen either Pastores or Minda Reyes at the river dyke after he and Villar had taken
Brillantes away, Magat's informing his father that Minda had been raped demonstrates these two appellants' awareness of what Pastores intended
to do with Minda when he asked his two companions to guard Brillantes while he (Pastores) compelled Minda to go with him.
Therefore, Villar and Magat's cooperation not being indispensable for the commission of the crime, they are only liable as accomplices.
*The court finds appellant Carlos Pastores guilty as principal in the rape of complainant Minda Reyes.

People vs Crisostomo (GR No. L-19034, February 17, 1923)

Facts:
The evidence shows sufficiently and beyond a reasonable doubt that while Macaria Gabriel and her aunt Candida Acuña were walking in
the direction of their houses from that of Gregoria Acuña, to whom Macaria had paid the sum of P30, the accused met them on the way and Pedro
Crisostomo, Lorenzo Alcoba, and Casimiro Garde, who were with the accused, dragged Macaria Gabriel along and took her against her will to a rice
field, Macaria Gabriel not having been able to prevent it by her cries and strife, and the insults proferred by her against those people who
maltreated her in such a way, while the other defendants, Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, caught hold of Candida
Acuña, thus preventing her from helping her niece until another woman, Gregoria Acuña, attracted by the cries of Candida, repaired to the place
and, with a club with which she was provided, attacked those who were holding Macaria Gabriel, and they lastly released her. As soon as Candida
Acuña was released by her aggressors, she went to the house of Macaria Gabriel and reported the matter to the latter's brother, Constantino, who
ran after the abductors of his sister overtaking them when they had just released her, which they did upon seeing Constantino.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, are guilty as accomplices of the crime.

Held:
Yes. The defendants Segundo Espiritu, Primitivo Alcoba, and Bartolome Caguiat, who, according to the evidence, did not lay hands on the
offended party, but did hold the latter's companion Candida Acuña, evidently for the purpose of preventing said Candida from helping Macaria, they
must be held to be accomplices for having cooperated in the performance of the crime by simultaneous acts.

People vs Tatlonghari, et al., (GR No. L-22094, March 28, 1969)

Facts:
FELIMON ALMARES, testified that at about 7:30 in the evening of 25 August 1954, in the barrio of Port Junction, Ragay, Camarines Sur,
while he and Victor Eje were walking along the railroad track towards their homes in barrio Catabangan, they met the accused, Santiago Tatlonghari
and Tiburcio Lalogo, in front of the house of one Marcos Nacionales; that thereupon, Santiago Tatlonghari shouted, "listo kayo mga bata" (get ready,
boys), after which stones rained on them hitting him (Almares) on the left knee; 1 that thus hurt, the witness rolled to the right side of the railroad
track and hid himself among the talahib and cogon grasses that abound in the area; that before rolling to safety, he saw Santiago Tatlonghari and
Tiburcio Lalogo hitting with bolos Victor Eje who was then lying on the ground with his two hands raised upward; 2 that he saw the stabbing
because there were beams of light coming from the houses of Catalino Arellano, Marcos Nacionales and Juan Corod, which were within the
vicinity; 3 that Santiago Tatlonghari had also a flashlight in his left hand which was focused on the victim while the latter was being hit with
bolos; 4 that thereafter, Fausto Mercado, Agapito Mercado, Cirilo Cueto and Ambrosia Tatlonghari appeared from the cogon grasses along the
railroad track and, with Santiago Tatlonghari and Tiburcio Lalogo, viewed the prostrate body of Victor Eje then they left the place together, going
eastward in the direction of the railroad station; 5that when the group was gone he left his hiding place and headed for home. He related the
incident to Pedro Comia and Epifanio Bico when they came to see him a little later.

Issue:
Whether or not defendants Fausto Mercado, his son, Agapito, Ambrosio Tatlonghari, and Cirilo Cueto, are guilty as accomplices of the
crime murder.

Held:
Yes. The record is clear, however, that, although they had not acted pursuant to previous concert, the appellants, Fausto Mercado, his son,
Agapito, Ambrosio Tatlonghari, and Cirilo Cueto, did knowingly aid the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and distracting his attention.
However, their cooperation, although done with knowledge of the criminal intent, was not indispensable to the murderous assault by Santiago
Tatlonghari and the fugitive Tiburcio Lalogo, for which reason the four should be held liable only as accomplices in the murder of the late Victor Eje.

People vs Balili (GR No. L-38250, August 6, 1979)

Facts:
Margarita Salingsing, wife of the victim Pio Araza, and her family lived in an isolated house in a farm at Barrio Himay Gandara, Samar.
Ricardo Cabarles, Felix Verzosa and Celestino Balili, went to the house of victim Pio Araza in 1971 to treat the later of his paralysis.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of September 4, 1972, while Margarita and her children, Perpetua, Alejo, and son-in-law Romeo
Dublon (husband of Perpetual were eating their dinner at the kitchen, Margarita's husband Pio Araza, afflicted with paralysis, was also eating in his
bedroom. The kitchen was well lighted with a torch placed on the table and a lamp, hanging over the table, with a lamp in the bedroom where Pio
Araza was eating. Three persons (Ricardo Cabarles, Celestino Balili and Felix Verzosa) entered the house suddenly.
Once inside, Ricardo Cabarles clubbed Perpetua Araza Dublon on the head, Celestino Balili did likewise with Margarita, while Felix Verzosa clubbed
and then stabbed Alejo.
Upon being hit on the head, Perpetua Araza Dublon purposely dropped herself under the table, and she saw Ricardo Cabarles enter the
room where her father Pio Araza was eating, after which Margarita Salingsing heard her husband say, "I have done no wrong to you but you stabbed
me." Perpetua, under the table, also saw her mother Margarita rush towards the room of her husband Pio Araza, followed by Celestino Balili
hacking her at the back that caused Margarita to fall, after which Celestino Balili proceeded to the room towards Pio Araza.
At that moment, Perpetua left the house to inform her brother Arturo, who lived about one kilometer from their house, about the
incident. When Perpetua returned to her parent's house the following morning, she saw the wooden trunk of her parents usually kept in her
father's room in the yard already opened. Perpetua went to the house and saw her mother Margarita lying on her side near her father. When she
informed her mother about the trunk, the latter told her to look for the money (P2,000) in the trunk, which she did, but failed to find it.
The family lost P2,000 and a transistorized radio worth P98.00. The radio was subsequently recovered by the police from Ricardo Cabarles,
the co-accused of appellant. Pio Araza died because of two mortal wounds inflicted on him.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant Ricardo Cabarles is guilty as an accomplice of the crime Robbery With Homicide with Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries.

Held:
Yes. In case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility. However, lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that
creates doubt whether accused had acted as principals or accomplices in the penetration of the offense, the doubt should be resolved in favour of
the accused by holding the accused guilty as mere accomplice. The wounds inflicted are sometime considered. The wounds inflicted by Ricardo
Cabarles could not have caused the death of the victim.

Article 19. Accessories. – Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery;
 3. By harbouring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his
public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

Tan vs People (GR No. 134298, August 26, 1999)\

Facts:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the
business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February
1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts,
such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks
valued at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently,
Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainant's
warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked the complainant's
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to
Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Ramon Tan is guilty as an accessory in the crime of theft.

Held:
No. There was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold him. "One is
deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has
the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually
believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence
would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers
to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained
therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person.
Hence, Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty as an accessory in the crime of theft.

Dizon-Pamintuan vs People (GR No. 111426, July 11, 1994)

Facts:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways testified that he has just arrived at his residence located
at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the
house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five
unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two
helpers and dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other occupants,
namely his wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away
jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was
then interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an operation group would be assigned to the case.
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on February 15, 1988. Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his
house and he was asked to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was later
told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an entrapment would be made
with their participation, on February 14, 1988. As such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino
Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen
displayed at the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought
from estimator Nancy Bacud, 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 and 1 gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000.
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified that he was with the spouses Teodoro Encarnacion, Jr. in the morning of February 24, 1988 and they
proceeded to Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan together with Sgt. Perez. After the spouses
Encarnacion recognized the items subject matter of the robbery at the display window of the stall being tended by the herein accused, they invited
the latter to the precinct and investigated the same. They likewise brought the said showcase to the WPD station. He further testified that he has no
prior knowledge of the stolen jewelries of the private complainant from one store to another.
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testified that he reported for duty on February 24, 1988; that he was with the group who accompanied the
spouses Encarnacion in Sta. Cruz, Manila and was around when the couple saw some of the lost jewelries in the display stall of the accused. He was
likewise present during the early part of the investigation of the WPD station.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is guilty as an accessory to the crime of robbery.

Held:
Yes. Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the fact that these jewelries were found in possession of appellant and they were
displayed for sale in a showcase being tended by her in a stall along Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
9

Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised
Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that "there is
rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of
the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to
"impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery
and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere
accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing.
Therefore, accused-appellant Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is guilty as an accessory in the crime of robbery and is guilty as a principal in the
crime of fencing.