LAW
REVIEW
ACADEMIC
YEAR
2018-‐2019
COLLEGE
OF
LAW
BULACAN
STATE
UNIVERSITY
GENERAL
OUTLINE
AND
COVERAGE
• CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
• ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW
• ELECTION
LAW
• LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
• PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
POLITICAL
LAW
• Branch
of
public
law
• Deals
with
the
organization
and
operations
of
the
governmental
organs
of
the
State
• Defines
the
relations
of
the
State
with
the
inhabitants
of
its
territory
Constitution,
defined
• It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these
powers are distributed among the several departments. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and
the people who run it. (Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commision [2010]
Constitutional
Supremacy
• A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and
administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Manila
Priince Hotel vs. GSIS [1997])
Parts;
Three
Constitution
in
One
Part Provision and
importance Provisions in
the
1987
Constitution
Constitution of
Liberty/Rights The
series of
provisions
setting
ARTICLE III
forth
the
fundamental
rights
of
Civil
and
Political
Rights
• Freedom
of
Belief citizens
and
imposing
limitations
on
• Personal
Freedom the
powers
of
government
as
a
means
of
securing
the
enjoyment
of
these
rights.
Constitution of
Government The
series
of
provisions outlining
ARTICLE VI,
VII,
VIII,
IX,
XI
the
organization
of
government
enumerating
its
powers,
laying
down
certain
rules
relative
to
its
administration
and
defining
the
electorate
Constitution of
Sovereignty The
provisions containing
the
mode
PREAMBLE, ARTICLE II,
XVII
or
procedure
in
accordance
with
which
formal
changes
in
the
fundamental
law
may
be
brought
about.
AMENDMENTS
AND
REVISION
(Constitution
of
Sovereignty)
• Historical
Evolution
under
the
1935,
1973
Constitution
• Article
XVII,
1987
Constitution
• Distinction
between
amendment
• Revision
in
light
of
“initiative
and
referendum”
Distinctions
Amendment Revision
Envisions
an
alteration
of
one
or
more
specific and
A
re-‐examination of
the
entire
document,
to
separable
provisions. determine
how
and
to
what
extent
,
or
of
provisions
of
the
document
which
have
over-‐all
implications
for
the
entire
document,
to
determine
how
and
to
what
extent
they
should
be
altered.
The
intention
of
an
act
to
amend
is
not
the change
of
Revision
may
involve
re-‐writing
the
entire
the
entire
constitution,
but
only
the
improvement
of
constitution.
specific
parts
or
the
addition
of
provisions
deemed
essential
as
a
consequence
of
new
conditions
or
elimination
of
parts
already
considered
obsolete
or
unresponsive
to
the
needs
of
the
times.
Move
to
change
from
presidential
to
parliamentary
or
federal
system?
Importance
of
distinction
• Important
in
light
of
limited
scope
of
initiative
and
referendum
• If
the
change
made
de
hors
(outside)
of
the
Constitution
is
made
by
the
sovereign
people,
the
resultant
alteration
is
not
unconstitutional
but
extra-‐constitutional.
(Bernas,
“ The1987
Constitution
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines,”
[2009])
• Revolution
and
Revision
(1973
Ratification
Cases)
Proposal
of
Amendments
and
Revision
• Article
XVII,
SECTION
1.
Any
amendment
to,
or
revision
of,
this
Constitution
may
be
proposed
by:
(1)
The
Congress,
upon
a
vote
of
three-‐fourths
of
all
its
Members;
or
(2)
A
constitutional
convention.
Key
Questions:
• Joint
Session?
• Voting separately?
• Nothing
is
said
about
a
joint
session,
each
house
may
separately
formulate
amendments
by
a
vote
of
¾
of
all
its
members,
and
then
pass
it
on
to
the
other
house
for
a
similar
process.
Disagreements
to
be
settled
through
a
conference
committee.
• Alternatively,
Congress
may
decide
to
come
together
in
joint
session
and
vote
separately
on
proposed
amendments
and
revisions.
Both
houses
must
vote
separately.
Why?
• Congress
Is
bicameral
and
not
unicameral.
Initiative
and
Referendum
• INITIATIVE
-‐ Method
whereby
the
people
directly
propose
amendments
to
the
constitution.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
Initiative
and
Referendum
• A peoples initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
and revisions to the Constitution. (Lambino vs. COMELEC [2006])
• Under
American
jurisprudence,
the
effect
of
logrolling
is
to nullify
the
entire
proposition and
not
only
the
unrelated
subject
matter.
Constitutional
Convention
• Article
XVII,
SECTION
3.
The
Congress
may,
by
a
vote
of
two-‐thirds
of
all
its
Members,
call
a
constitutional
convention,
or
by
a
majority
vote
of
all
its
Members,
submit
to
the
electorate
the
question
of
calling
such
a
convention.
Any
amendment
under
Section
2
hereof
shall
be
valid
when
ratified
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
in
a
plebiscite
which
shall
be
held
not
earlier
than
sixty
days
nor
later
than
ninety
days
after
the
certification
by
the
Commission
on
Elections
of
the
sufficiency
of
the
petition.
Self-‐Executing
and
Non-‐Self
Executing
Provisions
of
the
Constitution
• As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered
self-‐executing, and do not require future legislation for their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-‐executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the
inaction of Congress.
• By
its
very
title,
Article
II
of
the
Constitution
is
a
declaration
of
principles
and
state
policies.
x x x. These
principles
in
Article
II
are
not
intended
to
be
self-‐executing
principles
ready
for
enforcement
through
the
courts. They
are
used
by
the
judiciary
as
aids
or
as
guides
in
the
exercise
of
its
power
of
judicial
review,
and
by
the
legislature
in
its
enactment
of
laws.
Jurisprudence
(Tondo Medical
Employees
Association,
et.,
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
[2007])
• In Basco v.
Philippine
Amusement
and
Gaming
Corporation,this Court
declared
that
Sections
11,
12,
and
13
of
Article
II;
Section
13
of
Article
XIII;
and
Section
2
of
Article
XIV
of
the
1987
Constitution
are
not
self-‐executing
provisions.
Jurisprudence
(Tondo Medical
Employees
Association,
et.,
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
[2007])
• In Tolentino v.
Secretary
of
Finance,the Court
referred
to
Section
1
of
Article
XIII
and
Section
2
of
Article
XIV
of
the
Constitution
as
moral
incentives
to
legislation,
not
as
judicially
enforceable
rights. These
provisions,
which
merely
lay
down
a
general
principle,
are
distinguished
from
other
constitutional
provisions
as non self-‐
executing
and,
therefore,
cannot
give
rise
to
a
cause
of
action
in
the
courts;
they
do
not
embody
judicially
enforceable
constitutional
rights.
Jurisprudence
(Tondo Medical
Employees
Association,
et.,
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
[2007])
• In
the
remaining
provisions,
Sections
11
and
14
of
Article
XIII
and
Sections
1
and
3
of
Article
XV,
the
State
accords
recognition
to
the
protection
of
working
women
and
the
provision
for
safe
and
healthful
working
conditions;
to
the
adoption
of
an
integrated
and
comprehensive
approach
to
health;
to
the
Filipino
family;
and
to
the
right
of
children
to
assistance
and
special
protection,
including
proper
care
and
nutrition.
Jurisprudence
(Tondo Medical
Employees
Association,
et.,
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
[2007])
• Like
the
provisions
that
were
declared
as
non
self-‐executory in
the
cases
of Basco v.
Philippine
Amusement
and
Gaming
Corporation[
and Tolentino v.
Secretary
of
Finance, they
are
mere
statements
of
principles
and
policies. As
such,
they
are
mere
directives
addressed
to
the
executive
and
the
legislative
departments.
If
unheeded,
the
remedy
will
not
lie
with
the
courts;
but
rather,
the
electorates
displeasure
may
be
manifested
in
their
votes.
General
Considerations
• National
Territory
• Archipelagic Doctrine
• Jurisprudence
The
National
Territory
• ARTICLE
I
NATIONAL
TERRITORY
• The
national
territory
comprises
the
Philippine archipelago,
with
all
the
islands
and
waters
embraced
therein,
and
all
other
territories
over
which
the
Philippines
has
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction, consisting
of
its
terrestrial,
fluvial
and
aerial
domains,
including
its
territorial
sea,
the
seabed,
the
subsoil,
the
insular
shelves,
and
other
submarine
areas.
The
waters
around,
between,
and
connecting
the
islands
of
the
archipelago,
regardless
of
their
breadth
and
dimensions,
form
part
of
the
internal
waters
of
the Philippines .
National
Territory
• Both
the
1973
and
the
1987
constitutions
divide
the
national
territory
into
two
main
groups:
(1)
the
Philippine
archipelago
and
(2)
other
territories
belonging
to
the Philippines.
Archipelagic
Principle
• ……..The
waters
around,
between,
and
connecting
the
islands
of
the
archipelago,
regardless
of
their
breadth
and
dimensions,
form
part
of
the
internal
waters
of
the Philippines.
• Archipelago
is
defined
as
a
unit
of
water
studded
with
islands.
Based
on
this
definition,
the
land
area
is
everything
that
comes
within
the
water
area.
Magalllona vs.
Ermita [2011]
• In
March
2009,
Congress
amended
RA
3046
by
enacting
RA
9522,
the
statute
now
under
scrutiny.
The
change
was
prompted
by
the
need
to
make
RA
3046
compliant
with
the
terms
of
the
United
Nations
Convention
on
the
Law
of
the
Sea
(UNCLOS
III), which
the
Philippines
ratified
on
27
February
1984.Among
others,
UNCLOS
III
prescribes
the
water-‐land
ratio,
length,
and
contour
of
baselines
of
archipelagic
States
like
the
Philippines and
sets
the
deadline
for
the
filing
of
application
for
the
extended
continental
shelf. Complying
with
these
requirements,
RA
9522
shortened
one
baseline,
optimized
the
location
of
some
basepoints around
the
Philippine
archipelago
and
classified
adjacent
territories,
namely,
the
Kalayaan Island
Group
(KIG)
and
the
Scarborough
Shoal,
as
regimes
of
islands
whose
islands
generate
their
own
applicable
maritime
zones.
Magalllona vs.
Ermita [2011]
• Petitioners,
professors
of
law,
law
students
and
a
legislator,
in
their
respective
capacities
as
citizens,
taxpayers
or
x
x
x
legislators,as the
case
may
be,
assail
the
constitutionality
of
RA
9522
on
two
principal
grounds,
namely:
(1)
RA
9522
reduces
Philippine
maritime
territory,
and
logically,
the
reach
of
the
Philippine
states
sovereign
power,
in
violation
of
Article
1
of
the
1987
Constitution,embodying the
terms
of
the
Treaty
of
Paris1 and
ancillary
treaties, and
(2)
RA
9522
opens
the
countrys waters
landward
of
the
baselines
to
maritime
passage
by
all
vessels
and
aircrafts,
undermining
Philippine
sovereignty
and
national
security,
contravening
the
countrys nuclear-‐free
policy,
and
damaging
marine
resources,
in
violation
of
relevant
constitutional
provisions.
Magalllona vs.
Ermita [2011]
• UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-‐use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone 200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.
UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-‐long negotiations among United
Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along
their coasts.
• On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-‐out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Magalllona vs.
Ermita [2011]
• Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-‐based
rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right
to exploit the living and non-‐living resources in the exclusive
economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Magalllona vs.
Ermita [2011]
• Whether
referred
to
as
Philippine
internal
waters
under
Article
I
of
the
Constitution or
as
archipelagic
waters
under
UNCLOS
III
(Article
49
[1]),
the
Philippines
exercises
sovereignty
over
the
body
of
water
lying
landward
of
the
baselines,
including
the
air
space
over
it
and
the
submarine
areas
underneath.
UNCLOS
III
affirms
this:
• Article
49. Legal
status
of
archipelagic
waters,
of
the
air
space
over
archipelagic
waters
and
of
their
bed
and
subsoil.
1. The sovereignty
of
an
archipelagic
State
extends
to
the
waters
enclosed
by
the
archipelagic
baselines drawn
in
accordance
with
article
47,
described
as
archipelagic
waters,
regardless
of
their
depth
or
distance
from
the
coast.
2. This
sovereignty
extends
to
the
air
space
over
the
archipelagic
waters,
as
well
as
to
their
bed
and
subsoil,
and
the
resources
contained
therein.
• x
x
x
x
4.
The
regime
of
archipelagic
sea
lanes
passage
established
in
this
Part shall
not
in
other
respects
affect
the
status
of
the
archipelagic
waters, including
the
sea
lanes, or
the
exercise
by
the
archipelagic
State
of
its
sovereignty
over
such
waters
and
their
air
space,
bed
and
subsoil,
and
the
resources
contained
therein.
(Emphasis
supplied)
The
National
Territory
• ARTICLE
I
NATIONAL
TERRITORY
• The
national
territory
comprises
the
Philippine archipelago,
with
all
the
islands
and
waters
embraced
therein,
and
all
other
territories
over
which
the
Philippines
has
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction, consisting
of
its
terrestrial,
fluvial
and
aerial
domains,
including
its
territorial
sea,
the
seabed,
the
subsoil,
the
insular
shelves,
and
other
submarine
areas.
The
waters
around,
between,
and
connecting
the
islands
of
the
archipelago,
regardless
of
their
breadth
and
dimensions,
form
part
of
the
internal
waters
of
the Philippines .
Philippines’
National
Territory
(see
Magallona
Case)
• Archipelagic
states
instead
of
Baselines drawing
normal
baselines
have
drawn
“straight
baselines.”
The
straight
lines
are
drawn
connecting
selected
points
on
the
coast
without
applicable
departure
from
the
general
shape
of
the
coast.
• Also
referred
to
as
inland
waters.
Internal
Waters
Internal
or
inland
waters
consist
of
all
parts
of
the
sea
landwards
from
the
baseline
as
well
as
inland
rivers
and
lakes.
All
of
them
are
subject
to
the
sovereingy of
the
state
to
the
same
extent
that
the
land
domain
is.
Unlike
territorial
waters,
they
are
not
subject
to
the
right
of
innocent
passage
by
other
states.
• 1. The seabed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coastal state but
Insular
Shelf outside the territorial sea, to a depth of two
hundred meters or, beyond that limit, to
ARTICLE
I where the depth allows exploitation;
NATIONAL
TERRITORY
The
national
territory
comprises
the
Philippine archipelago,
with
all
the
islands
• 2. The seabed and subsoil of areas adjacent
and
waters
embraced
therein,
and
all
other
to islands. The coastal state has the right to
territories
over
which
the
Philippines
has
explore and exploit its natural resources, to
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction, consisting
of
its
erect installations needed, and to erect a
terrestrial,
fluvial
and
aerial
domains,
including
its
territorial
sea,
the
seabed,
the
safety zone over its installations with a
subsoil,
the
insular
shelves,
and
other
radius of 500 meters. The right does not
submarine
areas.
The
waters
around,
extend to non-‐resource material in the shelf
between,
and
connecting
the
islands
of
the
area such as wrecked ship and their cargoes.
archipelago,
regardless
of
their
breadth
and
dimensions,
form
part
of
the
internal
waters
of
the Philippines .
Right
to
Innocent
Passage
• A
state
exercises
sovereignty
over
its
territorial
sea
subject
to
the
right
of
innocent
passage
by
other
states.
• Innocent
passage
is
understood
as
passage
not
prejudicial
to
the
interests
of
the
coastal
state
nor
contrary
to
recognized
principles
of
international
law.
Note
Art.
19
(2)
of
UNCLOS.
….
Other
territories
over
which
the
PH
has
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction
• Covers
islands
over
which
the
PH
has
historic
or
legal
title.
• It
includes
as
well
territory
should
temporarily
be
controlled
by
an
invading
force,
and
any
other
territory
over
which
the
Philippines
might
establish
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction
in
the
future.
Declaration
of
Principles
and
State
Policies
• ….As
the
Court
explained
in Taada v.
Angara,[7] the
provisions
of
Article
II
of
the
1987
Constitution,
the
declarations
of
principles
and
state
policies,
are
not
self-‐executing.
Legislative
failure
to
pursue
such
policies
cannot
give
rise
to
a
cause
of
action
in
the
courts.
(Espina vs.
Zamora
[2010].
• Do
they
have
usefulness
in
litigation?
• They
obligate
the
judiciary
to
be
be
guided
by
the
provisions
in
the
exercise
of
the
power
of
judicial
review.
Article
II,
section
2
• Renunciation
of
war
• Incorporation
of
international
law
• Adheres
to
the
policy
of
peace,
equality,
justice,
freedom
of
cooperation
and
amity
with
all
nations
Renunciation
of
War
• As
a
signatory
to
the
UN
Charter,
we
do
not
merely
renounce
war,
we
also
adhere
to
Article
2
(4)
that
says,
“all
members
shall
refrain
in
their
international
relations
from
the
threat
or
use
of
force
against
the
territorial
integrity
or
political
independence
of
any
state,
or
in
any
other
manner
inconsistent
with
the
purposes
of
the
United
Nations.”
• REPUBLIC
ACT
NO.
9851
• AN
ACT
DEFINING
AND
PENALIZING
CRIMES
AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW,
GENOCIDE
AND
OTHER
CRIMES
AGAINST
HUMANITY,
ORGANIZING
JURISDICTION,
DESIGNATING
SPECIAL
COURTS,
AND
FOR
RELATED
PURPOSES
Incorporation
of
International
Law
• Incorporation
Doctrine
• [G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
(Pharmaceutical Health Care Association vs. Duque [2007])
Transformation
and
Incorporation
• Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.[The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
•
State
Immunity
from
suit
• The
State
may
not
be
sued
without
its
consent.
(Section
3,
Article
XVI,
1987
Constitution)
Jusmag vs.
NLRC
[1994]
• The
doctrine
of
state
immunity
from
suit
has
undergone
further
metamorphosis.
The
view
evolved
that
the
existence
of
a
contract
does
not, per
se,
mean
that
sovereign
states
may,
at
all
times,
be
sued
in
local
courts.
The
complexity
of
relationships
between
sovereign
states,
brought
about
by
their
increasing
commercial
activities,
mothered
a
more restrictive application
of
the
doctrine.
•
• xxx xxx xxx
•
• As
it
stands
now,
the
application
of
the
doctrine
of
immunity
from
suit
has
been restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities (jure
imperii). The
mantle
of
state
immunity cannot be
extended
to commercial,
private
and
proprietary
acts (jure
gestionis)
• The
rule,
in
any
case,
is
not
really
absolute
for
it
does
not
say
that
the
state
may
not
be
sued
under
any
circumstances.
On
the
contrary
x
x
x
the
doctrine
only
conveys,
“the
state
may
not
be
sued
without
its
consent;”
its
clear
import
then
is
that
the
State
may
at
times
be
sued.
The
State's
consent
may
be
given
either
expressly
or
impliedly.
Express
consent
may
be
made
through
a
general
law
(i.e.,
Commonwealth
Act
No.
327,
as
amended
by
Presidential
Decree
No.
1445
[Sections
49-‐50],
which
requires
that
all
money
claims
against
the
government
must
first
be
filed
with
the
Commission
on
Audit
which
must
act
upon
it
within
sixty
days.
Rejection
of
the
claim
will
authorize
the
claimant
to
elevate
the
matter
to
the
Supreme
Court
on
certiorari
and,
in
effect,
sue
the
State
thereby)
or
a
special
law.
• In
this
jurisdiction,
the
general
law
waiving
the
immunity
of
the
state
from
suit
is
found
in
Act
No.
3083,
where
the
Philippine
government
“consents
and
submits
to
be
sued
upon
any
money
claim
involving
liability
arising
from
contract,
express
or
implied,
which
could
serve
as
a
basis
of
civil
action
between
the
private
parties.”
Implied
consent,
on
the
other
hand,
is
conceded
when
the
State
itself
commences
litigation,
thus
opening
itself
to
a
counterclaim
or
when
it
enters
into
a
contract.
In
this
situation,
the
government
is
deemed
to
have
descended
to
the
level
of
the
other
contracting
party
and
to
have
divested
itself
of
its
sovereign
immunity.
(Department
of
Agriculture
v.
NLRC,
227
SCRA
693,
Nov.
11,
1993
[Vitug])
Not
all
contracts
• This
rule
is
not
without
qualification.
Not
all
contracts
entered
into
by
the
government
operate
as
a
waiver
of
its
non-‐suability;
distinction
must
still
be
made
between
one
which
is
executed
in
the
exercise
of
its
sovereign
function
and
another
which
is
done
in
its
proprietary
capacity.
• The
restrictive
application
of
State
immunity
is
proper
only
when
the
proceedings
arise
out
of
commercial
transactions
of
the
foreign
sovereign,
its
commercial
activities
or
economic
affairs.
Stated
differently,
a
State
may
be
said
to
have
descended
to
the
level
of
an
individual
and
can
thus
be
deemed
to
have
tacitly
given
its
consent
to
be
sued
only
when
it
enters
into
business
contracts.
It
does
not
apply
where
the
contracts
relate
to
the
exercise
of
its
sovereign
functions.
In
this
case
the
projects
are
an
integral
part
of
the
naval
base
which
is
devoted
to
the
defense
of
both
the
United
States
and
the
Philippines,
indisputably
a
function
of
the
government
of
the
highest
order;
they
are
not
utilized
for
nor
dedicated
to
commercial
or
business
purposes.”
(Department
of
Agriculture
v.
NLRC,
227
SCRA
693,
Nov.
11,
1993
[Vitug]
Does
not
apply
• Neither
does
it
apply
where
the
public
official
is
clearly
being
sued
not
in
his
official
capacity
but
in
his
personal
capacity,
although
the
acts
complained
of
may
have
been
committed
while
he
occupied
a
public
position.
(Amado
J.
Lansang v.
CA,
G.R.
No.
102667,
Feb.
23,
2000,
2nd
Div.
[Quisumbing])
Arigo vs.
Swift
(2014)
Tubbatataha Case
• A
petition
filed
for
the
issuance
of
a
Writ
of
Kalikasan directed
against
the
Commander
of
the
US
Pacific
Fleet
for
the
destruction
of
our
corrals
in
Tubbataha reef
(a
protected
area
system
under
the
NIPAS
[National
Integrated
Protected
Areas
System]
and
a
UN
declared
World
Heritage
Site
because
of
its
rich
marine
bio-‐diversity)
in
the
Sulu
Sea
caused
by
the
USS
Guardian,
an
American
naval
vessel
when
it
ran
aground
there
in
the
course
of
its
voyage
to
Indonesia
from
its
base
in
Okinawa,
Japan,
will
not
prosper
for
lack
of
jurisdiction
following
the
doctrine
of
sovereign
equality
of
all
States.
In
effect,
the
suit
is
a
suit
against
the
US
government
and,
therefore,
should
be
dismissed.
• The
waiver
of
immunity
from
suit
of
the
US
under
the
Visiting
Forces
Agreement
(VFA)
applies
only
to
waiver
from
criminal
jurisdiction,
so
that
if
an
American
soldier
commits
an
offense
in
the
Philippines,
he
shall
be
tried
by
Philippine
courts
under
Philippine
laws.
The
waiver
did
not
include
the
special
civil
action
for
the
issuance
of
a
Writ
of
Kalikasan.
• Also,
the
demand
for
compensation
for
the
destruction
of
our
corrals
in
Tubbataha reef
has
been
rendered
moot
and
academic.
After
all,
the
US
already
signified
its
intention
to
pay
damages,
as
expressed
by
the
US
embassy
officials
in
the
Philippines,
the
only
request
is
that
a
panel
of
experts
composed
of
scientists
be
constituted
to
assess
the
total
damage
caused
to
our
corrals
there,
which
request
is
not
unreasonable.
Northrail Case
(China
Natonal Railway
vs.
Judge
Sta.Maria (2014)
• In Holy
See, this
Court
reiterated
the
oft-‐cited
doctrine
that
the
determination
by
the
Executive
that
an
entity
is
entitled
to
sovereign
or
diplomatic
immunity
is
a
political
question
conclusive
upon
the
courts,
to
wit:
• In
Public
International
Law,
when
a
state
or
international
agency
wishes
to
plead
sovereign
or
diplomatic
immunity
in
a
foreign
court,
it requests
the
Foreign
Office
of
the
state
where
it
is
sued
to
convey
to
the
court
that
said
defendant
is
entitled
to
immunity.
Immunity
from
Suit
• The question now is whether any agency of the Executive Branch can make a
determination of immunity from suit, which may be considered as conclusive upon the
courts. This Court, in Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) v. National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC),emphasized the DFAs competence and authority to provide such
necessary determination, to wit:
• The DFAs function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons
and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenge, (sic) entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the
conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case
whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the
Philippine government before the international community. When international
agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted
the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our
country, this task falls principally of (sic) the DFA as being the highest executive
department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the
international arena.
•
• An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed
as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.
• In
the United
States,
the
Foreign
Sovereign
Immunities
Act
of
1976
provides
for
a
waiver
by
implication
of
state
immunity.
In
the
said
law,
the
agreement
to
submit
disputes
to
arbitration
in
a
foreign
country
is
construed
as
an
implicit
waiver
of
immunity
from
suit.
Although
there
is
no
similar
law
in
the
Philippines,
there
is
reason
to
apply
the
legal
reasoning
behind
the
waiver
in
this
case.
Separation
of
Powers
• The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
• Section
1
in
relation
to
Section
32
reserved
for
the
people
ordinary
legislative
power
through
“initiative
and
referendum.”
Bicameral
System
• The
Principle
of
Bicameralism
• The
Bicameral
Conference
Committee
• It
is
a
mechanism
for
compromising
differences
between
the
Senate
and
the
House
of
Representatives.
By
the
nature
of
its
function,
a
Bicameral
Conference
Committee
is
capable
of
producing
unexpected
results
– results
which
sometimes
may
even
go
beyond
its
own
mandate.
(Philippine
Judges
Association
v.
Secretary
Prado;
Tolentino
v.
Secretary
of
Finance)
Composition
of
the
House
of
Representatives
• 1.
District
Representatives
(2)
The
party-‐list
representatives
shall
constitute
twenty
per
centum
of
the
total
number
of
representatives
including
those
under
the
party
list.
For
three
consecutive
terms
after
the
ratification
of
this
Constitution,
one-‐half
of
the
seats
allocated
to
party-‐list
representatives
shall
be
filled,
as
provided
by
law,
by
selection
or
election
from
the
labor,
peasant,
urban
poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities,
women,
youth,
and
such
other
sectors
as
may
be
provided
by
law,
except
the
religious
sector.
Each
legislative
district
shall
comprise,
as
far
as
practicable,
contiguous,
compact
and
adjacent
territory. Each
city
with
a
population
of
at
least
two
hundred
fifty
thousand,
or
each
province,
shall
have
at
least
one
representative.
(3)
Within
three
years
following
the
return
of
every
census,
the
Congress
shall
make
a
reapportionment
of
legislative
districts
based
on
the
standards
provided
in
this
section.
The
Rule
on
Apportionment;
Aquino
vs.
COMELEC
[2010]
• The
second
sentence
of
Section
5(3),
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution,
succinctly
provides: Each
city
with
a
population
of
at
least
two
hundred
fifty
thousand,
or
each
province,
shall
have
at
least
one
representative.
• There
is
no
reason
why
the Mariano
case, which
involves
the
creation
of
an additional district
within
a city,
should
not
be
applied
to additional districts
in
provinces. Indeed,
if
an additional legislative
district
created
within
a
city
is
not
required
to
represent
a
population
of
at
least
250,000
in
order
to
be
valid,
neither
should
such
be
needed
for
an
additional
district
in
a
province,
considering
moreover
that
a
province
is
entitled
to
an initial seat
by
the
mere
fact
of
its
creation
and
regardless
of
its
population.
Difference
between
Legislative
Apportionment
and
Reapportionment
(Bagabuyo vs.
COMELEC
[2008]
• Legislative apportionment is
defined
by
Blacks
Law
Dictionary
as the
determination
of
the
number
of
representatives
which
a
State,
county
or
other
subdivision
may
send
to
a
legislative
body. It
is the
allocation
of
seats
in
a
legislative
body
in
proportion
to
the
population;
the
drawing
of
voting
district
lines
so
as
to
equalize
population
and
voting
power
among
the
districts.
• Article
VI
(entitled
Legislative
Department)
of
the
1987
Constitution
lays
down
the
rules
on
legislative
apportionment
under
its
Section
5
which
provides:
• Sec.
5(1).
(1)
The
House
of
Representatives
shall
be
composed
of
not
more
than
two
hundred
fifty
members
unless
otherwise
fixed
by
law,
who
shall
be
elected
from
legislative
districts
apportioned
among
the
provinces,
cities,
and
the
Metropolitan
Manila
area
in
accordance
with
the
number
of
their
respective
inhabitants,
and
on
the
basis
of
a
uniform
and
progressive
ratio,
and
those
who,
as
provided
by
law,
shall
be
elected
through
a
party-‐list
system
of
registered
national,
regional
and
sectoral parties
or
organizations.
• x
x
x
• (3)
Each
legislative
district
shall
comprise,
as
far
as
practicable,
continuous,
compact,
and
adjacent
territory. Each
city
with
a
population
of
at
least
two
hundred
fifty
thousand,
or
each
province,
shall
have
at
least
one
representative.
• (4) Within
three
years
following
the
return
of
every
census,
the
Congress
shall
make
a
reapportionment
of
legislative
districts
based
on
the
standards
provided
in
this
section.
Difference
between
Legislative
Apportionment
and
Reapportionment
(Bagabuyo vs.
COMELEC
[2008]
• Legislative
apportionment
does
not
mean, and
does
not
even
imply,
a
division
of
a
local
government
unit
where
the
apportionment
takes
place.
• Thus,
the
plebiscite
requirement
that
applies
to
the
division
of
a
province,
city,
municipality
or barangay under
the
Local
Government
Code
should
not
apply
to
and
be
a
requisite
for
the
validity
of
a
legislative
apportionment
or
reapportionment
Sectoral Representations
• Three
different
groups
may
participate
in
the
party-‐list
system:
(1)
national
parties
or
organizations,
(2)
regional
parties
or
organizations,
and
(3)
sectoral parties
or
organizations.
• National
parties
or
organizations
and
regional
parties
or
organizations
do
not
need
to
organize
along
sectoral lines
and
do
not
need
to
represent
any
“marginalized
and
underrepresented”
sector.
Sectoral Representation
• Political
parties
can
participate
in
party-‐list
elections
provided
they
register
under
the
party-‐list
system
and
do
not
field
candidates
in
legislative
district
elections.
A
political
party,
whether
major
or
not,
that
fields
candidates
in
legislative
district
elections
can
participate
in
party-‐list
elections
through
its
sectoral wing
that
can
separately
register
under
the
party-‐list
system.
Sectoral Representation
• Sectoral parties
or
organizations
may
either
be
“marginalized
and
underrepresented”
or
lacking
in
“well-‐defined
political
constituencies.”
It
is
enough
that
their
principal
advocacy
pertains
to
the
special
interest
and
concerns
of
their
sector.
The
sectors
that
are
“marginalized
and
underrepresented”
include
labor,
peasant,
fisherfolk,
urban
poor,
indigenous
cultural
communities,
handicapped,
veterans,
and
overseas
workers.
The
sectors
that
lack
“well-‐defined
political
constituencies”
include
professionals,
the
elderly,
women
and
the
youth.
Sectoral Representations
• A
majority
of
the
members
of
sectoral parties
or
organizations
that
represent
the
“marginalized
and
underrepresented”
must
belong
to
the
“marginalized
and
underrepresented”
sector
they
represent.
• Similarly,
a
majority
of
the
members
of
sectoral parties
or
organizations
that
lack
“well-‐defined
political
constituencies”
must
belong
to
the
sector
they
represent.
The
nominees
of
sectoral parties
or
organizations
that
represent
the
“marginalized
and
underrepresented,”
or
that
represent
those
who
lack
“well-‐defined
political
constituencies,”
either
must
belong
to
their
respective
sectors,
or
must
have
a
track
record
of
advocacy
for
their
respective
sectors.
The
nominees
of
national
and
regional
parties
or
organizations
must
be
bona
fide
members
of
such
parties
or
organizations.
Sectoral Representations
• National,
regional,
and
sectoral parties
or
organizations
shall
not
be
disqualified
if
some
of
their
nominees
are
disqualified,
provided
that
they
have
at
least
one
nominee
who
remains
qualified.
(Atong
Paglaum,
Inc.,
et
al.
v.
COMELEC,
G.R.
No.
203766,
694
SCRA
477,
April
2,
2013,
En
Banc
[Carpio])
Two
Questions
on
Party
List
1. How
many
votes
must
an
organization
receive
in
order
to
qualify
for
a
seat
in
House
of
Representatives?
2. Whether
the
allocated
20%
of
the
total
membership
in
the
House
of
Representatives
must
be
filled
up?
First
Question
• Parties,
organizations,
and
coalitions
participating
in
the
system
to
obtain
at
least
2%
of
the
total
votes
cast
for
the
party
list
system
in
order
to
be
entitled
to
a
party
list
seat.
Those
garnering
more
than
this
percentage
may
have
additional
seats
in
proportion
to
their
total
number
of
votes.
• No.
HRET/SET
is
the
sole
judge
of
all
contests
relating
to,
among
other
things,
the
qualifications
of
the
members
of
the
House
of
Representatives/Senate.
• Exception:
Grave
abuse
of
discretion,
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction.
Can
the
ET
determine
issues
on
terrorism
and
Fraud
in
an
election?
• It
can
annul
the
election
results
in
precint to
remain
faithful
to
its
constitutional
mandate.
Power
of
Appropriation
• No
money
shall
be
paid
out
of
the
Treasury
except
in
pursuance
of
an
appropriations
made
by
law.
(Section
29
[1],
Article
VI,
1987
Constitution)
• Under
the
Constitution,
the
power
of
appropriation
is
vested
in
the
Legislature,
subject
to
the
requirement
that
appropriations
bills
originate
exclusively
in
the
House
of
Representatives
with
the
option
of
the
Senate
to
propose
or
concur
with
amendments.
Pork
Barrel
System
• The
Court
defines
the
Pork
Barrel
System
as
the
collective
body
of
rules
and
practices
that
govern
the
manner
by
which
lump-‐sum,
discretionary
funds,
primarily
intended
for
local
projects,
are
utilized
through
the
respective
participations
of
the
Legislative
and
Executive
branches
of
government,
including
its
members.
The
Pork
Barrel
System
involves
two
(2)
kinds
of
lump-‐sum,
discretionary
funds:
Two
kinds
of
lump
sum
• First,
there
is
the
Congressional
Pork
Barrel
which
is
herein
defined
as
a
kind
of
lump-‐sum,
discretionary
fund
wherein
legislators,
either
individually
or
collectively
organized
into
committees,
are
able
to
effectively
control
certain
aspects
of
the
fund‟s utilization
through
various
post-‐enactment
measures
and/or
practices;
and
• Second,
there
is
the
Presidential
Pork
Barrel
which
is
herein
defined
as
a
kind
of
lump-‐sum,
discretionary
fund
which
allows
the
President
to
determine
the
manner
of
its
utilization.
X
x
x
the
Court
shall
delimit
the
use
of
such
term
to
refer
only
to
the
Malampaya Funds
and
the
Presidential
Social
Fund.
(Belgica v.
Ochoa,
G.R.
No.
208566,
710
SCRA
1,
105-‐106,
Nov.
19,
2013,
En
Banc
[Perlas-‐Bernabe])
Question
Hour
• The
Question
Hour
(Section
22,
Article
VI,
1987
Constitution)
• As
explained
by
the
Court
in
Senate
v.
Ermita,
this
question
hour
is
not
really
a
regular
feature
of
a
presidential
government,
but
is
merely
a
borrowed
concept
from
a
parliamentary
government.
Right
to
Information
• The
right
to
information
does
not
extend
to
matters
recognized
as
„privileged
information‟
under
the
separation
of
powers,
by
which
the
Court
meant
Presidential
conversations,
correspondences,
and
discussions
in
closed-‐door
Cabinet
meetings.
Presidential
Communications
Privilege
• Thus,
if
what
is
involved
is
the
presumptive
privilege
of
presidential
communications
when
invoked
by
the
President
on
a
matter
clearly
within
the
domain
of
the
Executive,
the
said
presumption
dictates
that
the
same
be
recognized
and
be
given
preference
or
priority,
in
the
absence
of
proof
of
a
compelling
or
critical
need
for
disclosure
by
the
one
assailing
such
presumption. Any
construction
to
the
contrary
will
render
meaningless
the
presumption
accorded
by
settled
jurisprudence
in
favor
of
executive
privilege.
In
fact,
Senate
v.
Ermita reiterates
jurisprudence
citing
“the
considerations
justifying
a
presumptive
privilege
for
Presidential
communications.”
Inquiries
• Congressional
Investigations
• There
are
two
(2)
kinds
of
congressional
investigations,
i.e.,
inquiry
in
aid
of
legislation
(Section
21,
Article
VI,
1987
Constitution);
and
the
question
hour
(Section
22,
Article
VI,
987
Constitution)
Inquiry
• In
Arnault v.
Nazareno,
the
Court
held
that
intrinsic
in
the
grant
of
legislative
power
itself
to
Congress
by
the
Constitution
is
the
power
to
conduct
inquiries
in
aid
of
legislation,
for
Congress
may
not
be
expected
to
enact
good
laws
if
it
will
be
denied
the
power
investigate.
• Note
that
Arnault was
decided
in
the
1950‟s
under
the
1935
Constitution,
and
in
that
Constitution
there
was
no
provision
similar
to
that
which
is
expressly
provided
in
the
present
Constitution.
Yet,
as
early
as
that
case,
the
Court
already
recognized
that
this
power
is
intrinsic
in
the
grant
of
legislative
power
itself
to
Congress
by
the
Constitution.
Relevant
Questions
• In
Bengzon,
Jr.
v.
Senate
Blue
Ribbon
Committee,
two
(2)
relevant
questions
were
raised.
• First,
is
this
power
of
each
House
of
Congress
to
conduct
inquiries
in
aid
of
legislation
absolute,
or
are
there
limitations?
• Second,
is
this
power
subject
to
judicial
review,
or
is
it
a
political
question?
NOT
ABSOLUTE
• As
to
the
first
question,
the
Court
clarified
that
a
mere
reading
of
Section
21,
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution
will
show
that
the
power
is
not
really
absolute;
in
fact
there
are
three
(3)
important
limitations
imposed
therein,
and
these
are:
• The
inquiry
must
be
in
aid
of
legislation;
• It
must
be
conducted
in
accordance
with
the
duly
published
rules
of
procedure
of
a
• House
of
Congress
conducting
such
inquiry;
and
• The
rights
of
persons
appearing
in
or
affected
by
such
inquiry
shall
be
respected.
SUBJECT
TO
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
• As
to
the
second,
the
Court
held
that
since
it
had
already
been
shown
that
the
power
is
not
really
absolute,
in
fact,
there
are
important
limitations,
it
follows,
therefore,
that
such
is
subject
to
judicial
review
especially
in
view
of
the
expanded
power
of
the
Court
to
determine
whether
or
not
there
has
been
a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction
on
the
part
of
any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
government.
COMMISSION
ON
APPOINTMENTS
• Section
18,
Article
VI
• Composition
• Proportional
Representation
of
all
political
parties
and
parties
and
organizations
registered
under
the
party
list
system.
• Total
number
of
representatives
divided
by
number
of
representatives
in
the
Commission
(complement).
The
full
complement
of
12
was
not
mandatory.
• Independent
body;
can
promulgate
its
own
rules;
the
Supreme
Court
cannot
pass
upon
the
correctness
of
the
interpretation
placed
by
the
Commission
of
its
own
rules.
• CA
can
only
meet
when
Congress
is
in
session.
• Intended
to
serve
as
check
and
balance
• Should
act
on
all
appointments
submitted
to
within
30
“session”
days
of
Congress
from
their
submission
and
that
the
Commission
should
rule
by
majority
vote.
Power
to
declare
war
• Who
exercises
power
and
what
kind
of
war
is
covered?
• Congress
by
a
vote
of
2/3
of
both
houses
in
joint
session
assembled,
voting
separately
shall
have
the
sole
power
to
declare
the
existence
of
a
state
of
war
(section
23,
article
VI)
• War
is
defined
as
armed
hostilities
between
two
states;
Emphasize
Article
II,
section
2
renouncing
aggressive
war
as
an
instrument
of
national
policy.
• Does
not
prohibit
the
waging
of
a
defensive
war
even
in
the
absence
of
a
declaration
of
war
or
of
a
declaration
of
the
existence
of
a
state
of
war.
• The
actual
power
to
make
war
is
an
executive
power.
It
may
make
war
even
in
the
absence
of
a
declaration
of
war.
Delegation
of
Emergency
powers
• Section
26,
Article
VI
• War
or
other
national
emergency
• Congress
may
authorize
the
president
to
exercise
powers
necessary
and
proper
to
carry
out
a
declared
national
policy.
A
delegation
of
real
legislative
power.
• Subject
to
two
restrictions:
(1)
For
a
limited
period.
Unless
sooner
withdrawn
by
resolution
of
the
congress,
such
powers
shall
cease
upon
the
next
adjournment
thereof;
(2)
Subject
to
such
restrictions
as
the
Congress
may
provide.
Doctrine
of
Inappropriate
Provisions
• Related
to
the
veto
power
of
the
president;
• A
provision
that
is
constitutionally
inappropriate
for
an
appropriation
bill
may
be
singled
out
for
veto
even
if
it
is
not
an
appropriation
or
revenue
item.
• Valid?
• An
exercise
of
presidential
judgment.
The
Executive
Power
• The
executive
power
shall
be
vested
in
the
President
of
the
Philippines.
(Section
1,
Article
VII,
1987
Constitution)
• Nature
of
the
Executive
Power
in
relation
to
Separation
of
Powers;Checks
and
Balances
• It
has
already
been
established
that
there
is
one
repository
of
executive
powers,
and
that
is
the
President
of
the
Republic.
This
means
that
when
Section
1,
Article
VII
of
the
Constitution
speaks
of
executive
power,
it
is
granted
to
the
President
and
no
one
else.
Corollarily,
it
is
only
the
President,
as
Chief
Executive,
who
is
authorized
to
exercise
emergency
powers
as
provided
under
Section
23,
Article
VI,
of
the
Constitution,
as
well
as
what
became
known
as
the
calling-‐ out
powers
under
Section
18,
Article
VII
thereof.
(Jamar
Kulayan v.
Gov.
Abdusakur Tan,
G.R.
No.
187298,
July
3,
2012)
Power
of
the
Executive
• The
duty
to
protect
the
State
and
its
people
must
be
carried
out
earnestly
and
effectively
throughout
the
whole
territory
of
the
Philippines
in
accordance
with
constitutional
provision
on
national
territory.
Hence,
the
President
of
the
Philippines,
as
the
sole
repository
of
executive
power,
is
the
guardian
of
the
Philippine
archipelago,
including
all
the
islands
and
waters
embraced
therein
and
all
other
territories
over
which
the
Philippines
and
sovereignty
or
jurisdiction.
X
x
x
Power
to
call
out
• To
carry
out
this
important
duty,
the
President
is
equipped
with
authority
over
the
Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
(AFP),
which
is
the
protector
of
the
people
and
the
state.
X
x
x.
In
addition,
the
Executive
is
constitutionally
empowered
to
maintain
peace
and
order,
protect
life,
liberty,
and
property,
and
promote
the
general
welfare.
In
recognition
of
these
powers,
Congress
has
specified
that
the
President
must
oversee,
ensure,
and
reinforce
our
defensive
capabilities
against
external
and
internal
threats
and,
in
the
same
vein,
ensure
that
the
country
is
adequately
prepared
for
all
national
and
local
emergencies
arising
from
natural
and
man-‐ made
disasters.
• To
be
sure,
this
power
is
limited
by
the
Constitution
itself.
X
x
x
(Rene
A.V.
Saguisag,
et
al.
v.
Executive
Secretary
Paquito N.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
212426,
Jan.
12,
2016,
En
Banc
[Sereno,
CJ])
Faithful
Execution
Clause
• The
Court
has
interpreted
the
faithful
execution
clause
as
an
obligation
imposed
on
the
President,
and
not
a
separate
grant
of
power.
Section
17,
Article
VII
of
the
Constitution,
expresses
this
duty
in
no
uncertain
terms
and
includes
it
in
the
provision
regarding
the
President‟s power
of
control
over
the
executive
department
• In
light
of
this
constitutional
duty,
it
is
the
President‟s prerogative
to
do
whatever
is
legal
and
necessary
for
Philippine
defense
interests.
• It
s
no
coincidence
that
the
constitutional
provision
on
the
faithful
execution
clause
was
followed
by
that
on
the
President‟s
commander-‐ in-‐chief
powers,
which
are
specifically
granted
during
extraordinary
events
of
lawless
violence,
invasion,
or
rebellion.
And
this
duty
of
defending
the
country
is
unceasing,
even
in
times
when
there
is
no
state
of
lawless
violence,
invasion,
or
rebellion.
At
such
times,
the
President
has
full
powers
to
ensure
the
faithful
execution
of
the
laws.
• It
would
therefore
be
remiss
for
the
President
and
repugnant
to
the
faithful-‐execution
clause
of
the
Constitution
to
do
nothing
when
the
call
of
the
moment
requires
increasing
the
military‟s defensive
capabilities,
which
could
include
forging
alliances
with
states
that
hold
a
common
interest
with
the
Philippines
or
bringing
an
international
suit
against
an
offending
state.
Deference
to
the
Presidential
Initiative
• This
approach
of
giving
utmost
deference
to
presidential
initiatives
in
respect
of
foreign
affairs
is
not
novel
to
the
Court.
The
President‟s act
of
treating
EDCA
as
an
executive
agreement
is
not
the
principal
power
being
analyzed
x
x
x.
Rather,
the
preliminary
analysis
is
in
reference
to
the
expansive
power
of
foreign
affairs.
We
have
long
treated
this
power
as
something
the
Courts
must
not
unduly
restrict.
X
x
x
• Xxx
• Understandably,
this
Court
must
view
the
instant
case
with
the
same
perspective
and
understanding,
knowing
full
well
the
constitutional
and
legal
repercussions
of
any
judicial
overreach.
(Rene
A.V.
Saguisag,
et
al.
v.
Executive
Secretary
Paquito N.
Ochoa,
Jr.,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
212426,
Jan.
12,
2016,
En
Banc
[Sereno,
CJ])
Doctrine
of
Qualified
Political
Agency
• Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of
the Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape
Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and
181527, April 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-‐De Castro])
Appointing
Power
• Conformably,
as
consistently
interpreted
and
ruled
in
the
leading
case
of
Sarmiento
III
v.
Mison,
and
in
the
subsequent
cases
of
Bautista
v.
Salonga,
Quintos-‐Deles
v.
Constitutional
Commission,
and
Calderon
v.
Carale,
under
Section
16,
Article
VII,
of
the
Constitution,
there
are
four
groups
of
officers
of
the
government
to
be
appointed
by
the
President:
• First,
the
heads
of
the
executive
departments,
ambassadors,
other
public
ministers
and
consuls,
officers
of
the
armed
forces
from
the
rank
of
colonel
or
naval
captain,
and
other
officers
whose
appointments
are
vested
in
him
in
this
Constitution;
• Second,
all
other
officers
of
the
Government
whose
appointments
are
not
otherwise
provided
for
by
law;
• Third,
those
whom
the
President
may
be
authorized
by
law
to
appoint;
• Fourth,
officers
lower
in
rank
whose
appointments
the
Congress
may
by
law
vest
in
the
President
alone.
• It
is
well-‐settled
that
only
presidential
appointees
belonging
to
the
first
group
require
the
confirmation
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
(Manalo
v.
Sistoza,
312
SCRA
239,
Aug.
11,
1999,
En
Banc
[Purisima])
Ad
Interim
Appointment;
Nature
and
Character
• An
ad
interim
appointment
is
a
permanent
appointment
because
it
takes
effect
immediately
and
can
no
longer
be
withdrawn
by
the
President
once
the
appointee
has
qualified
into
office.
The
fact
that
it
is
subject
to
confirmation
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments
does
not
alter
its
permanent
character.
• The
Constitution
itself
makes
an
ad
interim
appointment
permanent
in
character
by
making
it
effective
until
disapproved
by
the
Commission
on
Appointments
or
until
the
next
adjournment
of
Congress.
X
x
x
Thus,
the
ad
interim
appointment
remains
effective
until
such
disapproval
or
next
adjournment,
signifying
that
it
can
no
longer
be
withdrawn
or
revoked
by
the
President.
• The
Constitution
imposes
no
condition
on
the
effectivity
of
an
ad
interim
appointment,
and
thus
an
ad
interim
appointment
takes
effect
immediately.
The
appointee
can
at
once
assume
office
and
exercise,
as
a
de
jure
officer,
all
the
powers
pertaining
to
the
office.
• Thus, the term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of
appointment signed by the President, means a permanent
appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress
is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be
withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in
the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning
under Philippine jurisprudence.
• An
ad
interim
appointee
who
has
qualified
and
assumed
office
becomes
at
that
moment
a
government
employee
and
therefore
part
of
the
civil
service.
• He
enjoys
the
constitutional
protection
that
“[n]o
officer
or
employee
in
the
civil
service
shall
be
removed
or
suspended
except
for
cause
provided
by
law.”
(Section
2[3],
Article
IX-‐B
of
the
Constitution)
Thus,
an
ad
interim
appointment
becomes
complete
and
irrevocable
once
the
appointee
has
qualified
into
office.
X
x
x
Once
an
appointee
has
qualified,
he
acquires
a
legal
right
to
the
office
which
is
protected
not
only
by
statute
but
also
by
the
Constitution.
He
can
only
be
removed
for
cause,
after
notice
and
hearing,
consistent
with
the
requirements
of
due
process.
(Matibag v.
Benipayo,
380
SCRA
49,
April
2,
2002,
En
Banc
[Carpio])
Limitations
on
power
to
appoint
• Two
months
immediately
before
the
next
presidential
elections
and
up
to
the
end
of
his
term,
a
President
or
Acting
President
shall
not
make
appointments,
except
temporary
appointments
to
executive
positions
when
continued
vacancies
therein
will
prejudice
public
service
or
endanger
public
safety.
(Section
15,
Article
VII,
1987
Constitution)
May
a
Solicitor
General
be
appointed
as
SOJ?
• Section
7
(2),
Article
IX-‐B
of
the
1987
Constitution;
Section
13,
Article
VII
• Members
of
the
Cabinet,
and
their
deputies
or
assistants
shall
not,
unless
otherwise
provided
in
the
Constitution
hold
any
other
office
or
employment
during
their
tenure.
• The
prohibition
against
dual
or
multiple
offices
being
held
by
one
official
must
be
construed
as
to
apply
to
all
appointments
or
designations,
whether
permanent
or
temporary.
Exceptions
to
Prohibition
against
Multiple
Positions
• 1.
Those
provided
under
the
1987
Constitution
such
as
Article
VII,
section
3
authorizing
the
Vice
President
to
become
a
member
of
the
cabinet.
• 2.
Posts
occupied
by
Executive
Officials
specified
in
Section
13,
Article
VII
without
additional
compensation
in
ex
oficio capacities
as
provided
by
law
and
required
by
the
primary
functions
of
the
officials’
offices
Calling
out
power
as
Commander
in
Chief
• While
the
President
is
still
a
civilian,
Article
II,
Section
3
of
the
Constitution
mandates
that
civilian
authority
is,
at
all
times,
supreme
over
the
military,
making
the
civilian
president
the
nation‟s supreme
military
leader.
The
net
effect
of
Article
II,
Section
3,
when
read
with
Article
VII,
Section
18,
is
that
a
civilian
President
is
the
ceremonial,
legal
and
administrative
head
of
the
armed
forces.
• The
Constitution
does
not
require
that
the
President
must
be
possessed
of
military
training
and
talents,
but
as
Commander-‐in-‐Chief,
he
has
the
power
to
direct
military
operations
and
to
determine
military
strategy.
Normally,
he
would
be
expected
to
delegate
the
actual
command
of
the
armed
forces
to
military
experts,
but
the
ultimate
power
is
his.
(Jamar
Kulayan v.
Gov.
Abdusakur Tan,
G.R.
No.
187298,
July
3,
2012,
En
Banc
[Sereno,
CJ])
Subject
to
Judicial
Review
or
Political
Question
?
• When
the
President
calls
the
armed
forces
to
prevent
or
suppress
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion,
he
necessarily
exercises
a
discretionary
power
solely
vested
in
his
wisdom.
• This
is
clear
from
the
intent
of
the
framers
and
from
the
text
of
the
Constitution
itself.
The
Court,
thus,
cannot
be
called
upon
to
overrule
the
President's
wisdom
or
substitute
its
own.
However,
this
does
not
prevent
an
examination
of
whether
such
power
was
exercised
within
permissible
constitutional
limits
or
whether
it
was
exercised
in
a
manner
constituting
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
In
view
of
the
constitutional
intent
to
give
the
President
full
discretionary
power
to
determine
the
necessity
of
calling
out
the
armed
forces,
it
is
incumbent
upon
the
petitioner
to
show
that
the
President's
decision
is
totally
bereft
of
factual
basis..
(Integrated
Bar
of
the
Philippines
v.
Hon.
Ronaldo
B.
Zamora,
G.R.
No.
141284,
Aug.
15,
2000,
En
Banc
[Kapunan])
Basis
for
the
full
discretionary
power
on
call
out
power
by
the
President
• Full
discretionary
power
under
section
18,
Article
VII
• Call
out
such
Armed
Forces
to
prevent
or
suppress
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion
• Reinforced
by
Article
VII,
section
18
-‐ no
such
power
on
Congress
to
revoke
or
review
the
President’s
action
to
call
out
the
Armed
Forces
Two
conditions
to
exercise
the
power
to
suspend
the
privilege
of
Habeas
Corpus
or
impose
ML
• 1.
There
must
be
actual
invasion
or
rebellion;
and
• These
two
conditions
are
not
required
in
the
power
to
call
out
the
AFP.
The
only
criterion
is
that
“whenever
it
becomes
necessary”.
President’s
authority
to
declare
a
state
of
Exercise
of
Emergency
Power
(Art.VI)
Distinction
national
emergency
(Article VII)
Section
18. The
President
shall
be
the
Commander-‐in-‐Chief
Section
23.
of
all
armed
forces
of
the
Philippines
and
whenever
it
The
Congress,
by
a
vote
of
two-‐thirds
of
both
Houses
becomes
necessary,
he
may
call
out
such
armed
forces
to
in
joint
session
assembled,
voting
separately,
shall
prevent
or
suppress
lawless
violence,
invasion
or
rebellion.
In
have
the
sole
power
to
declare
the
existence
of
a
state
case
of
invasion
or
rebellion,
when
the
public
safety
requires
it,
he
may,
for
a
period
not
exceeding
sixty
days,
suspend
the
of
war.
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
or
place
the
Philippines
In
times
of
war
or
other
national
emergency,
the
or
any
part
thereof
under
martial
law.
Within
forty-‐eight
Congress
may,
by
law,
authorize
the
President,
for
a
hours
from
the
proclamation
of
martial
law
or
the
limited
period
and
subject
to
such
restrictions
as
it
suspension
of
the
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus,
the
may
prescribe,
to
exercise
powers
necessary
and
President
shall
submit
a
report
in
person
or
in
writing
to
the
proper
to
carry
out
a
declared
national
policy.
Unless
Congress.
The
Congress,
voting
jointly,
by
a
vote
of
at
least
a
sooner
withdrawn
by
resolution
of
the
Congress,
such
majority
of
all
its
Members
in
regular
or
special
session,
may
powers
shall
cease
upon
the
next
adjournment
revoke
such
proclamation
or
suspension,
which
revocation
shall
not
be
set
aside
by
the
President.
Upon
the
initiative
of
thereof.
the
President,
the
Congress
may,
in
the
same
manner,
extend
such
proclamation
or
suspension
for
a
period
to
be
determined
by
the
Congress,
if
the
invasion
or
rebellion
shall
persist
and
public
safety
requires
it.
Note
Article
XII
• Section
17. In
times
of
national
emergency,
when
the
public
interest
so
requires,
the
State
may,
during
the
emergency
and
under
reasonable
terms
prescribed
by
it,
temporarily
take
over
or
direct
the
operation
of
any
privately-‐owned
public
utility
or
business
affected
with
public
interest.
• Requires
delegation
of
power
from
Congress
Emergency
construed
• 1.
Economic
• 2.
Natural
Disaster
• 3.
National
Security
Infraction of
laws
of
the
state
or
ordinary
Addressed to
political
offenses
offfenses
Granted to
Individuals Granted
to
a
class
or
classes
of
persons
No need for concurrence of Congress Requires the concurrence of Congress
• Since
the
payment
of
legal
fees
is
a
vital
component
of
the
rules
promulgated
by
this
Court
concerning
pleading,
practice
and
procedure,
it
cannot
be
validly
annulled,
changed
or
modified
by
Congress. As
one
of
the
safeguards
of
this
Courts
institutional
independence,
the
power
to
promulgate
rules
of
pleading,
practice
and
procedure
is
now
the
Courts
exclusive
domain. That
power
is
no
longer
shared
by
this
Court
with
Congress,
much
less
the
Executive.
(In
re:
Exemption
of
the
National
Power
Corporation,
A.M.
no.05-‐10-‐2010
SC,
March
10,
2010;reiterated
in
the
case
of
In
re:
Exemption
of
Perpetual
Health
Cooperative
[2012])
CITIZENSHIP
• Value
• Citizenship
is
not
a
matter
of
convenience.
It
is
a
badge
of
identity
that
comes
with
attendant
civil
and
political
rights
accorded
by
the
State
to
its
citizens.
It
likewise
demands
the
concomitant
duty
to
maintain
allegiance
to
one‟s flag
and
country.
(Casan Macode
Maquiling v.
COMELEC,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
195649,
April
16,
2013,
En
Banc
[Sereno,
CJ])
Adherence
to
Jus
Sanquinis
• The
Philippine
law
on
citizenship
adheres
to
the
principle
of
jus
sanguinis.
Thereunder,
a
child
follows
the
nationality
or
citizenship
of
the
parents
regardless
of
the
place
of
his/her
birth,
as
opposed
to
the
doctrine
of
jus
soli
which
determines
nationality
or
citizenship
on
the
basis
of
place
of
birth.
(Valles
v.
COMELEC,
337
SCRA
543,
Aug.
9,
2000,
En
Banc
[Purisima])
Acquiring
Citizenship
• There
are
two
ways
of
acquiring
citizenship:
(1)
by
birth,
and
(2)
by
naturalization.
These
ways
of
acquiring
citizenship
correspond
to
the
two
kinds
of
citizens:
the
natural-‐born
citizen,
and
the
naturalized
citizen.
A
person
who
at
the
time
of
his
birth
is
a
citizen
of
a
particular
country,
is
a
natural-‐born
citizen
thereof.
• As
defined
in
the
Constitution,
natural-‐born
citizens
“are
those
citizens
of
the
Philippines
from
birth
without
having
to
perform
any
act
to
acquire
or
perfect
his
Philippine
citizenship.”
• On
the
other
hand,
naturalized
citizens
are
those
who
have
become
Filipino
citizens
through
naturalization,
generally
under
Commonwealth
Act
No.
473,
otherwise
known
as
the
Revised
Naturalization
Law,
which
repealed
the
former
Naturalization
Law
(Act
No.
2927),
and
by
Republic
Act
No.
530.
(Antonio
Bengson III
v.
HRET,
G.R.
No.
142840,
May
7,
2001,
En
Banc
[Kapunan])
Natural
Born
Citizens
• Natural-‐born
citizens
are
those
who
are
citizens
of
the
Philippines
from
birth
without
having
to
perform
any
act
to
acquire
or
perfect
their
Philippine
citizenship.
Those
who
elect
Philippine
citizenship
in
accordance
with
paragraph
(3),
Section
1
hereof
shall
be
deemed
natural-‐born
citizens.
(Section
2,
Article
IV,
1987
Constitution)
• In
general,
there
are
only
two
(2)
kinds
of
Filipino
citizens,
i.e.,
natural-‐born
and
naturalized.
There
is
no
third
category.
If
one
did
not
have
to
undergo
the
cumbersome
process
of
naturalization,
it
means
that
he
is
natural-‐born.
(Antonio
Bengson III
v.
HRET,
G.R.
No.
142840,
May
7,
2001,
En
Banc
[Kapunan])
Foundling
as
a
Citizen
• To
deny
full
Filipino
citizenship
to
all
foundlings
and
render
them
stateless
just
because
there
may
be
a
theoretical
chance
that
one
among
the
thousands
of
these
foundlings
might
be
the
child
of
not
just
one,
but
two,
foreigners
is
downright
discriminatory,
irrational,
and
unjust.
It
just
doesn‟t make
any
sense.
• Given
the
statistical
certainty
99.9%
-‐ that
any
child
born
in
the
Philippines
would
be
a
natural-‐born
citizen,
a
decision
denying
foundlings
such
status
is
effectively
a
denial
of
their
birthright.
There
is
no
reason
why
this
Honorable
Court
should
use
an
improbable
hypothetical
to
sacrifice
the
fundamental
political
rights
of
an
entire
class
of
human
beings.
• As
a
matter
of
fact,
foundlings
are
as
a
class,
natural-‐born
citizens.
While
the
1935
Constitution‟s enumeration
is
silent
as
to
foundlings,
there
is
no
restrictive
language
which
would
definitely
exclude
foundlings
either
• Domestic
laws
on
adoption
also
support
the
principle
that
foundlings
are
Filipinos.
These
laws
do
not
provide
that
adoption
confers
citizenship
upon
the
adoptee.
Rather,
the
adoptee
must
be
a
Filipino
in
the
first
place
to
be
adopted.
X
x
x
• Foundlings
are
likewise
citizens
under
international
law.
Under
the
1987
Constitution,
an
international
law
can
become
part
of
the
sphere
of
domestic
law
either
by
transformation
or
incorporatio
• The
common
thread
of
the
UDHR
(Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights),
UNCRC
(UN
Convention
on
the
Rights
of
the
Child)
and
ICCPR
(International
Covenant
on
Civil
and
Political
Rights)
is
to
obligate
the
Philippines
to
grant
nationality
from
birth
and
ensure
that
no
child
is
stateless.
• This
grant
of
nationality
must
be
at
the
time
of
birth,
and
it
cannot
be
accomplished
by
the
application
of
our
present
naturalization
laws,
Commonwealth
Act
No.
473,
as
amended,
and
R.A.
No.
9139,
both
of
which
require
the
applicant
to
be
at
least
eighteen
(18)
years
old
.
(Mary
Grace
Natividad S.
Poe-‐Llamanzares v.
COMELEC,
G
R.
No.
221697,
March
8,
2016,
En
Banc
[Perez])
Loss
or
Reacquisition
of
Citizenship
• Philippine
citizenship
may
be
lost
or
reacquired
in
the
manner
provided
by
law
(Section
3,
Article
IV,
1987
Constitution)
• There
are
three
(3)
ways
by
which
Philippine
citizenship
may
be
reacquired,
namely:
(1)
by
naturalization;
(2)
by
repatriation;
and
(3)
by
direct
act
of
Congress.
Effect
of
Marriage
• Citizens
of
the
Philippines
who
marry
aliens
shall
retain
their
citizenship,
unless
by
their
act
or
omission
they
are
deemed,
under
the
law,
to
have
renounced
it.
(Section
4,
Article
IV,
1987
Constitution)
Dual
Citizenship
vs.
Dual
Allegiance
• Dual
allegiance
of
citizens
is
inimical
to
the
national
interest
and
shall
be
dealt
with
by
law.
(Section
5,
Article
IV,
1987
Constitution)
• This
provision
is
not
self-‐executing.
The
word
employed
by
Section
5
is
“shall.”
The
law
referred
to
is
a
future
law.
Dual
Allegiance
vs.
Citizenship
• Dual
citizenship
arises
when,
as
a
result
of
the
concurrent
application
of
the
different
laws
of
two
or
more
states,
a
person
is
simultaneously
considered
a
national
by
the
said
states.
For
instance,
such
a
situation
may
arise
when
a
person
whose
parents
are
citizens
of
a
state
which
adheres
to
the
principle
of
jus
sanguinis is
born
in
a
state
which
follows
the
doctrine
of
jus
soli.
Such
a
person,
ipso
facto
and
without
any
voluntary
act
on
his
part,
is
concurrently
considered
a
citizen
of
both
states.
• Dual
allegiance,
on
the
other
hand,
refers
to
a
situation
in
which
a
person
simultaneously
owes,
by
some
positive
act,
loyalty
to
two
or
more
states.
While
dual
citizenship
is
involuntary,
dual
allegiance
is
the
result
of
an
individual‟s volition.
(Mercado
v.
Manzano,
307
SCRA
630,
May
26,
1999,
En
Banc
[Mendoza])
Are
persons
with
mere
dual
citizenship
disqualified
to
run
for
elective
local
positions
under
Section
40(d)
of
the
Local
Government
Code?
• The
phrase
“dual
citizenship”
in
R.A.
No.
7160,
Section
40(d)
(Local
Government
Code)
must
be
understood
as
referring
to
“dual
allegiance.”
Consequently,
persons
with
mere
dual
citizenship
do
not
fall
under
this
disqualification.
Unlike
those
with
dual
allegiance,
who
must
be
subject
to
strict
process
with
respect
to
the
termination
of
their
status,
for
candidates
with
dual
citizenship,
it
should
suffice
if,
upon
the
filing
of
their
certificate
of
candidacy,
they
elect
Philippine
citizenship
to
terminate
their
status
as
persons
with
dual
citizenship
considering
that
their
condition
is
the
unavoidable
consequence
of
conflicting
laws
of
different
states.
• By
electing
Philippine
citizenship,
such
candidates
at
the
same
time
forswear
allegiance
to
the
other
country
of
which
they
are
also
citizens
and
thereby
terminate
their
status
as
dual
citizens.
It
may
be
that,
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
foreign
state
and
of
its
laws,
such
an
individual
has
not
effectively
renounced
his
foreign
citizenship.
That
is
of
no
moment.
(Mercado
v.
Manzano,
G.R.
No.
135083,
307
SCRA
630,
May
26,
1999
[Mendoza])
Instances
when
a
citizen
of
the
Philippines
may
possess
dual
citizenship
considering
the
citizenship
clause
(Article
IV)
of
the
Constitution.
• 1)
Those
born
of
Filipino
fathers
and/or
mothers
in
foreign
countries
which
follow
the
principle
of
jus
soli;
• 2)
Those
born
in
the
Philippines
of
Filipino
mothers
and
alien
fathers
if
by
the
laws
of
their
father‟s country
such
children
are
citizens
of
that
country;
• 3)
Those
who
marry
aliens
if
by
the
laws
of
the
latter‟s country
the
former
are
considered
citizens,
unless
by
their
act
or
omission
they
are
deemed
to
have
renounced
Philippine
citizenship.
(Mercado
v.
Manzano,
G.R.
No.
135083,
307
SCRA
630,
May
26,
1999
[Mendoza])
Dual
Citizenship
Law
(RA
9225)
• The
law
applies
to:
(1)
former
natural-‐born
citizens
of
the
Philippines
who
have
already
become
citizens
of
a
foreign
country
through
naturalization;
and
(2)
natural-‐born
citizens
of
the
Philippines
who
may
wish
to
become
a
citizen
of
a
foreign
country
through
naturalization
after
the
effectivity
of
this
Act.
• In
both
cases,
they
are
given
the
opportunity
to
either
reacquire
(reacquisition)
or
retain
(retention)
their
Philippine
citizenship.
Thus,
in
effect,
they
will
possess
dual
citizenship.
• Casan Macode Maquiling v.
COMELEC,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
195649,
April
16,
2013,
En
Banc
(Sereno,
CJ)
• FACTS:
When
after
renouncing
his
American
citizenship
upon
his
filing
of
certificate
of
candidacy
for
mayor,
it
was
established
that
he
travelled
several
times
to
the
US
using
his
American
passport,
that
was
an
effective
recantation
of
his
renunciation
of
his
foreign
citizenship.
Thus,
he
reverted
to
his
prior
status
as
a
person
having
dual
citizenship
and,
therefore,
disqualified
to
run
for
mayor
pursuant
to
Sec.
40
(d)
of
the
Local
Government
Code
(R.A.
No.
7061).
• Section
5(2)
of
The
Citizenship
Retention
and
Re-‐acquisition
Act
of
2003
provides:
• Those
who
retain
or
re-‐acquire
Philippine
citizenship
under
this
Act
shall
Enjoy
full
civil
and
political
rights
and
be
subject
to
all
attendant
liabilities
and
responsibilities
under
existing
laws
of
the
Philippines
and
the
following
conditions:
xxxx
• (2)
Those
seeking
elective
public
office
in
the
Philippines
shall
meet
the
qualifications
for
holding
such
public
office
as
required
by
the
Constitution
and
existing
laws
and,
at
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
certificate
of
candidacy,
make
a
personal
and
sworn
renunciation
of
any
and
all
foreign
citizenship
before
any
public
officer
authorized
to
administer
an
oath.
• We
agree
with
the
pronouncement
of
the
COMELEC
First
Division
that
“Arnado‟s act
of
continuously
using
his
US
passport
effectively
negated
his
Affidavit
of
Renunciation.”
This
does
not
mean
that
he
failed
to
comply
with
the
twin
requirements
under
R.A.
No.
9225,
for
he
in
fact
did.
It
was
after
complying
with
the
requirements
that
he
performed
positive
acts
which
effectively
disqualified
him
from
running
for
an
elective
public
office
pursuant
to
Section
40(d)
of
the
Local
Government
Code
of
1991.
• Besides,
Arnado‟s subsequent
use
of
his
Philippine
passport
does
not
correct
the
fact
that
after
he
renounced
his
foreign
citizenship
and
prior
to
filing
his
certificate
of
candidacy,
he
used
his
US
passport.
In
the
same
way
that
the
use
of
his
foreign
passport
does
not
undo
his
Oath
of
Renunciation,
his
subsequent
use
of
his
Philippine
passport
does
not
undo
his
earlier
use
of
his
US
passport.
• We
therefore
hold
that
Arnado,
by
using
his
US
passport
after
renouncing
his
American
citizenship,
has
recanted
the
same
Oath
of
Renunciation
he
took.
Section
40(d)
of
the
Local
Government
Code
applies
to
his
situation.
He
is
disqualified
not
only
from
holding
the
public
office
but
even
from
becoming
a
candidate
in
the
May
2011
elections.
Naturalization
• Naturalization
signifies
the
act
of
formally
adopting
a
foreigner
into
the
political
body
of
a
nation
by
clothing
him
or
her
with
the
privileges
of
a
citizen.
(Edison
So
v.
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
G.R.
No.
170603,
January
29,
2007,
3rd
Div.,
[Callejo,
Sr.])
Ways
to
become
a
PH
citizen
• Under
current
and
existing
laws,
there
are
three
ways
by
which
an
alien
may
become
a
citizen
by
naturalization:
• (a)
administrative
naturalization
pursuant
to
R.A.
No.
9139;
• (b)
judicial
naturalization
pursuant
to
C.A.
No.
473,
as
amended;
and
• (c)
legislative
naturalization
in
the
form
of
a
law
enacted
by
Congress
bestowing
Philippine
citizenship
to
an
alien.
(Edison
So
v.
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
G.R.
No.
170603,
January
29,
2007,
3rd
Div.,
[Callejo,
Sr.])
• R.A.
No.
9139
may
be
availed
of
only
by
native-‐born
aliens
who
lived
here
in
the
Philippines
all
their
lives,
who
never
saw
any
other
country
and
all
along
thought
that
they
were
Filipinos;
who
have
demonstrated
love
and
loyalty
to
the
Philippines
and
affinity
to
the
customs
and
traditions
of
the
Filipino
people.
• To
reiterate,
the
intention
of
the
legislature
in
enacting
R.A.
No.
9139
was
to
make
the
process
of
acquiring
Philippine
citizenship
less
tedious,
less
technical
and
more
encouraging
which
is
administrative
rather
than
judicial
in
nature.
What
the
legislature
had
in
mind
was
merely
to
prescribe
another
mode
of
acquiring
Philippine
citizenship
which
may
be
availed
of
by
native
born
aliens.
The
only
implication
is
that,
a
native
born
alien
has
the
choice
to
apply
for
judicial
or
administrative
naturalization,
subject
to
the
prescribed
qualifications
and
disqualifications.
(Edison
So
v.
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
G.R.
No.
170603,
January
29,
2007,
3rd
Div.,
[Callejo,
Sr.]
Constitutional
Commissions
• Legal
Framework
:
Article
IX-‐ A,
1987
Constitution
• Civil
Service
Commission
• Commission
on
Audit
• Commission
on
Elections
• Declared
as
“independent
by
the
constitution”
Inhibitions
• 1.
Cannot
hold
any
other
office
or
employment
• 2.
Cannot
engage
in
the
practice
of
any
profession
• 3.
Cannot
take
part
in
the
active
management
or
control
of
any
business
which
are
affected
by
the
functions
of
their
office
• 4.
Shall
not
be
financially
interested
directly
or
indirectly,
in
any
contract
with,
or
in
any
franchise
or
privilege
granted
by
the
Government,
any
of
its
subdivisions,
agencies
or
instrumentalities
including
GOCCs.
Evidence
of
Independence
Principle
• 1.
Salaries
of
their
Commissioners
are
fixed
by
law
and
shall
not
be
decreased
during
their
tenure
(section
3,
Article
IX-‐A)
• 2.
Enjoy
Fiscal
Autonomy
(section
5)
• 3.
Commissioners
can
be
removed
by
impeachment
only
(Art.
XI,
section
2)
• 4.
President
cannot
designate
an
Acting
Chairman,
like
the
Chairman
of
the
Comelec (Brillantes vs.
Yorac [1990])
Fiscal
Autonomy
• The
agencies
which
the
Constitution
has
vested
with
fiscal
autonomy
should
be
given
priority
in
the
release
of
their
approved
appropriations
against
all
other
agencies
not
similarly
vested
when
there
is
a
revenue
shortfall.
(CSC
vs.
DBM
[2005])
• Appointments
in
the
civil
service
shall
be
made
only
according
to
merit
and
fitness
to
be
determined
as
far
as
practicable,
by
competitive
examination.
(section
2[2],
Article
IX-‐B)
• No
officer
or
employee
in
the
civil
service
shall
engage
directly
or
indirectly
in
any
electioneering
or
partisan
political
campaign.
(section
2
[4],
Article
IX-‐B)
• Not
allowed
to
engaged
in
strike,
but
entitled
to
right
to
self-‐
organization
Limitations/Restrictions
• No
candidate
who
has
lost
in
any
election
shall,
within
one
year
after
such
election
be
appointed
to
any
office
in
the
Government,
or
in
any
GOCC,
or
any
of
its
subsidiaries.
(Article
IX-‐B,
section
6)
• No
elective
official
shall
be
eligible
for
appointment
or
designation
in
any
capacity
to
any
public
office
or
position
during
his
tenure.
(section
7,
Article
IX-‐B)
• No
elective
or
appointive
officer
or
employee
shall
receive
additional,
double
or
indirect
compensation
unless
specifically
authorized
by
law.
(section
8,
Article
IX-‐B)
• No
elective
or
appointive
public
officer
or
employee
shall
accept
without
the
consent
of
the
Congress,
any
present,
emolument
or
title
of
any
kind
from
any
foreign
government.
(section
8,
Article
IX-‐B)
What
is
the
only
act
that
a
civil
service
employee
may
do
which
is
not
partisan
political
activity?
• Vote
• Section
79
(B)
of
the
Omnibus
Election
Code
– any
act
that
is
designed
to
elect
or
promote
the
election
of
a
candidate
is
an
electioneering
or
partisan
political
activity.
The
BILL
OF
RIGHTS
• Contextual
Framework
before
details
• Principles
• Whilst, the rights to liberty and property are provided for by the
international law instruments, the Philippines through its national
constitution has provided for the adequate and substantial
recognition of these rights.
Juridical
Concept
of
Liberty
• The
right
to
Liberty
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution
includes
the
right
to
exist
and
the
right
to
be
free
from
arbitrary
personal
restraint
or
servitude.
• Liberty
includes
the
right
of
the
citizens
to
be
free
to
use
his
faculties
in
all
lawful
ways;
to
live
an
work
where
he
will;
to
earn
his
livelihood
by
an
lawful
calling;
to
pursue
any
avocations,
an
for
that
purpose.
to
enter
into
all
contracts
which
may
be
proper,
necessary,
and
essential
to
his
carrying
out
these
purposes
to
a
successful
conclusion.
The
chief
elements
of
the
guaranty
are
the
right
to
contract,
the
right
to
choose
one's
employment,
the
right
to
labor,
and
the
right
of
locomotion.
• Rubi
vs.
Provincial
Board
[1919]
Restriction
• The
rights
to
liberty
and
property
are
subject
to
three
restrictions
or
limitations
– police
power,
eminent
domain
and
taxation.
• These
three
are
referred
to
as
the
great
and
inherent
powers
of
sovereignty.
They
constitute
the
totality
of
sovereign
power.
THE
CITY
OF
CEBU,
petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES
APOLONIO
and
BLASA
DEDAMO,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
142971.
May
7,
2002.
The
power
of
eminent
domain
is
lodged
in
the
legislative
branch
of
the
government.
It
delegates
the
exercise
thereof
to
local
government
units,
other
public
entities
and
public
utility
corporations,
subject
only
to
Constitutional
limitations.
LOURDES
DE
LA
PAZ
MASIKIP,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
CITY
OF
PASIG,
HON.
MARIETTA
A.
LEGASPI,
in
her
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Pasig
City,
Branch
165
and
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
respondents.,
[G.R.
No.
136349.
January
23,
2006.
Not
Limitless
• However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. Any arm of
the State that exercises the delegated power of eminent domain must
wield that power with circumspection and utmost regard for
procedural requirements. A government instrumentality that fails to
observe the constitutional guarantees of just compensation and due
process abuses the authority delegated to it, and is liable to the
property owner for damages.
• THE
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED
BY
THE
NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
FRANCISCO
DIAZ,
IN
HIS
CAPACITY
AS
ADMINISTRATOR
OF
THE
INTESTATE
ESTATE
OF
THE
LATE
MANUEL
DIAZ,
respondents.,
G.R.no.147245,
March
31,
2005
Requisites
• Over
the
years
and
in
a
plethora
of
cases,
this
Court
has
recognized
the
following
requisites
for
the
valid
exercise
of
the
power
of
eminent
domain:
(1)
the
property
taken
must
be
private
property;
(2)
there
must
be
genuine
necessity
to
take
the
private
property;
(3)
the
taking
must
be
for
public
use;
(4)
there
must
be
payment
of
just
compensation;
and
(5)
the
taking
must
comply
with
due
process
of
law.
• FERMIN
MANAPAT,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
NATIONAL
HOUSING
AUTHORITY,
respondents.,
G.R.no.110478,
October
15,
2007
Two
stages
• Expropriation
proceedings
consists
of
two
stages:
• first,
condemnation
of
the
property
after
it
is
determined
that
its
acquisition
will
be
for
a
public
purpose
or
public
use
and
• second,
the
determination
of
just
compensation
to
be
paid
for
the
taking
of
private
property
to
be
made
by
the
court
with
the
assistance
of
not
more
than
three
commissioners.
How
exercised
• The power of eminent domain is exercised by the filing of a complaint
which shall join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own,
or occupying, any part of the expropriated land or interest therein. If
a known owner is not joined as defendant, he is entitled to intervene
in the proceeding; or if he is joined but not served with process and
the proceeding is already closed before he came to know of the
condemnation, he may maintain an independent suit for damages.
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners
of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying or claiming to own the property.
Elements
of
Taking
• The
Supreme
Court
has
defined
the
elements
of
"taking"
as
the
main
ingredient
in
the
exercise
of
power
of
eminent
domain,
in
the
following
words:
"A
number
of
circumstances
must
be
present
in
the
'taking'
of
property
for
purposes
of
eminent
domain:
(1)
the
expropriator
must
enter
a
private
property;
(2)
the
entrance
into
private
property
must
be
for
more
than
a
momentary
period;
(3)
the
entry
into
the
property
should
be
under
warrant
or
color
of
legal
authority;
(4)
the
property
must
be
devoted
to
a
public
use
or
otherwise
informally
appropriated
or
injuriously
affected;
and
(5)
the
utilization
of
the
property
for
public
use
must
be
in
such
a
way
to
oust
the
owner
and
deprive
him
of
all
beneficial
enjoyment
of
the
property."
• NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MACAPANTON
MANGONDATO,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
113194.
March
11,
1996.
Neither
acquisition
of
title
nor
destruction
• It
is
a
settled
rule
that
neither
acquisition
of
title
nor
total
destruction
of
value
is
essential
to
taking.
It
is
usually
in
cases
where
title
remains
with
the
private
owner
that
inquiry
should
be
made
to
determine
whether
the
impairment
of
a
property
is
merely
regulated
or
amounts
to
a
compensable
taking.
A
regulation
that
deprives
any
person
of
the
profitable
use
of
his
property
constitutes
a
taking
and
entitles
him
to
compensation,
unless
the
invasion
of
rights
is
so
slight
as
to
permit
the
regulation
to
be
justified
under
the
police
power.
Similarly,
a
police
regulation
that
unreasonably
restricts
the
right
to
use
business
property
for
business
purposes
amounts
to
a
taking
of
private
property,
and
the
owner
may
recover
therefor.
• THE
OFFICE
OF
THE
SOLICITOR
GENERAL,
petitioner,
vs.
AYALA
LAND
INCORPORATED,
ROBINSON'S
LAND
CORPORATION,
SHANGRI-‐LA
PLAZA
CORPORATION
and
SM
PRIME
HOLDINGS,
INC.,
respondents.,
G.R.no.
177056,
September
18,
2009
Public
Use
• There is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is susceptible of
myriad meanings depending on diverse situations.
• The limited meaning attached to "public use" is "use by the public" or
"public employment," that "a duty must devolve on the person or
corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to
furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on
the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-‐public
agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned."
• The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public
interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
Public
Use
=
Public
Benefit
• The
more
generally
accepted
view
sees
"public
use"
as
"public
advantage,
convenience,
or
benefit,
and
that
anything
which
tends
to
enlarge
the
resources,
increase
the
industrial
energies,
and
promote
the
productive
power
of
any
considerable
number
of
the
inhabitants
of
a
section
of
the
state,
or
which
leads
to
the
growth
of
towns
and
the
creation
of
new
resources
for
the
employment
of
capital
and
labor,
[which]
contributes
to
the
general
welfare
and
the
prosperity
of
the
whole
community."
In
this
jurisdiction,
"public
use"
is
defined
as
"whatever
is
beneficially
employed
for
the
community."
• BARANGAY
SINDALAN,
SAN
FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA,
rep.
by
BARANGAY
CAPTAIN
ISMAEL
GUTIERREZ,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
JOSE
MATOTO
III,
and
PATRICIA
SINDAYAN,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
150640.
March
22,
2007.
Public
Use
• The
use
of
land
by
the
Government
for
military
and
aviation
purposes
is
a
public
use
within
the
meaning
of
the
provisions
of
law
authorizing
the
Government
of
the
Philippine
Islands
to
acquire
real
estate
for
public
uses
by
the
exercise
of
the
right
of
eminent
domain.
• VISAYAN
REFINING
COMPANY,
DEAN
C.
WORCESTER,
and
FRED
A.
LEAS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON.
MANUEL
CAMUS,
Judge
of
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
the
Province
of
Rizal
and
HON.
QUINTIN
PAREDES,
Attorney-‐General
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
15870.
December
3,
1919.
Just
Compensation
• Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or
the fair value of the property as between one who receives and one who
desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State. Thus,
if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with
the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value, to be computed from the time the
property is taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.
APO
FRUITS
CORPORATION
and
HIJO
PLANTATION,
INC.,
petitioners,
vs.
THE
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
LAND
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
164195.
December
4,
2009.
Just
Compensation
• The
general
rule
in
determining
"just
compensation"
in
eminent
domain
is
the
value
of
the
property
as
of
the
date
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint.
Normally,
the
time
of
the
taking
coincides
with
the
filing
of
the
complaint
for
expropriation.
Hence,
many
rulings
of
this
Court
have
equated
just
compensation
with
the
value
of
the
property
as
of
the
time
of
filing
of
the
complaint
consistent
with
the
above
provision
of
Section
4,
Rule
67
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court.
So
too,
where
the
institution
of
the
action
precedes
entry
into
the
property,
the
just
compensation
is
to
be
ascertained
as
of
the
time
of
the
filing
of
the
complaint.
• NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
MACAPANTON
MANGONDATO,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
113194.
March
11,
1996.]
Judicial
Function
• The
determination
of
'just
compensation
is
a
judicial
function.
Well-‐settled
is
the
rule
that
the
determination
of
"just
compensationn'
in
eminent
domain
cases
is
"
in
eminent
domain
cases
is
a
judicial
function.
In
Export
Processing
Zone
Authority
v.
Dulay,
the
Court
held
that
any
valuation
for
just
compensation
laid
down
in
the
statutes
may
serve
only
as
guiding
principle
or
one
of
the
factors
in
determining
just
compensation
but
it
may
not
substitute
the
court's
own
judgment
as
to
what
amount
should
be
awarded
and
how
to
arrive
at
such
amount.
The
executive
department
or
the
legislature
may
make
the
initial
determinations
but
when
a
party
claims
a
violation
of
the
guarantee
in
the
Bill
of
Rights
that
private
property
may
not
be
taken
for
public
use
without
just
compensation,
no
statute,
decree,
or
executive
order
can
mandate
that
its
own
determination
shall
prevail
over
the
court's
findings.
• NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
PUREFOODS
CORPORATION,
SOLID
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
J.
G.R.
No.
160725.
September
12,
2008.
Local
Government
• Local
government
units
have
no
inherent
power
of
eminent
domain
and
can
exercise
it
only
when
expressly
authorized
by
the
legislature.
By
virtue
of
RA
7160,
Congress
conferred
upon
local
government
units
the
power
to
expropriate.
SEC.
19. Eminent
Domain.
— A
local
government
unit
may,
through
its
chief
executive
and
acting
pursuant
to
an
ordinance,
exercise
the
power
of
eminent
domain
for
public
use,
or
purpose,
or
welfare
for
the
benefit
of
the
poor
and
the
landless,
upon
payment
of
just
compensation,
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
the
Constitution
and
pertinent
laws
.
.
..
(italics
supplied).
Antonio
v.
Geronimo,
G.R.
No.
124779,
November
29,
2005,
476
SCRA
340,
350.
Will
a
resolution
suffice?
• The
Court
in
no
uncertain
terms
have
pronounced
that
a
local
government
unit
cannot
authorize
an
expropriation
of
private
property
through
a
mere
resolution
of
its
lawmaking
body.
R.A.
No.
7160
otherwise
known
as
the
Local
Government
Code
expressly
requires
an
ordinance
for
the
purpose
and
a
resolution
that
merely
expresses
the
sentiment
of
the
municipal
council
will
not
suffice.
• Municipality
of
Parañaque v.
V.M.
Realty
Corporation,
supra
at
687;
Heirs
of
Suguitan v.
City
of
Mandaluyong,
supra;
Antonio
v.
Geronimo,
supra
at
352.
Necessity
of
an
Offer
• A
valid
and
definite
offer
is
a
mandatory
requirement.
It
is
the
Local
Government
Unit
who
bears
the
burden
of
proving
compliance
with
this
mandatory
requirement.
It
is
incumbent
upon
the
condemnor to
exhaust
all
reasonable
efforts
to
obtain
the
land
it
desires
by
agreement.
Failure
to
prove
compliance
with
the
mandatory
requirement
will
result
in
the
dismissal
of
the
complaint.
Pequonnock Yacht
Club,
Inc.
v.
City
of
Bridgeport,
259
Conn.
592,
790
A.2d
1178
(2002).
•
Necessity
of
an
Offer
• The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first
made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary
acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid
the expense and delay of a court action. The law is designed to give to
the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and
inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a
substantial right which should be protected in every instance.
Res
Judicata
not
a
bar
• The
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
the
principle
of
res
judicata,
which
finds
application
in
generally
all
cases
and
proceedings,
cannot
bar
the
right
of
the
State
or
its
agent
to
expropriate
private
property.
The
very
nature
of
eminent
domain,
as
an
inherent
power
of
the
State,
dictates
that
the
right
to
exercise
the
power
be
absolute
and
unfettered
even
by
a
prior
judgment
or
res
judicata.
The
scope
of
eminent
domain
is
plenary
and,
like
police
power,
can
"reach
every
form
of
property
which
the
State
might
need
for
public
use."
Bernas,
Joaquin
G.,
The
1987
Constitution
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines:
A
Commentary,
1996
ed.,
p.
348.
• While
the
principle
of
res
judicata does
not
denigrate
the
right
of
the
State
to
exercise
eminent
domain,
it
does
apply
to
specific
issues
decided
in
a
previous
case.
• For
example,
a
final
judgment
dismissing
an
expropriation
suit
on
the
ground
that
there
was
no
prior
offer
precludes
another
suit
raising
the
same
issue;
it
cannot,
however,
bar
the
State
or
its
agent
from
thereafter
complying
with
this
requirement,
as
prescribed
by
law,
and
subsequently
exercising
its
power
of
eminent
domain
over
the
same
property.
The
Power
of
Taxation
• Taxes
are
the
lifeblood
of
the
government,
for
without
taxes,
the
government
can
neither
exist
nor
endure.
A
principal
attribute
of
sovereignty,
the
exercise
of
taxing
power
derives
its
source
from
the
very
existence
of
the
state
whose
social
contract
with
its
citizens
obliges
it
to
promote
public
interest
and
common
good.
The
theory
behind
the
exercise
of
the
power
to
tax
emanates
from
necessity;
without
taxes,
government
cannot
fulfill
its
mandate
of
promoting
the
general
welfare
and
well-‐being
of
the
people.
• NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
CITY
OF
CABANATUAN,
respondent.,
G.R.
no.149110,
April
9,
2003
Attribute
of
sovereignty
• Taxation
is
an
attribute
of
sovereignty.
The
power
to
tax
is
the
strongest
of
all
the
powers
of
government.
If
approximate
equality
in
taxation
is
to
be
attained,
all
property
subject
to
a
tax
must
respond,
or
there
is
resultant
inequality.
To
prevent
such
a
lamentable
situation,
the
law
ordains
that
the
claim
of
the
State
upon
the
property
of
the
tax
debtor
shall
be
superior
to
that
of
any
other
creditor
Power
to
destroy
• The
power
of
taxation
is
sometimes
called
also
the
power
to
destroy.
It
should,
therefore,
be
exercised
with
caution
to
minimize
injury
to
the
proprietary
rights
of
a
taxpayer.
It
must
be
exercised
fairly,
equally
and
uniformly,
lest
the
tax
collector
kill
the
"hen
that
lays
the
golden
egg".
• ANTONIO
ROXAS,
EDUARDO
ROXAS
and
ROXAS
Y
CIA.,
in
their
own
respective
behalfs and
as
judicial
co-‐guardians
of
JOSE
ROXAS,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT
OF
TAX
APPEALS
and
COMMISSIONER
OF
INTERNAL
REVENUE,
respondents.,
G.R.
no.L-‐25043,
April
26,
1968
Free
to
select
subjects
• It
is
inherent
in
the
power
to
tax
that
the
State
be
free
to
select
the
subjects
of
taxation,
and
it
has
been
repeatedly
held
that
"inequalities
which
result
from
a
singling
out
of
one
particular
class
for
taxation,
or
exemption,
infringe
no
constitutional
limitation.
• COMMISSIONER
OF
INTERNAL
REVENUE
and
COMMISSIONER
OF
CUSTOMS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON.
APOLINARIO
B.
SANTOS,
in
his
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
67,
Pasig
City;
ANTONIO
M.
MARCO;
JEWELRY
BY
MARCO
&
CO.,
INC.,
and
GUILD
OF
PHILIPPINE
JEWELERS,
INC.,
respondents.
G.R.
No.
119252.
August
18,
1997.
Freedom
to
classify
• This
power
has
aptly
been
described
as
"of
wide
range
and
flexibility."
Indeed,
it
is
said
that
in
the
field
of
taxation,
more
than
in
other
areas,
the
legislature
possesses
the
greatest
freedom
in
classification.
The
reason
for
this
is
that,
classification
has
been
a
device
for
fitting
tax
programs
to
local
needs
and
usages
in
order
to
achieve
an
equitable
distribution
of
the
tax
burden.
The
classification
is
likewise
based
on
considerations
of
administrative
convenience.
For
it
is
now
a
settled
principle
of
law
that
"considerations
of
practical
administrative
convenience
and
cost
in
the
administration
of
tax
laws
afford
adequate
grounds
for
imposing
a
tax
on
a
well
recognized
and
defined
class."
• BENJAMIN
P.
GOMEZ,
petitioner-‐appellee,
vs.
ENRICO
PALOMAR,
in
his
capacity
as
Postmaster
General;
HON.
BRIGIDO
R.
VALENCIA,
in
his
capacity
as
Secretary
of
Public
Works
and
Communications
and
DOMINGO
GOPEZ,
in
his
capacity
as
Acting
Postmaster
of
San
Fernando,
Pampanga,
respondents-‐appellants.
,
G.R.
No.
L-‐23645.
October
29,
1968.
Rights
and
Liberties
• Right
and
Liberty
to
Property
• Intellectual Liberties
• Physical
Liberties
Intellectual
Liberties
• Section
4,
Article
III,
1987
Constitution
• No
law
shall
be
passed
abridging
the
freedom
of
speech,
of
expression,
or
the
press,
or
the
right
of
the
people
peaceably
to
assembly
and
petition
the
government
for
redress
of
grievances.
• Section
5,
Article
III,
1987
Constitution
• No
law
shall
be
made
respecting
an
establishment
of
religion,
or
prohibiting
the
free
exercise
thereof.
The
free
exercise
and
enjoyment
of
religious
profession
and
worship
without
discrimination
or
preference
shall
forever
be
allowed.
No
religious
test
shall
be
required
for
the
exercise
of
civil
or
political
rights.
• Section
8,
Article
IIII,
1987
Constitution
• The
right
of
the
people
including
those
employed
in
the
public
and
private
sectors,
to
form
unions,
associations
or
societies,
to
form
unions,
associations
for
purposes
not
contrary
to
law
shall
not
be
abridged.
Religious
Freedom
• Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the
framers of our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed
this preferred status well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good.”
• IGLESIA
NI
CRISTO
(INC),
petitioner,
vs.
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
BOARD
OF
REVIEW
FOR
MOVING
PICTURES
AND
TELEVISION
and
HONORABLE
HENRIETTA
S.
MENDEZ,
respondents,
G.R.
no.
119673,
July
26,
1996;
ISLAMIC
DA'WAH
COUNCIL
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
herein
represented
by
PROF.
ABDULRAFIH
H.
SAYEDY,
petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE
OF
THE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
of
the
Office
of
the
President
of
the
Philippines,
herein
represented
by
HON.
ALBERTO
G.
ROMULO,
Executive
Secretary,
and
the
OFFICE
ON
MUSLIM
AFFAIRS,
herein
represented
by
its
Executive
Director,
HABIB
MUJAHAB
HASHIM,
respondents,
G.R.
No.
153888.
July
9,
2003
• What
is
guaranteed
by
our
Constitution
is
religious
liberty,
not
mere
religious
toleration.
Religious
freedom,
however,
as
a
constitutional
mandate
is
not
inhibition
of
profound
reverence
for
religion
and
is
not
a
denial
of
its
influence
in
human
affairs.
Religion
as
a
profession
of
faith
to
an
active
power
that
binds
and
elevates
man
to
his
Creator
is
recognized.
And,
in
so
far
as
it
instills
into
the
minds
the
purest
principles
of
morality,
its
influence
is
deeply
felt
and
highly
appreciated.
• GREGORIO
AGLIPAY,
petitioner,
vs.
JUAN
RUIZ,
respondent,
G.R.
No.
45459.
March
13,
1937
• While
it
is
beyond
debate
that
every
citizen
has
the
undeniable
and
inviolable
right
to
religious
freedom,
the
exercise
thereof,
and
of
all
fundamental
rights
for
that
matter,
must
be
done
in
good
faith.
As
Article
19
of
the
Civil
Code
admonishes:
"Every
person
must
in
the
exercise
of
his
rights
and
in
the
performance
of
his
duties
.
.
.
observe
honesty
and
good
faith."
• RELI
GERMAN,
RAMON
PEDROSA,
TIRSO
SANTILLAN,
JR.,
et.al.,
petitioners,
vs.
GEN.
SANTIAGO
BARANGAN
and
MAJOR
ISABELO
LARIOSA,
respondents,
G.R.
No.
68828.
March
27,
1985.
•
• Freedom
to
Believe
• Enshrined
in
the
Constitution
is
the
inviolable
right
to
privacy
of
home
and
person.
It
explicitly
ordains
that
people
have
the
right
to
be
secure
in
their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
of
whatever
nature
and
for
any
purpose.
Inseparable,
and
not
merely
corollary
or
incidental
to
said
right
and
equally
hallowed
in
and
by
the
Constitution,
is
the
exclusionary
principle
which
decrees
that
any
evidence
obtained
in
violation
of
said
right
is
inadmissible
for
any
purpose
in
any
proceeding.
• Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a
valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure
outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court;
"otherwise such search and seizure become 'unreasonable' within the
meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision."
• Such
warrantless
searches
and
seizures
have
long
been
deemed
permissible
by
jurisprudence
in
instances
of
(1)
search
of
moving
vehicles,
(2)
seizure
in
plain
view,
(3)
customs
searches,
(4)
waiver
or
consent
searches,
(5)
stop
and
frisk
situations
(Terry
search),
and
(6)
search
incidental
to
a
lawful
arrest.
The
last
includes
a
valid
warrantless
search
and
seizure
pursuant
to
an
equally
valid
warrantless
arrest,
for,
while
as
a
rule,
an
arrest
is
considered
legitimate
if
effected
with
a
valid
warrant
of
arrest,
the
Rules
of
Court
recognize
permissible
warrantless
arrests,
to
wit:
(1)
arrest
in
flagrante
delicto,
(2)
arrests
effected
in
hot
pursuit,
and
(3)
arrests
of
escaped
prisoners.
• PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-‐appellee,
vs.
CHUA
HO
SAN
@
TSAY
HO
SAN,
accused-‐appellant,
G.R.
No.
128222.
June
17,
1999
•
• In
cases
of
in
flagrante
delicto
arrests,
a
peace
officer
or
a
private
person
may
without
a
warrant,
arrest
a
person,
when,
in
his
presence,
the
person
to
be
arrested
has
committed,
is
actually
committing,
or
is
attempting
to
commit
an
offense.
The
arresting
officer,
therefore,
must
have
personal
knowledge
of
such
fact
or
as
recent
case
law
adverts
to
personal
knowledge
of
facts
or
circumstances
convincingly
indicative
or
constitutive
of
probable
cause.
The
term
probable
cause
had
been
understood
to
mean
a
reasonable
ground
of
suspicion
supported
by
circumstances
sufficiently
strong
in
themselves
to
warrant
a
cautious
man's
belief
that
the
person
accused
is
guilty
of
the
offense
with
which
he
is
charged.
• with
respect
to
arrests,
it
is
such
facts
and
circumstances
which
would
lead
a
reasonably
discreet
and
prudent
man
to
believe
that
an
offense
has
been
committed
by
the
person
sought
to
be
arrested.
(1
BERNAS
87)
As
applied
to
searches,
probable
cause
refers
to
the
existence
of
facts
and
circumstances
which
could
lead
a
reasonably
discreet
and
prudent
man
to
believe
that
an
offense
has
been
committed
and
that
the
items,
articles
or
objects
sought
in
connection
with
said
offense
or
subject
to
seizure
and
destruction
by
law
is
in
the
place
to
be
searched
• The
Constitution
lays
down
the
general
rule
that
a
search
and
seizure
must
be
carried
on
the
strength
of
a
judicial
warrant.
Otherwise,
the
search
and
seizure
is
deemed
"unreasonable."
Evidence
procured
on
the
occasion
of
an
unreasonable
search
and
seizure
is
deemed
tainted
for
being
the
proverbial
fruit
of
a
poisonous
tree
and
should
be
excluded.
Such
evidence
shall
be
inadmissible
in
evidence
for
any
purpose
in
any
proceeding
Rights
of
an
Accused
• The
rights
of
the
accused
during
custodial
investigation
are
enshrined
in
Article
III,
Section
12
(1)
of
the
1987
Constitution
which
provides
that:
"Sec.
12.
(1)
Any
person
under
investigation
for
the
commission
of
an
offense
shall
have
the
right
to
be
informed
of
his
right
to
remain
silent
and
to
have
competent
and
independent
counsel
preferably
of
his
own
choice.
If
the
person
cannot
afford
the
services
of
counsel,
he
must
be
provided
with
one.
These
rights
cannot
be
waived
except
in
writing
and
in
the
presence
of
counsel."
• The
rights
to
remain
silent
and
to
counsel
may
be
waived
by
the
accused
provided
that
the
constitutional
requirements
are
complied
with.
It
must
appear
clear
that
the
accused
was
initially
accorded
his
right
to
be
informed
of
his
right
to
remain
silent
and
to
have
a
competent
and
independent
counsel
preferably
of
his
own
choice.
In
addition,
the
waiver
must
be
in
writing
and
in
the
presence
of
counsel.
If
the
waiver
complies
with
the
constitutional
requirements,
then
the
extrajudicial
confession
will
be
tested
for
voluntariness,
i.e.,
if
it
was
given
freely
— without
coercion,
intimidation,
inducement,
or
false
promises;
and
credibility,
i.e.,
if
it
was
consistent
with
the
normal
experience
of
mankind.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-‐appellee,
vs.
DONATO
B.
CONTINENTE
and
JUANITO
T.
ITAAS,
JOHN
DOE,
PETER
DOE,
JAMES
DOE,
PAUL
DOE
and
SEVERAL
OTHER
DOES
(at
large),
accused,
DONATO
B.
CONTINENTE
and
JUANITO
T.
ITAAS,
accused-‐
appellants,
G.R.
Nos.
100801-‐02.
August
25,
2000
•
•
• Sec.
12
(1)
Art.
III
of
the
Constitution
may
be
invoked
only
during
a
custodial
investigation:
"The
criminal
process
includes
the
investigation
prior
to
the
filing
of
charges,
the
preliminary
examination
and
investigation
after
charges
are
filed,
and
the
period
of
trial.
The
Miranda
rights
or
the
Section
12
(1)
rights
were
conceived
for
the
first
of
these
three
phases,
that
is,
when
the
enquiry
is
under
the
control
of
police
officers.
It
is
in
this
situation
that
the
psychological
if
not
physical
atmosphere
of
custodial
investigations,
in
the
absence
of
proper
safeguards,
is
inherently
coercive.
Outside
of
this
situation,
Section
12
(1)
no
longer
applies."
• PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
appellee,
vs.
SILVENO
ESTADO
y
AMISTOSO
JR.,
a.k.a.
"NONO,"
appellant,
G.R.
No.
150867.
February
5,
2004
• The
right
to
be
informed
requires
"the
transmission
of
meaningful
information
rather
than
just
the
ceremonial
and
perfunctory
recitation
of
an
abstract
constitutional
principle."
It
should
allow
the
suspect
to
consider
the
effects
and
consequences
of
any
waiver
he
might
make
of
these
rights.
• PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN
SAYABOC
y
SEGUBA,
PATRICIO
ESCORPISO
y
VALDEZ,
MARLON
BUENVIAJE
y
PINEDA,
and
MIGUEL
BUENVIAJE
y
FLORES,
appellants,
G.R.
No.
147201.
January
15,
2004.
• Any
information
or
admission
given
by
a
person
while
in
custody
which
may
appear
harmless
or
innocuous
at
the
time
without
the
competent
assistance
of
an
independent
counsel
must
be
struck
down
as
inadmissible.
Even
if
the
confession
contains
a
grain
of
truth
or
even
if
it
had
been
voluntarily
given,
if
it
was
made
without
the
assistance
of
counsel,
it
is
inadmissible.
• PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
appellee,
vs.
REY
SUNGA,
RAMIL
LANSANG,
INOCENCIO
PASCUA,
LITO
OCTAC
and
LOCIL
CUI
@
GINALYN
CUYOS,
accused,
G.R.
No.
126029.
March
27,
2003
• The
interdiction
against
warrantless
searches
and
seizures
is
not
absolute.
The
recognized
exceptions
established
by
jurisprudence
are
(1)
search
of
moving
vehicles;
(2)
seizure
in
plain
view;
(3)
customs
searches;
(4)
waiver
or
consented
searches;
(5)
stop
and
frisk
situations
(Terry
search);
and
(6)
search
incidental
to
a
lawful
arrest.
• The
Terry
search
or
the
"stop
and
frisk"
situation
refers
to
a
case
where
a
police
officer
approaches
a
person
who
is
acting
suspiciously,
for
purposes
of
investigating
possibly
criminal
behavior
in
line
with
the
general
interest
of
effective
crime
prevention
and
detection.
To
assure
himself
that
the
person
with
whom
he
is
dealing
is
not
armed
with
a
weapon
that
could
unexpectedly
and
fatally
be
used
against
him,
he
could
validly
conduct
a
carefully
limited
search
of
the
outer
clothing
of
such
person
to
discover
weapons
which
might
be
used
to
assault
him.
• A
custodial
investigation
is
understood
to
mean
as
"any
questioning
initiated
by
law
enforcement
authorities
after
a
person
is
taken
into
custody
or
otherwise
deprived
of
his
freedom
of
action
in
any
significant
manner."
It
begins
when
there
is
no
longer
a
general
inquiry
into
an
unsolved
crime
but
starts
to
focus
on
a
particular
person
as
a
suspect,
i.e.,
when
the
police
investigator
starts
interrogating
or
exacting
a
confession
from
the
suspect
in
connection
with
an
alleged
offense.
A
person
under
custodial
investigation
is
guaranteed
certain
rights,
which
attach
upon
the
commencement
thereof.
• Jurisprudence
provides
that
extrajudicial
confessions
are
presumed
to
be
voluntary.
The
condition
for
this
presumption,
however,
is
that
the
prosecution
is
able
to
show
that
the
constitutional
requirements
safeguarding
an
accused's
rights
during
custodial
investigation
have
been
strictly
complied
with,
especially
when
the
extrajudicial
confession
has
been
denounced.
The
rationale
for
this
requirement
is
to
allay
any
fear
that
the
person
being
investigated
would
succumb
to
coercion
while
in
the
unfamiliar
or
intimidating
environment
that
is
inherent
in
custodial
investigations.
Therefore,
even
if
the
confession
may
appear
to
have
been
given
voluntarily
since
the
confessant
did
not
file
charges
against
his
alleged
intimidators
for
maltreatment,
the
failure
to
properly
inform
a
suspect
of
his
rights
during
a
custodial
investigation
renders
the
confession
valueless
and
inadmissible.
• The
right
to
a
competent
and
independent
counsel
means
that
the
counsel
should
satisfy
himself,
during
the
conduct
of
the
investigation,
that
the
suspect
understands
the
import
and
consequences
of
answering
the
questions
propounded.
• Ibid
Right
to
Bail
• Section
13,
Article
III
of
the
Constitution
provides
that
the
right
to
bail
shall
not
be
impaired,
thus:
• Sec.
13. All
persons,
except
those
charged
with
offenses
punishable
by
reclusion
perpetua when
evidence
of
guilt
is
strong,
shall,
before
conviction,
be
bailable by
sufficient
sureties,
or
be
released
on
recognizance
as
may
be
provided
by
law.
The
right
to
bail
shall
not
be
impaired
even
when
the
privilege
of
the
writ
of
habeas
corpus
is
suspended.
Excessive
bail
shall
not
be
required.
• The
decision
of
the
SC
in
Government
of
the
USA
v.
Judge
Purganan
which
says
that
“no
bail
rule
applies
in
extradition
since
bail
is
available
only
to
one
who
had
arrested
and
detained
for
violation
of
Philippine
criminal
laws”
was
re-‐examined
and,
after
re-‐examination,
the
rule
now
is
that
an
extraditee may
be
allowed
to
post
bail
during
the
pendency
of
an
extradition
proceeding.
However,
for
him
to
be
allowed
to
post
bail,
still
he
must
prove
that
(1)
once
granted
bail
he
will
not
be
a
flight
risk
or
a
danger
to
the
community;
and
(2)
that
there
exists
special,
humanitarian
and
compelling
circumstances
that
will
justify
the
grant
of
bail
to
him,
by
a
clear
and
convincing
evidence.
Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan (2015)
• In
this
case,
former
Senator
Enrile was
shown
not
to
be
a
flight
risk
or
a
danger
to
the
community
(his
voluntary
surrender
to
the
authorities
and
his
record
of
respect
for
court
processes
in
earlier
cases),
and
that
there
exist
special,
humanitarian
and
compelling
circumstances
(his
advanced
age,
fragile
state
of
health
and
medical
predicament
that
will
require
the
services
of
doctors
of
his
choice)
that
will
justify
the
grant
of
bail
to
him.
After
all,
the
main
purpose
of
bail
is
to
assure
the
presence
of
an
accused
during
the
trial
of
the
case
as
required
by
the
cour
• Bail
for
the
provisional
liberty
to
the
accused,
regardless
of
the
crime
charged,
should
be
allowed
independently
of
the
merits
of
the
charge,
provided
his
continued
incarceration
is
clearly
shown
to
be
injurious
to
his
health
or
to
endanger
his
life.
Indeed,
denying
him
bail
despite
imperiling
hid
health
and
life
would
not
serve
the
true
objective
of
preventive
incarceration
during
the
trial.
• “Granting
bail
to
Enrile on
the
foregoing
reasons
is
not
unprecedented.
Right
against
self-‐incrimination
• The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of
counsel, being a purely mechanical act, is not a violation of his
constitutional right against self-‐incrimination. The constitutional right
of an accused against self-‐incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right
against self-‐incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving
of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.
• In
Pascual v.
Board
of
Medical
Examiners
(28
SCRA
344
[1969]),
we
held
that
the
right
against
self-‐incrimination
under
Section
17,
Article
III
of
the
1987
Constitution
which
is
ordinarily
available
only
in
criminal
prosecutions,
extends
to
administrative
proceedings
which
possess
a
criminal
or
penal
aspect,
such
as
an
administrative
investigation
of
a
licensed
physician
who
is
charged
with
immorality,
which
could
result
in
his
loss
of
the
privilege
to
practice
medicine
if
found
guilty.
The
Court,
citing
the
earlier
case
of
Cabal
v.
Kapunan (6
SCRA
1059
[1962]),
pointed
out
that
the
revocation
of
one‟s license
as
a
medical
practitioner,
is
an
even
greater
deprivation
than
forfeiture
of
property.
(Secretary
of
Justice
v.
Lantion,
322
SCRA
160,
184,
Jan.
18,
2000,
En
Banc
[Melo])
• [I]t
has
been
held
that
“a
congressional
committee‟s right
to
inquire
is
„subject
to
all
relevant
limitations
placed
by
the
Constitution
on
governmental
action,‟
including
„the
relevant
limitations
of
the
Bill
of
Rights‟.”
• One
of
the
basic
rights
guaranteed
by
the
Constitution
to
an
individual
is
the
right
against
self-‐incrimination.
(Bengzon,
Jr.
v.
Senate
Blue
Ribbon
Committee,
203
SCRA
767,
Nov.
20,
1991,
En
Banc
[Padilla])
• Section
17,
Article
3
of
the
1987
Constitution
provides
that
"no
person
shall
be
compelled
to
be
a
witness
against
himself."
Petitioner
asserts
that
obtaining
samples
from
him
for
DNA
testing
violates
his
right
against
self-‐incrimination.
Petitioner
ignores
our
earlier
pronouncements
that
the
privilege
is
applicable
only
to
testimonial
evidence
Right
against
Double
Jeopardy
• The
Supreme
Court
ruled
that
the
three
requisites
before
double
jeopardy
can
be
invoked
are:
(1)
the
first
jeopardy
must
have
attached
prior
to
the
second;
(2)
the
first
jeopardy
must
have
been
validly
terminated;
and
(3)
the
second
jeopardy
must
be
for
the
same
offense
as
that
in
the
first,
or
the
second
offense
includes
or
is
necessarily
included
in
the
offense
charged
in
the
first
information,
or
is
an
attempt
to
commit
the
same
or
is
a
frustration
thereof.
In
the
Court's
view,
it
is
clear
that
no
double
jeopardy
has
attached
in
this
case.
The
dismissal
order
made
by
the
trial
court
was
not
valid
and
cannot
be
used
as
basis
for
a
claim
of
double
jeopardy.
The
said
right
cannot
be
grounded
on
an
error
of
law.
• PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-‐appellee,
vs.
LUCIO
ALBERTO
y
DANAO,
accused-‐appellant,
G.R.
No.
132374.
August
22,
2002
• The
exception
to
the
double
jeopardy
rule
attaches
only
when
the
trial
court
commits
grave
abuse
of
discretion
due
to
a
violation
of
due
process,
i.e.,
that
the
prosecution
was
denied
the
opportunity
to
present
its
case
or
that
the
trial
was
a
sham.
Conversely,
there
cannot
be
a
grave
abuse
of
discretion
where
the
trial
court
gave
both
parties
the
opportunity
to
present
their
case
and
even
required
them
to
submit
memoranda
from
which
its
decision
is
based,
as
in
this
case.
In
other
words,
if
there
is
no
denial
of
due
process,
there
can
be
no
grave
abuse
of
discretion
that
would
merit
the
application
of
the
exception
to
the
double
jeopardy
rule.
METROPOLITAN
BANK
AND
TRUST
COMPANY,
petitioner,
vs.
HON.
REGINO
T.
VERIDIANO
II,
Presiding
Judge,
RTC-‐Manila,
Branch
31,
and
DOMINADOR
ONG,
respondents.,
•
•
• Our
Bill
of
Rights
deals
with
two
(2)
kinds
of
double
jeopardy.
The
first
sentence
of
Clause
20,
Section
1(now
Sec.
21),
Article
III
of
the
Constitution
ordains
that
“no
person
shall
be
twice
put
in
jeopardy
of
punishment
for
the
same
offense.”
The
second
sentence
of
said
clause
provides
that
“if
an
act
is
punishable
by
a
law
and
an
ordinance,
conviction
or
acquittal
under
either
shall
constitute
a
bar
to
another
prosecution
for
the
same
act.”
Thus,
the
first
sentence
prohibits
double
jeopardy
of
punishment
for
the
same
offense
whereas,
the
second
contemplates
double
jeopardy
of
punishment
for
the
same
act.
• Elsewhere
stated,
where
the
offense
charged
are
penalized
either
by
different
sections
of
the
same
statute
or
by
different
statutes,
the
important
inquiry
relates
to
the
identity
of
offenses
charged.
The
constitutional
protection
against
double
jeopardy
is
available
only
where
an
identity
is
shown
to
exist
between
the
earlier
and
the
subsequent
offenses
charged.
The
question
of
identity
or
lack
of
identity
of
offenses
is
addressed
by
examining
the
essential
elements
of
each
of
the
two
offenses
charged,
as
such
elements
are
set
out
in
the
respective
legislative
definitions
of
the
offenses
involved.
(People
v.
Quijada,
259
SCRA
191,
July
24,
1996)
• Legal
jeopardy
attaches
only:
(1)
upon
a
valid
indictment;
(b)
before
a
competent
court;
(c)
after
arraignment;
(d)
when
a
valid
plea
has
been
entered;
and
(e)
the
case
was
dismissed
or
otherwise
terminated
without
the
express
consent
of
the
accused.
(Cuison v.
CA,
289
SCRA
159,
April
15,
1998
[Panganiban])
Freedom
of
Movement
• Article
III,
Section
6
of
the
1987
Constitution
should
be
interpreted
to
mean
that
while
the
liberty
of
travel
may
be
impaired
even
without
Court
Order,
the
appropriate
executive
officers
or
administrative
authorities
are
not
armed
with
arbitrary
discretion
to
impose
limitations.
They
can
impose
limits
only
on
the
basis
of
"national
security,
public
safety,
or
public
health"
and
"as
may
be
provided
by
law,"
a
limitive phrase
which
did
not
appear
in
the
1973
text
(The
Constitution,
Bernas,
Joaquin
G.,
S.J.,
Vol.
I,
First
Edition,
1987,
p.
263).
• RICARDO
C.
SILVERIO,
petitioner,
vs.
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
HON.
BENIGNO
G.
GAVIOLA,
as
Judge
of
the
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Cebu
City,
Branch
IX,
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
respondents,
G.R.
No.
94284.
April
8,
1991
•
• Article
III,
Section
6
of
the
1987
Constitution
should
by
no
means
be
construed
as
delimiting
the
inherent
power
of
the
Courts
to
use
all
means
necessary
to
carry
their
orders
into
effect
in
criminal
cases
pending
before
them.
When
by
law
jurisdiction
is
conferred
on
a
Court
or
judicial
officer,
all
auxiliary
writs,
process
and
other
means
necessary
to
carry
it
into
effect
may
be
employed
by
such
Court
or
officer
(Rule
135,
Section
6,
Rules
of
Court).
Right
to
return
• The
right
to
return
to
one's
country
is
not
among
the
rights
specifically
guaranteed
in
the
Bill
of
Rights,
which
treats
only
of
the
liberty
of
abode
and
the
right
to
travel.
• It
is
the
court's
well-‐considered
view
that
the
right
to
return
may
be
considered,
as
a
generally
accepted
principle
of
international
law
and
under
our
Constitution,
is
part
of
the
law
of
the
land
[Art.
II
Sec.
2
of
the
Constitution.] It
is
distinct
and
separate
from
the
right
to
travel
and
enjoys
a
different
protection
under
the
International
Covenant
of
Civil
and
Political
Rights,
i.e.,
against
being
"arbitrarily
deprived"
thereof
[Art.
12
(4).]
Right
to
Privacy
• The
essence
of
privacy
is
the
“right
to
be
let
alone.”
In
the
1965
case
of
Griswold
v.
Connecticut
(381
U.S.
479,
14
L.
ed.
2D
510
[1965]),
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
gave
more
substance
to
the
right
of
privacy
when
it
ruled
that
the
right
has
a
constitutional
foundation.
It
held
that
there
is
a
right
of
privacy
which
can
be
found
within
the
penumbras
of
the
First,
Third,
Fourth,
Fifth
and
Ninth
Amendments
x
x
x.
In
the
1968
case
of
Morfe v.
Mutuc (22
SCRA
424,
444-‐445),
we
adopted
the
Griswold
ruling
that
there
is
a
constitutional
right
to
privacy
x
x
x.
• Indeed,
if
we
extend
our
judicial
gaze
we
will
find
that
the
right
of
privacy
is
recognized
and
enshrined
in
several
provisions
of
our
Constitution.
(Morfe v.
Mutuc,
22
SCRA
424,
444
[1968];
Cortes,
The
Constitutional
Foundations
of
Privacy,
p.
18
[1970]).
It
is
expressly
recognized
in
Section
3(1)
of
the
Bill
of
Rights
x
x
x.
Other
facets
of
the
right
to
privacy
are
protected
in
various
provisions
of
the
Bill
of
Rights
(viz:
Secs.
1,
2,
6,
8,
and
17.
(Ople v.
Torres,
G.R.
No.
127685,
July
23,
1998
[Puno])
• The
Civil
Code
provides
that
“[e]very
person
shall
respect
the
dignity,
personality,
privacy
and
peace
of
mind
of
his
neighbors
and
other
persons”
and
punishes
as
actionable
torts
several
acts
by
a
person
of
meddling
and
prying
into
the
privacy
of
another.
It
also
holds
a
public
officer
or
employee
or
any
private
individual
liable
for
damages
for
any
violation
of
the
rights
and
liberties
of
another
person,
and
recognizes
the
privacy
of
letters
and
other
private
communications.
The
Revised
Penal
Code
makes
a
crime
the
violation
of
secrets
by
an
officer,
the
revelation
of
trade
and
industrial
secrets,
and
trespass
to
dwelling.
Invasion
of
privacy
is
an
offense
in
special
laws
like
the
Anti-‐Wiretapping
Law
(R.A.
4200),
the
Secrecy
of
Bank
Deposits
(R.A.
1405)
and
the
Intellectual
Property
Code
(R.A.
8293).
The
Rules
of
Court
on
privileged
communication
likewise
recognize
the
privacy
of
certain
information
(Section
24,
Rule
130[c],
Revised
Rules
on
Evidence).
(Ople v.
Torres,
G.R.
No.
127685,
July
23,
1998
[Puno])
• Two
constitutional
guarantees
create
these
zones
of
privacy:
(a)
the
right
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures,
which
is
the
basis
of
the
right
to
be
let
alone,
and
(b)
the
right
to
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence.
• In
assessing
the
challenge
that
the
State
has
impermissibly
intruded
into
these
zones
of
privacy,
a
court
must
determine
whether
a
person
has
exhibited
a
reasonable
expectation
of
privacy
and,
if
so,
whether
that
expectation
has
been
violated
by
unreasonable
government
intrusion.