1
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of
the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which he
disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the
law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in
accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional
formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the
will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on
the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore,
went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator
having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the
will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the
presence of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will
invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make said section read as
follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. — No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in
the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each
other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page thereof, on the left
margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence
of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the
date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs
Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a
decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to
the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38
Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the effect of a change in
the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in the execution of a will, when such
change is made intermediate to the execution of a will and the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc.,
1076. and any textbook on Wills, and Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid
down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are
controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its
execution was sufficient at the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later statute are
the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by him, expressing his wishes, is not
a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a will, the law in force at the testator's death
applies and controls the proof of the will." (Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the
foregoing proposition and the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa
would have to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be
tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have
no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be supported by the weight of authority. It was the
old English view; in Downs (or Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to
have said that "the general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's
death, is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of the Supreme
Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil Procedure of the Philippine
Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon [1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice Sharswood
(Taylor vs.Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best considered. In this opinion is found
the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed
only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will,
formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its
execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule
subsequently enacted, though before his death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable
to such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his
past act, and rest satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is
ambulatory until the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually
take effect until then. General words apply to the property of which the testator dies
possessed, and he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing
or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go into effect at a
future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in the States of
Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase the
necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair the validity of a will already made and,
when they lessen the formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed
according to the law in force at the time of their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535;
Price vs. Brown, 1 Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our selection,
under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property
and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and
third rules on the subject.

The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The
act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a
completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take
effect on the property until a future time.lawphil.net
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.
In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect."
(Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos [1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112
U.S., 536; U.S. vs American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code, is
corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect, unless therein
otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect. Such,
likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having
special application to testamentary succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558;
Timbol vs. Manalo [1906], 6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will
of Bibiana Diquiña [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section 617,
Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section 634 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be disallowed in either of five cases,
the first being "if not executed and attested as in this Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become
part and parcel of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and
attested as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe
that the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634.
Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as
completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all
testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments
made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule,
particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the
will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to
admit the said will to probate, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET
AL., oppositors-appellants.
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he
died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in
Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in
longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on
he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his
2
writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was
his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's
death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of
holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to
the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order
dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father
Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are
involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute
a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not
be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time
that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed
certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or
sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios
of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the
three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41 Phil.,
875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of
every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on,
the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and
her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of the
document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of
the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its
probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code
which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-
petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly
provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the
time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the
affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death
or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the
will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of
his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is

executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid
down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should
be followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor
and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said
intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the
testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a
will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one
executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his
heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or
which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will
and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule
is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-
193).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. With
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlib
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis,
or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
3
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including
the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it
released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor —
pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to
the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by
the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by
this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
4
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of
the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to
postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro
Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other
things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as
well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance
with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are
on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those
of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns
as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of
certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It
is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample
opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in
this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph
G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws
in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on
the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and

disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as
expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be
made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the
scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without
any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have
resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July
29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also
designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore,
Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his
appointment.2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3
5
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As administrator of
Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following
properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue,
Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in
Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.5
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. 6 The will was
also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips
was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the
Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on
July 24, 1986.8
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and
Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s
estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares
in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided
interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of
Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest);
directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to
the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs. 12
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of
the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent,
while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by respondent on the
ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest
of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾
undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.15
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special
Proceeding No. 9625.16Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when

he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance
with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati
property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his
entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the
entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he
had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged
that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as
they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are
already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of W.
Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and
the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August
27, 1999.19
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the
CA gravely erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO.
9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED
AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND
BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND
EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES,
AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN
PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the
administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and
in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and
the same has already been executed.21
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of
the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with
Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms
of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will
and how the estate will be divided.22
6
Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubrey’s
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the
express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand
because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant
laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because
she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing entirely her
estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for
the settlement of Richard’s estate.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding
effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of
the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. 24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court
ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.26
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground
that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic
fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, 28 and
must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. 29
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that
petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith,
amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of
the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance
with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate
in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted
daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the complaint was filed only in
1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no
opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it
was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her
inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her
interest.31
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of
the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is
petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the
fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and
therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition thereto,
and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were
all done in 1991.32Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since
it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of
 7

petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to
annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
prescribed. be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 the
Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool
the unwary." Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show
another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new
suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair
hearing.34 While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.38
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 35
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates
and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest
wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded
trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in
the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before
the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is
the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.
he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair
average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by
which his conduct is to be judged.36 Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept
petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early
as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of
Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a
her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." 39 He had all the legal
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as
ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of
Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of
declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project
Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court
of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full
of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of
successional right to the Makati property.
Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of
hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
the Civil Code, to wit:
miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the
rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his
 8

concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s
correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus: conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audrey’s
death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta
and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died,
invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs.
the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the
Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs.
proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire
Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it
estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in
appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary
Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the
administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey.
ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite
Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the
failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also
duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that during
the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill
share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by
Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing
appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of
the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in
First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court
a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see
xxx
Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey was
prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiff’s
adopted daughter Kyle Guersey. In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of
the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached his
judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of
duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty
partition.
admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the fiduciary
nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration of the decedent’s last
will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the
Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in
resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that petitioner or any
the case.41 (Emphasis supplied) other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then
Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the
belongs to respondent.
law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon
petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is
clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:
negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to
analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in
consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have
the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of
the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights. 42
mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law,
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows: the testator's having meant just what he said.

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46
upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title for
administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides that "unless a contrary intent
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand,
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions
declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to
must prevail over general ones.47
settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of
decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the
circumstances".43

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens
who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys
acquired the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were
reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court
clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business
enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization of natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or
exploitation of private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens
was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private
lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born
citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands
of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and
the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this case, since the Makati property had already passed
on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the
Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision
to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the
court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of
death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed
in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
9
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which
may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue
of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us
in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines,
and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the
above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen
should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of
her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his
will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property
is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
 10

The most important assignments of error are as follows: lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
I Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT
HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since
II
he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
make home in the State of California.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for
V
the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
appellee's brief:
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904. settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former
"home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
Sacramento, California.
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
it is situated.
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-
Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of
the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing
the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions
of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it
in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on
executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal
law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity
of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the
validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the
fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute
the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
11
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
 12

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof
country' means the whole of its law. and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
xxx xxx xxx those domiciled abroad.
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel,
in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place
on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
where the act in question occurred.
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
of a question to the same system of law.
case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case
xxx xxx xxx
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil
as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of Code.
the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
the person of the owner.
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing of California, not by the internal law of California..
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
reversed, with costs against appellees.
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of
intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said
on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin
in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age,
when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two
sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its