SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS Half of this land (0.

5 hectares), formerly was conjugal property of her parents,

Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was
Contents acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of
HEIRS OF URIARTE V CA ........................................................................................................................................
Justas property should be1as follows as private respondent contends:
VIZCONDE V CA .....................................................................................................................................................
A - The first 1/2 hectare2should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan
Arnaldo which will accrue4 to petitioners and the second half which pertains to
TISON V CA ............................................................................................................................................................
Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.
PAVIA V UGARTE ...................................................................................................................................................6
B - As to the second portion
SALAO V SALAO ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 of the area of the land in question which as already
stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to the
DIAZ V PAMUTI .....................................................................................................................................................9
conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to
LEONARDO V CA .................................................................................................................................................
private respondent, who10is the son of AgatonicaArreza, and who is only three
degrees from JustaArnaldo,
ROSALES V ROSALES............................................................................................................................................ 11 whereas petitioners who are the children of
PrimitivaArnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from
RODRIGUEZ V RAVILAN .......................................................................................................................................
JustaArnaldo 12
ADOPTION ...............................................................................................................................................................15
ISSUE:
SANTOS YNIGO V RP ...........................................................................................................................................15
Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa’s
MANUEL V FERRER ..............................................................................................................................................
estate as her nearest relatives 16 within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code?
ACAIN V IAC.........................................................................................................................................................17
HELD:
SUAREZ V CA .......................................................................................................................................................19
The nephew who is the son of Justa’shalf sister is entitled to the
TEOTICO V DEL VAL .............................................................................................................................................20
property

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent
is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a
person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is
the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a
third degree relative of Justa.

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of
Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.
HEIRS OF URIARTE V CA
The heirs of Uriarte claimed that they have a successional right over a 2.7 Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is
hectare piece of land in Surigaodel Sur left by JustaArnaldoSering upon her the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is
death on March 31, 1989. of no moment.Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private
respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan

1
Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private
respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.
Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private
respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justas half-
sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa’s nephew. A nephew is considered a
collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse
survive the decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is
immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt’s heir. As the
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, The determination of whether the
relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the
extent of the share of the survivors.
VIZCONDE V CA
CHARACTERS:
PETITIONER LAURO G. VIZCONDE and his wife ESTRELLITA
NICOLAS-VIZCONDE had two children, viz., CARMELA AND
JENNIFER.
SPOUSES RAFAEL NICOLAS AND SALUD GONZALES-NICOLAS
(parents of Estrellita).
The other children of Rafael and Salud are:
o Antonio Nicolas;
o Ramon Nicolas;
o Teresita Nicolas de Leon;
o Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent; and
o Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived
by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.
FACTS:
On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land located at
Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) for P135,000.00,
evidenced by a LubusangBilihan ng Bahagi ng LupanaNasasakupan ng Titulo
TCT NO. T-36734. On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property
2
for P3,405,612.00. In June of the same year, Estrellita bought a parcel of land
with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paranaque (hereafter
Paranaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car
while the balance was deposited in a bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner’s life occurred. Estrellita
and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991.
Petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud . The
extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita
and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The
settlement gave 50% of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and
her daughters to Rafael, except Saving Account No. 104-111211-0 under the
name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other 50% was allotted to
petitioner. The Paranaque property and the car were also given to petitioner
with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heirs in the said properties.
On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted
an intestate estate proceeding listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the
wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special
Administratrix of Rafaels estate and sought to be appointed as guardian ad
litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Private
respondent Ramon filed an opposition praying to be appointed instead as Salud
and Ricardos guardian. Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among
others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she
sold for not less P6,000,000.00 before her gruesome murder. On May 12,
1993, Ramon filed his own petition entitled In Matter Of The Guardianship Of
Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas and averred that their legitime should
come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by
Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of
Rafaels children by right of representation as the widower of deceased
legitimate daughter of Estrellita.
The RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita,
in turn, was appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The
courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs. Neither was
the Paranaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the
estate. Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed
Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without
the courts knowledge and permission.
Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten
(10) days to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending
petition. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994,
stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael
and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. Despite the
Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion moved to include petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paranaque property, as well as
the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property,
be collated. Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994
granted the same.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court
of Appeals. In its decision respondent Court of Appeals denied the petition
stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the
Valenzuela property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling
the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the Order of the
Probate Court. (NO!)
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate
proceeding regarding Rafael’s estate is proper. (NO!)
RULING:
No. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. The probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors
First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafaels
compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
3
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos
1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,
shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this
Code.
With respect to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown
to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such,
petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither
may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or
interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation.
Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench,
however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its
jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the
Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer
of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well
as the presence or absence of consideration, are matter outside the probate
courts jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action
Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paranaque property to
collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings
is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the
legitimate of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.
Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Paranaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of
a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paranaque property which
Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property
does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of
the Paranaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court
presupposes that the Paranaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael
to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paranaque property was
conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc.,
to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner
who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paranaque property is not
one of Rafaels heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against
petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita,
the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafaels
estate. As it stands, collation of the Paranaque property is improper for, to
repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent
during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent
the transfer of the Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public
instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership and
participation as heir[38] in the Paranaque property.
Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be
stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from
Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. [39] Hence,
even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not
be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to
the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the
matter serves no valid and binding purpose.
The content of the Order: (ARON MAKA RELATE TAS PANGHITABO….)
4
The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde
were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable
consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased
Rafael Nicolas in the latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further
goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael
Nicolas. And LauroVizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation,
from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the
occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.
To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable
to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, LauroVizconde claims that
they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen
concessions and garment manufacturing.However, no competent evidence has
been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.
In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the
property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.
Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by
her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paraaque which was
purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of property by the deceased
Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
TISON V CA
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of
the deceased TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their
father HermogenesDezoller. TeodoraDezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983
without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband,
Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died
on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from TeodoraDezoller Guerrero
by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating
unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to
herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued
in the latter’s name. Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners
filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-
half of the property in question by right of representation. Teodoro Domingo
however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon DezollerTison was presented as the lone
witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to
their father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and
submitted a written offer of the exhibits. Subsequently, private respondent
filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial
court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by
herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint
affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an
heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation.
Ruling:
1. NO. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the
legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no presumption of the law more
firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And
well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally. Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
5
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that
would amount to an insult to his memory. The necessity of an independent
action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’ This principle
applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed by
law. Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred
by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child
born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims
to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so
that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts
occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily
available.
2. YES. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner
by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:"
"“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and
illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the
rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under
Article 1001.”
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”
Upon the death of TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property
was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his
share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower
and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right.
Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-
fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent.
Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the
property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively."
PAVIA V UGARTE
FACTS:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December,
1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the
legitimate heir of the deceased.
The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the
estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure in force at the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she
was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice
to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.
In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her
guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased,
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased — a
fact which this new relative did notdeny — be required to render an account of
the property of the estate.
6
PETITIONER'S CONTENTION:
What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of
succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled
to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by
representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled
to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e
Iturralde.
COURT'S DECISION:
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the
estate that the niece was entitled to.
ISSUE:
WON herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo Linart and is
entitled to half of the estate of the deceased.
RULING:
NO.
the error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very
clearly shown.
The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the
estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law, the right of
representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children
of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a
daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the
daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite
different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the
deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have
inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an
error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include
"grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a
conclusion.
The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and
December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those
decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to intestate
successions. In both cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of
Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code, where a testator had named
certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass to their
children, it was held that "Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the SALAO V SALAO
word "children," and that in such a case the grandchild does not, properly
speaking, inherit by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event
succeed the child in the natural and regular order," and pointed out in the last
decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision, "the fact
that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint
that the action was based upon the right of representation, is not sufficient to
deny to the appellant a right which he had under the terms of the will." The
difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take
into consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he
substitutes the children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are
ordinarily considered as included in the term "children," unless they are
expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should only be
had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of FACTS:
representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the sons and
Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, their three children and 1
daughters of brothers or sisters.
grandson partitioned her property. (pls. see table below) Prior to Valentina’s
We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the death, her children Ambrosia and Juan Sr. secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185
deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare
being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the fishpond located at SitioCalunuran and they exercised dominical rights over it
collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao. Later, Ambrosia and Juan Sr.,
daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo acquired that Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No.
Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre which adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. Said
Calunaran and Lewa fish ponds are the bone of contention in this case.
The court ordered the record be remanded to the court of First Instance from
whence it came for execution of the said judgment.
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about
a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility
(she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-
halfproindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S.
Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already
the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from
his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces
of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over
the said properties during her lifetime.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of VictorinaSalao in a

letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a
7
one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession
thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-
third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that
Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole
owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens
titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's
one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against
Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan
(Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for
the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to
them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in
the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the
Torrens title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of
Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages
amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than
P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his
bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age
of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six
children and by the administrator of his estate.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds
in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the
condition that the properties would remain under administration during the
pendency of this case.
The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y.
Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and
Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real
properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heir after her death in 1914;
that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it
subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three
children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.
8 the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,217
Issues:
Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have successional
rights over Ambrosia’s share.
Ruling:
Succession: Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not
have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of
Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third
degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been
also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao,
the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the
estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only
in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half
blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita
Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5
Phil. 176).
Table 1. Properties of Valentina Ignacio upon her death on 1914.
(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents,
Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was
owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 21,700
(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418
(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989 (VALENTIN)
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469 (VALENTIN)
(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased
from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9,
1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 11,205
(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters,
(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454
(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January
27, 1890 with a house and two camarins thereon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DIAZ V PAMUTI
FACTS:
Thee respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First
Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero," praying among other things,
that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that
she be appointed as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.
It is undisputed: 1) that FelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of Simona PamutiVda. de
Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate
children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana
married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born FelisaPamuti and
another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona PamutiVda. deSantero is
the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents PascualSantero and Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero; 5) that PascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in
1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his
death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural
children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with FelixbertaPacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared FelisaPamutiJardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
9
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of PascualSantero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an
Incompetent Person, Simona PamutiVda. deSantero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of
Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.
Issue: whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children
of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona PamutiVda. deSantero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona
PamutiVda, de Santero.
who are the legal heirs of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero — her niece
FelisaPamutiJardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?
Ruling:
Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona
PamutiVda. deSantero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the
applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as
follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other
hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized
by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it
is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing
but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law - Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted
does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that
resentment. petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona - For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell,
PamutiVda. deSantero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal
person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his
case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural
PamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural or Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime in September 1963.
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by
- the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner finding the
the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did
evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove ownership of
not commit any error in holding FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
the properties in suit.
heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.
- From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence. This
LEONARDO V CA petition.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
- Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
two (2) daughters, Maria and SilvestraCailles and a grandson, Sotero
PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES,
Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who predeceased
HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY REPRESENTATION.
her.
RULING:
- Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while SilvestraCailles died in 1949
without any issue. 1. NO. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still
he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left
- On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be
by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by
the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of
the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the
properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance
fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged
of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more,
the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate
his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most,
of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein,
petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab
Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes,
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like
described in the complaint, partitioned between him and defendant
the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the income derived
Philippines.)
from said properties from the time defendants took possession
thereof until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him
his share therein with legal interest.

10
ROSALES V ROSALES
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, ET AL
Principle:
A widow/widower cannot inherit from the parent-in-law by right of
representation. Article 971 explicitly declares that the representative is called
to succession by law because of blood relationship. The representative does
not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. A widow of the person represented cannot assert the
same right of representation as there is no filiation by blood.
Facts: Petra Rosales is the decedent. She is survived by her husband, their two
(2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and
his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the
deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the
estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son
of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Petitioner contends that she is a compulsory heir as enumerated in Art. 887
being the widow or widower of the son of the decedent and that at the time of
the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent
right to the properties of Petra Rosales as her compulsory heir by right of
representation together with her son.
Issue: Can a widow inherit from the mother-in-law?
Held: NO
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of
11
any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by
her own right or by the right of representation.
The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession
(Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs
of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have
so provided in the Code.
Article 887 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to
the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate
of the parent-in-law.
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited
does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article
confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-
law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that
Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles
970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz—
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which
the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by
the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession
by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father,
Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother,
Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner
cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of
Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband
was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales
who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not
succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
RODRIGUEZ V RAVILAN
Facts:
JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas
Mendoza, filed a written amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina,
Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other
things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo of
Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana,
Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that,
although five of them divided among themselves the said property, consisting
of lands situated in the said pueblo and several carabaos, the legal portions
which pertained to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, remained
undivided, and these latter continued to possess, in common, the property that
fell to their shares, and were also associated in business separately from their
other coheirs.
The said property, as aforesaid, was administered by EspiridionBarte, in
common accord with the others, and, he having died without leaving heirs, by
force of law the part that pertained to him passed to his brother Pedro and his
sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and,
by common agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their
partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator;
that during the latter's administration, MateaBarte also died, leaving as her
heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs;
that at the death of Pedro Barte, JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in the
12
name of their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property
mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of
the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition, on
the pretext that, as the administratix of that property, she had to pay debts of
the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts
having been settled, as admitted by the defendant herself, the latter was
requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do, and
that she continued in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said
property, without the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that JorgiaBarte,
Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of MateaBarte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named
Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were then entitled to the
property in question, which should be divided among them in three equal
parts, one to be allotted to JorgiaBarte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the
other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.
Issue:
Whether or not partition should be granted.
Ruling:
No. Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or
holding real estate with others, in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in
common, may compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for
partition shall set forth the nature and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain
an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and
name each tenant in common, coparcener, or other person interested therein,
as defendants."
So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the
status of a coproprietor or coowner of the property the partition of which is
asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that JorgiaBarte and the son of
MateaBarte, through his representative, aver that they are the coowners of the
said Mandaue lands of others situated in the municipalities of Bogo and
Tabogon, they have not proved their averment by titles which establish the
common ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient,
since the defendant party, representing the four daughters of the deceased IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint. DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the BAR Q: Suppose that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X
parties are all coowners or coproprietors of the undivided property to be and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can
partitioned. The question of common ownership need not be gone
into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in Lucio
Felisa Ramon
Campo
what proportion the said property of common ownership Delgado Osorio
shall be distributed among the interested parties by
Sisters: Guillerm Josefa Luis
order of court. Roman Marciana Nazario Edilberta Jose Jacoba Gorgonio Delgado
o Rustia Delgado
Rustia Damian & Half- blood
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition (deceased) Hortencia sibling of
Cruz nephews Josefa
demanded, it must be remembered that the Illegitima
and
te child
hereditary succession of the deceased EspiridionBarte, nieces,
nephews Luisa
who it is said left no legitimate descendants at his children and Delgado
de facto grandneph
nieces Adopted petitione
death, should be divided among his eight brothers and ews and
child grandniece r
sisters who may have survived him, and in case any of these
s
have died, the children of his deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews
they succeed each other reciprocally?
and nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to the
provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which FACTS:
prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the
whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes,"
representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the
deceased.

The record does not show whether JorgiaBarte left any legitimate heir at her
death, and if she did not, her collateral relatives succeed her in the manner
provided by law.
It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four brothers
and sisters can not affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of
the deceased predecessor in interest successions.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, to declare and we do hereby declare, that the
partition prayed for be denied
Vda de la Rosa v Vda Damian
Plaintiffs are the Delgados, half- blood sibling and decendants of Josefa
Delgado while Respondents are the siblings of Guillermo. This case concerns
the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
may be divided into two groups:
(1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-
blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and
(2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted
child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

13
Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-
blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio
Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in
dispute. The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got
married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether
their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal
intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives
ISSUE:
Who are the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and JosefaDelgado.
RULING:
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her half and full blood sibs,
nephews and nieces may represent but not the grandnephews and nieces. THE
LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA- his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.
1. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO- all her half and full blood
sibs, nephews and nieces may represent but not the grandnephews
and nieces.
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status
of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first
be addressed. We hold that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never
married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations
with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a
tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to
succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child
greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that, succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the
14
prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate
families does not apply to the case under consideration.
That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate
and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are
illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different
persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation.
We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate
brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers
and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall
share equally.53
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,
nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of
the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and
nieces).Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who
are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or
their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972.
They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not
being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were
the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the
time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit
from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
2. THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA- his sisters,69 nieces and
nephews.
Intervenor (now co-respondent) GuillermaRustia is an illegitimate child 58 of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59 She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
IntervenorGuillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate
child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this
case, intervenorGuillerma’s right to claim compulsory acknowledgment
prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise
fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood
as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo
Rustia). The report card in UST of intervenorGuillerma did not bear the
signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in
its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia
himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published
in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not
the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been
admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in
the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the
newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed
manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, GuillerminaRustiaRustia,
who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses
and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
15
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenorGuillermaRustia and the ampun-
ampunan GuillerminaRustiaRustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo
Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and
nephews.70
ADOPTION
SANTOS YNIGO V RP
G.R. No. L-6294 June 28, 1954
In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS
SANTOS-YÑIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YÑIGO, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
PRINCIPLES:
ADOPTION; PURPOSE - The purpose of adoption is to afford to persons who
have no child of their own the consolation of having one by creating, through
legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood
relationship. This purpose reject the idea of adoption by persons who have
children of their own, for, otherwise, conflicts, friction, and differences may
arise resulting from the infiltration of foreign element into a family which
already counts with children upon whom the parents can shower their paternal
love and affection
ADOPTION; PERSONS WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN CANNOT ADOPT -
There is merit in the contention that the petition should not be granted in view
of the prohibition contained in article 335, paragraph 1, of the new Civil Code.
This article provides that persons who have legitimate children cannot adopt,
and there is no doubt about its application because the petition was filed on
June 24, 1952 and at that time petitioners had two legitimate children, one a
boy born on November 12, 1950 and the other, a girl born on April 13, 1952.
FACTS:
 a. June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in CFI of Zamboanga by Santos and
his wife for the adoption of a minor named MarcialEleuterioResaba. It
is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor have given their
consent to the adoption.
b. It was also alleged that petitioners had reared and cared for the minor
as if he were their own.
c. OSG filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners have 2
legitimate children who are still minors, and as such they are
disqualified to adopt under the provisions of the new civil code
d. Petitioners argue that their 2 LCs were born after the agreement for
adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of the minor.
Also the old code at the time of agreement contains no such
prohibition.
ISSUE: Is the adoption valid even if the agreement to adopt was made before
the spouses had legitimate children.
HELD:
No.
While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law
applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that rule does not
prohibit persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree
to the proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the
relation of paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court.
Now, said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to adopt a
minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province
where he resides (section 1). This means that the only valid adoption in this
jurisdiction is that one made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure
laid down by the rule, which shows that the agreement under consideration
can not have the effect of adoption as now pretended by petitioners.
MANUEL V FERRER
PRINCIPLE: A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is
neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
16
FACTS: Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling are spouses. During his marriage
with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From
this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land,
with an area of 2,700 square meters, was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel (WHO?). Juan and Esperanza tookModesta Manuel-
Baltazar into their fold and raised her as their own "daughter" (WARD).
In 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half
(1/2) portion of his land.
Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
A month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land. Following the
registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of
Deeds, the three titles were transferred in Modesta’s name.
In 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a
Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2)
portion of the land that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit
well with petitioners who are the legitimate children of spouses Antonio
Manuel and Beatriz Guiling.
Petitioners SOUGHT TO ANNUL THE RENUNCIATION AND QUITCLAIM MADE
BY MODESTA (WARD) argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of
Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving
spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil
Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall
be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to
the entire estate.
 If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate,
and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction
with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
In a summary judgment, the RTC dismissed the complaint holding that
petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan
Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.
ISSUE: WON the legitimate brothers and sisters can be an heir of their
illegitimate brother who died intestate survived by a spouse and a ward
(ampon)
WON a ward can be an intestate heir
HELD:
1. NO!
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in
the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects
succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on
the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on
the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on
testamentary dispositions.Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to
illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several
other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-
brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
17
inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot
succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his
natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her
deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated
by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered
inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as
to produce a harmonious whole.
2. NO!
Modesta is also not an heir of decedent. In her answer to the complaint,
Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan
Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
ACAIN V IAC
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs.IAC, VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.
Principle:
Preterition applies to adopted children but not to spouses. (A spouse is not a
relative in the direct line of the other spouse. Adoption makes the adopted
child the legitimate child of the adopter).
FACTS: (FYI: This happened in Cebu. They live in Sanciangko Street. The
disputed properties are in Cebu City and Bantayan)
Petitioner ConstantinoAcain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late NemesioAcain and
for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary on the premise
that NemesioAcain died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers
Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura
were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by NemesioAcain on
February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya with a translation in English submitted
by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of
a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
Part of the will:
“THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and
money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by
me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and
presently residing…. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all
the money properties, lands, houses…. which constitute my share shall be
given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina,
laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner.
The oppositors respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted
daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa DiongsonVda. deAcain
filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no
legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir
and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion
was denied by the trial judge.
Respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Appellate Court granted private respondents'
petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of
the will of NemesioAcain.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present
petition for the review of respondent Court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents have been preterited.
SC RULING:
Yes, on the part of the adopted child but NO on the part of the wife.
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or
18
born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply
as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she
is not in the direct line. however, the same thing cannot be said of the other
respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
been questioned by petitioner. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted
child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be
denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not
result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other
testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily,
the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must,
as already stated above, be respected.
REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE MATTERS:
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested
party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor. Petitioner is not the appointed
executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the
testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real
property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an
interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a
person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation
of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an
heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the
will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings must be dismissed.
As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's
authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in
Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the
following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been preterited. It was denied by the trial court in an
order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion
to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in
the course of the trial on the merits of the case. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed
the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as
petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs
coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been
preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste
19
of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied
its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
Petition is hereby DENIED.
SUAREZ V CA
aPrinciple:Thelegitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each
child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned
property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners
became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through
their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are
not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to
protect their own interests.
FACTS:
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his
estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has
lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and
Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract
and for damages, and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally,
herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as
damages. 1
The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having
become final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro
Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June
24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the
amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate of
sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.
On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners
filed a reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment
of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of
property. Therein, they alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case
decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable therefor and that the
five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor Adoption
sold on execution.
Facts:
ISSUE:
Maria Mortera y BalsalobreVda. de Aguirre made a will giving a legacy
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels
to Dr. Rene Teotico of P20,000. Dr. Rene Teotico is the husband of Josefina
of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioner’s
Mortera, the testatrix's niece. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as
deceased father?
her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
RULING: disposed of in the will. The testatrix died on July 14, 1955.
The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a
of the institution of the case.
deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2,
the decedent."
1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1)
Article 888 further provides:
said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically
"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3)
the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr.
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the
spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the testatrix during her last illness.
legitimate children or descendants."
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its
Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the
decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the
legitime of each child.
disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by
different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-
way of intestate succession.
owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own
right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Both
in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that
own interests. portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the
vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the
latter from that portion which admits the will to probate.

Issue:
TEOTICO V DEL VAL
Teotico vs Ana Del Val

20
 Whether or not an adopted child of the testatrix’s deceased sister
(Ana del Val Chan) has the right to intervene in the probate proceeding in this
case.
Ruling:
NO.
The Supreme Court held that the oppositor (Ana del Val Chan) cannot
derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera
because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely
to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for
by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the
collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of
the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the
adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of
the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate
children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes
certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the
children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The
relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and
does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not
extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited
to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine
Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also
Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling
of the court a quo.
21
1. A) (Family Code) Art. 189. Adoption shall have
the following effects:
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents
and other blood relatives.
Section 16 of RA 8552 provides that except in cases where the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).
It is by this severance that an adopted child is not an intestate of either
his biological parents or his blood relatives. Adoption relieves the birth
parents of the adopted person of all parental rights and responsibilities
and terminates all legal relationships between the adopted person and
the birth parents and other relatives of the adopted person. Thereafter,
the adopted person is a stranger to the former relatives for all purposes,
including inheritance.
B) RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestate succession,
the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiation.
In other words, after adoption, the adopted person shall be treated as if
he or she was born to the adopting parents and shall have all rights and
be subject to all of the duties arising from that relation, including the
right of inheritance. Thus, an adopted child is an intestate heir of the
adopters.
As regards to the adopter’s blood relatives, he is not an intestate
heir. The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to
the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered
as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents,
nor of the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption,
except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason
of adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively
between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the
relatives of either.
2. No. RA 8552 Section 18 provides that in legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. If the adopting
parent should die before the adopted child does, the latter cannot
represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of
the adopter.
In other words, the law does not create any relationship between the
adopted child and the relatives of the adopting parents, not even to the
biological or legitimate children of the adopting parents.
 The adopter’s blood relatives shall not be entitled to inherit
from and through the adopted individual under the laws of
intestacy in the absence of a will, unless expressly excluded. The
rationale for this is the relationship established by the adoption is
restricted to the adopting parents, and does not extend to his other
relatives.

3. Article 39 (2) PD 603 provides that adoption dissolves the authority

vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the adopter is the
spouse of the surviving natural parent.
Article 342 NCC provides that parents by nature shall inherit from the
adopted child and the adopter shall not be a legal heir of the adopted
person.
However, they were repealed by RA 8552 which states that in legal and
intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal
rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
5. Both shall inherit.
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted
shall be governed by the following rules:
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall
divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents
or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters

Thus, an adopted child shall not inherit real or personal property

from his or her birth parents or their relatives when the relationship
between them has been terminated by final order of adoption, nor
shall the birth parents or their relatives inherit from the adopted
child. This means that the adopter and adopted shall become intestate
heirs as to each other.

4. Article 39 PD 603 provides that: The adopter shall not be a legal

heir of the adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit from
him, except that if the latter are both dead, the adopting parent or
parents take the place of the natural parents in the line of succession,
whether testate or interstate.

Article 342 CC provides: The adopter shall not be a legal heir of the
adopted person, whose parents by nature shall inherit from him.

However, Article 190(2) CC provides that when the parents, legitimate

or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with
the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited
by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters.

But by the enactment of RA 8552, the birth parents of an adopted

person are relieved of all parental duties and responsibilities toward the
adopted person, including the right of inheritance unless specifically
provided by will. Thus, adoptive parent is an intestate heir of the
estate of the adopted child.

22