REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS, Petitioner,
vs.
UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS GmBH, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 166309-10, March 9, 2007

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1985, respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a
40-foot container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders,
remote controllers, parts and accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. (Handyware). Don Tim
Shipping Corporation transported the goods with Evergreen Marine Corporation as shipping
agent. After the shipment’s arrival, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) discovered that the Unimex’s
shipment to Handyware did not tally with the description appearing on the cargo manifest.
Hence, The Bureau of Customs (BOC) seized and forfeited the shipment owned by UNIMEX
Micro-Electronics. When the latter filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA),
the forfeiture decree was reversed and the court ordered the release of the goods. However,
respondent’s counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA decision. When
respondent asked for release of its shipment, BOC could no longer find subject shipment in its
warehouses. The CTA ordered the BOC to pay UNIMEX the commercial value of the goods with
interest. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the BOC Commissioner, assailed the
decision of the CTA in the SC. One of its grounds was that the government funds cannot be
charged with respondent’s claim without a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by
mere judicial order.

ISSUE: Can the government be held for actual damages?

HELD:
Although the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the government, and
that under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for governmental acts
(jusimperil), the court still holds that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of
the case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine. The court cannot
turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondent’s
goods. In the case of Depatment of Health v. C.V Canhela & Associates the court enunciated that
the Court, as the staunch guard of the people’s rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice so
patent in its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time,
courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to
reason is not allowed in law. The situation does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the
mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. The doctrine must be fairly observed and the
State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have
legitimate claims against it.
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs. VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a chinese citizen,
and Priscila Dulay, a Filipina, was born in Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines. On July 17, 1998, Ching, after graduated of Bachelor of Laws
course at St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 bar exam. The
Supreme Court allowed him to take the Bar Examinations, provided that he can produce proof of
his Philippine Citizenship. In compliance with said requirements, Ching submitted the following
documents:

A.) Certification from board of accountancy of the PRC showing that he is a

certified public accountant.
B.) Voter certification from COMELC Tubao La Union.
C.) Certification that showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union.

On April 5, 1999 Ching was included as one of the successful bar examinee and the
schedule of their oath taking was on May 5, 1999 but he was not allowed to take his oath due the
questionable citizenship issue. The OSG filed its comment stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was
a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is a filipino citizen? Whether or not his election to Philippine
citizenship within the reasonable time prescribed by the law?

HELD:
- No. Since the applicant was born on 1964, the governing charter with regards to
citizenship issue is the 1935 constitution. Therefore as what is provided by the said
constitution, which said that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother with an alien father followed the citizenship of the father unless upon reaching the
age of majority which is 21 years of age elected Philippine citizenship.
- In the case at bar, Ching did not elect his citizenship when he reach 21 years old but
instead in 1999 which is 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court
considered as not within the reasonable period of time considering the length of 14 years
after he reaches 21 year sold. In addition to that, the court said that Philippine citizenship
can never be treated like commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. In view of the foregoing, the court denies Vicente D. Ching’s
application for admission to the Philippine bar.
The Supreme Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to
the Philippine Bar.
LOIDA SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 90314 November 27, 1990

FACTS:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air
Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark
Air Base. According to applicable regulations, where there are qualified dependents of military
or civilian personnel, who are locally available, appointments to positions shall be limited to the
dependents. As per records, she possessed all the qualifications for the job at that time. Instead of
hiring Shauf, however, one Mr. Isakson was selected for the position who was not a dependent of
a military or civilian personnel. In addition, Mr. Isakson apparently lacked certain qualifications.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-
day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill
the vacancy. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to
vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended. Thus, Shauf was never
appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny
her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this
allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with
the applicable regulation. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and
an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian
personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason
of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth). RTC ruled in favor of
Shauf. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they
are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official
governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. CA reversed
RTC’s decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the
respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US
government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit.
They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal
& unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US
Armed Forces

HELD:
No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or
the acts of its agents in the Philippines. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying
petitioner Shauf. While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against
state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts
contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that
invades or violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the
official & such suit will not be a suit against the state. The doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen.

The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was
previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. The person appointed was
not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from the US
Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof.
She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position. Shauf has
proven that discrimination did occur. Thus, Detwiler and Persi should be accountable. Though
Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be paid for the supposedly unearned income had she
been hired as a Guidance Counselor.