Macasaet etal vs Co
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013
Facts: On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned
at the Western Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily
tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its
Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias
Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and
its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners), claiming damages
because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the
June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, docketed as Civil Case
No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due
course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including
Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana
Street corner A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila. In the morning
of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the
stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in
the address were futile because the defendants were then out of
the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day
to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was
informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to
resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in
his sheriff’s return dated September 22, 2005.
Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction over the petitioners have been
acquired.
Held: Yes.
the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject
the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action – is an element of due process that is
essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in
rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in
rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of
summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement
of due process.
The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in
personam, on the one hand, and an action in rem or quasi in rem,
on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v. Jensen,
thusly:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi
in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and
by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is
based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his
right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek
to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the
mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is
to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or
liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character
are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
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actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam
is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the
person, as distinguished from a judgment against the property to
determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is
brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are
concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam.
In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal
judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of
real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against
persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the
discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding
is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening
the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership
or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties
to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or
interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are
binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant
who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of
the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem
or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In
the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made
upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the
purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due
process, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of
the action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby
take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other
hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case
against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction
over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.
As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing
the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the
summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the
defendant in an action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The
service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely:
(a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant;
and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on
the claim brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in
personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper service
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of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the
ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly
does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of
personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the
action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper
service of the summons being intended to afford to him the
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also
waive the process. In other words, compliance with the rules
regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due
process as it is of jurisdiction.
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly
be effected on the defendant himself whenever practicable. Such
personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons
to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive
and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is
to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the two
fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons,
the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time,
the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by
leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copy at his office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is
known as substituted service because the service of the summons
on the defendant is made through his substitute.
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve
the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office
address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the
second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed
because Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and not available”
and the other petitioners were “always roving outside and gathering
news.” After Medina learned from those present in the office
address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any
of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that
or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them
in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected
or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly
authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to
effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard,
what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances
obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the
defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the
circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the
spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
Sumons GOMEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO AND
MARIANO TROCINO GR NO. 127692, 18 March 2004
FACTS:
Sometime in 1975, spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged 2
parcels of land to Dr. Yujuico in Cebu City. The mortgage was
subsequently foreclosed. Respondent-spouses Trocino sold the
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lands to petitioner- spouses, who in turn redeemed the lands from
the mortgagee. However, the spouses Trocino refused to deliver the
titles to petitioner-spouses. Thus, spouses Gomez sued spouses
Trocino for delivery of the titles. The husband Trocino died before
the suit was filed, thus his children, including Adolfo Trocino and
Mariano Trocino, were impleaded in the suit. Summons was served,
and it was only received by Caridad Trocino in behalf of the
children. The trial court rendered judgment against the spouses
Trocino and their heirs. Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for
the annulment of the judgment of the RTC with the CA, alleging that
no jurisdiction was acquired over them. At that time, Adolfo Trocino
was a resident of Ohio, USA while Mariano Trocino was a resident of
Talibon, Bohol, and both were not found in Cebu City at the time
summons was served.
ISSUES:
1. What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of
the service of summons should be based?
2. Was there a valid service of summons? 3. If personal service were
impossible to comply, what should have been done?
RULINGS:
1. The action was an action in personam. While it is a real action
because it affects title to or possession of land, it does not
automatically follow that the action is one in rem. In a personal
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. A real action
is one affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a
mortgage on real property. An action in personam is an action
against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action
in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the
person. The present case is an action in personam, because it is an
action against persons, on the basis of their personal liability of non-
delivery of titles. Thus, personal service of summons upon the
private respondents is essential in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons.
2. There was none. In actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to
him. In substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of
impossibility of personal service should be explained in the proof of
service. Where the defendant in an action in personam is a non-
resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of
the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential
to acquire jurisdiction over his person. An exception was accorded
in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein service of summons through the
non-resident’s wife, who was a resident of the Philippines, was held
valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a
prior civil case filed by the non-resident, and the second case was
merely an offshoot of the first case. In an action in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be
served upon the defendant for purposes of due process. Thus,
where the defendant is a non-resident and not found in the
Philippines, and: 1. the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; 2. the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is
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property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a
lien or interest; 3. the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant
from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or 4. the
property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines.
Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465 Jan 18 2000
Facts
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for
the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US
laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded with
the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical
evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential
decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition
request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein.
The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information
is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such
document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a
mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused
are not yet available.
Issue
1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted
access to the official extradition request and documents with an
opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a
breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a
copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear
conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to
comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant
role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree
already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s
liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat
to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting
due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.
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The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most
fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a
treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to
harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The
doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments.

In this case, there is no conflict between international law and

municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual
concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their
respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord
common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact,
neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of
due process from a prospective extradite