Republic of the Philippines
-- No suit or proceeding
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his
official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati), Petitioners,
vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution
denying reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's
letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), 4 he explained that the increase in the
cost of labor and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting
receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown. 5 As a consequence, while
business was good during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses
amounting to ₱71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted
creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of
₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. 9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit
additional documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not
acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review 11 in the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the
two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. 12 It
invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected.
shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax
hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or
duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2)
years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the
face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to
have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its
right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood
that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of
days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis
supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the
NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000
was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days 14 after respondent filed
its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 16 Hence, it filed an appeal in
the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. 18 It ruled
that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap
year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year
is a leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked
1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law
days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one). 31Section 27, Book VII (Final
interpreted nor construed.20 Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be
strictly construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly
applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the
prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day
claimants file their final adjusted returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on
or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its
final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within
the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis,
however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final
adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a
year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v.
Tecson,25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
regular year or a leap year.26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the laws to be abolished. 32 Thus, the provision above
only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of
1987.1avvphi1
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly
and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law
encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically
or reasonably reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of
legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of
1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we
hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the
more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which
case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains;
"day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case,
the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final
adjusted return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as
follows:

Year 1 1st April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number calendar month
of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next 2nd May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
calendar month
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from 3rd calendar month
January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 30
4th July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
calendar month
 5th August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998 24th March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
calendar month calendar month

6th September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

calendar month We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last
day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return.
7th October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998 Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
calendar month

8th November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998 Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
calendar month
Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113
December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
9th calendar month Arturo V. Parcero.

10th January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999 No costs.

calendar month

11th February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999 SO ORDERED.

calendar month

12th March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

calendar month

Year 2 13th April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

calendar month

14th May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

calendar month

15th June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

calendar month

16th July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

calendar month

17th August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

calendar month

18th September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

calendar month

19th October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

calendar month

20th November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

calendar month

21st December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000

calendar month

22nd January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

calendar month

23rd February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

calendar month
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which
dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing
of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their
son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. 9 Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner
also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged
against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality
of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately
deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM,
a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently,
posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to
which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing
the instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien,
the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this
case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating
respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family Code,
thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all
persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of
the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier
in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that
since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family
Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent
with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which lays
down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to
the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the
three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The
third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of
law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights
and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves
a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future
cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA
would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of
a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is not
excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code
on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle
applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and
duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign
law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to
his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which was not disputed by
respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the
ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign
law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal
of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would
work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation
is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable
under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall
include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the
purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing
the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation
to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody
of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child
is considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:
"[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and
to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As
such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent.
It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his
arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting,
that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall
prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in
ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly,
the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
 [Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture
and distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street,
Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been
manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines
plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its
office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of the physical
proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some
of the [respondent’s] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-made
automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design,
same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower price as
[respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the
Manila
manufacture ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer
bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s]
THIRD DIVISION manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from
[respondent’s] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately
G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014 copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and have caused [respondent]
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner, damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO MILLION PESOS
vs. as of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this
DECISION action and thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).
PERALTA, J.:
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the
following facts: that it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
items made of plastic and metal and that there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office
Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and
to [respondent]’s office, and that someof [respondent’s] employees had transferred to
Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
[petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
86744.
[respondent’s] products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this
present complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent
injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short)
from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as
the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their
construction and composition merely conforms to the specificationsof the original parts
of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it
"originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts,
it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over
these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of
these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were
already openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner
clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and
performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC further opined that under the
circumstances, in order for respondent’s property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s
acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of
respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent’s customers, which it
cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two
Million (₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand
(₱100,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from
manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good
belonging to another,the copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to
unfair competition as competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner
further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It
points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and
the copying of these can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial
for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses
that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the instant case as the
parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts are contrary to good conscience for
deliberately copying its products and employing its former employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of
the RTC. Relevant portions of said decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its
business interest against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the award by
the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven.
The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business,
only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to
2002. No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative
income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in
comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to the
subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of
Willaware that prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize
and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary
damages is also maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby
MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted
and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for
lack of merit by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for
our resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties
are not competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and
attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have
been established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be
considered in the light of the said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than
this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has
established "goodwill?"6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts
amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil
Code on humanrelations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as
the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration.
A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that
covered by intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the
extended concept of "unfair competition" in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven
cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s contracts,
or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts
amounting tounfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial
or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a
right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not
competitionper sebut the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may
deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the
law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means usedare fair
and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must
involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are
characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or
interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by unconscionable means.9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the
manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were
clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and even
went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s customers. 10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former
employees of respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of
respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing
with the business of [respondent].1âwphi1 [Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as
executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of
the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic
kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged
the services of the then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De
Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in
order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not being
made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and
maintenance operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman
indicates that it is banking on his experience gained from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man
of [respondent], was fired because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner].
Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by
[petitioner] for the same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of
events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De
Guzman.11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of
suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made
automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ
and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent. 12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit
to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of
business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose,
he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of
petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of
respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted
that it was never engaged in the business of plastic-made automotive parts until recently,
year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is
(sic) not? Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr.
Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have known the [respondent]
Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive
products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic)
physically become familiar with these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size,
shape and composition as those sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden
transfer ofJesichris’ employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing
Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t
know the exact date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have
transferred to your company, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one,
just one month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by
the testimony of [petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product
Corporation (sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform
this court what unusual even (sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I
passed by the place where they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr.
Salinas uttered something, sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang
pababagsakin ko na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be
referred to as your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had
been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal
damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010
and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be
lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank
(Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision 2 dated August 23,
2012 and the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.

The Factual Antecedents

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese
national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a
parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder. October 15, 2003.

At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. No. 42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No.
9118]5 were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to 9118 in the parking lot’s title.
the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to
reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 833496 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos against Kang and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and
(₱100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another stipulations:
check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for ₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and
dated August 26, 20039covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after,
Parking Slot No. 42;
Suzuki took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the
renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No.
66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s
Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver
the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki 3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
to verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot for the alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland
Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President 5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion;
Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. and
53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the
condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for anannotation under Entry 6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the
No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. titles.
18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA).
Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999
The RTC Ruling
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213,
of Perez. Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim 12 dated
September 8, 2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the
No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the properties prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to
titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the verify the status of the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe
need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason. titles. Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en
Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after he bought the properties
because Orion never bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9,
18186 and 9116.
2003, stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When
Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation
and cost ofsuit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC
insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry
No. 73321/C-10186 pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves
as a warning to an SRRV holder about the implications of a conveyance of a property
investment. It deviated from the RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its
January 25, 2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule
45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments: 15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean
law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both
spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate copies
of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits
any conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim
of good faith by Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly
raised on appeal. Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a
condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a purchaser in good faith, and is
thus entitled to the protection of the law.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and
evidentiary re-evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual
conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court. 18 In the present case, while the
courts below both arrived at the same conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence
in their factual findings and the legal principle they applied to the attendant factual
circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual issues in the exercise
of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may have been made. 19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We
cannot uphold this position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only
raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court. 20 To consider these
belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if
only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present
petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws
of the country or state where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of
immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely
connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there. 22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by
what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a
title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained
or lost.23 This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and
transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where
the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign
law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid
law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28 Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads: Dacion en Pago

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept faith, if it should be movable property.
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two
or more duly executed contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated
August 26, 200335 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion36 and was properly
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be
identified by Suzuki’s witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37
governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated.
In a contract of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to
conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of
pay a price certain to the seller.38 The execution of the notarized deed of saleand the
the Republic of Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does
actual transfer of possession amounted to delivery that produced the legal effect of
not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no
transferring ownership to Suzuki.39
showing that it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.30
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius
tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual
due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded,
is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. 31
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to
"5-c" to prove the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated
merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. 32 In other words, the import from the
September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional ₱800,000.00
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his
loan. The RTC, however, denied the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in
name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
its order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court by any
witness."40
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the
property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a
conjugal or community property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the
tender ofexcluded evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either
Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition.
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the
present petition, the copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and xxxx
documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en
Pagowas duly executed. First, there appears to be no due and demandable obligation
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and
when the Dacion en Pago was executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion’s
surcharge due from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?
witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was in default in his
₱1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:
A: It’s just the principal, sir.
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?
Q: Okay, so this loan of ₱1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat
but....
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...

Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?

Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]

A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of
A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we
February 10, 2003, the outstanding obligation which is due and demandable principal
have executed a dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just
and interest and other charges included amounts to ₱1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
execute[d] the dacion en pago rather than going through the Foreclosure proceedings.

xxxx
xxxx

Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges,
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
based on this document?

A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41

A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43

A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the ₱1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a
speak of when the supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.
real estate mortgage. However, no document was ever presented to prove this real
estate mortgage aside from it being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27,
2003. Neither can Orion claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
because the wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand
its interest and other charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE
PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There was thus no due and demandable loan obligation when Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line
the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed. Agreement referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that
there was a subsequent collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only
have a vague idea of the transaction he supposedly prepared. During his Kang for the loan?
cross-examination, he testified:
xxxx
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44 Q: There was no actual cash?

Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and A: Yes, sir.
Samin demanded the delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki
caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only on Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an
October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates ₱800,000.00 additional right?
first spoke of the Dacion en Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on
October 1, 2003, when he personally received a letter demanding the delivery of the
A: Yes, sir.47
titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and opted to first consult with his
lawyer.46
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago
on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact,
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital
nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the
of facts surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that
property even six (6) months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en
"on [September 4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was granted
Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki,
a new Credit Line Facility by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
who then made immediate improvements thereon. If Orion really purchased the
THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,800,000.00)." Perez, however, testified that there was "no
condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it not
cash movement" in the original ₱1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he said:
assert its ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did it have to
assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps
COURT: have remained unanswered and unfilled.

xxxx In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete
absence of anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for the property in question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land and
that first ₱1,000,000.00 loan? occupied the premises. The absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its
right of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That
A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir. notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in possession of
the disputed condominium unit – from the time of the execution of the Dacion en
Pagountil the property’s subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably strengthens the
xxxx
fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.

Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this
These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and
₱1,000,000.00 loan?
testimony of Orion’s witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en
Pago.
A: None sir.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago
Q: No payments? is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
A: None sir. sale it embodies is a true
conveyance
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the
principal, by way ofpayment of interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to
this loan? be considered as containing all the terms of the agreement. 49 While a notarized
document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir. of the validity of its contents."50 The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is
not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 51
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
execution of the Dacion en Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
proceedings below where their prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly
questionable circumstances surrounding their execution. 52 SO ORDERED.

Effect of the PRA restriction on

the validity of Suzuki’s title to the
property

Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to
Suzuki. In particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in
view of the express PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186. 53

We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction
cannot affect the conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur
withthe following findings of the CA:

x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special
Resident Retiree’s Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his property
which serves as his investment in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the
Implementing Investment Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the Philippine Retirement Park
System Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the
Philippine Retirement Authority) states:

Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or
transfer the same to another domestic enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his
condominium unit or units to another person, natural or juridical without the prior
approval of the Authority, the Special Resident Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or
unmarried minor child or children[,] may be cancelled or revoked by the Philippine
Government, through the appropriate government department or agency, upon
recommendation of the Authority.54

Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on
the basis of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted
with Kang. Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating Kang’s request to cancel the
mortgage annotation despite the lack of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction.
Orion, thus, is estopped from impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki
on the basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to
circumvent.

With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we
see no reason for the application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the
New Civil Code. Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to
establish the validity of conveyance in his favor.
 CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution 3 dated 20
November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P.
Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation

(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro
Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement
Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which
reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave

with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee's legitimate dependent
(parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

THIRD DIVISION xxx

[G.R. NO. 182836 : October 13, 2009] ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. xxx

ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE The Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS'Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case
of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In
case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and
sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week
of pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the
female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but denied
his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance.7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano's claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to
settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October
2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue
of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño,
an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute,
the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and
Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article
XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have
first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases
wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as
Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of
Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died
prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and
voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 15 Dugan's
child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano's
child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the
same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees' unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts
in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and
decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did
not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It
claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death
and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano's case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil Code, contended that
only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was
not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a
dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be
supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous.
Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted
definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of
the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the
CBA - the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement
leave and other death benefits - bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the
latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies.
Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other
death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted
"company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,
issued a Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay
and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay
by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties' CBA,
three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death
must be of employee's "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties' CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of
employee's "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee's
legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for
support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or
aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a
dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent,
unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING
[herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement
leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00)
representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano's claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employee's dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of
pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated
by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not
acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was
bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said
child's birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua
non for Hortillano's entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under the
CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño's
Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as
follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in which the term
"death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that
the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive
upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could
never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly
an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical
significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting
bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel's]
theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not
share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of
human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and
death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter's immediate family,
extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel's] insistence that the certificate of
fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear
and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only
one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical
personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X,
Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent,
spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the
dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under
Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillano's claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the
purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the
CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no
need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental
Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of
the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code,
the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her
death that were passed on to or assumed by the child's parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latter's death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the life of the unborn from conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support;
one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else."
Under said general definition,26 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillano's child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without
depending upon its mother, Hortillano's wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in
the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must
have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers.
Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mother's womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in relation to his/her
parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
(Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children - - legitimate
(and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and
illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case,
it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child
was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element
entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the
death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00),
under the CBA, Hortillano's claims for the same should have been granted by respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
Continental Steel. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an SO ORDERED.
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents' grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other
death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time
and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the
interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor
of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor
of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,30we
pronounced: Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are
equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner EN BANC
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in
favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold. vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH
categorically stated that: ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents.

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social DECISION
justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. MENDOZA, J.:

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the
social justice policy.
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision1 and the May 9, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the
October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC)
which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to the remains of the
decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008
and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697,
affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay
and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law
Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The
couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario,
Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients,
until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he
continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United
States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was
around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty.
Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called
Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her request was
not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the
family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the
interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano
before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his
wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of
Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial
Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for
more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the
time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife.
Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to
support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty.
Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also
claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still
left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his
remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by
respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she
knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park. Taking into
consideration the fact that Rosario left for the United States at the time that he was
fighting his illness, the trial court concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for
him. Considering also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities
of a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be
buried in the Valino family mausoleum.4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer of the body
of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in
Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful purpose and so he should be
spared and respected.5 Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have
the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise
directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the
decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was
entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the
New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view
of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also
the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was
still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at
the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents due to
the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent burial when the
wife and the family were in the United States. All other claims for damages were
similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the
remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Court’s Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 6 of the Family Code,
specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the
deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall
be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred.
In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without
the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying
the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary
expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of
one’s common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 7 a petition for habeas
corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover,
Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his
residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over
the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married
in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of
co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to
'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses.
The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold
that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was
not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. 8 [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact
that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or
renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and
Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human
compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents
wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few
days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as
they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992
(December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino
and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail
pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty.
Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be
noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at
the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim.
Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of
Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true
wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No
presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a
long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to bury her
husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the
same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her
legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed
to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of
a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to
the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s
keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even
bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the
Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased.
In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the
funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the
person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members
of the family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the "form of the
funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained
earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified
in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be
interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of the
deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority
on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the
wishes of the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary
disposition.10 As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be
expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty.
Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that
other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot,
no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with respect to his
funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not be
contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions concerning
funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the time and manner of
disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be observed. 11 [Emphases
supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article
305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same
to those charged with the right and duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the
remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained by the appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty.
Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the Manila
Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even assuming arguendo that it
was the express wish of the deceased to be interred at the Manila Memorial Park, still,
the law grants the duty and the right to decide what to do with the remains to the wife, in
this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to
defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred,
despite the fact that her intentions may have been very commendable. The law does not
even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been
separated-in-fact and had been living apart for more than 30 years. 12
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring the remains
of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a place other than the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of his family. It does not
only violate their right provided by law, but it also disrespects the family because the
remains of the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of
man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse
exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third
persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the
duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive
the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty.
Adriano during his final moments and giving him a proper burial. For her sacrifices, it
would indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her. As aptly
explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro
Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated in fact from his wife,
lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was
alive and even took care of his remains when he had died.

On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual damages.

Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the remains of
Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family were all in the United States and
could not attend to his burial. Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In
this case at bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual
damages.

Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary

damages.1âwphi1 Moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able to
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal
connection with the acts complained of because moral damages although incapable of
pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants,
nor was any intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand,
may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to
sustain an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately
established by plaintiffs-appellants.

As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof
as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and counsel's fees are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's
fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have searched but found
nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the award of attorney's fees. 14

Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make arrangements for the
funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the bereavement of the family and
disturbed the proper solemnity which should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose
of preventing such controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to include the
provisions on "Funerals."15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and
curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel Tarlac
City;

2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine Constabulary

and was assigned in Araya, Pampanga since August 24, 1967[;]

3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on

January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;

4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up

their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac
City;

5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September 15,

1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a
member of the Philippine Constabulary;

6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat,

Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated
with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;

April 25, 2018 7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the
National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared missing
G.R. No. 230751 since 1979 x x x;

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, Petitioner 8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for
vs any news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither]
did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he
DECISION was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;

VELASCO, JR., J.: 9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the
[p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3)
decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated November 28, 2016 and been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income coupled
Resolution3 dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits
129467. that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;

The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the Regional Trail Court
(RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Wifredo N. Matias (Wilfredo).4 The allegations of the petition read:
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for
a proof of death or at least declaration of presumptive death by the
Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely
to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4850 and was raffled to Branch 65 of the
Tarlac City RTC. A copy of the petition was then furnished to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG)_.
Subsequently, the OSG filed its notice of appearance on behalf of herein respondent
Republic of the Philippines (Republic).5
On January 15, 2012, the RTC issued a Decision 6 in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting the
petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: 7
WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declared (sic)
WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead under Article
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming
financial benefits due to him as former military officer.x x x x
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for certiotrari.8
On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision granting the certiorari petition of the
Republic and setting aside the decision of the RTC. It accordingly disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The Decision dated January 15, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court, branch 65, Tarlac City, in Special Proceeding no. 4850 is
ANNULED and SET ASIDE, and the petition is DISMISSED.
The CA premised its decision on the following ratiocinations:
1. The RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively dead on
the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code (FC). Article 41 of the FC
does not seek to remarry. If anything, the petition was invoking the
presumption of death established under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code, and not that provided for under Article 41 of the FC.
2. Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively dead
should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without
authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is to
have a person declared presumptively dead under either Article 390
or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by jurisprudence,
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person is
dead-which presumption may be invoked in any action or proceeding,
but itself cannot be the subject of an independent action or
proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA remained steadfast. Hence,this appeal.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal
I
The CA was correct. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by the
petitioner is not an authorized suit and should have been dismissed by the RTC. The
RTC's decision must, therefore, be set aside.
RTC Erred I Declaring the
Presumptive Death of Wilfredo under
Article 41 of the FC; Petitioner's
Petition for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death is Not Based on
Article 41 of the FC, but on the Civil
Code
A conspicuous error in the decision of the RTC must first be addressed.
It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012 Decision, granted the
petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the
FC." By doing so, RTC gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to Article 41 of the
FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action
that would have warranted the application of Article 41 of the FC shows that the
presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose
of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration
of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
 presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed
"not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a
amended.10
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death
under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code 11 as the basis of her
petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absence still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of
the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken
part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence has
not been known for four years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the presumptive
death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper.The petition for the
declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil
Code, and not on Article 41 of the FC.
Petitioner's Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Ought to Have Been
Dismissed; A Petition Whose Sole Objective is
To Declare a Person Presumptively Dead Under
the CivilCode, Like that Filed by the Petitioner
Before the RTC, Is Not a Viable Suit in Our
Jurisdiction
The true fault in the RTC's decision, however, goes beyond its misleading fallo. The
decision itself is objectionable.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration of presumptive
death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC should have dismissed such petition
outright. This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a
person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit
and no court has any authority to take cognizance of the same.The above norm had its
conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re: Petition for the Presumption of Death of
Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of
death13 is merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action or
proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action or
proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which
permits the court to presume that a person had been unheard from in
seven years had been established. This presumption may arise and
be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a
competent court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor
can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In
this case, there is no right ti be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither
is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status or for
the ascertainment of particular fact, for the petition does not pray for
the declaration that the petitioner 's husband us dead, but merely asks
for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension
cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the
petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is already
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even
if final and executory, would be a prima faciepresumption only. It
is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is tha only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the
controversy between the parties, or determine finally the right or
status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
 certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the
subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a
party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata,
subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had
been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final. (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
The above ruling in Szatraw has since been ussed by the subsequent cases of Lukban
v. Republic14 and Gue v. Republic15 in disallowing petitions for declaration of
presumptive death based on Article 390 of the Civil Code (and, implicity, also those
based on the Civil based on Article 391 of the Civil Code).
Dissecting the rulings of Szatraw, Gue and Lukban collectively, we are able to ascertain
the considerations why a petition for declaration of presumptive death based on the Civil
Code was disallowed in our jurisdiction, viz:16
1. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of
evidence that only allow a court or a tribunal to presume that a person
is dead upon the establishment of certain facts.
2. Since Articles 390 an d 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules
of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually
presents
no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action,
there would be no actual rights to be enforces, no wrong to be
remedied nor any status to be established.
3. A judicial pronouncement declaring a person presumptively dead
under Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code, in an action
exclusively based thereon, would never really become "final" as the
same only confirms tha existence of a prima facie or disputable
presumption. The function of a court to render decisions that is
supposed to be final and binding between litigants is thereby
compromised.
4. Moreove, a court action to declare a person presumptively dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be
unnecessary. The presumption in the said articles is already
established by law.
Verily, under prevailing case law, courts are without any authority to take cognizance of
a petition that-like the one filed by the petitioner in the case at bench-only seeks to have
a person declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. Such a petition is not
authorized by law.17 Hence, by acting upon and eventually granting the petitioner's
petition for the declaration of presumptive death, the RTC violated prevailing
jurisprudence and thereby committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA, therefore, was
only correct in setting aside the RTC's decision.
II
Before bringing this case to its logical conclusion, however, there are a few points the
Court is minded to make.
It is not lost on this Court that much of the present controversy stemmed from the
misconception that a court declaration is required in order to establish a person is
presumptively dead for purposes of claiming his death benefits as a military serviceman
under pertinent laws.18 This misconception is what moved petitioner to file her
misguided petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo and what
ultimately exposed her to unnecessary difficulties in prosecuting an otherwise simple
claim for death benefits either before the Philippine Veterans' Affair Office (PVAO) of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
What the Court finds deeply disconnecting, however, is the possibility that such
misconception may have been peddles by no less than the PVAO and the AFP
themselves; that such agencies, as a matter of practice, had been requiring claimants,
such as the petitioner, to first secure a court declaration of presumptive death before
processing the death before processing the death benefits of missing serviceman.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it necessary to issue the
following guidelines-culled from relevant law and jurisprudential pronouncements-to aid
the public, PVAO and the AFP in making or dealing with claims of death benefits which
are similar to that of the petitioner:
1. The PVAO and the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of
a missing soldier without requiring the claimant to first produce
a court declaration of the presumptive death of such soldier. In
such claims, the PVAO and the AFP can make their own
determination, on the basis of the evidence presented by the claimant,
whether the presumption of death under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code may be applied or not.
It must be stressed that the presumption of death under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of law, without need of a
court declaration, once the factual conditions mentioned in the said
articles are established.19 Hence, requiring the claimant to further
secure a court declaration in order to establish the presumptive death
 of a missing soldier is not proper and contravenes established
jurisprudence on the matter.20
2. In order to avail of the presumption, therefore, the claimant need
only present before the PVAO or the appropriate office of the AFP, as
the case may be, any "evidence"21 which shows that the concerned
soldier had been missing for such number of years and or under the
circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes a court
declaration of presumptive death.
3. The PVAO or the AFP, as the case may be, may then weigh the
evidence submitted by the claimant and determine their sufficiency to
establish the requisite factual conditions specified under Article 390 or
391 of the Civil Code in order for the presumption of death to arise. If
the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by
the claimant is sufficient, they should not hesitate to apply the
presumption of death and pay the latter's claim.
4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted by
the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under
the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the
claimant may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP)
pursuant to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.If
the OP denies the appeal, the claimant may next seek recourse via a
petition for review with the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of the
Court.1avvphi1 And finally, shold such recourse still fail, the claimant
may file an appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court.
While we are constrained by case law to deny the instant petition, the Court is hopeful
that, by the foregoing guidelines, the unfortunate experience of the petitioner would no
longer be replicated in the future.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2016
and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
129467 are AFFIRMED. The Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that
a person is presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine Veterans'
Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their consideration.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No.
19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P.
MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera
in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for
two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial
student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her.
Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s
resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage
on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his
parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their son
was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They
were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However,
starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice
or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he
would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did
not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously
married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.7 She was so
embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when they exchanged their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He
informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to
marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed
that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified
that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed
in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975
and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer
valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six
(6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and
directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of
₱200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that
Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s
20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the
ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that even if the private
complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still
be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for
bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private
complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice
for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying
the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a
fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account Article
390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this
Court in United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good faith
and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is
applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code.
Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as
provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even
assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG
maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not afford
any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the private
complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court
was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41
of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive death
as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002
is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting
that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED
DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE
41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO
BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the
felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He
avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years
since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of
law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one
who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph
refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead.
He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975
and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence,
under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present.
The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of
the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective.
Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a
judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He
further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the
requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO"
before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved
and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had an
illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming
the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on
record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto el
anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie
of marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the
law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the
presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration
of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. 22 It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage
must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential
element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there
are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been
lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical
effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. 25 As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and
declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a
new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act. 28 He
explained that:
… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated
in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal
Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the
subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by
very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute
a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and
well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have
elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find
her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent
intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime. 29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a
felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot
exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is
deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary." 31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal
excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. 32 When the act or omission
defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused,
the law presumes it to have been intentional. 33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law
that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. 34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an
evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is
presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the
private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a
valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years
since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent
on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge
his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse
present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of
good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest
importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the
manner prescribed and the causes specified by law. 37 The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general
welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of
the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable
relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and
an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and
the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an
invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the
law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive
evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a
well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what
they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to
vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily
capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit
second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the
dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon
certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance, 41 namely, a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of
the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any
necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus,
before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute
summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a)
The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive
years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to
Article 40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely
to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the
acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil
law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned
by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of
the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an
absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that
the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has
for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only
requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 48 In In Re
Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively
dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to
have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in
seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated
that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other
spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper
proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those
authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the
administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of
the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death
of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349
or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as
not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not
been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively
dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He
maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when
the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not
present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349
seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but
even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He
posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise
to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the
case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she
contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of
bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. 57 Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that
the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the
present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses
presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice)
who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive
death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not
be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if
the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an
absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded
because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need
to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority
on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead,
there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made
only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. 60 Before such declaration, it was
held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good
faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling
in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears
to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other
spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under
Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains
that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages (4) Adultery or concubinage;
for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private
complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding
(6) Illegal search;
that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while
bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is
not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
(8) Malicious prosecution;
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente
porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos
lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba
mencionados.64
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and
the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
Rodeo.
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. 65 An award for
moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be
an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the
claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third, the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous
cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where
the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising
out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been any reason
for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and analogous cases (which refer to
those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or
resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private
complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private
complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21
of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are
the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised
in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article
20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21
provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes."
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
depends upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house
of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance – that
he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even
stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and
dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful
husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were
married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery and
heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous
series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to
the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,
attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured
mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful
husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice
and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar
to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries,
damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the
actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031
(1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than
negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences
though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v.
Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953);
Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant’s conduct was not merely negligent, but
was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and
mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became
entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The
plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t
sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just
basis appears for judicial interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000
punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117
A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest
and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she
is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public
policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act
which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor
immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the
person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having
done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass.
370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was induced
to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that
the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by
cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for
enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v.
Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation. The
criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental
results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage
relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388,
114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324;
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829,
33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the
circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her
illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s misrepresentation, and that she
does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such
considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.
Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958. 76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
₱200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male
and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming
from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices
said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and
slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and
sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the
civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and
his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his
own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé]
and the realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any
cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No.
02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change
of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was
in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in
so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12)
recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. 25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his
first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such
as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast,
sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is
it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of
the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register.
Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the
local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and
"female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage,
there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or
"the distinction between male and female." 33Female is "the sex that produces ova or
bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to
have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to
be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned
sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may
be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed
on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles
of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, Costs against petitioner.
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal SO ORDERED.
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the
changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has Republic of the Philippines
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, SUPREME COURT
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Manila
Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the SECOND DIVISION
Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to Petitioner, Present:
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However,
it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this Respondent. Tinga,
case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
 VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 12, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions
of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered
the following changes of entries in Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered
as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court.
The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent’s
condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but
because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally
and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that this condition is very
rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondent’s
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent
has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which
reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the
reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and
convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioner’s
body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are
that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby
ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal
certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE
NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF
"SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENT’S
MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT
MAKE HER A "MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to
male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
"Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is
fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The OSG argues
that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil,
Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to
publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of
the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate
has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed
under Rule 108,10 and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to
the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified
by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall
set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing
at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the
hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months
after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on
behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name
of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of
the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule
shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the
same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did not implead
the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a
party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.[12]Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.13 The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil
registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the
matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule 108
when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic
Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction
or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition
produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base,
an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal
structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian
tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening
of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000
children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread use.
According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may
have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex
people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to
resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a "disorder" which is almost always recommended to be
treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has
been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’
for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female’."[25] The current state
of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for
a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical
testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female,
then a change in the
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent
has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous
genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due
course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency
due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent
as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how
an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change
of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the
reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial court’s grant of
respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO

MANALO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated

15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of

San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by
virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The
petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing,
counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's
Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic
of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on
its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper
action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a
Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December
6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and in
fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the
event that petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for
her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties,
together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages." 6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar
to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage between a
foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of
two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the
marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former
is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil
Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still
be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or
she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. 24 The
aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New
Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have
already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
 decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter
to remarry.27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen
has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and enforcement
of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the
entry of marriage in the local civil registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that
[she] is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not
be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her
maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised
sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality
rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the
trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is
void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability. The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was
filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared
with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that
she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred
that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case
filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
 from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from
the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse
can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings
in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national,
was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage
between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground
of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed
for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to
obtain a divorce decree must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We
referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no
longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is
severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status
is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without
dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino
people, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the
prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers.37 "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League
of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry under the laws of his or her country.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated
the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at
the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their
alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under
Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and
that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge
its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and
more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
Constitution.48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to
exercise free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to
travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety
or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of
its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over
the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies
with respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
violates one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly,
the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien
spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly,
while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and
void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is
recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on
grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law
at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he
or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in
accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the
dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply
in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 encourages
Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of
Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown to
support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith
in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e.,
satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent
of crime or wrong,57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts,58 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he
or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are
relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the
victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge
the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was
said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a
marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 64 Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner
Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is
recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
 Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my
intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social institution
of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage
it, Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry
the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part
of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon
him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and
with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make
further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity. 68 When the
Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased
to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From August 30, 1950,
upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce
obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th
Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116,711062,72 238073 and 602774 were filed in the
House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
and Family Relations on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the
grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified
or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the
mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or
a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim
of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a
common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more
than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family
Code, restated as follows:
1. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below
twenty-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such party
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband or wife;
2. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
3. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless
such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts
 constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
4. The consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
5. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or
appears to be incurable; and
6. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible
infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at
the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is
filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in
Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity
was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment
surgery or transitions from one sex to another, the other
spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have
resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond
repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our
customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the
separation of Church and State will be violated.75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a
state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State
and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country. 77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others,
the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of
all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed
in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail
order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004"), R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No.
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012"), and R.A.
No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364
("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must
not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences,
not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of
the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under
Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and
against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all
over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more
often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality
for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment
is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth
that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. 84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the
literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import
a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law.87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the
Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact of divorce
must still first be proven.90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
 General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the
Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing
the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence
of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the
divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese
law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon
her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry,
can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American
wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that
the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse,
as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,
but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained
a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
remarry.
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of ASIDE.
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
No pronouncement as to costs.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
SO ORDERED.
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still
remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It
is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.
 Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to
work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but
was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and,
in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
Manila
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
THIRD DIVISION that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
vs. force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
DECISION
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
BRION, J.: divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court (present petition). This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by
the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends
that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the
RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself
as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce,
on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article
26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and
the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed
the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent
is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement
that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In
other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our
laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and
for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been
done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s
legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but
also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign
divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.

(a) births; Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice
(b) deaths; Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree.
(c) marriages;
For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
(d) annulments of marriages; effect.1avvphi1

(e) divorces; Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of
(f) legitimations; the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of
(g) adoptions; entries in the civil registry.

(h) acknowledgment of natural children; Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
(i) naturalization; and
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
(j) changes of name. before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with
xxxx the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in
concerning the civil status of persons: the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well
as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
DIVISION
SO ORDERED.

[ GR No. 226013, Jul 02, 2018 ]

LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO v. RYOJI* MORISONO +

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 105 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
Decision[2] dated July 18, 2016 of the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which
denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's (Luzviminda) petition before it.

The Facts

Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on
December 8, 2009.[3] Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three
(3) months but were not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would
constantly quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he
was much older than Luzviminda.[4] As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by
Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was
eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head of
Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.[5] In view of the foregoing, she filed a
petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji[6] before
the RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport
and for her to be able to marry again.[7]
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the RTC set the case for hearing.
Since nobody appeared to oppose her petition except the government, Luzviminda was
allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. After the presentation and absent any
objection from the Public Prosecutor, Luzviminda's formal offer of evidence was
admitted as proof of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, and as part of the
testimony of the witnesses.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's petition. It held that
while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized in the
Philippines – provided that such decree is valid according to the national law of the alien
– the same does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e., petitioner, who
procured the same. Invoking the nationality principle provided under Article 15 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that since
petitioner is a Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign
divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the Philippines;[10]hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree she procured with
Ryoji.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as
follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts
cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the Civil
Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth,in mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[13]
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and
support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by
our courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still
being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the
former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her
national law.[14] In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,[15] the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that
the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
 Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree),
whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.[16] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
According to Republic v. Orbecido III,[17] the following elements must concur in order
for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[18] In the same case, the Court also
initially clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the
one who procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to
instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated
a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.[19]
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),[20] the Court En
Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed
marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse.
Pertinent portions of the ruling read:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
xxxx
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,
it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of
the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is
the right to remarry.Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to
live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it
only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should
be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither
can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words
as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes. x x x.
xxxx
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter's national law.

xxxx
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly
situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There
are real, material and substantial differences between
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with.
More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if
made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference
between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings
and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance
of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and
foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article
26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no
longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction
between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.
xxxx
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development. It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. To our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the
alien spouse. x x x.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under
the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair
has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these
are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent
but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be
tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions. Living in a flawed world,
the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive
of any good to the society where one is considered released
from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x
x.[21] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages
between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction,
regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that
the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the
Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[22]
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's
petition to have her foreign divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored
on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a
Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot
just order the grant of Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree,
as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained, in
Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require
an examination of various factual matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2016 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to
the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on
March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal
partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of
said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines
and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2,

Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or
place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view — sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x
x 33
34
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition
which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to
our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in
which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
– Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the
Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased
the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to
1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which
has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated
by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when
the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of
divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established
through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice
as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact,
for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because
only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as
it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we
are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence,
the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid
v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court
described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August
25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent
Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract;
while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No

Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as
a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who
owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga,
an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the
petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. 11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY
WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE
CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE
WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN
EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in
the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage
null and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are
raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value
of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of
law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings
is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may
also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may
either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the
civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the
promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." 20 An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. 21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into
or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled
that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the
wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth
in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified
of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence.
With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court
thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria
Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office 24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence"
of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
Republic of the Philippines
SO ORDERED. SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009

MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Emphasis and
BRAZA, Petitioners,
underscoring supplied)
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA
TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,Respondents. Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on
DECISION December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Register.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also
known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma.
Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7,
1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent
Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the
course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1)
the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3)
the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and,
for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of
September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under
the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test,
hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Date of Birth : 01 January 1996 Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29,
2007, they filed the present petition for review.
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Father : Pablito S. Braza Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend
that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the present case,
Date Received at the can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.14
January 13, 1997
Local Civil Registrar :
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
Annotation : "Late Registration"
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

"Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the
Annotation/Remarks :
on January 13, 1997" procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
Remarks :
on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or
a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction
of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners
seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous
and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick
to be subjected to a DNA test.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the
entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their
citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were never legally married.
Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial and not merely
innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature,
upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those
obtaining in the present case.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
birth records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided
in said Code.1avvphi1

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and

filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.

Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return
of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband.
Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the latter’s marriage
to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two marriages, it
being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.

In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the
petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate children of
Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are not the
latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between

the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of
the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof
with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed
and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
 LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2
dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal
Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7)
months of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court,
dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While
in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990
at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004 On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for
divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago 4 at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. 6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayoras
maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8
the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge
of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9
which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in
which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has
no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce
granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense
of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before
the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final
and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 12
of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was
void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law
(such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. 16
However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s original
decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion
prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of.
Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER
OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF
THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.
The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent
are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in
the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our
ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 19 of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was
in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by
his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of
the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423
of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration
of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become
final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally SO ORDERED.
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of
a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia
at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In
the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued
and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption THIRD DIVISION
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is now moot and academic.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October
DECISION
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is MENDOZA, J.:
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC), declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent
Liberty Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No.
2004-1588.3cralawlibrary
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of
her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing
on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as
void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid
a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the
parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never
again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00
because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5,
2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had
no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and
that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never
intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and
wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that
is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE
OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONE IN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship
and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the
marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the
benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should
be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that
her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted
for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage
fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In
the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as “limited purpose”
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14cralawlibrary
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud
in immigration cases. It ruled that a “marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.” This standard was
modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not “entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States.” The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does
not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for
the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early cases on
limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the
notable case of United States v. Rubenstein17was promulgated, wherein in order to
allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live
together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned
Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in
the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all.
Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what
forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as
such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put
an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have
never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter
into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive
others.18cralawlibrary
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided “merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.” 20The 1980 immigration case of Matter
of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a nonsubsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary. 22 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving “limited purpose” marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages
as valid.23cralawlibrary
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married. As in the Rubensteincase, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to
enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in
the presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26cralawlibrary
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such
plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as
akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in
form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a
valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit
for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
precribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.28cralawlibrary
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by
law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article
45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same
Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conviction involving
moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud
as a ground tor an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a: marriage tor the sole
purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any oft he listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be
brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Cout1 cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
quality for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore,
be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Cout1
cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the
needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06
is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab
initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the
Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November
1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated
between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he
came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three
weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly
so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay
City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who
had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and
gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he
discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece
of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the
same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he
confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of
their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife
absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief,
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. 6 The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to
him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by
both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or
her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was
amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was]
he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package.
Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his
own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of
paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem
to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after
he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose],
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in
case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a
lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would
have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate
(T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his
sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It
cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of
marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa]
through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to
be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as
it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment
of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery
of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.
Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had
only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage.
However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his
marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded
that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of
the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted
that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of
Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting
parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect.
The prescription was established only in Article 7 18 of the Family Code which does not
govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application
of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and
the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C.
Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v.
Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority,
that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they
desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted
back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the
5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground
to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to
the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate
court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the
Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid
and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of
its Petition, to wit:
I Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ,
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties
therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of
their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of
their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by
petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24
November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that
the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as
the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was
not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The
Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’
marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil
Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2)
District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988,
indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a
false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code
governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party
habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil
Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is
the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that
it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the
Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of
cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have
attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each
other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably
construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where
a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a
sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but
to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article
76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law
can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of
a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic
admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The appellate court
also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced
to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum
five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to
decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46Under Rule 45, factual findings
are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the
parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal
requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot
be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an
apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of law or fact
leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which
was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage
under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so
must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former
is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter
in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on
equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot
thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
equity finds no room for application where there is a law. 54 There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of
the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped
from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that
Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa’s
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached
except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not
prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of
Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the
petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until
properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October
1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court. 3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that
she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his
child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely
prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and
that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He
also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage
license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus
obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing
that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere
belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not,
and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is
presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of
the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal
to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state
with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that
petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the
affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that
he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null
and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties,
as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the
obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent.7 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC
No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De
Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against
the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with
respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the
marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they
executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth
being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The false
affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action
for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the
instant action for support. Citing several authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void
marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and
anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of
the courts.12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with
respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to
thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and
rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be
attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically
brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not
evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that
despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to
being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was
improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and
respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that
courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since the right
to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the
evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that
their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial
court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not
valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction
to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action
for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case
being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass
upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity
of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of 1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22 November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila; 30

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they
living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they
the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus— would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While
ATTY. CARPIO: respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the
pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and
wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"),
correct? defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture
(Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.31
A Yes, sir.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
is hereby REINSTATED.
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and SO ORDERED.
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. 26 In the
instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of
paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and
therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 28

The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition,
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is
null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life
which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed
it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
— meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and continuity —
that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within
the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known
to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to
the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or
brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are
considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions
monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to
file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a
suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition
to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and
cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage
cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before
its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if
it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that
on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may
pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.