Probing  the  Dialectics–Immanence  Relation  
Through  Hegel  and  Deleuze  
 
 
 
By  Joshua  Windsor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Abbreviations  used  in  this  paper  
 
Hegel  
EL  -­‐  Encyclopedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences  in  Basic  Outline.  Part  I:  Science  
of  Logic  
PS  -­‐  The  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  
 
Deleuze    
IL  -­‐  ‘Immanence:  A  Life…’,  in  Pure  Immanence:  Essays  on  a  Life    
DR  -­‐  Difference  and  Repetition  
WP  -­‐  What  is  Philosophy?    

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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INTRODUCTION    
 
Eliciting   a   sense   of   ‘vertigo’,1  and   embroiled   in   scandalous   histories,   few  
philosophical  concepts  have  proved  as  evasive  yet  exigent  as  ‘dialectics’  and  
‘immanence’.   The   stakes   are   only   deepened   when   the   question   of   their  
relationship   is   posed:   identity   or   incompatibility?   In   approaching   this  
question,   I   will   first   briefly   define   and   contextualize   the   philosophical  
deployments   of   immanence   and   dialectics   to   gauge   the   prima   facie   tension  
between  them.  This  tension  will  then  be  intensified  through  confronting  the  
thought   of   Hegel   and   Deleuze.   If,   as   one   commentator   suggests,   this  
confrontation   ‘marks   the   conceptual   horizon   of   much   contemporary  
European   philosophy’,2  it   has   specific   salience.   Both   Hegel   and   Deleuze   lay  
claim   to   philosophies   of   immanence   yet   are   sharply   divided   on   its   relation   to  
dialectics.   Taking   stock   of   Deleuze’s   anti-­‐dialectical   theses   will   enable   us   to  
problematise  the  relationship  between  dialectics  and  immanence  as  it  orients  
the  thought  of  these  philosophers.  It  will  also  provide  a  basis  upon  which  to  
rethink   their   conceptual   relationship,   in   a   way   that   nuances   the   binary  
alternatives  of  identity  or  incompatibility.  
 
I.  DEFINITIONS  AND  TENSIONS  
 
Immanence    
From   the   Latin   ‘manere’,   immanence   means   ‘to   remain   within’.   It   is  
conventionally   opposed   to   ‘transcendence’,   which   connotes   an   existence   or  
experience   ‘beyond’.   In   some   contexts,   immanence   appears   as   a   privative  
concept.   One   might   recall   here   how   Kant’s   epistemological   immanence   is  
‘redeemed’   by   the   moral   transcendence   of   practical   reason.   Immanence   can  
also  take  on  repressive  connotations,  such  as  what  Adorno  and  Horkheimer  
diagnose   as   the   enclosure   of   Enlightenment   rationality,   where   ‘[n]othing   at  
                                                                                                               
1  G.   Deleuze   and   F.   Guattari   make   this   association   regarding   immanence   in   WP,   45.   Adorno  

makes   this   association   regarding   dialectics   in   Negative   Dialectics,   trans.   E.   B.   Ashton  

(London:  Routledge,  1990),  33.  
 
2  R.  Sinnerbrink,  Understanding  Hegelianism  (Stocksfield:  Acumen,  2007),  173.    

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all  may  remain  outside’.3  Yet  when  untethered  from  figures  of  false  enclosure  
or   an   absolute   ‘beyond’,   immanence   can   suggest   a   reassuringly   ‘down-­‐to-­‐
earth’  standpoint.      
 
A   provisional   distinction   can   be   drawn   between   methodological   and  
ontological  senses  of  immanence.  An  ‘immanent  method’  would  be  one  that  
does   not   appeal   to   any   external   principle,   but   rather   remains   within   the  
presuppositions   and   developmental   possibilities   of   the   matter   at   hand.   A  
‘philosophy  of  immanence’,  on  the  other  hand,  would  concern  the  privileged  
relations   structuring   an   ontological   scheme.   As   Deleuze   puts   it,   ‘[a]bsolute  
immanence   is   in   itself   […]   it   is   not   in   something,   [or]   to   something’.4  It   is  
opposed   to   any   causal   eminence   or   ontological   hierarchy.5  Combining   both  
methodological   and   ontological   senses,   Hegel   speaks   of   immanent   deduction,  
where   something   posits   its   own   presuppositions   and   distinctions   ‘from  
within   itself’.  6  Both   Hegel   and   Deleuze   conceive   immanence   in   terms   of   the  
self-­‐movement   or   autopoiesis   of   the   real,   and   formulate   their   positions  
against   the   shortcomings   of   previous   philosophies   to   articulate   this.   Just   as  
Deleuze  affirms  that  ‘the  secret  is  that  there  is  no  secret’,7  Hegel  insists  that  
there  is  nothing  ‘behind  the  so-­‐called  curtain’.8  
 
Dialectics    
From   the   Greek   prefix   ‘dia’   and   verb   ‘lego’,   dialectics   connotes   both   a  
‘gathering’   and   ‘separation’.   In   ancient   Greek   philosophy,   dialectics  
designated   a   dialogic   form   of   reasoning,   proceeding   through   opposition  
                                                                                                               
3  T.   W.   Adorno   and   M.   Horkheimer,   Dialectic   of   Enlightenment,   trans.   J.   Cumming   (London:  

Verso,  2010),  16.  

 
4  Deleuze,  IL,  26  (italics  added).  

 
5  G.  Deleuze,  Expressionism   in   Philosophy:   Spinoza,   trans.  M.  Joughin  (New  York:  Zone  Books,  

1994),  173.    
 
6  Hegel,  PS,  §84.  

 
7  G.   Deleuze   quoted   in   G.   Gutting,   Thinking   the   Impossible:   French   Philosophy   Since   1960  

(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2011),  40.    

 
8  Hegel,  PS,  §165.    

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towards   truth.   With   Kant,   dialectics   engendered   a   pejorative   association.  By  

violating   the   proper   use   of   our   reason   in   applying   it   beyond   possible  
experience,  Kant  claims  that  one  ‘suffer[s]  from  a  dialectic’.9    
 
Hegel  lauds  Kant’s  insight  that  ‘contradiction  posited  in  the  realm  of  reason  
by   determinations   of   the   understanding   is   essential  and   necessary’.10     Yet   in  
rejecting   Kant’s   distinction   between   noumena   and   phenomena,   Hegel   also  
rejects   Kant’s   resolution   that   consigned   contradiction   to   ‘thinking   reason  
alone’.11  Thus   Hegel   generalises   dialectics   to   encompass   ‘all   objects   of   all  
kinds  […]  all  representations,  concepts,  and  ideas’.12  Where  Kantian  dialectic  
arose   through   the   contradictory   juxtaposition   of   independently   defensible  
theses,  Hegel   identifies  dialectics  as  the  animating  process  within  any  subject  
matter  itself.  Like  Kant,  Hegel  associates  dialectics  with  a  certain  suffering  –  
‘a   state   of   despair   about   all   so-­‐called   natural   ideas’ 13  -­‐   but   this   loss   is  
productive.  Rather  than  a  stumbling  block  of  subjective  reason,  contradiction  
is   the   generative   feature   of   both   thought   and   the   real.   The   result   of  
contradiction  is  not  simply  an  undermining  of  false  beliefs,  or  a  reductio,  but  
what   Hegel   calls   sublation   –   an   abolishing,   preserving   and   uplifting   of   an  
opposition   by   virtue   of   its   contradiction.   The   dialectic   thus   ‘goes   beyond  
itself’.14  Hegel   describes   the   dialectic   as   the   immanent   transition   of   finite  
determinations   into   their   opposites,   the   grasping   of   ‘the   unity   of   [these]  
determinations  in  their  opposition’,  and  the  ‘pass[ing]  onto  something  else’.15    
   
 
                                                                                                               
9  I.  
Kant,   Prolegomena   to   Any   Future   Metaphysics,   trans.   J.   W.   Ellington   (Indiana:   Hackett  
Publishing  Company,  1977),  §56.    
 
10  Hegel,  EL,  §48.  

 
11  Ibid.  

 
12  Ibid,  §42.    

 
13  Hegel,  PS,  §78.    

 
14  Ibid,  §80.    

 
15  Hegel,  EL,  §82.  

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Conceptual  tensions    
So,  we  have  immanence  as  a  ‘remaining  within’,  and  dialectics  as  that  which  
‘goes  beyond  itself’.16  While  Hegel  does  not  explicitly  define  the  relationship  
between   immanence   and   dialectics,   they   are   clearly   associated.   This   is   seen  
in   his   alternation   of   noun   and   adjective   forms   –   e.g.   ‘immanent   dialectic’17  
and  ‘dialectic  immanently  ground  in  […]’.18  But  how  can  something  out-­‐pass  
itself   (dialectics)   without   going   outside   itself   (immanence)?   It   is   perhaps   this  
uncertainty   that   enables   Deleuze   to   accuse   Hegel   of   transcendence   posturing  
as   a   philosophy   of   immanence,   while   Hegel   accuses   Spinoza   (recalling   that  
for  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  Spinoza  thought  ‘the  “best”  plane  of  immanence’19)  
for   failing   to   immanently   deduce   his   metaphysical   categories.   For   now,   we  
have  a  rendezvous  of  questions.  Does  dialectics  violate  immanence?  Does  the  
above  tension  preclude  a  dialectical  articulation  of  immanence,  or  does  this  
tension  in  fact  pertain  to  immanence?  Finally,  can  immanence  be  evacuated  
of  residual  transcendence?  
 
II.  INCOMPATIBILITY?    
Confronting  Hegel  and  Deleuze  
 
With   these   questions   in   mind,   the   Hegel-­‐Deleuze   confrontation   will   now   be  
examined   more   closely.   For   present   purposes,   I   am   less   concerned   with  
evaluating   the   internal   integrity   of   Deleuze’s   philosophy,   which   is  
sophisticated   and   complex.   Instead,   I   will   use   his   anti-­‐dialectical   theses   to  
sharpen   the   stakes   of   the   dialectics-­‐immanence   relation   as   it   pertains   to  
Hegel.   Given   Deleuze’s   ‘detestation’   of   ‘Hegelianism   and   dialectics’,20  it   is  
unsurprising   that   he   deems   immanence   and   dialectics   incompatible.   To  
                                                                                                               
16  Hegel,  PS,  §80.    

 
17  Hegel,  EL,  §215.    

 
18  G.   W.   F.   Hegel,   Science  of  Logic,  trans.   G.   Giovanni   (Cambridge:   Cambridge   University   Press,  

2010),  522.    
 
19  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  60.      

 
20  G.   Deleuze,   ‘Letter   to   a   Harsh   Critic’,   in   Negotiations,   1972-­‐1990   (New   York:   Columbia  

University  Press,  1995),  6.    

 

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unpack   the   philosophical   sense   of   this   polemical   quip,   I   will   examine  

Deleuze's   claims   along   with   countering   Hegelian   responses.   Deleuze   deems  
dialectics  incompatible  with  immanence  because  it:    
 
• Subordinates  originary  affirmation  to  negation.    
• Subordinates  pure  difference  to  contradiction.  
• Subordinates  the  virtual  to  the  actual.21  
 
Affirmation  versus  negation      
Deleuze   is   unequivocal:   ‘[w]ith   immanence   all   is   affirmation’22  and   ‘lacking   in  
nothing’.23  Consequently,   negation   is   considered   as   always   derivative,   the  
‘shadow   of   the   more   profound   genetic   element’. 24  Because   Hegel   takes  
negation   to   be   an   essential   component   of   any   affirmation,   Deleuze   argues  
that   dialectics   remains   in   thrall   to   ‘epiphenomena’,25  moving   solely   ‘within  
the  limits  of  reactive  forces’.26  Like  the  founding  negations  of  transcendence  
that   institute   a   problematic   hierarchical   order,   Deleuze   sees   dialectics   as  
leading   to   negative   valuations,   where   some   ‘lower’   realm   depends   upon   a  
‘higher’  one.  By  betraying  and  distorting  the  immediate,  Deleuze  claims  that  
dialectics  is  constitutively  incapable  of  thinking  immanence  in  its  purity.  27  
 
Might   we   resist   the   Deleuzian   equation   of   immanence   with   affirmation?   If  
transcendence   implies   negation,   must   negation   always   imply   transcendence?  
Hegel   certainly   insists   on   the   immanence   of   negativity.   This   is   expressed   in  
the   dialectic   of   ‘indeterminate   being’   in   his   Logic,   that   unfolds   the  
                                                                                                               
21  Deleuze   does   not   explicitly   oppose   his   concept   of   the   virtual   to   Hegelian   actuality.  
Nonetheless,  its  anti-­‐dialectical  outlines  are  clear  enough,  as  will  be  seen.  
 
22  Deleuze,  Expressionism  in  Philosophy:  Spinoza,  174.  

 
23  Deleuze,  IL,  31.    

 
24  Deleuze,  DR,  55.    

 
25  Ibid.  

 
26  G.  Deleuze,  Nietzsche  and  Philosophy,  trans.  H.  Tomlinson  (London:  Continuum,  2002),  159.    

 
27  Deleuze,  DR,  10.    

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inseparability  of  being  from  the  not,  and  the  not  from  being.28  It  is  absolute  
or   skeptical   negation   that   Hegel   considers   an   external   procedure   -­‐   and   the  
same   would   go   for   absolute   affirmation.   As   the   motor   of   the   dialectic,  
determinate   negation,   in   contrast,   carries   something   forward,   and   casts  
something  back.  Thus  it  is  equally  the  positive,  because  it  ‘is  specifically  the  
nothingness   of   that   from   which   it   results’. 29  It   is   this   understanding   of  
negation   as   determinate   that   prevents   it   from   lapsing   into   an   absolute  
‘outside’.   It   is   a   negativity   ‘continually   contesting   positivity’,   rather   than   ‘a  
pure  wellspring  of  alterity’.30  Since  for  Hegel  there  is  no  ‘absolute  difference’  
between   ‘the   positive   and   negative’, 31  one   must   think   the   constitutive  
relation   between   affirmative   and   negative   modes   of   being.   Rather   than   a  
barrier   between   thought   and   being,   Hegel   sees   the   negative   as   the   immanent  
opening  that  puts  us  into  things.    
 
The   logic   of   Deleuze’s   affirmationism   recalls   Hegel’s   discussion   of   sense  
certainty.   For   sense   certainty,   negativity   and   mediation   do   not   exist,   and   it  
variously  attempts  to  ground  its  certainty  in  the  immediate  givenness  of  the  
object   or   subjective   experience.   However,   in   trying   to   index   the   singular,  
sense-­‐certainty   necessarily   produces   the   universal,   because   the   indexical   is  
indifferent  to  any  particular  content.  It  should  be  noted  that  Hegel  does  not  
simply   dismiss   immediacy.   Philosophy   is   obliged   to   begin   with   something  
immediate,   and   in   that   sense   immediacy   is   irreducible.   However,   the  
experience  of  sense-­‐certainty  reveals  that  there  can  be  no  immediate  grasp  of  
immediacy.   Immediacy   qua   immediacy   shows   itself   to   be   thoroughly  
mediated.   At   the   same   time,   because   immediacy   and   mediation   ‘form   an  
inseparable  combination’,32  mediation   does   not   simply   efface   immediacy,   and  

                                                                                                               
28  S.  Houlgate  (ed.),  The  Hegel  Reader  (Oxford:  Blackwell  Publishing  Ltd.,  1998),  129.    

 
29  Hegel,  PS,  §79.    

 
30  B.   Noys,   The   Persistence   of   the   Negative:   A   Critique   of   Contemporary   Continental   Theory,  

(Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  2010),  101.  

 
31  Hegel,  EL,  §119.  

 
32  Ibid,  §12.    

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immediacy  is  not  simply  epiphenomenal  (as  Deleuze  would  claim  of  negation  
and  mediation).  
 
In   response   to   the   accusation   that   dialectical   negativity   is   emblematic   of  
reactive   forces,   we   might   query   the   socio-­‐political   implications   of   Deleuze’s  
affirmationism.   Because   for   Hegel,   pure   affirmation   is   ‘utterly   abstract’,   it   is  
receptive  ‘to  any  content’.  33  By  subordinating  negativity  and  social  mediation  
to   pure   ontological   immediacy,   affirmationism   is   ‘just   as   capable   of  
sanctioning’   one   thing   as   its   opposite.34     It   thus   risks   alignment   with   the  
repressive   tendencies   structuring   the   status   quo.   As   Noys   argues,  
affirmationism   represents   a   ‘valorisation   of   power,   production   and  
accumulation’   that   does   not   so   much   ‘break   with   the   horizon   of   capital   but  
mirrors  it  in  inverted  form’.35    
 
Pure  difference  versus  contradiction    
Deleuze   accuses   dialectics   of   rendering   ‘the   obscure   […]   already   clarified  
from   the   outset’, 36  by   illegitimately   injecting   conceptuality   into   the  
ontological   substratum.   So   what   does   Deleuze   affirm   of   immanence?   And  
what   does   dialectics   allegedly   miss?     In   an   early   reflection,   Deleuze  
hypothesised   an   ontology   in   which   the   dialectical   figure   of   contradiction  
would   be   the   merely   ‘phenomenal   and   anthropological   aspect’   of   deeper  
difference.37    This  is  later  crystallised  in  the  notion  of  ‘pure  difference’,  which  
is  neither  difference  from  or  between  the  same,  nor  temporal  change  within  
the   same.   In   both   cases,   difference   would   be   degraded   to   a   relative  
conceptual   measure   between   self-­‐same   states.   For   Deleuze,   philosophy’s  
‘positive   and   direct   relation   to   things’   can   only   be   legitimated,   if   it   grasps  

                                                                                                               
33  Ibid,  §74.  

 
34  Ibid.  

 
35  Noys,  The  Persistence  of  the  Negative,  125.  

 
36  Deleuze,  DR,  263.    

 
37  G.  Deleuze  quoted  in  C.  Kerslake,  ‘The  Vertigo  of  Philosophy:  Deleuze  and  the  Problem  of  

Immanence’,  Radical  Philosophy  113,  May/June  2002,  12.    

 

  9  
  

things   in   their   ‘internal  difference’.38  On  this  basis,  Hegel’s  dialectic   is  accused  
of   subordinating   ‘pure   difference’   to   difference   between   prior   identities  
(represented   as   contradiction),   only   to   be   reconciled   in   a   higher   identity  
(sublation).  For  Deleuze,  immanence,  as  the  affirmation  of  ‘pure  difference,’  is  
not   ‘determinable   as   a   concept’. 39  By   stripping   difference   of   its   intrinsic  
positivity  and  imposing  ‘a  plan  of  organisation  or  development’  on  originary  
juxtaposition,40  Deleuze  sees  the  dialectic  as  conceptually  circumscribing  the  
immanent   becoming   of   unrepresentable   singularities.   Philosophical   concepts  
must   instead   be   ‘opened’   to   immanence   as   their   pre-­‐philosophical  
presupposition;  immanence  cannot  be  dialectically  opened  by  the  concept.        
 
If  philosophy  is  obliged  to  start  with  the  identifying  ‘is’  of  predication,  Hegel  
grants   this   no   ultimate   finality,   just   as   he   rejects   the   ‘indifferent   also’   of  
endless   juxtaposition.41  Notably,   Hegel   distinguishes   dialectical   ‘self-­‐identity  
in   otherness’,42  from   the   ‘formal   identity’   that   abstracts   from   differences,  
which  appears  to  be  the  object  of  Deleuze  critique.  For  Hegel,  difference  and  
identity   imply   each   other.   ‘Pure   difference’,   or   ‘difference-­‐in-­‐itself’,   would  
have   to   be   a   kind   of   ‘indifferent   difference’,   to   prevent   it   manifesting   as  
contradiction   or   self-­‐relating   identity.   Hegel   would   consider   this   to   be  
undermined   by   the   very   purity   intended   to   provide   its   guarantee.   In   his  
analysis   of   perception,   he   notes   how   the   ‘in   so   far’   caveat   is   employed   to  
stave   off   ‘actual   opposition   in   the   Thing   itself’,43  by   variously   locating   the  
principle  of  identity  or  difference  outside  it  –  for  example,  in  the  mind.  But  a  
diversity   that   was   indifferent   to   its   difference   would   mean   its   principle   of  

                                                                                                               
38  G.   Deleuze,   Desert  Islands  and  Other  Texts,   trans.   M.   Taormina   (New   York:   Semiotext(ed),  

2004),  32.    
 
39  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  37-­‐38.  

 
40  Deleuze,  Spinoza:  Practical  Philosophy,  128.    

 
41  Hegel,  PS,  §113.    

 
42  Ibid,  §54.    

 
43  Ibid,  §124.  

  10  
  

difference   fell   outside   it,   and   thus   could   not   be   ‘difference-­‐in-­‐itself’,44  but   a  
relational  difference.    Similarly,  if  diversity  was  purely  ‘self-­‐referring’,  then  it  
would  already  ‘be  identical  with  itself’,45  and  thus  positioned  in  opposition  to  
others,  rather  than  indifference.        
 
Like  Kant,  Deleuze  reads  contradiction  as  an  anthropological  limit.  As  such,  it  
is   always-­‐already   abstracted   from   the   thought   of   immanence   as   ‘pure  
difference’.   For   Hegel,   however,   it   is   precisely   the   insulation   of   pure  
difference   (or   pure   identity)   from   contradiction   that   would   miss   the  
‘qualitative  immanent  motion’,46  and  result  in  lifeless  equality.  Contradiction  
is  the  immanent  disremption  of  both  ‘pure  identity’  and  ‘pure  difference’.  Just  
as   mathematical   formalism   abstracts   from   qualitative   differences,   ‘pure-­‐
difference’   abstracts   from   identity   –   and   both   would   not   ‘get   as   far   […]   as  
essential  opposition  or  inequality’.47  
 
For  Hegel,  dialectics  operate  immanently  within  and  through  representations,  
‘transform[ing]   representations   into   thought’.48  He   insists   that   one   ‘cannot  
without   more   ado   go   straightaway   behind   appearance’.49  Unlike   Deleuze,  
who   opposes   representation   to   some   deeper   reality,   Hegel   provides   a  
‘dialectical   re-­‐working   of   what   fissures   representation’   itself.50     As   a   non-­‐
relational   principle   lying   outside   conceptual   mediation,   ‘pure   difference’  

                                                                                                               
44  Ibid,  §117.  

 
45  Ibid,  §120.  

 
46  Ibid,  §45.    

 
47  Ibid.    

 
48  Hegel,  EL,  §20.  

 
49  Hegel,  PS,  §165.    

 
50  Noys,  The  Persistence  of  the  Negative,  98.    

  11  
  

seems   close   to   what   Hegel   calls   ‘edification  rather  than  insight’51  -­‐   the   mere  
‘negative  of  representation’.52  
 
Hegel   would   surely   see   any   effort   to   liberate   ‘pure-­‐difference’   from  
contradiction   in   the   realm   of   thought   to   be   a   ‘flight   of   abstraction’.53  This  
carries  practical  implications.  Might  it  not  be  the  evacuation  of  contradiction  
from   our   political   vocabulary   that   is   responsible   for   de-­‐radicalising  
difference?   The   valorisation   of   ‘difference-­‐in-­‐itself’   is   arguably   quite  
compatible  with  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  capitalist  status  quo,  with  its  
culture   of   opinion,   multiculturalist   conceits,   and   compulsive   production   of  
fetishised  novelty.  Similarly,  the  contemporary  refrains  of  ‘all  united’  against  
global  warming,  or  ‘we’re  all  in  this  together’  regarding  austerity  measures,  
threatens  to  defang  the  negativity  and  contradiction  implied  by  our  economic  
disparities   in   position   and   opportunity.   This   is   sufficient   to   raise   concerns  
regarding   the   alignment   of   affirmationism   and   non-­‐contradictory   differences  
with  the  repressive  context  of  immanence  mentioned  earlier.    
 
Virtuality  versus  actuality    
Hegel   notoriously   claimed   that   ‘[w]hat   is   rational   is   actual,   [a]nd   what   is  
actual,   is   rational’. 54  For   Deleuze,   the   privilege   accorded   to   actuality   by  
Hegel’s   dialectic   reverses   the   direction   in   which   immanence   should   be  
articulated.  He  claims,  rather,  that  pure  immanence  is  the  virtuality  beneath  
the   ‘accidents’   of   ‘the   subjectivity   and   objectivity   of   what   happens’.  55  As  
Deleuze  sees  it,  actuality  consists  of  defined  bodies  and  states  of  affairs.  The  
virtual,   in   contrast,   is   characterised   as   ‘pure   reserve’,   always   ‘elud[ing]   its  
own   actualisation’.56  In   Deleuze’s   final   essay,   ‘a   life’   is   defined   as   precisely  

                                                                                                               
51  Hegel,  PS,  §7.  

 
52  Hegel,  EL,  §44.  

 
53  Ibid,  §159.  

 
54  Ibid,  §6.  

 
55  Deleuze,  IL,  28.    

 
56  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  156.    

  12  
  

that   which   ‘only   contains   virtuals’. 57  ‘A   life’   is   its   own   definition   and  
expresses   ‘the   immanence   of   immanence’,58  as   an   open   singularity   beyond  
specification.   As   Agamben   explains   it,   ‘a   life’   is   a   principle   of   ‘virtual  
indetermination’, 59  or   a   pure   potentiality,   rather   than   the   potentiality   of  
something   actual.   While   ‘A   life   is   everywhere’, 60  it   can   only   be   intuited  
through  the  cracks  of  the  actual  where  subjectivity  disappears.    
 
‘A  life’  recalls  what  Hegel  calls  ‘pure  being,’  as  the  ‘immediacy  of  the  absence  
of   determination’.61  As   we   have   seen,   such   formless   immediacy   is   always-­‐
already   dismantled   for   Hegel.   A   ‘sheer   force   without   spread’   would   be  
‘without   content’,62  just   as   pure   ‘tendency’   is   lifeless.63  Nonetheless,   this   is  
precisely   what   Deleuze   thinks   can   almost   be   grasped   –   a   category   of   pure  
possibility   that   remains   forever   possible,   in   detachment   from   any  
actualisation.   Hegel   rejects   the   intuition   that   possibility   is   the   ‘richer   and  
more   encompassing’   category   than   actuality.  64     Because   ‘every   concept   can  
be   put   into   this   form’,   it   is   rendered   empty,   and   simply   means   it   has   been  
‘detached   from   its   relations’. 65  For   Hegel,   the   dialectical   actualisation   of  
thought   and   action   is   a   process   of   enrichment,   rather   than   an  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
57  Deleuze,  IL,  31.  

 
58  Ibid,  27.    

 
59  G.   Agamben,   ‘Absolute   Immanence’,   in   Potentialities:  Collected  Essays  in  Philosophy,   ed.   and  

trans.  D.  Heller-­‐Roazen  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  1999),  233-­‐234.    

 
60  Deleuze,  IL,  29.    

 
61  Hegel,  EL,  §86.    

 
62  Hegel,  PS,  §10.  

 
63  Ibid,  §3.    

 
64  Hegel,  EL,  §143.    

 
65  Ibid.  

  13  
  

impoverishment   of   virtual   possibilities. 66  Immanence,   conceived   as   a  

preservation  of  pure  potential,  simply  ensures  nothing  will  come  of  it.  
 
Hegel  shares  Deleuze’s  view  that  any  absolute  dualism  between  subject  and  
object   would   violate   immanence,   by   establishing   the   transcendence   of   one   in  
respect   to   the   other.   Deleuze’s   solution   lies   in   the   indetermining   and   de-­‐
subjectifying   direction   of   ‘pure   contemplation   without   knowledge’. 67  For  
Hegel,  the  immanent  overcoming  of  this  dualism  can  only  be  expressed  as  a  
dialectical  and  determinate  result  –  neither  as  ‘immediate  substance  or  pure  
self-­‐contemplation,’   but   only   ‘in   the   whole   wealth   of   developed   form’.68  In  
Deleuze’s   quasi-­‐Romantic   preoccupation   with   ‘deeper’   virtuality,   the  
determinations   of   subject   and   object   -­‐   the   so-­‐called   ‘accidents’69  of   the   actual  
-­‐   are   considered   unessential   to   immanence   conceived   as   ‘a   life.’   What   is  
ontologically   fundamental   for   Deleuze   is   the   ‘productive   affirmative  
process’,70  always   in   excess   of   determinate   form.   A   key   feature   of   Hegel’s  
dialectic,   as   Malabou   points   out,   involves   ‘the   becoming   essential   of   the  
accident  and  the  becoming  accidental  of  essence’.71  That  is,  determinate  form  
is  not  a  distortion  of  immanence,  but  ‘the  void  or  gap  that  splits  the  process  
of  life  from  within’.72    
 
 
 

                                                                                                               
66  B.  Baugh,  ‘Actualization:  Enrichment  and  Loss’,  in  K.  Houle  and  J.  Vernon  (eds.),  Hegel   and  

Deleuze:   Together   Again   for   the   First   Time   (Illinois:   Northwestern   University   Press,   2013),  
76.  
 
67  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  213.    

 
68  Hegel,  PS,  §19.    

 
69  Deleuze,  IL,  28.    

 
70  S.   Žižek,   Absolute   Recoil:   Towards   a   New   Foundation   of   Dialectical   Materialism   (London:  

Verso,  2015),  374.    

 
71  C.   Malabou,   The   Future   of   Hegel:   Plasticity,   Temporality   and   Dialectic,   trans.   L.   During  

(London:  Routledge,  2009),  193.    

 
72  Žižek,  Absolute  Recoil,  374.  

  14  
  

Hegel  with  Deleuze?  

It   is   perhaps   all-­‐too-­‐easy   to   read   Deleuze   as   one-­‐sided   in   a   Hegelian   sense.  
Judging  this  confrontation  from  a  strictly  Hegelian  or  Deleuzian  standpoint  is  
likely   to   end   in   reductionism.   Nonetheless,   Deleuze’s   vehement   opposition  
(rather   than   indifference)   to   Hegel   itself   raises   some   dialectical   questions.  
Malabou  has  tracked  how  the  Hegel  that  appears  in  Deleuze’s  text  is  marked  
by   ‘reduction  and   exception’,   and   ‘granted   all   the   negative   respect   one   pays   to  
an   absolute   heteron:   unable   to   be   assimilated’.73  What   kind   of   symptomatic  
relation  might  Deleuze’s  self-­‐professed  ‘allergy’  to  dialectics  imply?  Does  he  
miss  the  Hegelian  insight  that  ‘something  opposed  to  another  is  its  other’?74    
 
Rather  than  being  for  or  against  Deleuze,  more  might  be  said  about  where  the  
two   philosophers   seem   to   alight   upon   similar   problematics.   To   take   one  
example,   both   philosophers   associate   immanence   with   a   certain   passivity.  
Hegel   speaks   of   ‘holding   off’,75  ‘look[ing]   on’,76  ‘surrender’,77  and   ‘refusal   to  
intrude’78  in   the   immanent   unfolding   of   the   concept.   Similarly,   Deleuze   and  
Guattari  associate  immanence  with  the  themes  of  ‘detachment’,  and  ‘passive  
creation’. 79  As   we   have   seen,   both   philosophers   endeavor   to   think  
immanence   in   terms   of   self-­‐movement.   Just   as   Hegel   calls   ‘sophistic  
dialectics’   the   endless   back   and   forth   that   only   produces   a   semblance   of  
movement,   Deleuze   calls   ‘emanation’   (as   opposed   to   ‘immanation’)   the  
spectral   dynamism   that   collapses   back   into   the   inertia   of   the   One.   We   thus  
find  a  suggestive  concordance  in  the  characterisation  of  Hegelian  sublation  as  

                                                                                                               
73  C.   Malabou,   ‘Who’s   Afraid   of   Hegelian   Wolves’,   trans.   D.   Wills,   in   Deleuze:  A  Critical  Reader,  

ed.  P.  Patton  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  1996),  120.    

 
74  Hegel,  EL,  §119.    

 
75  Ibid,  §238.  

 
76  Hegel,  PS,  §85.    

 
77  Ibid,  §53.    

 
78  Ibid,  §58.  

 
79  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  212.  

  15  
  

a   ‘lifting   up’   that   ‘preserves’,   and   Deleuzian   immanation,   as   a   ‘flowing   out’  

that  ‘remains  within’.80  I  simply  gesture  towards  these  parallels  here.    
 
It  must  be  asked,  however,  can  either  of  their  conceptions  of  immanence  be  
criticised   rationally?   This   question   seems   particularly   acute   in   the   case   of  
Deleuze,  given  that  immanence  is  presented  as  a  pre-­‐philosophical  and  non-­‐
conceptual   presupposition.   Like   Wittgenstein’s   final   gesture   in   the   Tractatus,  
Deleuze  and  Guattari  aim  ‘not  so  much  to  think  THE  plane  of  immanence  as  
to  show  that  it  is  there’.81  They  may  as  well  write  under  erasure  at  this  point.  
To   proceed   further   might   involve   a   dialectic,   but   to   resign   oneself   to   ‘that  
which   must   be   thought   and   that   which   cannot   be   thought,’ 82  risks  
undercutting   the   conditions   of   philosophical   transmission.   For   Hegel,  
because  showing  ‘that’  is  always  implicated  in  a  specification  of  ‘what’,83  the  
‘unutterable   is   nothing   else   than   the   untrue’. 84  Moreover,   one   wonders  
whether  Deleuze’s  conception  of  immanence  is  in  fact  sustained  by  a  certain  
transcendence   of   the   virtual.   Resting   as   it   does   on   a   kind   of   featureless  
intellectual   intuition,   immanence   conceived   as   ‘a   life’   appears   as   a   kind   of  
‘pre-­‐reflexive  philosophical  presupposition’,85  which  raises  problems  for  any  
specification  of  immanence  in  terms  of  affirmation  and  pure-­‐difference.    
 
Despite   Hegel’s   principled   avoidance   of   such   ‘bare   assurances’,   his   position  
also   faces   dilemmas.   If   ‘the   True   is   the   Whole’,   and   dialectical   method   and  
content  are  interlinked  as  he  maintains,  what  rational  grounds  are  there  for  
entering   into   his   system?   Rosen   terms   this   dilemma   the   ‘post-­‐festum’  
paradox.   That   is,   if   the   rationality   of   Hegel’s   method   can   only   be  
comprehended  at  its  point  of  systematic  completion,  then  to  criticize  it  at  any  
                                                                                                               
80  Agamben,  ‘Absolute  Immanence’,  224.    

 
81  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  59.    

 
82  Agamben,  ‘Absolute  Immanence’,  224.    

 
83  Hegel,  EL,  §73.    

 
84  Hegel,  PS,  §110.    

 
85  Kerslake,  ‘The  Vertigo  of  Philosophy’,  15.  

  16  
  

prior   point   violates   the   essential   premise   regarding   the   inseparability   of  

method   and   content,   which   is   the   distinguishing   feature   of   his   dialectic.86  
Nevertheless,   unlike   purely   ex  post   justification   where   process   is   dispensable  
from  result,  Hegel’s  dialectic  is  also  intended  to  be  rigorously  ex  ante.  Thus,  
he  claims  that  ‘the  way  to  Science  is  itself  already  Science’.87  To  what  extent  
Hegel  succeeds  in  this  respect,  however,  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  
 
III.  IDENTITY?  
Rethinking  the  dialectics-­‐immanence  relation  
 
If   we   grant   the   compatibility   of   immanence   and   dialectics   in   light   of   our  
Hegelian   responses   to   Deleuze’s   anti-­‐dialectical   criticisms,   it   remains   to  
specify   the   dialectics-­‐immanence   relation   more   substantively.   Compatibility  
is   certainly   a   weaker   term   than   identity,   and   can   accommodate   significant  
differences.  Here  I  follow  Hegel’s  suggestion  that  the  logic  of  ‘either-­‐or’  –  e.g.  
‘identity’   or   ‘incompatibility’   –   is   an   abstract   fixation   of   the   understanding.  
But   if   immanence   and   dialectics   are   not   strictly   identical   or   incompatible,  
what  is  their  relation  and  reciprocal  excess?  
 
In   section   I,   immanence   was   defined   as   that   which   ‘remains   within’,   and  
dialectics  as  that  which  ‘goes  outside  itself’.  Here  we  must  push  dialectics  to  
its   logical   limit.   Against   consumptive   readings   of   Hegel   as   a   thinker   of  
omnipotent   totality,   it   should   be   insisted   that   dialectics   itself   depends   on   a  
non-­‐dialectical   moment.   That   is,   dialectical   totality   must   be   constitutively  
‘not-­‐all’.   Analogous   with   the   problems   posed   to   ‘pure   difference’   earlier,   an  
entirely   self-­‐sufficient   dialectic   would   be   exclusive   and   thus   entirely  
undialectical.   There   would   be   ‘no   dialectical   relation   between   dialectical  
totality   and   that   which   must   be   its   determinate   negation’.88  We   find   such   a  
relation,  however,  in  the  figure  of  ‘abrogation’  appearing  in  Hegel’s  doctrine  
                                                                                                               
86  See   M.   Rosen,   Hegel’s  Dialectic  and  its  Criticism  (Cambridge:   Cambridge   University   Press,  

1984).  
 
87  Hegel,  PS,  §88.  

 
88  F.   Ruda,   Abolishing  Freedom:  A  Plea  for  a  Contemporary  Use  of  Fatalism  (Lincoln:   University  

of  Nebraska  Press,  2016),  102-­‐103.    

 

  17  
  

of   ‘absolute   knowing’.   Following   Malabou   and   Žižek,   ‘[a]brogation   is   a  

sublation  of  sublation’   in   the   sense   of   a   relief   or   letting   go   of   ‘a   certain   type   of  
attachment’. 89  It   is   the   ‘immanent   conclusion   of   the   entire   [dialectical]  
process’,   redeeming   it   from   ‘the   “spurious   infinity”   of   an   endless   process   of  
sublation’.90  This  would  imply  a  certain  immanent  non-­‐relation  as  a  condition  
of   dialectical   relation.   Parenthetically,   this   is   perhaps   not   so   far   from   the  
colonic  (non)connection  Deleuze  inserts  in  the  title  of  his  final  essay  between  
‘immanence’  and  ‘a  life’.    
 
So,   if   dialectics   does   not   go   ‘all   the   way   down’,   how   should   we   define   this  
non-­‐dialectical,   yet   nonetheless   immanent,   ‘outside’?   If   dialectics   and  
immanence   were   wholly   co-­‐extensive,   then   the   moment   of   abrogation   or  
detachment   would   seem   to   imply   a   transcendent   ‘outside’   unaccounted   for  
by   either.   Conversely,   if   dialectics   is   ‘not-­‐all’   and   this   ‘outside’   is   not  
transcendent,  how  should  this  immanent  excess  be  qualified?  We  might  say  
that   to   ‘remain   within   itself’,   the   dialectic   must   abrogate   itself.   Yet,  
paradoxically,  this  is  precisely  what  ensures  its  status  as  dialectical.  Here  it  is  
the   negative   that   prevents   the   system   from   totalising   closure,   providing  
neither   a   window   upon   some   virtual   plentitude,   or   teleological   blueprint,   but  
an   ontological   transformability,   with   no   guarantee   of   creation   or   self-­‐
destruction.    
 
If   dialectics   is   not   ‘a   totalising   movement   towards   identity   and   the   Same’,91  
then   it   must   be   thought   of   as   ‘open’.     But   if   it   is   to   avoid   the   transcendence   of  
‘an   endless   process   of   unresolvable   negativity’, 92  then   it   must   also   be  
considered   as   in   some   sense   ‘bounded’.   We   must   push   further.   If   dialectical  
‘openness’   avoids   re-­‐inscribing   a   transcendent   ‘outside’,   does   this   mean  

                                                                                                               
89  C.   Malabou,   The   Future   of   Hegel:   Plasticity,   Temporality   and   Dialectic,   trans.   L.   During  
(London:  Routledge,  2009),  156.    
 
90  S.  Žižek,  The  Sublime  Object  of  Ideology  (London:  Verso,  2008),  xiv.    

 
91  I.  James,  The  New  French  Philosophy  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press,  2012),  87.    

 
92  Ibid,  87.    

  18  
  

transcendence   is   a   mere   illusion   wholly   explicable   in   terms   of   immanent  

processes  –  one  that,  as  Deleuze  and  Guattari  argue,  ‘arise[s]  from  the  plane  
[of  immanence]  itself,  like  vapors  from  a  pond’.93  The  question  here  is  one  of  
unilateral   dependency   and   its   simple   inversion.   As   we   know,   Deleuze   seeks  
to   root   out   residual   transcendence   that   would   denature   immanence,   by  
rendering   it   dependent   on   some   ‘beyond’.   But   what   are   we   to   make   of   his  
inversion,   where   transcendence   is   considered   simply   illusory   and   reducible  
to   the   plane   of   immanence?   Are   not   both   gestures   equally   beholden   to   the  
logic   of   origins?   Rephrasing   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   comment,   we   could   say  
that   here   transcendence   is   tolerated   ‘locally   or   at   an   intermediary   level,   a  
little   like   a   terraced   fountain   where   water   can   briefly   [transcendate]’,  94  but  
on   the   condition   that   it   comes   from   a   deeper   immanent   source.   If   the  
theological  image  left  too  much  ‘outside’,  perhaps  Deleuze  leaves  us  with  an  
overly   congested   ‘inside’.   Like   Hegel,   Deleuze   resists   the   relativisation   of  
immanence   within   ‘limits’,   but   one   wonders   whether   his   relativisation   of   a  
‘vaporous’   transcendence   to   the   plane   of   immanence   is   in   fact  
indistinguishable   from   a   generalisation   of   transcendence.   As   Hallward  
suggests,   Deleuze’s   ‘affirmation   of   an   expressive   or   creative   immanence   does  
not   so   much   eliminate   the   question   of   transcendence   as   distribute   it  
throughout  creation  as  a  whole’.95  
 
Pace   Deleuze   and   Guattari’s,   we   might   say   that   immanence   requires   a  
moment   of   genuine   transcendence,   just   as   dialectics   depends   on   a   non-­‐
dialectical  moment.  This  would  also  distinguish  immanence  from  the  pseudo-­‐
transcendence   defining   the   immanent   context   of   capital,   which,   as   Adorno  
observes,   ‘must   constantly   expand,   progress,   advance   its   frontiers,   not  
respect   any   limit’   in   order   to   remain   the   same.  96  Might   we   insist   on   an   active  
transcendence   that   contests   immanence,   instead   of   a   creative   immanence  
                                                                                                               
93  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  49.    

 
94  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  45.  

 
95  P.  
Hallward,   Out   of   this   World:   Deleuze   and   the   Philosophy   of   Creation   (London:   Verso,  
2006),  6.    
 
96  Adorno,  Negative  Dialectics,  26.    

  19  
  

that   is   impeded   by   a   false   transcendence?   If   Deleuze   worries   that   such   a  

conception  of  immanence  would  present  ‘a  prison  […]  from  which  [only]  the  
Transcendent   will   save   us’,97  we   might   affirm,   with   Adorno,   that   dialectics  
ensures   the   ‘prison   has   windows’.98  As   Hegel   underscored,   clinging   to   the  
‘either-­‐or’   (transcendence   or   immanence)   evades   the   problem.   Might   we  
think   of   immanence   neither   in   absolute   opposition   to   transcendence,   nor  
reduce  transcendent  to  a  mere  illusion  (even  a  necessary-­‐regulative  one),  but  
as  reciprocally  constitutive?  
 
Names   have   been   lent   to   such   a   thought   -­‐   the   ‘bounded-­‐unbounded’, 99  
‘immanent   transcendence’, 100  and   ‘horizontal   transcendence’. 101  We   could  
apply   Hegel’s   own   injunction   to   the   concepts   of   immanence   and   dialectics  
themselves:   ‘whatever   is   more   than   […]   a   word’   involves   ‘a   becoming-­‐other  
that  has  to  be  taken  back,  or  is  a  mediation’.102  Like  we  saw  with  immediacy  
and  mediation,  we  could  say  that  dialectics  and  immanence  are  irreducible  in  
form,  yet  unsustainable  in  their  abstract  isolation.    
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The  Deleuze-­‐Hegel  confrontation  yields  stark  contrasts:  originary  affirmation  
versus   dialectical   negation;   pure   difference   versus   contradiction;   and  
indetermining   virtuality   versus   actualised   determination.   Where   Deleuze  
pursues   immanence   in   terms   of   desubjectifying   immediacy   and   singularity,  

                                                                                                               
97  Deleuze  and  Guattari,  WP,  47.    

 
98  T.  W.  Adorno,  H.  Albert,  R.  Dahrendorf,  J.  Habermas,  H.  Pilot,  and  K.  Popper,  The   Positivist  

Dispute  in  German  Sociology,   trans.   G.   Adey   and   D.   Frisby   (London:   Heinemann   Educational  
Books  Ltd,  1977),  24.  
 
99  G.  Priest,  Beyond  the  Limits  of  Thought  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2006),  108.    

 
100  See   P.   Haynes,   Immanent   Transcendence:   Reconfiguring   Materialism   in   Continental  

Philosophy  (Bloomsbury,  2014).    

 
101  J.   Hyppolite,   Genesis   and   Structure   of   Hegel’s   Phenomenology   of   Spirit,   trans,   S.   Cherniak  

and  J.  Heckman  (Evanston:  Northwestern  University  Press,  1974),  544.    

 
102  Hegel,  PS,  §20.  

  20  
  

Hegel   goes   to   great   lengths   to   demonstrate   the   insufficiency   of   all   deictic  

gestures   through   a   dialectical   negotiation   of   the   subjective   rupture.   Hence  
their  preferred  images  of  the  ‘plane’  and  ‘pathway’  respectively.  If  the  Hegel-­‐
Deleuze  confrontation  proves  impossible  to  satisfactorily  adjudicate,  we  have  
at  least  seen  that  Hegel  has  concrete  answers  to  many  of  Deleuze’s  criticisms.    
 
So   what   is   the   relation:   predicative,   dialectics   is   immanence;   disjunctive,  
dialectics   or   immanence;   or   connective,   dialectics   and   immanence?   This  
cannot   be   answered   directly.   In   clarifying   the   stakes   of   the   dialectics-­‐
immanence  relation,  I  have  suggested  that  the  self-­‐definition  of  both  concepts  
requires   a   certain   supplement.   Just   as   dialectics   depends   on   a   constitutive  
non-­‐dialectical  moment,  immanence  depends  on  a  moment  of  transcendence.  
Pace  Deleuze,  it  is  perhaps  not  the  attribution  ‘to’  that  denatures  immanence,  
but  the  pure  ‘in’  to  the  exclusion  of  the  ‘to’.  If  dialectics  ensures  the  ‘open  to’  
of   immanence,   immanence   ensures   the   ‘remaining   within’   of   dialectics.   A  
certain   tension   between   the   methodological   and   ontological   senses   of   the  
terms   should   thus   be   preserved,   between   dialectics   as   immanent   method,  
and   immanence   as   dialectical   in   content.   By   abandoning   themselves  
exclusively   to   method   or   ontology,   they   would   lapse   into   either   empty  
formalism  or  a  positivist  discourse  on  being.  But  held  in  tension,  they  might  
resist  both  false  ontological  closure  and  utopian  recourse  to  a  ‘beyond’.  
 
 
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