Hermano vs. Yap Tico GR no.

6791 (insufficiency of evidence)

To the complaint before us a demurrer was interposed, stating merely that the complaint did not
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. No particular ground was specified.
No specific failure was asserted or named. No. precise weakness was pointed out. The
order overruling the demurrer does not indicate that the court was informed as to the Specific
grounds upon which it was based. Certainly, so far as the records goes, the plaintiffs never knew
until after the demurrer was decided precisely what the defendant was driving at when he
presented it. Under such conditions, we do not feel that we should use our discretion to indulge
presumptions in favor of the demurrant in determining whether or not the allegations of the
complaint are sufficient. We do not feel like going out of the beaten path, even if we could, to
search for defects in the complaint when neither the plaintiff nor the court was precisely informed
of the alleged defects until it was too late to be use to either. We do not feel like favoring a
demurrer which is as full of defects as the court overruling the demurrer should be sustained if
there is any legal ground upon which it can be, although such ground was not presented by the
court below as one of the reasons for its decision. The fact that the demurrer was worthless as a
pleading is one of the strongest reasons for overruling. It has been urged that our decision
requiring that in all demurrers the specific grounds of the particular objection should be set out
distinctly, is against the weight of authority. We do not think so. But if it were, we should still be
forced, in conscience, to stand upon the proposition as we have stated it, as it seems to us to be
fundamentally right and to be fully supported by reason and logic.

Fuentes VS. People of the Philippines GR no 186421 (Partially evident bad faith)

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 states:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as
follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official
functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. 19
After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the Sandiganbayan correctly
convicted Fuentes of the crime charged, as will be explained hereunder.

Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal
Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time he committed the acts complained of.

As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission
of the crime, namely, through "manifest partiality", "evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence."
In Coloma, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,20 the Court defined the foregoing terms as follows:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."21 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

PRIMITIVO MARCELO, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. G.R. No. 69983. May 14, 1990.

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. No. 3019);

"BAD FAITH”; CONSTRUED. — petitioner did not act toward the judgment creditor with manifest
partiality, which it described as "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side rather than the other." 8 The record does not disclose such motivation. As the respondent
court observed, "the evidence falls short of that quantum necessary to establish the fact that he
had been manifestly or patently partial to the plaintiff’s corporation." But while absolving the
petitioner of such fault, the respondent court ascribes to him evident bad faith in acting as he did,
resulting in injury to the complaining witness and incidental benefits to the judgment creditor.
Citing authorities, the decision stresses that — "Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series,
895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18
SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of
the accused to do wrong or cause damage."

GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE

We believe that the petitioner is not liable even for "gross inexcusable negligence," as there is
no showing that he had acted in a wantonly careless manner to the prejudice of the
complaining witness. The breach of duty was not flagrant and palpable. The petitioner had
not acted recklessly or in utter disregard of consequences so as to suggest some degree
of intent to cause injury. Notably, the petitioner did not appropriate the vehicle for himself
but left it in the compound of the judgment creditor. As previously observed, there was
plausible reason to suppose that the Ford Fiera belonged to the Sanz Steel Corporation which,
significantly, was a family corporation with Sanchez as its president. If the petitioner mistook the
vehicle for property of the corporation, such mistake certainly cannot be considered so gross or
inexcusable as to come under the sanctions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR.

A more appropriate relief against the petitioner would be a civil action for damages or an
administrative complaint for the faulty implementation of the writ of execution. This observation
should, of course, not be taken as a prejudgment of such cases if they are filed. We do feel,
though, that the criminal action lodged against the petitioner was ill-advised and that his
conviction, on the basis of the meager evidence submitted was less than warranted. While this
Court has always been implacable in the face of guilt that must be punished, it has also never
hesitated to protect the innocent against an accusation that is palpably unjust, as in the case at
bar. In earlier decisions, we have cautioned the prosecution against hasty indictments, lest the
accused be needlessly molested and irreparably stigmatized. We now address a similar
admonition, and in the same spirit, to the lower courts. That the innocent may not suffer from an
undeserved sentence, we urge the judges to be more careful in their evaluation of the evidence,
always remembering that what is presumed in the free society is not the guilt of the accused but
his innocence.

G.R. No. 205745

CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and BREGIDO MALA CAT, JR., Petitioners
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent (reasonable doubt)

Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a
person's very conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne,
not by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on
the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden
upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter
of course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees.1âwphi1 Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be
acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an
acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof
as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.

Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on
the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his
innocence.81 (Citations omitted)

The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral
certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While
not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of events,
they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff, JEORGE EJERCITO, ESTREGAN, CRISOSTOMO B. VILAR, ARLYN
LAZAROTORRES, TERRYL GAMITTALABONG, KALAHI U. RABAGO, ERWIN P. SACLUTI, GENER C.
DIMARANAN, RONALDO C. SABLAN, and MARILYN M. BRUEL, Accused SB-16-CRM-0124 For: Violation
of Sec. 3(e) of -versus- R.A. No. 3019

Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 provides: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

XXXX

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions. The essential elements thereof are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and,

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.^^ First Element
The first element is not in dispute, given the stipulations entered into between the defense and
prosecution as to the positions held by the accused public officers during the subject period. As to accused
Marilyn Bruel, it is well-settled that a private individual may be held liable for Violation of Sec. 3 of R.A.
No. 3019 if such individual conspires with an accountable officer to commit acts in violation thereof.^^ In
addition, both parties admitted her identity as the proprietress of FRCV.

Second Element

Tiongco V. People, defines "partiality," "bad faith," and "gross negligence" as follows: The prohibited act
of either causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference may be
committed in three ways; through (1) manifest partiality, (2) evident bad faith, or (3) gross inexcusable
negligence.

In People v. Atienza, the Court defined these elements:

XXX.

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
(Citations omitted)

Manifest partiality is present "when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another."^^ It is "synonymous with 'bias' which 'excites a disposition to
see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.'"

Evident bad faith, on the other hand, connotes "not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will" and "contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes."^^ Coloma V. Hon. Sandiganbayan^^ also
held that "[b]ad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or
intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud."
As alleged in the Information, the constitutive acts in this case are: (i) the award, without undergoing
public bidding, of the "accident protection and financial assistance" contract to FRCV, a business entity
not registered and without a Certificate of Authority from the Insurance Commission; and (ii) the
immediate ratification and approval of the same by the accused Sangguniang Bayan members despite
pronounced irregularities.