Analysis
News out of Guatemala over the past year has been filled with details regarding various
investigations into high-level corruption. InSight Crime breaks down the often overwhelming and
confusing stream of information to offer a condensed briefing of the most high-profile cases.
In 2015, then Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina and his Vice President Roxana Baldetti were
arrested following revelations into a customs fraud network they allegedly oversaw. Since then, the
pair have been implicated in a number of other corruption cases in a process largely driven by the
Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office and the United Nations-backed anti-impunity commission
(Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala – CICIG), which have worked tirelessly
to expose the nefarious dealings of an administration the CICIG likened to an organized crime
syndicate.
Below, InSight Crime sorts through the often confusing and seemingly overlapping investigations to
breakdown the four major corruption cases that involve the now disgraced former president and
vice president.
‘La Línea’
Guatemala’s most prominent and well-known recent corruption case is that of “La Línea,” which
was the first major investigation into the Pérez Molina administration. The customs scandal led
directly to the president’s resignation and the jailing of both Pérez Molina and Baldetti.
The scandal broke in April 2015, when Guatemalan authorities arrested nearly two-dozen current
and former government officials for customs fraud. This included the head and former head of
Guatemala’s customs agency, the Superintendency of Tax Administration (Superintendencia de
Administración Tributaria – SAT).
The arrests were the result of investigations initiated in May 2014 by the Guatemalan attorney
general and CICIG into a fraud network — dubbed “La Línea” (The Line) — that lowered taxes on
importers in exchange for financial kickbacks. From May 2014 to February 2015, the CICIG
estimated the network earned roughly $328,000 per week.
Upwards of 60 people may have been involved in the network, although investigators believe it
was actually composed of two subgroups with interaction limited to several intermediaries. One
group consisted of at least 28 SAT officials, while the other was composed of individuals working
outside the SAT, including importers and lawyers. (See a more detailed breakdown of how the La
Línea scam functioned here)
Initially, La Línea’s presumed leader was Juan Carlos Monzón, the private secretary of former Vice
President Baldetti, who resigned in May 2015 over her connections to the case. As more
information became available, however, evidence gleaned from wiretaps seemed to indicate that
Pérez Molina and Baldetti themselves actually oversaw the network’s operations. As a result,
Baldetti was arrested in August 2015, and in early September Pérez Molina resigned and was
arrested after being stripped of his immunity.
In late September 2015, Salvador Estuardo González Álvarez, alias “Eco,” an alleged top member of
La Línea, testified that Pérez Molina and Baldetti earned the most in the kickback scheme, both
receiving around 21.25 percent of all illicit proceeds. Monzón allegedly earned 5 percent, while
González Álvarez earned 2.5 percent. In October, Monzón, a fugitive for five months, turned
himself in to authorities.
Pérez Molina and Baldetti are currently in preventative custody as proceedings continue.
Quetzal Port
In April 2016, Guatemalan prosecutors revealed accusations that Pérez Molina and Baldetti created
a structure for laundering bribe money received from a Spanish container port construction
company, Terminal de Contenedores Quetzal (TCQ) — a subsidiary of Grup Terminal de
Contenedores Barcelona (Grup TCB).
While in office, Pérez Molina and Baldetti appointed several collaborators to top positions within a
state company that manages Guatemala’s Quetzal Port, the largest port on Guatemala’s Pacific
coast. In 2012, these collaborators negotiated a 25-year operating concession with TCQ worth $255
million for building and managing a new terminal in Quetzal Port.
In order to secure the contract, however, the company allegedly had to pay up to $30 million in
bribes. The Spanish company eventually made two payments, one in late 2013, and another in
early 2014, for a total of just over $12 million. Investigators believe Pérez Molina and Baldetti each
received about $4.2 million of this cash.
Baldetti’s personal secretary, Juan Carlos Monzón, allegedly played the role of messenger between
the Spanish company and Guatemalan officials. He was also instrumental in arranging bribes for
Quetzal Port union leaders in exchange for their collaboration.
Investigators named a total of 18 collaborators, including five who are based outside of Guatemala,
and in June, Guatemalan officials seized TCQ’s assets.
On June 2, officials from the Attorney General’s Office and CICIG announced accusations related to
an illegal campaign finance and government-contracting network allegedly run by Pérez Molina
and Baldetti. Formal money laundering and corruption charges followed on June 16.
Investigations into the case, dubbed “Cooptación del Estado” (Cooptation of the State), uncovered
a criminal network organized and led by Pérez Molina and Baldetti that received illicit funds from a
group of state contractors to help finance their 2011 presidential election campaign. Contractors
provided these funds on the promise they would be given preferential treatment in winning state
contracts should Pérez Molina be elected president.
Between taking office in January 2012 and April 2015 the pair then received an estimated $38
million in illicit kickbacks on around 70 state contracts. Pérez Molina and Baldetti put this money to
personal use buying properties, vacations, and vanity items. Baldetti, for instance, allegedly spent
$27,000 for liposuction treatment and over $11,000 on designer clothes in Miami, while Pérez
Molina bought a farm in Zaragoza.
So far, investigators have implicated a total of 70 people in the case, including a number of former
government ministers.
‘La Cooperacha’
The most recent corruption case to surface is that of “La Cooperacha” (Kick-In), which was
presented by Guatemalan Attorney General Thelma Aldana during a June 11 press conference
when she outlined a new round of charges against top government officials.
The case involves at least five ministers, including the former heads of Guatemala’s Defense,
Communications, Energy, and Interior Ministries, and the head of Guatemala’s Social Security
Institute (IGSS) during Pérez Molina’s government. Those arrested included former Interior
Minister Mauricio López Bonilla.
These officials are accused of spending over $4.7 million during a three-year period to buy Pérez
Molina luxurious birthday gifts, including a powerboat in 2012, a luxury beach house in 2013, and a
$3.5 million helicopter in 2014. The five ministers also contributed $100,000 each to buy Baldetti a
vacation home on the Honduran island of Roatán.
Much of the money used to buy the gifts allegedly came from public funds, and Pérez Molina and
Baldetti apparently organized the money collections for each other’s presents. Once again, Juan
Carlos Monzón was responsible for retrieving the cash and arranging the purchases.
Taken as a whole, the cases illustrate an administration organized around corruption: allegedly
using a corrupt campaign finance scheme to cheat its way into office, and using its influence and
offices to steal money from an already impoverished nation, while collecting bribes from foreign
and domestic government contractors and other businesses.
Guatemala Corruption Report
Judicial System
Businesses dealing with the judiciary face a high corruption risk. Bribes and irregular payments are
often exchanged to obtain favorable decisions, and the courts suffer from political interference
(GCR 2015-2016). Furthermore, judicial corruption and ineffectiveness have contributed to the
institution’s inefficiency and long delays in the handling of cases (ICS 2016). Business executives
perceive the courts to be inefficient in settling disputes and in challenging regulations, and judicial
decisions are inconsistent (GCR 2015-2016; ICS 2016). Foreign companies do not face any
discrimination when dealing with the judicial system (ICS 2016). Enforcing contracts is significantly
more time-consuming in Guatemala compared to the regional average, taking 1,400 days (DB
2016).
In a 2015 corruption case, the Supreme Court lifted the immunity of Magistrate Marta Sierra de
Stalling to later arrest her for taking bribes from attorneys of six members of an alleged tax fraud
scheme in return for their release on bail (HRR 2015). The case is pending (HRR 2015).
Guatemala is a member of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
and is a signatory to the New York Convention 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards.
Police
Businesses dealing with the security apparatus face a high corruption risk. The police are corrupt
and lack the resources to operate effectively (ICS 2016; HRR 2015). Impunity is reportedly high, and
the government lacks the mechanisms to investigate corruption (HRR 2015). Recent years have
seen several reports of police extortion and other abuses (FitW 2015). Guatemala is hobbled by a
weak rule of law and high crime rates, and businesses do not perceive the police to be reliable in
protecting them from crime or in enforcing order (ICS 2016; GCR 2015-2016).
The military is sometimes used by the government to maintain internal security and policing, and
in recent times a pattern of military personnel exploiting their networks for corrupt and illegal
purposes has emerged (HRR 2015; BTI 2016). In one case in 2014, the UN-backed International
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) accused retired military Captain Byron Lima
Oliva of building a multimillion-dollar empire from controlling the Guatemalan jail system and
taking bribes in return for prison transfers (Yahoo News, Sept. 2014). The Public Prosecutor’s Office
initiated 12 investigations into Lima, yet none reached the courts. CICIG investigations revealed a
far-reaching corrupt network including congressmen and public officials, and Lima reportedly often
bragged about his close relationship with President Otto Perez Molina (Yahoo News, Sept. 2014,
Public Services
The public services sector carries a low risk of corruption. Bribes and irregular payments are not
widespread in the process of obtaining public utilities (GCR 2015-2016). However, access to public
services highly depends on power relations, and corruption hinders the functioning of
administrations (BTI 2016). Regulatory systems are opaque and confusing (ICS 2016). Businesses
complain of burdensome administrative procedures (ICS 2016). Obtaining permits and licenses
includes lengthy processes and bureaucratic hurdles (ICS 2016). Even though foreign companies
are in principle not discriminated against, inconsistencies and bureaucratic hurdles give local
companies more familiar with these challenges an advantage (ICS 2016). Starting a business is less
time-consuming and less costly than the regional averages (DB 2016).
The government has developed a website (Asisehace.gt) to help with business registration
procedures (ICS 2016).
Land Administration
Property rights are well defined; nonetheless, a poor rule of law has negatively affected property
rights in practice (BTI 2016). Guatemala lacks a land registration system, creating an obstacle to
landowners and paving the way for abuses, fraud, and illegalities (BTI 2016). Registering property is
less time-consuming and less costly compared to regional averages (DB 2016).
Tax Administration
The tax administration carries a moderate-to-high corruption risk. Companies sometimes give
bribes when meeting with tax officials (GCR 2015-2016). Despite this, paying taxes in Guatemala is
less time-consuming and less costly than the regional average (DB 2016).
Customs Administration
The customs administration carries a very high risk of corruption. Companies complain of high
levels of corruption in customs transactions, even more so in ports and borders outside the capital
(ICS 2016). Corruption is much more pervasive when dealing with importing than when exporting
out of the country (GETR 2014). More generally, import licensing requirements are an obstacle to
investment (BTI 2016).
In early 2015, a corruption case involving former president Otto Perez Molina, former vice-
president Roxana Baldetti and a number of other politicians led to country-wide demonstrations
and the impeachment of the president. Investigations into what became known as the Linea
(telephone line) corruption case revealed that Molina had set up a customs corruption ring with
the help of high-ranking officials from the customs and tax administrations (The New Yorker, Sept.
2015). A phone conversation between Molina and Bladetti was released in which Molina was
contacting the Tax Administration Superintendency director and asking the HR department to
accommodate the smuggling network (Telesur, Sept. 2015). Between May 2014 and February
2015, the corruption ring, which controlled several customs offices and the central customs
administration, benefitted from substantial bribes in exchange for the lowering of customs duties
on a minimum of 500 containers, charging between GTQ 20,000 and 100,000 and embezzling more
than GTQ 2 million in bribes per week. Molina and Baldetti have both been in pre-trial custody
since May 2015 (Latin America Herald Tribune, 25 Apr. 2016; ICS 2015).
Public Procurement
The public procurement sector carries a high corruption risk. Bribes and irregular payments are
often exchanged in the procurement process (GCR 2015-2016). Furthermore, companies believe
that funds are often diverted to companies and individuals due to corruption (GCR 2015-2016).
There have been complaints from businesses about public procuring entities structuring
requirements of tenders to favor particular foreign companies over others (ICS 2016).
All procurement contracts exceeding USD 117,570 must be submitted for public competitive
bidding (ICS 2016). Nonetheless, companies have complained that government entities have been
applying special-purpose mechanisms to large procurement contracts, which allows the procuring
entity to avoid competitive bidding through the public tender process and make direct purchases
from a pre-selected supplier (ICS 2016).
In mid-2015, a high-level corruption case involving Guatemala’s Social Security Institute was
brought under the spotlight by the CICIG and the chief prosecutor. Investigations led to the arrest
of 17 individuals including the Institute’s president, Juan de Dios Rodriguez (International Justice
Monitor, May 2015). Reportedly, the Institute had fraudulently awarded a USD 15 million public
contract to the pharmaceutical company Pisa to ensure renal dialysis to social security patients in
return for more than 15% commission and bribes to the board members (International Justice
Monitor, May 2015). Pisa did not comply with the minimum requirements of the contract and
lacked the required resources and capacity. All board members were jailed (International Justice
Monitor, May 2015).
Natural Resources
Guatemala is a compliant country to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Recent
years have witnessed several conflicts over land titles related to mining and hydropower
exploration (BTI 2016).
Legislation
Guatemala has a legal anti-corruption framework in place, and the government generally
implements the law effectively (HRR 2015). Guatemala’s Penal Code criminalizes active and passive
bribery, fraud, extortion, using public resources for private gain, and bribery of foreign officials.
Criminal penalties for those who commit corruption while in public office (e.g., by charging
commissions, influence peddling, illegal appointments and passive and active bribery) include
sentences ranging from five to ten years’ imprisonment and fines (Latin Lawyer, May 2015). Money
laundering is criminalized by the Anti-Money Laundering Law. Public officials receiving salaries
above USD 1,040 per month are subject to financial disclosure laws, and non-compliance can incur
administrative and criminal sanctions (HRR 2015). Financial declarations are available to the public
upon request (HRR 2015). The Asset Recovery Law allows the Guatemalan courts to seize goods
and assets derived from illicit activities (including corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation of
public funds, extortion, trafficking, and money laundering).
In 2015, several public officials in Guatemala engaged in corruption: The Public Ministry reported
the arrest of approximately 602 public officials during the year for their involvement in corruption
and abuse of office (HRR 2015).
Guatemala has ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption, OAS Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Civil Society
Freedoms of speech and press are protected by law, but increasing violations of these freedoms
have raised concerns among international organizations (FotP 2015). Libel and defamation are
criminal offenses, and authorities and other prominent persons sometimes use these laws to
silence the press (FotP 2015). The newspaper El Periodico is struggling with more than 70 legal
complaints and has faced 15 cyber attacks, mainly as a consequence of investigations into
government corruption (FitW 2015). In 2015, two journalists were killed, allegedly for their work
on corruption and organized crime in several municipalities in Mazatenango (HRR 2015). The
bribery of journalists is also a problem in Guatemala (FotP 2015). The law provides for public
access to government information, however, in practice it remains difficult to obtain information,
particularly for journalists reporting on corruption outside the capital (FotP 2015). Journalists and
reporters have encountered several attacks from public officials, who face no consequences (FotP
2015). The government does not restrict access to internet or censor content; however, reports
suggest authorities monitor private online chat (HRR 2015). This environment has led to
widespread self-censorship among journalists; accordingly, Guatemalan media is considered
“partly free” (FotP 2015).
Overall, civil society traditions are weak in Guatemala (BTI 2016). There is little cooperation
between the government and civil society organizations (BTI 2016). Several activists have been
victims of threats, attacks, and intimidation (HRR 2015). The law provides for freedom of assembly,
and the government generally respects this right in practice (HRR 2015).
What Guatemala’s political crisis means for anti-corruption efforts everywhere
Charles T. Call
Two weeks ago, Guatemala’s attorney general and the head of a U.N.-backed international
commission jointly asked the legislature there to lift the immunity of President Jimmy Morales
after uncovering over $800,000 in hidden and unexplained funds that went to his party’s 2015
campaign. Two days later, Morales deepened the political crisis by declaring the U.N.-appointed
commissioner persona non grata and ordering him out of the country. Within hours, the country’s
Constitutional Court had provisionally remanded that order, and on Monday it found enough
evidence to permit the legislature to consider lifting Morales’ immunity. Some in Congress are also
pushing back on helpful judicial reforms.
Now the country is waiting to see how this battle over impunity will be resolved and whether a
morally and legally damaged president can survive. The outcome of this contest will shape not only
whether Guatemala can emerge from decades in the grip of powerful criminal-political-security
networks, but also whether an innovative hybrid international-national experiment will be able to
continue to serve as a model for combating corruption and impunity in other countries. It also
offers a chance for the Trump administration to take an early visible stance in favor of controlling
the crime and corruption in Central America that abet violence, migration, and drug trafficking.
The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was launched in 2007 to
dismantle parallel security groups with links to criminal organizations and political elites that
persisted after a 1996 peace agreement ended decades of civil war. Staffed by international
experts and vetted Guatemalan prosecutors and investigators, it is empowered to independently
investigate cases and jointly bring them to the courts with the national Public Ministry. CICIG used
modern investigative techniques and empowered national investigators,
reducing the portion of acquittals to condemnations for homicides by half between 2005-06 and
2012-13. Guatemala’s
homicide rate fell from 46 per 100,000 in 2008 to 27 in 2016. The United States, seeing CICIG as a
contribution to democratic stability in a violent country that is source to migrants, has been
a solid backer of the experiment and provided roughly half of its $12-$15 million annual budget.
Current U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Todd Robinson has been outspoken in favor of CICIG’s
performance, drawing President Morales’ ire.
The Commission has been the driving force in embezzlement charges against a former president
and charges of extrajudicial executions against an ex-minister and the head of police criminal
investigations, as well as senior security officials. It has also put dozens of prominent drug
traffickers and politicians and security officials behind bars, including the interior minister who
helped create it. It has forced the ouster of over a dozen corrupt judges and a tainted attorney
general, and sparked the dismissal of over 2,500 police officers. CICIG shocked the country in 2010
by proving that then-President Colóm was innocent in a remarkable suicidal ruse whereby the
victim had contracted his own killing in order to blame Colóm and bring him down.
Related
Since 2013, Ivan Velásquez, a Colombian prosecutor known for exposing paramilitary-politician
collusion in his country, has headed CICIG. In 2015, CICIG’s investigations of a multi-million-dollar
customs fraud ring
led to the arrest of some 200 people, including the country’s vice president and its then-president
Otto Perez, both of whom resigned. CICIG continued its work with the support of President
Morales until the recent imbroglio. Following Morales’ attempt to oust Velásquez, several cabinet
and other senior officials left the government. In their resignation letter, the health minister and
her vice ministers
opined that the president had “assumed a position in favor of impunity and the corrupt sectors of
the country.”
CICIG is significant not just due to its impact at the highest levels in Guatemala, but because so
many prior international approaches to combat corrupt regimes have not worked. Decades of
traditional development assistance to judicial institutions and to corrupt or abusive police forces
have not been able to overcome the entrenched character of corrupt political systems in Latin
America. Foreign aid for the “rule of law” has helped reform criminal codes, introduce updated
investigative approaches, and confer technologies. However, hundreds of millions of dollars to
Latin American justice and police forces have not ended corrupt networks reaching the highest
levels of governments. Investigations of the Odebrecht company in Brazil reveal payoffs of some
$800 million to officeholders and political candidates in a dozen countries, including $35 million to
Peru’s then-president, showing how extensive the problem is.
Even the heavy footprint of U.N. peacekeeping missions has not been able to break corrupt mafias.
With thousands of troops and resourced mandates to reconstitute new civilian police and justice
institutions, peace operations have left behind post-war societies plagued by violent criminal
organizations and corrupt mafias in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, El Salvador, Afghanistan, Haiti,
and Tajikistan. U.N. and NATO peacekeeping missions are structured and mandated principally to
enhance security rather than the quality of justice. They can train and mentor police and military
forces, but are not generally empowered to strengthen national prosecutions through joint
criminal investigations.
This is what has made Guatemala’s CICIG such an interesting experiment. It began as an attempt to
dismantle security threats but ended up bolstering the justice system in ways that improved
governance. As a U.N. peace operation was winding down in the early 2000s, parallel security
groups with ties into the state continued to kill human rights activists and those seeking
accountable governance. Human rights groups sought an international commission to help fulfill
the government’s pledge to dismantle these groups made in a 1996 peace accord that ended 36
years of civil war. The initial proposal failed in the face of elite opposition and constitutional
objections, but eventually the Guatemalan government worked with the U.N. to create CICIG.
CICIG is the first hybrid international-national investigative body to tackle present-day problems of
impunity and criminal armed groups. Although it emerged from a peace process, its focus is not on
crimes associated with the prior civil war (like Sierra Leone’s hybrid Special Court). It falls short of a
U.N.-authorized mission but involves unprecedented powers by internationals to independently
select and investigate criminal cases that are then taken jointly with national prosecutors before
the Guatemalan courts. It thus overcomes the problems of conventional justice aid programs in
which national courts can bury, ignore, or dismiss internationally-assisted criminal investigations.
And it offers the advantage of bolstering, rather than supplanting, the capacity and legitimacy of
national institutions.
Despite slow initial progress, some premature accusations, and questionable decisions on where to
focus efforts, CICIG has become a model in the hemisphere. In April 2016, the Organization of
American States opened a Support Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras
(MACCIH), whose international investigators and prosecutors can select cases where they assist
vetted Honduras prosecutors and investigators to take forward. Discussions about a possible CICIG-
like body have percolated in El Salvador and Panama as well, though without success thus far. Next
month, the 13-year U.N. peacekeeping operation in Haiti will be replaced by a “U.N. Mission for
Justice Support” focused on the rule of law and human rights. In short, CICIG has been at the
vanguard of an international shift from concerns exclusively with stability and security in post-war
countries to concerns about corrupt governance and everyday criminal justice in such societies.
CICIG has been at the vanguard of an international shift from concerns exclusively with stability
and security in post-war countries to concerns about corrupt governance and everyday criminal
justice in such societies.
That is why the current crisis of CICIG poses a threat to the global trend of strengthened action
against entrenched corruption. If President Morales is able to push Commissioner Velásquez out of
the country, then the selection of the next commissioner will be shaded, and CICIG’s ability to
investigate and help bring charges against elites will be indelibly damaged. The cover that CICIG
has provided for Guatemalan prosecutors who want to do their jobs despite the risks will be
diminished, bolstering the caution and fear among investigators and prosecutors that CICIG had
undercut.
Furthermore, in today’s globalized world, the victory of impunity over this novel hybrid institution
will undercut the ability of comparable institutions like Honduras’ MACCIH in the future. Civic
organizations have mobilized in numerous countries in the last decade, angry that corrupt
politicians and criminal organizations have combined to foster insecurity and to gut democratic
representation. In countries where independent prosecutors and courts can operate, anti-
corruption efforts are making remarkable headway. Corruption charges have recently ousted
presidents in South Korea, Brazil, and the Gambia, and put ex-presidents behind bars in Peru,
Taiwan, El Salvador, Panama, and Montenegro. It is precisely in countries like Guatemala where
corruption and impunity cast the shadow of fear and intimidation on judicial institutions that such
headway can benefit from this experiment in what Stanford professor Stephen Krasner calls “
The U.S. response to recent developments can tip the scales of justice one way or another. The
Trump administration and the U.S. Congress have an opportunity in Guatemala to back the efforts
toward accountability in ways that will continue to dismantle criminal enterprises and dissuade
corrupt behavior. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley and members of both parties in
Congress have denounced the attempt to oust Velásquez. However, leveraging aid and other
(dis)incentives may be needed to prevent a major setback. If Morales is able to decapitate or
weaken CICIG, then corrupt politicians and criminal organizations around the hemisphere will take
note. The momentum gained by this initial experiment in a constructive international mission
against injustice may be dealt a blow that reverberates.
Newspaper articles
Guatemala decidirá si investiga a excandidata por corrupción
Por SONNY FIGUERA, Associated Press Updated 5:50 pm CDT, Friday, September 6, 2019
El expediente señala que en 2015 varias empresas financiaron al partido político a través del pago
de comisiones, malversación de fondos y sobornos de varias instituciones públicas y privadas.
Por este caso está prófugo de la justicia el empresario Mario Leal Castillo, quien fue su candidato a
la vicepresidencia.
Según la fiscalía, en ese año, el partido UNE no registró ante el ente electoral 27.6 millones de
quetzales (unos US$3.6 millones). Por tal motivo solicitaron al Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) que
inicie el proceso de cancelación de la agrupación política.
“Usted, Sandra Julieta Torres Casanov,a formó parta de una organización que tuvo que propósito
obtener recursos financieros para la campaña electoral del partido Unidad Nacional de la
Esperanza, recursos que no fueron reportados intencionalmente ante el Tribunal Supremo
Electoral”, dijo el fiscal Fernando Aldana durante la audiencia.
Aldana, explicó que Torres siendo secretaria general de la UNE, consintió la recepción de siete
aportes que sumarían 5.6 millones de quetzales (unos 800 mil dólares) que no fueron reportados
ante el ente electoral.
El proceso del viernes es conocido como audiencia de primera declaración, que ocurre cuando una
persona detenida por las autoridades es llevada ante un juez. En la cita, la fiscalía presenta las
pruebas que tiene y el juez decide si la investigación procede o no .
FIN DE LA COMISIÓN INTERNACIONAL CONTRA LA IMPUNIDAD EN GUATEMALA Destacado
Escrito por ANE Agencia de Noticias de Ecuador
GUATEMALA(SEP.02.2019,AgenciAne)._ La Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en
Guatemala, CICIG, termina su misión este 3 de septiembre, tras doce años de actividad y
haber logrado que la justicia los condene y encarcele por corruptos al expresidente Otto
Pérez Molina y la exvicepresidenta Roxana Baldetti.
La CICIG, con el apoyo del Ministerio Público, consiguió acusar a más de 1500 personas,
logró procesar a más de 660 y hasta julio de 2019, había conseguido 400 condenas. Cierra
sus puertas este tras doce años de actividad.En ese lapso contó con un amplio apoyo de la
sociedad civil, de las instituciones públicas y privadas guatemaltecas y de la ONU.
El caso más importante fue el denominado “La Línea” que se inició el 2015 y en el que se
vieron implicados el expresidente del país Otto Pérez Molina y la vicepresidenta Roxana
Baldetti, quienes renunciaron a sus cargos y posteriormente fueron procesados y
encarcelados por delitos de corrupción en las aduanas
El proceso de desaparición de la CICIG comenzó en agosto de 2018, cuando el presidente
del país, Jimmy Morales, envió una carta al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas
informándole su intención de no renovar el mandato de la Comisión.
Morales con este pedido intentó detener las investigaciones en las que se vinculó tanto a
su persona como a miembros de su familia, en actos de corrupción.El 27 de agosto de
2017, dicho gobernante declaró persona no grata al jefe de la Comisión, el colombiano,
Iván Velasquez,después de la presentación previa de otro antejuicio en su contra por
financiamiento electoral ilícito.
El anuncio del cierre de la Comisión la realizó el presidente Morales en una cadena de
televisión acompañado por decenas de militares, para demostrar su fuerza, mientras al
frente de la sede de la CICIG habían vehículos militares artillados,según narró el jefe de la
Comisión, Iván Velasquez.
El comisionado de la ONU recordó que Morales mantuvo esa disposición pese al fallo de la
corte constitucional que la dejaba sin efecto. En fin, declaró, “el Gobierno del presidente
Morales dijo que no acataba decisiones que ellos refutaban ilegales y que se reservaban el
derecho de cumplir las decisiones de la Corte que consideraran que se debían cumplir, ese
franco desacato del presidente no le produjo ninguna consecuencia”.
Gracias a la CIGIG los guatemaltecos tuvieron la oportunidad de ver cómo se movían los
hilos del poder, cómo funcionaban en las acciones de corrupción, cómo se lograba
controlar la respuesta garantizándose la impunidad de la que habían disfrutado por tantas
décadas.
No se conoce cuál ser la suerte de la CIGIG con el nuevo presidente, Alejandro Giammattei,
vencedor en los comicios celebrados en junio y agosto de este año.
La CICIG consiguió tocar el corazón del poder en Guatemala. Sus logros tienen que ver con
haber generado una conciencia ciudadana, que la lucha contra la corrupción sí era posible,
que sí se puede adelantar investigaciones serias y profundas independientemente de
quien sea la persona a la que se esté investigando, cuál sea su poder político o económico
o su prestancia en la sociedad”, afirmó el máximo responsable de la Comisión
Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala,Iván Velásquez.
Tribunal de Guatemala absuelve a hijo y hermano de Jimmy Morales en caso de corrupción
Ambos familiares fueron acusados por la fiscalía y la CICIG por supuestamente facilitar
facturas falsas para defraudar 12 mil dólares al Registro de la Propiedad en 2013. Por ello,
la autoridad pedía 11 años para Samuel, hermano y consejero, así como 8 para el mayor
de sus cuatro hijos.
Un tribunal de Guatemala absolvió este lunes al hijo y al hermano del presidente Jimmy
Morales, quienes estaban acusados de corrupción en un caso que golpeó la popularidad
del mandatario y que abonó a la salida del país de la CICIG, una comisión contra la
impunidad apoyada por Naciones Unidas.
La fiscalía solicitaba una pena de hasta 11 años de cárcel para Samuel "Sammy" Morales,
hermano y consejero político del gobernante, por fraude y lavado de dinero; y de hasta
ocho años de prisión por fraude para José Manuel Morales, hijo mayor de los cuatro que
tiene el presidente.
"No se demuestra ninguna intencionalidad de defraudar al Registro General de la
Propiedad, no tuvo conocimiento del hecho", dijo el juez Jaime González sobre el hijo del
mandatario durante la audiencia donde se dio lectura a la sentencia.
En enero de 2017, la fiscalía y la Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala
(CICIG) acusaron a ambos por supuestamente facilitar facturas falsas que sirvieron para
defraudar 12 mil dólares al Registro de la Propiedad en 2013, antes de que Morales fuera
electo.
Estos pagos simularon un servicio de catering que nunca se dio y que se usó para cobrar
canastas navideñas que la entonces madre de la novia de José Manuel vendió a esa
institución. Ambos fueron privados de libertad por menos de un mes hasta que se les
concedió prisión domiciliaria y una multa de unos 13 mil dólares.
"Yo no debo probar mi inocencia porque soy inocente", dijo, entre sollozos, Samuel
Morales en julio durante su última intervención antes de la sentencia.
El caso golpeó fuertemente a Morales, quien llegó a la presidencia con el lema "Ni
corrupto, ni ladrón". A partir de allí, el mandatario se enfrascó en una batalla contra el jefe
de la CICIG, el colombiano Iván Velásquez, a quien declaró "persona non grata" antes de
no renovar el mandato de la comisión, que vence en septiembre.
El mandatario ha negado que su enfrentamiento con la CICIG -que también lo investigó-
fuera una vendetta personal y la ha acusado de sembrar el "terror judicial".
Photografies