CASE DIGESTS Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine
Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
1) Tenchavez vs Escano, 15 SCRA 355 (1965)
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on
February 24, 1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with
the local civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live together after the
marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta left for the
United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open
court by the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had
several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and
undissolved under the Philippine Law.
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not
complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause,
leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and
finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon
the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,
thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of
adultery.
2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.
A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a tranger
to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable for alienation of affections resulting
from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to
leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives.
Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s independent decisions, certainly
cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives.
2) Van Dorn vs Romillo, GR Np. 68470, 8 Oct 1985
Facts:
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982,
they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore
Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the
divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they
had no community property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise
control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property.
“”Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private respondent.
However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.””
3) Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and
respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The
local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair
William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer
her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued
a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
ISSUE:
WON a criminal case for adultery, which took place after a divorce, is barred by the
previously acquired decree of divorce.
HELD:
The Court ruled on the affirmative side. This was based on two concepts. First, that
the Civil Code of the Philippines recognized a divorce acquired by an alien spouse in
another country provided that it is valid based on his national law. The second
concept is that adultery requires an offended spouse, which means that marital status
is relevant. In the case at bar, Geiling’s divorce decree acquired in Germany is
recognized in the Philippines freeing him and Pilapil from their marital bond and
responsibility. Since they are validly divorced, Geiling cannot be considered an
offended spouse to file an adultery case against Pilapil who had then the right and
Commented [WU1]: Di ko gets? Why still considered
freedom to enter into another relationships.
married? When binding man kaha ang divorce nila
Commented [WU2]: Meaning private respondent Geiling
4) Quita vs Dandan, 300 SCRA 406 (1998) cannot prosecute petitioner Imelda on the ground of
adultery since they are no longer husband and wife when he
FACTS: filed a suit.
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3)
weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time,
to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the
marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972,
that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent?
RULING:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No
dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him
and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. The implication is that petitioner
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should
have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either
supporting or opposing the evidence.
The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines.” It maintained that their divorce obtained
in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction.
The question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent’s claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22
April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby
resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and
void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate
heirs is AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by
the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan.
5) Llorente vs CA, 345 SCRA 592 (2000)
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed
in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship
and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. Paula gave birth to a boy registered
in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the certificate stating
that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula
was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.
On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of
San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment
of divorce.[11]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On December 4, 1952, the divorce
decree became final. In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. Lorenzo
married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children.
Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia
be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for letters of administration over
Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.
RTC: considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. CA
Affirmed
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?
RULING:
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court. “Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed. Will is valid. SC reversed the decision.
6) Republic v Iyoy, GR No. 152577, 21 Sep 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children.
After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was
“hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the care of
respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters
sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she
had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in
the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus,
she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the
enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely
married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her
marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen,
her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that
the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent
Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest,
plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab
ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is
that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another
man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in
an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological
incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:
The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of
Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by
respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot
be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained
a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984,
after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not
allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada
Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
7) Republic vs Orbecido III, GR No. 154380, 5 Oct 2005
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After
few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in
2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a
petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine
law.
The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen
and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the US.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted by Orbecido to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization as an American citizen
and obtained a divorce decree to remarry an American, the Court is unable to declare
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
8) San Luis vs San Luis, GR No. 133743, 6 Feb 2007
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The
second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying
the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry,
but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
9) Yasin vs Sharia District Court, 241 SCRA 606 (1995)
FACTS:
On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City
a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered
amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in
accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the
name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should
include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered
by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her
maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former
husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since
compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in
the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another
woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she
required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements
of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority
to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full
name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants
her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no
longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the
Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change
in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former
husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her
husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she
required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the
marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the
marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is
permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman
after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
10) Garcia vs Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001)
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife
in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was
validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree
from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken
down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace
Recio dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of
the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce
decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with
the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s
legal capacity to marry.
11) Roehr vs Rodriguez, GR No. 142820, 20 Jun 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.
Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree
had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent
RTC Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of
the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her
previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their
children.
1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.
Ruling: Yes.
A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality,
as in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment
even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire
rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.
2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.
Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the
award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have
parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were
summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in
the German court, the records remain unclear.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children,
the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of
parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the
children.
12) Bayot vs CA, GR No. 155635, 7 Nov 2008
FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in
Muntinlupa. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years
old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong
Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American. They had a child
name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.
In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic,
which resulted to judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the
distribution of conjugal properties pursuant to an agreement they executed.
Meanwhile, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996,
with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage. Rebecca, however, later
moved and secured approval of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under
oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been
living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa
City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's
alleged psychological incapacity, seeking for distribution of conjugal properties with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. To the motion to
dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid
divorce to speak of.
RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision.
According to the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since
the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was
granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is
valid.
RULING:
Yes, the divorce is valid. PETITION DENIED.
“”””Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.
Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at
birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad.
And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino
is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in
this jurisdiction.””””
Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen
and remains to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American
territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those
who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport. She
had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen,
as shown in her marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate, when she secured
divorce in Dominican Republic.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have
been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by affirmation of the DOJ Secretary does
not invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996.
In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the
jurisdiction of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
13) Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas, GR No. 186571, 11 Aug 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent
Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other
professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto.
Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the
filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the
Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished
to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian
divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite
the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former
marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition
of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper
party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code
which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign
divorce decree. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to
state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of
res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
14) Vda. De Catalan vs Catalan-Lee, GR No. 183622, 8 Feb 2012
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid ac-cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage
with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition
for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate. While the case was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one
of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC.
The two cases were consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the ground
of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to file the petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for
bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one
Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased
was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note
of the action for declaration of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the
deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question
in determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that
petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters
of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to
its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between
petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. The
RTC held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file said petition. The CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant that the
marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain
the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando.
Petition is partially granted. Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It concluded
that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage
with Bristol still existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree
itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied
by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
15) Fujiki v Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, 26 Jun 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did
not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper
venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding
for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment
is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.”
 Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on
the “family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment
is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part
of the comity of nations.
16) Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, 24 April 2018
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden
surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the
divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of
having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no
longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained
abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the
Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the
provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the
foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be
contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled
that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it
should not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection
clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated
a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the
foreign spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike,
and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree
obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the
Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign
spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of
divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe
that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be
proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.