CALDERON v.
CARALE confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the
GR NO. 91636, April 23, 1992
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.cralaw
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
PADILLA, J:
FACTS:
(1) This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality
of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines
to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715, stating:
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any
vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and
Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
(2) Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of
the issue in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent
appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such
appointments.The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA
6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII
by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments
without constitutional basis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to
governmentofficers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whoseappointments require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby
declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
RATIO:
(1) To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members
of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
(1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
(2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.
(2) It is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance
with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the
executive would want it interpreted.
FEDERATION OF FREE FARMERS v. CA
GR NO. 41161, September 10, 1981
FACTS:
There are 4 parties in this case:
a. FFF (union representing the farmers)
b. Planters (the group which harvests the lands where the farmers work)
c. Santos and Tikol (individual planters)
d. Central or Victorias (milling corp, Planters bring their harvest here to be
milled).
The law, Sugar Act of 1952 - RA 809 stipulates that any increase in the
share of proceeds of milled sugarcane and derivatives obtained by planters
from the Central, 60% of said increase should be paid by planters to their
respective laborers.
1. FFF alleged that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the
10% increase and from 1953-1974 with the 4% increase. CA ruled planters
and Victorias jointly and severally liable. FFF claimed too that Planters and
Victorias entered into an agreement when they have no legal right because
the law has already provided the ratio of division.
2. Victorias claimed that they should not be held jointly and severally
liable. The action filed was not founded on torts but on either an obligation
created by a contract or by law, and even if on torts, the action has
prescribed. They have paid the Planters so the Planters should only be the
one sued.
3. Planters claim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might
agree. And that they have paid the laborers.
Issue:
a. W/N Planters and Victorias should be severally liable
b. W/N agreement bet Planters and Victorias were permissible under RA
809
Held:
a. NO. Legal basis is that arising from law which does not impose upon
Centrals any liability, whether expressly or impliedly, any joint and several
liability. No contract bet sugar mill and the laborers. Principal liability on
Planters and secondarily on Dept or Labor.
b. YES. RA 809 applicable only in the absence of a written milling
agreement or in the absence of any stipulation on the benefits which the
laborers are entitled.
REPUBLIC v. MANALO
GR NO. 221029, April 24, 2018
FACTS:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married in the Philippines to Yoshino Minoro,
a Japanese national. She divorced Minoro in Japan and a Japanese court
issued the divorce decree dated December 6, 2011.
On January 10, 2012, she filed in the RTC of Dagupan City a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila,
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. She also prayed that she be
allowed to use her maiden surname: Manalo. She claims there is an
imperative need to have the entry of marriage cancelled so that it would not
appear that she is still married to a Japanese national who is no longer
married to her, and so that she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said
entry should she decide to remarry.
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Dagupan questioned the caption
of the petition and alleges that the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of judgment; this was admitted by Manalo and
accordingly amended the petition.
RTC Ruling: Petition denied.
The divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized based
on Article 15 of the New Civil Code.
CA Ruling: RTC ruling was overturned.
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained
makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to
remarry.
Conformably with Navarro, et al. vs. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling,
the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers. In
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national who is
no longer married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential.
ISSUE:
W/N a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law
after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his/her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
RULING:
YES, pursuant to Par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. However, this case
was remanded to the RTC to allow Manalo to prove the Japanese law on
divorce.
[Plain-Meaning Rule or Verba Legis Rule]
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words,
to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statue.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
227) Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. Verbal egis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
[The spirit of the law and the true intent of the legislature prevails]
Assuming arguendo that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to
carry out such ends and purposes.
The purpose of Par. 2 of Art.26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure
to address an anomaly where the Filipino souse is tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
[Regardless of who initiates the foreign divorce proceeding, a favorable
decree has the same effect upon the Filipino spouse]
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not,
a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her
alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will
effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a
Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien souse
are severed by the operation of the latter’s national law.
[Par. 2 of Art.26 violates the Equal Protection Clause - Sec. 1 Art. III of the
Constitution]
The limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce initiated by the
alien souse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and
whimsical classification.
A Filipino married to another Filipino is NOT similarly situated with a
Filipino married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material, and substantial
differences between them. Ergo, they should NOT be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and liabilities imposed.
There are political, economic, cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well
as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Fililpino
national who is married to an alien souse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with
the national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is NO real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his/her alien spouse.
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Par. 2 of
Art 26, both are still married to their foreign spouses who are no longer
their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based
merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. The treatment gives undue favor to one
and unjustly discriminate the other.
The differentiation in Part. 2 of Art. 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained
by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized
even if based on grounds similar to Arts. 35, 36, 37, and 38 of the FC. In
filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be
accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or
she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses.
[Other topic which might be asked in the
recit/exams]
2 Types of Divorce
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for acause arising after
marriage, are of 2 types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vincula matrimonii, which
terminated the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.
In our jurisdiction, the following rules on divorce
exist:
1. The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence
our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Art. 15 and 17 of the NCC, the marital bond
between 2 Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former
is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
CHAVEZ v. JBC
GR NO. 202242, April 16, 2013
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision
rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was
added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the
JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC
as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. It should mean one representative each from
both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Respondent contends that the phrase “a representative of congress” refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that
these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress”
as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their
respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only
with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the
House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase
“a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the
framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to
its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process.
The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers
causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
GR NO. 101083, July 20, 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented
by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the
country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
TATAD v. ENERGY & FINANCE SECRETARY
GR NO. 124360, November 5, 1997
Facts:
The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.” The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the (b) full
deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide
any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world
market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the
peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one subject
requirement of the Constitution.
Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition
on undue delegation of power.
Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition
Discussions:
The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or
catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single
general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.
Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the Court
states that:
“There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more
persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on
a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the
sale or the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market
structure in which one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a
product or service. On the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is
an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of
a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association, for
the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade and
commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution
and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory
authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means while
monopoly refers to the end.
Rulings:
The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has adopted a
liberal construction of the one title – one subject rule. The Court hold that
section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of
R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in
our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.[i][20] We
shall, however, return to the validity of this provision when we examine its
blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No.
8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of
the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is
mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date
of full deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the
date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is to time it as
far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable.
Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the
aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: “The State shall regulate
or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
FRANCISCO JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
GR NO. 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution...
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the... manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund.
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint[4] (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices[5] of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes."[6] The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,[7] and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003[8] in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"[9] but voted to dismiss
the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint [11] was
filed with the Secretary General of the House[12] by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the... alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.[13]
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
Issues:
1. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of
the judiciary.
4. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
5. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion
of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is... a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of
the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that... the framers
could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public
trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor.[114] Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a
non- justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Principles:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,... and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to
be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an... elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its... power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
A Republican form of government rests on the conviction that sovereignty
should reside in the people and that all government authority must emanate
from them. It abhors the concentration of power on one or a few, cognizant
that power, when absolute, can lead to abuse, but... it also shuns a direct and
unbridled rule by the people, a veritable kindling to the passionate fires of
anarchy.
LAMP v. SECRETARY OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT
GR NO. 164987, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing
the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act
(R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of
lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms
of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to
LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic
or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen
for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of
Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded
out of PDAF.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of
powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen
projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive
function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not
pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of
constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be
considered nothing less than malfeasance.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated
in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial
review are met in this case; and
2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of
Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:
I.
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the
petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional
statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient
reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy before the Court.
LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is
established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally
disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the
unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.
II.
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does
not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of
Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution.
In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality,
the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x
x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the
Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of
PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and
capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to

recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF.
The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines
whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines
and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power
given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to
exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that

individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of
PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators
in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between
the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.
_______________

NOTES:

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power;
(2) (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
(4) (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.