Exclusive

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980

Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines

[Give Words in a Statute Their Usual and Commonly Understood Meaning]

FACTS:

Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte is the daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte, who have been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Herein petitioner and her
Uncle, Hector Alfon, has been residing at Yulo Street crner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for
twenty-three years. Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte filed a verified petition praying that her
name be changed to Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the
petition: she has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; she has been enrolled in the
grade school and in college using the same name; she has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon
since her infancy and all her friends and acquiantances know her by this name; and she has exercised
her right of suffrage under the same name. However, the trial court partially denied invoking Article 364
of the Civil Code which provides that “Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition of Estrella S. Alfon, praying for the change of her name, be allowed

Ruling:

Yes, the lower court should have fully granted the petition. The only reason why the lower court denied
the petitioner’s prayer is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should
principally used the surname of her father invoking Article 364 of the Civil Code. The Court held, albeit
that the word “principally” as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there
is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of his mother to
which he is equally entitled. Therefore, there is ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not
whimsical but on the contrary, is based on soldi and reasonable ground, that is to avoid confusion.

Doctrine:

The words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.
Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one
daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return
to her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their
daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan.
When he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a certification that
respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which
could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on
the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)

ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.

HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be
affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining
custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal
interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and
promote welfare of children.

Shall
Baranda vs. Gustilo

GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered
by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both
parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found that
the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate
of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the
Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void,
cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of
a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new
certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for
reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?

HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that the
notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals.
The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances,
instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any legal
standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.

If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of his
right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD
117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for
registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register
of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of
Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”

The Director of Lands, Petitioner Vs. Court of Appeals and Teodoro Abistado,
substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado, Respondents.

G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997

Facts: Teodoro Abistado, private respondent, Filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
square meters of land under P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. During the pendency of the case, Teodoro Abistado died and was
substituted by his children - Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
who were all represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, ad litem ( act in which a lawsuit has a
representative in behalf of children not capable of representation.)

Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction in compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of initial public hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. Records
show that applicants failed to comply with P.D. No. 1529 Section 23 (1) requiring publication of notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
Initial public hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which granted the application and ordered the
registration of title to Teodoro Abistado, since publication in a newspaper of general Circulation is
merely procedural, hence dispensable. The Director of Land, represented by the Solicitor General,
elevated this case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of Notice of Initial hearing in a
Land Registration Case is mandatory.

Held: Yes. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 shall be followed requiring a publication once both in the Official
Gazette and newspaper of general circulation. The Land Registration Case is an in Rem proceeding,
meaning the applicant must prove his title over the land against all persons concerned, who might have
interest to right in the property and should effectively be invited in the court to prove why the title
should not be granted.

Such provision used the term "shall" which indicated that it is mandatory.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation,
or equivocation, there is room only for application.

Thus. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition for registration of
Land Title to the respondents.

When “shall” is construed as merely permissive:

Diokno vs Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case Digest

Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation

G.R. No. L-4712 (July 11, 1952)

FACTS:
Petitioner, the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304, sought to compel
Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His basis
was Sec. 2 of RA 304, which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions
owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or
discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain
specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this
particular section of the law is merely directory. The lower court sustained Respondent company.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.

HELD:
No. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word “shall” is imperative. However, the rule is not
absolute; it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.
The modifier, “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years.”, the interest to be
charged, that the verb phrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the
legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the
holders, for whose benefit the same have been issued, can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for
discounts. But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made, the context and the sense
demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to
the condition of the availability of loanable funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the
acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds.” In other words,
acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds.

Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099. February 21,1995)

16APR
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL
ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents
Ponente: QUIASON

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent
incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed
to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of
execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President
thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the
President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD:
NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

RATIO:
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to
the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer
therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed
order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have
used more direct language expressive of such intention.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and old laws.
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“May”