VALLES V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions
dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles,
against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she
ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election
was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo
warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient
proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition,
ratiocinating thus:
“A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the
impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce
documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father...
and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue
of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to
the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important
documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to
confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an
equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance
and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are
inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated
renunciation of her Filipino citizenship”.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for
re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco
Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-
066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in
the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a
Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
“Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above
table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No.
95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and
incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not
having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal
of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a
matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
“WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new
matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or
impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions
promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This
Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the
present petition.
SO ORDERED.”[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC
in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was
married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso
jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the
COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066,
declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent
is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3,
1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate
of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or
subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had
her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified
to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that
the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must
comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public
office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since
the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with
her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private
respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is
disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner
concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred
in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under
consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,[3] that:
“xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand. xxx”
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship
of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to
the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship
on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy
Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens
of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined
Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of
the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring
ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879
in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws
in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the
1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions. Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is
not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her
Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited
private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on
September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport
on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age
or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue
of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his
nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioner’s contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in the
more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount
to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen
in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a
certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.[8] As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs.
Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a
Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of
Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included
as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the
private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to
run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which
states:
“SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx”
Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified
“dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance.[9] Recognizing situations in which a
Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that
dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and
in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual
allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification.”
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did
not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship,
it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen.[11] This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein
private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such
fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was
cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the
Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent
must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an
issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy
Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.[12] He insists that the
same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on
the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic,[13] an exception to this general rule was recognized. The
Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim
Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on
citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on
these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make
the effort easier or simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient basis
to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA.
No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in
favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by
petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two
prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions.
However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the
merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively,
in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged
qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DELA CRUZ V. CA
[G.R. No. 138489. November 29, 2001]
ELEANOR DELA CRUZ, FEDERICO LUCHICO, JR., SOLEDAD
EMILIA CRUZ, JOEL LUSTRIA, HENRY PAREL, HELENA
HABULAN, PORFIRIO VILLENA, JOSEPH FRANCIA, CARMELLA
TORRES, JOB DAVID, CESAR MEJIA, MA. LOURDES V. DEDAL,
ALICE TIONGSON, REYDELUZ CONFERIDO, PHILIPPE LIM,
NERISSA SANCHEZ, MARY LUZ ELAINE PURACAN, RODOLFO
QUIMBO, TITO GENILO and OSCAR ABUNDO, as members of the
Board of the National Housing Authority from the period covering
1991-1996, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented
by its Commissioners, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This petition for certiorari[1] assails the Decision No. 98-381 dated
September 22, 1998, rendered by the Commission on Audit (COA),
denying petitioners’ appeal from the Notice of Disallowance No. 97-
011-061 issued by the NHA Resident Auditor on October 23, 1997.
Such Notice disallowed payment to petitioners of their
representation allowances and per diems for the period from August
19, 1991 to August 31, 1996 in the total amount of P276,600.00.
Petitioners, numbering 20, were members of the Board of Directors
of the National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996.
On September 19, 1997, the COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038[2]
directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national
government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations which have effected payment of any form of additional
compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies
and assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on
multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such
additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by
the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund of the same from the
time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the
consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Exexcutive Secretary
and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991.[3] The
COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court
Decision, which became final and executory on August 19, 1991,[4]
declared Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it
allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other
offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive
compensation therefor.
Accordingly, on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J.
Vasquez issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061[5]
disallowing in audit the payment of representation allowances and
per diems of "Cabinet members who were the ex- officio members of
the NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective alternates who
actually received the payments." The total disallowed amount of
P276,600 paid as representation allowances and per diems to each of
the petitioners named below, covering the period from August 19,
1991 to August 31, 1996, is broken down as follows: [6]
“NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF PAID REPRESENTATION/PER DIEM OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
For the period August 19, 1991 to August 31, 1996
AGENCY MEMBERS OF BOARD OF AMOUNT
DISALLOWED
DIRECTORS
DOF Eleanor dela Cruz
P25,200.00
(1991-1993)
DTI Federico Luchico, Jr.
36,450.00
(1991-1992)
 DOF Ma. Lourdes V. Dedal
DOF Soledad Emilia Cruz 2,250.00
57,300.00 (1993)
(1992-1995)
DTI Alice Tiongson
DOLE Joel Lustria 900.00
4,500.00 (1994)
(1992)
DOLE Reynaluz Conferido
DOLE Henry Parel 11,250.00
2,250.00 (1994-1995)
(1992)
DOLE Philippe Lim
DOF Helena Habulan 4,500.00
4,050.00 (1994-1995)
(1993-1994)
DOF Nerissa Sanchez
DOF Porfirio Villena 2,700.00
6,750.00 (1995)
(1993)
DOF Mary Luz Elaine Puracan
DTI Joseph Francia 1,800.00
73,500.00 (1995)
(1993-1995)
DOLE Rodolfo Quimbo
DOLE Carmela Torres 7,200.00
4,500.00 (1995)
(1993)
DOLE Tito Genilo
DPWH Job David 14,400.00
6,750.00 (1995)
(1993-1994)
DPWH Oscar Abundo
DPWH Cesar Mejia 7,200.00
3,150.00 (1995-1996)
(1993) _____________

P276,600.00”
============
Petitioners, through then Chairman Dionisio C. Dela Serna of the
NHA Board of Directors, appealed from the Notice of Disallowance
to the Commission on Audit[7] based on the following grounds:
1. The Decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Union and
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. was clarified in the
Resolution of the Court En Banc on August 1, 1991, in that the
constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions applies only to
the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. It does not
cover other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower
than the position of Assistant Secretary; and
2. The NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or
Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the
position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-381[8]
denying petitioners' appeal, thus:
“After circumspect evaluation of the facts and issues raised herein,
this Commission finds the instant appeal devoid of merit. It must be
stressed at the outset that the Directors concerned were not sitting in
the NHA Board in their own right but as representatives of cabinet
members and who are constitutionally prohibited from holding any
other office or employment and receive compensation therefor,
during their tenure (Section 13, Article VII, Constitution; Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317).
“It may be conceded that the directors concerned occupy positions
lower than Assistant Secretary which may exempt them from the
prohibition (under) the doctrine enunciated in Civil Liberties Union
vs. Executive Secretary, supra. However, their positions are merely
derivative; they derive their authority as agents of the authority they
are representing; their power and authority is sourced from the
power and authority of the cabinet members they are sitting for.
Sans the cabinet members, they are non-entities, without power and
without personality to act in any manner with respect to the official
transactions of the NHA. The agent or representative can only
validly act and receive benefits for such action if the principal
authority he is representing can legally do so for the agent can only
do so much as his principal can do. The agent can never be larger
than the principal. If the principal is absolutely barred from holding
any position in and absolutely prohibited from receiving any
remuneration from the NHA or any government agency, for that
matter, so must the agent be. Indeed, the water cannot rise above its
source.”[9]
Hence, this petition.
Presidential Decree No. 757 is the law "Creating the National
Housing Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies,
defining its powers and functions, providing funds therefor, and for
other purposes." Section 7 thereof provides:
“SEC. 7. Board of Directors. - The Authority shall be governed by a
Board of Directors, hereinafter referred to as the Board, which shall
be composed of the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication, the Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of
Labor, the Secretary of Industry, the Executive Secretary and the
General Manager of the Authority. From among the members, the
President will appoint a chairman. The members of the Board may
have their respective alternates who shall be the officials next in rank
to them and whose acts shall be considered the acts of their
principals with the right to receive their benefit: Provided, that in the
absence of the Chairman, the Board shall elect a temporary presiding
officer. x x x (Emphasis ours)
It bears stressing that under the above provisions, the persons
mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the
following: (1) the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications, (2) the Director-General of the National Economic
and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of Finance, (4) the
Secretary of Labor, (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive
Secretary, and (7) the General Manager of the NHA. While
petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are
“alternates” of the said officers, “whose acts shall be considered the
acts of their principals”.
On this point, Section 13, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
“SEC. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during their tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
“The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the
fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
Chairmen, or heads of bureaus of offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.”
Interpreting the foregoing Constitutional provisions, this Court, in
Civil Liberties Union and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines,
Inc.,[10] held:
“The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason
is that these posts do not comprise ‘any other office’ within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
“To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional
compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the concerned official’s office.
The term ex-officio means ‘from office; by virtue of office’. It refers
to an ‘authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position.’ Ex-officio likewise denotes an ‘act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any
other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.’
An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of
his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the
Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio
Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the
Light Rail Transit Authority.
xxx xxx xxx
“The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has
no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the
said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for
and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is
actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function
of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking ONG V. ALEGRE
matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For FRANCIS G. ONG, G.R. No. 163295
such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra Petitioner,
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an Present:
honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By
whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is PANGANIBAN, C.J.
prohibited by the Constitution.” PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
xxx xxx xxx YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
(Emphasis ours) - versus - CARPIO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of CORONA,
the NHA Board, are prohibited from receiving “extra (additional) CARPIO MORALES,
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an CALLEJO, SR.,
honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism," it AZCUNA,
follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be TINGA,
entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give CHICO-NAZARIO, and
petitioners a better right than their principals. GARCIA, JJ.

We thus rule that in rendering its challenged Decision, the COA did JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and Promulgated:
not gravely abuse its discretion. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. January 23, 2006
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. x---------------------x

SO ORDERED. ROMMEL G. ONG,

Petitioner,
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon , Jr., and Carpio, JJ.,
concur. - versus - G.R. No. 163354
Quisumbing, J., no part. Former DOLE Secretary.
Buena, J., on official leave.
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari
with petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELEC en banc
resolution[1] dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting
private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31, 2004[2] of the
COMELEC’s First Division.
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with application for injunctive relief, filed by petitioner
Rommel Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to
stop the COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid
May 7, 2004 en banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the
outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of these petitions.
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed
factual backdrop:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and
petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial
Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy[3] of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No.
04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-
consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the
May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three
(3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis
opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by
COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an
election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC
declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty
contest,[4] albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when
Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in
fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of
the municipality of San Vicente.
Acting on Alegre’s petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis’
certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First
Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a
resolution[5] dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as
follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to
those obtaining in the sample situations addressed by the Highest
Court in the Borja case. Herein, one of the requisites for the
application of the three term rule is not present. Francis Ong might
have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to
2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to
2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected
thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided
his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that
Stanley Alegre was the “legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte.” This disposition had
become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by
Ong, the case having become moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in
the Lonzanida case and applicable in the case at bench, Ong could
not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001
because “he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed
office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later
overturned … when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in
the May 1998 elections.” (Words in bracket and emphasis in the
original).
Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration,
contending, in the main, that there was a misapplication of the three-
term rule, as applied in the cited cases of Borja vs. Comelec and
Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-
048, a resolution[6] reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the
COMELEC’s First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis “as
disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the
…May 10, 2004”; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis’ name from the
official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of
election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of
the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to seek
the assistance of his political party, the Nationalist People’s
Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel
Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the
very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the
position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis.
The following undisputed events then transpired:
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel
Ong.
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed
a letter[7] to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines
Norte Liza Z. Cariño and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia
in which he appealed that, owing to the COMELEC’s inaction on
Alegre's petition to cancel Rommel’s certificate of candidacy, the
name “Rommel Ong” be included in the official certified list of
candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired
listing was granted by the PES Carino.
3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote[8] to then COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for
Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the legality of the action
thus taken by the PES Cariño. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano
issued a Memorandum under date May 10, 2004[9] addressed to PES
Liza D. Zabala-Cariño, ordering her to implement the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7,
2004.[10] Said Memorandum partly stated:
The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which he quote your stand,
"that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted
candidacy is denied due course. In the Resolution of the
Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis Ong
was denied due course," and elaborated further that:
"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the
name of a substitute candidate in the certified list of candidates
unless the substitution is approved by the Commission.
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate
of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due
course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete his name
from the list of candidates."
The above position of the Commission was in line with the
pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA
617) which states:
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not
only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy."
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the
said Resolution of the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048
promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in
bracket added].
4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would
seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San
Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the
votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that
Board.[11]
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Alegre as the winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San
Vicente, Camarines Norte.[12]
On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition for
certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His brother
Rommel’s petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a week after.
In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No. 163295 and
G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated.[13]
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order
dismissing private respondent Alegre’s Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being
moot and academic.[14]
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its en banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner
Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections and consequently ordering the
deletion of his name from the official list of candidates so that any
vote cast in his favor shall be considered stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommel’s
certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute
for his brother Francis.
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the
question of whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office
as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of
the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative.
Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that,
while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor
of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as
mayor-elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually
nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated
July 4, 2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida
vs. Comelec[15], that a proclamation subsequently declared void is
no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a
protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject
to the final outcome of the election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same
rule as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to
apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served
three (3) consecutive terms.[16]
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites
are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from
running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong
having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995
and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-
June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The
herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term,
albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the
same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the
1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially
declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The
question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not
Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one
full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit
rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,
“service for the full term”, and should be counted as a full term
served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective
officials from being elected and serving for more than three
consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election
Protest Case No. 6850,[17] that it was Francis’ opponent (Alegre)
who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the
legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it
must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has
expired. Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation
was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of
the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally
be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not
hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would
– under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made
in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the
Court’s ruling in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,[18] citing Borja vs.
Comelec[19]. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and
served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for
the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his
duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation
and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a
decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of
elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed
this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate
the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up
to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida
again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify,
under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted.
There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and that he
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of
involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly
observed, Lonzanida “cannot be deemed to have served the May
1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact
vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.”
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once
apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election
was declared a nullity for the stated reason of “failure of election”,
and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as
mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the
office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office
as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in
the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually no
interruption or break in the continuity of Francis’ service respecting
the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated
during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties
and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for
the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from running in
the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and
denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the
constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the three-term
limit rule for any local elective official cannot be sustained. What the
COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution
commends itself for concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying
the ruling in the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant petition
will be erroneous because the factual milieu in those cases is
different from the one obtaining here. Explicitly, the three-term limit
was not made applicable in the cases of Borja and Lonzanida because
there was an interruption in the continuity of service of the three
consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served
continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full
term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis
that he was not duly elected thereto on account of void proclamation
because it would have iniquitous effects producing outright injustice
and inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated
loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added; emphasis in
the original)
Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or
not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his
discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering
the implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc
resolution even before its finality[20] is now of little moment and
need not detain us any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis’ petition in G.R. No. 163295 is
Rommel’s petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel)
challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a
substitute candidate in the official list of candidates for the May 10,
2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC policy[21] provides
for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the
certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Court’s holding in Miranda vs.
Abaya,[22] that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another
belonging to the same political party as that of the former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a
registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate
of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does
not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the
person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled
under Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the
occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no
mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid
substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a
nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due
course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the
lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and
conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy
have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions
of Section 78 of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who
has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch
of the imagination, be a candidate at all.
xxx xxx xxx
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy,
it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a
cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to
the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear
and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be
any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy
has been cancelled and denied due course.
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004
elections were already passé, Rommel Ong’s petition in G.R. No.
163354 is already moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the
assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in
SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.