EN BANC

June 30, 1987

G.R. No. L-53373

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When
the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order
of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order
was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate
the matter to the appellate court. 3

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals
that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General
he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting
the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the
Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the
accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was
given time to file an opposition thereto.10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested
by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to
move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment of a pre-existing obligation the
Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also
erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and therefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the moming.
 SO ORDERED. 11

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition
and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a
restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from
the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23,
1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set
aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said
criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said
case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16

In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to
comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he
recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the
comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the
Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En
Banc resolved to give due course to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating
that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may
not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his
opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot
be controlled by the complainant. 20 Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the
duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed
within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become
convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a puma facie case that would
warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he
finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24 Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to
prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of
criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and
Courts that grant the same commit no error. 26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the
re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. 27 In a
clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of
prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the
Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an op pressive and vindictive
manner. 30

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who
has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is
the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of
the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The
only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36 or the right of the People to due
process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of
Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny
it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of
Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the
Secretary of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution
of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple.1âwphi1 The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to
proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment
as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the
People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the
hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to
appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control. 38

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal
or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction
and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely
for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Teehankee C.J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 54; HON.
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN
YABUT and FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment2 in this special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the
deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:

A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST
WERE ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY Of THE
LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
APPEAL FROM SAID PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE.

B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN

PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO
SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE
ACCUSED.

C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED WAS MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND
THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.

On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.

On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol
in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masantol Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago
Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo
Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir Yumul, a
certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a
preliminary examination in the form of searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate
Serafin B. David of the MCTC issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.

Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco
Yambao submitted his counter affidavit.3

On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution 4 in Criminal Case No. 95-360 finding
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and that the accused were probably guilty thereof.
His findings of fact and conclusions were as follows:
That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago "Docsay" Yabut,
including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol, Pampanga for
the purpose of looking for a certain PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.

At first, the accused, riding on [sic] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol, Pampanga inquiring
about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of Mayor Lacap for the purpose of inquiring
[about] the [the location of the] house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to reach the
house of said Virgilio Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.

Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all riding, stopped and
parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of the accused descended from the truck
and positioned themselves around the house while others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the
truck with a bodyguard.

Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside the house of Virgilio Dimatulac [and]
were even offered coffee.

[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go down to see the
Mayor outside in front of his house to say sorry.

[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and then, the son of
Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words: "What did you do to my father?!"

One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as a consequence, he died; and before
he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut as the one responsible.

That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to go on board the
truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and asking for help.

On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to accused John Doe
Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was asked to bring the accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he
did.

Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to Masantol.

The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the witnesses presented,
[is] satisfied that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder was committed and
that the accused in conspiring and confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.

Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.

That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against Santiago Yabut,
Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David, Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato
Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan Magat with no bail recommended.

However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the police authorities to
furnish the court [a] description personae of the accused for the purpose of issuing the needed warrant of
arrest.

The accused were furnish [sic] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for them to file their
counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic] law.

As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and all the others waived
the filing of the same.

A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which the court finds it [sic]
straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be consistent with truth, human nature and [the]
natural course of things and lack of motives [sic], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared
to] the others, which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional liberty,
and the court's previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward he entire records of the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further action, together with the bodies of accused
Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to be remanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga. 5 (emphasis supplied)

In a sworn statement,6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut, accompanied by a number of
bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's
uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed the group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut
told Virgilio to come down from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul
heard a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor Yabut's companions. Peter
Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter spoke to the people of Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter
Paul added in a supplemental statement (Susog na Salaysay) 7 that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.

It his Sinumpaang Salaysay,8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police Station in Masantol,
Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m., while he was at the polite station, three men
approached him and asked for directions to the house of Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1
Labet Malabanan of Minalin, Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of the three returned to
ask whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at home. The group left on
board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day, SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone
call at the police station reporting that someone had shot Virgilio Dimatulac.

Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation. However, it is
not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago
Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut (hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-
affidavits before the MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding," submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.

In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that the YABUTs and the
assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed
was only homicide, not murder. In support of such finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:

The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must be noted that to
constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the employment of the [sic] means of
execution were give [sic] the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted . . . .

In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the evidence, such that the
attack upon the victim while descending the stairs was so sudden and unexpected as to render him no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter Paul
Dimatulac, negate the presence of the second requisite. According to the said witness, the victim was
already descending when Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and immediately thereafter,
he heard the gunshot. This would therefore show that the assailant did not consciously adopt the position of
the victim at the time he fired the fatal shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to
afford no opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor Yabut in
giving the command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did not concert the means and
method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there would have been no necessity for him to give the
order to the assailant. The method and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant at the spur of the
moment and the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously adopted. Treachery
therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably believe[d] to have been committed is Homicide
as no circumstance would qualify the killing to murder.

Alfonso-Flores then ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:

1. An information be filed with the proper court charging Santiago,

Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one John Doe alias Danny
as conspirators in the crime of Homicide;

2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap

a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Bladimir
Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari, Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus
dela Cruz and Joselito Miranda.

Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.

The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and clarificatory questions were
propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.

On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners, appealed the resolution
of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:

1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED IN RULING THAT

THERE WAS NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE
ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:

(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH THE AID OF
ARMED MEN AND WITH THE USE OF A PERSON TO INSURE OR AFFORD
IMPUNITY;

(B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE,

REWARD, OR PROMISE;

(C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION OF A

DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN THE SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING" WAS
RAGING ON NOVEMBER 3, 1995;

(D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENT PREMEDITATION;

2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO
BY RULING OUT CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST FORTUNATO
MALLARI AND NOT CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.

To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted, petitioners asserted that the
meeting of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former purposely searched for the victim at the height of a
typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut even remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung
ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the
stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari represented to the deceased that the latter was
being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the victim declined the invitation by claiming he was sick, accused
Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come down by saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in
the truck." In view of that enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accused's
resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further narrated that when the deceased ran away after the first shot, the gunman still
pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away at a safe distance and told everyone in the truck,
"Tama na, bilisan ninyo," (That's enough, move quickly) without giving medical assistance to the deceased and without
exerting any effort to arrest the gunman.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.

On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution 11 ordering the release of accused Evelino
David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of
Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order, the Provincial Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996."

On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Flores and Provincial
Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against
the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny Manalili" and docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of
the information read as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol, province of Pampanga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3 Virgilio
A. Dimatulac, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac
on his abdomen with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him a gunshot wound which cause[d] the
death of the said victim.

All contrary to law.

The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on "2/27/96", i.e., a day
before its filing in court.
On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash bonds of the YABUTs, each
in the amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest. 13

On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor, filed two (2) motions with
the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All Accuseds 14 [sic]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer
Proceedings, 15 copies of which were furnished the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was
grounded on the pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the motion.
Judge Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16

17
On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili.

On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order and the Motion to Defer
Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court and were bound by the condition therein to "surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek
permission from the court should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the second, the pendency of the appeal before
the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial court had to consider their right to a
speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for the resolution of the appeal. Then invoking this Court's rulings
in Crespo v. Mogul 19 and Balgos v. Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a
motion to defer the filing of the information for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from the
Secretary of Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the information in court.

In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, insisted on the
need for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the accused's right to a speedy trial would not be impaired
because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear
and convincing proof that the killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in
treachery; and contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy trial was inconsistent with their filing of
various dilatory motions during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition.

On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order until "such time that all the
accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer Proceedings as he found no compelling reason
therefor, considering that although the appeal was filed on 23 February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any
indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the
accused on 12 April 1996. 23

It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to Defer Proceedings since, on
12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a
petition for certiorari questioning the order of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26,
1996." Arraignment was then reset to 3 May 1996.

On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) on the ground
that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's appeal in the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b)
prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the
case into Murder." At the same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition 26 with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M).

On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment 27 with the trial court wherein he
opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is nothing in the record . . . which shows that the subject
killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that he "will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle
the prosecution of [the] case" in view of the latter's petition to inhibit Judge Roura.

On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to Branch 54 of the RTC,
presided over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28

On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 29

On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection with their Motion to Defer
Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense
committed was murder, not homicide. The documents which they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public
prosecution were the following:

a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.

b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.

 c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.

d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.

e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.

f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.

g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation of Criminal Case No. 95-
360, containing the testimony of:

a. Peter Paul Dimatulac

b. Vladimir D. Yumul

c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan

d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao

h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.

i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.

j. Sketch

k. Unscaled Sketch

Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a Resolution 31 directing respondent
therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from notice and to show cause within the same period "why no writ
of preliminary injunction should be issued as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on
the prayer for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment [was] submitted."

On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with the RTC, furnishing the trial court with a copy of the
aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the trial court to the rulings of this Court in
"Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals . . . as well as the decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals."

33
On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May 1996. On the latter date, the
YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34

Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment,35 citing
the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the
application for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that
the filing of the information for the lesser offense of homicide was "clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of the
unquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and asserted that a number of Supreme Court
decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view of the pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.

On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the accused to file their comment on the Urgent Motion to Set Aside
Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.

In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary Teofisto Guingona of the
DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled that treachery was present and directed the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga "to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to
murder," and to include Fortunato Mallari as accused in the amended information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary
Guingona read as follows:

Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3 Dimatulac.
Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the stairs. The attack was unexpected
as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to
speak. From the circumstances surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
 Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and deliberately adopted by the
respondents to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The admission of respondent
Malabanan is replete with details on how the principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the
assailant and others, had consciously and deliberately adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime.
According to him, while they were on their way to the victim's house, Mayor Yabut already instructed Danny,
the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo lang, alam no na king ano ang gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This explains why
Danny positioned himself near the stairs of the victim's house armed with a handgun, such positioning was
precisely adopted as a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered
nobody else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position was very strategic to
ensure the killing of the victim.

As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit: (1) employment
of means of execution that gives the person [attacked] no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]).
In the case at bar, these two (2) requisites are present as established from the foregoing discussion. Hence,
there being a qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed herein is murder, not homicide
(People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).

Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao, we find sufficient
evidence against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against Yambao. As can be gleaned from the
sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to go
with them, using as a reason that he (victim) was being invited by General Ventura. He was also seen trying
to fix the gun which was used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent with the claim that his
presence at the crime scene was merely passive.

On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed, under the obtaining
circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the request of Mayor Yabut to provide
transportation to the assailant. There being an actual danger to his life then, and having acted under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear, reason dictates that he should be freed from criminal liability. 38

The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, 39 citing Section 4 of "Administrative/Administration Order No. 223 of the
DOJ." 40

In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial court's attention to the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation and Motion 42 dated 1 July 1996,
petitioners asked the trial court to grant their motion to set aside arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the
Manifestation and Motion 43 of the Solicitor General dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
40393 wherein the Solicitor General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better interest of justice, [the]
Petition for Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In support of said prayer, the Solicitor
General argued:

2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice would find their
Appeal meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be directed to upgrade the Information
to Murder and extreme prejudice if not gross injustice would thereby have been avoided.

3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the issuance of a writ

of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in holding the arraignment of the accused, pending
resolution of the Appeals with the Secretary of Justice.

The YABUTs opposed 44 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they had already been
arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the public prosecutor — not the private
prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case.

In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary of Justice set aside his
order to amend the information from homicide to murder considering that the appeal was rendered moot and academic by the
arraignment of the accused for homicide and their having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:

Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been arraigned on May 20,
1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as shown by a copy of the court order dated May
20, 1996, the petition for review insofar as the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been rendered moot
and academic.

However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information for homicide.
On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and to Admit Amended
Information.46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as one of the accused.

In his Order 48 of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment, citing Section 4, DOJ
Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for
reconsideration 49 of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did
not violate the accused's right to speedy trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged was murder
and did not reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 that holding
accused's arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally, petitioners contended that in proceeding
with the arraignment despite knowledge of a petition for prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court
violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that
it raised no argument which had not yet been resolved. 51

On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato Mallari, 52 which the trial court
granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying petitioners' motion to set aside private
respondents' arraignment. 53 As expected, Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court's order and clamored for consistency in
the trial court's rulings. 54

In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying petitioners' motion to set aside
arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and explaining that the prosecution of an offense should be under the
control of the public prosecutor, whereas petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various
motions to defer proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed accused Mallari's motion for reconsideration
moot and academic. 56

On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 dismissing the petition therein
for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the
dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of petitioners' appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment.

Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura was ordered by the
Supreme Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was
previously presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge Roura informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that
he had already inhibited himself from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59

On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari/Prohibition and Mandamus. They urge this Court to
reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private
respondents; order that no further action be taken by any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved;
and order respondents Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to
murder.

Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private respondents tricked the
victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an
orchestrated effort on the part of [private respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in view
of evading prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder," as shown by the following events or circumstances:

(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature of the crime
committed to homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a motion for reinvestigation filed
by the YABUTs who had not yet been arrested.

(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the killing and went into
hiding for four (4) months until the offense charged was downgraded.

(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the Secretary of Justice and request to defer
any action on the case.

(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the private prosecutor from
further participating in the case.

(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in open court that
there was no prima facie case for murder, notwithstanding the pendency of petitioners'
appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.

(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order inhibiting himself and the
order regarding the transfer of the case to Branch 54, public respondent Judge Villon set
 the case for arraignment and, without notice to petitioners, forthwith arraigned the accused
on the information for homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.

(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to the arraignment nor take
any action to prevent further proceedings on the case despite knowledge of the pendency of
the appeal.

(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June 1996 of the
Secretary of Justice directing the amendment of the information to charge the crime of
murder.

Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment.
Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; he should have deferred the
proceedings just the same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment
despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further, Judge Villon unjustly invoked private
respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three (3) months from the filing of the information on 23 February
1996; overlooked that private respondents were estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing,
only to resurface when the charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of
private respondents. Judge Villon should have been more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding with the arraignment,
the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.

Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the Secretary of Justice
once the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances where the appellants are the accused, since by
submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their appeal.

In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside private respondents'
arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 may 1996, due to petitioners' pending appeals with the
DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the
DOJ had not yet resolved petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the
fact that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86 days prior to private respondents'
arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC's 26 March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer,
opting instead for Judge Roura's recusal and recourse to the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the
Court of Appeals, it was but proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondent, to which the
public and private prosecutors did not object.

Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the exercise of discretionary
powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation of powers, petitioners' recourse should have been
to the President. While as regards petitioners' plea that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide
to murder, private respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the determination as to what offense was committed is
a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President.

As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by complainants is allowed only if the
complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused
can appeal. Hence, petitioners' appeal was improper.

Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the public prosecutor of the
private prosecutor's authority to handle the case.

In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the petition be denied because:
(a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of
Justice shall be dismissed motu proprio; (b) the filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive
under Section 4(2), D.O. No. 223, i.e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause shall
not hold the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated petitioners by initially deferring
arraignment pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any
restraining order, arraignment was properly had; and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and
others had not been arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending
resolution of their petitions before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.

Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude that something had gone
awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly
the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State and to private complainants, herein petitioners.
First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary liberty.
However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs were not arrested; neither did they surrender.
Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or
upon motion of the YABUTs, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have
done so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the provincial
prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, as here, this difference
of opinion must be on the basis of the review of the record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as
she had no other option under the circumstance, she was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the
YABUTs and all other accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further stretching
her magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit their counter-affidavits without first
demanding that they surrender because of the standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the
YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the
lesser offense of homicide.

Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused "Danny," despite the fact
that they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives from justice for having avoided service of the
warrant of arrest issued by the MCTC and having failed to voluntarily surrender.

Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. She could not have
been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending
the killing, and that the private prosecution had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of
the Secretary of Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's stand and exposed the blatant errors of
Alfonso-Reyes.

Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28 February 1996. It is
interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996, it was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only
on 27 February 1996. This simply means that the Office of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information.
No undue prejudice could have been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact,
they filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores was extremely generous to
the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not afford the offended parties the same courtesy by at least
waiting for instructions from the Secretary of Justice in view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter
for instructions. Clearly, under the circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.

Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga did not even
bother to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private prosecution had appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores
and had sought, with all the vigour it could muster, the filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and
established by the evidence before it.

Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor did not even
have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This
amounted to defiance of the DOJ's power of control and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate
on. Moreover, in an unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to announce
that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case" simply because the
private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura. Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here
had not waived the civil action nor expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they
had the right to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of the Rules of Court.

It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores. The last paragraph
of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city
fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the
complaint or information.

It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended party or the accused.

More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over prosecutors. Thus,
in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held:

Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, 62 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors;
and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
 Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the
secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and
City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38,
paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate;
direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; . . . .

Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:

Sec. 3. . . .

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State
Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform such other duties as may be
assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a
specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office,
division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper
Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review,
modify, or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service.

"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative
law as follows:

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer

to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform such
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should
be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.

DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the accused to appeal from
resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section
1 thereof provides, thus:

Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State
Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City Prosecutor dismissing a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to
the Secretary of Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.

While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not barred from appealing
from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that their complaint was for murder. By holding
that only homicide was committed, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for
murder. Accordingly, petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar redress
of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case, demonstrated what unquestionably
appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. Section 1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by
the offended parties are allowed only in cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule
112, Rules of Court would be meaningless.

We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section 1 of DOJ Department
Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraph thereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold
the filing of the information. As stated above, Section 4 applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision
reads:
 Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of minifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If
the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu proprio by
the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the
filing of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)

The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or accused. So we held
in Marcelo v. Court of
Appeals, 63 that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul, 64 reiterated in Roberts v. Court of Appeals, 65 forecloses the power
of authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information
already having been filed in court. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining
a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case,
the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed
resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we went further by saying that Crespo could not have
foreclosed said power or authority of the Secretary of Justice "without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court" which is quoted above.

Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the information for homicide,
depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.

As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26
March l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the accused who are
out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not
shown any indication that [the] appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Neither rhyme nor reason or even
logic, supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate action thereon was called for as the
accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if they wanted to. To hold that
arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to
the second motion, Judge Roura was fully aware of the pendency of petitioner's appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early
as 23 February 1996. In fact, he must have taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of the accused only on 12
April 1996, and on that date, after denying petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to defer proceedings, he
further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten (10) days within which to file a petition for certiorari to
question his denial of the motion to defer and of the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the better part of
wisdom suggested that, at the very least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned
them that if the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.

Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same time, moved to inhibit Judge
Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" inhibit himself from the case on 29 April 1996 67 and to
transfer the case to the branch presided by public respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the records of the case on 30
April 1996. From that time on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch,
Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20 May 1996. If Judge Villon only perused
the record of the case with due diligence, as should be done by anyone who has just taken over a new case, he could not
have helped but notice: (a) the motion to defer further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days
within which to file a petition with the Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; (4)
the resolution of the Court of Appeals directing respondents to comment on the petition and show cause why the application
for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted and deferring resolution of the application for a temporary
restraining order until after the required comment was filed, which indicated a prima facie showing of merit; (5) the motion to
inhibit Judge Roura precisely because of his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura's
subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30 April 1996 supporting a
charge of murder, not homicide; and (8) most importantly , the pending appeal with the DOJ.

All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious attitude as these were
unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge
Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may be true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as he
had, procedurally speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on his sound discretion, 68 his
judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 April 1996 and to initially determine, for his
own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he
could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of
circumstances, Judge Villon should have heeded our statement in Marcelo 69 that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least, respect
for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending
before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.

We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the
YABUTs on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties were deprived of due process.
Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to function in a manner
consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon
and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need be reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be
punished 70 and judges and prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to see justice done, i.e.,
not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to
suffer. 71

Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, 72 they are the representatives not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As
such, they are in a peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer.

Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected to prosecute the public
action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved, but at all times cautious that they refrain from
improper methods designed to secure a wrongful conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent
facts at the judge's disposal with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the
evidence, with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's mind as to the accused's innocence or guilt.

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is
akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies
of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence
reposed in him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive jurisdiction and
competence, 76 his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. 78

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of
society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the
party wronged, it could also mean injustice. 79 Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.

In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon was gross, grave and
palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a constitutional sense, due process. As to said
judges, such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto,
thereby nullifying as having been done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the
motion to reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.

These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must remedy the situation before the
onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced
in Galman v. Sandiganbayan: 80

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified.
The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to
exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to
render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention of
redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.

We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere ministerial task to
process each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our democratic society under a rule of law.

Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution, holding that murder
was committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the information, solely on the basis of the
information that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and
supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered
to the latter's inappropriate conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon in respect of the arraignment of the
YABUTs. The sins of omission or commission of said prosecutors and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that
the crime committed was murder, in unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended
parties. The DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the shocking
"mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully serve the ends of justice. The DOJ
could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers over its personnel, the DOJ could have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in not, inter
alia, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal, informing the DOJ, from time to
time, of the status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from
further participating in the case.

Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of
arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.

We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended
with grave abuse of discretion.

It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal of the case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be
invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in
this case as above discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the Motion to Defer
Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the
orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3 May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996
denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not
guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July
1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice
of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall
proceed in said case with all reasonable dispatch.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936,
entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."

The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby
ordered DISMISSED.3

Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand
Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial
Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC
of Valenzuela City.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
outcome of the civil action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No.
127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the
amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-
complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa
Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were
raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest"
before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.

In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the
MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court
itself only on 07 June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on two
counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the
appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed
to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review 5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.

In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for appropriate action.

On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent and private complainant to comment on the
petition.

In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing
Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to
[respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the private
[complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private
respondent then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 to file her
complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.

The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.

xxx

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person.

In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended,
are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of
the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is in
consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended,
governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the Supreme Court in
Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 9

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326,
as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription for
violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that
interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.10 It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant
Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v.
Reyes, Jr.11 that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have
interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence
superseding the aforesaid ruling.

Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with
the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for
violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure
to comply with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and the required proof of
service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.

Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases
relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 15 Respondent pointed out that the
crime imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326,
as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws,
as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.

The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such
offense.

We find merit in this petition.

Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the
12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that
attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition
was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.

With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent
had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law
reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
xxx.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or
by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive
period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened
by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. 17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s
Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.

Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more
distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the
prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.

In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled
that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do
not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of
presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of
the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of
Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before the
Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case
for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under
his control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON.
LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity
suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an
unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of
their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV,
of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be
set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No.
87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent
city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a
consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved
for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The
same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not
guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later,
private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order
of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate
the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express
rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing
of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement and rationale
would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a
logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to
be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the
legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a
complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a
divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to
be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make
the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and
jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between Alice Van
Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if
true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew
that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there
be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the
old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman
to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that
the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to
stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity
would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said
case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this
case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A
cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although
an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation
akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21,
1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 153284 April 17, 2007

REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR SANTIAGO M. TURINGAN, as alter ego of the Secretary of Justice in Region V and STATE
PROSECUTOR and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON SSS 1 CASES IN REGION V ROMULO SJ. TOLENTINO, in their official
capacities and for and in representation of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARITES C. DE LA TORRE, in her official
capacity as counsel for the complainant Social Security System Bicol Cluster, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19, and
MURIEL C. APOLINAR, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for certiorari and mandamus 2 seeks the nullification of the March 13, 2002 and April 12, 2002 orders of respondent Judge
Zeida Aurora B. Garfin3 in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 entitled People of the Philippines v. Muriel C. Apolinar. The orders
granted private respondent Muriel C. Apolinar’s motion to quash and denied petitioner state prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino’s motion
for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 arose from an Information charging Apolinar for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections
19(b) and 28(e) of RA 82824 for non-remittance of social security and employees’ compensation5 premiums of his workers for the
period January 1997 to December 1998, and nonpayment of the 3% monthly penalty for late remittance. The Information, signed by
state prosecutor Tolentino, read:

The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Legazpi City, accuses MURIEL C. APOLINAR, as a
registered trimobile operator with business address at 108-1 San Mateo Street, Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga City, for Violation of Section
22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of R.A. 8282[,] otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, committed as follows:

That on or about February 1997 and up to the present, in the City of Naga, Camarines Sur, Philippines, within the functional jurisdiction
of SSS Naga Branch and the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused while being a registered trimobile
operator, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally refuse and fail and continuously refuse and fail to remit the premiums due
for (sic) his employee to the SSS in the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SIX PESOS (₱2,256.00), Philippine
Currency, representing SSS and EC premiums, for the period from January 1997 to December 1998, and the 3% penalty per month for
late remittance in the amount of TWO THOUSAND FORTY EIGHT PESOS and 26/100 (₱2,048.26) computed as of 30 July 2000,
despite lawful demands by letter in violation of the above-citied provisions of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the SSS and the
public in general.

CONTRARY TO LAW.61ªvvphi1.nét

The accompanying certification, also signed by state prosecutor Tolentino, read:

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE REQUIRED INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE UNDERSIGNED
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND UNDER OATH AS OFFICER OF THE COURT, THAT THERE IS
REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE OFFENSE HAS BEEN COMMITTED, THAT THE ACCUSED IS PROBABLY
GUILTY THEREOF AND THAT THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION IS WITH THE PRIOR AUTHORITY AND APPROVAL OF THE
REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTOR.7

Prior to his arraignment, Apolinar moved for the quashing of the Information on the ground that state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the
authority to sign it.

On February 13, 2002, Tolentino opposed Apolinar’s motion. He contended that he was clothed with the authority to investigate, file the
necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases in view of his designation as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V under
Regional Order No. 97-024-A dated July 14, 1997.

In an order dated March 13, 2002,8 respondent Judge Garfin dismissed Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 for lack of jurisdiction. State
prosecutor Tolentino moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in an order dated April 12, 2002. 9 Thus, this petition.
The petition must be dismissed.

The issue in this petition — whether or not state prosecutor Tolentino had the authority to file the Information for violation of RA 8282
despite the absence of a written authority or approval of the provincial or state prosecutor — is similar to that in People v. Garfin.10 In
that case, the same state prosecutor Tolentino charged Serafin Saballegue also for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections
19(b) and 28(e) of RA 8282. The certification accompanying the Information (which was identical to the certification in the Information
against Apolinar) was also signed by Tolentino. The case was also raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Garfin.

Three days after pleading not guilty to the charge, Saballegue filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Information was filed
without the written authority or approval of the city prosecutor. This was opposed by Tolentino.

After considering the arguments of the parties, respondent Judge Garfin granted Saballegue’s motion. She denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Tolentino.

Tolentino filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in this Court assailing respondent Judge Garfin’s orders granting Saballegue’s
motion to dismiss and denying the motion for reconsideration. This Court, thru Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno, dismissed the
petition and declared:

[I]n the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS
cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-
0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that
cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 11

In this case, state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to file the Information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0582 because there
was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of
the Information by the city prosecutor. In accordance with Garfin, the Information suffered from a jurisdictional defect. Respondent
Judge Garfin correctly dismissed the case against Apolinar for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Costs against state prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

April 24, 2018

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First
Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case
for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting
of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption
of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is
also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and
in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return
and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that
were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file
for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages." 6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the
meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. 17 Aside
from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26. 18 This provision was originally
deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino
signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations
of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law. 24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and
obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid
divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated
to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and
for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the
husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole
custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is
binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree
obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce
the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced
decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability .
The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled
the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen,
against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign
divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides
in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond
of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation
before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in
the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy.
In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on
the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests
that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia
v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to
the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it
should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute,
a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until
the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. 37 The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure." 38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of
the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To
obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the
rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. 42 Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse
to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the
residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their
alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. 45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence
to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is
upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially involves a public
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which
have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one
of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree
initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his
her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar
to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused
of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the
bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically
apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We
adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, 57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted
to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection,
rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and
conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge
the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of
marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage
it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute
divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce,
such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross
insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect
and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an
absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in
the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2
absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
 e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except
when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below
twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or
ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or
appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the
reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present
at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is
entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite
earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and
their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects
can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country. 77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. 78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in
order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A.
No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and
R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose
sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a
restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of
the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions. 83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of
the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. 84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit
or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact of divorce must still
first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his
office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are
constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. 93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign
court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations
in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally seeks: (1) to nullify the order 1 of respondent
judge admitting the amended information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of not guilty entered by order of respondent judge when petitioner refused to be
arraigned on the amended information for lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to nullify the appointment of a counsel de
oficio/PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit respondent judge from "over-speedy and preferential scheduling of the trial of
the aforementioned criminal case;" and (5) to compel respondent judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the
amended information.

Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information 2 for the crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused
the death of said Maureen Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes
independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro
Hultman which prevented her death.

After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.

Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of court to file an amended information and to
admit said amended information. The amended information, 4 filed on October 31, 1991, reads:

That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to
kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting
mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.

Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of the prosecution. On November 13, 1991, the trial court
issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.

At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a
preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for
petitioner.

Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not
take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein
petitioner.

Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:

 (a) Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation,
after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted;

(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an accused who is
represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial of due
process and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court; and

(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed and preferentially scheduled for trial
over and at the expense and sacrifice of other, specially older, criminal cases. 8

In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment to the basic petition. It appearing from a
further review of the record that the operative facts and determinant issues involved in this case are sufficiently presented in the petition
and the annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions of petitioner and respondents, the Court has decided to dispense
with the aforesaid comment to obviate needless delay in fairness to petitioner.

I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein underscored, that the accused ". . . did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the
head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman . . ." constitutes a substantial
amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner
further submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish that the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated (sic) by timely and
able medical assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it could have been caused by a supervening act or fact
which is not imputable to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that there being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be
allowed after arraignment and during the trial.

Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely different offense,
involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary
investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted.

We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the trial court.

Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court,
at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to
the substitution of the information or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after the defendant
pleaded, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from the
original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information must be with leave of
court as the original information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of the
accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy.
On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or
is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of
information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise,
where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to
commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In
this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 10

Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence the former
is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances
such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning
and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for both. This is because, except
for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.

In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is
involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same
offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will
suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a
substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable.

As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time before
the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do
not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription. 14

We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form and provided that no
prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. 15 The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced
by such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally
available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 16

Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the
offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the
victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious
act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner
may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is
allowed even during the trial of the case.

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite
preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to
be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The
amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges
essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime
originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry
into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. 17

We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein petitioner whose counsel of record
refused to participate in the proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated herein as baseless,
we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the case. And, finally,
for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases
should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously attributed to him, the extraordinary
writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000

SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of Parañaque and MA. FE F.
BARREIRO, respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The question raised in this instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is whether or not the trial court can indefinitely suspend the
arraignment of the accused until the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) has been resolved.

The facts of this case are not disputed.

On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque filed an Information 1 for estafa against Ma. Fe Barreiro (private respondent) based
on the complaint2 filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. (petitioner). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-536 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro" before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided by public
respondent Judge Rolando G. How.

Before the scheduled arraignment of private respondent on August 5, 1999 could take place, respondent court issued an Order 3 dated
June 29, 1999, resetting the arraignment of private respondent on September 2, 1999 on the ground that private respondent had "filed
an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ)".4 Private respondent manifested in the same Order that she would submit a
certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal on or before the second scheduled arraignment. 5 On September 24, 1999,
respondent court issued an Order6 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order that previously reset the arraignment of
private respondent. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment of private respondent to November 18, 1999.

On November 10, 1999, private respondent filed another "Motion to Defer Arraignment". 7 On November 15, 1999, before the scheduled
date of the arraignment of private respondent and before the date set for the hearing of private respondent’s "Motion to Defer
Arraignment", respondent court issued an Order8 further deferring the arraignment of private respondent "until such time that the appeal
with the said office (SOJ) is resolved".9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by respondent court on
November 22, 1999.10

Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have elapsed since private respondent appeared or submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court and up to now she still has to be arraigned.11 Respondent court allegedly violated due process when it issued the
assailed order before petitioner received a copy of the "Motion to Defer Arraignment" of private respondent and before the hearing for
the same motion could be conducted.12 Petitioner points out that despite the order of respondent court dated September 26, 1999 which
stated that the arraignment of private respondent on November 18, 1999 is "intransferable", respondent court, in utter disregard of its
own order, issued the now assailed order indefinitely suspending the arraignment of private respondent. 13

Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further delaying the arraignment of private respondent and denying the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner violate Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner further submits that this instant petition raises "a pure question of law of first impression" 14 since "it involves the application
and interpretation of a law of very recent vintage, namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of
1998".15 Petitioner mainly relies on Section 7 of said law that states that:

"Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. – The arraignment of an
accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the
justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. xxx"

By issuing the assailed order, respondent court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack/excess of
jurisdiction.16 Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside the order of respondent court dated November 15,
1999.

Petitioner limits the issues to the following:

I.
 RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ARRAIGN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT DESPITE THE LAPSE OF
THE TIME LIMIT OF THIRTY (30) DAYS MANDATORILY IMPOSED BY SECTION 7, OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1998"; AND

II.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DEFYING SECTION 12, RULE 116, OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.17

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court
is well settled. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,18 reiterated in Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,19 we clarified that nothing in Crespo vs.
Mogul20 forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite
an information already having been filed in court. 21

The nature of the Justice Secretary’s power of control over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals 22 in this wise:

"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative
Code,23 exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings.

Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of justice
supervision and control over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power
of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:

‘(1) Supervision and Control. – Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify
acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; x x x x.’

Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007, which read:

‘Section 3. x x x x

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall x x x
perform such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice in the interest of public service.’

xxx xxx xxx

Section 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper
Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or revoke any decision or action of
said chief of bureau, office, division or service."

‘Supervision’ and ‘control’ of a department head over his subordinates have been defined in administrative law as follows:

‘In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform
such duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.’

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed."24

Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any disposition therein is
subject to its sound discretion.25 The decision to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice
is an exercise of such discretion. Consistent with our ruling in Marcelo,26 we have since then held in a number of cases that a court can
defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the
information.27 This is in line with our general pronouncement in Crespo28 that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion
over criminal prosecution.29 Thus, public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it suspended the arraignment of
private respondent to await the resolution of her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.
In several cases, we have emphatically cautioned judges to refrain from arraigning the accused precipitately to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.30 In Dimatulac vs. Villon,31 the judge in that case hastily arraigned the accused despite the pending appeal of the accused with
the DOJ and notwithstanding the existence of circumstances indicating the probability of miscarriage of justice. Said judge was
reminded that he should have heeded our statement in Marcelo32 "that prudence, if not wisdom, or at least respect for the authority of
the prosecution agency, dictated that he (respondent judge therein) should have waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending
with the DOJ."33

It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to
determine prima facie case.35

Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review authority of the Secretary of Justice after an
information has been already filed in court may possibly transgress the right of a party to a speedy disposition of his case, in light of the
mandatory tenor of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be arraigned within thirty (30) days from the filing of an
information against him. Petitioner then impresses upon this Court that there is a need to reconcile the review authority of the Secretary
of Justice and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submits that "the Secretary of Justice must review the appeal and rule thereon within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date the information was filed or from the date the accused appeared in court (surrendered or
arrested)"36 if only to give meaning to the Speedy Trial Act.

We are not persuaded. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has
already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy
Trial Act.

Contrary to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing the thirty-day period for the arraignment of
the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence. The pertinent portion thereof provides that:

"SEC. 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:

xxx

"(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that
the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such
period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this
section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice
served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial."

Accordingly, the view espoused by petitioner that the thirty-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act must be strictly
observed so as not to violate its right to a speedy trial finds no support in the law itself. The exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial Act
of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of "speedy trial" is "a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept."37 In fact, in implementing the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, this Court issued SC Circular No. 38-98, Section 2 of which
provides that:

"Section 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. – The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of
the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded."
(Emphasis ours)

As stated earlier, prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of Justice
resolves the petition for review questioning the resolution of the prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because the
determination of whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be simply
reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the length of delay is not the lone criterion to be considered, several factors must be taken
into account in determining whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The factors to consider and
balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such
delay.38

The importance of the review authority of the Secretary of Justice cannot be overemphasized; as earlier pointed out, it is based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies that holds that "mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts."39

We are not unmindful of the principle that while the right to a speedy trial secures rights to the defendant, it does not preclude the rights
of public justice.40 However, in this case, petitioner as private complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive private respondent,
accused therein, of her right to avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a criminal case. The immediate arraignment of private
respondent would have then proscribed her right as accused to appeal the resolution of the prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since
Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the accused/appellant has already
been arraigned.41 Hence, in this case, the order suspending the arraignment of private respondent merely allowed private respondent to
exhaust the administrative remedies available to her as accused in the criminal case before the court could proceed to a full-blown trial.
Conversely, in case the resolution is for the dismissal of the information, the offended party in the criminal case, herein petitioner, can
appeal the adverse resolution to the Secretary of Justice. 42 In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court aptly pointed out that:

"the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for review of the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in
that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice."43 (Emphasis ours)

The fact that public respondent issued the assailed order suspending the arraignment of private respondent before the "Motion to Defer
Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It was well within the power of public
respondent to grant the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this authority.

Public respondent substantially complied with the requirement of Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act when it stated its reasons for the
deferment and eventual suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in its orders dated September 24, 199944 and November
22, 199945 . In said orders, public respondent reasoned that the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent was to give the
opportunity to the accused to exhaust the procedural remedies available, 46 to allow the Secretary of Justice to review the resolution of
the City Prosecutor47 so as not to deprive the former of his power to review the action of the latter by a precipitate trial of the case, 48 and
based on the discretionary power of the trial judge to grant or deny the motion to suspend the arraignment of the accused pending
determination of her petition for review at the Department of Justice. 49 Despite the absence of a law or regulation prescribing the period
within which the Secretary of Justice must dispose of an appeal, the presumption still holds true that in the regular performance of his
functions, the Secretary of Justice will decide the appeal in the soonest possible time. Recently, the Department of Justice issued
Memorandum Order No. 12 dated July 3, 2000 mandating that the period for the disposition of appeals/petitions for review shall be 75
days.50 In view of this memorandum, the indefinite suspension of proceedings in the trial court because of a pending petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice is now unlikely to happen.

Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court does entitle the offended party to intervene in the criminal case if he has not waived the
civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute it separately from the criminal action. However, the prosecution of the criminal
case through the private prosecutor is still under the direction and control of the public prosecutor 51 and such intervention must be with
the permission of the public prosecutor.52 In this case, based on the power of control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice over
public prosecutors, the pendency of the appeal of private respondent with the Secretary of Justice should have impelled the public
prosecutor to move for the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent. Considering that private respondent had already
informed the court of her appeal with the Secretary of Justice and had moved for the suspension of her arraignment, the public
prosecutor should have desisted from opposing the abeyance of further proceedings.

Lastly, petitioner’s argument that the suspension of the arraignment in this case was in violation of Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure is likewise not tenable. Section 12, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:

"Section 12. Suspension of Arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the case against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

(b) The court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial question."

There is nothing in the above-quoted provision that expressly or impliedly mandates that the suspension of arraignment shall be limited
to the cases enumerated therein. Moreover, jurisprudence has clearly established that the suspension of arraignment is not strictly
limited to the two situations contemplated in said provision.53 In fine, no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the assailed
order suspending the arraignment of private respondent until her petition for review with the Secretary of Justice is resolved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 157472 : September 28, 2007]

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner, v. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO
L. ESCUETA, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy1 (petitioner)
seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 20022 and December 18, 20023 issued by Presiding
Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal
Case No. 02-42.

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and
sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.4

On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.5

However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order,6 likewise dated
September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having
qualified the crime to Murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead
wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion
remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim's name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."7

On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the
crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered
for him a plea of not guilty.8

On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of
the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was
validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express consent;
that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information
for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.

In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of
former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was
rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or
convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced
and did not terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid
proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank,"
the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that
the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the
amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing
jurisprudence.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the information for murder; and that to
try him again for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's
conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only
serves to affect the imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or
correction ordered by the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed in
double jeopardy.

In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion
for Reconsideration, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED.

Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this case. Further, the
Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the crime of homicide stands. 13

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the
classification of the crime of homicide to murder.

On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED
THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY
TERMINATED.15

Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the public respondent
ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure; that the public respondent's ruling that "disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which
qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed
upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of
rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after petitioner
has entered his plea.

Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash
the Information for Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated
without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.

Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact
grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information
for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of
the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double
jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the Information to
Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic;
that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent; that petitioner
confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002
mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.

Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended
Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for
homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.

In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to Murder after his
arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without his express consent;
and that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda.

Generally, a direct resort to us in a Petition for Certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.17

In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation of the provisions
on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy,
one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of
second punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to
prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for
Homicide. The argument of petitioner - -

Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his express consent, he
cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the
termination of the information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge
him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy. 18

is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, to wit - -

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

xxx

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of
the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110. For this
purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph
refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.

It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made before or after
the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but substitution of information
must be with leave of court as the original information has to be dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of
the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused
has to plead anew to the new information; andcralawlibrary

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information
after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would
be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes
that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily included in the
original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information
involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information,
an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is
distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when
the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily
include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 20

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and
not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only change made was in
the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word
"Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for
Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all
any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus,
we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal. 21

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already
pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused. The test of whether the
rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when
any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.22 Since the facts alleged
in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to
the rights or defense of petitioner.

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as
the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,23 we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge
of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of
petitioner.

Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge from Homicide to
Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of
double jeopardy is not meritorious.

Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

xxx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first.24

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or
the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.25

It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution
for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. 26

Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide without his express
consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal which
terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of
acquittal.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court - - which, for convenience, we
quote again - -

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance
with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:

SEC. 19. - When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of
the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different from
the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information
even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information
charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or
an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 28

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment
of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information
that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed
that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering that the
original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder.
That ruling was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of
Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.

We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.

A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that "disregard of rank" is a
generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected
himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted;
nor was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32557 October 23, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO C. REYES as Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Fourth Judicial District, and FRANCISCO
ESTRELLA, respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Petitioner, by way of certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction, questions as alleged grave abuse of discretion, the order 1 dated
July 10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in
Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's verbal
motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the year "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the
year "1964 ". Respondent Judge anchored his denial of the verbal motion on, to wit:

After a careful study of both memoranda in support and against the said motion, this Court finds and so hold that the
amendment to the information cannot be made without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused in the above-
entitled case.

WHEREFORE, the motion to amend the information is hereby denied in accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of People vs. Placido Opemia et al., 98 Phil. 698. ...

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner also assails the order of respondent Court, dated September 14, 1970, 3 denying its motion for reconsideration 4 of the July
10, 1970 order.

5
This court issued a preliminary injunction on September 24, 1970.

Pertinent facts of record are:

Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed against private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, as
Criminal Case No. 6799, in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, pertinent portion as follows:

The undersigned Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuses Narciso Mananing, Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and
Melecio Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality of San Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Narciso Mananing being the driver of complainant
Maria Ignacio- Francisco, Florentino Alcantara, repair shop owner where the truck hereinafter described was found
and recovered, Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary soldier stationed at Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all
conspiring together, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one (1)
Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559, with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner, Maria Ignacio-Francisco in the amount of P23,000.00, value of said vehicle. 6

On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City, (converted into city) Nueva Ecija, filed an information (Crim. Case No.
CCC-IV-170) with the respondent Court, charging private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, with qualified theft, as
follows:

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Narciso Mananing Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio
Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of August, 1969 in the City of San Jose, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Narciso Mananing being then the driver of Bedford
truck bearing Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, with Chassis No. 153559, and with a Motor No. 2/54/5/6 owned by
 Maria Ignacio-Francisco, conspiring and confederating together with his co-accused namely: Florentino Alcantara,
Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra, and with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the said Bedford truck valued at Twenty Three
Thousand Pesos ( P23,000.00) Philippine Currency and dismantled the same without the consent of the said owner
and to her damage and prejudice of the said sum of P23,000.00. 7

On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty During the arraignment,
respondent-Judge required his clerk to read the information to Francisco Estrella. The court interpreter was directed to translate the
information into Tagalog for the benefit of the accused. The prosecution, although represented, made no move to amend the
information, if indeed it was really erroneous. From January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the scheduled trial of
the case, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. 8

On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally moved that it be allowed to amend the
information 9 so as to change the date of the commission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964." 10 Private respondent
Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969",
vigorously objected to the verbal motion. 11

Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution's motion to amend, and instead, required the prosecution to present its first
witness, to determine whether the sought amendment in the information would constitute a change of substance affecting the rights of
the accused or merely of form. 12

Florentino Alcantara, originally a co-accused but discharged as a prosecution witness, testified that the offense was committed in 1964.
The defense refused to cross-examine witness Alcantara, asked respondent Court to strike off the testimony of Alcantara because it
referred to an offense not mentioned in the information, and asked for a ruling by respondent Court on the prosecution's verbal motion
to amend the information. 13

Respondent Judge required the prosecution and the defense to submit memoranda. The contested order of July 22, 1970, denying the
prosecution's verbal motion to amend information on the ground that said amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused was issued by respondent Court. 14

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned contested order alleged that time was not material ingredient of the
offense of qualified theft and claimed that the case of Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698, relied upon by the trial court for its denial of
the motion to amend information, was not applicable to the case. 15

The respondent Court, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, in its order of September 14, 1970, 16 stating that the
prosecution's honest mistake in the information filed cannot prevail over the substantial rights of the accused based on constitutional
provisions. Hence this petition.

The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the respondent Court abused its discretion when it refused an amendment to the
information filed in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV 170-NE, to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense from "August 1969"
to "August 1964", on the ground it would constitute an impairment of the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the
Constitution.

Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the complaint or information in a criminal case where the accused had been arraigned and
had pleaded, as in this case, may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the accused.

As to whether or not a sought for amendment of an information to change the time of the alleged commission of crime from 1969 to
1964 (period of five years) would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused after his arraignment and plea, this Court ruled in the
case of People vs. Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698, that:

In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947, and not on June 18, 1952, as alleged
in the information. The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one
cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the co-defendants in 1952 was
also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the accused, who came to Court prepared to face a charge
of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being
confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them,
for it violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives
them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an offense of which they were
not charged.

In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was investigated for an offense allegedly committed in August of 1964. Then,
he was charged for an offense allegedly committed in August of 1969. He pleaded not guilty to the latter charge. Now petitioner desires
to put him on trial for the alleged 1964 offense. This cannot legally be done.
The petitioner's argument that the time or date of the commission of the offense is not a material ingredient of the crime of qualified
theft cannot be given much weight in this case because the disparity of time between the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy
approximation in the commission of one and the same offense. While it has been held that except when time is a material ingredient of
an offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this Court stated that this does not mean that the
prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may
make the allegation so indefinite as to amount to the same thing. 17 The prosecution is given the chance to allege an approximation of
time of the commission of the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it does not mean that it can prove any date remote or
far removed from the given approximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused.

What happened in this case is that the petitioner committed a mistake in the placing of the date of the alleged crime in the information
filed. During the arraignment and plea of private respondent Francisco Estrella on January 28, 1970, the prosecution had all the
chances to realize and rectify its mistake. It did not do so. The trial of the accused was set for May 21, 1970. Petitioner therefore, had
more than three months to take steps. Again, it failed to do so. Finally, petitioner verbally moved to amend the information only at the
start of the trial. To permit petitioner to do so would surprise the accused and prejudice his substantial rights.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated July 10, 1970 and September 14, 1970, by respondent Judge are hereby AFFIRMED, the
preliminary injunction issued on September 24, 1970 dissolved, and this petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 201572 July 9, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RAEL DELFIN, Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 April 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said
Decision, the CA affirmed, with modification, the conviction of herein appellant Rael Delfin for murder under Article 248(1) of Act No.
3815 or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The antecedents:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being
gunned down at a store just across his home.

Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.3 The information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting
upon the victim gunshot wound, which caused his immediate death. CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz (Joan) and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).

Joan is an eyewitness tothe gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner of the victim. The substance of her testimony is as
follows:5

1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing outside Emilio’s house at R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas
City. From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking over the telephone at a store just across his house. Also at the store
during that time was the appellant who was seated on a bench to the left of Emilio.

2. Joan then went inside Emilio’s house. Almost immediately after going inside the house, Joan heard the sound of a gunshot.
Joan rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio shot in the head and sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw the appellant,
now holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio.

3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous misunderstanding between Emilio and the appellant; neither did she
observe any altercation brewing nor hear any word spoken between Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.

Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police physician who examined post mortemthe corpse of Emilio. He issued
Medico-Legal Report No. M-608-00,6 which revealed that Emilio died as a consequence of two (2) gunshotwounds: one that penetrated
the left side of his head and another that penetrated his chest. Dr. Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his report.

The defense, for its part, relied onthe testimonies of the appellant 7 and a certain Rene Villanueva (Rene).8

Appellant offered the alibithat he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the date and time of the supposed shooting. According to the
appellant, he left for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. Appellant
also testified that he was accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other individuals—one of which was Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However, Rene later admitted thathe, the appellant and their other
companions actually left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000—not the 27th ; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27
September 2000—not the 28th . Thus, at the date and time of the supposed shooting, Rene and the appellant were already in Navotas
City.

On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision 9 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder under Article
248(1) of the RPC.10 Based on its assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, the RTC was convinced that it was the
appellant who killed Emilio and who did so with the use of treachery. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant tosuffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetuaand to pay civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 and another ₱50,000.00 as consequential damages.

Aggrieved, appellant appealedthe RTC decision with the CA.

On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant. The CA, however, deleted the award of
₱50,000.00 consequential damages and replaced it with an award of ₱50,000.00 moral damages. 11 Hence, this appeal.

In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the
discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of
November 2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant protests that the failure of the
information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against
him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibiover and above the version of the prosecution.

Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against him.

OUR RULING

We deny the appeal.

Variance In the Date of the

Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information

We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of
the commission of the crime as alleged inthe information and as established during the trial.

In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute
specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merelyrequires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the
date of commission be approximated:12

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.– A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense
was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have beencommitted on a date as
near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied).

Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission
different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution.13 In
such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial 14 or may
even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.15

The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the
information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so greatthat it induces the perception that the
information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the
information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of
the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. Such was this Court’s ruling in the case of People v. Opemia. 16
In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952 was filed against four (4) accused. After all of the accused
entered a plea of not guilty and during trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the effect that the purported theft was committed in
July of 1947. The prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of the information to make it conform to the evidence with respect to
the date of theft. The trial court rejected the motion and instead dismissed the information altogether. The dispute reaching us in due
course, we sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the information:

The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the commission of the crime charged from June 18,
1952 to July, 1947. In not permitting the amendment the learned trial Judge said:

"It is a cardinal rule in criminalprocedure that the precise time at which an offense was committed need not be alleged in the complaint
or information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as the information or complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for this rule is obvious. It is to
apprise the accused of the approximate date when the offense charged was committed in order to enable him to prepare his defense
and thus avoid a surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as
alleged in the information. The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot
help but beled to believe that another theft different from that committed by the Defendantsin 1952 was also perpetrated by them in
1947. Under this impression the accused, who came to court prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by
them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense
committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair tothem, for it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the
specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an
offense with which they are not charged.

"It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendanthas entered his plea, the information or complaint may be
amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice tothe rights of the Defendant(Rule 196, section
13). An amendment that would change the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form.
The difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the
difference is not only in the year, but also in the month and in the last two digits of the year.It is apparent that the proposed amendment
concerns with material facts constituting the offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
Defendants."

His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the amendment as referring to substance and not merely to form. But
even supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendantshad pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be
proper only if it would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the court did not make good use of that discretion in
disallowing the amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced thereby would appear to be really unfair to the
Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court "it violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge
against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves." 17 (Emphasis supplied).

In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia, but the general rule.

Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that there is no mistaking that both the information and the
evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e., the murder of Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that
the accused may have been caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence pointing to commission of the murder on 27
September 2000, considering that all documentary attachments to the information (such as the Resolution 18 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn Statement19 of Joan) all referred to the murder as having been committed
on that date. Indeed, appellant never objected to such evidence during the trial and was even able to concoct an intelligent alibiin direct
refutation thereof.

What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere
clerical error. This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder ashaving been committed on the
27th of September2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was committed. 20 Such an error is
evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.

Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the appellant was tried and convicted, as valid.

Appellant’s Defense of Alibi

Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder

We also find unavailing the appellant’s insistence on the credibility of his alibi.1avvphi1 On this point, we quote with approval the
following discourse of the CA, which we find to be consistent with time-honored jurisprudence:21

Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of their probative weightis given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless it is ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.22
As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution witness, Joan, was clear, candid, straightforward, positive and
credible, as against the denial and alibi of the [appellant]. She positively identified the [appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x.

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a
charge of murder.23 Considering that Joan’s account of how the [appellant] killed [Emilio] was clear, credible, and positive, there is,
thus, no compelling reason to disturb the trial court’s reliance on her testimony.

As to the [appellant’s] defense ofdenial and alibi, the same are unavailing and worthless in the face of the positive identification by the
prosecution’s witness x x x.

x x x. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proven that the [accused] was at some other place at the time the crime
was committed and that it was physicallyimpossible for him to be at the locus criminisat the time [the offense was committed].24 x x x.

At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his committing the crime as even, Rene, the witness who was supposed to
corroborate his alibi, admitted that theywent back home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of September 27, 2000 and were already at
Navotas City at the time the incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly possible for him to be present at the crime scene despite his
allegations to the contrary. Hence, based on all the foregoing evidence, he is, without a doubt, the perpetrator of the crime.

Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the appellant, we find it to befully justified by the evidence on
record. Again, we approve of the CA’s observations on this matter:

Concededly, the [appellant’s] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. Before the attack
was made, [Emilio] was merely conversing with another on the phone. He was undoubtedly in no position and without any means to
defend himself. By all indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to evade the gunshots, to defend himself, or to retaliate. For this
reason, the [RTC] correctly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the offense as Murder.25

All in all, we find no error inthe conviction of the appellant.

Recoverable Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence,26 we increase the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages payable by the appellant from
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.

In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay exemplary damages in the amount ₱30,000.00. 27

The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to
₱75,000.00; (2) that the amount of moral damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (3) that the appellant must pay, in
addition to civil indemnity and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral damages
and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the finality of
this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 213598, July 27, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERCELITA1 ARENAS Y BONZO @ MERLY, Accused-

Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision2 dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05533, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated April 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen
Pangasinan, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. L-8966. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

In an Information3 dated August 9, 2010, the appellant was charged as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about August 6, 2010 in the evening, in Brgy. Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully sell two (2) heat-sealed
plastic sachets of Metamphetamine (sic) Hydrochoride (Shabu), a prohibited drug, in exchange for P2,000.00 marked
money to PO3 Benedict Julius B. Rimando, acting as poseur-buyer, and was likewise in possession, with intent to sell,
one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of methamphetamine Hydrochoride (Shabu) without lawful authority to possess and
sell the same.

Contrary to Art. II, Section 5 of RA 9165.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Upon her arraignment5 on August 25, 2010, she pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Pre-trial and trial thereafter
ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Benedict Julius B. Rimando (PO3 Rimando), PO2 Alex Aficial, Jr.
(PO2 Aficial), Police Senior Inspector Myrna Malojo (PSI Malojo), PO2 Catherine Viray (PO2 Viray), Barangay Kagawad
Dioniso S. Gulen, Police Inspector Ma. Theresa Amor Manuel, and Police Senior Inspector Leo S. Llamas (PSI Llamas).

The prosecution evidence established that sometime in July 2010, the Chief of Police (COP) of the Sual Police Station,
Sual, Pangasinan, PSI Llamas, started conducting a surveillance on the alleged illegal drug-selling activities of
appellant. At 6:00 p.m. of August 6, 2010, he called on PO3 Rimando, PO2 Aficial, SPO2 Gulen, PO1 Viray and SPO1
Editha Castro to an emergency conference and instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant who
agreed to deliver the items in front of Las Brisas Subdivision, along the National Highway in Poblacion Sual,
Pangasinan. During the briefing, the appellant was described as a woman of about 4 to 5 feet tall and between 45 to
50 years old. PO3 Rimando was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given two (2) P1000 bills to be used for the
operation, which were photocopied and entered into the police blotter. PO2 Aficial had earlier coordinated with the
PDEA of the intended buy bust.6chanrobleslaw

At 6:30 p.m., the team walked to the area which was about 150 meters away from their station. PO3 Rimando and
PO2 Aficial stood at the side of the highway beside the subdivision as earlier instructed by PSI Llamas while the other
team members were positioned strategically. After 5 minutes of waiting, appellant came near PO3 Rimando who told
the former in Ilocano dialect that he was instructed to pick up the items and asked the appellant whether she had the
items to which the latter answered in the affirmative. PO3 Rimando then handed appellant the two marked P1000.00
bills and the latter gave him the two (2) small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO3 Rimando
signaled PO2 Aficial, who was two meters away from him, to come over and they introduced themselves as police
officers. PO3 Rimando conducted a routine body search on appellant and he was able to recover from her the marked
money and another small plastic sachet she was holding in her left hand.7chanrobleslaw

Appellant was brought to the Sual Police Station where PO3 Rimando marked the two plastic sachets subject of the
buy-bust with "BJB-1" and "BJB-2," and the one plastic sachet recovered from appellant with "BJB-3," He prepared
and signed the confiscation receipt of the seized items in the presence of a barangay kagawad, a Department of
Justice (DOJ) Prosecutor, and an ABS-CBN reporter, who all affixed their signatures in the Confiscation Receipt, as
well as the appellant.8 PO2 Viray took pictures of the seized items, marked money as well as the signing of the receipt
inside the police station.9 PO3 Rimando brought the seized items as well as the Request for Laboratory
Examination10 prepared by PSI Llamas to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Lingayen, Pangasinan.

PSI Myrna Malojo, a forensic chemist, personally received from PO3 Rimando the letter request and the seized
items.11 The laboratory results showed a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, and having a
weight of 0.08 grams, 0.07 grams and 0.05 grams, respectively, which findings were contained in PSI Malojo's
initial12 and confirmatory13 reports. PSI Malojo sealed the seized items and placed her own markings thereon and
turned them to the evidence custodian.14 She identified in court the items she examined as the same items she
received from PO3 Rimando15 and the latter also identified the subject items as the same items he recovered from the
appellant during the buy-bust operation.16chanrobleslaw

Appellant denied the charges alleging that at 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. of August 6, 2010, she was with a certain Mina grilling
barbecue at a video bar in front of Jamaica Sual Subdivision; that after a while, Mina's boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived
and talked with Mina. When PSI Llamas left, Mina asked her to deliver a letter to a certain Renee who owed her
money. Mina called on a tricycle driver who would bring her to Renee. When she met Renee, she handed her the letter
from Mina and Renee gave her a sealed envelope. Upon her return to the bar, she gave the envelope to Mina who was
drinking beer with PSI Llamas. She then asked permission to go home as she would still cook dinner but Mina told her
to grill more barbecues. As she insisted in going home, PSI Llamas placed his right arm around her neck and called
someone on his cellphone. She tried to remove PSI Llamas' arm around her neck when a police car arrived and
brought her to the police station where she was forced to say something about the shabu which she had no knowledge
of and she was later detained.17chanrobleslaw

In rebuttal, PSI Llamas denied knowing Mina and going to the videoke bar on August 6, 2010; that he only met the
appellant at the police station and was not the one who arrested her.18 In her sur-rebuttal, appellant claimed that she
had known PSI Llamas for about 3 weeks prior to her arrest and insisted that he was the one who arrested her.

On April 16, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision19 finding appellant guilty of the charged offenses, the dispositive
portion of which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the guilt of accused
MERCILITA ARENAS y BONZO @ "Merly," this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1. For violation of Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165, this Court hereby sentences said accused
to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay [a] fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);

2. For violation of Section 11, Art. II of the same Act, this Court hereby sentences said Accused to a prison term of
Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC found that PO3 Rimando, who acted as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, positively identified
appellant as the one who sold and handed him the two plastic sachets of shabu in the amount of P2,000.00 and the
same person who received the marked money from him. It was also proven that during appellant's arrest, PO3
Rimando recovered one more plastic sachet of shabu in her possession, and he marked the three plastic sachets with
his initials; and that every link in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachets was also established. The RTC
found that PO3 Rimando testified in a frank, spontaneous and straightforward manner and his credibility was not
crumpled on cross examination, and it rejected appellant's defenses of denial and frame up.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of its Decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38 dated 16 April 2012 is AFFIRMED.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, this appeal filed by appellant. Both appellant and the Solicitor General manifested that they are adopting their
Briefs filed with the CA.

Appellant is now before us with the same issues raised before the CA, i.e., that the RTC gravely erred: (1) in giving
weight and credence to the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; (2) in holding that there was a
legitimate buy-bust operation; (3) in convicting appellant of the crimes charged despite the failure to prove the
elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the chain of custody and the integrity of the allegedly seized items; and (4)
in convicting appellant under an Information which charges two offenses in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court.

We find no merit in the appeal.

For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment for the thing. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.22 We find all the elements necessary for appellant's conviction
for illegal sale of shabu clearly established in this case.

PO3 Rimando, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person whom he caught in flagrante
delicto selling white crystalline substance presumed to be shabu in the buy-bust operation conducted by their police
team; that upon appellant's receipt of the P2,000.00 buy-bust money from PO3 Rimando, she handed to him the two
sachets of white crystalline substance which when tested yielded positive results for shabu. Appellant's delivery of
the shabu to PO3 Rimando and her receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.
The seized shabu and the marked money were presented as evidence before the trial court.

Appellant's reliance on the case of People v. Ong23 wherein the Court acquitted the appellants of the charge of illegal
sale of shabu for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged is misplaced. The Court
found therein that the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, who acted as the poseur-buyer, showed that he was not privy to
the sale transaction which transpired between the confidential informant, who did not testify, and the appellant.

Here, while it appeared that it was PSI Llamas who initially dealt with appellant regarding the sale of shabu, it also
appeared that PSI Llamas had designated PO3 Rimando as his representative in the sale transaction with appellant.
Notably, PO3 Rimando was instructed by PSI Llamas to wait at the specified area where appellant would be the first to
approach him for the sale of shabu,24 which established the fact that appellant was already informed beforehand as to
the person she was to deal with regarding the sale of shabu. Indeed, appellant approached PO3 Rimando who was
waiting at the designated area and upon receipt from him of the payment of P2000.00, the former handed to the
latter the two sachets of shabu. The identity of appellant as the seller, as well as the object and consideration for the
sale transaction, had been proved by the testimony of PO3 Rimando, the buyer.

We also find appellant guilty of illegal possession of shabu. The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (2) such possession is not authorized
by law, and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug.25cralawred What must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the
police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct
knowledge of the possession.26chanrobleslaw

In the instant case, PO3 Rimando, the person who had direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of
the shabu from the appellant, testified that he was also able to recover another plastic sachet of shabu which
appellant was holding with her left hand, which testimony was corroborated by PO2 Aficial. 27 As it was proved that
appellant had freely and consciously possessed one (1) plastic sachet of shabu without authority to do so, she can be
found guilty of illegal possession of shabu.

The RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the
seized shabu from the time they were recovered from appellant up to the time they were presented in court. Section
1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,28 which implements the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, defines chain of custody as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the
seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition.
It was established that after PO3 Rimando seized the three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from
appellant, he was in possession of the same from confiscation up to the police station.29 He marked the three plastic
sachets at the police station, which was only 150 meters away from the scene,30 with "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-
3."31 He prepared the confiscation receipt in the presence of a barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor and an ABS-CBN
Reporter, who all affixed their signatures therein, the appellant, PO1 Viray and PO2 Aficial.32 PO1 Viray then took
photographs of the seized items, the preparation and signing of the confiscation receipt. PO3 Rimando then brought
the request for laboratory examination prepared by PSI Llamas of the seized items and personally brought the same
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.33chanrobleslaw

PSI Malojo, the forensic chemist, personally received the said request and the three small heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance with markings from PO3 Rimando.34 After examining the items, PSI Malojo
found them to be positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu, which findings
were embodied in her Initial Laboratory Report and eventually, in her Final Chemistry Report. After her examination,
PSI Malojo sealed the seized items and placed her own markings thereon, and turned them over to the evidence
custodian for safekeeping.35 During her testimony in court, PSI Malojo identified the items she examined as the same
items she received from PO3 Rimando. PO3 Rimando also identified in court the subject items as the same items he
recovered from the possession of appellant during the buy-bust operation.36chanrobleslaw

We likewise agree with the CA that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to
minor details which did not relate to the crimes charged. The inconsistencies have been sufficiently explained during
trial by the witnesses themselves. We quote with approval what the CA said:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The alleged inconsistencies in the composition of the buy-bust team, in the identity and/or description of accused-
appellant, and in the markings on the seized items are collateral matters and not essential elements of the crimes
charged. Moreover, a scrutiny of these purported inconsistencies would show that the same are not conflicting at all.

Although PO2 Viray testified that she was at the office at the time PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial were conducting the
buy-bust operation, it does not necessarily mean that she was not part of the buy-bust team. PO2 Viray testified that
before the conduct of the buy-bust operation, she was designated by PO3 Rimando to be the official photographer.
She was told to take photographs after the subject operation, a task that she performed when accused-appellant was
brought to the police station. This explains why PO3 Rimando included her in his testimony as one of the members of
the buy-bust team.

Similarly the testimony of PO2 Aficial that he was with PO3 Rimando during the buy-bust operation is not conflicting
with PO3 Rimando's enumeration of the member of the buy-bust team. PO2 Aficial was asked who was with [him]
during the buy-bust operation and he merely answered the question of the counsel for the defense. PO2 Aficial was
not asked who were the other members of the buy-bust team. His answer was consistent with PO3 Rimando's
statement that when the latter gave the prearranged signal, he approached PO3 Rimando and they introduced
themselves to accused-appellant as police officers.

xxxx

As regards the source of the information on the description of accused-appellant which enabled the poseur-buyer to
identify her, the same is a trivial matter. Whether the information came from PSI Llamas or a confidential informant,
the fact remains that a crime was committed by accused-appellant in the presence of the police officers who were
members of the buy-bust team and who had the duty to immediately arrest her after the consummation of the
transaction. The fact also remains that the description about the seller matched accused-appellant. x x x

As to the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized items, the same are clearly typographical errors. The
transcript of PSI Malojo's testimony showed that she identified the markings on the seized plastic sachets as "BJB-1",
"NJN-2" and "BJB-3." However, the follow-up question of the prosecutor clarified that she was actually referring to
"BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3", to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Q. I am showing you then Madam Witness three (3) plastic sachet (sic) will you go over the contain (sic) to the one
you are testifying "BJB-1" to "BJB-3" (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
The universal practice is that exhibits or evidence are marked chronologically. It is highly unlikely that the second
sachet would be marked "NJN-2" when the first one was marked "BJB-1" and the third one was marked "BJB-3".
Notably, both Confiscation Receipt and Request for Laboratory Examination showed that the seized items were
marked "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3" consistent with the testimony of PO3 Rimando. It should also be noted that in
the computer keyboard, the letters "B" and "N" are beside each other. Hence, the only logical conclusion for the
purported discrepancy is that the stenographer inadvertently pressed the letter "N" instead of the letter
"B."37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Anent the matter of the confiscation receipt bearing the date August 5, 2010 when the buy-bust happened on August
6, 2010, PO3 Rimando explained that he committed an error in placing the date August 5 which should be August
6.38 Moreover, it was established by the testimony of Kagawad Gulen that on August 6, 2010, he was called to witness
the ii£ms confiscated from appellant and was asked to sit beside PO3 Rimando while the latter was preparing the
confiscation receipt.39 Gulen even identified in court the confiscation receipt where his signature
appeared.40chanrobleslaw

Appellant's contention that the RTC erred in convicting him under an Information that charged two offenses is not
persuasive. Although the Information in this case charged two offenses which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one
offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses," nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as
many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings
of fact and law in each offense."41chanrobleslaw

Appellant's failure to raise that more than one offense was charged in the Information in a motion to quash42 before
she pleaded to the same is deemed a waiver.43 As appellant failed to file a motion to quash the Information, she can
be convicted of the crimes charged in the Information if proven.

We also find no merit in appellant's claim that she cannot be convicted of illegal possession of illegal drugs as its
possession is absorbed in the charge of illegal sale.

In People v. Lacerna,44 We held:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is
further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale
and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.
Here, it was established that PO3 Rimando was able to recover from appellant's possession another plastic sachet
of shabu which was not the subject of the illegal sale; thus, she could be separately charged with illegal possession for
the same.

We find that the RTC correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 45 for
the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

As to the crime of illegal possession, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree
of purity thereof:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(1) ...

(2) ... and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs
are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements;
or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
Clear from the foregoing, the quantity of the dangerous drugs is determinative of the penalty to be imposed for the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. We note, however, that the quantity of shabu found to be in
appellant's possession was not indicated in the Information which is important as the law provides for the graduation
of penalties. We cannot just rely on the quantity established by the prosecution, which the RTC did in imposing the
penalty, without violating appellant's right to be informed of the accusation against her. The RTC imposed the
minimum penalty provided by law since the quantity recovered from appellant's possession was less than 5 grams
of shabu; however, it could have been different if the quantity recovered from appellant was more than 5 grams
where the penalty imposable is imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or even
the maximum penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), because in this case, the Court could not impose the penalty
provided by law in view of the non-allegation of the true quantity in the information.

By analogy, in theft cases,46 where the penalty is graduated according to the value of the thing stolen, we ruled that
when the prosecution failed to establish the amount of property taken by an independent and reliable estimate, we
may fix the value of the property taken based on attendant circumstances or impose the minimum penalty. Since it
was proved that appellant was in possession of shabu but the quantity was not specified in the Information, the
corresponding penalty to be imposed on her should be the minimum penalty corresponding to illegal possession of
less than five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu which is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to
Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00).47chanrobleslaw

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall below the
minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period allowed under the law;
hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months.
One final note. Public prosecutors are reminded to carefully prepare the criminal complaint and Information in
accordance with the law so as not to adversely affect the dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only insofar as to the penalty imposable
for the crime of illegal possession so that appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation through the
criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the
information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense established to have been
committed by the accused.

The Case

Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 affirmed
.with modification his conviction for the illegal possession and control of 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves in violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City had handed
down through its decision dated February 1, 2000,2 sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion perpetua maximum or
imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (₱750,000.00)
Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment."

Antecedents

The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:

That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves
placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.

On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala, a
suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the
RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s
residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. 4 SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other
elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search
of Manansala’s house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of
the information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of ₱655.00
that included the two marked ₱50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy.5

All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect, along with his father, Jose
Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. 6 The certification listed the following seized articles, to wit: (a) one kilo, more or less, of
suspected dried marijuana leaves; (b) rolling paper; and (c) money amounting to ₱655.00.

SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned over the seized articles to the
evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of October 20, 1994, the seized articles were submitted to the
PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga for qualitative examination.

The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-94,7 to wit:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
 Spmn "A" – One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two (2) rectangular bricks of dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting
tops having a total weight of seven hundred fifty five (755) grams.

Spmn "B" – One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 9.045 grams. x x
x.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated drug in the above-stated specimen. x x x.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result for MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. x
x x.

CONCLUSION:

Spmns "A" and "B" – contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug.8

Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994. 9

On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an amended information,
ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal
possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law.10 But the RTC did not act on the motion.

Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier summarized.

In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up. His version follows.

On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without any warrant, and brought him to
an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors
mugged and then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and possession of marijuana. They turned down his request to be
brought to a hospital for the treatment of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he could
not identify his captors and whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter testified at
the trial.11

Decision of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, holding
thus:

The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully, unlawfully and knowingly x x x engage in selling,
delivering, giving away to another and distributing x x x falling under the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged
act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the
team who is alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the
testimony of SPO4 Felipe Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance conducted prior to the application of the search warrant, a
member of the team acting as poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay.

However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find marijuana leaves in the custody,
possession and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the search warrant and has been established by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the weakest defense, this
Court is convinced that accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that
is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with. In light of these
circumstances, this Court has no option that to find accused guilty and liable for the crime proved. Since the date of the commission of
the crime as proved is October 19, 1994, the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, in so far as the imposable penalty is concerned, will
find application.

WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman, GUILTY of Violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from
thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (₱750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the CA

On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the following issues, namely:

1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured by virtue of an invalid warrant, was erroneous;

2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of prohibited drug on the misplaced and inaccurate
theory that the offense in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 was necessarily included in the offense in violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425; and

3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and misrepresented facts and evidences of substance and importance
that, if weighed, assayed and considered were enough to acquit the accused. 13

On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the conviction subject to modification, viz:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of seven hundred
fifty thousand pesos (₱750,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment.

Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant are hereby ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.14

Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he already assigned before the CA.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana
dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control."

The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 15 which
provides:

Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or
shall act as a broker in any such transactions.

Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after trial,
the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which states:

Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that the trial court had erred in convicting him for
illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4.

The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8
under the information that had alleged the illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4 was proper, giving its reasons as follows:

xxxx
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit
drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence. The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In the case before Us, the trial court
correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the offense
of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same.

While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the established
principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before Us, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the
bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In
this light, We find that the court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of RA 6425 necessarily
includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that
the lawful search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP
Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of the positive testimony of the prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is
indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed and that accused-appellant was the author of the same.16

xxxx

To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8,
which the information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against him.

For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found an accused charged with the illegal sale of marijuana in
violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8. In the oft-cited case of People v.
Lacerna,17 the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except
if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal
sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in
Lacerna was that the illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale. The Court
observed thusly:

In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused sold and
delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not
expressly state it, the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can
never be proven without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a condition sine qua non.

It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court
will thus determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.

From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs
are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug. 18

In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna, however, the involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale
as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the
information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused for the illegal
possession. As such, the illegal possession is either deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal sale. On
the other hand, any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale
should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be flagrantly violated.

It is true that there was an error in the information’s statement of the facts essential to properly describe the offense being charged
against Manansala as that of illegal possession of marijuana; and that the error became known to the Prosecution, leading Prosecutor
Manalansan to himself file the motion for the admission of the amended information dated January 3, 1995. 19 In the motion, Prosecutor
Manalansan manifested that the information as filed charged a violation of Section 4; and that during the preliminary investigation, he
had concluded that Manansala should have been charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of a violation of Section 4 as far as the
750 grams of dried marijuana leaves seized from his possession during the implementation of Search Warrant No. 8-94 was
concerned. The distinct and separate nature of the 750 grams of marijuana leaves from the quantity of marijuana worth ₱100.00 that
was the object of the test buy became all the more evident in Prosecutor Manalansan’s letter dated December 28, 1994 addressed to
City Prosecutor Prudencio B. Jalandoni.20
There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750 grams of marijuana dried leaves had been seized from the possession Manansala
on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the search warrant, while the attributed illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994
during the test buy conducted to support the application of the search warrant. The letter specifically stated:

xxxx

3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the seizure on 19 October 1994 are separate incidents giving rise to
two distinct offenses;

4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the "sale of prohibited drugs" on 19 October 1994 because he was
engaged in it before.1âwphi1 There is no evidence to show that the accused was engaged in the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution and transportation of drugs as provided under Section 4;

5. The two (2) ₱50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the accused was engaged in selling the 750 grams of marijuana
leaves. They can prove the sale on 18 October 1994 but cannot qualify his possession of the 750 grams of the drugs.

xxxx

Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.

The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing
or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution 21 was not violated simply because the
information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of
dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale
included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. 22 According to Section 5, Rule 120,
Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006; and ORDERS accused CHAD MANANSALA y
LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the
same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal
Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without
acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing
his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a
judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal
Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No.
82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the
public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether
petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing
him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing
this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of
the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The
RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs
even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory
review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss
of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not
ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at the
MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for
which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" 13 protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case
No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely
separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not." 15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if
it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it
would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-
four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article,
in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which
they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to
the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6
and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple
imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles
of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized
under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to
this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that
by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is
principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be
absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum,
to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person
or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with
the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands on
solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in
itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that
quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in
post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules
defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown
shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch
of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act
or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting
with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case
for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from
the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question
was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v.
Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en
banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v.
Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in
1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses
was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not
be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the
post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence"
despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which
the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan: 38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not
be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge
of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact
which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated
January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should
be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical
injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-
and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a
Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his
acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied
relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted
with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case
cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without
the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of
the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95)
signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose
Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose
Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted.
The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose
Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both
cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion
to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his
subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay
City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless
manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the
Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging
the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading
double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there
said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the
Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First
Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to
support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying
its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the
acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the
Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of
dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on
the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to
the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It
was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero,
etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device
allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies 46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will
only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus,
Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes
falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and
their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models
– that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge,
collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under
Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article
48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the
second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level
courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of
double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting
acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v.
Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if
there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the
physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the other.
Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require
single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365,
and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy
adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate
the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of
quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in
Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined
with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows
only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge
of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number
and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence
alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same
first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under
Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-
craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower
rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager and authorized representative Norma
Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO
BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of
Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934
and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking
spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any
motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. 1

According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the
Informations are the following:

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S.
Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin
Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal
is ₱26,250.00. The fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not paid by the respondents
herein.

In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan
and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey
Walan which was then considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered immobile
by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner,
Jadewell, its use and value which is ₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the declamping fee of ₱500.00
were not paid by the respondents.2

The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against
respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents Benedicto
Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-
Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary investigation took place on
May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of
Jadewell's employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.

In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia
denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the
placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to
remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint he filed against Jadewell. 4

In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto
Banez found probable cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery against
respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:

We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery,
specifically the intent to gain and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.
 xxxx

We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these
cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes
fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands.
(Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who
has been dragged into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for
violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against them in
Court.6

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:

That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of action
and concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly
dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate
No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for violation of
the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation
(Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW,

San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 Motion to
Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state
facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense.

In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.

2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.

3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall
prescribed [sic] after two months."

4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the
right hand corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months
after the alleged commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was already
extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed. 9

In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 3, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order 11 to argue among other
points that:

6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted
by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2,
2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period. 12

Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a Reply14 on April 1, 2004.

The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The
Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is
that the criminal action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.

These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged violations of City Ordinances.

Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
filed in Court and not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF
PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN
PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).

Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch
7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription.
Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged against the
private respondents was halted by the filing of the Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:

x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor
unless otherwise provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal action shall interrupt
the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws." 17

Petitioner contended further that:

the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before
this Honorable Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed.

xxxx

The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the
old Rules on Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can
only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure, these criminal cases
"shall be commenced only by information." These criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.

Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The
offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in court as
required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for
violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information." 18

Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-
month prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.

In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of
Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. 20 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to
judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was
not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and
ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the
respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the
filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City
Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled in favor of the
respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order dated February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005
Order.

Hence, this Petition.

The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled
the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."

Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because
respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that
the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of
two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall be
filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.

In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also,
respondents raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted
no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also,
respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the
case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the private
complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.

In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution
dated April 16, 2004 only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the grounds on which
the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the
preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure 25 and Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.

Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified
petition"26 before the court.

The Petition is denied.

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of
the offense. With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the
law does not provide any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation
omitted)

With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance
003-2000.

The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions
effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
 xxxx

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by
information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.

The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:

SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in
this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are those component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent
of the province.

Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities or component cities. An independent component
city has a charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress are
chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act
or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime
charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.

In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present
case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information
was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city
ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine
of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from
conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court,
whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed
to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.30

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court,
this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan31 categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes
is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However,
the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.

There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of
Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the
original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the
Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the
offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus,
respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:

SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and
filed with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.

The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –

a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;

b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;

c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and

d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:

SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient if it states that the crime charged was
committed or some of the ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place in
which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election
Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the
domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."

Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:

SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period
of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted:

a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or

b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, or even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.

However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the
complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of the commission of the
violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution
Offices. These Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions where the Informations will be filed.
Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was designated to file the Information within the two-month
period provided for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1âwphi1

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the
private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the
necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the
prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that
possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain
language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS
ALAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30, 2007 Decision1 and
the April 18, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed the trial court’s Orders of January 24, 31,
February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda,
forthwith issued a commitment order4 against petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical
Center.5

After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,6 he was released from detention, and his arraignment was
set on January 24, 2007.

The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus
Motion7 praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or
to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 20078 deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing the prosecution to
conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia;
and (2) Order of January 31, 20079 denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the public prosecutor’s
recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to
grant him time to comment on the prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable
cause.10 Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the
Amended Information.11

The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 200712 that admitted the Amended
Information13 for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8, 200714 which set the arraignment
on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court.

The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition, arguing that:

PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW
WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT[;]

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S
AMENDED INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT,
CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007, WHICH LED TO THE
QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]

CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S FINDINGS IN HIS RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007 ARE BLATANTLY
BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING
ADDUCED DURING THE REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the original omitted)

Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed through during which petitioner refused to plead, drawing the
trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.

Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela16 which the trial
court, after hearings thereon, granted by Order of May 21, 2007, 17 it finding that the evidence of guilt for the crime of murder is not
strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to post bail in the amount of ₱300,000 for his provisional liberty.

The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court, went on to try petitioner under the Amended
Information. By Decision of January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the
pendency of which he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied petitioner’s
application which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by Decision of March 17, 2010.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition had been rendered moot since the presentation of
evidence, wherein petitioner actively participated, had been concluded. 18

Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the petition, for in the present case, petitioner did not, by his
active participation in the trial, waive his stated objections.

Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission to
bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing
the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.

By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the
validity of the admission of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information, as he vigorously
raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he
raised were still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him.

The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning the illegal arrest or the lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation applies "only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without
previously invoking his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible.20

From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining
a definite resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation, the OSG offered no clear and
convincing proof that petitioner’s participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his
petition. In fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present petition. 21

Whatever delay arising from petitioner’s availment of remedies against the trial court’s Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner to
operate as a valid waiver on his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be deemed as a voluntary
relinquishment of petitioner’s principal prayer. The non-issuance of such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not
preliminarily find any exception22 to the long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal
prosecution.23 Consequently, the trial of the case took its course.

The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial court’s rendition of judgment.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.24

The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended Information for murder operates as a supervening event that
mooted the present petition. Assuming that there is ground 25 to annul the finding of probable cause for murder, there is no practical use
or value in abrogating the concluded proceedings and retrying the case under the original Information for homicide just to arrive, more
likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of murder,
for proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than probable cause, would have been established in that instance.
Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness, the Court proceeds to resolve the legal issues in order to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public. 26 In the present case, there is compelling reason to clarify the
remedies available before and after the filing of an information in cases subject of inquest.

After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the
appellate court in finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the four trial court Orders.

In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an
investigation or reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an
accused is arrested without a warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused.

The contention lacks merit.

Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with
existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace
officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but
he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.
Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the
time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this
Rule. (underscoring supplied)

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law
is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. 28 As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a
preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant 29 involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where
available, has been conducted.30

Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons
arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said persons
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. 31

It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person and the private complainant during the brief
period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or information in court.

BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the private complainant may proceed in coordinating with the
arresting officer and the inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the arrested person has the option to avail of a
15-day preliminary investigation, provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial
authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant
since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or
information with the proper judicial authorities within the applicable period,32 belongs to the arrested person.

The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with either
the prompt filing of an information in court or the immediate release of the arrested person. 33 Notably, the rules on inquest do not
provide for a motion for reconsideration.34

Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately
available in cases subject of inquest.

Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of
Justice may prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, 36 Section 1 of which provides
that the Rule shall "apply to appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation." In cases
subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before elevating
the matter to the DOJ Secretary.

In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private complainant may pursue the case through the regular course of a
preliminary investigation.
ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet provide the accused with another opportunity to ask for a
preliminary investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of Court and the New Rules on Inquest are
silent, however, on whether the private complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the present case, a similar
right to ask for a reinvestigation.

The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the ensuing disquisition.

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.37 The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for
the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has
the control of the prosecution of the case.38 Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the
criminal action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial prosecutors must "examine the Information vis-à-vis the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections or revisions and to ensure that the information is
sufficient in form and substance."41

x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of the
preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it will be the
prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it required that such
nuances as offenses includible in the offense charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the prosecutor can
and should institute remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see
that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. 43

The prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite, however. 44 The standing principle is that once an information is filed in court,
any remedial measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Interestingly, petitioner
supports this view.45 Indeed, the Court ruled in one case that:

The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal
or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although the prosecutor retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion upon the tribunal.
For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court, once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor may deem proper thereafter

should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

xxxx

In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the
court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause
the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the
court.46 (underscoring supplied)

While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized
that a trial court may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation of a criminal case pending before it.

Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with
discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial court’s approval of the resulting proposed
course of action.

Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present case, the Court’s holding
is bolstered by the rule on amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (emphasis supplied)

In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave
of court.49 After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the
rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.50

It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is
void ab initio cannot be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.51 An amendment which operates to vest jurisdiction upon the trial
court is likewise impermissible.52

Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in substance and even without leave of court at any time before
entry of plea, does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere superfluity?

It is not.

Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete disposition or an intermediate modification 53 of the charge –
is eventually addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the
merits of the case. Since the trial court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of action, it is for the
prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the
appropriate motion to be filed in court.

More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial amendment of the information. Due process of law
demands that no substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting another or a new preliminary
investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an information
entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in
the original Information.

The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

The Court answers in the affirmative.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction
of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations
which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood
would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged
therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. 55 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not necessarily or automatically deprive the accused of his right
to another preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the original Information and the amended Information
in Matalam were similarly charging the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is "one of substance with very
serious consequences."57 The amendment involved in the present case consists of additional averments of the circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and material
element of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the
amendment essentially varies the prosecution’s original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of
defense to be mustered by petitioner.

The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58 and Pacoy v. Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of the caption of the
Information from homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was no real change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were already
clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out that the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of
superior strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already
alleged in the original Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the present case.

Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a
reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining
whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.60 What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the
charge of murder61 after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.

Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge.
Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme
caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a condition sine qua non to the
validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to
controvert the complainant’s evidence was accorded him.62

In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried issuance of the last two assailed RTC Orders despite the
pendency before the appellate court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two trial court Orders allowing a reinvestigation.

The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary retraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued.63 The appellate court, by Resolution of February 15, 2007,64 denied petitioner’s
application for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive reliefs proved
futile.65 The appellate court thus did not err in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded with
the case and eventually arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover,
petitioner opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that was available after the reinvestigation and which
could have suspended the arraignment.661avvphi1

Regarding petitioner’s protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in resolving incidents of the case is not per se an indication
of bias. In Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice,67 the Court held:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as
the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it
was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This,
petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady
without discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors. 68

There is no ground for petitioner’s protestations against the DOJ Secretary’s sudden designation of Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel
Velasco as Acting City Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case69 and the latter’s conformity to the motion for reinvestigation.

In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public prosecutor who will conduct the reinvestigation or preliminary
investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice 71 who
is vested with the prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor to handle a particular case, which broad
power of control has been recognized by jurisprudence. 72

As for the trial court’s ignoring the DOJ Secretary’s uncontested statements to the media which aired his opinion that if the assailant
merely intended to maim and not to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed — the DOJ Secretary reportedly uttered that "the filing
of the case of homicide against ano against Leviste lintek naman eh I told you to watch over that case… there should be a report about
the ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then that’s not a complete investigation, that’s why you should use that as a ground" — no abuse
of discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it.

The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable
cause."73 On the contrary, the remarks merely underscored the importance of securing basic investigative reports to support a finding of
probable cause. The original Resolution even recognized that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot be determined based on
the evidence obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in
evidence[.]"74
The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at the back of his head, the absence of paraffin test and ballistic
examination, and the handling of physical evidence,"75 as rationalized by the prosecution in its motion, are sufficient circumstances that
require further inquiry.

That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail hearings does not affect the prior determination of
probable cause because, as the appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail
to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case. 76

In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of
probable cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced during the reinvestigation.

Petitioner’s argument is specious.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one
made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.77

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the
arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC.

To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge
is duty-bound to personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of the
presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.80

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. 81 (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused
before any warrant may be issued.82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable
cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records should be
[since t]he extent of the judge’s examination depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case
require."83 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:

The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the presence
or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s determination of probable cause is made ex parte and
is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause
by needless motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no circumstances exist that would qualify the crime from
homicide to murder.

The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no credence, because new pieces of evidence are not
prerequisites for a valid conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter or evidence was presented during the
reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the
case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and re-
evaluate its findings and the evidence already submitted. 85

Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in, and be subject of, a petition for review on
certiorari since this Court is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the evidence adduced by the parties on the issue of the
absence or presence of probable cause, as there exists no exceptional circumstances to warrant a factual review. 86
In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is not to stray at will and resolve questions and issues beyond its competence,
such as an error of judgment.87 The court’s duty in the pertinent case is confined to determining whether the executive and judicial
determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is possible
that error may be committed in the discharge of lawful functions, this does not render the act amenable to correction and annulment by
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.88

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.