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Buatlah analisis untuk kasus dibawah ini dan berikan jawaban untuk pertanyaan yang disertakan.

The Dearth of Ethics and the Death of Lehman Brothers

Many believe the beginning of the end for Lehman Brothers was when Washington repealed the
Glass-Steagall Act. This landmark legislation from the Great Depression separated the interests of
commercial and investment banks, preventing them from competing against each other (2) and
protecting their balance sheets by allowing each sector to focus on the business and transactions
that it did best. For investment banks, that typically meant highly liquid, asset-light portfolios,
leaving commercial banks to handle capital-intensive portfolios, including real estate or corporate
investments. Additionally, the act insulated the economy from mass collapse in the event of one
sector’s failure by preventing the other from being dragged down in tow. But in 1999, President
Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act into law, allowing commercial and investment banks
to compete head-to-head for the first time in 60 years (2). The arms race that ensued would prove
disastrous for Lehman Brothers, the financial community, and the global economy at large.

With the repeal of Glass-Steagall, Lehman Brothers became a key player in the United
States housing boom. From 2004 to 2006, Lehman Brothers experienced a 56 percent surge in
revenues from real estate businesses alone (1). The firm recognized profits from 2005 to 2006, and
in 2007 it reported a record net income of $4.2 billion on revenues of $19.3 billion. In the same
year, Lehman Brothers’ stock reached an all-time high of $86.18 per share, giving it a market
capitalization close to $60 billion (1). This proved exceptional to the surrounding climate,
however, and the housing market began to show signs of a pending bubble burst.

In March 2007, the stock market experienced its biggest single-day plunge in five years,
while the number of mortgage defaults simultaneously rose to the highest percentage in almost a
decade. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers’ most comparable Wall Street rival, experienced the total
failure of two hedge funds in August. Despite rapidly deteriorating marketing conditions, Lehman
Brothers continued writing mortgage-backed securities and touting its financial strength to the
press and shareholders while decrying the notion that domestic and global economies were in
danger. Meanwhile, its operations were reckless, as illustrated by its $11.9 billion in tangible
equity and $308.5 billion in tangible assets on balance sheets in 2003 that yielded a leverage ratio
of 26 to 1. Four years later, its $20 billion in tangible equity and $782 billion in tangible assets
sent its leverage ratio skyrocketing to 39 to 1 (4). Even with storms brewing in every direction,
Lehman Brothers failed to trim its portfolio of high-risk, illiquid assets, and when crisis erupted in
2007, Lehman Brothers had missed its chance. Instead of acknowledging this misstep, executives
took internal action to preserve a rosy façade.

By means of deliberate accounting sleight-of-hand, concealment, and communication of

misleading information, until 2008 Lehman Brothers maintained the appearance of underdog
success to the investment community. The primary means by which Lehman Brothers disguised
its distress was through implementation of what was known to insiders as “Repo 105.” This legal
but shady accounting device helped create favorable net leverage and liquidity measures on the
balance sheet, which was key for credit rating agencies and consumer confidence. By utilizing
Repo 105, Lehman Brothers raised cash by selling assets to a behind-the-scenes phantom company
called Hudson Castle, which appeared to be an independently run organization but was actually
controlled by Lehman Brothers executives. In accordance with Repo 105 terms, assets were sold
to Hudson Castle and repurchased between one and three days later (3). Because the assets were
valued at 105 percent of the cash received, GAPP accounting rules allowed the transactions to be
treated as sales, thus removing the assets from Lehman Brothers’ balance sheet altogether.

Under the direction of Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan and the certification of Chief
Executive Officer Richard S. Fuld, Jr., Lehman Brothers applied this technique at the end of the
first and second fiscal quarters of 2008 to transfer a combined total of $100 billion, amending its
leverage ratio from 13.9 to a far more favorable 12.1. Thanks to creative accounting and clever
public relations, Lehman Brothers was able to report a positive view of its net leverage, including
a $60 billion reduction in net assets on the balance sheets and a deep liquidity pool. Each of these
quarterly balance sheet spins was intended to offset the effect of announcing — for the first time
in years — a loss of $2.8 billion from write-downs on assets, decreased revenues, and losses on
hedges (1). Application of Repo 105 allowed Lehman Brothers to avoid having to report selling
assets at a loss.

During the bankruptcy investigation, the company’s global finance controller admitted
that, “there was no substance to [Repo 105] transactions (5).” Fuld, Callan, and their respective
teams concealed the use of this tactic from ratings agencies, investors, and the board of directors.
The one party in on the scheme was Ernst & Young, Lehman Brothers’ audit firm, which failed to
alert either internal or external parties to the manipulation that was taking place, even when
explicitly questioned. They could not maintain the illusion for long, however, and in September
2008, Lehman Brothers’ situation finally came to a head.

On September 10, 2008, just three months after reporting second-quarter successes,
Lehman Brothers announced that its supposedly robust liquidity amounted to approximately $40
billion, but only $2 billion constituted assets that could be readily monetized. The remainder was
tied up on so-called “comfort deposits” with various clearing banks, and though the firm
technically had the right to recall said deposits, the validity of Lehnman Brothers’ work with these
institutions was questionable at best (2). By August, the deposits had been converted into actual
pledges.

A few months prior, Fuld began coming to terms with Lehman Brothers’ negative outlook.
In a last-ditch effort, he made a public offering that yielded $6 billion in new capital for the firm.
However, by the by the time third fiscal quarter financial statements were due, Lehman Brothers
was projecting additional losses of $3.9 billion. Its stock price had plummeted to $3.65 per share,
a 94 percent decrease from January 2008. Fuld announced a plan to spin off the majority of the
company’s real estate holdings into a new public company, but there were no prospective buyers
(Holdings, Inc.). On Sept. 13, the United States Treasury made it clear that Lehman Brothers would
not be the recipient of bailout money. Instead, a number of financial institutions, including
Barclays and Bank of America, were being encouraged to acquire the faltering company,
invigorate it with much-needed capital, and bring it back from the edge of collapse (3). Each
potential acquiror declined. On Sept. 15, 2008, Fuld admitted defeat and finally heeded private
advice from Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr. At 1:45 a.m., he filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, just before the opening of Asian markets (1).

In the days following the largest bankruptcy filing in United States history, the American
market experienced a shock unlike any it had felt since the Great Depression. When the domestic
stock market opened on Sept. 15, the Dow Jones dropped 504 points. The following day, Barclays
agreed to buy Lehman Brothers’ United States capital markets division for the bargain price of
$1.75 billion. Meanwhile, insurance giant AIG was on the verge of total collapse, forcing the
federal government to step in with a financial bailout package that ultimately cost $182 billion (3).
On Sept. 16, the Primary Fund announced that due to its Lehman Brothers exposure, its price had
plummeted to less than $1 per share. The ripple effect of Lehman Brothers’ failure was widespread,
giving rise to a confidence crisis in global banks and hedge funds. Credit markets froze, forcing
international governments to step in and attempt to ease concerns. Domestically, this resulted in
the controversial passage of the Trouble Asset Relief Program, a $700 billion federal rescue aid
package, on Oct. 3, 2008 (5).

Finally, Ernst & Young, the only third party privy to the happenings at Lehman Brothers, failed to
reveal the extensive steps taken by executive leadership to conceal financial problems. As a firm
of certified public accountants expected to honor and uphold an industry-wide code of ethics, Ernst
& Young may be accused of being responsible for gross negligence and lack of corporate
responsibility. Why would such a highly respected organization risk its own reputation and turn a
blind eye on behavior that is clearly unethical? Obviously Lehman Brothers was a sizeable (and
presumably lucrative) client of the firm. But past scandals involving questionable accounting
observances, such as Enron, have demonstrated firsthand that inaction is as equally reprehensible
as direct involvement in the scheme itself. More than just a paycheck was at risk, and failure to act
successfully discredited Ernst & Young on the basis of ethical and industry standards.
 As an accounting firm, Ernst & Young is charged with certifying that companies deliver
accurate and reliable information to shareholders. In this regard, Ernst & Young failed completely,
as executives were aware of behind-the-scenes bookkeeping and the extent to which it was
occurring. In this situation, concern for ethical behavior was of minimal or nonexistent concern.
Therefore, the company’s shareholders were deliberately deceived for the purpose of preserving a
paycheck, and in that regard, the team of accountants who chose not to act disappointed more than
just their company; they let down the entire industry and each of the right-minded professionals
within it.

The story of Lehman Brothers’ demise is unfortunate, and not just because its collapse
meant the end of a Wall Street institution. The real tragedy lies in the lack of ethical behavior of
its executives and professional advisors. They made conscious decisions to deceive and
manipulate, and the consequences proved too dire to preserve the historic investment bank’s
existence. The perennial lesson of the Lehman Brothers case is that no matter how dire the
circumstances may appear, transparency and accountability are paramount. Right action up front
may sting initially, but as history has repeatedly shown, gross unethical business practices rarely
endure in the long term. A global financial crisis such as that of 2008 may not be prevented from
happening again. What can be improved, in large measure through ethics education, is how
corporations behave. Wall Street should take note of the case of Lehman Brothers to ensure history
does not find a way to repeat itself.

Instruksi:

Jelaskan fakta-fakta dari kasus hukum dan keterlibatan akuntan publik (kantor akuntan) pada kasus
tersebut diatas.

Sumber : Case Study: The Collapse of Lehman Brothers.” Investopedia.com. 2 Apr. 2009. Web.
26 Nov. 2011.

Jawaban :

Aliran dana kredit dari berbagai bank terhenti dan bank tidak percaya satu sama lain.

Kepercayaan perbankan merosot tajam. Akibatnya, perusahaan-perusahaan raksasa yang

sudah berusia di atas 100 tahun, seperti Lehman Brothers pun ikut bangkrut. Menyusul

General Motors, perusahaan otomotif terkemuka di dunia yang genap berusia 100 tahun
September tahun 2008, juga telah meminta persetujuan otoritas bisnis AS untuk

dibangkrutkan.

Pada 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers meminta perlindungan atas kebangkrutan

sesuai Bab 11 Undang-undang Kepailitan AS. Kewajiban utang Lehman Brothers terhadap

bank dinyatakan sejumlah 613 miliar dolar AS. Dimana sebesar 155 miliar dolar AS utang

obligasi. Sementara total asset Lehman Brothers yang dimiliki hanya sejumlah 639 miliar

dolar AS.

JP Morgan Chase & Co dan Citigroup meminta tambahan penjaminan sebesar 21

miliar dolar AS ketika Lehman mulai terguncang. Laporan itu menyebutkan, pada 11

September 2008 JP Morgan meminta tambahan jaminan 5 miliar dolar AS. Permintaan

jaminan oleh para kreditor Lehman berdampak langsung terhadap likuiditas Lehman. Ini

menjadi penyebab utama kebangkrutan Lehman.

Selain itu, Auditor Ernst & Young sebagai auditor keuangan Lehman Brothers juga

dinilai lalai, dan melaporkan hasil audit palsu soal keuangan lembaga keuangan terbesar dan

bergengsi di AS tersebut.

Selain permintaan tambahan kolateral, penumpukan aset Lehman Brothers juga dibuat

terpusat pada kredit kepemilikan kredit rumah bermasalah. Sehingga ada kasus penyesatan

informasi yang material dalam akuntansi Lehman.

Menurut laporan Auditor Ernst & Young, tersirat bahwa Lehman menggunakan

rekayasa akuntansi untuk menutupi utang sebesar 50 miliar dolar AS di pembukuannya.

Semua itu dilakukan untuk menyembunyikan ketergantungan dari utangnya. Para pejabat

senior Lehman, juga auditor mereka Ernst & Young, sadar akan tindakan ini.
 Tidak hanya itu, mereka juga menyinggung kemungkinan gugatan hukum terhadap

mantan pimpinan Lehman, Dick Fuld, juga pejabat keuangan Lehman, eksekutif Lehman

lainnya seperti Chris O'Meara, Erin Callan, dan Ian Lowitt. Perusahaan itu dituduh telah

melakukan skandal akuntansi. Itulah mengapa pemerintah Amerika Serikat tidak membail-

out Lehman Brothers, karena aktiva lehman lebih banyak berbentuk derivatif.

Berdasarkan deskripsi kasus diatas dapat dianalisa bahwa KAP Ernst & Young telah

melakukan pelangaran kode etik profesi akuntan publik. Dia dengan sengaja melaporkan

hasil audit palsu soal keuangan Lehman Brothers. Dia mengetahui bahwa Lehman Brothers

menggunakan rekayasa akuntansi untuk menutupi utang sebesar 50 milliar dollar AS di

pembukuannya, yang semua itu dilakukannya untuk menyembunyikan ketergantungannya

dari utang dan KAP Ernst & Young tahu akan tindakan Lehman Brothers. Bukan itu saja,

Ernest & Young tahu bahwa sebenarnya para eksekutif dari Lehman Brothers salah

melakukan penilaian bisnis untuk memanipulasi neraca perusahaan tetapi dia tetap

mengeluarkan opini audit wajar tanpa pengecualian sehingga tidak terdeteksi adanya krisis

di dalam perusahaan Lehman Brothers.Ernst & Young dan Lehman Brothers melakukan

skandal tersebut dengan sadar dan tahu akan akibat tersebut.

Berdasarkan teori Arens, terdapat 5 prinsip dasar etika profesional, yaitu:

1. Integritas

2. Objektivitas

3. Kompetensi profesional dan kecermatan

4. Kerahasiaan

5. Perilaku Profesional
 Berdasarkan analisa diatasdapat disimpulkan, kode etik profesional yang dilanggar

KAP Ernst & Young adalah sebagai berikut:

1. Integritas dan Objektivitas

Aturan Etika Profesi Akuntan Publik (IAI,20000.1-20000.6) menjelaskan bahwa

dalam menjalankan tugasnya, KAP harus mempertahankan integritas dan

objektivitas, harus bebas dari benturan kepentingan dan tidak boleh membiarkan

salah saji material yang diketahuinya atau mengalihkan pertimbangannya kepada

pihak lain. Auditor harus terus terang dan jujur serta melakukan praktek secara

adil dan sebenar-benarnya dalam hubungan profesional mereka. Sedangkan

objektivitas yaitu di mana para auditor harus tidak berkompromi dalam

memberikan pertimbangan profesionalnya karena adanya bias, konflik

kepentingan atau karena adanya pengaruh dari orang lain yang tidak semestinya.

Pada kenyataannya auditor tersebut tidak jujur dalam melakukan penilaian

laporan keuangan Lehman Brothers dimana pada kasus tersebut, sebenarnya KAP

Ernst & Young mengetahui bahwa perusahaan menutupi utang sebesar 50 milliar

dollar AS, tetapi auditor jelas-jelas terbukti menutupi fakta tersebut dan

melakukan skandal dengan kliennya, yaitu Lehman Brothers.

2. Perilaku Profesional

Para auditor harus menahan diri dari setiap perilaku yang akan mendiskreditkan

profesi mereka, termasuk melakukan kelalaian. Pada kasus ini,KAP Ernst &

Youngjustru melakukan skandal dengan Lehman Brothersperihal laporan

keuangan yang telah dimanipulasi, di mana skandal tersebut telah

mendiskreditkan profesi mereka dan KAP Ernst & Young dinilai tidak
 mempunyai perilaku profesional dalam menjalankan tugasnya oleh pelaku bisnis

yang akan menyewa jasanya sebagai auditor.

3. Kepentingan Publik

Auditor harus memegang prinsip kepentingan publik, dimana auditor

berkewajiban untuk senantiasa bertindak dalam rangka pelayanan kepada publik,

menghormati kepercayaan publik, dan menunjukkan komitmen atas

profesionalisme. Pada kasus ini, KAP Ernst & Young dianggap tidak memenuhi

prinsip kepentingan publik di atas, karena terdapat pihak-pihak di luar perusahaan

yang merasa dirugikan atas hasil opini auditor tersebut, dimana pada laporan

keuangan tersebut, menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan dalam keadaan yang baik.

Tetapi pada kenyataannya, KAP Ernst & Young mengetahui bahwa terdapat

masalah dalam perusahaan tersebut, dan KAP justru bekerjasama dengan

perusahaan dan malah melakukan kebohongan kepada publik.