Partition case No.

4
Mangahas svs. Brobrio

FACTS:
S. Brobio (Pacifico) died intestate, leaving three parcels of land. He was survived by his wife,
respondent Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children; petitioner
Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children. The heirs of the deceased executed
a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late Pacifico Brobio with Waiver. In the Deed,
petitioner and Pacifico’s other children, in consideration of their love and affection for respondent
and the sum of P150,000.00, waived and ceded their respective shares over the three parcels of
land in favor of respondent. According to petitioner, respondent promised to give her an additional
amount for her share in her father’s estate. Thus, after the signing of the Deed, petitioner
demanded from respondent the promised additional amount, but respondent refused to pay,
claiming that she had no more money. While processing her tax obligations with the BIR,
respondent was required to submit an original copy of the Deed. Left with no more original copy
of the Deed, respondent summoned petitioner to her office and asked her to countersign a copy
of the Deed. Petitioner refused to countersign the document, demanding that respondent first give
her the additional amount that she promised. Because respondent did not have the money at that
time and petitioner refused to countersign the Deed without any assurance that the amount would
be paid, respondent executed a promissory note promising to pay the amount of P600,000.00.
When the promissory note fell due, respondent failed and refused to pay despite demand.
Petitioner made several more demands upon respondent but the latter kept on insisting that she
had no money. Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against
respondent. In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent admitted that she signed
the promissory note but claimed that she was forced to do so. She also claimed that the
undertaking was not supported by any consideration. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint. The
CA said in its decision that petitioner should have filed [an action] for partition instead of a case
for specific performance.

ISSUE:
Whether partition should have been filed.

HELD:
No, the foregoing discussion (as to whether the Legal Wife’s consent is vitiated or not/W/N there
was consideration in the issued PN, etc.) renders the final issue insignificant. Be that as it may,
we would like to state that the remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the
circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common.
Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived
their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership;
there is nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person.
Forcible entry and Unlawful Detainer Case No. 1
Suarez vs. Emboy, Jr.

FACTS:
Subject lot is located in Cebu and owned by Carmencita. Said lot was used to be a part of Lot No.
1907–A, which was partitioned among the heirs of Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion
Pacres (Asuncion), to wit: Spouses Padilla, Heirs of Vicente Padilla xxx, Baricuatro, and Claudia
Padilla-Emboy (Claudia). Felix and Marilou own the house which stood on the subject lot (they
claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot during her lifetime who succeeded
her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion). Heirs of Vicente asked their cousins Felix and Marilou to
VACATE the subject lot, they refused. They then received a demand letter from the lawyer of
Carmencita on February 23, 2004 (they were informed that Carmencita had already purchased
the lot from the former’s relatives). However, the respondents did not heed the demand, instead,
they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e.,
forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot
No. 1907–A. Felix and Marilou filed before the RTC of Cebu City a complaint for nullification of
the partition and for the issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No.
1907–A. Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the respondents a complaint for unlawful
detainer (alleging that she bought the lot from the heirs of Vicente Padilla, the registered owners
thereof and the persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As
their successor–in–interest, she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the
right to demand from the respondents to vacate the same). MTCC ruled in favor of CARMENCITA
and ordered Felix and Marilou to vacate. RTC affirmed. On appeal, the CA reversed (ruled in
favor of Felix and Marilou).. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had sufficiently alleged and
proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

HELD:
No, Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for unlawful detainer are
present in the case at bar. In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional
facts must be alleged and sufficiently established:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent. Carmencita failed to
clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents entered the subject lot and constructed
a house upon it. Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who
specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came
about. Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation,
that (a) the respondents’ initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by
the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully withholding the
subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and new registered owner, had
demanded for the former to vacate the property. It is worth noting that the absence of the first
requisite assumes even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for decades,
they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof. Again, this Court stresses that to
give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.