[G.R. No.

189947 : June 13, 2012]

MANILA PAVILION HOTEL, OWNED AND OPERATED BY ACESITE (PHILS.)

HOTEL CORPORATION V. HENRY DELADA

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 13 June
2012 which reads as follows:

G.R. No. 189947 (Manila Pavilion Hotel, owned and operated by Acesite
(Phils.) Hotel Corporation v. Henry Delada). - Before the Court are the respective
Motions for Reconsideration of petitioner and respondent from the 25 January 2012
Decision of this Court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby MODIFIED. We rule that petitioner Manila Pavilion Hotel had the
authority to continue with the administrative proceedings for insubordination and willful
disobedience against Delada and to impose on him the penalty of suspension.
Consequently, petitioner is not liable to pay back wages and other benefits for the
period corresponding to the penalty of 90-day suspension.[1]

In his Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Henry Delada (Delada) again alleges that
the purported 90-day penalty of suspension is in fact a continuity of the 30-
day preventive suspension previously imposed on him. Consequently, he reiterates
that, since a preventive suspension cannot extend for more than 30 days, the
lengthening of the period of suspension imposed on him was in violation of the law. He
also renews his argument that petitioner Manila Pavilion Hotel (MPH) had no authority
to mete out the additional 90-day penalty of suspension, as the parties had already
submitted the issues to arbitration. Finally, he asserts that the offenses he allegedly
committed are not among those that warrant preventive suspension.

With respect to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner, MPH seeks a
clarification of the effect of our Decision on its liability to pay back wages to Delada for
the period following the lapse of the disciplinary action of 90-day suspension penalty.
Petitioner raises the point that there are three material periods in the instant case: (a)
10 May 2007 to 9 June 2007, or the 30-day preventive suspension period of
respondent; (b) 18 June 2007 to 15 September 2007, or the period of his 90-day
suspension penalty period; and (c) 16 September 2007 to 16 January 2008, or the
period in which he allegedly refused to work. Petitioner contends that the dispositive
portion of the 14 December 2007 Decision of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA),
which ordered petitioner to pay back wages and other benefits "up to the time of
[Delada's] actual reinstatement and transfer to his position as Head Waiter" made
petitioner liable to compensate respondent during the time in which no work was
performed by Delada. Petitioner posits that the PVA's order requiring back pay
corresponding to the period in which respondent refused to work remained effective, as
the CA affirmed the PVA Decision without discussing the extent of the payment for back
wages, and as this Court limited its discussion to the validity of the 90-day penalty of
suspension.
Anent the Motion for Reconsideration of Delada, we rule that the arguments therein are
a mere rehash or reiteration of the previous grounds and arguments raised in his
Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari of MPH, which this Court had already
passed upon in the 25 January 2012 Decision. Neither does respondent raise new
matters that would prompt this Court to look into and revisit the issues raised. We thus
deny his Motion for Reconsideration.

On the petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, although we do not see any
reason to further explain our 25 January 2012 Decision, we resolve to give due course
to the motion in the interest of putting an end to this dispute. We will thus treat the
motion as one for clarification.

Below is a reproduction of the dispositive portion of the PVA Decision, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Panel of Arbitrators hereby promulgates the

following:

Declaring the transfer of Henry Delada as Head Waiter from Rotisserie to Seasons
Restaurant as valid and justified;

Finding the preventive suspension and the 90 day suspension of Henry Delada as
invalid;

xxxxxxxxx

As a consequence thereof, the Manila Pavilion Hotel is hereby ordered to pay

Henry Delada his backwages and other benefits due him from the time of his
illegal preventive suspension on 10 May 2007 (which includes the 90-day period of
suspension) up to the time of his actual reinstatement and transfer to his
position as Head Waiter at Seasons within ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)

The ruling is unambiguous. The PVA limited the liability to pay back wages to the period
covering the 30-day preventive suspension until the lapse of the penalty of 90-day
suspension, or for a total of 120 days. The phrase "up to the time of his actual
reinstatement and transfer" should not cause much confusion, as it is to be read in the
light of the nature and the specific duration of the disciplinary action imposed on
Delada. In cases in which dismissal is not imposed, there is actual reinstatement the
moment the employee is restored to his or her former employment status, without loss
of seniority rights. There is actual reinstatement, even if it involves a transfer to a
different position, if the transfer is valid.

The disciplinary action meted out to Delada was the penalty of suspension. By its very
nature, suspension involves merely a temporary break in the employer-employee
relationship, and not a permanent cessation thereof. Thus, after the specified period of
suspension has lapsed, the employer must reinstate the worker to his former or to a
substantially-equivalent position. Here, when petitioner ordered Delada to immediately
return to work and assume his new assignment as head waiter of Seasons Coffee
Shop after the lapse of the penalty of 90-day suspension,[3] it was clear that there was
a mere temporary break in his employment relations with petitioner, and that actual
reinstatement to his employment duties would automatically follow. Consequently, his
continued refusal to return to work does not entitle him back pay for the corresponding
period, pursuant to the principle of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor." Our
Decision in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, quoted below, is enlightening:

If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay

unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was
illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented
from working. While if was found that respondents expressed their intention to report
back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)

In our 25 January 2012 Decision, we ruled that MPH "is not liable to pay back wages
and other benefits for the period corresponding to the penalty of 90-day
suspension."[4] Considering that it no longer questioned the ruling of the CA finding the
30-day preventive suspension to be illegal,[5] we thus clarify that petitioner is not
required to pay back wages for the period corresponding to the penalty of 90-day
suspension (18 June 2007 to 15 September 2007) until the time respondent reported
back for work. As respondent never disputed[6] the assertion that he only returned to
work on 17 January 2008,[7] we find that petitioner was absent from 16 September
2007 to 16 January 2008.

WHEREFORE, we hereby clarify that petitioner is not liable to pay respondent Delada
back wages and other, benefits for the period corresponding to his penalty of 90-day
suspension until the time he reported back for work, or from 18 June 2007 to 16
January 2008.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON

Deputy Division Clerk of Court