Provincial autonomy in Papua New Guinea

Thesis Title: Towards a federalist political system: negotiating a

practical system of government for Papua New Guinea
through provincial autonomy

Name: Patrick Kaiku

ID No: 20001412

“A thesis presented as partial fulfillment for the Honors Program in Political

Science, University of Papua New Guinea, September 2005”
 Contents
Title Page

Abbreviations and Acronyms……………………………………………………………………... 6-7

Preface …………………………………………….......................................................................... 8

1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 9-11

1.1 Methodology………………………………………………………………………………. 11

2. The background to the emergence of a PNG state………………………………………………..... 12

2.1 In the era of “statelessness”………………………………………………………………... 12-13
2.2 PNG state formation: 1950-early 1970s…………………………………………………… 13
2.2.1 Political education and socialization……………………………………………….13-14
2.2.2 Development of a National Constitutional and State’s structure…………………..14-15
2.2.3 Development of Local Government Councils…………………………………….. 15-17
2.2.4 The rise of indigenous “political” movements……………………………………. 17-19
2.3 Summary…………………………………………………………………………………… 19

3. Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………………............... 20
3.1 Defining Federalism………………………………………………………………………...
20-21
3.2 Federalism and Provincial Autonomy: Applications and Linkages……………………….. 21-28
3.2.1 Arbitrary Justifications for Provincial Autonomy in PNG………………………... 28-31
3.2.2 Advantages of a potential PNG Federation……………………………………….. 31-33
3.2.3 Scope of proposed Federation in PNG……………………………………………. 33-36
3.2.4 Foreseeable Constraints to Federalism in PNG…………………………………….36-40
3.3 Summary……………………………………………………………………………………40

4. Malaysia: Third World Viability of Federalism…………………………………………………… 41

4.1. Why Compare Malaysia to Papua New Guinea?................................................................. 41-42
4.2. Overview of Malaysian Federation……………………………………………………….. 42-43
4.3 Rationale for 1963 Malaysian Federation………………………………………………… 43-46
4.4 Socio-Economic Conditions by State……………………………………………………... 46-48
4.5 Federal and State Government Finances………………………………………………….. 48-51
4.6 Summary…………………………………………………………………………………... 51

5. Papua New Guinea’s government system: the need for a reconfiguration…………………………. 52

5.1 In the Political Wilderness…………………………………………………………………. 52-54
5.2 Preserving the State through Federalist Arrangement……………………………………... 54-57
5.3 Structural Adjustment and Political Legitimacy: Global Lessons………………………….57-59
5.4 Structural Adjustment and the Alliance of Neglect……………………………………….. 59-64
5.5 Under the OLPG&LLG: Compounding the State’s Legitimacy, 1995 to date………….... 64-65
5.5.1 Failures and constraints of the OLPG&LLG decentralization exercise………… 65-66
5.5.2 Human resource and the politicization of the OLPG&LLG……………………… 66-68
5.5.3 Infrastructure and Finance………………………………………………………… 68-69
5.6 Summary………………………………………………………………………………… 69-70

6. Case Study: East New Britain and Eastern Highlands Provinces……………………………… 71

6.1 General overview: East New Britain and Eastern Highlands Provinces …………………. 71
6.1.1 East New Britain: Geographic setting and demographic characteristics…………. 72-73
6.1.2 Provincial administrative structure………………………………………………. 73
6.1.3 Social and economic infrastructure……………………………………………… 73-76
6.1.4 Eastern Highlands: Geographic setting and demographic characteristics……… 76-77
6.1.5 Provincial administrative structure………………………………………………. 78
2
 Contents

6.1.7 Social and economic infrastructure…………………………………………… 78-81

6.2 Summary………………………………………………………………………………… 81

7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………… 82-84

Appendix………………………………………………………………………………………………… 85

Model ……..….…………………………………………………………………………………. 85
Illustrations/Figures……………………………………………………………………………… 86

Figure 1.a Malaysia: five year development plan allocations, 1971-2005………………………. 86

Figure 1.b Malaysia: development allocation by State, 1976-2000…………………………….. 86

List of Tables……….…………………………………………………………………………………… 77

Table 1 ― Chapter 4 Malaysia: Third World Viability of Federalism………………………………… 87

Table 1.1 Malaysia: summary of Federal and State Government functions…………………… 87

Table 1.2 Malaysia: summary of Federal and State Government revenue……………………… 88

Table 1.3 Malaysia: development composite index by state, 1990, 2000 (1990 = 100)………… 89-90

Table 1.4 Malaysia: average GDP growth rate by state, 1971-2000 (% per annum)…………… 91

Table 1.5 Malaysia: incidence of poverty (%) by state, 1970-1999……………………………… 91

Table 1.6 Malaysia: socio-economic indicators by State, 1999……………………………… 92

Table 1.7 Malaysia: health facilities and road density by State, 1995-1999…………………… 92

Table 1.8 Malaysia: Government revenue, 1975-2001 (RM million)…………………………… 93

Table 1.9 Malaysia: federal and consolidated state government revenues

and expenditures, 1985-1999 (RM '000 million)……………………………… 93

Table 1.10 Malaysia: grants to State governments, 1975-1999………………………………… 93

Table 1.11 Malaysia: Outstanding Federal Loans to

State Governments, 1996, 1998, 1999 (RM million)………………………………94

Table 1.12 Malaysia: development allocation per capita by State, 1996-2000 (RM)………… 94

Table 1.13 Malaysia: development allocation by area (RM/Sq Km) by State, 1976-2005………… 95

Table 2 ―Chapter 6 Case Study: East New Britain and Eastern Highlands Provinces………………… 96

Table 2.1: Eastern Highlands provincial government revenue

and budgetary allocations, 1998, 1999, 2000……………………………………… 96

3
Table 2.2: East New Britain provincial government revenue and
Budgetary allocations, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002………………………………… 97

Table 2.3: Provincial Infrastructure Grant (an Organic Law grant) according
to district programs allocation in the East New Britain province in 2002……………… 98

Table 2.4: Functional classification of National Recurrent Expenditure

(In Millions of Kina)…………………………………………………………………….. 99

Table 2.5: Citizen households by type and purpose of agricultural

Activities and sector based on the 2000 Census, Eastern Highlands province………… 100

Table 2.6: Population by sector, sex and citizenship based on the 2000
Census, Eastern Highlands province…………………………………………………… 100

Table 2.7: Education and Literacy (Summary indicators), Eastern

Highlands province……………………………………………………………………... 101

Table 2.8: Citizen Population by district, East New Britain province………………………….. 101

Table 2.9: Population by sector, sex and citizenship-East New Britain

Province, 2000 Census (in thousands)………………………………………………….. …… 101

Interviews: Dates and Personalities……………………………………………………………… 102

Questionnaire …………………………………………………………………………………….102

Reference………………………………………………………………………………………….103-109

4
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANU Australian National University

ARB Autonomous Region of Bougainville

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

CPC Constitutional Planning Committee

CPI Consumer Price Index

DAP Democratic Action Party

DSG District Support Grant

ENB East New Britain

FMS Federated Malay States

G7 Group of Seven

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GST Goods and Services Tax

IASER Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research (now National Research Institute)

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISA Internal Security Act

JPP&BPC Joint Provincial Planning and Budget Priorities Committee

LLG Local-level Government

MP Member of Parliament

MSC Multimedia Super Corridor

MTR5MP Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990

MTR7MP Mid-Term Review of the Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000

NDC National Disaster Centre

NEC National Executive Council

NEP New Economic Policy

OLPG Organic Law on Provincial Governments 1977

OLPG&LLG Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments 1995

5
OPP2 Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000

PAS Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party)

PBS Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party)

Petronas Petroleum Nasional Berhad

PNG Papua New Guinea

PNGIPA Papua New Guinea’s Institute of Public Administration

RENB Radio East New Britain

SAP Structural Adjustment Program

UMNO United Malaysia National Organization

UPNG University of Papua New Guinea

U.S. United States

VAT Value Added Tax

6
PREFACE

In the compilation of this thesis it could not have been possible without the unwavering assistance, support,
exhortations and intellectual guidance of several mentors. Though ink and paper cannot express the totality of
gratitude, the citation of these unique personalities will be incompletely attempted nevertheless.

Firstly, I acknowledge the guidance of the learned Professor Allan Patience, the head of the political science
strand at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG). For his initial intellectual stimulation for me to consider
the “world-view” perspective on the idea or subject of federalism and his availing me of up-to-date literature and
materials on the subject of federalism from his “personal collection” of texts relating to the topic on federalism.

In my initial consultation with Professor Allan Patience to gauge his views on the idea of federalism, he expertly
proposed for my consideration of the idea of a Pacific federation. Though this (Pacific federation) is not
highlighted in the following discourse, the essence of taking the “anarchical” international system as a starting
point increased my determination in understanding globalization as an influential force on the PNG State, thus
serving as a premise of this paper.

Secondly, I thank Dr. Alphonse Gelu for his patience in allowing me time (a variable I attempted to observe in
this project) and the proof-reading and suggestions offered towards the final structure and content of this paper.
With this extraordinary level of patience and understanding in my confronting this intuitive exercise, Dr. Gelu
has tacitly given me motivation to “declare an all-out-war” on one of my long-standing fallibilities as a student–
the appreciation of time management and dealing with the ungainly habit of procrastination.

Thirdly, I acknowledge the contributions by Mr. Daniel Aloi, Dr. Henry Okole and Mr. Ngen Isana for their
input into the subject matter as learned scholars and practitioners in the disciplines of politics and public
administration. I was lucky to have had a neutral perspective and “mind-teasing” deliberations on government
re-thinking from these knowledgeables.

Fourthly, I thank Dr. Bernard Minol of the Language and Literature strand of the UPNG for his appreciation of
my writing and potential. Without such intellectual support and mentors in this world, learning, scholarship and
the expansion of knowledge is as stagnant as can be. Likewise, acknowledgment is also rendered to my
colleague, Teddy Winn for his learned suggestions and camaraderie during the academic year of 2004.

Finally and significantly, I pay homage to my parents, Mr. Ombone Kaiku and Mrs. Tukul Kaiku for having to
tirelessly bear the brunt of my physical and emotional demands pertaining to the forthwith completion of this
paper. My parents are the foundations of my intellectual pursuits. Their investment in my acquiring knowledge
cannot be merely simplified into letters and text format. In my endeavors as a scholar, I hope to portray the
cultured upbringing and intellectual heritage you so thoroughly bequeathed.

7
1. INTRODUCTION

The thirtieth year of Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) existence as an independent entity heralds challenges with the
corresponding impulse for timely redressing of its internal structures. Therefore, reconfiguration of the inter-
government arrangement in the face of globalization and its effects ought to be an inherent institutional
objective. The argument in this paper then focuses on the reconfiguration of the internal political institutions as
a precondition for the eliciting of maximum benefits in Papua New Guinea’s external relations. Likewise it
should be taken to counter the unwavering prevalence of the neo-liberal economic ideology and concurrently
where the PNG state is desperately in need of reasserting its political independence and internal legitimacy.

Papua New Guinea’s professed status as a sovereign unit entails that the internal mechanisms have to be
reassessed in light of the growing complexities of the world around it. The internal (national) and external
(international) arenas over the course of Papua New Guinea’s progression as a nation-state have been
transformed from simple to complex “playing fields” and these have had direct manifestations on the conduct of
government in our time.

Therefore it is the hypothesis of this paper that since the attainment of political independence in 1975, Papua
New Guinea has not had a clearly defined form or system of government to articulate the dual process of
institutionalized legitimacy and indigenous empowerment. Compounded in recent decades by the alliance of
neglect by centralist regimes and insensitive global forces, the welfare of the predominantly rural-based masses
in the provinces hangs in the balance. Scholarly insight should now direct Papua New Guinea towards the
confrontation of this political dilemma; finding a productive government arrangement. Unless we are aware or
admit the precarious nature of our problem, the amelioration needed will still not be in sight.

Hence, the direct crisis of legitimacy and the “intangibility of the state” can be redressed through the provincial
autonomy and federalist agenda as these are convenient and appropriate forms or systems of government for the
state of PNG. In the following, the urgent need to find a consensually agreed-upon system of government for
Papua New Guinea will be highlighted.

Chapter 1 will briefly introduce the progression of the state system in the Papua New Guinean landscape. The
theme of this part is the undisputed fact that the institution of state is a “foreign” concept. Its establishment in
Papua New Guinea deserved in part the socialization of its presumed beneficiaries to the intricacies of that
institution. Also the consideration of existing semi-autonomous and indigenous initiatives could have been more
entrenched.

Rather than being an apologist of the slow introduction of PNG into a “relatively stable, satisfied society” by
predominantly “laid back” Australian colonial policy, Chapter 1 puts up the phases of political development in
PNG as an “upheaval” that is currently showing in the very heavy obsession with macro-level politics of the
national level. It portends that the “incomplete business” of citizenry participation and input into the
mechanization of a greater self-reliant and self-sufficient state can be more institutionalized at the rural levels,
under the tutelage of the provincial governments.

Chapter 2 then is the conceptual framework and it introduces the proposed solution. Therein, the intended scope
of federalism in a potential PNG federation, the literature of federalism and the defining of the concepts of
federalism and autonomy will be elucidated. The linkages and applicable utilization features of government
under federated arrangements will be directly intuited as reflective of the Papua New Guinea problem. Likewise,
to draw concrete evidence that the “second-best” option of federalism is viable to the PNG context and that an
indigenization of local initiatives can best be facilitated by a Papua New Guinean re-definition of federalism, the
case of Malaysia’s experience with federalism will be briefly accounted. Given that Malaysia is a third world
county, an existing political reality in relation to the federalist political system, it is necessary to prove the
intuition that that the development of political institutions and attaining high levels of socio-economic are
attainable for “new-comers” to the state system if the state mechanism is mastered.

8
Chapter 3 gives the justification as to the need for the reconfiguration of the government or the mechanisms of
the state. It proposes that only after accepting the fact or a political analysis is instituted that the PNG state or
government system can be rethought. As a legacy of the era of colonialism, the theoretical underpinnings and
practice of government in PNG has seen the obsession with ideal types and the strict institutional prescriptions of
the Western democracies. These are all falling apart due to its seemingly unworkable nature in the PNG context
and so too is the question relating to the universality of the orthodox state system. Chapter 3 also introduces the
concept of a federalist system via initial autonomous provincial governments as an institutionalized repellent
against the unwanted forces that are now increasingly de-politicizing the masses’ knowledge of the state.

Chapter 4 is an analysis on the experience of the Malaysian federation and how it has assisted in the maturation
of political institutions and intergovernment relations, the fostering of provincial initiative and self-reliance and
particularly the Malaysian contextualization of federalism. In the analysis, the “middle-man” functions and
powers of the Federal Government in relation to the States will be deliberated on. Likewise, the available data
on the socio-economic performances of the States will be presented to understand the accruable benefits the
Malaysian federation. This will hopefully shed light on the need to confront developmental circumstances
peculiar to third world states and hopefully translate into Papua New Guinea’s own quest to re-configure the
government arrangement in our time.

The central theme of Chapter 5 therefore is that federalism or greater provincial autonomy as well as being
compatible with the social, political and economic developmental circumstances of Papua New Guinea societies
would be a repellent system of government with an indigenous flavour serving as a buffer against the foreseeable
threat on the viability of that very institution in the Papua New Guinea political system by recurring external
forces. It points to the fact that the current Provincial Reforms of 1995 which were instituted to have the
delivery mechanism more sensitive and responsible to the plight of the masses has not assisted the legitimate
claims of the state or central government because the national-level politicians and the national-level trivialities
take precedent over the need for capacity and political commitment to meeting the objectives and legal
provisions of the Provincial and Local Government Reforms. The reforms were on the other hand politically
expedient for insecure political interests in Waigani.

Specific to the challenges on the PNG state system are the “undemocratic” conditions of Bretton Woods
financial institutions (representations of economic globalization in our time) and the hitherto relations with the
successive gullible political elites of this country. Within the phase of the mind-numb ling structural adjustment
programs and as currently witnessed the institutionalized neglect associated with the central government
mortgaging the sovereignty and constitutional duties and responsibilities of the state towards its predominantly
rural-based constituents had shown that its professed legitimate capacity to command respect and civic-
mindedness is questionable in the long run.

Chapter 6 looks at the case study provinces of East New Britain and Eastern Highlands provinces where the
initial process of provincial autonomy can be instituted. The provinces were taken for brief analysis because
they show potential or deserving candidates to be granted self-governing powers and resemble some level of
being direct outcomes of the alliance of neglect. It is the frustrations that such provinces have to undergo to see
their plight as necessitating local (provincial) initiative. The “tangibility of government” then is a resounding
criterion if the provincial leaders of East New Britain and Eastern Highlands provinces look for provincial
solutions to provincial problems. In the overall picture of the quest to have a form of government reflective of
the plague of political legitimacy in PNG, the predominantly rural masses have to see the result of their
individual enterprises.

The quantitative analysis of budgetary allocations, population distribution, potential socio-economic capital and
infrastructure the relations with the central government will draw the trend in intergovernmental affairs. It will
also draw conclusion as to whether the central government is really that serious in relation to its promises to
equitably see the provinces as fundamental constituencies in PNG as was the aptly stated premise of the
Provincial Reforms in 1995.

Of course the ideas herein are preliminary. The task is to have indigenous scholars and committed policy-
makers take the idea on as necessitating change because the fundamental questions of justice, equitable

9
development and self-reliance, political and economic independence are at the threshold of Papua New Guinea’s
development as a nation.

1.1. Methodology

The methods in generating or substantiating the arguments in this thesis were based on the qualitative research
approach. Qualitative research methods were developed in the social sciences to enable researchers to study
social and cultural phenomena. Another noteworthy concept, qualitative data sources, basically includes
observation and participant observation (fieldwork), interviews and questionnaires, documents and texts, and the
researcher’s impressions and reactions (Myers, 1997: 241-242).

Distinguishing between primary and secondary sources of data generally would see primary sources as those
data which are unpublished and which the researcher has gathered from the people or organization directly.
Secondary sources refer to any materials (books, articles etc.), which have been previously published (ibid.).

The general techniques used for collecting empirical data in this research, ranged from face-to-face interviews,
through to archival research. In my theoretical and intuitive discussions on the concept of autonomy and
provincial government system, written data sources, including published and unpublished documents, provincial
government reports, memos, and viewpoint letters to the newspaper columns, newspaper articles and so forth
were cited as secondary resources. The qualitative research methods used in this research consisted of the case
study approach; statistical analysis from existing reports of the relevant government organizations, and in depth
interview-all of which fall in the ambit of the qualitative research approach.

Firstly, the in-depth interview method was formally conducted with learned scholars to decipher their ideas and
views and experiences on provincial government experiences. Formally, the interview was structured with
questionnaires and an allotted consultation time for Dr. Henry Okole. On another occasion, I had the opportunity
to informally consult Daniel Aloi (University of Papua New Guinea’s Public Policy and Management program)
and Ngen Isana (Papua New Guinea Institute of Public Administration) on their honest viewpoint on the
experience of decentralization and the role of the public service in the whole process since 1977.

Secondly, the perusal of existing literature on federalism (publication by relevant authorities on federalism) and
the world-wide-web was also a vast source of up-to-date information, particularly assisting my conceptualizing
federalism and autonomy and the relevant statistical data on the Malaysian federation. Likewise, the existing
literature on federalism, specifically texts published by scholars in the study of Australian federalism (Galligan,
1995; Hughes, 1998) and updated materials on the Malaysian political system were sourced courtesy of
Professor Allan Patience personal collection, of which I am greatly indebted.

The case study of the two provinces, Eastern Highlands, and East New Britain provinces was based on the given
trends and with a combination of statistical analysis and perusal of publications by commentators and agencies
involved in the different sectors of development of the two provinces. Data was sourced predominantly from the
Department of Finance and Treasury and the National Statistical Office’s 2000 National Census figures.

As well, secondary materials by experts (the international aid agency, AusAID’s publication was perhaps the
most up-to-date material on Eastern Highlands) on the affairs of the provinces were cited. Statistical analysis
(quantitative material) especially in demographic, economic, budgetary and infrastructural data was obtained
from the Department of Finance and Treasury and the National Statistical Office. Unfortunately, due to resource
constraints, I was incapacitated to be involved as a participant observation and be on any fieldwork in the two
case study provinces of Papua New Guinea used in this study and owe the above-mentioned agencies both public
and non-governmental for their publishing the appropriate information for public understanding.

10
2 THE BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF A PNG STATE
2.1 In the era of “statelessness”
It is reasonable that in the ensuing comparative analysis into Papua New Guinea’s political development, the
immediate post-colonial legacies, transitional dilemmas, challenges and potential implications of that period be
evaluated in light of the present condition of the institution of state in the Papua New Guinean context. For want
of a guide in relation to the timeframe, the immediate political evolution within the pre-Independence and post-
Independence years (the 1950s to the late 1970s) will be highlighted.

Obviously the logical starting point of Papua New Guinea’s “collision” with the ideals of Western political
organization was with the age of colonialism, when the dominant forces of Western capitalist societies swept
across the globe subjugating the less technologically sophisticated and politically fragmented peoples in their
wake. In this manner, Western Europe’s values, culture and political structures and orientations were
superimposed to elicit the maximum benefit from their newly found possessions. Unfortunately, their
understanding of political organization was limited to and or determined by how they organized themselves in
their own European context.

So how did Europeans understand the institution of the state? In the modern sense of the concept, state “denotes
a historically specific unity among the various processes of legislation, execution, adjudication, and
administration within a given territory” (Isaac, 1987:158). As to its coercive nature, the modern state resembles a
set of institutions and organizations that are “invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people
and organizations juristically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary
force” (Evans and Rueschemeyer, 1985:44-47).

It is explicit that the foregoing definitions encapsulate the modern state as the sovereign: possessive of ultimate
authority and enforcer of rules on everyone who comes under its jurisdiction. The state therefore settles disputes
arising between individuals within its jurisdiction, it organizes defenses against external enemies and it imposes
taxes or other economic contributions upon them (Mair, 1962). By its very character, the complexity and
sophisticated centralization of power typifies the Western European view of the state.

Pre-colonial Papua New Guinea society on the other hand was labeled as a stateless society (Amarshi et al,
1987:3; Peasah, 1994:5). Indeed, PNG communities did not have elaborately structured centralized authority and
judicial institutions. As well, many PNG communities did not have chieftaincy systems characterized through
centralized authority. The geographical isolation of these communities also compounded any significant
aggregation into a territorially defined and politically cogent unit. Coupled with the agrarian-based organization
of societal lifestyle, political organization was not complex nor did it resemble state structure. The pattern of
“agriculture based on shifting cultivation and before the advent of the European, employing only the most
primitive implements, hunting, and in the case of coastal peoples, fishing formed the basis of a stationary,
subsistence economy”.1

In the regulation of society, the “government” was entrenched on the rules imposed by the kinship organization.
Along these kinship ties existed some level of “patron-client relationships wherein the ‘big man’ - an
accomplished fighter-leader who commanded more wives and wealth – possessed some limited powers in
deciding production and distribution patterns”(Amarshi et al. 1978: 3). Since this nature of leadership was based
on superiority of wealth, and not on the function of hereditary status, “the principle of reciprocity has meant that
the man who could make the most ostentatious display in the provision of feasts or the giving of presents could
reach the position where he could not be repaid except in services”(Legge, 1956:5). However, this position was
not an indication of overall extensive powers, rather, as an economic assertion of superiority. Such functions as
adjudicating community dispute was not vested solely on the ‘big man’, so the resorting to “private vengeance
still provided an accepted means of redressing private wrongs” (ibid.).

The absence of any “formal”, large-scale political organization or elaborate system of hereditary rank was the
initial “administrative problem” for the colonial powers in the New Guinea territory. It was the sparsely,
1
Legge, J.D. (1956), Australian Colonial Policy, Sydney, Sydney University Press, pp.1-6
11
separated villages which constituted the largest unit, with a mere few hundred people. Moreover, these small-
scale societies mostly existed as self-contained and largely self-sufficient units. The commonality to forge any
state-resembled organization was inadequate for these village units because of the persistence of a state of
mutual hostility between villages, absence of any common lingua franca and relatively dissimilar cultural
patterns.2

One scholar has argued that the past or any future categorization of a New Guinea “society” is problematic in the
sense that “[A]t present there is not an effective aggregate, simply a categories of nonintegrated units, each
representing a narrow sphere of interaction, except, mainly, for external trade”. 3 In essence, tribal and village
units in the New Guinea experience were miniature societies, stateless because of their absence of focus in the
political sense (ibid.). These methods of state creation established a system of centralized authority above the
other existing smaller and relatively autonomous political units. In other words, informal apparatuses of the State
were imposed and gradually allowed to evolve and crystallize into a sophisticated structure. During the
Administration period, political power being vested and controlled with colonial policies dictated from Canberra
in the case of the former Territory of Papua and Germany in the case of German New Guinea and the
manifestations of colonial rule through rudimentary and direct methods.

Presently, in the broader context of proposing the federalist structure of government for the intergovernmental
relations of Papua New Guinea, the recurring dilemma encountered is the legacy of political maturity and
unfamiliarity with the intricacies of the institution of state. If federalism is taken as requiring political
sophistication or is suitable only to a “relatively stable, satisfied society” (Sawer, 1977), then deductive
understanding will certainly point to the impression that Papua New Guinea has to rethink the current role of the
provincial governments and local-level governments in the overall normative process of nation-building in view
of the current demands by exogenous forces of globalization. Understanding the implications of Papua New
Guinea’s political development is just one of the tasks in this discourse.

2.2 PNG State Formation: 1950-early 1970s

In this discourse, the crucial starting point in the phase of Papua New Guinea’s political transition began on the
13th of December 1946 where the United Nations Trusteeship Council authorized Australia to be the
administering authority over New Guinea. Combining the two territories of the then Australian Territory of
Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea, Australia came to assume administrative responsibility over what
became the Administration of Papua and New Guinea. As mentioned earlier, the new name of Territory of Papua
and New Guinea would have been adopted through Australian legal approval on the 10 th of March 1949.

The highlight of this phase was the institutionalization of political structure through the establishment of the
Legislative Council as of 1951 and eventually the rapid realization and growing consciousness in the 1960s by
Papua New Guinean elites of the inevitable destiny of an independent PNG nation-state. The formal structures of
the state were birthed in this phase and for the first time Papua New Guineans were given the leverage to
familiarize themselves to the roles and responsibilities of managing the institution of state. This process of State
formation involved political education and socialization, the development of a national constitution with its
prescription of the State’s structure, the establishment of Local Government Councils, and the rise of indigenous
“political” movements.

2.2.1 Political education and socialization

The 1950s through to the early 1970s witnessed the preponderance of the following in the process of state
formation. Firstly, the process of political socialization or political education paved the way for the
universalizing of the principles of liberal democracy and its tenet of representative government. For instance,
political education in the mechanics of electoral politics was conducted in the 1964 elections. It was state
formation in the mould of Western European countries where parliamentary representation derives its existence
on the vibrant functioning of political parties, an inclusive format of universal adult suffrage or voting and
representative government or parliamentary democracy.

2
ibid.
3
Stanner, E. H. (1953), The South Seas in Transition, Sydney, p.13
12
Since 1950, Local Government Councils were established at Hanuabada, Baluan, Reimber and Vunamami.
Local governments were the formal sub-units of an emerging modern state and their significance as venues for
electoral or political education and familiarization with the process of choosing representatives were undisputed
milestones in the transition from statelessness to a modern state.

Within the second phase of rapid political transition under the precarious auspices of the Australian
Administration, local governments and Territorial (what would then subsequently be National) legislature
representations facilitated the campaign of political education – a venue for the dissemination of information to
villagers about the significance of the new representative legislature. Utilizing “party symbols or other aids to
the illiterate could not have been employed in such a system, and voters who could not read or copy the names of
candidates had to be assisted by the returning officers” (Mair, 1970:47). Furthermore, legislative councilors were
given “parliamentary seminar” conducted at the request of the administration and this included the discussion of
powers and functions of various office-holders, the drafting of bills, parliamentary procedures and so forth
(ibid.).

Prior to this method of political socialization and familiarization, political rights were reluctantly withheld from
Papua New Guineans and the ethnocentric perception that they “were hardly to be seen as having the potential to
participate in their own governance...[and the]…Australian administration was only too ready to provide the
wise guidance and leadership which they lacked”(Amarshi et al, 1987:182). The culmination of electoral
education and participation in the initial stages of suffrage to the formal institutions of state witnessed in 1965
the definite program of New Guinea United National Party led by Oala Oala Rarua. As secretary for the Port
Moresby Workers Association he was adamant on organizing and engaging in the development of a Territory-
wide federation of associations (Mair, 1970:50).

Political parties, under the banner of “agents or avenues” in the articulation and aggregation of national interest
are critically documented, especially their “lateness” in the political development and political education of
Papua New Guineans. Political parties only played a limited role in the process of constitutional change in PNG.
They “have not mobilized the people, but rather given coherence to the political elite and provided the
mechanisms through which the elite gains access to, manipulates and retains political power” (Amarshi et al. op.
cit;188). In other words, political parties are the reservoirs for the formation of the potential governments.
Through electoral processes, representatives into the House of Assembly claim the mandate as representative of
their constituencies’ interests.

One might ask, what was the correlation between “transition to modern state’ and political education or
socialization? The obvious relationship was the attempt to deconstruct ethnic differences and the parochial
mindsets into a nationally envisaged superior authority in the form of the emerging modern state. Parliamentary
representation and its inherent procedures of voting, party affiliation, and so forth entailed the “unifying” of all
sub-units of the erstwhile “stateless” society into a new sovereign political organization encompassing in
jurisdiction and functions. Loyalty and legitimacy of the political institutions and representatives were therefore
inculcated and derived through the process of elections and political awareness.

2.2.2 Development of a National Constitutional and State’s structure.

The second method employed in the highlighted transition was the procedural task of drawing the Constitution
where official legality was given to the institutions of the state – in other words, the rule of law and the
functioning of the institutions of the state derived their authority from the Constitution. Apparent in the
Constitutional framing was the defining of the structures of government and the state, the assigning of the
policy-making /policy -executing role of the Executive arm of the state and the localization of the public service.

The imminent progression toward statehood that in May 1965 saw a Select Committee appointed to produce
“Constitutional proposals” to serve as a guide for the future constitutional development of the Territory (Mair,
1970: 49). This undertaking ensued after the 1962 United Nations Mission’s visit headed by Sir Hugh Foot and
his recommendation for PNG to become self-governing as soon as possible. The Foot Mission in 1962
specifically “called for much faster progress to keep up with world trends, making a particular issue of the need

13
to for a long-range economic plan, a system of higher education, and a more representative legislature in the
colony”(Amarshi et al. 1978:185).

The changes in line with the said Mission firstly, included the increase in membership of the House of Assembly
to eighty-four.4 The second change included the reservation of seats where the non-native, were replaced by
fifteen “regional electorates” (seats). Herein, candidates were required to have the minimum requirement of three
years of secondary schooling. Thirdly, the constitutional indicated the transition from Executive council to semi-
responsible Cabinet, to be “the principal instrument of policy”. However, responsibility was still with the
Administrator acting on behalf of the Australian Government. The fourth requirement under the Constitutional
considerations was for departmental policy to be made by ministerial members and heads of departments in
consultation, with disagreements referred to the administrator. The final aspect of Constitutional directives was
the appointment of a budget committee of five elected members for the purpose of reviewing and passing on
budget proposals from back-benchers (Mair, 1970: 50). This role imposition was implicit of the fiscal policy
responsibility of the emerging executive arm of the modern state system.

Moreover, in the progression toward a modern state, the acceptance of the Westminster system of government
entailed some responsibility on the Constitution framers to adopt the structure of government or the state
structure used by Great Britain. These include having the three arms of government articulated and legalized
under the Constitution. The Executive, Judicial and the Legislative arms of government therefore came into
force and recognized as legally valid for the enforcement of statutes made by the modern state system. On 1
December 1973, when PNG became self-independent, the Constitution began to take effect. This is significant
because as a sovereign, the dictations of the state were encompassing of the former autonomous and self-
contained political units in the stateless society scenario.

2.2.3 Development of Local Government Councils

The third process through which Papua New Guinea attained or transformed toward modern state status was
through the establishment (by the Australian administration) of local level governments and peripheral political
sub-units in the Territory. The relevance of this process to the overall question of political transition was the role
of the sub-units of the modern state in linking and “neutralizing” the tensions of diversity into a single entity, the
state. Allegiance, loyalty and legitimacy was commanded by the central government and reinforced through the
peripheral entities and through political participation within the lower-level entities.

During the Second World War was the administration unified under Australian Military Administration. After
the war, the functions of government were handed over to civil administration from military administration.
Responsibility for administrative policy lay with the Minister for External Territories and its department in the
Australian capital, Canberra. Execution of policy was by the Administrator in Port Moresby, working through
district administrative structure headed by the District Commissioner (Simpson & Killop, 1994:10-11).
Nevertheless greater controls were placed on the missions, and the powers of the Kiaps were reduced.
Furthermore, the kiaps’ role was largely taken over by specialist departments, which had been established in
considerable number compared to pervious decades and that caused a dramatic increase in government
employment. This led to local participation encouraged by Ordinance passed in 1954. It allowed Papuans and
New Guineans to enter the Public Service if they possess appropriate qualifications.

The period in which specialist departments were established also saw the growth of Local Government Councils.
The village council’s creation emerged out of the first Local Government Ordinance in 1949, and 1954 the
Ordinance created local councils. The councils were given responsibility for formulating own area development
plans in 1963. By 1969 there were about 142 councils, representing almost two million people (Jinks et al.,
1973).

The post-war period marked new breed of Papua New Guineans with less awareness of Australian
administration and have enthusiasm to participate in the reconstruction of the country. The late 1960s and early
1970s, were years of turmoil in which large numbers of groups campaigned for greater political recognition and
in some cases threatened to secede. The groups that had the greatest impact were based in Gazelle Peninsula
4
In 1964 the first House of Assembly had 54 elected and 10 appointed members.
14
(East New Britain) and in Bougainville. Opposition there focused specifically on Local Government, though
more broadly it expressed resentment to whole of Australian rule. The most important secession movement was
based in Bougainville, which attempted to promote regional interest. Besides regional interest, pressure for
increased autonomy arose from feelings of cultural distinctiveness and rejection of the potential domination of,
or even the more neutral interaction with, other ethnic and cultural groups (Jinks et al.; 1973).

By the late 1960s, Australian had become embarrassed by her status as a colonial power and was seeking a rapid
way to Papua New Guinea independence. In 1969, Mr. Whitlam, leader of Australian Labor Party visited Papua
New Guinea and proclaimed that Papua New Guinea would be self governed in 1972 and gain independence in
1976. Then he became the Prime Minister of Australia in 1972 provided the impetus toward self-government and
independence. The general election in 1972 was the most salient political event. From it was formed a national
coalition government on the 1 st of December 1973 in which Pangu (Papua and New Guinea Union) Party was the
major partner. It was Michael Somare's drive and leadership that had successfully held national politicians
together and led them to self government much sooner than generally had been expected.

After self-government, an all party Constitutional Planning Committee was set up and they conducted meetings
throughout Papua New Guinea, aiming at drawing a national constitution that will be referred to as ‘home
grown’. The Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) consultations raised one of the most important issues
with the level of centralized decision-making process in Canberra and Port Moresby that was dissatisfying. The
planning committee recommended that Papua New Guineas’ diverse regional and cultural groups would be best
served by a decentralized system of government rather than a single unitary state. According to CPC
recommendation, Provinces should be based on the existing Districts and that the Sub-districts should be
renamed Districts. On the basis of the CPC Interim Report, Bougainvillean leaders proceeded to organize an
Interim provincial government. To dampen secessionist sentiment, the National Government recognized the
formation of the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government in 1973.

The March 1974 commissioning of a report by two political scientists, Professors Tordoff and Watts stated:

Political systems in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean in our experiences, we have not come across
an administrative system so highly centralized and dominated by its’ bureaucracy. In suggesting a
remedy, they called for introduction of full decentralization within a unity system. They
suggested that the government should ultimately aim to devolve all administration and all aspects
of legislative powers that could not be clearly identified as desirable for national retention
(Tordoff & Watts, 1974: 2/1).

However, the central government insisted, in opposition to CPC that only the principle of Provincial
Government should appear in the constitution, with details left to ordinary legislation. The CPC wanted stronger
safeguards for this moved forward and established the legal basis for provincial government in an Organic Law.
When the National Constituent Assembly considered the draft on 30 July 1975, provincial government was
omitted from the constitution and Bougainville Provincial Government was suspended in a last minute decision.

The main reasons being that central government saw newly independent Papua New Guinea could not afford to
pay for the extra cost of provincial government structure (Tuner, 1990:124), that too-powerful political centers
would be created in the province (with consequent provincial inequalities) and national departments feared
diminution of their powers. Hence, the constitution was finalized and adopted by the House of Assembly on 17
August 1975. It provided for a single House of Parliament, a Governor General, Prime Minister who should be
the leader of the majority party in government and general elections at four yearly intervals.

The climax of the secession movement came on 1 September 1975 just 15 days before Australia was schedule to
confer independence on Papua New Guinea – when the flag of so-called North Solomon Republic was raised at
Arawa. It was a step taken by Bougainvillean leaders as result of the suspended Bougainville Interim Provincial
Government. After Papua New Guineas’ independence in 16 th September 1975 in an uncertain circumstance, the
central government officials hold reconciliation talks between Bougainvillean leaders, which led to the
Bougainvillean Agreement in 1976. Under the Agreement, Bougainville agreed to remain part of Papua New
Guinea if provincial government was reinserted in the constitution.

15
In August 1976, this amendment was approved by parliament through the Organic Law on Provincial
Government. The Organic Law set the parameters for administrative and financial decentralization. It had been a
narrow avoidance of a permanent national split and a form of decentralization that would have been even greater
than that finally agreed. This officially ushered in the old provincial government system which was generally
aimed at satisfying regional demands for political representatives where the rural population and their
representatives could participate effectively in planning and development.

2.2.4 The rise of indigenous “political” movements

From the 1950s through to the early 1970s, the political development in the most disparate localities vis-à-vis to
central administration and especially in the inevitable progress toward modern nation-statehood was left to the
devises of the indigenous peoples who for the most part had no significant experiences of the broader intricacies
of the modern state system. For political mechanisms, their “unofficial” role as interests groups in place of
established political parties served to break the barriers of parochialism and the contentedness of an agrarian
existence. As political movements, the role of so-called cargo cults, solidarity movements and self-help
organizations fall in line with Ron May’s (1982) broad interpretations as micro-nationalist movements. They
reflected to some extent the growing consciousness and indigenization of political expression and participation,
given that the Australian administration failed to facilitate political expression in the first place.

Therefore, the final (although not exhaustive) observed phenomenon employed in the transition to a modern
state was the prevalence of such movements in the Territory prior to the achievement of political independence.
It was the role such entities played which brought to the attention of the Australian administrators the growing
disillusionment over the successive failures of European rule to bring socio-economic prosperity to the
indigenous populace. Many authorities refer to the demand for equality, which is an important value in most of
Melanesia and PNG, and central to the demand for justice in cargo cults and other indigenous movements.

For instance, in explaining the phenomenon of cargo cults, Worsely (1957) used a unilinear system of evolution
and anticipated an increasingly centralized and complex system. In other words, the centralization of a modern
state authority in PNG was seen as an abrupt phenomenon in a society which knew divergent pasts or histories
was tantamount to creating a political system out of diverse aspirations. This convergence in the name of
political development led Ron May to expound on these aspect of micro nationalism as having a “continuing
role in the expression of regional, communal, and ethnical elements in Papua New Guinea society” (May,
1982:447). Cargo cults were construed as expressions of the political ideology of indigenous/ethnic identity if
sporadically distributed in a relatively deprived region or society. Cults are seen in this instant as organizing
local people especially in resistance to the white man’s power in one form or another.
Many other researchers (Maher 1967, Mead 1956), in the Melanesian scene have attributed cargo cults as
movements toward change as central to their interpretation. Maher looks at the economic development aims and
consequences of activities that we are dealing with a Melanesian form of a worldwide development, which aims
at the enhancement of life. The self-help attitude, communal identification and in some instances, anti-European
rule antagonism propelled the cause of a subjugated and divided people into a common mould of thinking about
their future political destiny.

This aspect of the transitional era of Papua New Guinea’s colonial status to an independent nation-state has
ramifications in our time if political development is to be understood at the fundamental levels of society. When
one looks at for instance the cooperative societies and the accessibility in which these organizations are easily
identified by people of the same constituency, the common thread is that they facilitate cooperation and the
“pooling” together of resources and time towards societal progress and harmony. It shows that indigenous
groupings in the jurisdictions of provinces can readily identify with ventures that will benefit their immediate
environment and livelihood.

The citation of this portion of the political development of PNG is intended to set the premise that under
relatively self-governing provincial governments, local aspirations of mass movements, interest groups or civil
society organizations that would have been discriminatorily branded as “cargo cults” or secessionist movements
during the transitional era be included in the political process to form the much needed issue-oriented, class-

16
based or ideology-driven body polity that even the national political institutions and process have even
seemingly failed to nurture.

The retrospective analysis of the development of groupings and movements of the “political” nature during the
transitional period was that the “nature of Australian colonial rule militated against the appearance of a
nationalist movement: in style heavily authoritarian and thoroughly paternalistic; in substance highly restrictive
of autonomous political activity, and non-participatory” (Hegarty, 1979: 188-190). In other words, political
mobilization at the grassroots level was deliberately discarded in the transitional era by authoritarian policies by
the Australian administration where political movements or protest groups were dismissed either as “cargo cults”
or secessionist movements with the potential of disrupting the colonial order (May,1984). Even political activity
by indigenous peoples such as party rallies in the 1960s was met with suspicion by where Special Branch police
“were regularly to be observed taking notes” at such meetings (Wolfers, 1970:445).

How is this related to the ideals of autonomous governments and the need to usher in the federalist system of
government? Significantly the crucial starting point in any quest toward the reconfiguration of the state and
government system in PNG is to appreciate the seemingly inherent failure and incomplete process of political
institutionalization that the hastily contrived provincial government systems have failed to bring to fruition
during the transition of PNG into a nation-state and in the intervening years since the 1977 Organic Law on
Provincial Governments (OLPG) and the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level
Governments (Provincial reforms). This is where the proposition of a system of government as federalism would
be appropriate to embody and reflect the values, genuine aspirations and ideals of the sub-units of PNG society
and where everyone is made to be part owner of the decision-making and the socio-economic benefits thereof.

Crucial to the current plight of the Papua New Guinea nation-state is the process of grassroots mobilization and
citizen participation at the micro-levels of this country. Such movements proved in the transitional period that
they were capable of gathering popular support and are never obsolete in this day and age. They were evidently
in the mode of asking the fundamental question: “How do we want our societies in PNG to develop”? So-called
cargo cults, self-help groups, and other indigenous movements were way ahead of their time even by political
modernization standards because they were already looking for answers and practical solutions to their existence
(see Billings, 2002, especially Chapter 4).

Hence, under autonomous governments, the process of grassroots mobilization with political participation
should enable the “efforts of the people themselves to be united with those of [provincial] government
authorities to improve the economic, social, and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate those
communities into the life of the nation; and to enable them to contribute to national progress”. 5 Such an
endeavor would be attainable under relatively self-governing provinces because it will entail that local initiative
and the availability or complementing of technical and governmental services will encourage such initiatives to
be more effective.

On this note, being a paper to propose constitutional reform for the current government, the fact that has to be
established at the outset is that the PNG state as we know it is a transplanted system. We are using an institution
that derives appropriate historical suitability from Western Europe. As such one has to delineate the Western
aspirations from the indigenous realities to elicit some workability of that system in the PNG context.

But, in this discourse to understand the maze of political legitimacy and the capacity of the state to be infinitely
entrenched in the day-to-day affairs of individual citizens in a diverse society as PNG, the initial task of state
transplantation has to be understood. As I seek to propose the system of government of federalism, the
seemingly unfinished chore of articulating the aspirations of erstwhile autonomous peoples or communities in an
appropriately sensitive system of governing was an objective worth uncovering.

For this reason, the next chapter will be focused on the theoretical understanding and definition of the concept of
federalism. The perceived benefits of this theoretical exercise are twofold; firstly, to relate the general tenets of
federalism and the nature of autonomous government to the Papua New Guinea context, and secondly; to justify

5
United Nations (1975) Reports of the United Nation’s Seminar on Community Development and Social Welfare in Urban
Areas, Economic and Social Affairs Commission, Geneva
17
why the federalism and autonomous systems of government are preferable for a political system as Papua New
Guinea. It will be proposed in the following that being an incorporative exercise for the eliciting of popular
legitimacy and support, federalism and the relative self-governing existence of the provinces will redress the
lingering practical virtues and traditions that the State formation era aborted to institutionalize in the day-to-day
affairs of the predominantly rural-based constituents of PNG.

2.4 Summary

The preceding chapter established the fact that symbols of democracy and institutions purported to be of the
Westminster tradition were transplanted for reasons of universalizing uniformity and coherence. Here the
utmost task was to make the transition into a politically “modernized” society irrespective of whether it
accommodated indigenous initiative or was reflective of the need to construct an internally strong foundation for
the subsequent political independence.

On the path to this modernization in political institutions, the processes of institutionalization were reinforced
through the localization of political education and participation. However, taken on the premise that neglect,
entrenched centralism and elitism have compounded the envisaged democracy of pre-independence years, it is
only justifiable that the bedrock of Papua New Guinea’s political existence – the rural constituency is given pre-
eminence in a resurgent scholarly re-thinking of the foreseeable role of government in Papua New Guinea.

The unfinished and short-lived process of political socialization and education, the incomprehensive national
constitution which is frankly not reflective or accommodating of the diversely autonomous PNG communities,
the ad hoc appeasement exercise of the North Solomon province under the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial
Governments (OLPG) that saw the universal adoption by other aspiring provincial governments and the
unincorporated indigenous ideologies could well be enhanced under an alternative system of government.

In this discourse then, the idea of provincial autonomy and federalism as systematic response to the crisis of
government or state legitimacy raises questions on the genuine comphrensiveness of the pre-nationhood
measures of garnering civic loyalty. By virtue of our seeking alternatives, it would seem that political
socialization and education was not adequately enforced by the government arrangement of pre-independence
era. As it was, issue oriented political parties and the micro-units of provincial constituencies played
insignificant part in the fomenting of national political development. On the other hand, macro-level institutions
of parliament and the “democratic” process of universal adult suffrage were free-willingly entertained. Also, the
constitutional delineation of the structure of national and provincial government was imposed in a vacuum of
political illiteracy.

In this resurgent mode of re-thinking the arrangement of government the totality of provincial initiative and the
leeway to practically incorporate micro-level and hitherto local aspirations should be facilitated under a
federalist-through-autonomy agenda. Take for instance the emergence of the cargo cult movements expressing
diverse philosophies and aspirations. In the instant that autonomous societies found themselves confronting
political modernization, what could have been the arrangement? Keeping in mind the fact macro-level political
affairs took precedence over micro-level necessity, how was this translated into the failure to initially
incorporate these indigenous aspirations? The unanswered questions and current plague of legitimacy derive
traceable heritage from this critical phase of political development in PNG. And the institutionalization of an
appropriate government arrangement to mobilize local participation is needed today.

18
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Defining Federalism

Federalism is a desirable system of government. But assuming a universal definition of federalism would be
inconsiderate of the diverging conceptualizations by constitutional lawyers, political geographers and political
scientists alike. However, significant insight into the subject of federalism can be drawn from the work by one
K. C. Wheare, who defined the federal principle as “the method of dividing powers so that the general and
regional governments are each, within a sphere, coordinate and independent”. 6 In essence, Wheare implicitly
alludes to the legalist understanding for the coordination between national and provincial governments so that
one or the other is not subordinate to another, with only the constitution reigning supreme over both levels of
government. Hence, the central essence of the federal principle is the emphasis placed on the “the independence
of each level from the other and the idea that the functions of government are divided so that some (e.g. defense)
are exclusively the responsibility of the central government while others belong exclusively to the provincial
units (Reagan and Sanzone, 1981: 9).

Moreover, federalism as an institutional arrangement can be taken as a political system where “there are two (or
more) levels of government thus combining elements of shared-rule through common institutions and regional
self-rule for the governments of the constituent units” (Watts 1999:6-7) Even under self-rule, the parties must be
under binding understanding to the specific functions, roles and responsibilities of the two (or more) tiers of
government and how these roles and responsibilities are subscribed. And to this effect, the Constitution must
explicitly articulate.

One leading figure in federalism’s scholarship described the federal principle as “the linking of individuals,
groups and polities in lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide for energetic pursuit of common ends
while maintaining the respective integrities of all parties”(Elazar, 1987: 5-7). This definition is perhaps sensitive
to the lingering question of jurisdictional authority by parties and with emphasis on the legal formal distinctions
in any federated arrangements (Wheare in Reagan and Sanzone, 1981:8).

The already articulated are not universally exhaustive definitions of federalism. By observable institutional
manifestations or common elements implicitly noted are: power-sharing between levels or tiers of governments
each enjoying some degree of autonomy from the other, and placing limits on the powers of one or the other
levels of government by means of a written constitution. Scholarly contributions to the study of federalism have
consistently highlighted six threads that commonly serve as the criterion in the acknowledgment of what may
constitute a genuine federative arrangement. Reagan and Sanzone (1981:9) surmised the formal attributes to
include:

1 There is a constitutional division of governmental functions such that each level is autonomous in
at least one sphere of action,
2 Each government is final and supreme in its constitutionally assigned area,
3 Both levels act directly on citizens (unlike a confederation, where only the regional units act
directly on the citizens while the central government acts only on the regional governments),
4 Both powers derive their powers from the “sovereign” (i.e., the people or the Constitution), rather
than from one another,
5 Therefore, neither can change the relationship unilaterally; and, finally,
6 The regional divisions (i.e., states) exist as of their own right

Likewise, according to Sawer, his comparative study on Australian federalism, led him to conclusively articulate
six components, which together comprise and embody the concept of federalism. 7 There are variable
familiarities with the above criterion as presented by Reagan and Sanzone (1981).
6
See Wheare, K. C. (1963), Federal Government, 4th Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 11, 2, and Chapter I
generally
19
For Sawer (1976), the following comprise a genuine federalism:

1 There are the central institutions of a nation state, which, in terms of international law, exercise
sovereignty over some form of limited, but overriding, jurisdiction over the entire territory of the
state. Or, sovereignty is vested in the central, federal government, and not in the component parts
or states,
2 The country is divided into a number of geographic regions or states, each having its own set of
governmental institutions,
3 The powers of government are distributed between the central government and the regional
governments or states in such a way that each government has a direct impact on the citizens in
its own area of competence,
4 The distribution of powers between the two levels of government is carried out by means
of a constitution. This is usually written and has a fair degree of rigidity, meaning it is not easy to
amend. Neither is it usual for any state or region to be able to secede,
5 The constitution provides rules to settle any conflict of authority in matters where each level of
government can claim competence over an activity. In the event of such conflict, ‘in all known
cases the general rule is that the central law prevails and,
6 The arrangement provides for the independence of the judicial arm for the interpretation of the
constitutionality of specific acts and legislation that is carried out by a separate judicial authority. 8

The institution of state and system of government is beneficial to the human collectivity if its structure is
adaptive or modified to ensemble the political circumstances therein (Patience, 2005:2). In the contextual
arrangement of PNG, the Sawer-designated variables warranting a viable future of federalist arrangement or
greater provincial autonomy for provinces are distinctly manifest. It is fair to say that the preconditions and
indicators have been met either through natural and established constitutional circumscription.

However it is very important that in any move towards greater provincial autonomy and federalism, the ideals of
national unity and territorial integrity ought to be safeguarded under a consensually agreed-upon regime or
infinitely binding compact deterring of unwanted secessionist inclinations. The initial “consensus” should also
establish measures against the perversion of powers or centralization of the responsibilities or functions that the
PNG National Government is endowed with. This is to have provincial powers clearly articulated in a most
accommodating and consensually agreed upon manner. Likewise, it could potentially involve the identifying of
workable tenets of both federal and autonomous governing arrangements which could be incorporated into the
Papua New Guinea national-provincial government relations.

3.2 Federalism and Provincial Autonomy: Applications and Linkages

In Papua New Guinea’s government arrangement, I am taking this argument as an augmentation of Henry
Okole’s intuitive exercise (2002) that federalism as a system of government is attainable only after the initial
stages of provincial government institutionalization. Henry Okole’s differentiation of federalism from autonomy
is based on his view that as a ‘stepping stone’ into the federal system, greater provincial autonomy in strategic
areas of government is essential in the political institutionalization process. That is, a PNG federation can be
established after autonomous entities are in the vogue of being self-governing and self-sustaining. To that end,
he proposed that provinces should be nurtured under the autonomous government arrangement so that
benchmarks are set, rules and procedures ingrained and the inculcation of purpose in the eventual existence of
the provincial entity as a self-sustaining sub-system in the larger federal union is established.

Simply, Okole argued that the autonomous status of provincial governments would be the ideal staging point or
overture in the eventual goal pursuant of a foreseeable PNG federal political system (Okole, 2002). And this is in
part the thrust of my argument. Borrowing from the proposition by Okole, I extend the argument further in light
7
I chose to include the criterion as presented by Sawer to show the country-specific approach in his purported “success
story” classification of the Australian experience with federalism.
8
Sawer, 1976: 1.
20
of the latest developments by East New Britain; autonomous provincial government can be negotiated to
concurrently exist in the currently quasi-federal arrangement of Papua New Guinea. Whether initially entrenched
autonomous entities can be facilitating of subsequent federal collaborations, the fundamental justification is that
the plight of the masses in the provinces is realized and the institution of state is reflective of the inherent
dynamism from the sub-units of government.

In this discussion, the significant factor confronting political illegitimacy of the State system and the need to
address institutionalized neglect of the provinces is proposed as another justification towards the autonomy and
federalist arrangement On this basis the two concepts federalism and autonomy are used interchangeably in this
discoursethe entrenchment of autonomously self-reliant polity would be a more viable facilitator of any federal
collaboration.

Autonomy should therefore not be confused here with federalism. Although both federalism and autonomy are
means or implicit means of devolving various degrees of power, adjusting the structures of the state, or devices
arranged to respond to widely varying circumstances and contingencies, both posses contrasting governmental
scope and structural power in relation to the provincial government’s conduct with the central government.

Autonomy or greater provincial autonomy would perhaps be the most preferable mechanism of distributing
provincial power in any inter-government arrangements within political systems with outstanding ethno-cultural
sensitivities.9 Unlike Okole’s “overture” thesis of federal system through autonomous government arrangement,
in this discourse, provincial autonomy has to be distinguished from federalism because the task is to draw
workable aspects of both arrangements which could co-exist in a “developing” political system as Papua New
Guinea’s.

Inherent principles of federalism and autonomous systems can concurrently be incorporated or integrated in the
proposed Papua New Guinea inter-government arrangement if a serious comparative exercise of both systems is
undertaken. The ideals or features of autonomy then are cited here as inclusive of three (although not exhaustive)
parts. Firstly, autonomy, as broadly used, is seen where special powers are vested with certain states or
provinces, but, are not granted to others (www.idea.int/publications/democracy).

In essence, there is constitutional preferential accommodation of states or provinces which have deep-seated
relationships with the centre or in relation to the other states or provinces of the federation. The other
terminology usually noted as a synonym of this accommodating nature of autonomy is asymmetrical federalism.
Differences in territorial, demographic, linguistic, cultural or religious identity can be the delineating factors in
the consideration of asymmetrical federalism (Auclair, 2002).
The Malaysian system illustrates this approach. Even though in recent times Malaysia has been described as
having a highly centralized system of government, 10 the federal constitution of “Malaysia has given the states of
Sabah and Sarawak powers that normally fall under federal jurisdiction”…[where these]… “two Borneon states
have considerably more autonomy than the 11 other states in areas such as taxation (in particular customs and
excise), immigration and citizenship, trade, transportation and communication, fisheries and several social
affairs sectors” (Auclair, 2002).The initial aim of this asymmetrical delineation of powers and functions was to
protect the distinctive characteristics of the two states and their interests. 11

Federalism on the other hand is an arrangement “where power is devolved equally to all regions and each region
has an identical relationship to the central government” 12 where the governments are (federal and state or
provinces) equal or coordinate. Normatively, in federal systems, constituent units (federal and state or provinces)
are considered to be equal and have the same legislative powers (Auclair, op. cit).
Having noted this distinction, it is fitting to see say that federalism is “more than a system of government…but
also as a process of ongoing negotiations, an art of resolving conflicts, an approach based on compromise and
cooperation” (Auclair, op cit.), characterizing of federalism as an arrangement where “equals” under the
Constitution have relatively enduring influence in relation to each other. This definition of federalism was taken
9
See Nijhoff de Villers (1994); Ghai (1998); Hannum (1993) Lapidoth (1996)
10
Jomo K. S. and Wee Chong Hui (2002)
11
See table below in case study of Malaysia to see the composition of the racial groupings of the Borneon states
12
See website at www.idea.int/publications/democracy
21
up by the Canadian scholar Thomas Courchene when he described federalism, not as a power-sharing system,
but as a process.13

For Papua New Guinea, the idea of federalism should not be seen as a “final solution” to our developmental
circumstances but rather as a mechanism to reach settlements where there is leverage for negotiations among
constitutional partners and not imposed by a single central authority. For instance, provinces in Papua New
Guinea must be allowed to negotiate for greater control of their internal revenues in the financing of provincial
infrastructure than what is currently a national responsibility bordering on taxation and national-to-provincial
transfers.

Secondly, an autonomous region or state may not necessarily be participating or is not fully participating in
federal affairs or political life of the country. The emphasis is on the states or provinces to control their own
affairs, rather than to participate in national institutions. In autonomous governing arrangements, the region’s
[provincial governments’] power to control its own affairs is exercised rather than participating exclusively in
national institutions (www.idea.int/publications/democracy). What this means is that the autonomous provincial
governments will be “political institutions which have their roots within the territory for which they have
jurisdiction…[and]…will not be administered by the agents of a superior government but will be governed by
the politics of the area” (Smith, 1985: 18). Provincial autonomy then infers of a self-governing entity with
relatively independent and sovereign political institutions.

Federalist systems on the other hand has two orders of government, each in direct contact with its citizens where
there is discernible representation of distinct regional opinions within federal decision-making institutions,
usually guaranteed by the specific structure of the federal Second Chamber, denoting the observance of bi-
cameral representative assemblies in federal systems (Watts, 2002:8). In federal arrangements “the regions
[provinces] participate actively in national institutions and national policy-making, in addition to controlling
devolved subjects within the region [provinces]” (www.idea.int/publications/democracy).

In Papua New Guinea, the former provincial government system under the Organic Law on Provincial
Government (OLPG 1977) came close to resembling the two tier system of legislature distinct in established
federal political systems. Therein the provincial governments had provincial assemblies with representatives
convening on behalf of the different constituencies in the provinces. As well, the open electorates and regional
seats ensured that representatives from the provinces served as Members of Parliament at the national level,
resembling a so-called quasi-federal system, with the center still relatively dominant by virtue of the
Constitutional supremacy of the national law-making legislature (Axline, 1993).

Thirdly, the arrangements in autonomous governing provinces or states are tailored towards self-governing
functions. This means that strategic functions such as finance and taxation powers, administrative responsibility,
and so forth remain the domain of the autonomous states or provinces.

If the recently established Autonomous Region of Bougainville is any substantive indicator for this third
distinction of provincial autonomy according to the Papua New Guinea context, it was noted in the monthly
publication of the Government of Papua New Guinea the Gavamani Sivarai, that the concept of autonomy
“entails substantial control over many powers and functions of Government, as well as the provision of
Government services in the jurisdiction”. 14 This implies that the provincial government must be reasonably
capable by law to initiate functions, powers and control over Government services.

The ideals of “local control” or provincial autonomy was hinted by the Minister responsible for Bougainville
Affairs, Sir Peter Barter to include local or provincial government taking over functions, powers, resources and
services (ibid; 12). In the sphere of financial or economic powers and responsibilities, the nature of being
autonomous under constitutional stipulation can mean that the Autonomous Region of Bougainville has “direct

13
Comments made by Thomas Courchene at a recent conference held in Porto Alegre, Brazil: "Fiscal Federalism in
Mercosur: The Challenges of Regional Integration”
14
Vol. 02, Issue No.05, May 2005, pp. 2 and 12
14

22
access to income tax revenue raised in the jurisdictions, and the power to set the rates and collect the revenue
from what are currently national government taxes” (ibid, 3).

Creating a PNG version of federalist arrangements should border on facets of the federal arrangement and the
provincial autonomy governing system. Negotiating federalism for PNG, provincial government powers should
be constitutionally specified for provinces to hold “exclusive authority” or “absolute competence”. Resembling
somewhat a compromise between federalism and autonomy, the states or provinces ought to be functionally self-
governing. Where disagreements do arise between the established autonomous entities and the central
government, the issues are subjected to the basis of consultations or cooperation with the central government. An
impartial arbitrator or authority should also be legally established to offset the duties of central agencies such as
the Inter-government Relation Department, Department of Personnel Management and Treasury.

The suggestion to innovatively borrow from principles of autonomous arrangement and federalist systems is
based on the fact that relying exclusively on the outcome of one than the other would not be in the long-term
beneficial. This is because as the experience of federalist systems shows, there is always the inevitable and
realistic trend of invariable recentralization of financial powers and the ensuing political clout of provincial
governments’ vis-à-vis the central government.15 Even the constitutions of established federalist political systems
have delineations of concurrent or residual powers overtly acknowledging the pre-eminence or extensively
detailing national level powers over the provincial parties. Increasingly, under the pretext of federal governments
intervening for the sake of national standards this emphasis on the pursuance of “national political egalitarianism
which elsewhere has led to centralisation” (Smith, 1985: 14).

Provincial autonomy then infers of a self-governing entity. In the PNG system, the idea is to have self-governing
provinces reconfigured along constitutionally designated areas of absolute competence for which the central
government should not traverse. The East New Britain provincial government has proposed financial,
administrative and political autonomy to delineate between the general greater autonomy. Perhaps, the
administrative aspect may be extreme or a prematurely requested criterion. The financial, political and legislative
terms of references would have been more adequate whilst the administrative responsibility should concurrently
be a national and provincial issue in a self-governing arrangement.

Although the latter province boasts of having reliable record of relative cohesive relationship between the
administrative and political structures resulting in the somewhat maturation of political governments in the East
New Britain province, stability in the public service however could also be complemented with an open “world-
view” perspective on the emerging trends in global public administration practices that a parochial public service
may find itself conflicting with.

This is because of the inherent problems of public service professionalism in PNG, particularly at the provincial
level, district and local-level government. The need for complexity and basic professionalism to set in motion
the provincial public bureaucracy is fundamental in the autonomous agenda, and particularly for the viability of
that provincial government to subsequently develop into a formidably self-reliant or self-sustaining system. The
inevitability of proliferation of administrative arrangements in the local-level arena may exacerbate failure of
political institutionalization and we would end up with low “quality of administration as larger numbers of
officials with less education, narrower outlooks and hardly any experience are employed”. 16

This peculiarity in the overall experience of the decentralization exercise in third world political systems is
exemplified where the capacity of provincial and local level governments (financial, technological, human
resources, etc.) is “very low”. In Nigeria for instance, with “the low level of education of councilors, shortage of
administrative, technical and professional personnel, inadequate funding and poor communication
systems”(Materu, 2002:9), the central government’s responsibility towards capacity building programmes and its
fiscal capacity to finance such responsibilities remain crucial indictors in that country’s decentralization
exercise.

15
Riker called this phenomenon “centralized federalism”, an identifying feature of which is the tendency, as time passes, for
the rulers of the federation to overawe the rulers of the constituent governments (1964:10-11).
16
See Mukerji, B. (1961), “Administrative problems of democratic decentralization”, Indian Journal Of Public
Administration, Vol., 7, no. 3 for the Indian experience under autonomous administrative arrangements for its regions.
23
In PNG, to countermand the inevitable constraint of administrative capacity at the provincial and local level
government, the Papua New Guinea Institute of Public Administration (PNGIPA) and central government
expertise or bureaucrats can be used in the foreseeable autonomous provincial governments to boost the capacity
and ‘know-how’ of the cadre of local-level and elite provincial level public servants. Hence, some common or
concurrency in administrative transactions and exchanges or capacity building 17 should be left open in case
provinces pursuing the autonomy agenda need significant assistance in this vital area of service-delivery. This
would ensure that national standards and national policy initiatives are an-across-the-board priority of the public
servants and administrative mechanisms of the autonomous provinces are geared towards the overall macro-level
prosperity of Papua New Guinea. Equally so, the need for nation-wide and a world-view perspective on policy,
government and public administration standards should be fostered in an administrative arrangement where
personnel are conscious of the ‘ rapidly globalizing environment around them’, thus, preventing localism or
parochialism or even excessive provincialism and regionalism.

If the example of the Malaysian experience can be worthy of emulation, the Federated Malaya States 18
arrangement of 1896 when the Malaya College of Kuala Kangsa was entrusted the duty of training some of the
finest indigenous elites of the Malaysian administrative machinery. The PNGIPA would be in the forefront to
serve as a “pool” to train elite provincial-level bureaucrats towards a set of specific national goals. 19 As such, the
level of education at the tertiary level can be of added significance if the competitiveness required of provincial
bureaucrats requires capacity building at a designated learning institution which can instill national uniformity
by enhancing the capacity of provincial bureaucrats in parallel with a definable set of national goals and
priorities.

Moreover, in relation to the capacity of lower levels of government in the promotion of the “nation-state”
mentality and the viability of the provincial government machinery in performing its designated functions in
Papua New Guinea, the current provincial and local level government system has demonstrated severe lack of
appreciation of the intricacies of government. For instance, the case of national Members of Parliament having
positions in the provincial governments has entailed conflicts between national MPs and the provincial assembly
representatives.20 Working with this problematic in mind, it would perhaps be beneficial to cut back on the
influence of MPs in the provincial forum (Okole, personal communication, 2004).

In turn the onus would be on the provincial governments to ensure that local level government presidents meet
strict criteria based on significant levels of political education where capacity building and the intricacies of
governance, public office responsibilities and so forth are administered would be the responsibilities of district
administrators and particularly, provincial governments.

In some quarters however, the idea of greater provincial autonomy is not deemed as workable. The eminent
scholar, Allan Patience has argued against the move in 2004 by the East New Britain province to invoke the
provincial autonomy agenda.21 He argues that the entrenchment of localism and parochialism is the main
rationale behind such moves in the autonomy agenda. Further, in this age of rapid globalization with the
necessary requisite to political leaderships’ appreciation of the intricacies of the increasingly globalized world,
he has long-term ambivalence towards the autonomy agenda. Charging that local bigmen or already entrenched

17
Capacity places emphasis “on the ability, talent, competency, efficiency and qualifications of people” (Oxford English
Dictionary, 1989:857). Capacity can also include the range of resources, tangible or otherwise, for the realization of any
organization’s objectives. Here, it alludes to the prerequisite in addressing the need for skilled public sector personnel
[manpower], and equally so, a sustainable financial base to undertake the wider range of functions as possible. The essence
of which relate to the need to be possessive of capabilities and to be responsive to new environments and demands.
18
See Case Study of Malaysia below.
19
It is worth noting that the Department of Personnel Management does not strictly require of provincial public servants to
be trained at the PNGIPA. Provincial governments make the choice in the areas of personnel capacity building for their
officials.
20
I am mindful of the fall-out from the Madang provincial assembly representatives (local level government presidents) no-
confidence vote against the incumbent Governor. The Court ruling and subsequent rift between Peter Yama and Moses Yali
has engendered the reality that though this is not an isolated case, it gives credibility to the utter nonsensical appreciation of
the spirit of the OLPG&LLG.
21
Post Courier (2004), “Need for Constitutional reform”, September 20, p. 11
24
provincial elites may rise and the provincialism mentality is unproductive to the nation-state’s survival is
inconsiderate of two significant factors in the process of provincial autonomy and federal arrangement.

Firstly, the boosting of provincial governments through the autonomy and eventual federal arrangements should
be seen, and as it is apparent in the East New Britain case as a consensually agreed upon compact a new treaty
or constitutional agreement between the potential government as the direct mechanism of the state and the
subjects or local people and the national government or National Executive Council (NEC). Symbolically, we
are starting from a “clean slate” because it involves the public mandate through a vote of confidence (or no
confidence) or referendum for the provincial government. From the standpoint of accountability and political
responsibility, this is fundamental and it entails that public scrutiny or an “internalized” checks and balance
system of the provincial government is installed in the mindset of constituents from the outset.

Because the constituents endorsed the creation of a self-governing provincial government, the logical thinking is
that the future existence of that political entity must conform to their collective preference and reflect the
sanctity deservedly appropriate for such an institution. There would be no room for any bigmen to hijack such
institutions if the overwhelming majority had voted for its existence in the first place and there is an articulation
or public agreement to the proactive provincial watchdog agencies enforcement of leadership or criminal codes.

The provincial government should therefore be no-one’s personal property or ‘birthright’ by virtue of its
sanctioning by the majority. It would be akin to the contractarian thesis of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John
Locke. In fact, it would contribute to civic responsibility so that the constituents work towards and demand
transparent and honest leadership of the provincial governments. The public’s overwhelming support should also
be reinforced through other equally significant requites as the severing of electoral ties with the corruptive
national level politics. Of drastic indispensability today though would be a large-scale program of public
awareness and information gathering. People ought to be involved in the initial stages of getting the right
information concerning the autonomy and federal system of government.

The debate as to the world-view potential of public office-holders in autonomous provincial governments, I
believe must go in tandem with the obligation of the national government to equally consider specific powers,
responsibilities and functions that are relevant to the socio-economic development and development of the
provincial government system. In line with the functionalist thesis, the institutionalization of provincial
government can work if the process of political socialization draws respect for the legitimacy of the central
government and state institution from the foundations of the political system. Contrary to what was argued by
Allan Patience, national level politicians or legislators and public bureaucrats have not set the standard in the
crucial area of upholding the supposed sanctity of the state institution, hence, the need to be inclusive of the
masses at the most fundamental levels of society.

To further counter Patience’s prognosis, there is a deduction amongst observers or commentators of Papua New
Guinean affairs that the country has already cultivated the integrationist “state idea” 22 or has had enough
experience in the fostering of the symbolic charisma of the nation-state entity as compared to the immediate
pre-independence era (Okole; 2003). The dilemma though is the benefits accruable through the utilization of the
much-battered institution of the state whose relative preponderance in this part of the world has not been readily
appreciated. Therefore, to confront the globalized world, it is indispensable to start the mobilization from the
fundamental sections of the political arenathe provinces and districts.

Using the analogy of a sick person, it can be said that the health of the patient would be of primary concern
within the duration when he or she is bed-ridden. Only after the curing formulae had been administered and the
nagging pestilence dissipated can he or she dare to venture beyond the erstwhile safety of the hospital bed.
Hence, when the political analysis of the provincial government system in PNG is met with the appropriate
institutional reform to save the institution of state from the destructively unpredictable external forces can PNG
claim its rightful place and the constituents would readily be receptive of the external intricacies of the
globalized world. It is the prerequisite of what we can do for the health of our domestic political institutions and
22
See Dinnen, S. (1998), “In weakness and strength-the states, societies and order in Papua New Guinea”, in P. Dauvergne
(ed.), Weak and strong states in Asia- Pacific societies, Australian National University, Canberra, Allen and Unwin
25
processes before we are in a position to elicit the much sought-after benefits of the increasingly globalized
world.

To appreciate the globalization scenario, take for instance Papua New Guinea’s situation in the proposed idea for
a greater Pacific Island region integration arrangement. What would be the position of Papua New Guinea in
relation to the potential benefits accruable though that proposed integration if its internal mechanism of
government is incapacitated towards fulfilling the distributional role it constitutionally was endowed to perform?
Therefore it is argued here that regionalism, as one political currency in the overall process of globalization
would not be in the long-term beneficial to states such as Papua New Guinea based on the fact that national
“conditions” or efficiency must determine the stability and viability of the regional cause. Hence, to prevent the
sub-optimal outcome of the regional endeavor one nation-state cannot alone seek the assumed comfort of the
regional or global environment, but must also do a lot to persist in working with their internal mechanism of
government.23

In the overall discussion of the concept of federalism and provincial autonomy in PNG, this proposed
constitutional reform should be seen as a means of the PNG state to restore its national dilemmas and internal
capacity before any foreseeable quest towards the maximization of regional ideals and visions in this
increasingly globalized world. In the long-term understanding of the process and benefits of the process of
globalization, one has to contend with the fundamental forces at work and the capacity of the state in the
domestic front.

Hence, autonomy itself is a desirable government arrangement because it entails provincial jurisdictional
authority goes hand in hand with control, political credibility and political responsibility. It differs from
federalism because it is manifestly indicative of a greater level of independent interaction between government
levels in relation to how influential one should not be over the others or vise versa. Autonomy refers to the
measures, legal or otherwise in “placing limits on the powers of one or other levels of government by means of a
written constitution” and poses the question of “how much power” is distributed to realistically be self-
governing in one’s own area of competence (Hughes, op. cit.; 260-61).

Simply put, autonomy or greater provincial autonomy in the context of PNG will be relatively an independently
functioning political entity. So to institutionalize the ideals of self-reliance and political development, the
realization of autonomous powers ought to set the precedent. Experiences indicate federalism to entrench the
relational aspects of central and state governments as conflicting and begrudging if particularly there is deemed
on the part of the state government that the central government has gradual preponderance over the initial
agreement to the federation.24 It is the view of this discourse that autonomous government or greater provincial
government in the PNG context is successfully negotiated so that the provincial governments continue to
develop at their own pace, with their own style and under relative ease if and when federation is agreed-upon.

Federalism can only be reached if the groundwork of self-government is in vogue and highly institutionalized.
This was the reason Hughes (1998:258) preconditioned that “Federations arise when a group of previously
independent states…desire to be united for some purposes but stay separate for others”. Given the recognition
given to institutionalization of self-governing entities, the initial step (parallel with the Okole “overture” thesis)
would be to allow provinces relative autonomy to run their affairs separate of central government interference. In
this overall agenda of reconfiguring the intergovernmental relations of Papua New Guinea, the recurring
indicators and justifications for this institutional reform do manifest themselves in the current political climate.

3.2.1 Arbitrary Justifications for Provincial Autonomy in PNG

23
As reported in the Post Courier (‘Pacific Plan not exhaustive’) of September 19, 2005 the Pacific Island Forum Secretary-
General Greg Urwin questioned the viability of the Pacific Plan as capable of solving the shortcomings of the Pacific due to
the inevitable financial and physical constraints facing the member states. Mr. Urwin aptly added that …“A lot of the work
that is required [to solve regional problems] will continue to be done at national level by member governments. It is in those
areas where the government believe they will get better value by working at a regional level , that the Pacific Plan will
concentrate” (p. 9)
24
See Case Study on the Malaysian Federation below for a brief exposition on Malaysia’s experience.
26
The qualifications towards a Papua New Guinea federation where autonomous provincial governments are
established however cannot be identical in all the provinces. To attain greater provincial autonomy and the
“earned right” for autonomy should correlate with viably conducive indications showing within the provinces
themselves. Not that it would be discriminatory to other less-viable provinces, but the severity of being self-
governing entities must be an introspective soul-searching exercise for parties that erroneously assume that the
autonomy agenda is a quick fix to their plight.

But if some arbitrary indications can be intuitively attempted one such necessitating factor in the straightforward
application of autonomous government would firstly be considerate of internal socio-ethnic cohesiveness. It is
indispensable that the necessitating factor of relative internal (that is, provincial) cohesiveness be omnipresent in
the jurisdictional vicinity of the province seeking autonomous responsibilities for its own affairs. Where there is
internal tolerance and integration in the social and ethnic composition of the province’s populace, law and order
would be deemed as facilitative of the process of autonomy.

Socio-cultural integration and societal cohesiveness would entail that the Electoral Boundaries Commission be
employed to see persisting cleavages in provinces prone to ethnic and tribal upheaval due to ethnic demarcation
of allegiance. If the rule of law, respect for authority and public trust can be facilitated in an atmosphere where
there is relative socio-ethnic tolerance, the provincial government would be capable of maintaining relative
order. In supporting this thesis, one needs to look at the plight and aspirations of the Hela people in the greater
Southern Highlands province and their desire to foment their own provincial identity by virtue of the relative
commonality in ethnic composition.25 In this instant there is insightful basis to portend the easing of existing
“tensions” to the broader goals of networking and integration.

Another arbitrary justification for provinces to be given self-governing powers would be based on the proven
track record of having strong and consistent institutional or administrative coordination. For instance, the East
New Britain’s push for autonomy is not coincidental. Rather, a generational succession of dedicated statesmen
and administrations paved the way or laid the foundations (even stretching as far back as the colonial period) for
today’s cogent appeal for administrative, financial and political autonomy. The role of the pre-Independence
Mataungan Movement of the Gazelle Peninsular exemplified the communal solidarity with the persisting bi-
partisan political leadership in the pursuance of the political issue of self-government in the immediate Gazelle
peninsular and East New Britain province (East New Britain, 2004: 19; Woolford, 1976: 43-67). Preferably, the
democratic process of a series of public referendum can be instituted to gauge the outlook of the people in
constituencies mostly to be affected by the autonomy agenda.

If the lingering appeal of provincial government reconfiguration has been in the political existence of East New
Britain for example, it is little wonder that in the first phase of the consultation process by the community
consultative committee that the autonomy agenda received overwhelming support. The committee reported that
“the people in the Gazelle Peninsular which includes the Baining areas from the North to the South and the outer
Islands, show quite clearly that ninety-five percent of the people who participated in the discussions fully
supported ‘realistic decentralization’ or Greater Provincial Autonomy for East New Britain” (East New Britain,
2004: 16). That is, about seventy-five percent of the East New Britain constituency was visited by the committee
and a resounding ninety-five percent of the people consulted consented to the idea of having an autonomous
provincial government.26

Thirdly, relatively consistent stable economic indicators may well be the all important criterion when
preconditioning the successful candidate for a greater autonomous government. Vibrant entrepreneurial abilities
inherently manifested in the formal and informal economy of the provinces and the contribution to the national
macro-economic indicators can be utilized in warranting the province concerned with greater powers pertaining
to financial matters. Perhaps this empowerment should go one step further with provincial government given the
significant powers in matters administrative, financial and legislative where they can respond to the challenge of
economic competitiveness, innovativeness and prosperity.

25
Agiru, Anderson in The National, “Implications of autonomy on PNG” of June 3, 2005, p. 20,
26
Post Courier (2004), “On the Long Road to Autonomy”, April 13, p. 11
27
Concurrently, the path towards self-government can facilitate the enhancement of equally significant societal
attributes and indigenous initiative in socio-economic affairs. It was interesting citation by Hank Nelson (1974)
when he proposed the examples of the Gazelle Peninsular (Tolais of the East New Britain) and the people of the
Goroka sub-district (Eastern Highlands) as two societies or provinces who are possessive of the in-bred ability as
pursuers of economic achievement in their traditional societies. These underlying values under the regulation of
self-governing provincial government institutions would be indispensable in that the provincial constituents are
“free to react to the modern situation with traditional values and institutions largely intact and operative”,
keeping in mind “that their traditional values and institutions prepared them well for their encounter with the
commercial world” [or western capitalist economy] (Hank, 1974: 100).

Interestingly, the idea of provincial self-government and self-sufficiency can be realized because of the fact that
communal groups identify well within a provincial jurisdiction and especially when mobilization of the existing
units (e.g. clans, tribes, hamlets, etc.) is assured of mass participation in the socio-economic objectives of the
provincial government concerned. In the event that the provinces are elevated towards being responsible for
facilitating or coordinating the prowess of their citizenry towards entrepreneurial activities, there is an incentive
for these cooperative societies to exist. The role of the provincial government would be to empower. For
instance, the idea of setting up a micro finance scheme where the District Support Grant can be channeled into
viable commercial projects by cooperatives vying for loans or capital. Clansmen and tribesmen can register their
cooperatives or communal groups as mini-business entities with the provincial government. 27 This is
compellingly enough a functionalist approach of looking at the way economic development should be
approached. The obvious principle is that sub-units contribute to the greater stability of the larger unit by
exercising relative self-reliance for economic management and revenue generating abilities under the
independence functioning of their provincial governments.

Interestingly, this view was reiterated by the Minister for Inter-government Relations, Sir Peter Barter, M.P.
during the 2004 National Governor’s Conference in Madang province when he said that the provinces as the unit
of analysis in national development are the basis of the country and that they power the country by virtue of their
being inhabited by the majority of this nation’s population. As he rightly deduced, the strength of the national
government is determined by the strength of provinces. So by making provinces rich, the socio-economic health
of the nation would surely be inevitable and guaranteed. 28

Undoubtedly one can expect to witness the entrepreneurial contribution of the masses as a potentially beneficial
outcome of the quest toward greater provincial autonomy and federalism. The persistent call for greater
autonomy by the East New Britain province lies with the recurring problem of revenue generation and
constitutionally unfulfilled task by the national government to equally distribute the components of the Value
Added Tax (now changed to Goods and Services Tax). The said province has been in the forefront of vibrant
economic growth and internal revenue sustainability, showing in return the province’s estimated annual internal
revenue of about K15.5 million.29

If this has been the consistent telling indicator of potential economic self-sufficiency and entrepreneurial vigor,
shouldn’t this be encouraged through greater responsibilities in matters financial? It is about utilizing the system
of government to empower and enhance the uniquely endowed “inherent prowess” of the citizenry to make
changes worthy of boosting the macro-economic indicators. The stimulation of traditionally inherent laissez-
faire practices and habits is fundamentally the foreseeable benefit of relatively autonomous regions functioning
independently of central governments and would reward the provinces that strive to be self-sufficient and
contribute towards the overall economic growth of Papua New Guinea. 30
27
Perhaps to prevent potential “political” mismanagement of these rural-based entities, the regulatory and trustee
responsibility should be left to a corporate entity legislated to operate independently off the provincial government with
private sector orientations. The case of the East New Britain Development Cooperation with its relative independence of the
provincial government is noteworthy.
28
Sir Peter Barter during the FM 100 Talkback Show hosted by Roger Hau’hofa and John Rei, Friday October 16, 2004
(12:00pm), at the Madang Resort Hotel
29
See Table 2.2 in Appendix on provincial (internal) revenue of East New Britain province.
30
The Autonomous Region of Bougainville has undertaken the task of instilling the “savings culture” in the recent initiation
of the micro-finance system. This has seen grassroots participating in “learning the basics of how to run and manage micro-
credit schemes in their villages” (The National, ‘Villagers learn about credit schemes’, August 30, 2005, p. 8).
28
Fourth, a literate or responsive polity could easily be seeking greater provincial powers. For the crucial role of
political education and awareness the receptiveness of the populace is fundamental to understanding the process
of political participation and empowerment. Conveniently, the grassroots sector of the community and provinces
would totally agree with the notion of autonomy if the endeavor were to succeed and be accepted. The role of an
impartial consultative committee is perhaps one direct means in conducting public awareness and to seek the
opinion of the wider community. The quality of education and the level of community knowledge about current
events in addition to strengthening the human capital needed for economic development, social development and state
accountability may also aid students practicing social capital skills, such as participation and reciprocity; schools
providing forums for community activity; and, through public education students learn how to participate responsibly
in their society (Phillpot, 2003).

The Papua Guinea Human Development Report 1998 provides data on communications in PNG because it is argued
that it ‘plays an essential role in facilitating the process of economic and social development and promoting human
development…[through disseminating]…information and in linking remote locations to services’ (Government of
PNG 1999:128). Naturally, an informed populace, coupled with high literacy rates would be in a position to
understand the gravity of having a greater influence in determining the legitimacy of self-governing provincial
governments. Communication of political information in an environment where there is relatively high level of
literacy can best be facilitative of the initial process of building an informed constituency.

For instance, the following case study concerning the Eastern Highlands and East New Britain (Chapter 6)
provinces clearly demonstrates the ostensible advantages for the East New Britain community consultative
committee in disseminating relevant information concerning policy-making and governance issues to their
populace. With a literacy rate at over 80 percent in the East New Britain and the proficiency of communication
and disseminating public information in the traditional lingua-franca due in part to the Provincial Government’s
emphasis since 1996 in establishing Tok Ples Skul (East New Britain, 1996:22), there is definitely a correlation
between education level (literacy rate) and civic responsibility in the conduct and viability of relatively self-
governing provincial government affairs. Interestingly, the community consultative committee on provincial
autonomy in the East New Britain province assigned for the provincial radio station, Radio East New Britain
(RENB) the task of producing “some radio jingles and TOKSAVE SLOTS on important issues and questions
relating to greater provincial autonomy as part of the public awareness program” (East New Britain Provincial
Government, 2004:78)

The fifth justification is the geo-spatial or topographical limitations that exacerbate the “cost of doing
government”. Arguably worth resounding are the inaccessibility and the ensuing unfamiliarity of the national
government with issues and concerns in the provinces. From a geographical or spatial argument, the national
government’s efficient response to provincial issues has deteriorated over the years to the point where we find
ourselves burdened today with a highly centralized and financially parasitical national government. The
predominantly rural populace in the provinces is indeed part of the politically displaced by virtue of the
geographical or spatial factor. Although this may be construed as discriminatory to provinces, the view presented
here is that if the central agencies are permanently based in Port Moresby with the inherent dilemma of
coordination with provincial administrations, there is every reason to intuit that even the central seat of power or
provincially elected leaders to the national legislature will be less representative of the genuine interests of the
people they purport to represent.

Appropriately, in any federalist and relatively self-governing arrangement in PNG, the need to re-establish
leadership and a ‘face-to-face’ or interactive government structure in PNG can facilitate the prospects of greater
accountability. Accountability in financial matters could also be strengthened if revenues raised from local
sources and populace (through increased powers in taxation matters) “will mean people are more aware of the
costs of what their elected representatives have decided [spending plans] than if the money comes in the form of
a block [or grant] allocation from a higher level of government” (Smith, 1985: 112).

Conversely, the “sheer tyranny of distance” and the expanse of the country cannot be economically viable or
politically facilitative to coordinate inter-government affairs efficiently. Public policy issues or the
implementation of central government directives is increasingly becoming a funding and logistical nightmare,

29
hence, the need to have provinces control or have jurisdiction over relevant powers that they can easily dispense
of in the local setting.

Likewise, due to their proximity to the majority of their rural constituents, the fundamental criterion of
geographical significance comes to the fore in any foreseeable quest to give greater power to the addressing of
any provincial predicament, as it deems fit. In recent decades, the exacerbated “crisis of penetration” and the
impervious bureaucratic arm of the central government has failed immensely in impacting the lives of citizens at
the lower-tiers of the PNG political system. Even the decentralization policies of the OLPG 1977 and the current
OLPG&LLG 1995 have never been any closer to significantly address the long-term presence of government and
committed public bureaucracy. Very limited as they have been, the two attempts at decentralization have seen
the national government more authoritarian in the possession of certain powers (under the façade of national
interest) pertinent to the growth of provincial governments.

3.2.2 Advantages of a potential PNG Federation

Applying federal structures or institutions would sound very appealing indeed. However, the “quick-fix”
perceptions and connotations of federalism is easier thought of than executed. Determinants invariably alter or
assist the institutionalization of federal systems. And given the nature of societal diversity and challenges to the
state system, particularly the “much-delayed identity of the state” in third world regions of the world, including
PNG (Okole, 2003: 5), it simply is an constant scholarly pursuit to find the ambiguous “politics of
accommodation” (Lijphart, 1968).

With the above definitions of federalism and distinction from provincial autonomy in mind, we gauge the
disciplines in the forefront of scholarly contribution toward the understanding of federalism, keeping in mind its
relevance to the PNG perspective. Here, much of the scholarly elucidations on federalism or the idea of
autonomous local governments has been the specialty of both political scientists and political geographers alike.
Political geographers and political scientists have attempted to specify conditions under which federalism is the
chosen state structure (Paddisson 1983: 105). Together, they emphasize the intrinsic worth of spatial distribution
of power and the manner in which power of government can be distributed vertically to the local levels of
government. Papua New Guinea, as a geographically configured political system with the inherent dispersion of
constituents along a multitude pf tribal and lingua-cultural identities tops has the marvel of political geographers
and political scientists alike. Joseph Peasah (1994: 1) once observed that:

The sheer demographic and geographic characteristics of the country impose upon it the
fundamental problem of discovering a suitable balance between the need for uniform
administration, as one country, and the necessity to take account of the specific requirements and
characteristics of its diverse peoples and localities. Mountains, valleys, ravines, forests,
marshlands, vast ocean waters and rivers fragment the country into discreet regions, districts and
groups of islands...

And specific to political geography is the view concerning territorial integration. The essence of territorial
integration is based on the premise that federated state structures are arrangements for maintenance of some
level of coherence of a state in situations of high territorial diversity. It is little wonder that federalism is often
described as the most ‘geographical’ of state systems and has been widely studied in political geography
(Dikshit 1971, 1975; Paddisson 1983).

Inherent in the territorial integration theory is one fundamental question that may apply in sensitive proportions
to Papua New Guinea’s initial task in pondering over the federalist agenda and appropriately serve as a
yardstick. What binds states together? The question was answered in Hartshorne (1954) with his identification
of federalism as engendering of “one basic centripetal force of convincing importance – the state idea”. Every
state has a reason for existence, and it is the strength of this “idea” which counteracts the divisive centripetal
force. The centripetal force here is the ideology of national unity inherent in federalism. From a territorial and
social-cultural postulation, Hartshorne’s centripetal forces is a practical explanation because it is consciously
designed to fit a particular situation of diversity and most often promoted by a central authority. So rather than

30
dwelling on the disruptive features (language, ethnic and religious differences), Hartshorne exhorts the benefits
of union rather than separation – found only through federal arrangements.

In instance of a pluralistic society, federalism or the creation of local states are “seen as a democratic institution
reflecting the wishes of the general population and the activities of the various pressure groups” (Short
1982:165) within that society. Peculiar to Third World experience is the imbedded factor of heterogeneity in
population composition and the problem of geographical proximity to central government. These necessitating
factors have had an impact on the intention of federalist model. That is, the enhancement and/or maintenance of
“unity through the distribution of central governing power to lower governments” (Okole 2003:13)

It is what Clifford Geertz (1963:109) called “primordial attachments” where the role of the coordinating central
authority is therefore to utilize this existing cleavage so that they would be in a position to empower them, and in
the aggregate contribute toward their own development and the process of national building. Successful
federalism has been dependent on units of government “sharing a common cultural inheritance and language”. 31
As well as showing ethno-cultural determinants, constituent units;

“must possess sufficient economic resources to support both an independent and general government
and independent regional governments. It is not enough that the general government should be able to
finance itself, it is essential also that the regional governments should be able to do likewise” (Wheare
1963, cited in Reagan and Sanzone, 1981; 8)

However, the whole idea of federalism, no matter how endowed in materialistic factors the sub-units of
governments does not guarantee a universally coherent model for local government institutionalization in the
varying third world states/societies. Peripheral units of government in developing countries are immediate
products of the circumstances at hand.

In case this emphasis on the significance of the ideas presented by the discipline of political geography and the
essence of spatial distribution of power is dismissed as a mere theoretical exercise, unrelated to the Papua New
Guinean case, one should keep an open mind in relation to the watershed conflict of Bougainville. What was
perceived initially as minor dissatisfaction over the central government’s irresponsibility to fairly facilitate the
compensation payment for the environmental damage and social disruption the mining impinged on the lives of
customary landowners suddenly erupted in the all-consuming civil war, taking in a secessionist face as it ‘snow-
balled’ into an ethnicity justified rebellion. 32 Hence, when taking the diversity of Papua New Guinea into
perspective, the accommodating political strategy is the creation of autonomous local governments or federalist
arrangements that is reflective of the unique perceptions that the ordinary provincial constituent has of the
distant national government in Waigani. Formalizing the ‘state idea’ can be greatly enhanced through the
institutional goal of autonomy and federal arrangements.

Another factor towards the federal arrangements of any political community is significantly to do with localism
or the conscientious “identification with a piece of territory” (Kesselman and Rosenthal, 1975:6). In essence, the
territorial unit retains or acquires meaning for residents and localism is a force to be reckoned with in analyzing
the larger political system and its operations. Localism is a determinant of consideration for federal
accommodation through power distribution because it embodies the citizens’ “political values within a society
linked to [their] conceptions of social space or territoriality” (ibid.).

The appeal and advantages of federal systems however is not only associated with the territorial or geo-spatial
nature in the power distribution mechanics of politics. Ideological reasoning too has basic connotation with the
idea of federalism. It sounds advantageously enthralling when traditional democratic principles are evoked as
justifiable cornerstones of federated arrangements. Favoring federalism is argued in some quarters of the
democratic tradition due to the enduring “notion that good government means having small government(s) closer
to the people”.33 Further expanded, the close proximity of government to the majority is also given emphasis due

31
Wheare, K. C. (1963), Federal Government, 4th Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press Chapters 1 and 2
32
Filer, C. (1990), “The Bougainville Rebellion, the Mining Industry and the process of Social Disintegration”, in May, R. J
and M. Sprigs (eds.), The Bougainville Crisis, Bathurst, Crawford House Press
33
Hughes, O. (1998), Australian Politics, 3rd Edition, South Yarra, Macmillan Education,
31
to the fact that it is more involved in the lives of citizens than the central government. Public choice scholars
likewise promote the idea of having smaller governments proximate to the people so as to maximize the level of
accountability in governmental affairs and higher productivity level of public bureaucrats. 34

Federalism and its arrangements is advantageous because it embodies the delegation of mechanisms where “the
control of local programs to local, state-level communities can mean a more precise delivery of programs and
better administration, which in turn reduces overall costs”. This embodiment of the ‘subsidiarity principle’
stresses that “governmental services should be devolved to the lowest possible level, dependent on the kind of
service in question” (Hughes, 1998: 266).

In PNG however, as is the hypothesis of this discussion, the compounding forces on the consistency of the
central government responsiveness and the socio-economic isolation of the masses through the institutionalized
political network of neglect must serve as an impetus for the PNG political system to re-think its
intergovernmental or national-provincial government arrangement. Hence, the process of de-politicization of the
masses from day-to-day knowledge of their destiny is raised in this discourse because I see it as a necessitating
precondition for the forthwith reconsideration of national-provincial government relations. If the currently
failing system fails to address the perennially neglected, rural-based majority, isn’t this then a precondition to
negotiate a system one thinks is fairer and reflective of its constituents desires? Better still which system would
be more democratically facilitative of social and economic justice?

3.2.3 Scope of proposed Federalism in PNG

As this is an intuitive exercise based in part on the retrospective analysis of the hitherto decentralization process
in PNG, the inevitable re-configuration of the provincial government system is needed through a series of
constitutional reforms and the adoption of a federalist system should be seen as the means towards the
objectives of political institutionalization, provincial participation for the overall end of untrammeled socio-
economic self-reliance, mobilization of the grassroots sections of society for a concerted reclamation of the
institution of government by the masses predominantly in the provincial jurisdiction of the PNG political system.
Further, it should begin through the retrospective exercise of diagnosing the fundamental constraints that have
been facilitative of the unconvincing obeisance of the central government’s authority in the far-flung
communities in PNG.

To demonstrate the challenge at hand, one learned observer of Papua New Guinean affairs reiterated what is
already common knowledge when he observed that:

The future of the state is dependent on finding the rules and gaining broad acceptance for efficient
and fair operation of high office holders and for the delivery of services to villages. If villagers
continue to be institutionally weakly connected to the state, solve most problems without
reference to the state, and often leave home to obtain access to state services, then consciousness
of the state and loyalty to the state will remain slight in the minds of many people .35 [Emphasis
mine]

In essence, in the arguing for constitutional reform for the current provincial-national government system,
defining a common ground for the application of a Papua New Guinean federal system should be reflective of
the three traditional approaches where the provinces and their constituents are in the absolute equation of
government. The three areas to federalism would fall under constitutional or formal federalism, financial or
fiscal federalism and the political aspect of federalism. In weighing the strengths and weaknesses of these three
approaches with the track record of decentralization in PNG in mind, a negotiable model or orientation is most in
need of being defined. Briefly, constitutional or formal federalism “focuses on the legal division of powers and
on arguments over what governments can and cannot do”. Strictly speaking, this “approach does not convey a
wholly realistic picture of the balance of power within [any] federation” (Hughes, op. cit.: 269).

34
See Ostrom, V. (1973), Can Federalism Make a Difference? Publius, Vol. 3 (2)
35
In The National (2000), ‘Failure of PNG Development’, October 2, p. 15. The observation was made by Prof. Ron
Duncan of the Australian National University (ANU)
32
If lessons are to be gleaned from the history of intergovernmental relations in PNG under the Organic Law on
Provincial Government 1977 (OLPG) and the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level
Governments 1995 (OLPG&LLG), the strict conformity to the legalistic approach has the potential to entrench
the “pre-eminent position of the national government, and the National Parliament in all things relating to the
ways in which powers and functions are divided among the levels of government, and even to the very form of
the Constitution itself” (Peasah, 1994:124).

Take for instance the case of Manus provincial government under the old system (OLPG), by far the most
substantial period in relative self-government. Under its entrusted legislative responsibilities, the Manus
provincial government in 1982 unanimously enacted the Community Government Act where the Manus Local
Government was abolished and replaced with sixteen (16) Community Governments. This was enforceable
because the national parliament left unlimited legislative powers for the provinces to address their unique
situations, especially the inclusion of the rural communities in the conceptualized “bottom-up Planning”. 36 Under
the Provincial Reforms of 1995, the provinces are made to wait on the authorization of the National Executive
Council (NEC) most often after equally disheartening cumbersome procedures (Marai, 2000: 131).

It goes to illustrate that the potential distribution of power must equate with the internal aspirations of the
provinces and how the provincial legislators want to see their provinces progress. In fact, the inability to see
tangible development and the “outcome” of government must be counterbalanced through provincial initiative so
as to prevent rebellious inclinations on the part of the governed. Furthermore the Manus experience gives us a
fair indication that the constitution or Organic Law for a federated arrangement should not be rigid but more
explicit in the assigning of provincial responsibilities particularly in the socio-economic sector so that deserving
provincial peculiarities or parties to the federation are free to enact laws that they think are in the best interest of
their constituents’ welfare.

But equally too, legalism should not strictly be considered as a delineating and differentiating factor in the
ambits of governments in a foreseeable PNG federalism because “the division of powers and functions among
the levels of government should not be duly encumbered with the legalistic and technical complexities” (Peasah,
1994: 124). In a federalist system, the provinces and the national government should not be seen to be fighting
seemingly never-ending court battles to get the courts interpretations over their respective subject matters if the
constitution does not address this aspect of inter government relations initially. The areas of competence of the
parties to the federation or autonomous entities ought to be specifically reflective of the developmental needs of
provinces at the very beginning to avoid confrontations over the legality of the functions, responsibilities and
powers.

This has been the recurring issue between the provincial governments and the national government under the
arrangement of the OLPG&LLG with the exclusive articulation of seemingly exercisable powers of provinces
designated to the national government under ostensible pretext of “being in the national interest”. In turn,
provincial governments are allegedly confined to ‘trivial” and mundane functions and responsibilities. It is the
problem besetting the current inter government arrangement where legality is given pre-eminence over the
governmental chore of ‘getting the job done’ where pressing circumstances necessitate addressing and where the
capacity to perform is readily available to the provinces concerned. For successful realization of the beneficial
impact of federalism in PNG, it arguably would be cautionary that the national Constitution be more explicit in
its endowment of powers so that a “finite number of common or essential functions” (Hughes, op. cit.; 269)
enable provinces relative freedom and maneuverability from central interference and where the provinces are not
faced with discriminatory centralist constitutional bias in subject areas within their means of performance.

Basically, legalism in federalism entails the process of dividing “power between two levels of government and a
constitution needs to prescribe how this is done” (Galligan, 1995:33). In observing legalism in federal
arrangements, “[T]here are two methods: one is to enumerate the powers of the states or provinces as well as
those of the national government, as is done in the Canadian Constitution 37; the other is simply to save for the

36
New Ireland, North Solomon, West New Britain and East New Britain provinces also used their legislative flexibility in
the old provincial government arrangement to legislate for community governments.
37
Under the Canadian Constitution, “Part VI of the Constitution Act, 1982 …deals with provincial powers. Under the
amended section 92 [under the previous British North America Act, 1867], the provinces now have broader and more
33
states the remaining or residual powers that have not been vested in the national government, as the American
Constitution does (ibid.).

The financial approach to federalism, as the name suggests focuses on “federal-state, taxing and spending
powers and the economics of federalism” (Hughes, op. cit.: 268) although studies on federalist systems have
since shed light on the growing re-centralization in financial powers (Reagan and Sanzone, 1981). The inherent
trend in the relations of federal-state financial arrangements is that ultimately, in the course of federal-state
relations the growing pre-eminence of the center over the state-local units of government in matters relating to
disproportionate financial powers (taxation powers) is established. In the fiscal study of federalism, the
unquestionable fact may slant toward the idea that “the spending responsibilities of the states [or provinces] are
not matched by their taxation powers and, over time, the central government has gained disproportionate
financial power over the states [or provinces]” (Hughes, op. cit.: 268).

For an indication of this trend in the re-centralization of financial and taxation powers, in PNG this was seen in
the implementation of the 1999-introduced ten percent (10 percent) Value Added Tax system where a portion of
three percent (3 percent) was in principle legally provided for the provinces. But since the VAT usually goes
through the Central Government’s re-distributional mechanisms or agencies (notably Treasury and Internal
Revenue Commission) the trend has been the subsequent dwindling of that source of internal provincial revenue
when meager portions “trickles-down” to the provinces. Indeed the national government is not honoring the
legally entitled formulae that were meant to be re-distributed. 38 The ideal situation would warrant that the
provinces are given more taxation (financial) powers and the National Government is penalized for not meeting
its constitutionally prescribed re-distributional responsibilities in financial resources.

Preferably, Papua New Guinea may adopt the accommodating and consensus principles of the cooperative
model of federalism. The political nature of a cooperative federalism would ensure the viability of provincial
governments because as self-governing institutions the leverage for “continual negotiations over the division and
exercise of political power” must be allowed (Hughes, op. cit.:268). Realistically, irrespective of what the
constitution may initially bestow as the ambit of a level of government, the strict adherence to a coordinated
federalism characterized by rigid and cumbersome legal formalism should have no appeal in the circumstantial
demands of modern-day political transactions.

It would be attractive to adopt certain tenets of the dual federal system where the constitution prescribes for “two
separate tiers of government [national and provincial governments], which should be independent, with their
own clearly defined areas of responsibility”, 39 or exclusive provincial powers. But equally important is that the
proposed federal arrangement in the PNG frame be based on the principles of cooperative federalism where
“[T]he various levels of government are seen as related parts of a single government system, characterized by
more co-operation and shared functions than by conflict and competition” 40 inevitable in areas where the
provincial governments in PNG are incapacitated. For instance, in the area of infrastructure and works where the
national government has the personnel and liaising expertise for major infrastructure developments in the
jurisdiction of provinces. I say this based on the reality that not all provincial governments would be in the
capacity to have the resources (socio-economic infrastructure or capital) to enhance their provinces. Some
reliance on the national government would be inevitable.

Potentially, in such a situation, the relations become manifest because co-operative relation between the central
government and the provinces “entails a network of political understandings and negotiations…[and]…more
fluid arrangements in which outcomes are determined by political processes and bargaining, rather than by the
letter of the Constitution” (Hughes, 1998: 271). In other words, the initial understanding of the constitution
would delineate the subject area of each tier beforehand with explicit certainty and breadth so that provinces
have ‘free rein’ to negotiate and be flexible in the exercise of their relative independence but at the same time

specific powers over their natural resources (Bartlett, et al. 1989:145).

38
See the East New Britain- Eastern Highlands Case Study below for further quantitative comparison.
39
Grant, A. (1991), The American Political Process, 4th Edition, Aldershot, England Dartmouth Publishing Company
Limited, p.270
40
Cummings, M. and D. Wise (1985), Democracy Under Pressure, 5th edition, Jovanovich, Harcourt, Brace, p. 31
34
knowing their limits when bargaining with the national government for assistance in subjects that is beyond their
capability.

Hence, in negotiating a federal system of interaction between the national and provincial levels of government, it
would seem credible that elements of cooperative federalism be attained. It would be concern with sharing,
matching and pooling all resources and powers together that may be a basis for a national-provincial consensus.
And “where the national government has not acted, the [provinces] are generally free to act” as circumstances
and needs arise (Reagan and Sanzone, 1981: 174).

The basic admission as implicit in the cooperative federalism model is that provinces may not possess all the
“assets” or capacity to be self-sustaining over a long-term under trying and diverse circumstances. Simply, PNG
is prone to capacity-related deficiencies or administrative complexities. Such institutional weaknesses and
shortfall in capabilities in the administrative personnel may prove as obstacles for provincial governments to be
“independent” in the true sense of the word. Hence, if the level of responsibility or function demands, their
bargaining and resource/capacity-matching with the national government to carry out such functions in its sphere
of influence must be left open.

In their study of the American experience with federalism, Reagan and Sanzone (1981) have noted the
subsequent proclivity of state governments to share power and authority with national governments as opposed
to the classical, idealized notion of a rigid system under dual federalism. However, they diverge from the
agreeable tendency of cooperative political negotiations and consensus in national-state relations to contend that
the states’ share of power and authority ultimately “rests upon the permission and permissiveness of the national
government” (Reagan and Sanzone, 1981: 175). This contention and natural progression in federal-state
government relations is authoritarian because the national government’s application of sanctions and conditions
through the political arsenal of legal interpretations and possessed legal authority usually militates against the
never exhaustible process of cooperative negotiations and consensus-making.

To impose restrictive measures on the provincial governments in the PNG context within any foreseeable
federalist undertaking would be a regression back into the days under the then OLPG 1977 and the current
OLPG&LLG where seemingly legalistic complexities and the politically expedient doctrine of ‘supremacy of
parliament’, national interest, and so forth emasculated the maneuverability of the provincial governments to
develop in tandem with their desperate circumstances.

Under the present Organic Law governing the provincial government (OLPG&LLG), it has been nothing less
than rigid, “complicated” and “unclear” or vague (Kwa, 2001:135). In hindsight, within the Constitution (either
intentionally or otherwise), there was always the potential that under the pretext of the supremacy of Parliament,
the unicameral national legislature could, without any public mandate or institutional checks and balances
mechanism have free rein to change at will the Constitution or Organic Law to its interests and for reasons of
expediency.

3.2.4 Foreseeable Constraints to Federalism in PNG

Critics of federalism are still entrenched in the thinking of the “old federalism” that Wheare illustrated: the
coordinated, rigid model with the strictest of emphasis on the letter of the Constitution vis-à-vis the delineation
of powers. In light of the of “modifiable” latter-day systems of federalism 41 and the realistic demands by voters
and constituencies for enabling developmental indicators and productive performance by governments, the
provinces and majority of Papua New Guineans must be seen to be content with the level of responsiveness by
government. The essential point to bear in the debate as to the debate on federalism is: if there is a much better
way to the pursuance of the ultimate goal of political and economic independence by the majority, then shouldn’t
it be “entertained” as a matter of utmost importance?

With the urgent need for significant constitutional reform in mind, how do critics view federalism as a system of
government in general? Three broad classifications (although not exhaustive but with relevance to PNG) can be

41
See Reagan and Sanzone (1981) for an account of the counter-perspectives on federalism’s scholarly development in
America as reflective of the different Administrations’ priorities and the socio-economic challenges in the United States.
35
cited from the literature. Firstly; certain critics hold the view that federalism is obsolete and out of touch with
reality as well as the perceived disadvantage that it serves as an obstacle when attempts in attuning governmental
or public priorities under a standardized arrangement is urgently sought; secondly, the proposition that
federalism does not delineate clearly when sensitive issues arise to the respective ambit of governments thus
leading to confusion and conflict over responsibilities/functions, and the all-too-familiar ‘passing the buck’
syndrome; finally, it is seen as peculiar only to a receptive political culture and societies, presumably of the
Western or European ancestry.

Firstly, the obsoleteness of federalism stems from its critics’ view that it produces “conservatism and excessive
legalism” (Bryce, 1914: 432). This assertion would merely stand as a continuation of the American-British
debate as to which system of government qualifies as the universal embodiment of “true” democracy. Moreover,
proponents or opponents of the British system of majoritarian democracy through parliamentary sovereignty and
the American consensus democracy should not serve as a benchmark in indigenous initiatives towards
addressing the complexities of developing political systems such as Papua New Guinea’s. 42 However, in light of
the proposition to revise the arrangement of the provincial government at our disposal, it is erroneous to
wholeheartedly dismiss variants of federalism as outdated, reactionary and resistant to change merely because of
its failure to meet the expectations of either the American or British models or even the classical prescriptions of
the “fathers of federalism”.

Ironically, the criticism is obsolete in itself because it sticks to the conservative view of federalism as an
inflexible, rigid and stringently coordinated system of government. From this discourse, I propose that this is
erroneous thinking. Federalism is a modifiable system of governing; the dual pre-conditions of internal self-
examination and developmental circumstances evoke the need to ‘re-define’ federalism while concurrently
retaining its certain fundamental elements; notably, consensus and coordination between the tiers and where the
central government is left with the chore of being the “middle-man” in citizenry political transactions.

Another argument in this trend of thinking is that it produces disjointed and blurred results with lack of
uniformity in creating standardized approaches to national priorities. If Australia’s experience is any indicator,
the problems with addressing social reforms where the need for contingency programs affecting the populace has
to be coordinated quickly attests to the inability of governments to obtain some standardized levels of change
(Wilkes, 1983: 84-85). It is further argued that in strong and coherent unitary-type political system would it be
possible to “pass national legislature to deal with national problems and legislate to set national standards where
appropriate” (Hughes, op cit.: 263).

In Papua New Guinea, four areas (although not exhaustive) in intergovernmental relations may arise under
autonomous or federalist government system, which may pose questions on the supposed independence of the
provinces under the federalist arrangement and serve as a disincentive towards unwavering emphasis on national
development. Firstly, the area of taxation policy and more specifically the powers associated with financial
matters would entail some latitude in the taxation powers and enforcement of taxation responsibilities and duties
by the provincial governments in their taxable area of competence. This can be problematic in the sense that
given the capacity and personnel requisites necessary to effectively with maximum efficiency tax the
predominantly informal areas of provincial sources of revenue. In other words, the provinces and national
government may have totally diverging perspectives on where and what to tax or spend financial resources on
with the associated outcome of development disparity.

On the same token, the inherent constraint of taxation capacity and the provincial government agencies tasked to
perform this internal revenue-generating responsibility was noted in the case study instituted in 1989 by the
Eastern Highlands provincial government. Under the then Organic Law on Provincial Governments 1977
(OLPG), sections 56-57 provided the taxation powers of provinces. The single most important source of internal
revenue in that regime was the Retails Sales Tax which was incumbent on the provincial authorities and

42
Interestingly, the debate as to the superiority and hence, universality of British and American systems and constitutional
framework was debated in the preceding years to Papua New Guinea’s political independence in 1975. Scholars and the
constitutional framers of this transitional era were concern with the nature of the future government in PNG context.
Anthony Clunies Ross (1970) accounts the debate between the British Westminster system of responsible parliamentary
government and the American presidential system.
36
government to enforce. Far from being realized, the effectiveness in the collection of Retail Sales Tax was
minimal. Reagan (1989:4) suggests that there were a large proportion of available taxes which were not collected
with under-collection possibly the result of tax avoidance on the part of traders and from inadequate supervision
of taxpayers by Eastern Highlands Province Government staff. 43

The second factor that may come into consideration when discussions pertaining to relatively independent
provincial government in a federal arrangement are resonated is the responsibility in regards to humanitarian
issues or relief matters. For provinces prone to natural disasters on a cumbersome scale, the definite spheres for
provincial and national government responsibilities can be incongruently manifested. This matter presents a test
for provincial governments’ adamant on jurisdictional independence or autonomy. In the face of humanitarian
disasters or relief exercises requiring massive quantities of resources, the professed autonomy of the province
may be compromised if it lacks the resources and capacity, thus necessitating the intervention of the national
government.

With the dwindling transfer of resources to the provincial and local-level governments under the current
OLPG&LLG, the reality is that the Provincial Emergency and Disaster Committees lack the capacity and
resources to efficiently respond to full-scale disasters under their supposed jurisdictions. In such instances, the
‘liability factor’ on the national government by the provincial government and the ensuing “passing-the-buck” to
central government agencies by local officials would reinforce justifiable national government conditionalities
and in effect diminishing any alleged provincial ‘self-governing’ status. 44

The third area necessitating coordinated uniformity that would be tested under any federalist arrangement would
be the idea of provincial legal personality status. One legal question as to the viability of any autonomous entity
is whether the personal character of the province can be independent of the national government. The question
posed here is: do the provinces have the capacity and sufficient legal officers/employees with the expertise to
defend any proceedings brought against the provincial governments? Are they capable of being held accountable
to breaches when conducting their functions and hence be liable to a legal personality status in any proceedings
instituted by either private or public actors or citizens?

And fourth, the worthiness to negotiate independently in the accessing of development loans or grants would
arise in an intuition towards autonomous and federalist systems of governing. Here, the question of sovereignty
comes into play when the provinces exercising financial powers are made to negotiate with the donor
community for assistance in loans or aid packages. Confusion may arise if the provinces are left to borrow what
they cannot repay. Simply, the national government may be overarched in powers pertaining to dealing with the
economic assistance but the wariness of exorbitantly unmanageable debts can be a specter the national
government may not want the provinces to run into for the obvious reason of huge national budget deficits.

So the contrast of uniformity is found in federated arrangement where it (the federated unit) acts “as a
conservative constraint on the implementation of progressive policy, an obstacle to efficient government, the
transitional structure that has become a straitjacket on the development of the nation and, moreover, one that
fosters reactionary state regimes” (Galligan, 1995: 56). Delays and duplications in legislation and administration
are the problems encountered in the Australian experience of federalism so much so that it has generated
negative reactions from even as high as the political leadership post with Whitlam once criticizing it as a costly
system on the people (Whitlam, 1983: 28).

Papua New Guinea’s experience attests to the strictness of legalism and the conflict this aspect of
intergovernmental relations elicits. Operating by the entrenched principle that ‘national law’ supersedes other
laws, the provincial functions enforceable through autonomous legal jurisdiction are impeded by the centrally
induced ‘dictatorial expediency’ of the national legislature. In a situation where a Provincial government passed

43
Reagan, A. (1989) Imposing and Collecting Sales Tax-Proposal for an improved Sales Tax System with reference to Draft
Model Provincial Laws: A National Research Institute Report for the Eastern Highlands Provincial Government (An
IASER Report) National Research Institute, April 1989
44
Even the newly formed Autonomous Bougainville Government in light of the flood disasters during the month of July,
2005 reportedly approached the National Disaster Centre (NDC) in Port Moresby for possible assistance to the affected
areas in the Autonomous Region ( Kenneth, G. “Taskforce formed to assess disaster”, August 25, 2005, p. 3).
37
a law about a national function where there has hitherto been no national law in that area, the National
Government could then pass a law about it and the provincial law would no longer be effective.

Effectively, a dependency cycle of frustration and entrenched immobility in confronting solvable provincial
matters have been deliberately set by the designers of the successive Provincial government systems as
duplications have become the inhibiting constraints. Most significantly, provinces are left with residual powers
of trivial proportions.45 In this case the National legislature is deemed authoritarian and duplicating by virtue of
its stringent hold on whatever responsibilities it can have with the ensuing legislative power and dictation.

And there is no let up in this trend of criticism against federalism. Unfortunately, the obsoleteness argument is
prejudicially taken on the unfair presumption that it can generate cumbersome procedures instead of its potential
to facilitate counterbalancing power centers and in-depth alternatives to central government policy-making. The
issue in the arrangement is whether both the national and state or provincial governments are in fact fulfilling
their constitutional part or obligations to the initial agreement on the federated entity. This is implicit to the
process of complementation in essential areas of national development.

The same strand of thinking leads to the second disadvantage and proposition by critics that federalism is based
on the preconception that it is responsible for the institutionalizing of antagonistic relations between federal-
state/provincial governments and conflict over policies (Maddox, 1993:24). But there are other intertwining
factors that may account for any professedly tangible national-state/provincial animosity: some states may
perceive as interventionist or duplicating actions by central government on their jurisdictional ambit or scope of
authority; one state’s interpretation of the liberal democratic ideology may be different from the others;
parochially induced emotions by the state’s political elites or state patriotism of sorts; or mere politically
expedient grandstanding can be starting points in conflicting understandings in federal-state/provincial relations.

But the generalization is that differing goals and values of recalcitrant state or provincial governments can be an
invariably frustrating experience for central governments when the latter’s powers are perceived to be limited by
state/provincial government’s obstinacy. Insecurity by one level of government may lead to their “passing the
buck” or responsibilities.

In Papua New Guinea, the concern would be that the idea of ‘more powers’ to provinces does not create arrogant
provincial governments who may hijack existing ethnic and economic distrusts to present demanding questions
on the authority of the central government. There also lingers the apprehension that entrenched conflict or
obstinate relations between the central governing entity and the provincial governments may be propagated by
stereotypical images generated by each government of each other.

Even precarious would be the recurring views that federalism or greater autonomy to the provinces may serve as
a ‘spring board’ for secessionism. Realistically, the idea of federalism or greater provincial autonomy is still an
undeveloped notion and commands suspicion on the masses of Papua New Guineans who understandably have
not grasp the “world-view” understanding of the modern state system and its rightful place in the ‘modern
world’.

The third presupposition as held by critics of federalism is that it is not suitable by virtue of historical
adaptability and matured institutionalization to third world countries, for instance, PNG. Compounded by ethnic
heterogeneity, this persevering sociological presumption holds that political structures and institutions in such
volatile or chaotic-prone contexts and hastily contrived federations would fail (Kegley and Wittkoft, 2001: 62).
Questions arise to the inclinations of sociologically diverse political systems to perpetuate national disintegration
under any federalist, autonomous or self-governing arrangement.

Here, federalism is taken as requiring political sophistication or is suitable only to a “relatively stable, satisfied
society” (Sawer, 1977). Papua New Guinea’s experience with “primordial attachments” has had mixed results.
On the one hand there has been relative resilience and some sense of national unity as was accounted by Sinclair
Dinnen (1998). Whilst on the other hand there are undercurrents of colonial and post-Independence experience.
The destructive results of recent Bougainville and Southern Highlands lawlessness driven by ethno-economic

45
See Kwa, E. (2001), Constitutional Law of Papua New Guinea, Sydney, Lawbook Co., pp. 35-42
38
factors and the pre and post Independence “loyalty to the locality” secessionist threats are readily drawn basis to
the foreseeable disadvantage of federalism in PNG. What is feared is not so much disintegration but rather any
rebellion or recalcitrant behavior against the central government when dissatisfied (or satisfied) provinces are
not willing to be answerable to the central party in any potential federal arrangement (Woolford, 1976, 183-209).

In the same category with conflicting loyalty with an inviolable authority (central government), the maturity of a
political culture adaptable to rules and procedures inherent in the functioning of a vibrant state system is
virtually questionable. Federalism is a function “of institutional arrangements and political communities”
(Galligan, 1995: 55), and the foundational ground-work for a fluent federated entity is an urgent chore that
provincial autonomy should enforce with substantial acceleration of powers, functions and responsibilities at the
provincial levels.

But though federalism is taken as suitable only to a “relatively stable, satisfied society” (Sawer, 1977), one other
purported “third world” political system has demonstrated that “primordial attachments” and the political
institutionalization process can be accommodated or attainable under sustained political commitment to the goal
of political modernization and the inclusion of aspects of tradition in a federalist constitution. With the
Malaysian federation in mind, one can note in the following chapter that other significant challenges in relation
to the misapplied principle that ‘national law’ supersedes other laws and ‘dictatorial expediency’ by the
executive is experienced as well as the outcome of healthy inter-State relations. These are challenges and
potential constraints that the proposed Papua New Guinean federation with self-governing provinces is capable
of reeling from; hence the need to study existing realities for the sake of knowing the strengths and weaknesses
therein.

3.3 Summary

In summary, the literature on federalism with its definition varies according to the orientations of political
scientists, political geographers and constitutional lawyers. Given the existence of professed federalist political
systems it is only fitting that some semblance of the physical characteristics or generally accepted tenets are
highlighted in this chapter. Of course there are no ideal federal systems where “exclusive” self-governing
entities exist. The definition of federalism as a system where “there are two (or more) levels of government” in
a “shared-rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent units”
(Watt, 1999:6-7) is a misnomer because of the inherently disadvantageous outcome of strictly conforming to
legalistic requirements and interpretations. Experience in the study of federalist systems has indicated
consistently (for example, the Reagan and Sanzone, 1981) that re-centralization of powers and functions can
denigrate any assumed independence of provincial governments.

What the general observable tenets in this attempt to re-configure or re-think the current system of government
in PNG is that if the current geo-political arrangement of provinces fulfill certain criterion as presented , it would
be seen as beneficial starting points for a constitutional commitment towards the incorporation of autonomous
governments for provinces. To institutionalize self-government towards the federalist agenda the autonomous
existence of provincial governments must take precedence. As an overture into establishing a federalist system,
provinces must exercise or be allowed relative “autonomy” to cultivate the ‘indispensable’ mindset in
government. So autonomy is the initial stage where provinces having earned the right or manifesting self-
governing capacities are given the leeway to enhance their existence and pave the way for a subsequent
federalist union.

4. MALAYSIA: THIRD WORLD VIABILITY OF FEDERALISM

4.1. Why Compare Malaysia to Papua New Guinea?

In confronting the post-colonial unknown and the uncertainty emanating from the subsequent Cold War era with
its impact on the national security and stability of Malaysia (with the potential for worker’s’ unrest and
insurgency, national disunity through ethnic Chinese and indigenous Malayan racial strife), the Federation of

39
Malaya was instituted. Although federalism should not be seen as the absolute variable in the developmental
equation of Malaysia, it is noteworthy that the rationale for its institutionalization be understood in the “third
world” society that post-colonial Malaysia inherited and its contribution to the stability and administration of
Malaysia.

In light of the following discussion on Malaysian federation, should PNG adopt all facets of the Malaysian
political system, presupposing that such course would emulate the relative stability of Malaysia? Could the
experience of Malaysia present itself as the “best federation” or the ideal model for Papua New Guinea? I think
not.

What is considered here is that Malaysia should be seen as providing valuable “lessons”, that is; in order to
entirely satisfy all parties to the foreseeable Papua New Guinea federation, the federal structure must first and
foremost be flexible and reflect the particularities of its constituent groups or regions. Since there are no
universal patterns to follow, from Malaysia we can learn tremendously. Learn from its successes and learn from
its mistakes (Auclair, 2002).

Malaysia is taken as a case study because it “is widely accepted as a country which has been remarkably–
perhaps uniquely–successful in managing and containing ethnic conflict in a post-colonial context against [post-
colonial metropolitant] expectations…due to its ethnic redistributive policies, which have gone a long way
towards redressing the gross economic inequalities left by the colonial period whilst being accompanied by high
growth rates for a sustained period of decades”. 46 Comparing the post-colonial progression of Malaysia and
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), for instance, Donald Horowitz (1989) observed that during the period of decolonization,
expectations were that Ceylon was to be a stable and peaceful democracy, whilst Malaysia risked extensive
conflict. The reverse has subsequently been witnesses in the intervening years of Malaysia’s existence as a
nation-state, due in part, to the state redistributive mechanisms (of which the federal system is one) being
instituted at the twilight of independence.

Likewise, Malaysia has been included based on the premise that as a federal political system it is facing the
similar developmental challenges Papua New Guinea is mired in. 47As well as confronting the inherited
centralized administrative system of the British 48 (the same of which was experienced in PNG), 49 the post-
colonial sectors of its economic base are intriguingly similar to the Papua New Guinean scenario with
agriculture and mining playing significant roles in its growth and export sector. Therefore, this comparative
exercise will hopefully draw one to the conclusion that the quasi-federal system in PNG which is in essence an
ostensible unitary system of government invariably limits provincial entities exercising significant functional
autonomy and control over relatively enforceable responsibilities. However, the history of the Malayan
Federation should not be strictly identified with the year 1965 because during the colonial period (late 1890s)
some semblance of a federated union was in vogue under the patronage of the British colonizers.

4. 2. Overview of Malaysian Federation

Federation, in Malaysia’s experience saw initially the union of erstwhile autonomous regions for the
advancement of uniform national development and national integration. This is said in mind of the federation
system in Malaya by the Peninsular States under British rule. In 1896, Britain as the “protective” colonial power
on the Malayan Peninsular for reasons of administrative expediency within the Protectorate States got the parties

46
Brown, et al.,2004: 1
47
Inheriting a largely agrarian economic base with a significant rural populace and poverty rate at 52 per cent in 1970,
Malaysia has reduced the poverty rate by 15 per cent in 1990. This was highlighted by Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi’s in a speech entitled Challenges to development: Eradicating the human divide, presented on Pulau Langkawi on
the occasion of the African-Asian Summit in 2004.
48
Towards the end of the British colonial period in Malaya, the Federation of Malaya (Peninsular States) had developed a
centralized administration. Hence, federalism was the mechanism purportedly instituted to reverse this trend temporarily
(Jomo and Hui, 2004:41).
49
See Narokobi, “The CPC, Nationalism and Vision” (Paper presented at the Twenty Years of the Constitution Conference,
Granville, Port Moresby, 1996; and Constitutional Planning Committee, Constitutional Planning Committee Final Report
(Part 1) (Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1974) (CPC Final Report), p 10-11
40
to the Treaty of Federation as the Federated Malay States (hereafter F.M.S.), comprising tentatively at first of
Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang.

Initially, the latter four states on the Peninsular willingly federated under the auspices of Britain whilst Kedah,
Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johore chose to remain autonomous or self-governing without stringent
imposition required by the British colonizers. In the scheme of colonial policy, the federation of Perak, Selangor,
Negri Sembilan and Pahang was in the best interest of the British as they were then seeking through their ploy of
“indirect rule” by integrating the disparate self-governing states under traditional leadership of sultans. Working
with the existing institutions, they therefore sought legitimacy for the European politico-economic systems by
integrating the “new” systems with the traditional institutions. However the initial attempt at creating a union
from previously autonomous regions on Peninsular Malaysia was also challenging to say the least.

Firstly, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu and Johore through their indigenous “rulers showed a strong
disinclination to see their states absorbed in the federal structure with the any consequential loss of independence
and authority that seemed likely” (Roff, 1967:92). Secondly, to the east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu
the sheer geographical isolation with difficulty in accessibility and the profitability factor or any immediate
economic potential made the matter less pressing from the British point of view (ibid.).

Notwithstanding the suspicions of the traditional heredity rulers of the states outside the Federated Malay States,
it was becoming inevitable that the “distant dream” of a complete Malay Empire of the British Crown 50where
they would be drawn into the Protectorate arrangement as well as accepting British administrative officials
exercising powers equivalent to those of the Residents in the Federated States (Roff, op cit.; 91). What turned
out to be a calculative strategy of indigenous bureaucratization of the foreign administrative structure and the
“indirect control” using the “institutions on the ground” by the British was retrospectively beneficial for the
future independent state of Malaysia as its elites were nominally involved in nation-building and the integrative
process of state-building.

Likewise, under the F.M.S. arrangement, tradition was featured in a show of popular appeal for legitimacy and
accommodation of the foreign (European) state system with its politico-economic complexity. And as it was
demonstrated under the arrangement, Britain respected the Malay states’ susceptibilities to any rapid or radical
changes. The non-federated states to the F.M.S. deal were not prematurely forced to federate or give up their
autonomous existence (Roff, op cit.; 94). And eventually, by 1903, as they subsequently joined the F.M.S., the
sultans or rajahs of these states were accorded the dignitary or decision-making responsibilities in a consultative
or advisory body but tentatively without legislative powers (ibid. 95).

In essence, the Federated Malay States ushered in the much-needed process of political modernization and the
bureaucratic elite needed in the transitional period. With the ever-increasing complexity of administration, the
erstwhile autonomous states were unified under the F.M.S. provision for an indigenous Malay Civil Service.
Federalism as an innovative system of government for Malaya in that period proved effective as “decision-
making in the protectorate grew more routinized” and as this decision-making power “shifted from the rulers and
residents to new bureaucratic arenas” 51and staffed by a unified administrative corps with competitive and
competence-based training at the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar.

Indeed, the initial functioning of the federal system guaranteed an enabling environment through this
foresightedness in the capacity of the local Malays. Credited to this early role of power distribution was the
effect that ensued when within the last quarter of the eighteenth century significantly witnessed the formation in
the individual federated states of governmental and administrative system (ibid: 94).

By 1909, Johore and Kedah, two of the initial non-supporters of the federation treaty were beginning to web
modern bureaucratic organization to traditional systems of state government. This was due in part to their close
proximity to the Straits Settlement with nearly forty years’ experience observing British intervention and its
effects. Another factor would have been the bargaining prowess of the traditional rulers who were successful in

50
Treacher, W. H. (1907), “British Malaya, with More Especial Reference to the Federated Malay States ”, Journal of the
Society of Arts, No. 55, p. 492
51
Case, 1995: 84
41
securing formal or informal undertakings designed to prevent European or other alien usurpation of traditional
Malayan authority (Roff, op cit.; 94).

Comparatively, the micro-level institutions and procedures within the Sultanates, functioning public service
organization staffed by indigenous bureaucrats would be interpreted in this analysis as decisive and vital
components in the progression of Malaysia as a nation-state. The relevance of the 1896 federation experience
would have to some extent affected national cohesion and political legitimacy of the State system with its
institutions as subsequent incorporation of traditional systems of governance into the Malaysian Constitution.
Likewise, it developed a “politically conscious” rural-based constituency with the emergence of an indigenous
Malay UMNO (United Malays National Organization) professing to have articulated the identities of the
indigenous Malayans (Case, 1995). This was radically different from the Papua New Guinean scenario and it
paved the way for the subsequent reinforcement of Malaysian nationalism.

Presently, the Malaysian qualifies as a constitutional monarchy because its Head of State symbolically is
retained through the King. Originally, the Federation of Malaya (comprising the administrative divisions on
what is now Peninsular Malaysia) was established on upon its attainment of sovereignty status on 31 August
1957. On 9 July 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was formed with the formal inclusion of Sabah, Sarawak and
Singapore. The latter’s place in the federation was however ephemeral due in part to suspicion by the Chinese-
dominated Singapore of the predominant Malayan population in the Malaysian federation and so it left the union
on 9 August 1965.

4.3 Rationale for 1963 Malaysian Federation

In essence, it is beneficial to deduce the rationale behind the 1963 Malaysian Federation to decipher whether the
objectives have been met in the intervening years. The first objective of the federation was to accommodate and
incorporate the geographical-sociological designs of Malaysian society; secondly is the need for re-thinking the
role of the state or administrative expediency of the state in the socio-economic realms also tremendously
involving the astuteness of political leadership; and finally, the buffering of de-legitimizing or de-politicizing
forces on the institution of state where the parties are given “room to exercise relative self-governing” affairs.

Firstly, in the Malaysian experience, federalism is a healthy expression of a pluralist society that it is and the
pragmatic version of the “politics of accommodation”. In Malaysia, the incorporation of tradition, balancing of
multi-ethnicity and the consideration of geographical disparity gives weight to the need to upholding the federal
parliamentary system of government that it currently has.

In comparative terms, it is fair to say that Malaysia’s experience with federalism was molded to great extent by
persisting cleavage in its geo-demographic and ethnic composition, hence, the need to adapt and modify the
government mechanism so as to achieving developmental goals in an environment of tolerance and
constitutional inducements. Not surprisingly, Malaysia is one classic manifestation of a pluralistic society with
racial divisions reinforced by linguistic, territorial, cultural, religious, and most important, the class related factor
of economic division (Crouch, 1996:13). The table below gives an indication of the diversity of the Malaysian
federation in relation to the ethnic composition of the two Borneon states, notwithstanding the fact that the
Peninsular States are predominantly Malay and Chinese.

Sabah and Sarawak: population, 1999 (thousands)

Sabah Sarawak
Bumiputera*: Bumiputera*:
Malay 192.7 (6.5%) Malay 435.0 (21.5%)
Dusun/Kadazan 529.4 (17.8%) Iban 576.0 (28.4%)
Bajau 332.0 (11.2%) Bidayuh 64.5 (8.1%)
Murut 863.0 (2.9%) Melanau 112.8 (5.6%)
Other Bumiputera 393.4 (13.2%) Other Bumiputera 117.4 (5.8%)
42
 Non-Bumiputera 1436.6(48.4%) Non-Bumiputera 621.4 (30%)

Total 2970.4 (100.0%) Total 2027.1 (100.0%)

Non-Malay Bumiputera 1341.1 (45.1%) Non-Malay Bumiputera 970.7(47.9%)

(% Malaysia's population) (5.9%) (% Malaysia's population) (4.3%)

*Indigenous ethnic groups

Source: Department of Statistics, State/District Data Bank, 1999.

Undoubtedly, the need to contain communal and politico-economic disparities between the ethnic groupings as
well as uphold the indigenous peoples’ traditional status and political institutions (integrating variants of its
traditional systems of governance) and Islam as a national religion necessitated reconfiguring of the
intergovernmental arrangement as it was understood under British rule. To that end, the inherited centralized
British structure was reconstituted in 1963 when the Federation of Malaysia was formed with the union of
Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo (name of North Borneo changed to Sabah). Sabah
and Sarawak, separated from the Peninsular States by the South China Sea however, have varying history and
ethnic mixes with indigenous populations comprising of predominantly of Kadazans and Ibans respectively
(Funston, 2001: 165).

In administrative terms, this sociological demarcations have has endowed the “starting points” for incorporation
of hitherto traditional political institutions of leadership and socio-cultural identity into the formal post-31
August 1957 state system. Like the federated units’ embodiment of the various ethno-linguistic groupings, the
political parties readily show inclinations to organization along ethnic lines. The purpose of this brief
acknowledgement is not to see ethnicity as the ultimate justification for a Papua New Guinea federalist
arrangement. Rather, it should serve as a model in the process of incorporating the traditional aspects of our
diverse societies into the institution of the Western Westphalian state and the utilization of these erstwhile
demarcations to realize national goals of self-reliance and independence.

The second determinant, which quite ingeniously is a legacy that should be a credit to the foresight of the
political and bureaucratic elite of the transitional post-decolonization period and Britain as the colonial power,
was the re-thinking of the role of the state. Reasserting the regional and federal government’s significance in
dealing with the entrenched circumstances and disparities of the Malaysian society was a classic example of
political accommodation.

This was implicit of the States assigning a redistribution role for the modern Malaysian state institution, through
the federal mechanism. For instance the Borneon States of Sabah and Sarawak; their incorporation in the
Federation was primarily their perceived outcome of equitable economic benefits. Prior to the formation of the
Malaysian Federation, “Sabah and Sarawak were less developed than the other States”, hence, by joining the
Federation in 1963 they both hoped for net transfers of development of funds through the exploitation of their
vast natural resources by Federal Government-led collaboration with external multinational corporations (Jomo
and Hui, 2004:4).

Interpreting the case of Sabah and Sarawak, it is noted that perhaps their fate was a manifestation of one of the
central tenet of cooperative federalism where the interests of parties to the federation are collectively enshrined
and attainable under networks of political understanding and negotiations under a competent and neutral “middle
man” (Federal Government) (Hughes, 1998: 271). In the eventual scheme of the Federation, this was “only about
a third of those surveyed in Sabah (the former British North Borneo) and Sarawak had wanted to join the
Federation …and that the leaders and people expected to enjoy privilege treatment within the new federation”
(ibid;5).

The intentions by the elites and people of Sabah and Sarawak have seemingly been regretted in recent times.
Given that “Sabah and Sarawak entered the federation technically on a constitutional par with the eleven
peninsular states combined….the perceived erosion of this extra degree of autonomy [control over their own
immigration matters, extending over West Malaysia-born persons] has been the source of considerable disquiet
in East Malaysia”(Brown et al, 2004:7). In the early 1980s the concerns over autonomy had given rise to the
43
resurgence of a Kadazan political identity, which culminated in the PBS-elected (Parti Bersatu Sabah or Sabah
United Party) government in the State (Chin, 1997; Lim, 1997; Loh, 1992).

Finally, the federalist arrangement can be attributed to the strategic “buffering” role of the state or central
government. In dealing with the external forces of the post-decolonization period, the state had to contend with
the ensuing ideological and military forces of the Cold War and the de-legitimizing or de-politicizing effect
these would have had on how the constituents view the authority and capacity of the central government or the
institution of state. It was in this time of great regional and global superpower influence on domestic politics that
in 1961, the government of Malaysia (comprising the Peninsular States) sought to expand with the intention of
incorporating Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei and Singapore.

Basically, the federal institution was perceived as effective in containing Chinese-inspired unrest. In view of the
fact that the British and local leaders saw Peninsular Malaysia as Malay-dominated, and capable of containing
leftist Chinese ascendancy in Singapore the incorporation of the latter was necessitated and the “larger and more
diverse indigenous population of Sabah and Sarawak were also [included in] offsetting Chinese domination of
the federation” (Jomo and Hui, 2004:4). It is viable to say at this juncture that the idea of entrenching internal
stability and ethnic equilibrium as a truly national virtue, were predetermined through the federalist agenda.

In part, Malaysia’s expansionist and federalist arrangement can be interpreted in view of William Riker’s
classical argument that military or security threat is one motive behind federalist endeavors. According to Riker,
expansion and greater military security were attainable “in a federal bargain and…each one is a necessary
condition for the creation of federalism”. 52

The lesson from this exercise is that not only did Malaysia had to deal with the external spread of Communism
impinging on its internal sovereignty and independence, the circumstances in the external level of politics had to
be the cause behind the idea of solidifying federalist collaboration; notably hitherto ethnically distinct entities of
Sabah and Sarawak who were included in the “pact” arrangement with the Peninsular states. This act alone
signifies the fact that in the response to global and domestic political (or developmental) aspirations, the politico-
bureaucratic elites of Malaysia perceived of federalism as a viable system or process to better elicit whatever
gains there may be.

To this end, it would by way of interpreting the quantitative data at hand and the legal assignment of powers of
the Malaysian federation in relation to socio-economic conditions of states and federal and state government
finances, that an arbitrary evaluation as to how and why federalism as a system of government generally
enhances socio-economic and political legitimacy can be drawn. This causal relationship will be relevant in light
of the trend of political development where the variables of socio-economic development and growth are
invariably intertwined with or generally associated with judging the legitimacy of given political regimes (Miller
and Listhaug, 1999). But in discussing Malaysia, one has to be mindful of the invariable nature of political
legitimacy in relation to variables such as socio-economic performances of states or federal governments.

Though it is widely accepted and remains conventional knowledge in scholarly analyses that the hitherto ruling
political regime of the political system under study (Malaysia) has been characterized as “quasi-democratic”,
“semi-democratic” and “competitive authoritarian” (Case, 1993; Diamond, 2002; Zakaria, 1989) by virtue of
significant alterations and the inhibiting of democratic procedures 53 (and the likely effect of such practices on
federal-state relations), the central tenet of this brief analysis is to identify the “incentives” towards self-reliance
and the significant contributions of states towards Malaysia’s development.

Firstly, the powers of states in relation to socio-economic infrastructure and the indicators of state development
will be compared in relation to federal government’s “management” or “middle-man” role; and secondly, the
budgetary allocation of grant on a state-by-state basis must be noted. This will give one an indication of the level

52
Riker, W. H. (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance, Boston, Little-Brown, p. 13.
53
For instance through such factors as repressive legislations such as the Internal Security Act (ISA), Police Act and the
Societies Act and the Official Secrets Act; control of the judiciary (Muzaffar 1989: 147) and; electoral gerrymandering
where the process of elections is dubiously conducted (Lim 2003).
44
of commitment the federal government has towards the maintenance of its legally endowed functions and
powers in the Federation Constitution.

4.4 Socio-Economic Conditions by State

The survey herein begs the question; are State parties in the Malaysian Federation fully engaged in the
development of their jurisdictions without untrammeled Federal Government dictation in their subject areas of
relative competence and; if there is relative functional autonomy for these States, how has it contributed to the
overall socio-economic growth and the portrayal of self-reliance as a national virtue of the Malaysian political
system in the international context? The constraints hindering Malaysian States will naturally emerge in this
analytical exercise.

The starting point in this analysis is the Malaysian Constitution which stipulates relations between the Federal
Government and States with authority divided generally (Table 1.1 in Appendix)54 and in relation to revenue-
generating sources (Table 2.2). In discussing the contribution of States to the stability and macro-level
performance of Malaysia, the socio-economic indicators of the States and their capacity to utilize their internal
revenue-generating powers to enhance their growth and socio-economic sectors should manifest some
correlation. It is implicit in the Malaysian constitution that complementary and shared functions between Federal
and State Governments define federal-state relations. It is the translation of these functions based on state
performances that would serve as indicators in interpreting the usefulness of federalism and the constraints
therein in the Malaysian experience.

The crucial growth sectors such as agriculture, land, and to some extent forestry fall under the jurisdiction of
states. Even the provision of feasible socio-economic amenities such as state works and water are functions
required of the states to perform. It is interesting to note in Table 1.3 the capacity and performance ranking of
the respective States in relation to the provision of public amenities such as piped water, state works and water,
electricity, urbanization rate and so forth. The states of Johor, Melaka, Negri Sembilan, Perak, Pulau Pinang,
Selangor statistically fare well compared to Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang, Perlis, Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu.
Perhaps attesting to the perceived competitive nature of federalism with the inherent incentive for states to be
accountable in the provision of services to their immediate constituents, a national average development index,
measuring the development indices of the respective states was constructed in tandem with the Eight Malaysia
Plan for 2001-2005.

By “using a national average development index base of 100 for 1990, the development indices for the less
developed state ranged from 86.8 to 98.8 in 1990 and from 113.8 to 126.1 in 2000”. On the other hand, “the
development indices for the more developed states were higher, ranging from 100.0 to 109.9 in 1990 and from
131.9 to 139.2 in 2000” (Jomo and Hui, 2004:14). As illustrated (Table 1.3) the states of Selangor and Pulau
Pinang had the highest development index scores in the period under study.

As to the understanding and interpretation of the composite development index, it is constructed from the
economic development index and the social development index. Hence, the lower economic and social
development index within the decade under study (1990-2000), the less developed the state. Likewise, the higher
economic development and social development index, the more developed the state (Jomo and Hui, 2004:14).

This general quantitative categorization of Malaysian States by socio-economic indices is noteworthy as it

parallels the thesis developed by Henry Okole (2002:11). The latter in suggesting an institutionalized
autonomous provincial government system for Papua New Guinea proposed that states or provinces would
“exert some sort of learning process from among themselves” if healthy inter-provincial competition was left to
the innovative impulse of provinces to do well for themselves without being constrained by the national
government and central agencies.

Although it is not apparent in official public statements that any sort of “competition” exists in inter-State
relations in the Malaysian federation, the “more developed-less developed” delineation is implicit of
differentiation in levels of attainment and the prowess in utilizing the given “incentives” or through being

54
For subsequent quantitative data presentations refer to the relevant tables and figures in the Appendix
45
endowed with natural resources that some states have progressively been ahead of the others. For instances, the
states of Sabah and Terengganu have significant deposits of petroleum and natural gases whilst forestry was also
a major revenue earner of Sarawak until the late 1990s, contributing to the GDP growth rate of that state (Table
1.4) (Jomo and Hui, 2004:10). The “competitive” edge engenders the universal proclivity for people to rely less
and to be more creative. 55 The case for the States is to utilize the existing niche in the Constitution for their
advancement.

In relation to the incidence of poverty (Table 1.5), Kelantan, Kedah, Terengganu, Sabah, Sarawak and Perlis
have been characterized as relatively dependent on subsistence and rice agriculture. For Terengganu, Sabah and
Sarawak, even with their status as petroleum producing states, the apparent wealth, including royalty payments
accruing to the State governments have not been directed towards reducing poverty in those States (Jomo and
Hui, op cit.; 14).

Perhaps the level of poverty in each State can also be deciphered in the related socio-economic indicators and
particularly the provision of public services. In 1999, for instance, Sabah, Sarawak and Terengganu, the poverty
rate is manifested in these States’ higher infant mortality rate and fewer motorcycles, motorcars, and telephone
services per capita (Table 1.6). Fewer motorcycles, motorcars and telephone are categorized as public services
amenities because they are vital in the efficient functioning of economic activities and the mobility of people, the
accessibility of people to educational and health facilities, information and communication which are
indispensable towards socio-economic betterment and so forth.

The above high infant mortality rate in the aforementioned States is perhaps reflective of the wider imbalance
towards the health sector. Quantitatively speaking, this is not surprising due to the fact that in the trend of
funding, disproportionate financial attention and budgetary has been more towards economic programmes than
social services by the Federal Government (Figure 1.a).

On the same token regional inequity is also manifested. Aside from economic sector56 bias, Sabah, Sarawak,
Terengganu, Kedah and Kelantan relatively lack health skilled personnel (Table 1.7) due in part to the lack of
modern facilities as well as recreational and entertainment services closer to health workers’ expectations in the
aforementioned States. These health personnel would rather stay in more developed States (Jomo and Hui, op
cit; 32).

Road density, recognized as an important factor in the quality of accessing services from regional centers and for
income-generating marketing opportunities, the road densities relative to size has meant that larger States
(geographically) have lower road densities. Kelang Valley in Selangor is burdened with traffic congestion,
whilst Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan have lower road densities relative size (ibid.).

To this end, what has been the identified problem behind this apparently discriminatory regional bias by the
Federal Government? In relation to financial and fiscal federalism, this contentious issue in the present
Malaysian federation perhaps presents the crux of the matter in Federal-State relations. Considering the trend of
the flow of financial allocation and transfers to the States and the relative size and indicators of the States’
economies will present one the impression of the level of contentedness or lack of it in the States.

4.5 Federal and State Government Finances

One other significant indicator in the study of federalism is the commitment to financial redistribution and the
capacity of states to perform their functions with minimal fiscal dependence on the centre. In so far as the federal
55
The Post Courier of August 24, 2005 notes an interesting piece with ‘China ties set to boost tourism’. Therein it reports of
the officials from East New Britain province signing an agreement with the Chinese province of Hainan for a sister-
province relationship. The predicted benefits would include encouraging and promoting tourism, people to people contact,
economic and trade interflow, and so forth between the two provinces. This provincial initiative however does not question
the sovereignty of PNG but was reached through the East New Britain province’s concern to exploit the vast Chinese
tourism market in relation to existing bilateral relations between PNG and the People’s Republic of China.
56
Economic development programmes here include agricultural development, mineral resources development, commercial
and industrial development, development of transport, communications, energy and water resources, and related feasibility
studies as well as research and development to increase incomes (Jomo and Hui, op cit;30).
46
government honors its legal commitment there should be causal effect on the financial capacity of states to the
timely provision and maintenance of public services and functions.

The starting point to our understanding of fiscal federalism relations is again the Malaysian Constitution where
States’ internal revenues are generated with “authorization by federal law” (Jomo and Hui, 2004: 28). As
illustrated in Table 1.2, the Federal Government is mandated to collect direct taxes such as income taxes on
individuals, companies and cooperatives, whilst the State Governments possess residual powers to collect tax
revenues related to land, real property, agriculture and forestry. This assumption of States’ taxation powers,
however, is erroneous for the reason that even though States are nominally acknowledged, the reality is that the
Federal Government and executive wield significant influence by virtue of their arsenal of “constitutional-
amendment”57 or legal knack of setting limits to the State governments and invariably undermining the revenue
sources of the State governments.58

Take for instance the federal government ban of log exports on Sabah in 1991 due in part to the latter state’s
legislature being dominated by the opposition party PBS (Parti Bersatu Sabah). This directly undermined the
State government’s revenue (Wee, 1995:24). Likewise the case of the federal-owned Petronas (Petroleum
Nasional Berhad) which has been empowered under the Petroleum Act, 1974 to contract out exploration and
petroleum exploration and production of petroleum must be noted. It therefore remains the directive or discretion
of the federal government–through Petronas that the exploitation of the natural resources of such provinces could
be halted or kept away from the State with telling consequences on the royalty revenue of that State (Jomo and
Hui, 2004:28).

At best the effect has been the dwindling flow of government revenue (Table 1.8) to Terengganu, Sabah and
Sarawak (the three major hydrocarbon-producing States in the Federation) since the mid 1980s. Terengganu has
been inconsistently compensated or worse still is never compensated at all for the crude oil and natural gas
minerals extracted from within its jurisdiction. Conversely, the Federal Government revenue accruable from the
combined petroleum income tax and petroleum royalty has increased substantially since 1975 by RM11, 458
million.

It attests to the limitations of the State’s financial powers. Likewise, the executive control and dominance of the
federal government has implications in relation to financial allocation to States. Grants and transfers from the
federal government to States are given in consultation with the National Finance Council which in accordance
with Article 108 of the Constitution of Malaysia comprises the Prime Minister and ministers appointed by the
Prime Minister and one representative from each state. Given that the Prime Minster can appoint various
Ministers to the National Finance Council, he has much more power than any State representative (ibid.).

The Mahathir tenure (1981-2003) was perhaps the most exemplary in the assertiveness and powerful control of
federal government financial allocation over the States which were in the hands of opposition parties or that
were openly against the policies of the National Barisan (Khoo, 2003; Lim, 2002). For example, since the PAS-
dominated State Governments were elected in Terengganu in 1999 the allocations have relatively reduced.
Kelantan too has had its experiences of being discriminated against by the Federal Government when its State
Government was in the control of the PAS from 1959 until 1978, and then again from 1990 (Figure 1.b).

Coupled with federal government revenue sources, the spending or expenditure of financial resources is another
area indicating significant levels of bias towards the federal government than states (Table 1.9). It can be
deduced that so long as the federal government has relatively greater functions to perform than the States, it will

57
With ‘the consistent two-thirds majority of the Barisan National, the regime has amended the constitution to its needs as it
sees fit [whilst it] has been claimed by the opposition DAP that the government has amended the constitution over a
thousand times since independence’ (Ali et al. 2004:5). Indeed, Means (1991: 142) argues that ‘the Constitution is valued
for its capacity to provide the rituals of legitimacy, but [its] constitutional limitations on the government provide little more
than a temporary check on the exercise of power’.
58
Part VI of the Constitution of Malaysia delineates the relations between the federation and the states with Chapter 1
conferring the Distribution of legislative powers. Section 73 reads, ‘In exercising the legislative powers conferred on it by
this Constitution (a) Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the Federation and laws having effect outside as
well as within the Federation;’
47
continue to assert its authority to control of resources by justifying for the corresponding financial resources in
its control.

Take for instance the fiscal year of 1999 as illustrated in Table 1.9. The federal government expenditure was
estimated at RM 68,162 million compared to consolidated State government expenditures which was about RM
8,912 million. This disproportionate expenditure by the two levels of government is a sign of either the
predominance of the federal government in dictating the Constitution for its political conveniences or the
deliberate usurpation by the executive of fiscal responsibilities. Nevertheless, this trend has impacted the State
parties to the federation in many ways than one.

Firstly, given the decreasing flow of Federal Government grants to states (from 90 percent of its operating
budget in 1975 to 3.5 percent in 1999) (Table 1.10), the Federal Government has shifted its financial allocation
from grants to loans. In other words, States have resorted to “borrowing” from the federal government to finance
public expenditures within their respective jurisdictions, and in the process incurring the State authorities public
debt (see Table 1.11) Secondly, as an offshoot of the latter, the strain can be noticed in State Governments
having attempted to reduce their fiscal deficits through limiting spending in line with their revenue capacities
(Umikalsum, 1992:327).

In cases where states cannot finance local initiatives, the only solution is to hand over some of their
Constitutionally-designated functions to the Federal Government, a case of further centralization (Wee,
1996:285). Thirdly, though the federal government has retained functions meant for states, its capacity to
equitably realize national standards of growth would be less possible. The level of spending on states has been
uneven amongst states, reflecting in part federal government’s preferences as well as the unsettled financial
capacity of states.

In the experience of the Malaysian Federation, since 1966, the country has had eight five-year development
plans. And as Figure 1.b illustrates, the federal government allocations per capita is invariable 59as is apparent
over the course of the five-year demarcations since 1976.This redistributive function of the federal government
however presents an erroneous generalization because federal government allocations have predominantly been
towards economic rather than social development (Figure 1.a).

Social development programmes involve the provision of piped water supply, electricity, housing sewerage and
rubbish disposal, health services, roads and transport systems (Jomo and Hui, op cit; 30). Salient in this list is the
fact that the provision of such public services predominantly falls within the ambit of the States, indicating that
any concurrency or Federal-State collaboration or State’s functional autonomy would be superseded by the
overall Federal Government’s developmental objectives and the political expediency in relation to the favorable
outcome in electoral support. 60In most cases poorer States, regions and critical sectors are more likely to be by-
passed for cost, feasibility or viability considerations (ibid.).

One example of this bias and imbalance of the Federal Government developmental priorities towards the socio-
economic sector was noted in 2000 with the allocation of financial resources (in the billions) “spent on the new
administrative capital Putrajaya and its twin, Cyberjaya. This was at a time when there [were] still schools in
Malaysia without electricity” (Saifuddin, 2000:181). According to the latter situation, it raised questions about
the genuineness of Malaysia to be a key player in the I.T. industry, where “[I]nstead of investing in human
resources [socio-psycho infrastructure], the [federal government] is spending a great deal to develop a high-tech
township, Cyberjaya, anchor of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) (ibid.).

59
In the 1996-2000 period, the allocation in relation to area has increased for Sabah and Sarawak whilst decreases were seen
as a result of the election of the opposition PAS-led governments in Terrengganu in 1999 and Kelantan from 1959 until
1978, and then again in 1990.
60
It was observed by Jomo and Hui, (2004:5) that “initially under the guise of the 1971 promulgated New Economic Policy,
the regime has developed a fearsome machinery for dispensing patronage to supporters of the government”. Likewise at the
state level, it was for instance reported in one of the daily newspapers prior to the March 1999 state elections in Sabah, that
the federal government “would not be generous [with funding] if the state was under an opposition government” (Star,
11/3/99)
48
Conversely, development allocations to States have only not been for the objective of reducing inter-state
disparity or collectively realizing national standards. Improved allocations have been calculative from the
perspective of political considerations and patronage. It was suspected by Jomo and Hui (2004:41) that the
“improved allocations for Kedah from the tenth highest during the Third Malaysia Plan period (1976-1980) to
the sixth highest in the current Eight Malaysia Plan period (2001-2005) is widely attributed to the Kedah-born
Prime Minster’s [Mahithir] political concerns and provincialism”. Moreover, the fluctuations and
unpredictability of the development allocations for states would have causal effect on the planning and
budgetary forecast of their governments. For instance, the trend in relation to highest development allocations
for Kelantan within the same period (1976-1980)-(2001-2005) saw it lose its position from seventh to tenth
position. The reverse was seen in Selangor where from sixth highest development allocation (in 1976-1980), it
rose to third highest position (in 2001-2005) (see Table 1.12).

Indeed, the bias towards pro-Federal Government State regimes and the two Borneon states typify the centralist-
prone nature of Malaysian elites at the helm of federal government. The latter two States have been unfairly
compensated even though they both boast of having much larger sizes (see Table 1.13). Perhaps the succession
by the Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in October 2003 may well bring about a extensive change in the
intergovernmental relations since under Mahathir’s twenty-two year tenure, the political system, including the
policy making process, became much more centralized in the hands of the executive, and the prime minister in
particular (Khoo 2003; Lim 2002).

If this is any indicator, the “first six months of Abdullah's tenure saw a shift towards a more open style of
government, with a commission of enquiry into police brutality and a high-profile anticorruption drive that has
seen the arrest of several prominent figures, including one cabinet minister. This progress was rewarded with a
landslide victory for Abdullah in the March 2004 federal elections” (Brown et al; 2004:2). Hopefully these initial
steps are taken towards revisiting the Federation Constitution where the status of Sabah and Sarawak as
autonomous regions and the fiscal strength of the States are not further usurped by the Federal Government.

In the meantime, it is logical to intuit that the federal system even though criticized as highly centralized and
perverted through executive dominance will perennially be the viable point of reference in terms of the political
existence of the Malaysian state. This means that the federalist-oriented Constitution and the geographical
disposition of the States in the Malaysian Federation is the exhaustive system that decision-makers and policy-
makers should continue to work with. The reversing of the centralisation trend and any institutional reform
however rests with the political elites in the federal arena.

Centralization and contempt for the federal Constitution is apparently the recurring issue in the Malaysian
federation. In the Papua New Guinean case as will be presented in the next section, the problem is with the
excessive reliance on an incompetent and overburdened middleman, the national government. On face value, the
experience of the Malaysian federation could well have resounding similarities in the manner in which the
powers of the national/federal governments have been misapplied towards political patronage and party-defined
affiliation. On the other hand, the differentiating factor that is worthy of being compared is that the Malaysia can
successfully be ordained as cultivating the national virtue of self-reliance and national economic independence.
Conversely, as will be argued in the following section, successive Papua New Guinean national governments
have been or continue to be indecisive and precarious about the powers and status quo of national
parliamentarians in any institutional reform conducted towards getting provincial governments in exercising
greater provincial autonomy.

4.6 Summary

On this note, in the brief analysis and interpretation of the socio-economic indicators distribution of the States in
the Malaysian federation, what does it indicate of the federal system of government in general? Does it auger
well for a potential Papua New Guinea federal system? Moreover, how is federalism in the Malaysian
experience substantively contributing towards the enhancement of its political legitimacy and socio-economic
development?

To that end, firstly, the above study tried to decipher the nature of the Malaysian federalist political system as it
relates to the federal-state relations, comparatively as in Papua New Guinea’s central-provincial government
49
relations. It has been established in the literature (and apparently proven in the case study) that Malaysia
resembles that system of federalism which operates under the principle of “permissive federalism”. In
“permissive federalism”, the federal system is almost like a unitary system where the state/local governments
have only those powers and authorities permitted to them by the federal government. The state/local
governments derive their existence and authorities from the federal government. 61 Secondly, the above
study attempted to gauge the issue of federalism as a system of government compatible with Papua New
Guinea’s evolving intergovernmental affairs. Drawing from Malaysia’s experience, Papua New Guinea,
resembling a pluralistic society with the endowed constitutional duties of socio-economic developmental
responsibilities of the state towards enhancing the welfare of its citizenry would inculcate some degree of self-
reliance if certain levels of healthy inter-provincial competition healthy were embodied through the federalist
approach.

As seen in the Malaysian system, the 1965 Federation Constitution delineates the areas of responsibilities and
functions of the two levels of government. More so, in the preceding comparative analysis, the impression
generated has been that the States in the Malaysian federation are relatively more self-sufficient by virtue of their
capacity to generate revenue within their jurisdictions, implying that the States have relative self-governing
responsibilities and functions.

However, the reality is that in recent years, the centralization phenomenon, due in part to the parliamentary
dominance by the executive and the perennial UMNO-led federal government has given credence to the
permissive categorization of the Malaysian federal system. Though the central government has a significant
influence on the level of legitimacy, it is fair to say that recent political party identification with states interests
attests to the frustration by the constituents of State. For example, the domination of the Sabah state’s legislature
by the opposition party Parti Bersatu Sabah in 1991 indicates dissatisfaction or at best radical destabilizing
outcome in the face of centralist proclivities and executive dominance.

Interestingly, internal stability and the national political culture manifesting self-reliance and national
independence is perhaps the most notable in the Malaysian political system where States are given the ambit to
perform. For instance the constitutional prescription of the powers and functions of states entails greater
responsibility and independence by the states in the provision of public services and functions. As exemplified in
the post-1997 Asian financial crisis, the less reliance on external sources of financial assistance is perhaps
indicative of the internal political culture of self-reliance and national independence, national virtues that are not
apparent in the Papua New Guinea context as it increasingly relates with the outside world.

5 PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM: THE NEED FOR A

RECONFIGURATION

5.1 In the Political Wilderness

The thirtieth year of Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) existence as a political entity heralds ambivalence for its future
with the corresponding impulse for timely redressing and much needed amendment to its somewhat battered
reputation. Therefore, the re-thinking of provincial government arrangement in the face of globalization and its
effects is an inherent political reformation imperative. Strong internal political institutions should be seen as a
precondition for the eliciting of maximum benefits in external relations because “[G]overnments that are weak at
home cannot act as decisively or effectively as those with a strong domestic power base” (Strange, 1996:69) on
the international stage. Likewise it should serve to counter the unwavering preponderance of the neo-liberal

61
Cited at http://www.lebaneseforces.org/articles/arti_primer-on-federalism.php )

50
economic ideology and concurrently where the PNG state is desperately in need of reasserting its political
independence and internal legitimacy.

Increasingly the urgent pursuit by indigenous scholars must delve into the fundamental corpus of political
inquiry to expound on the resoundingly ageless question: “What is the best form of government?” That is, if the
hitherto government arrangements have been reflective of institutionalized hesitancy and ad-hoc tendencies,
surely, there must be a much better way to the pursuance of the ultimate goal of political and economic
independence? And on a serious note, where does Papua New Guinea stand after attaining political
Independence in 1975? Moreover, has this political independence spell a clearly defined form or system of
government that Papua New Guineans can attest as embodying or reflective of the values and ideals of the
Melanesian society as well as dealing with developmental questions at the fundamental levels of PNG society.

Far from suggesting federalism as a perfect system, in Papua New Guinea’s practical situation, its inclusion is
based on the fact that as a second-best option it is needed insofar as its contextual accommodation of Papua New
Guinea’s diversity or plurality is facilitative of the indigenous human potential. Political reality through an
arrangement as federalist arrangement must count for something, and as we have hitherto witnessed, the bias
towards a unitary arrangement of government has not delivered the amelioration needed to the increasing
demands on the institution of the State.

Likewise the Western perceptions of how government ought to be in the tradition of liberal democratic state
have to be re-thought. With the futile experience of the PNG state institutions and democratic symbols, it
challenges the purported universality of the Western prescription with the destructive human element that is yet
to be “matured” in the conduct of political complexity (Axline, 1993, 27-31). It now becomes an intimate reason
for the PNG political society to adapt and modify the arrangement of government.

I say this because Papua New Guinea's progression in its immediate region (the Asia-Pacific), entails that the
institution of government or the nation-state entity remains the central partner in development and people
participation in the ultimate goal of societal and citizenry self-reliance and independence. Therefore, with the
emphasis on the provincial government system, it is towards the end of ‘internal preparedness’ that the
reformation of the structure of government is sounded in this discourse

As cogently acknowledged by foreign policy experts, the Asia-Pacific region is so characterized “as the most
economically dynamic in the world…[with]…great international significance” (Evans and Grant, op cit.; 12).
Since “[T]he centre of gravity of world production shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the 1980s” with the
Asia-Pacific region as a whole, including North America now accounting for “over two-fifths of the world’s
trade, and produces well over half the world’s economic output” (ibid; 12-13), realistic independence and self-
reliance must be facilitated and nurtured as a political culture at all levels of government in Papua New Guinea.
It is proposed here that being internally stable and independent will determine Papua New Guinea’s place and
persuasive stance in the immediate region and beyond.

However, the nation-state in recent decades has been taken to task by scholars as diminishing in its worth. In
other words, it is not perceived as the ultimate or relevant binding entity in the organization and distribution of
vital goods and services or the focal point for mass mobilization (Strange, 1996). However, one should be wary
of Western-inspired scholarly directions and how such intellectual foundations can hinder the policy or
governance mechanisms in Papua New Guinea’s overall need to reinforce the need for the State in day-to-day
human and nation-state affairs. Globalization neo-liberalists, market proponents and the “borderless world”
school of thought have argued in opposition to the relevance of the nation-state and government. Ohmae (1990:
183), for instance argues that:

“The global economy follows its own logic and develops its own webs of interest, which rarely
duplicate the historical borders between nations. As a result, national interest as an economic, as
opposed to a political, reality has lost much of its meaning. And as information about products
becomes more universally available, consumers everywhere will be able to make better-informed
choices about what they want. It will matter less and less where it came from. Governments and
the national boundaries they represent become invisible in this kind of search. They have no
direct role to play”.
51
In PNG, the concern should be tilted to the defense of the nation-state because in this age of global
interdependence with large-scale integrations where nation-states are transferring parts of their sovereignty to
supranational institutions, what would this spell for the impending post nation-state scenario as propounded by
the declinist school in the field of international political economy? With the onslaught of supra-politico-
economic institutions mainly pushed by the countries of the North with the ostensible motive of shielding
themselves from the less progressive South and the rich benefits of being a united front, what would become of
the nation-state? Further they assert that the nation-state is a by-product of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries Westernization of the world, and a passing one at that by globalization standards. Implicit in this
argument is the reasoning that the South, predominantly former colonial possessions, is still enmeshed in the
nation-state mentality.62 And so the exercise of the social scientist is to re-assess the viability of the nation-state.

But in light of the frequency in the intermeshing of external forces on the state entity Bernd Hamm (1992) raised
questions that should be seriously considered by anti-statist or opponents of the nation-state entity. The first
concern is the problem of ascertaining what kinds of task to be performed by the state and at which levels of
government. Secondly, what would be the appropriate territorial unit (an administrative arrangement) to fulfill
such tasks not only with maximum efficiency, but equally so with maximum democratic governability? Thirdly,
the concern in light of global actors impinging on the state will bring to the fore the question of the
appropriateness of the nation-state entity. If the nation-state and its governing agent, the central government,
abandons or neglects many of its traditional tasks in favor of external dictation, what then is now its raison
d'être? Take for instance the public services and public infrastructures that are supplied by the central
government. What would be the likely effect of the legitimacy and authority of the state and the central
government if more powerful external political and economic actors displace such legitimacy-sustaining
constitutional duties?

Far from being an outdated redistributive mechanism of mobilizing and channeling societal welfare services, the
state is needed in defense of social and economic externalities unavoidable in the intermeshing of domestic and
international forces that pose questions on the stability of societies in the third world, and in particular, Papua
New Guinea. Hence, the nation-state’s government structure and system of government is highlighted as the area
in need of re-evaluation in PNG.

One has to heed the alarmist tone of Karl Polanyi (1944:73) when he said: “to allow the market mechanism to be
sole director of the fate human beings and their natural environment …would result in the demolition of
society”. The case of ‘unregulated’ personal insecurity of the individual should be factored in as a variable
necessitating a system considerate of grassroots sentimentality and where a debilitated national government does
not continue to suppress or exacerbate the already incapacitated provincial governments.

If written history is man’s teacher, the autonomy or provincial self-governing debate as a countervailing
accommodating strategy to limit the foreseeable adverse effects of the national government shirking its
responsibilities in the economic and socio-political spheres should not be seen as unique to this day and age. The
signs were obvious during the post-World War Two and transitional years (1960s-early 70s) when frustrated
Papua New Guinean’s were manifestly flirting with secessionist and self-governing desires due to the neglect
and the centralist approach the then Australian Administration and Legislative Council-cum-House of Assembly
in Port Moresby were cultivating. The argument here and as was evident in the retrospective aspect of the
development of the state system in Papua New Guinea is that: The case of neglect by central government in vital
areas of education, public health and public works was blatant and fuelled the frustrated lot outside of the
influential zone of Port Moresby who held “the common belief in their failure to be given a fair share of
‘development’” (Nelson, 1974: 98-99, Woolford, 1976:4).

Presently, the challenge becomes more and more stringent for the central government to re-draw the authority
and public legitimacy of the state system in PNG with the debilitating intensity attributed to the forces of

62
By ‘nation-state mentality’, I mean the continuing process (and a seemingly never ending one at that) or unfinished
business of political institutionalization where those who perceive it as the legitimate arena of identification in post-colonial
years attempt to give the political unit of the nation-state ultimate meaning through the appropriate medium. This would
categorically apply to the majority of the “late-comers” to the nation-state system or third world states.
52
predatory globalization. This exercise is not helped by the low standards of political developments currently
taking place on the floor of parliament or National Legislature. The problem is the gradual move by the
government towards an elitist and centralist existence. Impervious as it is to the demands of the majority of the
citizenry in provinces to the growing need for empowerment is the hallmark of authoritarianism. In stark reality,
there appears to be a low standard of political development set in the national-level where public opinion and the
“public mood” appear irrelevant in the political conduct of the government.

The elitist political reputation set by Waigani where the purported ideals of liberal democracy are evoked as
smoke-screens of ulterior interests are also testaments to the desecration of the legitimacy and authority of the
state system in the last decades or so. One can note with disillusionment and frustration the successive national
governments (and the national legislature in general) track record of being preoccupied with the now
problematic no-confidence motions and national-level power struggles. It is all these failing political processes
which have equally pushed the state system to be at its most vulnerable so that its gullibility to external forces
are deemed as ‘last resorts’ when in fact the seeds of diminished legitimacy and hopeless expectations were
initially cultivated by the very national-level of government.

In parallel with that view, during the transitional era and the subsequent designing of the Constitution there was
the need to shed powers to provincial powers “to protect the central leadership from being overburdened”. 63 Far
from being productively overburdened though, the national level of political leadership has polarized itself from
the masses. Therefore it is duly called for, the giving of provinces their fair share of government. Reconfiguring
the current arrangement should entail reducing or counterbalancing the seemingly entrenched ultimate position
of the central government through pragmatic legal-juridical guidelines, provincial governments can plan and
coordinate programs that confront pressing needs as they perceive appropriate (Reagan and Sanzone, op. cit., p.
88).

5.2 Preserving the State through Federalist Arrangement

Federalism with its tendency to accommodate diverging demands on the state and neutralize divisive aspects
associated with plurality can simultaneously serve as a preservative of political legitimacy at the local-level. In
view of the sociological heterogeneity of PNG and the need for legitimization through mass participation or
mobilization of government functions at the fundamental levels of society, we take the exhortation of William S.
Livingston when he said that:

The essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in the society
itself. Federal government is the device by which the federal qualities of the society are
articulated or protected. The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for…in the forces-
economic, social, political, cultural-that have the outward forms of federal necessary. Federalism,
like most institutional forms, is a solution of or an attempt to solve a certain problem of political
organization (Emphasis mine).64

The “problem of political organization” in PNG is that as a relative new-comer to the state system, the provincial
governments are the fundamental entities that can “take over” the role of the national government in
constitutionally defined areas. This argument for a Papua New Guinean perspective on an autonomous and
subsequent federal system of government derives logical justifications from the Organic State Theory. As a
variant in the functionalist school, the Organic State Theory postulates that “the State and its component parts
cannot be seen as passive machines or will-less instruments, subject to outside steering and hierarchical control”
(Tonnen, 1990: 284). What this means is that the different levels or units of government are ‘living’ or
‘dynamic’ entities who make up the complex whole of the State institution. In this case, Papua New Guinea’s
federalist agenda would be equated with “cushioning” the political legitimacy problems emanating from external
challenges on the Papua New Guinea State system through the utilization of relatively self-governing provincial
governments.

63
Khan, I. (1974), Australian Journal of Politics and History, Volume XX No. 3 (December), 221 Stanley Street, Brisbane,
Watson Fergussion and Company
64
Cited in Wildavsky, A. ed. (1967), American Federalism in Perspective, Boston, Little, Brown, pp. 37, 36
53
Therefore, when we speak of federalism and the need to reconfigure the state in PNG, the state should not be
mundanely identified with the national government, but fundamentally, the national, provincial and local
governments, which are interpreted as “compound, internally complex organic parts of the entire system”
(Tonnen, 1990: 284). Hence, federalism as a system of governing is seen in this context as capable of giving life
to the coordinated government units so that the “unity among these component parts and elements is necessary to
generate state authority” (ibid.). In PNG, the rejuvenation of the state institution should therefore work with this
principle of “involving the lower levels of government to repel any wholesale threat on the existence of the
State” (ibid.).

On another analytical level, the associated dilemmas of a central government fighting seemingly losing battles
on all fronts ought to be rethought. The politicizing of the greater body polity, preservation of state legitimacy
and buffering of external sources of a marketized, and globalized international system which threatens to
asunder the internal cohesion of the nation-state should be duly relegated to the most “elementary level” or
fundamental form of political organizations- the provinces and local levels of government. 65

It is the proposition of this discourse that a revitalized system of government (federalism through the
institutionalizing provincial autonomy) in Papua New Guinea should reverse the current plague in the crisis of
legitimacy that the supposed democratically elected central government is encountering. The hitherto disparate
experience concerning the current decentralization process (intergovernmental relations) and the central
government’s obsession with the seemingly irreversible SAP 66 (as tied conditions to the debt repayment to the
foreign lenders) and issues irrelevant to the day-to-day development of local constituencies should also be taken
as starting points for the proposed constitutional change or reform.

And as the current arrangement of government show disturbing deficiencies, what urgent political decisions and
actions should be undertaken? The argument as presented here draws pragmatic conclusions on a worrisome
trend that the hitherto Papua New Guinean state system and political elites have been so mesmerized by “ideal-
types” in the process of Papua New Guinea’s political development. Trying to appease whatever political
persuasion or self-interested elite or worse still emulating “word-by-word” and “structure-by-structure” the
institution of State in Western Europe’s experience is misleading because if the obsession and movement
towards the universalization of government towards neo-liberal uniformity would at any time more fervent, it
undoubtedly would be at its crescent today, where the pressures of international economic competition are
creating new networks amongst sub-governments (Slaughter, 1997:183-97).

In this discourse and only in an imperfect system, it is the premise of a confrontationist approach that there is
“room for maneuverability” and self-regulation, and fundamentally, the reservoir or “laboratory” to rekindle
indigenous debate and inquiry against the Euro-centric, grandstanding Western political manner of addressing
governance issues in PNG today. Hitherto, the history of political development and the test of diverse societal
circumstances have negated the universal notion that Western-contrived models of economic and political
progression as ideally encompassing. The lesson here for non-Western societies such as PNG is that one need
not be pressured to adopt the totality of the system overnight. Sadly, PNG has tried to without accepting into the
scheme of political development the fundamental units of society with their still semi-autonomous existence.

This reasoning is the confronting reality of the crisis of legitimacy in PNG. Hence, the appropriate re-
configuration of the state based on lessons provided by the history of decentralization attempts with suppressed
complacency is the path PNG should undertake. Preconditions to improvement involves acceptance of one’s
fallibilities and drastic steps in the amelioration of the vulnerable system of government. Sir Arnold Amet, a
learned and prominent Papua New Guinean commenting in his weekly column in one of the daily newspapers
captured this momentous national challenge when he said that:

65
See Grindle, 2000: 192-196
66
Structural adjustment is the “process of restructuring often characterized by an increased reliance on market forces and a
reduced role for the state in economic management, initiated in the industrialized countries and applied to developing
countries”. Usually structural adjustment incorporate more market-based to the organization and delivery of public services
including the contracting out of the public service and coincide with or form an integral part of overall government policies
on deregulation, privatization and trade liberalization (Sarfati, 1995).
54
 As we reach this milestone [30 years of political independence], I believe it’s a good time to
pause and do some very serious review and reflections on how far we have come as a nation and
where we are headed. It is good practice to regularly review and assess performances with a view
to making corrections, adjustments and improvements for the future. This is valid for individuals,
family, groups, organizations, institutions and nations. No individual or organization is perfect in
all aspects and there is scope for improvement.67 (My emphases)

First and foremost in this approach to realizing the benefit of a federalist system of government is the admission
that there lurks the overwhelming nature of the international system so demanding on the central government or
state system. That is, for this institutionalization of the federalist government, it thoroughly must depend on the
willingness of the current political elites to relieve their positions of relative privilege and the dismantling of the
fostered patronage network that that has contributed to the gross politicization of the and centralization of the
government system under the OLPG&LLG arrangement.

Until official political ‘diagnosis’, there is credible reason to doubt any re-legitimization of the institution of
state and in no sight would we expect the recession of the insistent challenges by elements of a frustrated body
polity over the essence of the state in PNG. Hence, the idea of reconfiguration is fundamentally to identify the
cause of the failure of the provincial government system in contributing to national development and redressing
with a system more parallel to the problem at hand. National adaptation through radical assessment of the
internal structure of government to meet the demands of an imposing global environment and impervious central
government under the compounding precepts of the neo-liberal ‘state limitation’ requires of PNG to rein in
centralist or elitist short-term ambitions for the PNG state system’s long term progression.

Not surprisingly, two authorities in the scholarship of globalization’s impact on domestic governance did
identify the importance of the nation-state; notably its internal structures as being crucial parts in the forefront of
adapting to the challenges posed by the forces of globalization (Keohane and Nye, 2000: 15). I am suggesting in
this era of strict conformity to the Westphalian state system and the demands of the entailed neo-liberalist world
economic partners and the absolute obsession with the disparagingly abused liberal democratic notion, that the
PNG federalism that we may know of could go along way in absorbing the shock of a de-politicized political
system seemingly cultivated by central government. Given the trend in neo-liberal governance where the central
government is symbolically “washing its hands clean” of its management of societal affairs relating to political
development and its related activities (left to the market), the effect may have repercussions inclusive of a
“politically illiterate” and frustrated body polity.

Hence, federalism would be an assurance that consolidation of the fundamental arenas of political participation
and existing institutions of human relations in PNG are reactionary to the de-legitimatizing forces of
globalization and its associated dilemmas on the welfare of individuals and the national body polity. The
overburdened state is therefore in a seemingly spiraling state of hopelessness of being re-assertive of the
command on legitimacy and respect it once effortlessly commanded. In such a scenario, the obvious concern
“for the legitimacy of public authority is that more demands are being placed on the government than
governments can deliver” (Rockman, 1990: 40).

The current wave of state and government re-thinking and foreseeable materialization is seen in the pragmatic
qualification of the people of East New Britain province as they seek to find a consensual agreement with the
Papua New Guinea national government is dramatically acknowledged to this effect. The proposition is based on
the fact that:

…Autonomy, or self government as it is usually called, has been a reaction against a trend of
development in the national sphere that was perceived to be a threat to our cultural identity as
well as a hindrance to our natural ability and right to create a society and government that reflect
the people’s wishes and aspirations….At present it would be a reaction against the failure as well
as unproductive and dictatorial nature of the reformed Organic Law on Provincial Government
and Local-level Government (OLPG&LLG). On top of this there is the current feeling of
insecurity among the people that leadership in the Central Government level has betrayed their

67
The National (2004), “Time to challenge the status quo” (August 24), p. 17
55
 trusts and confidence by allowing corruption in Government and politics to grow unchecked over
the years” (East New Britain Provincial Government, February 2004: 6-7).

Metaphorically speaking, recent national governments of PNG are seen as an overburdened ‘middle-man’ trying
to negotiate their way in and out of the mazes of obligatory duties and failing miserably at that. In the following
discussion on the experience of global forces such as the Bretton Woods institutions, one will form the opinion
that, not only are central governments in PNG increasingly spending more of their time and the ephemerally
‘hard-earned’ public resources in alleviating the illegitimacy caused by its successive internal inactions and
indecisiveness,68 increasingly, they have to contend with the global demands by international agents impinging
on the supposed sovereignty of the PNG State institution.

5.3 Structural Adjustment and Political Legitimacy: Global Lessons.

Since the thesis herein argues for the need to consolidate the ‘internal’ government arrangement of Papua New
Guinea by instituting a federal and autonomous provincial government system, it is worth understanding the
external powerful players who are dictating and effectively compounding the central government’s failure to be
responsive to the plight of the masses in the provinces. In all this, constituents in the provinces are left to the fate
of this “alliance of neglect” and severely lack the institutionalized mold (in the shape of a truly decisive central
government) to sustain the raison d'être of the PNG state system. In this frame of deductive analysis, it is the
following argument that the structural adjustment program in the political systems of predominantly the third
world regions of the world including PNG has had contradictory impact on the functions of the modern state.
The externally driven forces of the anarchical international system do pose questions on the very institution of
Western liberal democratic states and on the tendency towards political neglect by the central government in
fulfilling its constitutional duties. Hence the need to counter the de-legitimizing forces through a federal system
of government so that provincial governments are relatively self-sustaining instead of waiting on the central
government to dictate their existence.69

In the previous section, it was argued that federalism (where provincial governments are autonomously
facilitating their own self-sustaining existence) for PNG is seen in this discussion as an endogenous mechanism
to address increasing debilitation by exogenous forces imposed on the very legitimacy and authority of the
central government. It is suggested here then that to safe-guard the infiltration of ‘de-legitimizing’ forces on the
central government must entail the introduction of the federalism system of government. To that end, the
exogenous forces are briefly highlighted as including the unwavering preponderance of the Bretton Woods
institutions, of which Papua New Guinea has had its fair share of tutelage in the areas of reforms and significant
dictation of policy prescriptions under what is reverently preached as Structural Adjustment Programs.

The literature on the tangible manifestations of the Structural Adjustment Program agreed initially through
seemingly innocuous alliances by Third World governments with the two Bretton Woods financial institutions
point to its compounding effect on political, social and economic instability. The terms of conditionality as the
macroeconomic policy embodiment of the pervasive neo-liberal economics mandated by the rich countries of the
North, the Group of Seven (G7), are contradictory to governments’ pursuance of human welfare and political
democracy. Hence, in our time the triumphant ascendancy of Western political values and market-driven
principles in political systems symbolizing the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992) in the transformative post-
Cold War period comes into contact with a recurring contradiction in the form of the SAP. Rick Rowden (1999:
166) notes of the Western global financial institutions:

The strategy on the one hand is to have countries move in the direction of democracy, to become
more responsive and accountable to their citizens. Simultaneously, another strategy would have
governments acting over, above, and in spite of the wishes of the citizenry, specifically with the
unpopular implementation of structural adjustment plans of the Neo-liberal economic model.

68
If the deterioration in law and order is symptomatic of unnecessary challenges imposed by internal forces on the rule of
law and the authority of the State, then the budgetary allocation alone of the year 2001 has shown that the national
government spent K222.5 million in the law and public order affairs column as compared to a meager K197.7 million and
K184.1 towards education and health services respectively. See Table 2.4 in Appendix.
69
See surmised Model in the Appendix to clarify my position of the nation-state in relation to the international system.
56
In relation to Papua New Guinea, the SAP and its enforcers are the embodiment of the phase of globalization or
transformation in the world economy and the apparent subsumation of the PNG political system by the
hegemonic market ideologies will not necessarily mean that PNG will be buffeted by the forces of globalization,
rather, the challenges on the institution of state by these forces of globalization should be harnessed to give the
state system a new lease on life. One should not forget that increasingly in our time, political legitimacy is
becoming more and more an ensuing outcome of the economic criteria 70 where the state is obliged under
constitutional duty to maintain or facilitate economic growth to sustain social stability through the prompt
provision of infrastructure investments, education and health.

But the Third World experience is replete with the authoritarian and undemocratic exercise of government power
by gullible political elites who are brought under the spell of the IMF and the World Bank market-oriented
prescriptions. From Brazil71 to Western Samoa72, from Venezuela73 to South Africa74, the role of the IMF and the
World Bank in colluding with careless political leaders or pressuring Third World leaders into the inhibition of
their economic self-determination and sovereignty has been anti-democratic, since the IMF “is imposing on
these fledgling democracies mind numbing austerity programs and tax requirements their own citizens would
never accept” (Kemp, 1996).

What is further divulged is the myth that rich countries of the North are working to support the spread of
democracy in the post-Cold War world falls flat on its face when one equates the contradictory outcome of the
SAP. Internal instability in Third World countries brought about by the North-dominated IMF and World Bank
institutions show that these rich countries and their mechanisms are party to the political outcomes brought about
through these unpopular conditionalities.

These internal instabilities caused by diverging political and economic imperatives have been documented as
exacerbating internal instability as Third World governments lack the ability to deal with mounting difficulties
subsequently resorting to dictatorial control and increased repression (David 1992/93; Homer-Dixon, 1991;
Matthews, 1989). Significantly, one can draw the intuition that weakened governments would emerge where
perpetual indebtedness to authority and sovereignty by Third World governments negates their capacity to fulfill
the expected constitutional duties.

Imposition by the IMF and World Bank of the structural adjustment social policies on developing countries
seeking their aid has to be understood from the stranglehold they have on governments in relation to their
capacity to “freely adopt economic and social policies” (Leary, 1998: 266). The persuasive and influential
dominance of the free market ideology can only mean that ultimately these international financial institutions
and transnational corporations often end up having real influence over national policies (ibid.).

5.4 Structural Adjustment and the Alliance of Neglect

This analysis points to the on-going collusion between national-level political elites and the forces of
globalization vis-à-vis the PNG state. This dilemma also serves as a justification in the need for indigenous
scholarly prescriptions of a completely radical provincial government system and concurrently where the
experiences derived from analytical understanding of ‘matured’ federal political systems sets the groundwork for
the adoption of the federal agenda in Papua New Guinea. The proposition is that federalism in PNG would bear
the strong element of liberal provincialism as an antithetical to an increasingly vulnerable unitary semi-
authoritarian political system controlled by the consecutive insensitive and “unproductive” central governments.
Provincial liberalism through the federalist-autonomous agenda must be seen as restricting parasitical and
dictatorial impositions and failed leadership of central government. 75

70
Saich, 2000: 208-28
71
See R. Moffett, 1994; Bienen and Gersovitz, 1985
72
See Maiava, 1987
73
See San Francisco Chronicle, 1994; M. Moffett, 1994b
74
See Wessell, 1994.
75
See Model in Appendix for brief exposition on my point of view in relation to the justification for internal consideration
of federal and vibrant self-governing provinces.
57
Reiterating the essence of the argument, the problem of legitimacy and authority that the Papua New Guinea
State system is embroiled in has come about through the very actions and disastrous decisions of the supposed
political leaders and their successive “parochial” voters. Among the plethora of national problems, the poor
record of fiscal mismanagement of this country’s successive budgets and easy-way-out or ad-hoc government
actions (or inactions) initially brought the country to the doorsteps of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. So when the Structural Adjustments Programs were instituted for domestic acceptance, this
formally signified the alliance. And at its best it involved the interplaying of gullible and successive infantile
national political leaders and the domineering forces of global capitalthe two Bretton Woods institutions.

For Papua New Guineans to appreciate the intricacies of the international system and its relation to our current
political dilemma as a sovereign entity with a vulnerable rural population base, opponents of globalization or
more specifically, the phenomenon of global capitalism have readily pointed to the global impact of the thinking
around the “Washington Consensus”. Therein, that grandiose term emphasized “a world view pushed
aggressively by the U.S. Treasury, the IMF, and the World Bank in the early 1990s. This dictum held that all
countries should open their markets to trade, direct investment, and short-term capital as quickly as possible. The
transition would be painful, but inevitably, markets would achieve equilibrium, and prosperity would result”
(Engardio and Belton, 2000:40–45).

In the foregoing argument the IMF or Bretton Woods’ financial institution in today’s international system is
built around American hegemony of the world economy. Simply put, the IMF was fashioned by Americans to
serve American interests. Indicative of their economic and administrative power, these financial institutions
desire territory to operate whereby opening up of new markets for American interest and the reliance of the
“mother countries” of the IMF and World Bank on interest payment for debt repayment by debt-trapped
countries such as PNG.

By looking at the record of the associations by recent Papua New Guinea national governments with foreign
financial institutions, and particularly, with the conditioned policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, their
proselytizing the neo-liberal economic ideology very much typifies the phase of globalization in our time where
the less powerful state actors in the international political economy are subjected to a ‘stick and carrot approach
by global rule-makers predominantly from the affluent West. Hence, it is argued that the ensuing association by
the successive PNG governments with the IMF and World Bank’s conditions (so-called reforms agenda) saw
“the reform being driven from outside rather than from inside” (Kavanamur and Okole, 2004: 6).

In view of these uncontrollable forces of globalization, it is a matter of immediacy for a confrontationist

approach to deal with the crucial questions posed on the legitimacy and authority and indeed, the viability of the
PNG state. The obsession with the SAP is characterized by the causal effect in declining public expenditure and
social spending-the very means of the executive arm of government sustaining its legitimacy and internal
cohesion of the people of this country. As previously alluded to, the instances with the current preponderance of
the Bretton Woods’ financial institutions “are increasingly setting standards and rules that bind states and their
citizens together” (Grindle, 2000:190). So what economic globalization and the intermeshing of the world
economy are increasingly demonstrating is that the current PNG state system or government structure or
institutions predominantly of the post-colonial period or twentieth century will not survive too far into the
twenty first century without significant reform.

In retrospect, Papua New Guinea’s intimate alignment with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1989 with
subsequent solidifying of transactions has meant that PNG as a debtor nation is obliged, under strict and
demanding circumstances, to adopt economic restructuring as imposed by the IMF. Such instruments as
privatization, liberalization, austerity, and downsizing have been policy initiatives in PNG with the intention or
objective of reducing the size and scope of the government activities. Preceding the structural adjustment
package was the stabilization phase, inclusive of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy measures.
Specifically, government had to reduce government expenditure, then the kina (Papua New Guinea’s national
currency) was devalued against the US dollar by 10 percent in January 1990, restrictions were placed on
monetary policy intended to reduce the commercial banking system’s borrowing from the private sector
(Fernando and Iamo, 1992: 311).

58
The negative externalities of this strict and passive conformity by the national governments when diverting
national resources into unviable sectors (for instance, public service retrenchment exercises, debt servicing and
so forth) denied the majority of the citizenry in predominantly the rural areas appropriate funding and access to
basic services such as health care, education and agricultural extension services. The state, through its
established institution, the central government is in fact severing its moral obligation and constitutional duties to
the source of its legitimacy, the voting public. Whilst the central authority deals with the onslaught of economic
globalization and the challenges on democratic legitimacy, its juggling responsibilities of commanding or
sustaining its very existence is studiously needed in the lower levels of government where the majority of the
population is identified. As Robert Gilpin (1989: 3-4) predicted:

The world economy and the interdependencies to which it gives rise impinge directly, and at
times, significantly on [the nation-state’s] political autonomy, traditional values and social
structures. Thus, the world economy challenges what is most precious to any society’s definition
of national security, namely its political autonomy and cultural values. There is an inherent
conflict between the requirements of maintaining a well functioning international economy and
the desire of individual societies to maintain their national independence.

This being the case, the downside would undoubtedly be a de-politicized body polity. Ordinary Papua New
Guineans will or are gradually losing confidence, hope or enthusiasm in the day-to-day observance of the
purported binding rule of the state institution as the identifiable entity for the provision of welfare and public
good. So the lesson here is that for a state system with all its professed legitimate structures or institutions, the
shaky grounds it threads or the trivial responsibilities it acquires can undo its capacity to justify its existence or
raison d'être. In this discussion it is indicated that the successive PNG governments’ centralist transgressions
and free-giving proclivities to painful structural adjustments of the Bretton Woods institutions that proselytize
the neo-liberal thinking in critical public expenditure sectors of government has given impetus to the process of
de-politicization of the rural constituents and unprecedented neglect in the affairs of the provinces.

Under the structural adjustment programs, the conditionalities involve: Increasing exports which often are
agricultural /primary /raw commodities by nature with the associated problem of domestic environmental effects
of mass production and contending with discriminatory trade relations with industrialized economies; accepting
International Monetary Funds advisors; devaluation of the domestic currency; raising interest rates; privatization
and; reduced public expenditure and social programs (Lea, 2001: 194).

Being economically neo-liberalists, these measures were intertwined and subsequently have adverse and direct
effects on the most vulnerable groups in the economy. Macpherson (1990) predicted that the health of children
and women would deteriorate. In light of the demand to earn more cash through increased working hours or
work burden of women, childcare and women’s health would show negative consequences. It is fair to say that
the majority of peoples in the rural areas who constitute the overwhelming number of people in this country are
equally vulnerable and “voiceless” in this category. One can deduce the indifference of the international
financial organizations in complementing successive uncritical national governments with respect to
exacerbating disparities in the social and economic sectors of society.

Immediately following the monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy measures in January 1990, the inflationary
rise in prices of goods and services increased from 4.5 percent in 1989 to 7.0 percent in 1990. However, the
approximated measure of actual food prices by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for that period was said to have
risen by a larger 9.6 percent. Set conditions by the international lending institutions on a political system lacking
considerable accountable managerial skills saw a dramatic decrease in public spending and social programs by
the national government (ibid.). So in fact, the international financial institutions are emphasizing the doing
away with state or government’s constitutional responsibilities. 76 Either consciously intended or otherwise, the
concerns of particularly the IMF in limiting budgetary deficits have shown to have been detrimental on the

76
See Grindle, 2000: 189.
59
public expenditure and allocations on purportedly “unproductive” areas 77 as health, education and transport
infrastructure.

Moreover, the contentious issue in this relationship is the downsizing of subsidies and privatization with the
ostensible policy of “user pay”. In a political system as Papua New Guinea, the effective provision and
unwavering support of public services as education and health would be indicative of the government or state’s
concern for the welfare and prosperity of its citizenryit should be an investment in the human capital for the
human development of the country and not be seen as a recurrent or consumption aspect of the national budget.
What the user-pay does insofar as the economic neo-liberal ideology is concern is that it lessens the accessibility
of such constitutional rights to the worse-off classes. 78

The foreseeable long-term impact would be an illiterate, unproductive, neglected and marginalized body polity
with the unfortunate truth that the state or central government having a direct hand in their plight. Under such
straining circumstances, the authority and legitimacy of the national government can be tested by the frustrated
provinces who may perceive their circumstances as necessitating urgent redressing through their own initiative
at political reinforcement at the grassroots level; more specifically the provincial governments.

So what have been the lessons learnt in this alliance of neglect? The sub-optimal results of the externally driven
Structural Adjustment Program on the insecure and gullible national leaders has exacerbated the marginalization
of the grassroots levels of society, predominantly eighty-seven percent (87) of the populace in the provinces who
are one way or the other engaging themselves in small-scale cash cropping or subsistence patterns of living.

Their involvement in the national economy, national development and the entailed political power is virtually
curtailed by the so-called stabilization macro-economic policies where emphasis of the government is on the
reduction of external debt through expenditure control in the budget. There is the tendency for this measure to
have detrimental effect on the development and progress where “life-support” projects are shelved due to lack of
sufficient funds (Kavanamur and Okole, 2004: 36). Equally, the recurring cycle of debt-repayment with the
associated repercussions of stringent structural adjustment programs with submission to the IMF and World
Bank have clear and present impact on the ultimate priority of human development investments of the current
national government. It is now conventional truth that whilst the successive central governments are burdened
with problems of reducing debt deficits and appeasing their part of the deals with the IMF or World Bank
through expenditure control on the budget, there are inherent societal costs involved.

Presently, the Somare government has ‘rein in expenditure’ through across-the-board cuts to government
spending on goods and services. The cost-cutting and expenditure control exercise is disproportionate as
represented by a public service wages bill of K1.152 billion for consumption, which is 42 percent of government
recurrent expenditures with priorities in interest payments and fees of K692 million, which is a further 25
percent of available funds. The developmental and critical growth sectors of the economy (predominantly
infrastructure, agriculture, and so forth) are left for another day. 79

Reducing the deficits incurred by previous governments through their blatant negligence and outright
mismanagement of the economy is injustice to the masses of struggling citizens of this country. Table 2.4 in the
Appendix aptly illustrates the functional classification of the public priorities as recurrent public expenditure
goes. In 1999, for instance, government expenditure on the vital and nation-regulating community and social
services was at K372, 800, 000 whilst public debt servicing stood at K682, 900, 000. The differential is at a
staggering K310, 100, 000. Worse though is the fact that with the value of the kina still below the US$0.50

77
I am inclined to use ‘unproductive’ in view of the tentative flow of the budgetary allocation to such sectors. So in fact, the
very act by the national government of scaling its public funding of such ‘life-giving’ service has implicitly rendered their
short-term unprofitability. Table 2.4 in Appendix indicates that much public expenditure is concentrated in the
administrative and governance sector and debt-servicing obligations illustrating in quantitative terms the “pressing”
priorities of the National Government whilst growth-stimulating sectors as ‘transport and communication’ have received
insufficient financial attention.
78
See Curtin, T. (1997), “The Ethics for User Pays For Education in Papua New Guinea,” South Pacific Journal of
Philosophy and Culture 2, pp. 33-53.
79
Post Courier (2004) “The economy as it stands”, (August 20), p. 11-12
60
mark, convertible foreign public debt charges will consume a ‘larger chuck’ of future public expenditures that
could be used in indispensable areas of development.

Conversely too, the incomprehensive prioritizing of strategic areas such as infrastructure facilities toward
maximizing the intended export potential associated with the floatation of the Kina in the 1994-2003 period were
obvious indicators of the incomprehensive solutions of the Bretton Woods institutions in the political economy
of PNG. In hindsight, the currency floatation did not correspond with any boost in sustainable infrastructure
policy, especially the rural and provincial transport infrastructure. So the export sector and rural involvement in
the export initiatives stalled (Togolo and Manning, 2003).

Another unfortunate repercussion of wider concern to the macroeconomic stability and standard of living of the
rural poor is the “cost of doing business”. Not only are foreign investors scared by the disincentives and price
fluctuations and instability (Levantis and Manning, 2002), the average Papua New Guinean loses hope of taking
part in entrepreneurial activities lest costs and capital are beyond one’s commercial security and capacity. Hence,
we are left with an ever-increasingly frustrated lot who may pose considerable strain on the central government
if given the will and politically igniting arsenal.

The preceding are not diversions from the central issue of re-thinking the format of government and the nature of
the state in relation with its acceptance by Papua New Guineans. Reiterating the theme of this paper, the neglect
by the state of its constitutional duties and the capacity to sustain its legitimacy has deprived the provinces and
the larger population of PNG and future generations. This has been protracted by the burden of having to be
dictated upon by external forces and where the priorities of the state are less towards its citizenry than the
fulfillment of painstaking macro-level programs that are of no amelioration on the urgent plight of the majority.
Hence, the much-needed model of governing for provinces so that genuine independence and the determination
of self-reliance are inculcated.

So if the quantitative trend has a tacit message, it would be indicating some level of pessimism in relation to the
seemingly perpetuated debt-repayment obligation that future and present national governments shall inherit as a
result of past indecisiveness and poor management of the fiscal and macroeconomic plight of this country by
people at the helm. Much of what the current and future generation of Papua New Guineans will be burdened
with vis-à-vis the prioritization of fiscal policies and central government priority areas are the result of poor
hitherto central government decisions and actions (or indecisions and inactions) who knowingly or otherwise
collude with lenders to compound the legitimacy and sovereignty of PNG.

Also, the quantitative evidence have directly linked, among others, the cuts in public expenditure by the central
government to the deteriorating and significantly adverse indicators in social sectors “particularly in the remote
rural areas where such services were already at low levels” (Fernando and Iamo, op. cit.: 312). Indeed, cuts in
budgetary allocation to provincial government exacerbated the existing disparities in the areas of health,
education and transport infrastructure (maintenance of provincial road networks). 80 To think of a scenario where
the state or the central government is knowingly shirking its constitutional duties and leaving the affected
poorest where even access to private sector facilities for the provision of social services is deficient amounts to
nothing less than blatant neglect and is potentially detrimental to the internal stability and legitimacy of the state
system, where diversely competing ethno-political groups are consciously growing wary of the relatively
increasing disparities that may come to the fore.

To appreciate this argument and the role of the PNG central government in the fulfillment (or non-fulfillment) of
its societal responsibilities (within the timeframe, 1990-2003), the sudden closure of the of the revenue-
generating capacity of the Bougainville Copper Mine in May 1989 and the slump in export commodity prices
ought to be understood in their economic severity on the government’s capacity and the decisions undertaken
(Fernando and Iamo, 1992: 310). The twin disaster marked the significant loss of 20 percent of total revenue, 40
percent of export income and 8 percent of Gross Domestic Product. Further, it is safe to say that this mark in the
history of the political economy of PNG is a watershed and triggered the growing restlessness that has ever since

80
See the Case Study on Eastern Highlands and East New Britain for the level annual provincial infrastructure development
grant allocation.
61
ensued between the national “seat of power” and the provinces with the subsequent ‘alliance of neglect’ in the
form of reckless conceding81 of sovereignty to the SAP of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1990.

The Papua New Guinea state system was initiated into the ‘hard reality’ about political development in that
instant with the then incessant and unattended demands of the indigenous landowners of Bougainville which
ultimately conflagrated the reinvigorated secessionist mode. For the first time, real and organized rebellion
against the institution of state was dramatized. Ever since that decisive and trend-setting moment, the continuing
lesson which the successive national governments of PNG are failing to adjust to is that the failing PNG political
processes has not been in uniformity with the societal demands being made upon the government.

As justification for government re-thinking, this trend is not made easier with the drastic shirking of its
responsibilities. Little wonder, in some quarters, the view is “that PNG is becoming a broken-backed state”,
meaning that, “ while a government will continue in Port Moresby, funded by foreign aid and revenues from
[fast dwindling] resources development projects, its writ outside the capital will recede. Its relations with its
provinces will be shaped by fluid, ad hoc arrangements between national and regional politicians holding power,
rather than by the overarching authority of government in Port Moresby” (Aston, 1990:35).

Compounding the embattled position of the state through its central government entity to meet the increasing
demands of its citizenry, the questionable behavior of supposed public-office holders, and predominantly
national politicians has to be noted as equally degenerating of the institution of government. For instance, the
1989-90 periods saw the growing realization that the balanced budget performances of the government enjoyed
in the post-Independence was now a thing of the past as the impact on the Bougainville closure drove home the
fiscal implications for the government’s developmental promises. Correspondingly, the 1990 budget signaled
significant expenditure cuts on health, education and public work, while the National Development Fund, also
known as the MPs slush fund, was increased to K100, 000−all discretionary spending money for the MPs
electoral “business”.82

National priorities and the role of cogent policy making for targeted strategic sectors are rendered insignificant
by national politicians who are enriching themselves at the expense of a cash-strapped public coffer. Equally so,
the much abused and destabilizing provision of the no-confidence motions and the blatant disregard of
parliamentary procedures seems to be diminishing the legitimate worth and the public trust in preferred sanctity
duly appropriated for the national decision-making level of PNG.

Such scenarios nevertheless were signs of things to come in the political arena and especially, the compounding
effects of the post-1989 SAP. The stage was indeed set for the hitherto de-politicization and de-legitimization of
the state as the central government shed its roles and responsibilities in favor of short-term interests of people’s
in positions of power. Far from sounding pessimistic overtones, the apparent truth is that the “hands of man”
(Rotberg, 2003) in the decline of the state’s legitimacy can be redressed through the scholarly redefinition of the
current government institution in PNG and equally too, the political will of the masses in the provinces who
perceive their plight as necessitating alteration to a system where national government dictation has been
tantamount to the proverbial “blind leading the blind”.

5.5 Under the OLPG&LLG: Compounding the State’s Legitimacy, 1995 to date

There is a universal consensus that the one significant cause of the State losing its political legitimacy is when it
consistently neglects its constitutional responsibilities and duties toward the enhancement and is unsatisfactorily
protective of its citizen’s welfare. Increasingly, public confidence in the institutions of representative democracy
suffering enormous erosion because of government performance cannot be gauged by material standards or
economic conditions alone, but significantly too, citizens expect government to operate in an honest, competent
and efficient manner (Miller and Listhaug, 1999: 216). 83

81
By recklessly conceding PNG’s sovereignty, the gullible political elites were thinking the ‘easy way out’ to be assured of
‘bail out’ assistance in the form of long term loans.
82
The Times of PNG (1989), (previewing the 1990 budget), 1 November, cited in Aston, 1990, p. 35.
83
Worth noting are the objectives of the 1995 Reforms: to get the government closer to the people (efficiency in delivery
mechanism) and cut the purported mismanagement and corruption in the 1977 OLPG arrangement (National Monitoring
62
Morally high political standards and the obligation by public-office holders to the advancement of public
confidence in the institution of state has deteriorated badly as an absolute yardstick in determining the enabling
environment for the legitimacy of the PNG state system. Admittedly, the seemingly losing battle against the
irreparable damage on the supposed sacrilegious essence of the state is attributed to the failed duty of political
leadership and democratic representation where politicians or legislators and civil servants, manifesting poor
leadership, political instability and poor governance are held as the “direct causes of social problems faced by
PNG today”.84 It is therefore both the political leaders and equally responsible voters who put them up in the first
place that have run this country down to the point where the state institutions and structure of government has
been molded to accommodate the perversion of a supposed democratic political system. This is the premise
where the so-called PNG political elites or policy makers ought to take into account because where the
government fails to gain or sustain the right to rule, contesting internal forces, usually criminalized factions may
arise.

In this rebuilding equation, the political will and commitment in the form of central government leadership will
play the initial part in recognizing the overdue need for rehabilitating the arrangement of intergovernmental
relations. Breaking the entrenched precedent of poor governance and disrepute created by successive years of
institutionalized neglect, and patronage networking of the provincial government system through a constitutional
reform will restore the true meaning of government at the grassroots level. The question that begs to be answered
in the overall analysis of this chapter is; how would institutional legitimacy be enhanced under the federal
system? Furthermore, what would be the source of the new-found legitimacy?

Firstly, the source of the newfound legitimacy in the federal system is the people. Since the people are sovereign
it is appropriate that their consent be sought in relation to any proposed reform. The principle is derived from the
popular sovereignty exercise of public referendum where an informed populace is given the choice of voting for
or against the necessary institutional choices that are presented or ushered into the political system. The idea of
legitimacy in Papua New Guinea must therefore emanate from the proposed federalist system of government if
that arrangement is to start from a “clean slate” or a Constitutional reform articulating of the aspirations of the
masses. As sovereign people, this transformative act of reconstituting themselves as a federal polity involves
creating themselves a national people while preserving their provincial community.

For instance, it was recently demonstrated in the election of the Autonomous Bougainville Government that the
people themselves desired a change of system of government. 85 Likewise, the idea of popular sovereignty (at
least some element of it) has been demonstrated in the steps leading up to the East New Britain community
consultative committee compilation of the terms of reference for the National Executive Council to consider in
that province’s quest to negotiate for an autonomous government. In the latter, the idea was taken to the people
in a series of public consultations and extensive public awareness on the issue to gauge the views of the
electorate in relation to the idea of “realistic decentralization”.

So how is this related to the idea of federalism and the manner in which the legitimacy is enhanced? In both
instances, the common elements are that a majority of the constituency consent or are approached to make
informed choices on the desired form of government that suits their circumstances. In other words for legitimacy
to be instilled or re-kindled into the operations of government or the federated system with relatively self-
governing provinces, the involvement of the people or what is known as “direct popular initiative” must be the
foundation of that endeavor (Galligan, 1995: 26-27). In this manner of constituting government, for instance, it
may involve a series of referendum in seeking the people’s approval where the people through their vote give the
needed level of consensus and legitimacy to the system of government that would be better articulating of their

Authority, 1998). The question is, have these objectives been seriously met in the intervening period and is this
symptomatic of the diminishing constitutional responsibility of the state?
84
The National (2004), “Poor Governance is blamed for social ills”, October 4, p. 7. In the same article, Mr. Geno made
reference to the Ombudsman Commissions’ record in bringing, since 1976, sixty-seven leaders to the leadership tribunal
and subsequent prosecution. One would assume his are negligible figures when most public officeholders in the recent
documented cases have not been adequately punished and the leniency in stripping them of all their assets and banning the
guilty from public office for life.
85
It is the estimation that out of more than 170, 000 eligible voters of Bougainville, more than half of that number were not
involved in the election, presumably supporters of the self-styled Me’kamui Government of Francis Ona.
63
aspirations and the desired level of representation. Of course, initial public awareness must be made so that
informed choices are reflected in the peoples vote.

5.5.1 Failures and constraints of the OLPG&LLG decentralization exercise

In the history of the provincial government in PNG, it is perhaps fair to assert of it has lacking any
institutionalized maturity and it being emasculated under infantile political leadership and insignificant politico-
bureaucratic commitment. One could conclude that the whole exercise of decentralization in PNG has been
based on mere assumptions, trial and error guesswork, political calculations by frustrated politicians or
legislators and blatant ad hoc appeasement policy making. Some fundamental aspects can be highlighted in
hindsight of the debilitating and on-going unattended weaknesses of the 1995 Provincial Reform. It should be of
concern to us because the 1990s signaled the increasing restlessness and outward manifestations of the perpetual
challenges on the very institution of State.

The law and order deterioration, increasingly unnecessary compensation and ransom demands on the State, often
with the potential of debilitating macroeconomic-sustaining ventures by disaffected citizens, the degrading of the
political process of elections through manipulation and uncontrollable violence, the proliferation of illegal
firearms in blatant disregard or outright challenge to the supposed coercive power of the ‘sovereign’ State and so
forth are clear indications of the undercurrent of thinking that is reflective of the structural crisis of legitimacy
the successive national governments have steered the institution of State into.

One would assume then that the present climate would be experiencing significant improvements in socio-
economic and political development indicators in view of the fact that the promises of the 1995 Reforms on the
institution of government at the provincial level had the overwhelming political backing at the national level.
Certain levels of frustrations should have been quelled or the delivery system should have been resurrected, as
these were two of some of the fundamental objectives of the reform. As it been so? Far from reality!

What the OLPG&LLG has done in so far as the legitimacy and sanctity of government is concerned is to
exacerbate the existing frustrations. As a footnote, one should be wary of the fact that the OLPG&LLG of
1995an internally initiated program of the Chan government was encapsulating and in vogue with the neo-
liberal decentralist thinking of the SAP. In fact, this reform of the provincial government rode the crest of the
collaborative alliance between the IMF/World Bank and the central government (Manuhuia, 2002) and
significantly retracted the initial goal of the provincial government mechanism of 1977, which was
fundamentally aimed at political participation, and the institutionalization of a counterbalancing provincial
government system.

Purported cost-cutting measures, accountability issues and the ingrained political rivalry between provincial and
national-level politicians got the better of the system (Axline, 1993:80-2). Instead of successive national
governments boosting the technical and administrative or managerial capacity of the provincial government, 86
the institutional approach in the re-creating another dictatorial system-what is now the OLPG&LLG, was fast-
tracked without a thorough referendum or mass public input into what was a politically expedient Reform.

In fact a parliamentary Bi-Partisan Committee comprising of frustrated back-bench Members of Parliament who
were practically left powerless in matters of resource distribution under the OLPG was instituted to consider
recommendations from previous working committee to suggest a ‘better’ government system, which as we know
is the current OLPG&LLG arrangement (Axline, 1993). In light of the OLPG&LLG’s design and in part, to
appease the then compelling Bougainvillean threat of secessionism, has the exercise met its initial aims?

Therein, it purported to include: improving a rural-oriented services delivery mechanism; increasing

participation in Government at the community and local levels; decentralizing powers and responsibilities to
local levels; increasing funding to local-level governments; relocating public servants from urban centers to

86
See for instance the technical recommendations on the Report on the Financial Relationship between the National and
Provincial Governments, (Vulupindi Report) in 1982; The Review of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Papua New
Guinea, (Specialist Report) in 1984 and; The Scope for Greater Provincial Autonomy in Papua New Guinea,
(National/Provincial Working Group Report) in 1990.
64
districts and stations nearer the rural people; decreasing the number of elected politicians; and reducing
mismanagement or misuse of funds (National Monitoring Authority, 1998:2).

5.5.2. Human resource and the politicization of the OLPG&LLG

It is argued that the current reform exercise is not working due to the serous lack of qualified manpower at the
provincial and local level governments to make the system work or carry out their responsibilities with relative
efficiency and independence (Kavanamur and Okole, 2004: 30). This undoubtedly has causal effects on the
capacity of the current personnel stationed in most of the provincial and local levels of government which are
dismally inadequate to handle the complex tasks of policy actualization. Moreover, these personnel may not be
in the position to comprehend the seemingly complex nature of the OLPG&LLG that appears to have
compounded the problem of political illiteracy and segregation of mass participation as individuals are left to
their own devices to interpret the legalistic mazes of the aforementioned legal document.

The other side of the coin points to the debilitated delivery system stationed by unqualified political appointees
and third-rated personnel as working in favor of national politicians for obvious reasons of political patronage
and support base networking. In other words, people in power use this notable unprofessional lot to garner the
local cronies for their political survival, political campaigning, support networking and so forth. It is comparable
to a pool of useable resources for one’s aggrandizement or ‘empire building’. When substantial powers were
taken back by the central government, including finance and administrative powers, there appears to be no
incentives for relatively qualified people to be attached or contracted to the local-level governments and
provinces as was suppose to be the rationale with the dissolving of the provincial political government system.
Hitherto, a vacuum for independent-thinking, qualified and professional personnel exists.

Coupled with the significant involvement of national-level politicians in the bureaucracy and the provincial
politico-administrative process in the hitherto arrangement, the stage was set for their use of gullible, uncritical
and most often semi-illiterate political ‘puppets’ as their coordinates in the building of networks and support
base ‘structures’. One can deduce the corrupting outcome of the nobly intended OLPG&LLG when the
involvement of national-level politicians was not equated with significant powers and capacities for provinces to
offer incentives for qualified people and strict limitations of provincial administrations from the influence of
national-level politicians. There is reason to postulate that even qualified bureaucrats contracted to the national-
level public bureaucracy cannot be easily wooed to the provinces and district level if their professionalism is not
manifestly matched with their national MPs level of commitment and political literacy (Okole per. com. August
12, 2004).

At this juncture, there is great contention that the fluidity and ad hocism manifested in the current OLPG&LLG
arrangement give credence to the inability of the power-wielding national politicians and the national
government to relieve themselves of the their stranglehold and the exclusive responsibilities to the provinces.
This led to two academics noting the politically induced supernatural aura associated with the created position of
the Provincial Governor as one greatly contested post in the current arrangement as national parliamentarians
were allowed to sit in both the Parliament and Provincial Assembly (Kavanamur and Okole, 2004:30).

Of course, due respect is given to visionary and exceptional public office-holders in the position of the
provincial governor post. But the instances of power struggle initiated around these contentious and highly
contested post has substantive justifications for a total reorganization to prevent provincial uncertainty and
disharmony.87 Far from fulfilling the objectives of the OLPG&LLG, the national level laxity and unrelenting
entrenchment of the national politicians’ interests in the province through the institutional patronage network
tarnishes the spirit of the current reform. It goes to illustrate that all along, the 1995 Provincial reforms were
instigated for the purpose of maintaining the centralist and insecure interests of national politicians who quite
knowingly perceived the imposing challenges by provincial governments and provincial governments (under the
OLPG) on their status quo as the “rightful deliverers of development” (Axline, 1993).

87
For instance the saga in Simbu province after Fr. Louis Ambane’s death, see The National, (2004), “Time to overhaul
election of Governors” August 16, p. 18
65
In part, what is known as the District Support Grant (DSG) colloquially termed the “slush fund” has been one
contentious agenda that has found ‘fertile ground’ in the all-too-susceptible OLPG&LLG arrangement.
Normatively as the tradition of parliamentary representative democracy prescribes, it is expected of politicians
that they be the legislative or policy experts by virtue of their being voted into parliament. And as p olitical
leaders who are professedly in the position to comprehend the intricacies of societal realities, their fundamental
sphere of expertise should fall under legislation and policy; nothing else should be of their burden. And if
matters relating to the area of public administration arise, the professionalism of the civil servants to deal with
implementation processes comes to the fore.

The DSG has nullified that ‘genuine representative’ responsibility and continuously portrays the politician as the
“deliver of goods and services” or “policy implementers”, roles taken over or in recent years hijacked from
legitimate civil servants. More and more we are now seeing national politicians becoming “project managers”
and placed in precarious positions as large sums of money are now allocated towards their discretionary use for
projects in their respective electorates. 88 More often than not, these very monies are used to boost support for
coalition governments and used in the electorate to garner political support for MPsall in all corruptible in most
instances.

This very trend should raise questions about the professed credibility of national-level politicians in being
directly present in the provincial assembly 89 and whether the existing arrangement serves the political interests of
the nation-state in the long run if resources are squandered for today lavish “political games” hence,
compromising the sustainability of the future generations. But more importantly, large sums of public monies are
given to elected national leaders without due consideration of the susceptibility of these officials to
mismanagement and diversion towards personal aggrandizement and dubious support base “vote-buying”.

Retrospective analysis of the immediate years preceding the 1977 reform and the 1995 provincial government
reform however indicates the rationalist underpinning of opponents or proponents of these two significant
institutional changes based on the perceived outcomes it may bear on the survival of the political actors
concerned. For instance, the 1977 OLPG was initially met with the strongest political opposition as bureaucrats
of the self-government era (transitional period) and their ministers “whose empires were mostly likely to be
weakened by provincial governments” (Regan, 1997: 13) with the looming dismemberment of the existing
centralized state apparatus.

The conduct of the Somare government in that period to delay its political commitment to the Constitutional
Planning Committee’s recommendations for the provincial government agenda and the decision to remove
outright the constitutional guarantees for the provincial government system prior to Independence precipitated
the unilateral declaration of independence by Bougainville on 1 September 1975.

Political agents who perceived their insecure foothold on power reluctantly reinserted the relevant clause to the
constitution after Bougainville Agreement 1976 to appease secessionist inclinations. What these illustrate is the
lack of political commitment and the insecurity of shortsighted national-level politicians who have no vision in
the ideals of political institutionalization and may go a long way in inhibiting potentially beneficial government
processes.

Even the 1995 reform has shades of the early moments of the 1977 OLPG opposition by centralist and insecure,
power-hungry politicians. The assertion is that the current local-national politics has created areas for corruption
and patronage-based politics instead of linking the two levels together for developmental aims (May, 1997: 394-
395). One can only see the infiltration of the national-level politics that has been responsible for the deterioration
of political institutionalization in this country.

88
Sir Michael Somare recently proposed to increase the District Support Grant (DSG) for MPs from K500, 000 to K800,
000 in 2005. See The National (2004), “Government to hike slush fund”, October 19, p. 3.
89
The fear here is that with the entrenchment of the political linkages of national-level politicians through their provincial
and local-level government ‘cronies’, the obvious superiority of the national MPs by virtue of this predominance in the
lower levels of government can use the DSG or other nationally-derived funds to punish or reward followers and supporters.
It amounts to corrupt patronage politics for the advancement of national-level leaders. The so-called ‘Lemus structure’ in
New Ireland province is a classic example of the ‘bastardization’ of the OLPG&LLG for the politicians’ advancement.
66
Indeed, the low standard in political development set by the members of parliament in the secluded corridors of
Waigani has pervaded the lower levels of government as well with power struggles, factionalisms, and
opportunism the trend of politics in PNG. This aspect of politics is clearly attributed to the OLPG&LLG that set
a channel for national politicians to have significant dictatorial presence at the provincial and local-level without
any institutionalized counterbalancing mechanisms.

5.5.3 Infrastructure and Finance

Another countermanding attribute of the current system is its minor emphasis on the accessibility of capital
goods for public servants’ consumption or utilization and the long-term development or sustenance in the
provinces. Infrastructural support, in the form of public amenities, social services and functioning
communication, economic and transport infrastructures were inadequate to cater for the intended shift and local-
level revamp of the service delivery system and government presence through the district staff at the community
level (Barcham, 2002).

Obviously, the curtailing or retention of the financial powers by the national government through the 1995
reforms has meant that even the provinces would be limited or incapable of meeting the provision of incentives
for any committed personnel as well as basic up-keeping of fast deteriorating district-based infrastructures. Not
only were the provisions in the financial arrangement unfulfilled through the national government’s decline in
meeting its constitutionally imposed revenue-sharing duties, it seems to be perpetuating the dependency and
entrenched mentality that the national government should be the provider (Okole, 2002:11-13).

Significantly a two-pronged problem also emerged with the financial responsibility shift. The first involves the
entrenchment of the cargo mentality. This scenario is where the provincial government and the elected officials
into this arm of government are deemed as the facilitators of development. Provincial governments are in this
mould treated as institutions to draw from the state and central government (referring to financial grants) and not
as what they ought to be, the legitimate arms of government (Okole per. com. August 12, 2004).

Secondly and also related to the dependency thinking is the sense of inbred expectations that the central
government provides everything. This expectant thinking inhibits self-reliance and diminishes the purpose of
provincial government’s existence. Such entrenched thinking that the central government is the source of
providence may cause local frustrations (and direct ‘assault on the institution of State) if the latter does not fulfill
its lawful duties and commitments. Hence, it is advisable that the ideals of independence and self-reliance are
mooted under a system of government where the true nature of government is elevated to a “public ownership”
institution and where the constituents work towards its sustenance and legitimization (Okole per. com. August
12, 2004).

So contrary to the initial aims of the OLPG&LLG to improve the delivery of services, particularly in the rural
sector, relocate public servants from urban centers to districts and stations nearer to the local people, and
increase funding to local-level governments (National Monitoring Authority, 1998), the infrastructure and
financial capacity to start with was inadequate or worse, not enhanced within the intervening years of the reform.
A lot has to be asked about the genuine viability and far-sightedness of the designers of the current arrangement.
Cogently raised by the East New Britain Community Consultative Committee on Provincial Autonomy is the
classic case of chain reaction regression on the dependency on the national government’s ever-dwindling
financial support. Inhibitory as it is on the continuous sustenance of provinces (East New Britain Provincial
Government, 2004: 26-29); the fundamental step is ensuring greater provincial autonomy.

Consistency in dispensing financial grants and assistance to provinces and local-level governments, which is a
legally endowed responsibility of the national government [s. 91 and ss. 92-97] under the Organic Law on
Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments (OLPG&LLG) have been dropping. In recent years the
provincial grants fell by 22 percent in the 1998-1999 financial years alone (Barcham, 2002). Dictatorial as it is
with incomparable taxing powers (economic and financial powers) and the entailed right to dictate to the
provinces the conditions to abide by in expenditure, there is growing evidence of the frustrations of provinces. 90

90
Even some provinces resorted to taking the national government to court over the inequitable re-distributed portions of the
VAT (Value-Added Tax), now known as the Goods and Services Tax (GST). The highly publicized case by Morobe
67
Some have even dismissed the lawful formulae in distributing grants as a farce. The administrative support
grants, development grants, town and urban services grants and economic grants are designated provincial and
local-level government guarantees from the national government under the OLPG&LLG. However its timely
provision on an equitable basis needs a thorough reformation. Failing this, the responsibility should be given to
the provinces to administer their own financial development, through provincial autonomous arrangement with
subsequent self-governing fiscal initiatives.

But the whole dissipation of the ‘contract’ between the national government and the provinces in the
OLPG&LLG indicates the bureaucratic and legalistic failure of fulfilling responsibility on the part of the national
government with its apparent cumbersome and time wasting repercussions on the development or progress of
provinces. The aforementioned sources of revenue of provinces and local-level governments must pass the
political conduit within the provincial administration. The latter is in fact dominated by national politicians and
obviously one can portend the corruptive, manipulative impact it may bear on and entrench patronage network of
the national politicians. The other lawful grant portion is the District Support Grant that had the objective of
being district development-oriented. However, since its political supporters have been the MPs representing the
Districts, there is debate as to the tangible outcome and long-term impact of such a grant.

However, to this end the proposed intention of this paper is that to confront the neglect and negativity emanating
from the successive National Governments’ excesses, it is overdue that reform to the structure and nature of
government is undertaken through an autonomous-federalist arrangement. Perhaps by observing the quantitative
socio-economic performances of provincial governments, provincial initiatives and national-provincial
interactions will give us the trend of affairs and the warranting impetus for deserving provinces with the
potential and the existing political will and experience to undertake the ultimate challenge in defense of the state
institution in PNG.

5.6 Summary

In summary, on a theoretical level of justifying the need to re-think the PNG state or political arrangement of
government, the idea of federalism was illustrated in this chapter as an enforceable buffer in this era of neo-
liberalist preponderance. Given the trend of thinking that the state must cease to engage in distributional and
regulatory responsibilities, how futile would this spell for an already vulnerable PNG state with a legacy of
centralist and neglectful central governments?

The central theme of a federalist agenda in PNG with initial autonomous provincial government is to confront
the manifested challenges that presently plague the PNG state resulting in the illegitimate claims of the central
government. The belief here is that to advance in national development and external relations, the inherent chore
is to empower the internal structures of government so that the true meaning of independence as a national
political culture.

Equally so, the obsession with macro-level and central political institutions with their legacy of neglect and
quasi-authoritarianism has to be severed particularly when the national actors and institutions have not delivered.
Also, there the alliance by political elites with global actors, the reinforcement of potential undemocratic regimes
(as global experiences attests) “washing their hands” off their constitutional duties and social responsibilities are
stark realities.

As demonstrated above, the structural adjustment programs and the neo-liberal dogma as gullibly imported by
successive indecisive political elites, in the national arena of politics has resulted in the alliance of neglect. In
the long-term the struggling masses in predominantly the rural settings of PNG are left to device their own
means of bringing to the attention of the government their plight or worse still loose interest in anything to do
with government. This phenomenon of the “intangibility of the state” is taken as the current plague and the cause
of the de-politicizing trend. Together with compounding effects of the current centralist-prone arrangement of
government under the OLPG&LLG, the appropriate constitutional reform to have self-sustaining provincial
governments must be instituted.

province under Luther Wenge in 2001 comes to mind.

68
6. CASE STUDY: EAST NEW BRITAIN AND EASTERN HIGHLANDS PROVINCES

6.1 General Overview: East New Britain and Eastern Highlands provinces

East New Britain Province and Eastern Highlands Province are two provinces chosen as case studies. I will use
statistical analysis on the trend of successive budgetary allocation to the two respective provinces under
studyEast New Britain and Eastern Highlands. With this quantitative method, the rationale is to draw
justification to the end of political and socio-economic self-reliance, the incentives and untrammeled provincial
initiative inevitable under self-governing status and the fundamental question of justice in the equitable re-
distribution of the ‘hard-earned’ revenue (through derivation grants or infrastructure development grant) of
provinces to sectors that are deemed viable to their existence as relatively independent political entities.

69
It also can illustrate the parasitical and dictatorial posture of the central government in its cumbersome relations
with the provinces. The essence of analyzing these two provinces is to propose the opinion that in the
foreseeable federalist arrangement, the provincial constituents would be “seeing” the tangible impacts of their
provincial governments if the “hard-earned” outcome of provincial enterprises or initiatives would be translated
into concrete benefits for the masses in the provinces. In fact, the PNG State system with its formal trappings of
democratic institutions is of useless and negligible effect if the people are not “seeing” the physical
manifestations of their “hard work” or participation. This analysis therefore questions or is critical of the role of
the central government under the Provincial Reform and where its priorities are in relation to its relations with
the provinces concerned.

In the latter half of the 1990s, the national government’s existence and raison d'être could be stated as coming
under sever strain. On this premise it is argued that the central government’s dilemma as an agent or mechanism
of the State is self-inflicted to its long-term quest of garnering the support it ought to be commanding. In the
historical corroboration with external forces and the non-visionary political elites within its ranks, deserving
provinces in PNG where the bulk of the constituents inhabit should therefore be empowered or given the leeway
to confront the seemingly irreversible dilemma facing the institution of State. So to understand the potential
viability of the two provinces in managing their related socio-economic affairs and political establishment, the
economic preconditions and related justifications are of significance in the following analysis.

East New Britain Province, selected for its vibrant and dynamic pursuit of greater provincial autonomy is located
in the New Guinea Islands Region of Papua New Guinea. As a vocal and influential player in the autonomy
agenda, it is credible to cite the recent indicators at our disposal in trying to interpret the nagging dilemma it
faces as a political entity.

In this case study, the historic background of the experiences by the East New Britain Province in its pursuit for
provincial autonomy and federalism will be highlighted. The geographical setting and the current status of the
Province under the current Provincial Governments and Local-level Government reforms as enshrined in the
Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments of 1995 will be highlighted. And the fact
that despite the reforms, East New Britain province is still adamant that provincial autonomy and federalism is
still the way to go and is still therefore pursuing the issue as such.

Eastern Highlands Province has been selected for its great potential to have a self-governing provincial and self-
sufficient populace. Located in the Highlands Region of Papua New Guinea, the province has a well-defined
social capital and the social cohesiveness necessitating the facilitation of the masses. The Eastern Highlands
came into contact with Europeans only in the 1930s. Despite their short association with western ideas, it quickly
became part of the emerging and later the Independent State of Papua New Guinea arrangement.

It is fair to say of the Eastern Highlands as a follower when it comes to accepting the dictates that successive
national governments establish. It is the need for an internal resurgence that can bring to bear the successive
national government’s negligence. In its existence though, the continuous debilitation has been exacerbated in
recent years by the current system of government where greater functions were transferred to the provinces
without the corresponding financial resources to meet the goal of services delivery.

6.1.1 East New Britain: Geographic setting and demographic characteristics

The East New Britain province constitutes the easterly portion of the New Britain landmass, lying between 4 and
6 degrees south of the Equator with a total land area of 15, 816 sq. kilometers. It is predominantly inhabited by
the Kuanua-speaking Tolais, although other ethno-linguistic groupings make-up it’s disparate and pluralist
reputation.

Interestingly, even the boundaries of the local-level governments (LLGs) in the province are drawn along
traditional, customary and ethnic groupings so that local participation is easily facilitated or encourages
participation and beneficial to inter-communal relations. 91 It illustrates that even the internal politics of the

91
East New Britain Provincial Government, Proposed New Local Level Government Electoral Boundaries for East New
Britain, Rabaul, September 1996, p. 2.
70
province is determined by the heterogeneous groupings, hence, their aspirations for distinctive political and
administrative units. The ethic composition of that province then makes it an interesting internal provincial
process in the negotiation of the federal arrangement with the national government and other provinces in PNG.
In the case of the overall stability in the mobilization of the diverse groups in this province, it would be reflective
of maturity in the provincial integration and a precondition in any viable provincial government in the federalist
“spring-board”.

But aside from the Tolais, the Bainings, Sulkas, Tomaips and Taulils make up the remaining ethnic groupings of
people who inhabit the East New Britain province. In the composition of the major linguistic groupings in the
province according to district inhabitation, the Pomio District is inhabited by the variant groupings of Mengens,
Kols, Makolkol, mixed Nakanais and Mamusis, the Kokopo area is predominantly inhabited by Kuanua-Baining
speakers, the Pomio district comprises of groupings of the Mengen, Mamusi, Kol and Baining variants, and
Rabaul district is traditionally known as being inhabited by Kuanua, Duke of York and Bainings (Rannels, 1990:
26).

The population of the province as recorded in the 2000 National Census stands at 219, 298. Majority of the
population are rural-based as indicated in the Census records where it is estimated that about 95 percent of the
population live in the rural areas. It was further estimated that out of the total population of 219, 298, the rural
population was 209, 459.92 In that milieu, one can already deduce that given the related attributes of societal
cohesion and the strict organizational solidarity of a rural-based population, the translation of this social capital
into a politically vibrant and viable “provincial autonomy project” can be an effective facilitator of the move by
the East New Britain province if fully utilized by its political elites. Likewise, the predominantly rural-based
agriculture sector (a recurring justification for the push for greater provincial control) serves as the “engine-
room” of the province in economic terms. In fact it was estimated in the 2000 Census that over “96 percent of
households [in the East New Britain province] were engaged in growing cocoa, and about 77 percent were
engaged in growing coconut for cash”.93

And undisputedly, this aspect of the rural sector has been argued as the highest revenue-earner of the province.
But although East New Britain can boast as the “major producer of cocoa …in the last five years”, 94 the crux of
the matter is that the corresponding National Government dues, in terms of outstanding derivation grants
calculated in relation to the province’s contribution to the earnings in export have not been met. To date, the
National Government is yet to remit about K24 million to the East New Britain. 95

In this instant, the highly productive rural sector of East New Britain is said to be dealt calculated injustices by
the successive National Government and warrants the immediate responsibility of the provincial government in
the control of its internally generated revenues or revenues from its export commodities so that its predominantly
rural populace and their hard-earned revenue ends up in priority and growth-related sectors such as provincial
infrastructure and agricultural extension services.

6.1.2 Provincial administrative structure

Together with the other provinces in the country, East New Britain’s political and administrative structure under
the Provincial Government reform of 1995 saw the repealing of the 1977 OLPG provincial legislature
arrangement requiring provincial politicians to be directly elected into the assembly by the constituents in the
province. In East New Britain, as in all provinces of PNG, the OLPG&LLG creates under s 10(1) the provincial
government.

Presently, the provincial government comprises of the provincial assembly, the provincial governor, the
Provincial Assembly Committees and the joint provincial planning and budget priorities committee (JPP&BPC).
Under s.10 (3) of the same legal arrangement, the assembly comprises of the Members of Parliament from the
92
National Statistical Office, 2000 National Census: East New Britain Provincial Report, Port Moresby, December 2002, p.
5.
93
National Statistical Office, 2000 National Census: East New Britain Provincial Report, Port Moresby, December 2002, p.
61.
94
Post Courier (2004), “On the Long Road to Autonomy”, (April 13), p. 11
95
ibid.
71
provinces, the heads of all rural local-level councils and so forth. The local-level government is not a new
concept. Under the OLPG, the provincial assembly of East New Britain passed pieces of legislations called the
Local Government (Adoption) Act 1977 (No. 6 Act of 1977) and an enabling Community Government Act for
the establishment of the community governments. Under these two supporting provisions 22 community
governments (akin to the local-level government under the OLPG&LLG) were established.

The 1995 reform emphasized for the structure and institution of government to reach as much as possible the
rural and district levels of the provinces. Under the Reforms, the 22 community Governments were reduced to
18. For East New Britain, there are 4 (four) districts with their respective national representatives and 1 (one)
East New Britain provincial governor: Gazelle, Kokopo, Pomio and Rabaul and the provincial members of
parliament. In total, there are 18 (eighteen) local-level governments in East New Britain (16 rural and 2 urban
local-level governments) and a total of 370 wards. The composition of the provincial assembly as stipulated by
the Organic Law arranges that the 18 elected representatives of the Local-level governments in the province and
the 5 national members of parliament (MPs) are involved in the process of coordinating between public servants
the law-making and policy implementation processes.

This is done through the established political and administrative structure where the East New Britain Provincial
Government comprises of national-level politicians and the Presidents of the Local-level Governments plus the
appointed members of that assembly as stipulated under ss 10(3) (d), (e) and (f). In the coordination process
between politicians and public servants, the Permanent Committees and the Joint Provincial Planning and
Budget Priorities Committee (JPP&BPC) are significant provincial structures under the reform to elicit greater
bottom-up planning and the approval of rural development-oriented budgets.

In the history of the provincial government system of PNG, the relatively cohesive relationship between the
administrative and political structure have lent credibility to the maturation of political governments in the East
New Britain province. From the era of the old provincial government system under the OLPG to the current
OLPG&LLG “mature and harmonious relationship has always existed between politicians and public servants”. 96
Stability was also witnessed in the provincial public service where “Public Servants in Senior Management
positions have served all Governments” since the establishment of the provincial government in the 1977
decentralization exercise.97

6.1.3 Social and economic infrastructure

The education infrastructure in the East New Britain comprises of elementary, community and primary schools,
provincial high and secondary schools, a national high school (Kerevat National High) and tertiary institutions,
the renowned of which is the agricultural University of Vudal. In the province, as is the case in PNG, the role of
the churches in the provision of educational facilities and services cannot be overstated. The partnership between
the Catholic Church, United Churches, Seventh Day Adventists and the national education system in the
province is advantageous where the government is reluctant to provide educational services by virtue of the
sheer challenges presented on its capacity in the remotest areas of the province.

To quantify further the beneficial aspects of the collaborative service delivery mechanisms in the province, it
was in the 2000 National Census that the East New Britain province recorded impressive
indicatorsdemonstrating in part to its inherent commitment to the provision of social services and internal
consolidation of hitherto achievements. That is, the province can be taken seriously by the national government
when the fundamentals of greater provincial functions in the social services are imparted to its undertaking. So
in this discourse with its espousing the proposition that based on the capacity of provinces to be self-reliant and
relatively self-governing, the proven record or culture of provincial public service efficiency in the provision of
public services such as health and education must be taken into consideration by the national government in the
negotiating of the autonomous government system for East New Britain province.

96
East New Britain, East New Britain’s Implementation of the Provincial and Local-level Government Reforms, Office of
the Provincial Administrator, Rabaul, July 1997, p. 4.
97
ibid.
72
In provincial educational attainment, the males in the province showed that 11.4 percent had received either a
certificate diploma, degree or other related acknowledgment upon accomplishment of various levels of
education. The females of that province also scored 7.3 percent above the national average of 3.4 percent. On the
same token, the quantitative indications may give the impression that the population is relatively literate and
having a high-achieving educated populace would be receptive of processes of political or civic significance
because of the conventional knowledge that schools provide forums for community activity; and, through public
education students learn how to participate responsibly in their society (Phillpot, 2003).

Further, it was estimated that the overall population of male and female residents accounted over the national
average as far as the percentage of the literate population was concern. The literacy level among males in the
East New Britain province was recorded at 82.4 percent whilst the female stood at 80.7 percent. The national
average was 60 .2 percent and 50.9 percent for males and females respectively.

Clearly, the investment in the provincial human resource is reaping benefits. If for instance the provincial
literacy rate level is any telling indicator of the success of the provincial government’s provision of education
services, the educated and responsive populace in East New Britain province has reason to be wary of their
destiny in terms of reinforcing the greater role of the provincial government through a self-governing status. The
indications to its success are quantified using a nationally recognized yardstick and in the area of literacy (adult
literacy) or educational accomplishments can be gauged as indicative of the provincial government’s capacity
and potential to assume the responsibilities of social service delivery.

As far as funding in the education sector is concern, 98 there have been considerable increases by the National
Government allocation to areas of teacher salaries and education subsidies grants within the 1998-2002 periods.
One can also attest this to the increasingly vocal nature of the teacher’s union movement in demanding better
incentives for its members from the National Government.

However, there are glaring realties that the provincial perspective on education policy was very much integrated
into the national education reforms of the mid-1990s. This perhaps recognizes the inherent need to have
provinces operating in the best way they see the plight of their provincial priorities but complemented by the
National Government in the broader scope of realizing national agendas. The East New Britain province initially
adopted in its educational objectives until 1996 a Provincial Policy for attaining Universal Primary Education
(UPE) back in 1986. Since 1996, during the transitional period of the Provincial Government reform, the
achievements of the province included the implementation of the Tok Ples School Teacher Training Courses,
and the establishment of 159 new Tok Ples Skul (East New Britain, 1996: 22). 99

So, in the utilizing and integrating of the directions set by the current National Education Reform Policy, with
elementary school enrolments and the restructuring of the levels of primary and secondary levels of education, in
1997, a year after the provincial implementation of the national education reforms in tandem with the provincial
objective of universal education, East New Britain rated 93 percent in the country where accessibility to primary
education was concern.100

Within the 1997 period, the total number of enrollments of school-age children at the community school level
stood at 27, 609 children, indicative of the success of Provincial-National Government’s collaboration in the
policy area of education. According to the data available in East New Britain’s experience in the implementation
of the 1995 Provincial Government Reforms, in 2002, East New Britain had 61 primary schools high schools, 101
10 high schools and 4 recognized provincial vocational centers.

In terms of health services, it was estimated that in 1996, the province’s health division managed a total of 13
health centers and health sub centers and 75 aid posts. Upgrading identified health centers and aid posts to rural
hospital status and clinics were also undertaken. By 2000 in tandem with the provincial government’s promotion
98
See the Table 2.2 in Appendix for the trend in the allocation to education: teacher’s salaries and education subsidies.
99
East New Britain Provincial Government, Annual Report-1996, 1996, Rabaul (East New Britain province),
100
East New Britain Provincial Government, 2000 Budget, East New Britain Provincial Government, Rabaul, 2000, p. 6.
101
By December 13, 2004, the Provincial Education Board (PEB) had approved for five (5) new primary schools to be
opened in 2005 and for 10 feeder community schools to be merged into full primary schools with grade three to eight on the
one campus. See Post Courier, (2004), December 13, p. 9
73
of the slogan “a healthy population is a productive population”, the then Provincial Governor, Hon. Francis
Koimanrea, MP, estimated that in 3-4 villages or wards in the province, an aid post served the population in
those communities.102 That is equivalent to about 93 functioning aid posts in East New Britain if the calculations
are roughly established.

Considering the socio-economic infrastructure could not be complete without a brief examination of the trend in
the quantitative allocation of financial resources to the province. And such formulae used to calculate such
grants as provincial infrastructure grant, provincial and local-level grant, local-level grant and village services
grant and the town and urban services grant are erroneously built on the assumption that population of the
province is constant within the intervening 10 years between National Censuses. Calculating grants using the
K15 per head formulae or K20 per square kilometer is meager or at best, subject to inconsistency. It is not
surprising then that East New Britain’s share of national grants from the National Government does not show in
leaps and bounds. In part, the grants are either dwindling, inconsistent with the objectives set by the provincial
government or never transferred at all.

In the area of socio-economic infrastructure, the transfers in grants for the education and health sectors continue
to increase if the recent timeframe of 1998-2001 are any indication. However, the same cannot be said for the
transport or provincial infrastructure grant within that timeframe of analysis. For instance, the year 1998 saw the
provincial infrastructure grant at K2, 613, 600. By 2001 that aspect of the budgetary allocation was K1, 580,
400a differential of K582, 900. The amount may not seem much but with a growing population and the need to
link the rural sector of the economy to the ports, airstrips, towns or commercial centers, markets and so forth, the
investment in infrastructure is very desperately in need of being a reality to the majority of rural-based East New
Britons.

The quantitative dwindling of the recent provincial Organic law-sanctioned infrastructure grant for 2002
however was distributed to cater for Provincial Government Buildings Maintenance and Provincial Road
Maintenance in the four districts of East New Britain. 103 As Table 2.2 in Appendix indicates, the meager re-
distribution of this ephemeral grant in the district’s priority areas should be more reflective of the expanding
population and the demands of the rural populace to see the direct impact of the National Government.

Not surprisingly, infrastructure development was declared on the occasion of the 2002 Provincial Budget Speech
the Provincial Governor, the Hon. Leo Dion, as a provincial priority. Recognizing its existence as a stimulant for
growth and the quest in exercising self-sufficiency, the East New Britain Provincial Government has indicated in
its 2002 Provincial Budget committed its provincial revenue from internally raised financial resources towards a
two-pronged emphasis on infrastructure development. The programs were:

1. Maintenance and sustainability where the resources were geared towards the routine maintenance and
upgrading existing infrastructure in the province.

2. Consolidating the present status of East New Britain as a leader in infrastructure services development.
Through infrastructure revitalization and new development intervention services, the province has
committed its objectives to district-level staff and bold initiatives in the preservation and marketing of
the tourism potential of the province.104

Under the first program of maintenance and sustainability, a total of K2, 941, 000 was allocated to cater for
routine maintenance and development of major assets of the province. Another, K3, 920, 000 was expended on
upgrading and developing major district infrastructure that hitherto have not been completed or given urgent
priority. These ranged from road upgrading, sealing or completion to bridge upgrading, drainage construction
and public building renovation (classrooms, district offices, etc.).

Under the second major program of consolidating infrastructure through developing district-based with
administrative infrastructure for public servants, K850, 000 was expended for that objective alone. Being

102
ibid. p. 7
103
East New Britain Provincial Government, 2002 Budget, East New Britain Provincial Government, Rabaul, 2002, p. 20.
104
ibid. p. 23-4
74
administrative in scope, this portion focus on improving the delivery mechanism of government service to the
people and facilitate the “presence” of government in the districts. Another aspect of the second program had an
allocation of K270, 000 in financial priority. It involved the development to notable landmarks in the province
with emphasis on their tourism potential or in tandem with the tourism industry’s potential. The provincial
attractions that were included for development and maintenance were the Queens Park, Rabaul Tourists’ Sites
Development, Towangubatir Ridge Tourists’ Track and the Provincial Transit Residence.

By merely observing the trend in planning and budgetary allocations in the recent years in the East New Britain,
the emphasis has been on self-reliance and self-sufficiency where maximum financial resources and government
policies are increasingly intervening in governance and administration, growth-related infrastructure and social
development. These sectors have indeed provided the challenge for the government to “measure” its legitimacy
vis-à-vis the provincial government’s authority.105

6.1.4 Eastern Highlands: Geographic setting and demographic characteristics

The argument in this paper is that the existing social capital and the essential advantages of local initiatives can
be diverted towards an ingenious constitutional reform to elicit long-term productive developmental objectives
for the most deserving of provinces in Papua New Guinea. In my opinion then, the Eastern Highlands province
qualifies as a viable candidate for autonomous and eventual party to a federal government arrangement by virtue
of its huge potential in existing socio-economic capital and a infrastructure that hitherto macroeconomic policy
have failed to evoke into the national developmental equation. The missing link could well be the political will
and foundational cadre of consistent visionary “political engineers” or sophisticated and committed bureau-
political elite both at the national and provincial level and a receptive and politically literate populace.

In geographical terms, Eastern Highlands province strategically shares provincial boundaries with Madang to the
north, Gulf to the south, Chimbu to the west, and Morobe province to the east. Its geographical contiguity and
road link to Lae, the industrial city of Morobe province and economic conduit between the other Highlands
provinces and seaport in trade gives added advantage in its quest to be competitive in the area of commodity
export and economic self-sufficiency. Given the mountainous and rugged topographic make-up, the inherent
problem of accessibility is obviously manifested. However, the Highlands Highway is perhaps the main link, and
if the province is significantly to “trade its way” into self-sufficiency in the economic sector, the obvious
political and other autonomous powers must subsequently and justifiably be rendered to its disposal accordingly.

Eastern Highlands province is predominantly a patrilineal society with relatively peaceful people. If the social
capital of socio-cultural cohesiveness is one guarantee of a viable candidate for a self-governing party in a
federal arrangement, the observations by two analysts puts Eastern Highlands as having less problems of law and
order due to fewer alcohol problems, although the situation has been left to worsen due to the less formal and
informal jobs, the growth of rascal gangs and in the fashion of government irresponsibility, the cutbacks in
police budgets and correctional services ineffectiveness. 106 Furthermore, it is multi-lingual with around 20 local
languages, the two largest grouping of which comprises of the Gahuku and the Benabena populate the Goroka
Valley whilst to the eastern part of the province, the Kamano/Kafe and Fore speaking people are distinctively to
be found.107

In ethno-linguistic distribution according to geographical zones, the Goroka area comprises of Gahuka-Asaro,
Benabena and Siane-speaking people. To the north, the Henganofi area composes of predominantly Kamano-
speaking peoples, whilst, the easterly Kainantu area is inhabited by the Gadsup, Agarabi and Tairora-speaking
people. Lufa to the southwest has Kamano-Yagaria and Gimi-speaking peoples. Marawaka, as the southerly
region has Baruya, Simbari and Yagwola-speaking constituents. Finally, Okapa area which is situated on the
south east of Eastern Highlands is home to Fore, Gimi and Auyana-speaking people.
105
It was noted on the occasion of the passing of the 2005 East New Britain provincial budget that the provincial assembly
passed the budget “with little debate”. This indirectly shows the level of satisfaction by the constituents’ elected
representatives over the provincial government’s priorities and rule. See the Post Courier, (2004), “Works, education
receive biggest slice”, (December 21), p. 7
106
Duncan and Gupta, 2000: 134-35.
107
Uyassi, M. (1990), The Eastern Highlands, Papua New Guinea, Eastern Highlands Provincial Government, Hong Kong,
Colorcraft, p. 13
75
However, the main mode of lingual interaction is the Tok Pidgin language, which is obviously the integrative
aspect of this varying linguistic grouping in that oft geographically inaccessible province. In the face of such
internal diversity, the logical thinking is that to facilitate greater recognition of the institution of state, the
provincial avenue of political participation to elicit the ensuing legitimacy can be forthcoming if the Eastern
Highlands province is self-governing in its internal affairs.

In 2000 a total population of 432, 972 was recorded by the National Census, 108 illustrating in quantitative terms
that an annual growth rate during the intervening 1990s period of 3.6 percent. This provincial rate is
coincidentally the average of the overall population of the provinces of the Highlands region of PNG.

One can see the rate of the population growth and assume that the out-migration pattern may have had direct
linkages to a change in either the betterment in the standard of living of the population or other equally
beneficial alternatives in the lifestyle of the people. The province recorded a net out-migration of 16,436 within
the 1980-90 periods, a population loss of 0.5 percent each year. In the recent years (late 1990s) according to the
2000 Census, the inter-provincial citizen by province for Eastern Highlands recorded a net out-migration of 34,
422 within the 1990-2000 periods.109

In relation to the population density of the province as one contributing factor to the migration phenomenon, it
was estimated in the 2000 National Census that the about 4, 310 square kilometer of the land in the Eastern
Highlands is arable land. And with a population of about 432, 972, the population density would have been 100
persons per square kilometer.110

Another notable feature of the demographic spread of the province is that the population of the Eastern
Highlands is rural-based with predominantly an agrarian culture. Table 2.5 in Appendix according to the
summary indicators agrees to the fact that 94 percent of Eastern Highlanders live or reside in the rural sector.
And to this populace the means of engagement in the economy is through agricultural activities where the most
significant cash-derived cash crop being coffee features prominently in almost 97 percent of Eastern Highlands
households interviewed.

6.1.5 Provincial administrative structure

Eastern Highlands province with the implementation of the 1995 Organic Law on Provincial Governments and
Local-level Governments saw the abolition of the provincial departments under the then 1977 Organic Law on
Provincial Government. In matters administrative, the provincial administrator became the conduit between the
national department and the provincial governments. With the planning and policy-making capacity of the 1977
decentralization program under the Waigani-appointed provincial secretariat 111and though the advice or
assistance were his or her areas of competence to the provincial government, the fact that he or she was a conduit
between the national politicians and the provincial administration ensured that the interest of Waigani was still
predominantly reinforced.

The objective of the 1995 Provincial Reforms was to “decentralize administration from Waigani to the provinces
and from the provinces to the districts” (Duncan and Gupta, 2000: 143). Hence, the position of the provincial
administrator as the successor of the provincial secretariat in the 1995 Reform was allowed to be nominated
from a list of other candidates by the provincial assembly and to be endorsed by the National Executive Council
(NEC). In the new provincial government arrangement, the Provincial Administrator would be acting as an agent
108
National Statistics Office, ‘Launching of 2000 National Population and Housing Census Final Figures’, The National
(advertisement) (May 10, 2002), p.21
109
National Statistics Office, Eastern Highlands Provincial Report, Port Moresby, December 2002, p. 31.
110
ibid. p. 6.
111
The Provincial Secretary of the Eastern Highlands was until 1984, appointed from Waigani. See Stewart, R. G. (1997)
“Eastern Highlands Province 1977-1990”, in May, R. J. and A.J. Regan (eds.), Political Decentralization in a New State:
The Experience of Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea, Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing, p. 190.
76
of the national government and to report to the National Executive Council (NEC) through the Minister for Inter-
government Relations Minister on the affairs of the province.

Equally powerful was to the position of the district administrator who was responsible for the provincial-district
relations. This institutional endeavor in 1995 too was designed in such a way that the districts became the ebb of
activity in terms of national government responsibility in funding. The districts were indeed reliant on the
transfers to the provinces from the central government.

In Eastern Highlands province, the districts are Daulo, Goroka, Henganofi, Kainantu, Lufa, Obura-Wonenara,
Okapa and Unggai-Bena who have respective district administrators. In the districts are local-level governments.
The exceptions are Goroka, Kainantu and Obura-Wonenara that have two local-level governments. By January
15, 1997, there were 11 (eleven) local-level governments in the Eastern Highlands province.

6.1.7 Social and economic infrastructure

Of particular importance to the self-regulating existence of a foreseeable self-governing political entity in a

federated whole, the human resource development and literacy level would be required to be at the highest level.
If the validity of any potential self-governing entity is queried, the social and economic infrastructures are
fundamental indicators in determining that endeavor. Of concern is the state of this infrastructure under the
current powers and responsibilities under the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level
Governments (OLPG&LLG). With more functions transferred to the province, one can only anticipate that the
timely maintenance of the provincial infrastructures are met with equal commitment on the part of the national
government in the transfer of the financial resources it has collected from the province. The quantitative
indications are of the contrary.

Given that Eastern Highlands generates internal revenue at the average mark of K45 million annually, the
meager allocation under the infrastructure development grant 112 at its continuously dwindling rate is
emphatically a disincentive for future growth in the province. The other areas of concern that the provincial
government can take as a justifiable cause to its autonomy agenda are the human capital as seen in the education
and health sectors. Likewise, the infrastructure, notably the transport sector is of importance since the Highlands
Highway is perpetually the recognized link between the province and its other “neighbors”.

Firstly, education infrastructure in the Eastern Highlands province has been restructured like other provinces in
PNG. According to the education reforms, the grade levels of 1 and 2 were moved from the primary to
elementary as well as the transfer of the grade 7 and 8 levels to primary schools whilst the grades 9 and 10 level
were moved to the secondary. At the same time, there is more output in relation to the availability of secondary
schools where grades 11 and 12 are readily available. It was estimated by the Eastern Highlands Provincial
Education Advisor that around June 1999, the province had 138 elementary schools, 230 community schools, 22
primary schools (with 7 and 8), eleven high schools and four vocational schools.

Around the 1990 time period the province experienced a trend of increased enrollments by school-age children
in grades 1-6 with a percentage of 59.5 percent recorded in the 1990 Census. Even the enrollment for the
secondary education (Grades 7-10) was noted at 16.5 percent, an increase of 4.2 percent from the 1980s.
Although the quantitative analysis looks promising, the reality is that the Eastern Highlands is not adequately
reflected in the literacy levela key determinant in a responsive and knowledgeable populace or Eastern
Highlands constituency.

In the area of literacy, the provincial indicators of 2000 suggest that there are considerable improvements,
although it still hovers under or barely over the 50 percent mark. In the 1990 National Census, the rate of literacy
in the province (percentage of population aged 10 years and over) was 51. 1 percent for males and 19.5 percent
for females, the 2000 Census recorded increases where the males recorded a literacy rate of 51. 0 percent and the
female population were 36.5 percent.113 The provincial populace would therefore be more disinclined to pursue

112
In 1998 and 1999, the infrastructure development grant stood at K3, 909, 900 and K1, 670, 200 respectively. The
differential between the two years stood at K2, 239,700.
113
National Statistics Office, Eastern Highlands Provincial Report, Port Moresby, December 2002, p. 34.
77
or be receptive to the self-government agenda given that the crucial area of information dissemination and public
contentedness are bound by the level of understanding the complex world around oneself. 114

Also, the high levels of enrollment at the primary levels of education do not necessarily mean that all the
enrolled would subsequently end up with some form of educational qualifications. If the 2000 Census is any
telling factor in the educational front for an educated populace, the level of schooling children or persons who
successfully completed their education with attainment of the relevant qualifications (degree, diploma, certificate
or so forth) stands at 4.5 percent for males and 1.8 percent for females. 115 It perhaps indicates that not all who
initial enroll for primary education complete the other “higher” levels of education or better and are in a
preferably competitive position to be employed by the formal employment sector.

However, with the seeming proliferation of educational infrastructures in the province, the reality is that they are
less maintained and the level of financial assistance in the operations of these educational assets are not
consistently prioritized or taken as urgent. In the budgetary allocation, one can see the dwindling amount of
national transfers to the education services affairs as in the periods 1998-2000. It may sound ironic, but with
more responsibility and reformation to unmanageable and proliferating government services, the level of
commitment on the part of the national government towards the self-regulation of the education infrastructure in
the Eastern Highlands is wanting of a government system eliciting self-reliance.

For the health services sector, the quantitative factor of intergovernmental financial responsibilities also fails to
substantiate any legitimate claim of the national government to fulfilling its part of the Constitutional
requirements as stipulated by the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments
(OLPG&LLG). Aside from the dwindling National Government transfers in the up keeping of the health
facilities in the Eastern Highlands province, the provincial government has cited worrying trends.

For instance, even though it was recorded in the 1998 budget recurrent expenditure that 161 aid posts existed, on
the ground the fact was that some were not operating due to funding and personnel shortages or cutbacks. 116
Likewise, in 1997, 57 aid posts were closed whilst another 38 were not staffed. In 1999, the Provincial
Government closed another 45 aid posts.117

If a general assumption of the national situation concerning health and education infrastructures are to be taken
as a benchmark in understanding the national governments neglect in fulfilling its legal obligation under the
OLPG&LLG, the dwindling transfers in the 1998-2000 periods characterizes that negligence aptly. This premise
is applicable to the Eastern Highlands as much as other provinces in PNG as well and is supported in a study by
Fernando and Iamo (1992) that quantitatively shows that “cuts in public expenditure [in line with the SAP
conditions] had a significant adverse impact on the delivery of health services particularly in remote rural areas,
where such services were already at low levels”. 118 One can deduce the powerlessness in resisting the central
decision-making taking place in Waigani. In matters of life and death, the life determining services that the State
is constituted to deliver are not adequately funded or maintained on a timely basis by the urban-biased national
government.

The unfolding dilemma then points to the fact that Eastern Highland’s potential would be seen as greatly
impeded by the inconsistency and aggravated neglect in the national government meeting its constitutional
responsibility to transfer the rightful amount of funds to correlate with the planning and implementation of

114
By comparing and contrasting the impact of this factors and preconditions of the two provinces (however brief and
superficial I might be dismissed) under the discourse, it is obvious that the level of internal self-sufficiency and a track
record of provincial effectiveness must be attained. Also, the population has to be content with its present situation to
consider broader political goals such as provincial autonomy and federalism .
115
See Table 2.7 in Appendix.
116
Eastern Highlands Provincial Government, Eastern Highlands Province, Profile and Notable Events, Goroka, 11
February 1999; interview with the Provincial Health Advisor, Mr. Ben Haila, cited in Ron Duncan and Desh Gupta (op. cit.
p. 141)
117
Eastern Highlands Province, Division of Health, Five Year Health Implementation Plan 1997-2002, vol. 1, Goroka, 1997,
Annexes 1-8
118
Fernando and Iamo, 1992 Social Costs of Economic Restructuring in Asia and the Pacific, p. 312.
78
government reforms at the provincial level. 119 Looking at the trend in grant allocation to Eastern Highlands
province by the National Government, there is quantitative justification to assert that the socio-economic plight
of Eastern Highlanders in predominantly the rural sector would not be drastically improved under the current
arrangement of financial resource allocation and political power distribution.

Given the aggravated neglect in responsible transfer of legally prescribed grants and the massive cuts as shown
for instance in the 1999 Budget, where a total value of K42.6 million appropriation in 1998 was severed to under
K35 million in 1999, provinces in the caliber of the Eastern Highlands should be given the responsibility of
addressing pressing needs by using the maximum internal avenues accruable through their own hard work.
Significant too in the facilitation of the rural sector’s participation in the cash economy was the cut in the priority
area of infrastructure development grants which in the 1998-1999 periods.

This is reason enough to re-think the heavy dependence on the National Government as the uncontested re-
distributional authority under the OLPG&LLG. Also considering the level of unconditional and conditional
grants that were meant for the province at the end of the fiscal year of 1998, the Eastern Highlands Budget
Estimates figures point to an unfulfilled K4 million worth of grant still outstanding meant by law to be given by
the national government to the Eastern Highlands provincial treasury. 120

It is worth analyzing the budgetary and intergovernmental financial relations of recent years under the Provincial
Government reform to point out the contradiction of the national level of politics and its political actors. The
1995 Organic Law was in principle designed to transfer more resources to provinces by doing away with the
former Provincial Government system so that “obstructive level” would leave the target areas of the rural local-
level governments more accessible.

Although critics may say that the “determining factor appears not to be the quantum of financial resources, but
how efficiently a country allocates available resources to achieve the targets and, the degree of commitment to
the achievement of those targets”,121 it is noteworthy here that the inclusion of the district and local-level
government in the Eastern Highlands was in fact the so-called refurbishment of the delivery mechanism for the
flow of resources to the most vulnerable as was fervently argued and defended by the very proponents of the
OLPG&LLG.

It was instituted so that the supposed “target groups” in the rural people are more accessible and efficiently
reached by the provincial and national governments which has been far from realization because the national
government has failed its part of the bargain to duly and accordingly meet its part of the “transfers” requirement
and the dictatorial negligence of the National-level of decision-making.

6.2 Summary

In summary, the agenda of a federated union with relatively self-governing autonomous provinces can be the
venue for provinces who show the potential to exercise powers and responsibilities to cumulatively prosper.
Concurrently, the appropriate “middleman” status of the national government must come to the fore.

Firstly, East New Britain province has been the recurrent “hotbed” of provincial government re-thinking. Built
entirely on the economic gains of the agricultural sector, the East New Britain Province is now beginning to
question the national government’s right to control over the derivation grants as the well as the least consistent
flow of the infrastructure development grant to the growth sector of the province. As shown by the commitment
by successive generations of provincial regimes and political leaders in the province, the political culture and
provincial ideology (at the elite level) has been translated into stability over the years in the political arena. This
is crucial since the permeation of an objective at the highest level of leadership can serve as a mobilization
“tool” for the masses who may perceive their plight of institutional neglect as necessitating urgent redress.

119
Eastern Highlands Province, Division of Health, Five Year Health Implementation Plan 1997-2002, vol.1, Goroka, 1992,
p. 19.
120
Eastern Highlands Provincial Government, Budget Estimates, 1999, p. 11
121
ibid. p. 325-26
79
The Eastern Highlands province on the other hand shows potential to be politically, economically and
administratively self-sustaining as an autonomous unit in a foreseeable federated union. With a demography in
the predominantly rural agricultural sector and a strategic economic base and strategic transit point between the
Highlands provinces and the coastal provinces of the Momase region (Morobe, Madang and the Sepik
provinces), the Eastern Highlands has the inherent capacity to fully utilize its resources. However, due to its
linkages to the central government through the OLPG&LLG, there are direct manifestations of entrenched
neglect and reactive leadership by the national government in the commitment to the said legal document.

For instance in the 1999 Budget, a total value of K42.6 million appropriation in 1998 was severed to under K35
million in 1999 and significantly too, the facilitation of the rural sector’s participation in the cash economy was
impaired with the cut in the priority area of infrastructure development grants in the 1998-1999 period.

This is one reason among others to re-think the heavy dependence on the National Government as the
uncontested re-distributional authority under the OLPG&LLG. At the end of the fiscal year of 1998, the Eastern
Highlands Budget Estimates figures point to an unfulfilled K4 million worth of grant still outstanding meant by
law to be given by the national government to the Eastern Highlands provincial treasury. It amounts to illegal
and unjustified neglect and centralist-prone national governments that need to be countermanded with
appropriate autonomous arrangements for the Eastern Highlands province.

7. CONCLUSION

In the preceding exposition the critical aspects of the current system of decentralization was raised. Learned and
qualified analyses on the provincial government system abound but the realistic objective of articulating any
definite system to empower the masses is obviously not in sight. This is partly due to the political calculations by
the successive national legislators of Papua New Guinea and particularly the destabilizing effect such
institutional changes may pose on the status quo of these national politicians.

And with the inherent glamour of the present capitalist and individualist-oriented economic system on the
aspirations of calculative public office-holders and an increasingly insensitive National Government, the
problem of accountability and an active checks and balance mechanism over the excesses of public-office
holders have denigrated the true intentions of the institution of State. In Papua New Guinea, the problem is
further compounded by the fact that the seat of government and national parliament is geographically stranded in
Port Moresby where the constituents are denied by the sheer tyranny of distance in up-dating the performances
(through accessible public information and consistent appraisal) and the credibility of representatives.

To further understand the current dilemma in the decentralization exercise, it was concluded in this paper that the
national political leaders and legislators possess relatively overarching influence on the administrative and
financial systems. However, their presence in the policy and governance mechanisms of the provinces and local
level governments has not been compatible with improvement of delivery of services. Conversely though, we
continue to witness the deteriorating infrastructure in rural areas, the corrupting of the electoral system through
patronage networking and hence, the incapacity of provincial governments in mobilizing citizenry participation
towards the realization of the national goals and developmental objectives.

Therefore the thesis proposed in an intuitive manner the desirability of re-thinking the state or government
system towards the self-governing status of provinces under a federal system as a measure against the apparent

80
failure of the “tangibility of government” phenomenon that is plaguing the Papua New Guinea government
machinery. People will at some stage begin to see the physical existence and processes of government to be
active participants in the affairs of their communities.

Aside from ensuring that incentives for local mobilization are set and strengthened for provinces, the
counterbalancing of externally driven destructive forces on the existence or raison d'être of the State ought to be
enhanced. At a time when so-called “experts” and analysts are pinpointing the ineffective and dissatisfactory
track record of hitherto national governments in the fulfilling of their constitutional obligations towards the
people of this country, the questions posed in this paper were; “who” are the people of this country or supposed
subjects of the Independent State of PNG? And what are their aspirations and the desired form of organizing
themselves to elicit the maximum benefit of government? Furthermore, what are the peoples’ genuine views
concerning government and the future of their children? Will they ever see tangible manifestations of their
collective aspirations? What is the response of the PNG nation-state in the face of the increasing challenges
posed by the process of globalization on its internal capacity as a purported sovereign entity?

To this end, for PNG to be assertive in the immediate region and the global scene, the emphasis should not
exclusively be concentrated on the alien formal trappings of “democracy” which is now being obsessively
identified at the national level of political institutions (macro-institutions). Rather, the question is whether people
have a “voice” in the immediate provincial boundaries of their society where their accessibility and the relative
ease of identification are guaranteed.

In the quest to confront the forces of neglect and inherent failures of the preceding and current reform exercises,
the federal and autonomy agenda should be seen as working towards encapsulating fundamental areas of
government that the process of nation-building left unattended in the political development of the PNG State. It
has already been proposed that the central government neglect and the undoing of the provincial government
system initiatives through the collusion of national-level leadership with dominant external forces, political
patronage and mismanagement have begged questions on the viability of the State institution in PNG.

Surely after thirty years of independence and after having seen two Organic Laws purportedly passed for the
desired and appropriate forms of provincial government, there has to be a much better way for government to be
structured or organized. Irrespective of these endeavors in provincial government institutionalization (with their
noble intentions), the political nature with which the entrenchment of centralist leadership positions amongst
insecure and infantile national-level legislators has failed miserably to set the highest standards for provinces to
emulate in the overall political development of the Papua New Guinea political system.

Federalism was not suggested to be the absolute panacea for the ills of Papua New Guinea but rather considered
as an alternative system of national-provincial government relations for Papua New Guinea. Indeed, the very
existence of the PNG State and its appropriate modification to its unique societal context would be better mooted
under the guiding model or structure of the federal arrangements. Invariably, federalism as a system of
government is plurality-oriented and a better accommodating or preservative of traditional institutions of
government and principles of people rule in view of their circumstances since it embodies relative self-
government or autonomous institutions that can operate alongside the central government.

Papua New Guinea’s provinces are not short of the indigenous agents or native organizations for incorporation
in any revitalized system of government. In fact the idea of accommodating traditional organizations and
systems or values in the ‘introduced’ mechanism of government is not a new idea. It was self-evident in Albert
Murray’s period in colonial Papua (1906-40). It anticipated the creation of ‘new’ institutions in the indigenous
communities tentatively instituted “with an eye continuously turned towards native custom and practice” (Legge,
1971:36-7). So accommodating as it is, federalism as a system of local governability is intuited in this thesis as
capable of reinforcing the political interests, aspirations and common values within the local context. It would be
a case of fostering the provinces and local-level governments as bases of government by the masses in need of
seeing the physicality of that hitherto elusive institution.

Thus, ensuing that the PNG State is capable of counterbalancing the destabilization forces to its power and
authority base is fundamental in taking a contingency approach at federalism and greater provincial autonomy.
Hence, the envisaged federal political system through the reinvigorated provincial-level government system
81
would play a role in confronting the de-legitimization and the de-politicizing forces that may impinge on the
much-needed viability of the state system in the PNG context.

So under a contingent approach of federalism/autonomous provincial government arrangement, it is intuited that

fundamental aspects of tradition will be reinforced. In this case, indigenous principles or institutions of
government can be integrated into the modern notion of government. No one can deny the sanctioned provisions
for the people of Papua New Guinea “to foster the Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic
organizations as the tools for achieving the social, political and economic development of Papua New
Guinea”.122

The incorporation of tradition can only come about if the provinces are undertaking initiatives independently or
are given the legislative and administrative powers to decide for themselves and institute structures that are
reflective of their situation and indigenous initiatives instead of being dictated to by the national government
under the ostensible evocation that “national law prevails because of the national interest”. Potentially, such
legislative leeway would allow provincial citizens to institute structures or mechanism they can readily identify
with and therefore contribute towards the eliciting of authority and legitimacy.

Furthermore, the federal and autonomous system of government is better as an integrative or preservative of
traditional systems of governing or leadership. Moreover, it can utilize the exiting social capital 123 and
networking for cooperative understanding in the accomplishment of developmental goals and the legitimizing
state institutions through government ‘ownership’ exercises and perhaps the spirit of confidence and trust
throughout the whole community is enhanced. Indeed, there is incentive in realizing the fundamentally subtle
prowess and comparative advantages of the provincial inhabitants.

In the case studies concerning the two provinces of East New Britain and Eastern Highlands, the highlighted
situation was that East New Britain is one province that is still not satisfied with the current arrangement even
though it manifests strong and deserving predictability in its socio-economic affairs. Likewise, the Eastern
Highlands province was highlighted as a case study in the proposed quest for a more appropriate form of
government for its socio-economic growth. With Eastern Highland’s inherent potential to be self-sufficient with
a high performing agricultural sector and generally the realization of economic and social advancement, the
institutionalization of self-governing provincial governments were iterated in this paper as capable of eliciting
healthy inter-provincial competition and provincial-national collaboration.

On a comparative level of analysis, the case study on the performance of the Malaysian federalist political
system as indicated in the federal-state relations resembles that system of federalism which operates under the
principle of “permissive federalism”. In “permissive federalism”, the federal system is almost like a unitary
system where the state/local governments have only those powers and authorities permitted to them by the
federal government, denoting in essence the dominance of the federal government over the state governments.
The lesson learnt from the Malaysian experience is that the dominance of the executive in the national Cabinet
and the measures or political reprisals by the dominant UMNO-led coalition according to opposition political
party composition in state legislatures determines the level of collaborative assistance or otherwise to the states.

Likewise, Papua New Guinea, resembling a pluralistic society with the endowed constitutional duties and
responsibilities of the state towards enhancing the welfare of its citizenry would inculcate some degree of self-
reliance if certain levels of healthy inter-provincial competition healthy were embodied through the federalist
approach. As exemplified in the post-1997 Asian financial crisis, the less reliance by Malaysia on external
sources of financial assistance were indicative of the internal political culture of self-reliance and national
independence.

122
Gawi, Ghai and Paliwala, “National Goals and Law Reform: A Report on the Goroka Seminar”, (1976) 4 (2) Mel I. J. at
261.
123
In this discourse, social capital would be perceived as determined by two sets of issues; on the one hand the norms,
values and traditions which promote greater cooperation and on the other hand the networks, relationships and organizations
that bring people together to try and solve their own uniquely common problems as a ‘normal’ continuation from times past.
82
Malaysia was seen in this paper as providing valuable “lessons” to the foreseeable Papua New Guinea
federation. That is, the federal structure must first and foremost be flexible and reflect the particularities of its
constituent groups or regions. At the same time, for Papua New Guinea as an evolving political entity, ought to
also learn from the successes and learn from mistakes of other existing political realities. This means that rather
than being parochial or relying on trial and error decentralization exercises, relating to other political systems
can be more instructive.

Appendix

Model

Model or Illustration: depicting the concept of a ‘repellent state’ and notion of predatory forces of globalization
and impinging influence of external sources these have upon a state.

The International System

National Government

Provincial
Government

83
The model above illustrates the concept of a ‘repellent state’ where the predatory forces of globalization and the
impinging influence of external sources draw the state; comprising of the national and provincial institutions of
government into a crisis of legitimacy and questions the public utility of the state system to the effect that it is
not performing its constitutional duties toward its very citizens. It is therefore proposed that the inception of the
structural prerequisites of federal government will enhance the capacity of the lower/regional units of
government to counter the de-politicizing forces of globalization with emphasis on the subjects; the people at the
grassroots level.

Illustrations/Figures

Figure 1.a Malaysia: five year development plan allocations, 1971-2005

Sources: various Malaysia Plan documents.

84
Figure 1.b Malaysia: development allocation by State, 1976-2000

State
Sources: various Malaysia Plan documents.
List of Tables

Table 1 ― Chapter 4 Malaysia: Third World Viability of Federalism

Table 1.1 Malaysia: summary of Federal and State Government functions

85
Source: Malaysia, Constitution of Malaysia-Ninth Schedule (Article 74, 77) on ‘Legislative
Lists’

Table 1.2 Malaysia: summary of Federal and State Government revenue

86
Source: Constitution of Malaysia.

Table 1.3 Malaysia: development composite index by state, 1990, 2000 (1990 = 100)
More developed states

87
Indicator Year Total Johor Melaka Negri-Sembilan Perak Pulau-Pinang Selangor K.L

Per capita 1990 104.4 97.0 100.1 94.9 95.1 106.4 114.4 120.6
GDP 2000 133.8 128.5 131.2 126.8 127.4 140.0 133.7 154.1

Unemploy- 1990 106.2 108.0 104.6 106.6 102.2 107.6 110.0 104.2
ment rate 2000 133.2 132.5 132.5 131.8 128.4 138.0 130.4 138.7

Urbanization 1990 106.5 100.0 95.7 97.2 102.7 112.7 112.8 124.5
Rate 2000 135.9 129.1 126.0 125.0 134.4 142.9 144.4 149.3

Registered
Cars & 1990 106.6 101.2 99.0 99.7 97.9 108.6 113.3 126.4
Motorcycles* 2000 134.2 130.9 130.7 129.9 130.5 140.8 147.8 128.8

Telephones* 1990 106.6 101.2 99.0 99.7 97.9 108.6 113.3 126.4
2000 134.2 130.9 130.7 129.9 130.5 140.8 147.8 128.8

Incidence of 1990 107.2 107.3 105.1 107.9 98.3 108.5 109.6 113.5
Poverty* 2000 130.3 132.5 127.5 132.5 121.6 132.2 133.3 132.8

Piped water* 1990 108.1 101.2 108.7 105.5 104.1 112.6 110.4 114.2
2000 142.2 141.1 142.0 142.0 142.9 142.9 142.0 142.9

Electricity* 1990 105.0 99.1 107.6 106.8 99.1 106.8 107.6 107.6
2000 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9

Infant mort-
ality rate per 1990 106.0 102.5 107.1 104.3 103.4 108.9 105.9 109.7
1000 live births 2000 133.4 139.2 125.2 134.0 138.2 136.6 144.4 116.4

Doctors per
10, 000 1990 105.0 97.4 99.2 100.0 98.3 104.7 101.9 132.9
population 2000 133.4 122.6 132.1 126.0 126.3 133.9 147.4 145.5

Economic
develop. 1990 106.3 102.9 100.8 100.7 99.4 110.6 112.6 116.8
index 2000 135.5 131.6 131.7 129.7 131.0 142.1 137.3 145.5

Social
develop. 1990 106.2 101.6 105.5 104.9 100.6 108.3 107.01 115.6
index 2000 135.1 134.3 132.5 134.1 133.0 136.3 140.6 134.7

Development
Composite 1990 106.3 102.2 103.2 102.8 100.0 109.5 109.9 116.2
index 2000 135.3 132.9 132.1 131.9 132.0 139.2 139.0 140.1

Change in 29.0 30.7 28.9 2 9.1 31.9 29.7 29.1 23.9

Index

(Continued)
Malaysia: development composite index by state, 1990 and 2000 (1990 = 100) (continuation)
Less developed states

88
 Indicator year total Kedah Kelantan Pahang Perlis Sabah Sarawak Terengganu

Per capita 1990 94.6 88.3 84.3 94.2 90.1 96.3 99.2 108.2
GDP 2000 123.9 120.9 116.8 123.1 123.7 121.2 126.7 142.3

Unemploy- 1990 93.8 102.2 95.4 108.0 101.7 79.9 80.9 88.6
ment rate 2000 118.8 131.1 112.5 124.2 128.4 108.3 111.8 115.2

Urbanization 1990 93.5 92.8 93.2 91.8 90.0 93.1 95.2 98.4
Rate 2000 121.8 122.5 121.2 118.6 119.4 120.7 126.4 124.1

Registered
Cars & 1990 91.8 94.5 89.5 96.3 98.1 84.4 91.0 88.9
Motorcycles* 2000 125.4 127.9 123.8 127.8 128.5 119.6 125.6 124.2

Telephones* 1990 93.4 92.0 89.6 93.2 94.7 95.9 96.9 91.6
2000 117.8 115.9 115.4 122.4 115.9 115.9 120.1 119.0

Incidence of 1990 92.8 87.8 87.9 107.1 100.3 83.5 96.6 86.5
Poverty* 2000 115.7 115.3 107.2 127.8 115.7 105.1 125.9 113.2

Piped water* 1990 91.9 94.5 79.8 98.7 92.3 93.0 87.9 97.2
2000 131.2 141.1 115.6 136.5 138.3 111.9 137.4 137.4

Electricity* 1990 95.0 100.9 95.0 103.8 106.8 77.2 79.5 102.1
2000 128.1 135.9 135.9 135.9 135.9 107.7 109.1 135.9

Infant mort-
ality rate per 1990 94.0 100.8 103.1 98.7 97.1 71.2 87.6 99.9
1000 live births 2000 125.1 128.8 122.6 1210 131.3 113.3 140.8 117.9

Doctors per
10, 000 1990 95.0 94.7 95.3 96.1 97.2 93.3 93.6 95.0
population 2000 119.4 121.1 122.6 119.9 121.1 114.1 118.0 119.0

Economic
develop. 1990 93.4 93.9 90.4 96.7 94.9 89.9 92.6 95.2
index 2000 121.7 123.7 117.9 123.2 123.2 117.1 122.1 125.0

Social
develop. 1990 93.8 95.7 92.2 100.9 98.7 83.6 89.0 96.1
index 2000 123.9 128.5 120.8 128.2 128.5 110.4 126.2 124.7

Development
Composite 1990 93.6 94.8 91.3 98.8 96.8 86.8 90.8 95.7
index 2000 122.8 126.1 119.4 125.7 125.8 113.8 124.2 124.8

Change in 29.2 31.2 28.1 26.7 29.0 27.0 33.3 29.2

Index
Source: Third Outline Perspective Plan, 2001-2010, Table 4-8.
Note: * per 1000 population.

89
Table 1.4 Malaysia: average GDP growth rate by state, 1971-2000 (% per annum)

Sources: Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-1985, Table 5-2; Seventh
Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000, Table 5-3; Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005, Table 5-4; Third
Outline Perspective Plan, 2001-2010, Table 4-10.

Table 1.5 Malaysia: incidence of poverty (%) by state, 1970-1999

* For Peninsular Malaysia only.

Sources: Fifth Malaysia Plan, 1986-1990 (5MP), Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Malaysia Plan,
1986-1990 (MTR5MP), Second Outline Perspective Plan, 1991-2000 (OPP2), Mid-Term Review
of the Seventh Malaysia Plan, 1996-2000 (MTR7MP), Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005 (8MP).

90
Table 1.6 Malaysia: socio-economic indicators by State, 1999

# No. of deaths of infants less than 1 year old per 1000 live births, for 1998
* Excludes Multi-media Super-corridor (MSC).
Note: Figures in parentheses show ranks.

Table 1.7 Malaysia: health facilities and road density by State, 1995-1999

Note: Figures in parentheses show ranking.

Sources: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, Social Bulletin of Statistics, 2000.
Calculated from data in Department of Statistics, Malaysia, State/District Data Bank, 1999
Handbook of Statistics, Malaysia, 1999

91
Table 1.8 Malaysia: Government revenue, 1975-2001 (RM million)

Table 1.9 Malaysia: federal and consolidated state government revenues and expenditures, 1985-1999 (RM '000
million)

Sources: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various issues.

Table 1.10 Malaysia: grants to State governments, 1975-1999

* 2000 estimate
Sources: Economic Report, various issues; Federal Public Accounts, various issues.

92
Table 1.11 Malaysia: Outstanding Federal Loans to State Governments, 1996, 1998, 1999 (RM million)

State 1996 1998 1999

Johor 821 961 944
Kedah 1168 1257 1315
Kelantan 678 636 639
Melaka 372 503 574
Negeri Sembilan 678 859 992
Pahang 642 751 829
Perak 193 190 183
Perlis 120 122 175
Pulau Pinang 197 309 312
Sabah 140 231 456
Sarawak 790 862 1124
Selangor 1147 1084 1039
Trengganu 553 746 751

Sources: Federal Public Accounts, various issues.

Table 1.12 Malaysia: development allocation per capita by State, 1996-2000 (RM)

* Excludes Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.

Figures in brackets indicate ranks from highest to lowest.
Source: Calculated with data from various Malaysia Plans and Yearbook of Statistics, Malaysia.

93
Table 1.13: Malaysia: development allocation by area (RM/Sq Km) by State, 1976-2005

* Excludes Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur.

Figures in brackets indicate ranks from highest to lowest.
Sources: Various Malaysia Plan documents.

Table 2 ― Chapter 6 Case Study: East New Britain and Eastern Highlands Provinces
94
Table 2.1: Eastern Highlands provincial government revenue and budgetary allocations, 1998, 1999, 2000

Grant Type Years

1998 1999 2000
Unconditional grants
Administration grant 4,678.0 2,975.4 2,975.4
Staff grant 5,199.8 4,560.3 6,850.3
Teacher salaries 14,429.2 14,970.7 18,234.5
Church/health services (wages) 519.1 625.5 
Subtotal 24, 817.1 23, 131.9 28, 060.2

Conditional grants
Derivation grants 1,391.2 1,382.6 1,382.6
Infrastructure development grant 6,237.0 1,670.2 1,670.2
Local-level government grant 1,447.0 1,670.2 
Town & urban service grant 541.0 243.3 243.3
District support grant 2,400.0 2,000.0 
Church health services 790.0 600.0 600.0
Education services 4,000.0 3,994.2 3,994.2
Subtotal 16, 806.2 11, 560.5 7, 890. 3

Local level government 991.2 297.0 

Internal revenue 

Sales & service taxes 2,596.5 2,100.0 
Liquor licenses 90.9 50.0 
Gambling tax/licenses 563.8 600.0 
Provincial road taxes 34.2 30.0 
Hospital fees 11.5 10.0 
Court fees & fines 0.8 1.0 
Recovery from appropriations in previous years 2,149.2 5,000.0 
Other 66.8 59.0 
Subtotal 6, 233.5 8, 500.0 
Total 48, 848.0 43, 489.0 

Source: Eastern Highlands Provincial Government, Budget Estimates 1999 (adjusted February 1999), Goroka
 Appropriate data not necessary in the study

Table 2.2: East New Britain provincial government revenue and budgetary allocations, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002

95
 Grant type Budget Appropriation in K’000 (1998 – 2002)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
NATIONAL GRANTS  47, 729, 313 49, 571, 100 49, 109, 500 50, 610, 200
(Organic Law)
RECURRENT GRANTS  24, 205, 713 25, 091, 500 33, 994, 900 32, 526, 100
UNCONDITIONAL GRANTS  23, 135, 713 24, 021, 500 26, 979, 500 27, 324, 800

Staffing Grant 6, 971, 673 19, 857, 496 21, 438, 200 6, 932, 700 7, 395, 800
Administration Grant 3, 858, 438 1, 916, 300 1, 916, 300 2, 012, 100 17, 536, 500
Church Health Services Staffing 1, 418, 000 791, 000 - - 
Grant
LLG Secretariat Grant  570, 917 570, 900 570, 900 570, 800
Public Servants Leave Fares 0 0 43, 200 43, 200 
Teachers Leave Fares 0 0 52, 900 52, 900 
CONDITIONAL GRANTS 1,070, 000 1, 070, 000 52, 900 5, 201, 300
Derivation grants 1, 076, 500 1,070, 000 1, 070, 000 1, 693, 400 1, 693, 400
ORGANIC LAW 5, 347, 100 6, 067, 000 5, 067, 000 5, 322, 000 3, 507, 900
Infrastructure development grant 2, 613, 600 1,505, 100 1, 505, 100 1, 580, 400 1, 580, 400
Local-level government grant 1, 318, 700 1,505, 100 1,505, 100 1, 580, 300 1, 580, 400
Town & urban service grant 245, 600 202, 800 202, 800 252, 800 252, 800
District support grant 600, 000 1,000, 000   
Church health services 64, 200 89, 800 89, 800 94, 300 
Education services/subsidies 505, 000 1,764, 200 1, 764, 200 1, 814, 200 
Rural health services grant     98, 300

DEVELOPMENT –PIP  17, 456, 600 19, 412, 600 15, 114, 600 18, 040, 100
Gazelle Restoration Authority 17, 456, 600 19, 412, 600 15, 114, 600 18, 040, 100

PROVINCIAL (INTERNAL)  15, 670, 600 17, 900, 000 15, 620, 000 16, 789, 800
REVENUE
PROVINCIAL VALUE ADDED  9, 680, 400 11, 400, 000 9, 840, 000 9, 920, 000
TAX
VAT on Goods  6, 250, 000 6, 500, 000 5, 530, 000 5, 530, 000
VAT on Services  1, 400, 000 2, 000, 000 1, 450, 000 1, 450, 000
VAT on Alcohol  850, 000 1, 000, 000 910, 000 910, 000
VAT on Fuel  920, 400 1, 400, 000 1, 350, 000 1, 350, 000
Outstanding Sales Tax-1999  - 250, 000 100, 000 80, 000
Tax on Land Rentals and Leases  260, 000 250, 000 500, 000 600, 000

PROVINCIAL LICENCES &  1, 040, 000 1, 100, 000 1, 680, 000 1, 700, 000
FEES

Motor Vehicle Registration  700, 000 750, 000 1, 100, 000 1, 100, 000
Driving Licenses  150, 000 200, 000 330, 000 400, 000
Liquor Licenses  190, 000 150, 000 250, 000 200, 000

COMMERCIAL EARNINGS  400, 000 700, 000 700, 000 600, 000
Dividends from ENB  400, 000 700, 000 700, 000 600, 000
Development Corporation

OTHER RECEIPTS  4, 550, 000 4, 700, 000 3, 400, 000 4, 569, 800
Former Years Appropriation  4, 200, 000 4, 500, 000 3, 000, 000 3, 800, 000
Sundries  350, 000 200, 000 400, 000 769, 800

TOTAL PROVINCIAL  63, 399, 713 67, 471, 100 64, 729, 500 67, 400, 000
REVENUE
Source: East New Britain Provincial Government, East New Britain Provincial Government 2000 Budget, Rabaul
 Appropriate data was either incomplete or not available.

Table 2.3:Provincial Infrastructure Grant (an Organic Law grant) according to district programs allocation in the
East New Britain province in 2002.
96
 District Programs (2002) Allocation (in K)
Provincial Government Buildings Maintenance K635, 500

Gazelle District K140, 000

Rabaul District K120, 000
Kokopo District K190, 000
Pomio District K185, 000

Provincial Road Maintenance K944, 900

Gazelle District K310, 000

Rabaul District K155, 000
Kokopo District K179, 900
Pomio District K300, 000
Total K1, 580, 400

Source: East New Britain Provincial Government, 2002 Budget, East New Britain Provincial Government,
Rabaul

Table 2.4: Functional classification of National Recurrent Expenditure (in Millions of Kina)

97
 Affairs/Functions Actual Appropriation
1999 2000 2001
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 2, 315.9 2, 596.5 2, 917.5

GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 859. 0 853.3 981.8

Legislative and executive services 51.8 58.1 69.9
Overall planning, fiscal and financial services 64.3 66.7 71.9
External affairs 28.8 16.9 22.
Provincial governments coordination and administrative services 385.5 400.0 457.8
General personnel services 19.5 5.8 6.5
Fundamental and multidisciplinary research 2.6 2.1 2.5
Law and public order 167.2 175.4 222.5
National defense 91.7 85.1 90.4
Other general services 47.3 43.2 37. 8

Community and Social Affairs 372.8 403.7 453.4

Education services 174. 7 177. 5 197. 7
Health services 123.3 164. 5 184. 1
Social security and welfare 56.3 41.9 50.3
Housing services 0.5 0.5 0.3
Environment protection 4.4 4.6 4.2
Recreational, cultural and community relations services 13.6 14.7 16.8

Economic Affairs 122.0 125. 2 149. 4

Agriculture and renewable natural resources 33. 9 35. 4 38.1
Land administration services 5.5 5.6 9.1
Energy and fuel services 2.8 2.7 3.4
Non fuel mineral resources administration 5.1 5.2 5.0
Construction regulation and technical services 18.5 23. 0 24. 8
Transport and communication 37.7 35.1 45.3
Other economic services 18.6 18.3 23.8

Multi-Functional Expenditure 279.2 428.7 326.5

General transfers to provincial and local governments 175.4 144.6 152.6
Other multi-functional expenditure 103. 8 284. 1 174. 0

Public Debt Charges 682.9 785. 7 1, 006.4

Interest payments 383.9 375.8 393.3
Commitment fees and other borrowing related charges 8.8 5.0 16.9
Principal payments 290.2 404.9 596.3

Source: Papua New Guinea, 2001 Estimates of Revenue and Recurrent Expenditure of National Government
Departments, Volume 2 (Part 1), for the year ending 31st December, 2001.

Table 2.5: Citizen households by type and purpose of agricultural activities and sector based on the
2000 Census, Eastern Highlands province
98
Type of activity Total Urban Rural
Engaged Cash Own Engaged Cash Own Engaged Cash Own
use use use
Total activities (a) 242.408 45.8 54.2 2.857 47.2 52.8 239.551 45.8 54.2

Cocoa 0.4 56.9 43.1 1.7 55.9 44.1 0.4 57.1 42.9
Coffee 88.4 96.6 3.4 18.1 86.5 13.5 91.3 96.7 3.3
Rubber 0.2 37.8 62.2 0.8 3.3 96.7 0.2 42.8 57.2
Oil palm 0.2 27.8 72.2 1.0 31.6 68.4 0.2 26.9 73.1
Coconut 1.1 21.3 78.7 2.4 51.6 48.4 1.0 18.4 81.6
Betel nut 13.5 27.5 72.5 5.6 57.3 42.7 13.8 27.0 73.0
Livestock 47.8 10.3 89.7 11.3 28.1 71.9 49.3 10.1 89.9
Poultry 12.5 35.2 64.8 10.7 47.0 53.0 12.6 34.8 65.2
Food crops/ vegetables 76.7 15.5 84.5 49.7 21.4 78.6 79.0 15.5 84.5
& root crops
Fishing 2.6 20.2 79.8 1.6 35.9 64.1 2.6 19.8 80.2
Other 0.1 95.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 95.0 5.0

Source: National Statistics Office, Eastern Highlands Provincial Report, Port Moresby
(a) Households can have multiple activities

Table 2.6: Population by sector, sex and citizenship based on the 2000 Census, Eastern Highlands province

Area Total Citizens Non-citizen

All sectors
Persons 432, 972 431, 799 1, 173
Males 222, 851 222,221 640
Females 210, 121 209, 588 533
Urban Sector
Persons 26, 311 25, 535 776
Males 13, 984 13, 568 416
Females 12, 327 11, 967 360
Rural Sector
Persons 406, 661 406, 264 397
Males 208, 867 208, 643 224
Females 197, 794 197, 621 173

Source: National Statistics Office, Eastern Highlands Provincial Report, Port Moresby

Table 2.7: Education and Literacy (Summary indicators), Eastern Highlands province

Indicators per Citizen Population ( % per gender (Year 2000)

99
 Male Female
Attending school (% of population aged 5-29 years) 26.2 21.5
Ever been to school (% of population aged 5 and over). 45.2 33.2
With qualification (% of population 15 years and over). 4.5 1.8
Literate 51.0 36.5
Source: National Statistics Office, Eastern Highlands Provincial Report, Port Moresby December 2002.

Table 2.8: Citizen population by district, East New Britain province

District Census Figures

2000 1990
East New Britain (provincial total) 219, 298 184, 364
Gazelle 89, 625 na
Kokopo 57, 913 46, 696
Pomio 44, 888 28, 870
Rabaul 26, 872 108, 798

Source: East New Britain Provincial Government, 2000 Budget, East New Britain Provincial Government,
Rabaul, 2000.

Table 2.9: Population by sector, sex and citizenship-East New Britain province, 2000 Census (in
thousands)

Area Total Citizen Non-Citizen

All Sectors 880, 532 877, 192 3, 340
Persons 220, 133 219, 298 835
Males 115, 704 115, 135 569
Females 104, 429 104, 163 266
Urban Sector
Persons 10, 290 9, 839 451
Males 5, 579 5, 288 291
Females 4, 711 4, 551 160
Rural Sector
Persons 209, 843 209, 459 384
Males 110, 125 109, 847 278
Females 99, 718 99, 612 106

Source: National Statistical Office, 2000 National Census: East New Britain Provincial Report, Port Moresby, December
2002.

Interviews: Dates and Personalities

1 Thursday, August 12, 2004

100
 Discussion with Dr. Henry Okole, Lecturer in Political Sciences at the University of Papua New Guinea

2 Mr. Daniel Aloi (informal and undocumented communication)

3 Mr. Ngen Isana (informal and undocumented communication)

Questionnaires
1 From your own experience, what have been the inhibiting factors in the relatively ineffective record of
decentralization?
2 As one proponent or knowledgeable in the forefront of the provincial autonomy agenda, where do you
think the current system of decentralization is not functioning (please relate to the political aspect of
intergovernmental relations)?
3 What would be the ‘best’ political and administrative structure or model of a self-governing entity or
autonomous government?
4 In your opinion, what would be the exclusive roles and responsibilities of an autonomous provincial
government?
5 Would you want the powers, roles and responsibilities to be explicitly articulated in Constitutional write-
up, as is the current situation under the OLPG&LLG?
6 In mind of the latter (# 5), what would be the likely role of a national government under an arrangement
of provincial government autonomy?
7 Based on your own opinion, would the autonomy arrangement be on a PNG-wide scale or as a
constitutionally designated ‘earned right’ to deserving provinces?
8 With the obvious problem of political illiteracy or lack of access to politically oriented information by
the masses, what immediate actions do you think are feasible to make the autonomy agenda a public
issue (question of public ownership) where the people can take sides through a referendum or popular
mandate through votes?
9 As a foreseeable integrative mechanism of the traditional structures or institutions in a society of diverse
ethno-cultural groupings, would you wan the varying traditional systems of politics formally
institutionalized as part and parcel aspects of the modern state system within the autonomous provincial
arrangement?
10 Before I conclude, are there any comments you would like to make or areas that I have not covered
which you would like to comment on?

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