FRANCISCO A. LABAO, vs. LOLITO N. FLORES, et. al.

G.R. No. 187984

November 15, 2010

FACTS:

The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective
Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor. Respondents
were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation,
Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. Each of the
respondents had a monthly salary of ₱7,020.00.

On July 27, 2004, the petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security
guards to submit their updated personal data files, security guard professional
license, and other pertinent documents by July 30, 2004 for reevaluation in
connection with the SMPSA’s new service contract with the NPC-MRC.

When respondents failed to comply with the petitioner’s directive the petitioner
relieved them from NPC-MRC duty and ordered them to report to the Senior
Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new assignments.

Respondents filed individual complaints with the Iligan City Sub-Regional

Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
illegal dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed
when they were not given new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite
repeated requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for new assignments. The
complaints were consolidated.

The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal. They
countered that the respondents’ relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of
its management prerogative.

Labor Arbiter (LA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua dismissed the consolidated

complaints for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It noted that the
respondents’ relief was in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the
best interest of the business enterprise since SMPSA merely exercised its
management prerogative and discretion to protect its business interest.
the CA set aside the NLRC resolution, finding that the respondents were
constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for more than
6 months

ISSUE:

whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition despite its late filing,
and in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions.

RULING

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should
be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a
speedy disposition of their case.

In the present case, the respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight
(28) days late from Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29,
2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should not suffer for Atty.
Plando’s negligence in failing to inform them of the September 29, 2006
resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their December
6, 2006 notice.

The Court cannot sustain the respondents’ argument that they cannot be bound by
Atty. Plando’s negligence since this would set a dangerous precedent. It would
enable every party-litigant to render inoperative any adverse order or decision of
the courts or tribunals, through the simple expedient of alleging his/her counsel’s
gross negligence.

The Court finds that the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition for
certiorari despite its late filing. The NLRC resolution was already final and
executory, and the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except to order
its dismissal.
The present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside. The decision of the Labor Arbiter was
reinstated.

ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113296
January 16, 1998

FACTS:

On October 6, 1980, a complaint for a sum of money attorney’s fees and damages
was filed by petitioner before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Davao City. The pre-trial was conducted by Judge Pacita Canizares-Nye
and later by Judges Alejandro Siazon and Cristeto Dinopol. During the trial on
November 20, 1984, Judge Renato Fuentes heard the evidence for petitioner and
private respondent, but the latter’s cross examination on August 28, 1985 and the
presentation of the parties’ rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences were heard by Judge
Roque Agton, having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When the judiciary was
reorganized under the Aquino administration, Judge Agton was transferred to
another branch of the Regional Trial Court, 3 (RTC) but within the same Judicial
Region. Meanwhile, Judge Romeo Marasigan, who assumed office on February 3,
1987, 4 was assigned to Branch XVI.

Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent’s motion

for extension of time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 decision penned by
Judge Agton was rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent moved to
reconsider said decision, but the same was denied in an order dated March 1, 1988,
issued by Judge Marasigan.

Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified Judge
Agton’s decision on the ground that at the time he rendered the judgment, he was
neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of RTC Branch XVI, and
correspondingly remanded the case to the lower court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid.

RULING

It is a rule that a case is deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the rules, or by the court. Records
disclose that this case was submitted for decision sometime on March 1987 after
the parties’ submission of their memoranda as required by the court, at which time
Judge Marasigan was already presiding in Branch XVI. Thus, the case was
submitted for decision to Judge Marasigan and not to Judge Agton who by then
was already transferred to another branch. Judge Agton’s decision, therefore,
appears to be tainted with impropriety.

The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by the
death, resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. To
remand a validly decided case to the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch XVI, as
what the CA suggests, would only prolong this rather simple collection suit and
would run counter to the avowed policy of the Court to accord a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition for every action.

The appealed decision of the CA is set aside and the decision of Judge Agton is
reinstated.
 CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72873
May 28, 1987

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land
registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the
Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share
of the herein petitioners by way of absolute sale. One year later, Eustaquia Padua,
his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated
"Con Pacto de Retro Sale."

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them.
The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a
part of the enclosed area.

Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. However, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.

The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had
lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in
1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the
law.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that the notice required
by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute.
ISSUE:

Whether or not there was correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law
as invoked by both petitioners and the private respondents.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the present petition appears to be an illustration of the Holmes
dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue
against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their
co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for
redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The
complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and
fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends
to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.

The Court cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware
of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. . The purpose is
clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. The Court are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.

The petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is reversed and that of
the trial court is reinstated.
 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ
G.R. Nos. 99289-90
January 27, 1993

FACTS:

On May 13, 1991, an information was filed against petitioner, Miriam Defensor-
Santiago with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of
the accused fixed at P15,000.00. The petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion
for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago.

The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond

for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance. May 15, 1991,
petitioner filed a cash bond.

Petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance. Meanwhile, in a resolution, the
Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner. The hold departure
order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for
the United States to accept a fellowship.

The petitioner argues that Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering
that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and that the
hold departure order in the was issued under disturbing circumstances which
suggest political harassment and persecution.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
herein petitioner?

(2) Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

RULING:

(1) The Court find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of
her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond
for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and
other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is
posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said
motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of
said court.

(2) The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public
statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher
studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan
in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in
thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She
holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court.
She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency
of the case.

The Court discern in the proceedings of the case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who
initiate recourses before the Court, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our
judicial system by seeking relief directly from the Court despite the fact that the
same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. The Court ruled that
this practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of the Court but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
It therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that the Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts
or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG v. HON. ACHILLES MELICOR

G.R. NO. 140954
April 12, 2005

FACTS:

Private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed Balane,
filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of
Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog (Bertuldo for brevity). They
alleged that, they own a parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol,
sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said
property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light
materials at a nominal annual rental of P100.00 only, considering the close
relations of the parties; after the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded
the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but
Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property.

Private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from the premises of the subject
property and restore upon themselves the ownership and possession thereof.
Bertuldo filed his Answer, and alleged ownership of the disputed property by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On November 18, 1997, private
respondents rested their case. Thereupon, Bertuldo started his direct examination.
However, on June 24, 1998, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and
nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to
specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct
docket fees.

The petitioners filed before the Supreme Court the present Petition
for Certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case
to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency.

RULING:

The Supreme Court noted the procedural error committed by petitioners in directly
filing the instant petition before the honorable Court for it violates the established
policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.

The Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is

shared by the Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.

In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling

circumstance analogous to any of the above cases has been adduced by the
petitioners so as to justify direct recourse to this Court. The present petition should
have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine
on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of
the petition at bar.

Thus, while the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation, the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards which were left
for determination by the court or as may be proven during trial would still be
subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It
would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees.
The Court ruled that the petitioners utterly failed to show that the trial court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. On the contrary, it
acted prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA
G.R. No. 174385
February 20, 2013

FACTS:

On March 14, 2005, Indigo Distribution Corporation and thirteen other petitioners
filed before the respondent judge a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction against
the Honorable Secretary of Finance, et al. The petition sought to nullify the
implementation of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334, otherwise known as
"AN ACT INCREASING THE EXCISE TAX RATES IMPOSED ON
ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 131, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED," as unconstitutional.

The lower court petitioners are importers and traders duly licensed to operate
inside the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SSEFZ).

Congress enacted, in 1992, R.A. No. 7227, otherwise known as "The BASES
CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1992," which provided, among
others, for the creation of the SSEFZ, as well as the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). Pursuant to this law, the SBMA granted the lower court
petitioners Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption. The certificates
allowed them to engage in the business of import and export of general
merchandise (including alcohol and tobacco products) and uniformly granted them
tax exemptions for these importations.

Congress passed R.A. No. 9334. Based on Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, the SBMA
issued a Memorandum directing its various departments to require importers in the
SSEFZ to pay the applicable duties and taxes on their importations of tobacco and
alcohol products before these importations are cleared and released from the
freeport.

The memorandum prompted the lower court petitioners to bring before the RTC
their petition for declaratory relief with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or a TRO to enjoin the Republic (acting through the
SBMA) from enforcing the challenged memorandum.

The respondent judge granted on August 11, 2005 the private respondents’ motions
and complaints-in-intervention. The Republic moved to reconsider the respondent
judge’s August 11, 2005 order, arguing that it had been denied due process because
it never received copies of the private respondents’ motions and complaints-in-
intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent acted with manifest partiality and with grave abuse
of discretion when he issued the orders.

RULING:

The Court disagrees with the private respondents’ procedural objections.

First, we find that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period.
Contrary to the private respondents’ position, the 60- day period within which to
file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republic’s receipt of the July 5,
2006 order denying the latter’s motion for reconsideration.

Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed require that
recourses should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher
courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of exceptions under well-
defined circumstances.

Lastly, under our rules of procedure, service of the petition on a party, when that
party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and is not binding
upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard that
may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice
manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case.
Procedural rules can bow to substantive considerations through a liberal
construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
In the present case, records show that the OSG had never received – contrary to the
private respondents’ claim – a copy of the motions and complaints-in-
intervention. The Republic duly and fully manifested the irregularity before the
respondent judge.

While we may agree with the private respondents’ claim that the matter of
intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, what should not be
forgotten is the requirement that the exercise of discretion must in the first place be
"sound." In other words, the basic precepts of fair play and the protection of all
interests involved must always be considered in the exercise of discretion. Under
the circumstances of the present case, these considerations demand that the original
parties to the action, which include the Republic, must have been properly
informed to give them a chance to protect their interests.

The Court grants the writ of certiorari and accordingly set aside the orders of
respondent Judge Ramon S. Caguioa for being null and void.

The Supreme Court dismissed the prayer for writ of prohibition on the ground of
mootness.