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Persons and Family Relations 2019

Persons Exam 3 Cases Family Code

Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
Romero vs Singson prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
FACTS petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
• The parties herein — Consolacion Domingo-Romero
efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
and Rosario Domingo and Engracia Domingo-Singson
— are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject
Domingo, own a 223-square-meter piece of property. of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
It appears that Consolacion and Rosaria and their other
siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the actual • The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise
occupants of the subject property, having stayed there should be resolved in respondent’s favor. True, no suit
with their parents since birth. On the other hand, Engracia between members of the same family shall prosper unless
took up residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married. it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
• On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
Felicidad died on September 14, 1997. made. However, the failure of a party to comply with
this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.
• Title to the property passed to Engracia by virtue of a
If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a
notarized “Absolute Deed of Sale” ostensibly executed
motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.
on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and
Felicidad — as sellers, and Engracia — as buyer. And
this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad were then
Moreno vs Kahn
already deceased.
FACTS
• Soon thereafter, Engracia sent letters to her siblings
• Jose Moreno alleged that since May 1998 and in their
demanding that they vacate the subject property, under
capacity as lessees, he and his family have been
pain of litigation.
occupying two (2) parcels of land (subject lands) co-
• Consolacion and Rosario and their other siblings just as
owned by his full-blooded sister, Consuelo Moreno Kahn
soon filed a Complaint against Engracia for annulment and
Haire and his nephews and nieces, Rene Kahn, Rene
cancellation of Engracia’s title to the property and the June
Luis Pierre Kahn, Philippe Kahn, and Ma. Claudine Kahn-
6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages.
McMahon (respondents).
• On September 26, 2006, Engracia filed an unlawful
• Around April or May 2003, through numerous e-mails
detainer suit against Consolacion, Rosario, and her
and letters, Consuelo, et al. offered to sell to Jose the
brothers Rafael and Ramon before the MeTC.
subject lands for the amount of US$200,000.00
• The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Engracia. Upon
(US$120,000.00 to be received by Consuelo and
appeal to the RTC, which initially affirmed the MeTC ruling,
US$20,000.00 each to be received by her children), which
and after a Motion for Reconsideration of the original RTC
Jose accepted. Notably, the agreement was made
decision, the RTC dismissed the ejectment case for
verbally and was not immediately reduced into writing, but
substantive reasons, while acknowledging that Engracia
the parties had the intention to eventually memorialize the
failed to make a verified complaint that earnest efforts
same via a written document.
toward a compromise has been made in accordance with
• Over the next few years, Jose made partial payments to
Article 151 of the Family Code.
Consuelo, et al.
• The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated
• However, in July 2010, Consuelo decided to "cancel"
the initial decision of the trial court, affirming the MeTC
their agreement, and thereafter, informed Jose of her
decision.
intent to convert the earlier partial payments as rental
payments instead. In response, Jose demanded that
ISSUE
Consuelo, et al. proceed with the sale, which the latter
• Is dismissal of the case proper since no attempt at
ignored.
compromise was made by Singson based on Article 151 of
• He then claimed that on July 26, 2011, without his
the Family Code?
consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their
shares over the subject lands to Rene, thereby
RULING
consolidating full ownership of the subject lands to him.
Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a demand letter
to Rene, and later on to Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and
Claudine, asserting his right to the subject lands under
the previous sale agreed upon.

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• As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the
matter to the barangay lupon for conciliation
proceedings between him and Rene only, since
Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are all living
abroad.
• As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was
constrained to file the subject complaint for specific
performance and cancellation of titles with damages
and application for temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction.
• In an Order dated January 18, 2012, the RTC motu
proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for
failure to allege compliance with the provision of
Article 151 of the Family Code which requires earnest
efforts to be made first before suits may be filed
between family members.
CONTENTION (Jose)
• The RTC cannot motu proprio order the dismissal of
a case on the ground of failure to comply with a
condition precedent, i.e., non-compliance with Article 151
of the Family Code.
• Article 151 does not apply to the instant case,
contending that while Consuelo is indeed his full-
blooded sister, her co-defendants namely his
nephews Rene, Luis, and Philippe, and niece Claudine
are not considered members of the same family as
him and Consuelo.
ISSUE
• Was the motu proprio dismissal proper?
• Does Article 151, FC, apply?
RULING
• In this case, a plain reading of the records shows that
the RTC ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint
even before Consuelo, et al. have filed a motion or a
responsive pleading invoking such non-compliance. As
such ground is not a jurisdictional defect but is a
mere condition precedent, the courts a quo clearly erred
in finding that a motu proprio dismissal was warranted
under the given circumstances.
• Even assuming arguendo that Consuelo, et al. invoked the
foregoing ground at the earliest opportunity, the Court
nevertheless finds Article 151 of the Family Code
inapplicable to this case. For Article 151 of the Family
Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively between
or among "members of the same family." Once a
stranger becomes a party to such suit, the earnest
effort requirement is no longer a condition precedent
before the action can prosper. (Hiyas Savings and Loan
Bank, Inc. vs Acuña)
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Family Code
Article 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and
descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters,
whether of the full or half-blood.
• In this light, case law states that Article 151 of the
Family Code must be construed strictly, it being an
exception to the general rule. Hence, any person
having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff
other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the
Family Code is considered a stranger who, if included
in a suit between and among family members, would
render unnecessary the earnest efforts requirement under
Article 151.
• In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and
Consuelo are full-blooded siblings; and (b) Consuelo is the
mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine, which make
them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then
follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are
considered "strangers'' to Jose insofar as Article 151
of the Family Code is concerned.
• In this relation, it is apt to clarify that while it was the
disagreement between Jose and Consuelo that directly
resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact remains that
Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully
impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s complaint as they are
co-owners of the subject lands in dispute.
• In view of the inclusion “strangers" to the suit
between Jose and Consuelo who are full-blooded
siblings, the Court concludes that the suit is beyond
the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce,
the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing Jose's
complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest effort
requirement therein.
O’Laco vs Co Cho Chit
FACTS
• A parcel of land at Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz, Manila was
bought by Emilia O'Laco as vendee, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale in the latter’s name.
• On 17 May 1960, spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O
Lay Kia learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco
sold the same property to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila for P230,000.00, with assumption
of the real estate mortgage constituted thereon.
• On 22 June 1960, said spouses sued spouses Emilia
and Hugo Luna to recover the purchase price of the
land, asserting that Emilia O'Laco knew that they were
the real vendees of the Oroquieta property, and that
the legal title thereto was merely placed in Emilia’s name.
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They contend that Emilia O'Laco breached the trust when
she sold the land to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila.
• The CA ordered Emilia and Hugo to pay Valentin and O
Lay Kia.
CONTENTION (Emilia and Hugo)
• Emilia and O Lay Kia are half-sisters. The case should
have been dismissed since Valentin and O Lay Kia failed
to allege in their complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise were exerted.
ISSUE
• Is dismissal of the complaint proper because of a lack of
allegation that earnest efforts at compromise were made?
RULING
• No, dismissal is not proper.
• Admittedly, the present action is between half-sisters.
Consequently, there should be an averment in the
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made. Hence, the defect in the complaint is
assailable at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal, for lack of cause of action.
• But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint
to correct the defect if the amendment does not
actually confer jurisdiction on the court in which the
action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was originally
within that court's jurisdiction. In such case, the
amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the
complaint, thus may be allowed.
• While Valentin and O Lay Kia did not formally amend their
complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce
evidence purporting to show that earnest efforts
toward a compromise had been made, that is, O Lay
Kia importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the
transfer of the title of the Oroquieta property in the name
of spouses O Lay Kia and Valentin Co Cho Chit, just
before Emilia's marriage to Hugo Luna.
• But, instead of transferring the title as requested, Emilia
sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila. This testimony was not objected to by Emilia
and Hugo. Hence, the complaint was deemed
accordingly amended to conform to the evidence.
• Indeed, if the defendant permits evidence to be
introduced without objection and which supplies the
necessary allegations of a defective complaint, then
the evidence is deemed to have the effect of curing
the defects of the complaint. The insufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint is deemed ipso facto rectified.
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Guerrero vs RTC of Ilocos Norte
FACTS
• Gaudencio Guerrero filed an action for an accion
publiciana against Pedro Hernando.
• It was dismissed by the RTC of Ilocos Norte judge, Luis
Bello, on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-
law the complaint should have alleged that earnest
efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
• Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties
exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise and that the
same failed. However, Hernando apparently overlooked
this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to
dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his
answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial
conference, that the relationship of Guerrero and Hernando
was noted by Judge Bello, Jr., they being married to half-
sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof
Judge gave petitioner five (5) days “to file his motion and
amended complaint” to allege that the parties were very
close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and
that the complaint to be maintained should allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but
failed. Apparently, Judge considered this deficiency a
jurisdictional defect.
CONTENTION (Guerrero)
• On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7
December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity
are not members of the same family, he was not required to
exert efforts towards a compromise.
• Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from
raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor
assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
ISSUE
• Are brothers by affinity considered members of the same
family with regard to the requirement of efforts at
compromise?
• Is the absence of an allegation of such efforts a ground for
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction?
RULING
On Brothers by Affinity as Family
• The instant case presents no occasion for the application
of Article 151 of the Family Code.
• As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v.
Gayon that the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as
members of the same family does not comprehend
“sisters-in-law.” In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion
emphasized that “sisters-in-law” (hence, also “brothers-in-
law”) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family
Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of “members
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of the family,” we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence
on the matter.
• Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of Hernando, was
required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
before filing the present suit.
On the Requirement of Allegation of Efforts at Compromise
• In O’Laco v. Co Cho Chit, the attempt to compromise as well
as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing
of a suit between members of the same family, the absence
of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at any
stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action.
• It is not therefore correct, as Guerrero contends, that
Hernando may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid
defect in failing to move to dismiss or raise the same in the
Answer.
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. vs Acuña
FACTS
• On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private
respondent) filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the
spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending
that he did not secure any loan from Hiyas Savings, nor did
he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that
his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas Savings and the
spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage;
that he could not have executed the said contract because he
was then working abroad.
• On May 17, 2001, Hiyas Savings filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that Alberto failed to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. Hiyas Savings contends that since
the complaint does not contain any fact or averment that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to
its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack
of cause of action.
• Alberto filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with
Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He
argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member
of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest
efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff
before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to
dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the party-
defendants are not members of his family the ground relied
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upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and
unavailable.
ISSUE
• Does lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise become a
ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction when other parties
who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit?
• Can a stranger to the family invoke lack of earnest efforts
toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint?
RULING
On Earnest Efforts Toward a Compromise as a Ground for
Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
• In Magbaleta vs Gonong, the case involved brothers and a
stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the subject
property. The Court ruled that:
o It is neither practical nor fair that the determination
of the rights of a stranger to the family who just
happened to have innocently acquired some kind
of interest in any right or property disputed among
its members should be made to depend on the
way the latter would settle their differences among
themselves.
• Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit
involving members of the same family, the law no longer
makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be
made towards a compromise before the action can
prosper.
• Hiyas Savings makes much of the fact that the present case
involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case
between brothers. However, the Court finds no specific,
unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in
Magbaleta inapplicable to suits involving a husband and his
wife, as in the present case.
• In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code is clear that
the provisions therein apply to suits involving “members of the
same family” as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family
Code.
On the Invocation of Lack of Earnest Efforts toward
Compromise
• Hiyas Savings also contends that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
the former, not being a member of the same family as
Alberto, may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of
the Family Code.
• Since the Court has ruled that the requirement under
Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases
which are exclusively between or among members of the
same family, it necessarily follows that the same may be
invoked only by a party who is a member of that same
family.
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Patricio vs Dario III
FACTS
• On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was
survived by his wife, Perla G. Patricio and their two sons,
Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino
G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building built
thereon.
• On August 10, 1987, Patricio, Marcelino Marc and Dario
III, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Accordingly, a certificate of title was issued in the names of
Patricio, Dario III and Marcelino Marc.
• Thereafter, Patricio and Marcelino Marc formally advised
Dario III of their intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Dario III refused to
partition the property hence Patricio and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
• In the CA proceedings, the appellate court decided in
favor of Dario III and acknowledged Dario IV as a minor
beneficiary of the family home.
ISSUE
• Is Dario IV considered a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Family Code in order for the family home to be exempted from
partition?
RULING
Family Code
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
(223a)
Article 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living
in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for
legal support. (226a)
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a)
• To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites
must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
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enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support
upon the head of the family.
• Dario III’s minor son, who is also the grandchild of
deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
• Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of Dario III and grandson
of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death
of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
• However, as to the third requisite, Dario IV cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has
parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability
for legal support falls primarily on the parents, especially his
father, herein Dario III who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support
upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and
only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents.
• Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing
in the family home and his being a descendant of
Marcelino V. Dario, Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he
did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his
own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age.
Modequillo vs Breva
FACTS
• On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the
Court of Appeals:
o Judgment is hereby rendered finding the
defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and
Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to
plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth.
• The said judgment having become final and executory, a
writ of execution was issued by the RTC to satisfy the said
judgment on the goods and chattels of the Jose and Benito at
Malalag, Davao del Sur.
• On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of
residential land located at Poblacion Malalag registered
in the name of Jose; and a parcel of agricultural land
registered in the name of Jose.
• A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution
was filed by Jose alleging therein that the residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is
built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and
as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment;
and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the
family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated
under Article 155 of the Family Code.
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ISSUE
• Is the residential house and lot a family home so as to exempt
it from execution?
RULING
• Yes, it is a family home.
• The residential house and lot of Jose was not constituted
as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially
under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August
4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on
August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
• The contention of Jose that it should be considered a
family home from the time it was occupied by Jose and
his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the
Family Code, it is provided that “the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable.”
• Article 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that
the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Family Code
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building. (243a)
• But the debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the
appellate court on January 29 1988. Both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case
does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the Family Code.
Taneo, Jr. vs Court of Appeals
FACTS
• On March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo, father of Pablito Taneo, Jr.,
Jose Taneo, Nena Catubig, and Cilia Moring, constituted the
house in question erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares
as a family home but was however, notarized only on May 2,
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1965 and registered with the Register of Deeds on June 24,
1966.
• On July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a civil case
for recovery of property against Pablo Taneo, wherein
Judgment was rendered on June 24, 1964, in favor of Abdon
Gilig and against Pablo Taneo ordering the latter to pay
damages in the amount of P5,000.00.
• By virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was issued on
November 22, 1965 against the properties of Pablo Taneo
and on December 1, 1965, a Notice of Levy was executed
wherein the properties in question were among the properties
levied by the Sheriff.
• The said properties were sold at public auction wherein the
defendant Abdon Gilig came out as the highest bidder, ceding
the said properties in favor of Abdon Gilig.
• On November 3, 1985, Pablito, et al. filed the present action
to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over
the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
• Is the house a family home, which is exempt from execution?
RULING
• Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may
be constituted judicially and extrajudicially, the former by the
filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court,
and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the
proper registry of property declaring the establishment of the
family home. The operative act then which created the family
home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of
Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241
of the Civil Code.
• Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer
necessary. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied in the family residence.
• It is under the foregoing provision which Pablito, et al. seek
refuge to avert execution of the family home arguing that as
early as 1964, Pablo Taneo had already constituted the
house in question as their family home. However, the
retroactive effect of the Family Code, particularly on the
provisions on the family home has been clearly laid down
by the court as explained in the case of Manacop v. Court
of Appeals, citing Modequillo vs Breva.
• The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the
Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a
family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law
provides certain instances where the family home is not
exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Civil Code
Article 243. The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
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(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the
Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
• The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
constituted the house in question, erected on the land of
Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was registered only on January
24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was
rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the
“debt” was incurred, the family home was not yet
constituted or even registered. Clearly, Pablito et al.’s
alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not
exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).
• Moreover, the trial court found that the house was
erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on
the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition
of the law that the “family home is the dwelling house where
a person and his family resides and the land on which it is
situated,” it is understood that the house should be
constructed on a land not belonging to another.
Cabang vs Basay
FACTS
• Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot
No. 7777. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never
occupied nor took possession of the lot.
• On June 16, 1987, spouses Basay bought Lot No. 7777
from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00. The latter
also did not occupy the said property.
• Simeon Cabang, Virginia Cabang, and Venancio Cabang,
on the other hand, had been in continuous, open,
peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of
land since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees
in the cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778.
• During the said cadastral proceedings, Cabang, et al.
claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were
actually occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out,
however, when the Municipality of Molave relocated the
townsite lots in the area in 1992, it was then discovered that
Cabang, et al. were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
• On June 23, 1992, spouses Basay filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Property against Cabang, et al.
• The trial court decided in favor of Cabang, et al. Upon appeal,
the CA reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
• Is the subject property a family home exempt from execution?
RULING
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• No, it is not a family home.
• As aptly pointed out by the appellate court, it was already of
judicial notice that the improvements introduced by
Cabang, et al. on the litigated property are residential
houses not family homes.
• The property on which Cabang, et al.’s alleged family
home stands is owned by spouses Basay and the question
of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality of the
appellate court’s judgment. Thus, Cabang, et al.’s
continued stay on the subject land is only by mere
tolerance of spouses Basay.
Eulogio vs Bell, Sr.
FACTS
• Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell,
Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Beneraño IV are the
unmarried children of Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan-Bell.
• In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint for
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title
and damages against Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad
Eulogio. The Complaint sought the annulment of the
contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329‐
square-meter residential house and lot, as well as the
cancellation of the title obtained by Spouses Eulogio by virtue
of the Deed.
• The RTC granted the Bell sibling’s prayers, but declared
Spouses Bell liable to Spouses Eulogio in the amount of
P1 million plus 12% interest per annum.
• Both Spouses Eulogio and Bell, Sr., et al. appealed to the CA,
but the trial court’s Decision was affirmed in toto. Spouses
Bell later brought the case to this Court to question their
liability to Spouses Eulogio in the amount of P1 million plus
interest. The Court, however, dismissed their Petition for
failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA.
Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.
• On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a
result of which Bell, Sr., et al.’s property was levied on
execution.
• Upon motion by Bell, Sr., et al., the trial court, on 31
August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution
on the ground that the property was a family home.
• Spouses Eulogio filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the
Family Code, they posited that the current market value
of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000
considering that it was located in a commercial area, and
that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for P1 million.
ISSUE
• Can the family home of Bell, Sr., et al. be sold on execution
under Article 160 of the Family Code?
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RULING
Family Code
Article 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he
has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually
worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may
apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall
so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds
the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum
allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the
family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of
the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a
family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied
first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the
liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any,
shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)
CONTENTION (Spouses Eulogio)
• They allege that this case falls under the exceptions to the
exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale.
They claim that the actual value of Bell, Sr., et al.’s family
home exceeds the P300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is
supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby Bell, Sr., et
al. agreed to sell the property for P1 million way back in 1995.
Therefore, the RTC only properly ordered the execution sale
of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money
judgment awarded to them.
• It has been judicially determined with finality that the
property in dispute is a family home, and that its value at
the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit.
Moreover, Bell, Sr., et al. have timely claimed the
exemption of the property from execution. On the other
hand, there is no question that the money judgment
awarded to Spouses Eulogio falls under the ambit of
Article 160.
• To warrant the execution sale of Bell, Sr., et al.’s family home
under Article 160, Spouses Eulogio needed to establish these
facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the
increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the
property introduced by the persons constituting the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the
increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under
Article 157.
• During the execution proceedings, none of those facts
was alleged — much less proven — by Spouses Eulogio.
The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but
the trial court had already determined with finality that
the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an
equitable mortgage. Evidently, when Spouses Eulogio and
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Spouses Bell executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price
stated therein was not the actual value of the property in
dispute.
• The Court thus agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the sale on execution of the property in dispute
under Article 160. The trial court had already determined
with finality that the property was a family home, and there
was no proof that its value had increased beyond the statutory
limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it
ordered the execution sale of the property.
De Mesa vs Acero, Jr.
FACTS
• Claudio Acero, Jr. filed a complaint for violation of BP 22
against Spouses De Mesa for issuing an unfunded check.
The check was payment for Spouses De Mesa’s loan from
Claudio.
• The RTC acquitted the spouses but ordered them to pay
Claudio.
• The Sheriff levied upon the property owned by Spouses De
Mesa that had their family home.
• Claudio emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction
for the subject property.
• Claudio leased the subject property to Spouses De Mesa and
another renter. All failed to pay rent, so Claudio filed a
complaint for ejectment.
• Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint to nullify the certificate of
title of Claudio over the subject property, which reached the
SC in a petition for review.
CONTENTION (Spouses De Mesa)
• The subject property is a family home. Thus, the writ of
execution from the BP 22 case should not have been
executed against the subject property.
ISSUE
• Was the subject property a family home?
• Was it exempt from execution?
RULING
• Yes, it was a family home, but the execution against it could
no longer be assailed.
On the Status of the Subject Property as a Family Home
• The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for
purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized
as follows:
o First, family residences constructed
before the effectivity of the Family Code
or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either
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judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order
to be exempt from execution;
o Second, family residences constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed
to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
o Third, family residences which were not
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as
a family home prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, but were existing
thereafter, are considered as family
homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family
Code.
• The subject property became a family residence
sometime in January 1987. There was no showing,
however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a
family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively
exempt from execution. Spouses De Mesa were thus
correct in asserting that the subject property was a family
home.
On the Exemption of the Property from Execution
• Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home
and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, we
nevertheless rule that the CA did not err in dismissing
Spouses De Mesa’s complaint for nullification of TCT No. T-
221755 (M). Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the
subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or
within a reasonable time thereafter.
• Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the
supposed exemption of the subject property before the
sale thereof at public auction, Spouses De Mesa now are
barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop them
from later claiming the said exemption.
• They allowed the subject property to be levied upon and
the public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the
time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed of Sale
was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli’s Torrens title was
cancelled and a new one issued under Claudio’s name, still,
Spouses De Mesa remained silent. In fact, it was only after
Claudio, et al. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or
approximately four (4) years from the time of the auction
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sale, that Spouses De Mesa claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.
• For all intents and purposes, Spouses De Mesa’s
negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they
have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the
exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
right, it is incumbent upon Spouses De Mesa to invoke and
prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the
sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject
property as a family home.
Salazar vs Felias
FACTS
• On February 28, 1990, Remedios Felias, representing the
heirs of Catalino Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages against
the Spouses Romualdo Lastimosa and Felisa Lastimosa to
recover from the latter four parcels of land.
• Romualdo died during trial, and his wife and children (Heirs
of Lastimosa) substituted him in the case.
• The RTC decided that the Heirs of Nivera are the true owners
of the lands and ordered the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate
the properties.
• The RTC also ordered the demolition of the improvements
on the properties.
• Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar, daughter of Romualdo, along
with Recto and Rizalina filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment dated June 22, 2006 with the CA. But it was
dismissed by the CA and the SC.
• The Heirs of Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and
Demolition dated May 28, 2010. Dissatisfied with the ruling,
the Heirs of Lastimosa filed an appeal before the CA,
questioning the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by
the lower court, but the CA dismissed the appeal on
December 6, 2013.
• Felicitas filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied.
CONTENTION (Felicitas)
• A family home is erected on the properties. Such cannot
be the subject of the Writ of Execution and Demolition under
Article 155, Family Code.
ISSUE
• Was the improvement on the properties a family home?
RULING
• No, the improvement is not a family home.
• The claim that the property is exempt from execution for being
the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze
the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and
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executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for

the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family
home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil
Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be
set up and proved.
• In addition, residence in the family home must be actual.
This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed
to something merely possible, or that which is merely
presumptive or constructive.
• A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her
bare allegation, Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate
her claim that the property sought to be executed is
indeed her family home.
• Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for
Reconsideration dated December 23, 2013, and her Petition
for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she is,
and has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.
Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas' petition for review
on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.
• Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final
ruling of the RTC Branch 55 in the case for recovery of
ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the
Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.
• Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property
subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an
unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the binding
nature of a final and executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of
Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 must
perforce be given effect.

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Persons and Family Relations 2019