the simplicities of the observer and the Louis H.
Louis H. Kauffman is a Professor of Mathematics at
Computational Synthesis in Radical Constructivism
56
and arguing would vanish if he had started
world can be studied in the circularity of its
creation.
« 9 »  We do not know if there are
worlds beyond our distinctions. Any world
that we study is a distinction/observer for
us who are it in full circularity.
« 10 »  These comments are a ladder for
me to walk up to the considerations in Fül-
lsack’s article. Since I have constructed them
for the sake of making a connection and
further conversation with Füllsack’s ideas, I
will not say that the ladder should be thrown
away. Nevertheless, anyone reading these
paragraphs is encouraged to construct his or
her own ladder from personal distinguish-
ing to the distinction/observation that “is”
the world. The issue of observer and world
is beautifully illustrated by Füllsack in his
discussion of the possible “cutout” nature
of observing observing (§10). When we
model observation and distinction, there is
a tendency to introduce extra distinctions
that make our models more cumbersome
than what goes on in actuality. The personal
observer observes himself without making
a sharp distinction between himself as the
observed and himself as an observer. This
occurs through circularity, which I believe
creates within our awareness a persistence
of vision that smooths the edges that might
otherwise be there. Occam’s razor does not
always cut; it also joins.
« 11 »  Consider the last implicit injunc-
tion to the reader – to construct his or her
own ladder to the world. The point about
including the observer in science is, I be-
lieve, that each of us must make the effort to
understand and create on our own terms. In
this respect, mathematics is a clear example
of second-order science. For there is no one
else who can substitute the understanding
that one finds for oneself, and mathemati-
cal knowledge is changed as each new per-
sonal understanding arises. The same is
true of other science, but there, the issue of
“taking another’s results on faith” arises. At
this point, issues of agency and collabora-
tion arise, just as they do in Füllsack’s Fig-
ure 1. The discussion of the relationship of
the personal power of individual observers
and the collective power of collaborating
observers in the making of science is the
beginning of an aware performance of the
creation of new knowledge.
Constructivist Foundations vol. 10, N°1
the University of Illinois at Chicago, specialized in
topology and knot theory. He is a long-time student
of Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form and a long-time
participant in second-order cybernetics. Kauffman
served as President of the American Society for
Cybernetics from 2005 to 2008. He is the recipient of
the 1993 Warren McCulloch award of the American
Society for Cybernetics and the 2014 Norbert Wiener
award of the American Society for Cybernetics.
Received: 26 October 2014
Accepted: 28 October 2014
Systemic-internal and
Theoretical Views on Second-
Order Observations
Edmundo Balsemão Pires
Coimbra University, Portugal
edbalsemao/at/icloud.com
> Upshot • I address Füllsack’s main con-
clusions in his article regarding the mean-
ing of second-order observations. Espe-
cially envisaged are the epistemological
and ontological difficulties raised by his
scrutiny of the merging between system-
ic-internal conditions of second-order
reflexivity and the thematic-theoretical
accounts of selection, intentionality and
purposiveness in evolutionary systems.
« 1 »  Courageously, Manfred Füllsack
articulates some well-established construc-
tivist categories concerning the significance
of observation, observer-dependency of
cognition and “second-order cybernetics,”
introduced in former work by Heinz von
Foerster, with views on eigenbehavior origi-
nating from John Conway’s “Game of Life”
and with some economic extensions of the
“intentional stance” of Daniel Dennett’s
modeling of cognition in psychic systems.
The author did not discuss the meaning of
the word “science” in his title, assuming that
the reader has a benevolent attitude to his
endeavor under the heading of “second-or-
der science.” The author’s essay missed the
terminological distinction between obser-
vations, descriptions, theory, types of theory
and meta-theory. Some equivocal meanings
by clarifying these analytic levels. Below, in
§7, when I refer to the need for restriction
to a metaphorical sense of the teleological
language of theory, I have in mind a con-
sequence of the blurred use of these levels
throughout the article.
« 2 »  Coherently, the author follows
George Spencer-Brown’s distinction be-
tween marked and unmarked space in or-
der to lay down the formal structure of the
binary space generated with the emergence
of an observation (see §§2, 8, 9, 13, 14 and
footnote 3 of §9). He again uses the marked/
unmarked border to emphasize the singular
character of the structure of a distinction
as a whole that can re-enter in itself, mak-
ing feasible the fixing of the source of the
indicative stance of the initial distinction
within new emerging distinctions of new
observations. This reflective frame consti-
tutes the formal condition of an observa-
tion of observers, or so-called second-order
observation, according to von Foerster’s
theoretical proposal (Foerster 1993: 46f)
and taking into account the work on circu-
lar causality since the beginnings of cyber-
netics (Pias 2003–2004). According to Fül-
lsack’s terminology, this elementary calculus
and the consequences that may follow from
the admission of an algorithmic increase in
neg-entropy in systems as an outcome of re-
entries of basic observational distinctions
can establish the grounds for a link between
second-order observation and complex-
ity formation / reduction in systems. The
systemic importance of this link goes from
physical systems to biopsychic processing of
information. The co-reference of first- and
second-order observations is the basis for
James Crutchfield’s “intrinsic emergence”
and for Terrence Deacon’s “teleodynamic
processes” (§23). Departing from Robert
Rosen’s anticipatory systems (§27), the au-
thor also developed the consequences of
that basic link for economic expectations
and economic eigenbehavior. In a general
formula, the author says that both types of
observations, first- and second-order, co-
evolve.
« 3 »  After a proficient distinction be-
tween first- and second-order observations
and observers, the author moves to a very
important thesis – the blended structure re-
sulting from the evolutionary co-condition-
 Radical Constructivism
ing between first- and second-order stances.
This thesis needs a detailed scrutiny, not
because it is flawed, but due to its crucial
meaning in the study of particular systems,
as in the case of normative systems and oth-
er meaning systems. The ways the blended
structures result can be very complex and
are connected to the modes we learn, as
Gregory Bateson’s deutero-learning concept
illustrated (Bateson 1972: 166ff). The ab-
sence of a proper level of deutero-learning
mechanisms can lead to paradoxical situa-
tions in behavior. A treatment of the para-
doxical sequels of the enchainment of first-
and second-order observations would have
been important in Füllsack’s essay.
« 4 »  Evolutionary purposiveness and
intentionality in evolution are conclusions
within inferences and arguing in metathe-
ory or in interpretative theory that should
remain in the context of such theory. The
article gives a considerable amount of ar-
gumentative space to these notions of in-
tentionality and purposiveness. However,
if one applies with hindsight the notion
of evolutionary “purposes” to empirical
systems that “evolve,” this means that one
misses not only the boundaries between
theory and observations (of first- and sec-
ond-order) but also the boundary between
observations and the domain of reference,
the “domain of existence” according to
Humberto Maturana’s terminology (Mat-
urana 1990). In some inferences from the
author’s arguments, this disentanglement
of levels is not persuasive or is absent. If
the general argument develops along the
physical-biopsychic corridor (empirically),
some of the essay’s conclusions risk ad-
vancing to a metaphysical terrain if the au-
thor passes from what has an observational
status in descriptions – and especially in
meta-theoretical descriptions – to what has
observational status in the inner circular
connections of the elements of the scruti-
nized systems. The example here is the use
of Darwinian metatheory of evolution and
its metatheoretical categories such as “best
fitted to…” to identify the results of second-
order observations in systems, instead of
the identification of the signs of self-aware-
ness of change in the system’s elements. I
consider such consequence a conclusion
that is ontologically biased from premises
that look like constructivist talk.
Systemic-internal and Theoretical Views Edmundo Balsemão Pires
« 5 »  The theme of change and percep-
tion of change is basic to the understanding
of evolution from within systems. In some
systems, the elements can reflect second-or-
der inferences in the way they organize their
moves to the next stages (deutero-learning
instances). This is the obvious case of sys-
tems whose elements are conceived as obey-
ing self-conscious rules. Here, the enchain-
ment of first- and second-order is connected
to time-reflexivity and to learning capacities
that deal with interpretation of sets of sym-
bols. But it is not possible to give the ability
to cope with Darwinian (theoretical) cate-
gories to the real elements of the biopsychic
processing of organic information (neural
nets / mental representations) in such a way
that one may legitimately claim that an im-
manent purposive orientation towards a
“best fit,” generally speaking, is present in
those elements. Some of Dennett’s ideas and
terminology about biopsychic “natural se-
lection” are stipulations of a meta-theoretical
description about the biopsychic corridor
and not results of second-order observa-
tions within the systems. If one transduces
the stipulated predicates of a so-called evo-
lutionary orientation of the candidates for
conscious representations into a real impe-
tus present in the neuro-psychic corridor to-
wards the “best fitted,” one can be accused of
a metaphysical generalization. If we say that
the elements of a system learn with the order
generated in the system through selective
operators and under selective conditioning
or pressure, this is a conclusion in an infer-
ence of a third-order observation and would
be correct, as such. However, some stipulated
predicates of meta-theoretical descriptions
that postulate what is systemic-dependent
(or only theory-dependent) as worldly can-
not be aspects of the inner systemic process-
ing of information. Theory or metatheory
are not components of the blended structure
of first- and second-order observations; they
are descriptions. Some are able to mirror the
real processing of information more directly
than others. But others are pure interpre-
tative endeavors. There is no “struggle for
life” in the brain, except in the brain of the
theorist when he writes theoretical state-
ments about best-fitted elements in a tem-
poral orientation. Going now to the psychic
systems, the belief in an inner orientation of
the elements of the system to promote the
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/10/1/046.fuellsack
“best fitted” for the final mental representa-
tion would entail a belief in the thesis of the
exclusive cognitive character of the whole
of the psychic system. But this last belief is
hardly compatible with the admission of
unconscious elements and sensory-motor
elements in the psychic system, as in Va-
rela’s “embodied mind” (Varela, Thompson
& Rosch 1991), with a relative autonomy
regarding the representational contents.
The theorist that declares that an emerged
representation is the best fitted to gain our
attention supposes that the psychic system
is fundamentally based on conscious rep-
resentations or is substantially working to
produce representations.
« 6 »  After the introduction, §§5–8
seem to postulate a quasi-immanent ten-
dency towards regularity and order in the
elements of biological systems. But the re-
marks on the example of the ants and the
pheromones differentiate coherently be-
tween two sides of a coin on the emission
of pheromones: coordination (order) and
diffusion (entropy). In the ant-pheromone
case, an observer that decides that what is
important is the emergence of coordination
in interaction resulting from the emission
of the pheromones is making a decision
favorable to the side of order. The observer
organizes its descriptions from this angle.
One may consequently say: “Order is a con-
struction of an observer” (§8). But the dif-
ficulties result from the need for clarification
of “blind spots” here. The observer emerges
from order, needs order and increases or-
der, but the price paid is partial blindness 57
regarding other possibilities. The author
puts this question correctly when he says
that the observation stance depends on the
results of a process, in §9. This is one side
of the problem, which normally coincides
with the notion of first-order observations.
But there is another side. This one results
from the recapturing of the process of the
emerging order by the system itself. This
opens the system to the possibility of going
beyond actuality and towards latency. It is
the orientation of the system to the latent
in it that makes a second-order observation
discernible. The system may then deal with
change, with its own modal configuration in
time, due to change, and indicate for further
processing that such and such observations
were results of singular states with their own
 time-modal-reference in the process of self-
change. In my view, this occurs through a
complex semiotic self-capturing of the sys-
tem in itself, which is quite similar to sec-
ond-order observations. Thus, the system
would be able to follow the selective process
leading to the state of order responsible for
the first-order observation, but always under
evolutionary limits. This explains why “sur-
viving species” are truly threatened species in
systems with sensitivity to change and the
perception of change. Due to the system’s
openness to second-order perspectives on
Computational Synthesis in Radical Constructivism
its own operations (“internal second-order
observations,” according to the author), the
system is able to process information about
possibilities of possibilities and other more
complex modal settings (Luhmann 1987:
31ff), which means that it puts an empha-
sis on possibilities instead of actuality, on
selection as a process instead on the results
of selection. Inside the system, such sensibil-
ity to latency and the possible is simultane-
ous with the emergence of self-awareness to
variation and change. What second-order
observations add to this is eventually the
inclusion of first-order observations in a
thematic modal-temporal frame. But the
most important is the fact that second-order
observations emerge if the sensibility to
change re-enters as a sensibility to changes in
the perception of change. According to such
self-perception, the reflection of evolution
and evolutionary conditions takes place.
« 7 »  An important theme is the discus-
sion of the status of the impact of second-
58 order observations in systemic couplings or
trans-systemic transductions. The author
discusses some aspects of this topic in the
section “Preceding and succeeding obser-
vational confirmation.” Here seems to be
located the main source of difficulties in
situating the retro-reference of psychic ob-
servations to biological systems or physical
systems, to the neural, brain infrastructure
– or so-called hardware – in the author’s
discussion of the “intentional stance.” This
is especially difficult if one assumes that no-
tions such as autopoiesis or operative clo-
sure are theoretically relevant. It is not easy
to reconcile autopoiesis with Dennett’s the-
sis about the biopsychic corridor and evolu-
tionary retro-reference from psychic to bio-
logical processes. Under these conceptual
restrictions, it is very difficult to see how
Constructivist Foundations vol. 10, N°1
psychic second-order observations develop
results that influence biopsychic or physical
systems in a non-metaphorical sense. If the
author is using the notions of intentional-
ity and “capitalization of gains” as equal to
neg-entropy gains appropriately, in the ex-
ample of the hammer (§27), to describe the
eigenbehavior of the elements of artificial
systems, he is surely talking about the pro-
gram of the machine as analogous to what
occurs in meaning systems such as antici-
patory moves in economic reasoning. How-
ever, in many ways it is possible to avoid
the intentionalist fallacy or the as if kind of
argumentation that follows from this pro-
cedure. The “following a plan” in the case
of the brain-mind corridor or hardware-
software coupling must be restricted to a
metaphorical use.
« 8 »  In his essay, Füllsack accepts a de-
gree of incorporation of what the theory and
metatheory stipulate regarding what comes
from temporal complexity or evolution and
the results of internal second-order reflec-
tion inside the systemic sequences. From the
above, I present my conclusions in a quasi-
axiomatic frame, seeking more clarity in the
distinction of two different dimensions with
two different results:
Inner-systemic dimension: What / how the
system observes (as first- and second-
order observations).
Result: The results of what/how the sys-
tem observes may re-enter in the stream
of the systemic processing and can be re-
taken for recursions of the same system
or in systems that operate under struc-
tural couplings (e.g., psychic and social
systems).
Theoretical-descriptive dimension: What/
how the theory describes what /how the
system observes.
Result: Unless the systems are able to
understand and mobilize the meaning
of theories, the theoretical conclusions
of the theories about what/how the sys-
tem observes cannot re-enter the stream
of the systemic processing. This can le-
gitimately happen only in a metaphori-
cal sense.
« 9 »  In other words, there are two di-
mensions (inner-systemic and theoretical-
descriptive) that lead to different outcomes
(results) in reflective recursions. The out-
comes of theoretical descriptions such as the
purposiveness of living organisms cannot
be retaken directly by the inner sequences
of the systems. On the contrary, reflective
outcomes of inner-systemic second-order
observations may be mobilised and used in
the system’s own sequentiality.
Edmundo Balsemão Pires is Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Coimbra. He wrote his Ph.D. on Hegel’s
political philosophy in 1999. Balsemão is the author of
the books Povo, Eticidade e Razão – Contributos para
o estudo da Filosofia Política de Hegel (2006) and A
Individuação da Sociedade Moderna (2011), and edited
Public Spaces, Power and Communication (2007),
Still Reading Hegel (2009) and Relations of the Self
(2010). His areas of interest include systems-theory,
constructivism and Luhmann’s theory of social systems.
Received: 14 October 2014
Accepted: 17 October 2014
Entropy as a Resource for
Double Contingency
Florian Grote
Native Instruments GmbH,
Germany • florian.grote/at/native-
instruments.de
> Upshot • Observers construct an inter-
nal, local state of order for the perspec-
tive of their observations, but in doing
so they increase the overall entropy of
the system they belong to, e.g., society,
by adding more options for potential
courses of action. Thus, the Second Law
of Thermodynamics is not just satisfied
in the circular condition of second-order
observations, but the increase in entropy
is actually exploited as a resource by a
system such as society, where it serves
as a prerequisite for double contingency.
« 1 »  If observation is an operation that
establishes order, as Manfred Füllsack sug-
gests in §§6–8 and throughout the article,
then we might be tempted to describe the
observation of observers as an operation
establishing order from order. As Füllsack
states in §5, the Second Law of Thermody-
namics dictates that in every system that is
separate from its environment, an increase