G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is
now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was
relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965
and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the
same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by

ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution
the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE

CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF

SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-

ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL

CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT

MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald
Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of
the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the
basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal
action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being
a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,
73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property-
through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified
only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs,
what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than
the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
 sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise.
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11
not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,
sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but
for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",
(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability
of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City,
Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD
SECURITY CORPORATION, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
29, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing
Civil Case No. Q-89-1751, and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying herein, petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred
at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the
security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf
and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989 an action for damages against Benigno
Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc.,
("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the
following:

1. . . .

Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant

Safeguard) and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION (Defendant Superguard)
are corporations duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, with
offices at 10th Floor, Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz, Manila. They are
impleaded as alternative defendants for, while the former appears to be the employer of
defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA (defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of defendant TORZUELA by extending its
sympathies to plaintiffs.

Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age, an employee of defendant

SAFEGUARD and/or defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the incident
complained of, was under their control and supervision. . . .

3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m., defendant TORZUELA, while he was on

duty as security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila shot and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to
defendant SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police Report dated January 7,
1989, copy attached as Annex A);
 4. The incident resulting in the death of NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control
of its employee to avoid the injury.

xxx xxx xxx

(Rollo, pp. 117-118)

Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The
said Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
presided by respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.

On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil
liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. In addition, the private respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-59).

Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground
that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p. 96).

Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is
based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or an industry.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of
the Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the
complaint is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon
showing that Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through overt acts, SUPERGUARD
extended its sympathies to petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).

Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.

On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to
dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not
mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was
done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating the facts showing such
negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106). Respondent judge also declared that the
complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The dispositive portion of
the order dated April 13, 1989 states:

WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of the material and ultimate facts alleged in
the verified complaint and in accordance with the applicable law on the matter as well
as precedents laid down by the Supreme Court, the complaint against the alternative
defendants Superguard Security Corporation and Safeguard Investigation and Security
Co., Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed. (Rollo, p. 110)

The above order was affirmed by the respondent court and petitioners' motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts
of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA
195 [1990]). Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a
quasi-delict actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. This
liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the
subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action against the
employer may therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 Section 3
of the Rules of Court. Petitioners submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an employee of
respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD would be better resolved after trial.

Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of
the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which provides:
 Rule 111. . . . .

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since
the civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. On the other hand, it is the private
respondents' argument that since the act was not committed with negligence, the petitioners have no
cause of action under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The civil action contemplated in
Article 2177 is not applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but only applies to quasi-
offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty. Dulay to death,
aside from being purely personal, was done with deliberate intent and could not have been part of his
duties as security guard. And since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done within
the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the private respondents cannot be held liable for
damages.

We find for petitioners.

It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of
Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis supplied)

It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express
reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the
petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the
ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not
attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.

The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of an action or suit and
the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. (De Tavera v.
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the
present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to recover
damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
complaint.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:

 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court
already held that:

. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law. (Emphasis supplied)

The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA
195 [1990]), wherein the Court held:

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is prosecuted or found guilty
or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually
also charged criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472] (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and
should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court will not disturb
the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the
actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term "physical injuries" in Article
33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is
not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held that no independent civil action may be filed
under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted however, that
Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence,
whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.

Private respondents also contend that their liability is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and
that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard.
It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as
aforequoted, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Layugan v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180
is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and
a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA
792 [1989]). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint
simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private
respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the
general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements are present,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right;
and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA 33 [1992]);
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD.
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the
latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate
however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was actually
reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of
Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are actually liable, are
questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present
evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of
a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint
does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v.
CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can
be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed
by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27
SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it
would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for
trial on the merits. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.

Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.

Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-
748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.

Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on
August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal
and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section
3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court
erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict. Petitioners have
raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern
it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for
relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but
the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants
may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims. 9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:

4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts
which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the tip of the
said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again connected
by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same concrete
hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is
likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which
was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence
which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the
exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time,
the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during
rainy or stormy seasons.

5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the
water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized
iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so
much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates,
portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
 6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water
conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while
herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep,

wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be planted to any
crop or plant.

b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,

washed away.

c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers
are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs

are exposed to destruction. ... 10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil
Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the
flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a
third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or
lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject
of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no
pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed
and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage
to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. 13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in
the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose
did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless
the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City)
dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to reinstate
Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision
is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.

W. L. Wright, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a
minor, by his father, his nearest relative.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric
light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the
Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached
by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of
age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of
the defendant, who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry
that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and
perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in
wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does
not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house where they had asked for
Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders
and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered
on the ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges
and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps,
and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each
took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made
a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and
obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a
hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied
a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's
premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that
some months before the accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of
the same size and kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant
near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the time when these
caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of an extension of defendant's street
car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to
have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to
have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors
from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As
admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes
crossed the foot bridge to the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed
premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is
evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's
premises, although it must be assumed that the company or its employees were aware of the fact that
they not infrequently did so.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the
interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and
mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical
draftsman and continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears
that he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and
physically than most boys of fifteen.

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the
evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are
seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant
company's premises were the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession
and control, and that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the
point where they were found.

The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently
relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff,
offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that
plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.

It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the
McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting
a well on the company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where
the caps were found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by
it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the
neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping
ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of
blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the
circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of
twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's
premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in
question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to
disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its
employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of
the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and
perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left
them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where
not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young
boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.

Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these
conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's
well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however,
that while the workman employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White and Co.,
a firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and
control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the
blasting on the McKinley extension was done by independent contractors. Only one witness testified
upon this point, and while he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by contract,
he could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the
alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant company. The fact
having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on work done by
the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have
introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable
inference that it was the owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for
tortious or negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been
intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be
applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises,
as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence of
such proof we think that the other evidence in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and
justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its
property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its employees.

Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that
code.

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
 xxx xxx xxx

The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper place.

Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts
proven at the trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of
these articles, and since we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the
various questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be involved in a
decision affirming the judgment of the court below.

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to
establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising
in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed
at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an
appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his
own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the
property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut
open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.

But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon
defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the
direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries
sustained by him.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts
of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the
cases based thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury
received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of
amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company
knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which when carried
away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a
dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in
playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer
injury in playing with such machine.

In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the
premises liable.

As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was
whether a railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from
idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to
the negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad
company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully
upon its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to
such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct
of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of adult. While it
is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule
in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the
case."

The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply
criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs.
Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases,
especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the
language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries
sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in
favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the
premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on
the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no
difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of an
invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.

Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the
courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349).
And the doctrine has been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in
other States.

On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and
approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35,
36), lay down the rule in these cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs.
Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by
Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine
laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many
of the adjudged cases, both English and American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles
announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The
plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the
defendant's premises, without defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was by
accident injured by falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but
which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or anything to give
warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of
passers-by. On these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere
trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen
danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.

We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to the
facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would
seem to dispose of defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the
defendant company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would
not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.

We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case
now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving
unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have forbidden
all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it
did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and
witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting
its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young, would
often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that locality and playing
around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard for the
safety of these children would have suggested that they were in danger from being so near a
pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a
mass of burning coals into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under
all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a
mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser,
to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no obligation to make
provisions.

In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited
with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs
passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by
their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted
and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of
his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What difference, in
reason we may observe in this case, is there between an express license to the children of this
village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license,
resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning, to do so
at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen,
Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well says:
"It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of land liable for setting a trap
thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct,
might run into it and be killed, and which would exempt him from liability for the consequence
of leaving exposed and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's
child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby
be killed or maimed for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs.
Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):

Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses; and
others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate upon
this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children
anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might
naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to
be taken.

And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit
the premises of another, says:

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for
children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be
equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away
upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication
should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)

The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases
of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less
cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here
are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the
restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is
permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the
attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does
the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of
premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children
are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child
has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner
owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent
the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are
accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is
at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such
conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty,
responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the
premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be
expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of
the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to
enter.

This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has
a right to do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their
parents or guardians, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight
to put in doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is acquired and
held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights and interests of
the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants
of very tender years it would be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in
which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case
wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event
of accident to the child the negligence of the parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as
to deprive it a right to recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss nor decide.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred
there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the
defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of
the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the
detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible
for the injuries thus incurred.

Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's
youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition,
although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to
discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co.
vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been
free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which
rests the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of
responsibility for injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown
boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express
permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have
been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a
match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion.
On this point, which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine
laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid, although it is worthy of
observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has been directed,
the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such
tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the
explosive instruments which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able
to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well
knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who
was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity,
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him
at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which
might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the
resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might
be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It
would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care
and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held
civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence
on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question
of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own
acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be
said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite
variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under
the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by
our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and
incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of much
practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the
capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of
each case. Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to
be capable of committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that
he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
(Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain circumstances, choose
which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the
appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765).
And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G.
O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible
of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he
was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate
the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been
the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause
of the accident which inflicted the injury.

The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire.
(Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)

The Patidas contain the following provisions:

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)
 And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)

And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law
touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its
provisions by the supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover
damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391),
is directly in point. In that case the court said:

According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is a
source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of
cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a
third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omission were
imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury
was the negligence of the injured party himself.

The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or
negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."

See also judgment of October 21, 1903.

To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of
March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when between it
and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage caused does
not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make good upon
the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when
it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured
party himself.

And again —

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898, have
especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points of the
proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with
the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act
or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As the
decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately and
directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal
ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
 Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)

(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in
this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein
we held that while "There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground
that "the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of
January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year);
none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence
of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the
practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require the
application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and definitely denied the right of
recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the accident.

The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving
occasion for damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was
an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly
or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury,
less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion,
the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of
the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
can not recover."

We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon
defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of
cause and effect between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises and the injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps.
Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years
would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known
fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the
age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under
all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the
court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be
returned to the court wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the
defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984

ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY

BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of
reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.

The petitioners were charged under the following information:

The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO

BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO,
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO
DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:

That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias
Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and
mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent
Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building
No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the
door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods,
wares and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and
his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral
damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael
Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion,
and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to
pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs
of this proceedings.

The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac,
Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose
Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal
participation in the crime charged.

The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the
trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners,
the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the
complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the
market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which
gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners
questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months and one day and of accessory penalties
provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs
of the suit.

The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-
appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals
denied the motion holding that:

xxx xxx xxx

... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion
was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law
into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence
on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of
actual damages is correct.

Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF
DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
 II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED

DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN

JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO
THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER
HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR
WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND
THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,

APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.

The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a
reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting
them from the criminal charge.

Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97
Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49
O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda,
5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted
not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no dispute over
the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other instruments, and the carting
away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated
coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.

The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:

For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar.
...

xxx xxx xxx

The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
 From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious
mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of
these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The
information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either
threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by
means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is
entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made
to enter into trial upon a valid information.

We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.

While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss
of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of
Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant
case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and
loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused.
And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right
to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives
the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).

The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil
liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon
acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia,
et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of
civil liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability
arising from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one
of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or
crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
 xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage
suffered.

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil.
558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal
Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act
or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer
for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from
the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:

... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of
the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a
declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The
civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense
charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule
III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an
accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated
on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A
person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar, he could show
that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be
rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if
he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a
manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello, 120 SCRA
203)

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that
the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings
where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact,
exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more
vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply
because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and
unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of
all concerned.

The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the
prosecution and the defense:

xxx xxx xxx

(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that
Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the
goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio
Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out
from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.

The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:

On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some
members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers,
demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having
first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the
municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take
possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.

The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:

Cost of stall construction P1,300.00

Value of furniture and equipment

judgment destroyed 300.00

Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00

P9,600.00

It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate
what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in
fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a
nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the
complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:

On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal
building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...

The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when
the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted."
According to some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and
cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and
following the dictates of logic and common sense.

As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:

... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to
justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused
on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to
this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate
actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based
on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence:
(b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or
enable him to take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve
the unsettling implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action
whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.

... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the
Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil
action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action,
and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss
the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other
civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt
without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct
and separate.

In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and
no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings
damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine
must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an
acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or
institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not
because the act or omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured
thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).

We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages
despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly
provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act
or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that such separate
filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment
of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil
liability unless there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which
imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet
non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he seeks.

We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator
that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover
just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from
civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given
rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning
followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between
criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the
social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the
offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it
is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved
only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less
private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code
Commission, pp. 45-46).

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
filed.

With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the
petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory.The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of
the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision
that has become final and executory.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March
29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La
Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered
DISMISSED.[4]

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [5]

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:

a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death,
plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year
at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and
the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the
sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years
at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages
and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]

c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the
sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses
and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum
of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
 d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees
of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of
her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of

income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for

loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual

damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount
of P10,000.00;

h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as

doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;

i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00
as moral damages;

k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the
amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to
the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for
the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and
executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel
for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was
denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the
Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be
excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31,
1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to
dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee,
the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then
the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the
civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issues

Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee,
may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164
SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The
former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped
bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases

Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:

Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy.
 Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government
may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy. [9] Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their
right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]

Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph
of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal.[12]

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived
their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also
to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this
wise:

x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the
trial in absentiaproceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel
appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the
aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x[14]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction
of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. [15] While
at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. [16]

Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or
has applied for probation.
 In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against
him has become final and executory.[17]

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeepers employees.

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which
reads:

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted

in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

xxxxxxxxx

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted
in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis
of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
32,[20] 33,[21]34[22]and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and
omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. [25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to
pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which
was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary
liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases,
the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. [28] Although in substance
and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the
present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy

Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants
Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts
finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[31]
 An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard
against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter
is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction.[33] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the
lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open
to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial
court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right
to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right
against double jeopardy.

Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process

Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court
below final.[35] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived
his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang
Gioc[36] ruled:

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the
right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may
avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused
flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived
his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x x x. [37]

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself
in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach
of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. [38] Such conduct is intolerable and
does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to
the proper authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in
the criminal case against him is now final.

Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the
rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v.
Adil[43] do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers
in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense
of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these
leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of
the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its
accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.[44] The provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in
the cases to which they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court
need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. [46] In effect and implication, the
stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.[48] By the same token, to allow them
to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also result
in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability
of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are
engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely
present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability,
criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction
has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could
be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not
affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for
this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of
the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason
of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent
on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process

As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to
be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal
negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of
the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not
only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. [52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. [53] It
is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise. [54] Hence, the legal requirements must
be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.[57] In
these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed
by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.[58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings
before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have
lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.[60] In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be
clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has
been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act
and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila,
a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute that there
was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.

YAP, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on
February 17, 1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a
,Seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was
allegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less.1

Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio
Ligon, was never apprehended and is still at large.

The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused,
Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and
driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going
towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by
the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street
before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic
light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette
vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales
approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and
immediately thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is
not controverted, however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to
the window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was
rushed by some bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries and was confined thereat until his death on October 30, 1983.

Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio
Castillo. He was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane in
a slightly oblique position ("a little bit to the right").2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down
on the pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas
Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal
monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in
chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two men in the jeep joined the chase
and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi
when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled up right
behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao
and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion,
Fernando Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the
Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat.4The three were all brought by
the police officers to the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The taxicab
driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along with them. The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo
Primicias were taken by the traffic investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan.5 Payuan also prepared a Traffic
Accident Report, dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released
early morning the following day, but Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's
Office for further investigation.

Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated
December 6, 1983 charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. 7 Six months later,
however, or on June 28, 1984, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio
Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide.8 He filed the latter information on the basis of
a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo9 and a joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo
Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident on October 23, 1983.10These affidavits
were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January 17, 1984.

On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of
Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."11

The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo,
that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the
window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. In its decision, the
trial court summarized the testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 23, 1983, Castillo was then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far Eastern
University, and at the intersection of Lerma and Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light changed from
green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio Castillo's taxi was right behind a
Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to change to green, Castillo Idly watched the
Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a cigarette
vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was
handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi moved
forward, Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran
beside the Kombi and was able to hold on to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand.
While Rosales was clinging to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to
speed towards the C.M. Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely following the Kombi, then saw
Gabat forcibly remove the hand of Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face down on
Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass.12

The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date
and time in question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen
Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and
Quezon Boulevard when the traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes,
called a cigarette vendor who approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of
cigarettes and handed to the cigarette vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00 big,
Rosales placed his cigarette box containing assorted cigarettes on the windowsill of the front door of
the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window frame. Suddenly, the traffic light changed from
red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward, heedless of the transaction between
Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which was squeezed
between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales then ran beside
the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw the
cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order that
Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be
done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and Ligon was
maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the window
frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but
Ligon replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of Gabat, and
later they would come back to the scene of the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding
along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by
policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police headquarters, but neither of them executed any
written statement.13

The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that
Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no
reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed
Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the
windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already been able to
balance himself on the stepboard.

On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette
vendor placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he
was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of
common knowledge that cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their
cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given
by a customer.

As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on
appeal, unless it is shows that the findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to
consider certain material facts and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar,
a careful review of the record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been
overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they
would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.

While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to
the court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is
not entirely free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken.
The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat
was riding-a fact admitted by Castillo at the trial.14Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the
rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately one-
third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly
what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances
which must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened
between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the
taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of
vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony that he saw Gabat grab
the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the
Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering that this occurrence happened in
just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the traffic.

We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening, 15 Castillo did not
mention that he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi,
although the police report prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same
date, stated that when the traffic signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the
cigarette box of the cigarette vendor (Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly
the former clung to the door and was dragged at a distance while at the same time the latter punched
the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement," thus showing that during the police
investigation Castillo must have given a statement to the police which indicated that Gabat did
something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi.16 It was by way of a supplementary affidavit
prepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the Assistant City Fiscal on
January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was made the basis for
filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.

Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of
the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the
quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with
homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.

However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. 17 The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.18

The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different
from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may
be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?

For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion.
It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a
cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged. 19

In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts
from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof
required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act
and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the
damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy
street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales.
Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward while the
purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to the moving
vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the driver's
act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These proven facts taken
together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the damage done to
Rosales.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or
negligence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of
P15.000.00 for the latter's death, P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for
funeral expenses. The alleged loss of income amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by
sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.

Ramon Sotelo for appellant.

Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:

At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He
lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila
where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the
company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose
from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took
his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform
which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and
extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As
the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off
also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his
feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated.
It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident
occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is
found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had
been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks
which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of
sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was
due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.

The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the
injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain
hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result
of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a
second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and
surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.

Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the
servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and
leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's
trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although
negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering.
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.

It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall
as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined.

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all,
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint
from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the
Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates
only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.

Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly
points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa
clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."

In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition
that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach
of a contract.

Upon this point the Court said:

The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same
code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain
cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their
employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were, the master would be liable in
every case and unconditionally — but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation
of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant
whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of
negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to
make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if
the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or
not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.

It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant
relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary, that proof shows that the
responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-
contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by
mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible
care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for
the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and
he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of
their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code
the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant,
but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.

The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code,
has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)

This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua
and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual
liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while
acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of
the Civil Code, said:

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
he is relieved from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of
course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based
upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is
in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the
liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special
relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.

On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a
contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control,
and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his
liability for the breach of his contract.

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual

obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain
members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each
member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in
character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach
of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give
rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of
this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-
contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum
juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary
duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.

With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend
that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in
a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil
Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases
in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's
agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.

The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to
another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation
upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests
upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred
show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff
has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings
whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant,
or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima
facie to warrant a recovery.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based;
while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a
 contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).

As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach
was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the
actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or
omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense
to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of
agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those
acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be
logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise
due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence
caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically
complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent
acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no
doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of
such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by
reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to
permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the
payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the
clerk?

This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a
mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court
of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the
decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that
defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The
Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:

These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages
caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .

A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done
by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the
negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for
damages for breach of contract.

In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was
not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented
on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been
negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or
carefulness.

In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was
allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a
contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the
defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover
damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving
defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages
were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable,
although he was present at the time, saying:

. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . .
. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time
that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.

In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep.,
8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903,
although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to
him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was
that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes
the distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a
rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the
particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.

It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though
founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination
of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this
theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in
any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and
that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that
defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of
the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of
the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points
out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of
a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its
essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due
to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a
defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to
exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in
either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada
case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to
whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in
the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would
have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the
contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of
the servant.

The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more
broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty,
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof
that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate
cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the
train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no
liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his
injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in
fact guilty of negligence.

It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many
authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a
moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the
opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day
life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it.
Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no
injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason
to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been
for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.

We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's
work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to
be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by
the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec.
3010.)

Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep.,
809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the
plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average
prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff
should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.1awph!l.net

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the
effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In
considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find,
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to
its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as
we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of
the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility
concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.

As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher
than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the
spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of
cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in
an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing
apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly
familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a
copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing
that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We
are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability
is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of
P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.

The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of
P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

 AIR FRANCE, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IOLANI DIONISIO,
MULTINATIONAL TRAVEL CORPORATION OF THE PHIL., FIORELLO and VICKY
PANOPIO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT; EXTENDS ONLY OVER

PROPERTIES UNQUESTIONABLY BELONGING TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR. — The subject
property is registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the Multinational
Food and Catering Corporation and not in the name of either the Multinational Travel Corporation of
the Philippines or of the spouses Fiorello and Vicky Panopio who are the judgment debtors. It is well-
settled that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. Here, the property in question was sold to private
respondent Iolani Dionisio, who was not a party to the case subject of execution. Multinational Food
and Iolani Dionisio, not being parties to the case, the property covered by TCT No. 353935 may not
be levied upon to satisfy the obligations of private respondent spouses and the Multinational Travel
Corporation.

2. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; RESCISSION OF CONTRACT; SHOULD BE FILED IN A SEPARATE

ACTION. — Petitioner’s contrary claim that the property belongs to private respondent spouses, if
true, requires a rescissory action which cannot be done in the same case, but through the filing of a
separate action. Rescission is a relief which the law grants on the premise that the contract is valid for
the protection of one of the contracting parties and third persons from all injury and damage that
contract may cause, or to protect some incompatible and preferential right created by the contract.
Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally effective until set aside in a rescissory
action and may convey title. Nor can they be attacked collaterally upon the grounds for rescission in a
land registration proceeding. An action for rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary
proceeding through a motion, but in an independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial. As
provided in Article 1383 of the Civil Code.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRACTS UNDERTAKEN IN FRAUD OR CREDITOR AS A GROUND; RULE. —

Regarding contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors, the existence of the intention to prejudice the
same should be determined either by the presumption established by Article 1387 or by the proofs
presented in the trial of the case. In any case, the presumption of fraud established by this article is
not exclusive. To repeat, an independent action is necessary to prove that the contract is rescissible.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD IN FILING THEREOF WHEN MADE IN FAVOR OF
CREDITORS. — Under Article 1389 of the Civil Code, an accion paulina the action to rescind
contracts made in favor of creditors, must be commenced within four years.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

This a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which annulled and set
aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27.
The facts, as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Air France filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages against private respondents
Multinational Travel Corporation of the Philippines, Fiorello Panopio and Vicky Panopio before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, then presided over by the Hon. Ricardo Diaz.

After the trial, the court rendered judgment on August 31, 1987 in favor of petitioner, ordering private
respondents to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the amount of P2,518,698.66, with legal rate of
interest per annum from September, 22, 1986, until fully paid and P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s
fees.

On December 29, 1989, petitioner moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the ground
of unsatisfied judgment. It likewise moved to declare the sale of Iolani Dionisio of a parcel of land with
a house erected thereon in the name of the Multinational Food Corporation and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 353935 as one in fraud of creditors.

Petitioner, in said motion, stated that private respondent spouses jointly owned 91% of Multinational
Food and Catering Corporation (Multinational Food), other stockholders being: Aldo Glen Panopio
(brother of Fiorello) — 3%; Jaime Dionisio (husband of private respondent Iolani Dionisio) — 3%; and
Marie Rose Ricasa — 3%. Petitioner stated that although Multinational Food was registered with the
Securities and Exchange Corporation, it neither engaged in operations nor held meetings because of
adverse business conditions. The Corporations, through its President Iolani Dionisio, filed a sworn
statement to this effect with the SEC dated July 28, 1986. However, petitioner alleged that despite its
being non-operational, Multinational Food acquired from Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (Ayala Corporation) the subject property on February 1, 1985.

Petitioner further alleged that private respondent spouses subsequently sold the property to Iolani
Dionisio on April 11, 1985. However, the sale was not registered until one year and nine months later
or at the time petitioner was pursuing the issuance of a writ of attachment.

Petitioner’s motion was set for hearing on January 4, 1990, on which date the respondent court
ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution and on January 8, 1990, the same was issued.

Private respondents spouses filed their opposition thereto on the following

grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (a) the respondent court has no jurisdiction because the alleged buyer in the person of Iolani
Dionisio is not a party in the case; (b) that Iolani Dionisio was not served with summons and therefore
to declare the sale to her in fraud of creditors without even jurisdiction would amount to deprivation of
property without due process of law; and (c) that the proper remedy is an independent civil action
where indispensable parties are to be impleaded to afford them to answer and/or refute
charges."cralaw virtua1aw library

On January 19, 1990, the trial court issued an order requiring Iolani Dionisio and Multinational Food
to answer the allegations contained in petitioner’s motion. However, both parties failed to file their
respective answers thereto.

On November 19, 1990, the court issued an order finding the sale in favor of Iolani Dionisio of the
subject property covered by TCT No. 353935 registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in
the name of Multinational Food as having been made in fraud of creditors.

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the order of February 15,
1991; whereupon, they then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the
lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On February 24, 1992, the appellate court rendered a decision annulling and setting aside the
questioned orders. It further enjoined petitioner from proceeding against the property in question.

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
annulling and setting aside the orders of the trial court.

Petitioner claims that a separate civil action, as proposed by private respondents, will only perpetrate
fraud.

We find petitioner’s contention to be devoid of merit.

First, the subject property is registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the
Multinational Food and Catering Corporation and not in the name of either the Multinational Travel
Corporation of the Philippines or of the spouses Fiorello and Vicky Panopio who are the judgment
debtors.

It is well-settled that the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. 2 Here, the property in question was sold to private
respondent Iolani Dionisio, who was not a party to the case subject of execution.

In Bayer Philippines, Inc. v. Agana, 3 the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are
deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated
comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. Indeed,
the nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the
properties of the loser is generally ministerial. . . .

x x x

In other words, construing Section 17 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rights of third-
party claimants over certain properties levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment should not be
decided in the action where the third-party claims have been presented, but in the separate action
instituted by the claimants.

This is evident from the very nature of the proceedings. In Herald Publishing, supra, We intimated
that the levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made
under authority of the court only when the property levied upon unquestionably belongs to the
defendant. If he attach properties (sic) other than those of the defendant, he acts beyond the limits of
his authority. Otherwise stated, the court issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce its
authority only over properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party appear to claim the
property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the Rules is that such claim should be
the subject of a separate and independent action." (Emphasis supplied)

Multinational Food and Iolani Dionisio, not being parties to the case, the property covered by TCT No.
353935 may not be levied upon to satisfy the obligations of private respondent spouses and the
Multinational Travel Corporation.

Petitioner’s contrary claim that the property belongs to private respondent spouses, if true, requires a
rescissory action which cannot be done in the same case, but through the filing of a separate action.

Rescission is a relief which the law grants on the premise that the contract is valid for the protection
of one of the contracting parties and third persons from all injury and damage that contract may
cause, or to protect some incompatible and preferential right created by the contract. 4

Under Art. 1381 of the Civil Code, the following contracts are rescissible:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer lesion
by more than one fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the
preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the
claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant without
the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission."cralaw virtua1aw library

Rescissible contracts, not being void, they remain legally effective until set aside in a rescissory
action and may convey title. Nor can they be attacked collaterally upon the grounds for rescission in a
land registration proceeding. 5

An action for rescission may not be raised or set up in a summary proceeding through a motion, but
in an independent civil action and only after a full-blown trial. As Article 1383 of the Civil Code
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 1383. The action of rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted except when the party
suffering damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the same."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Regarding contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors, the existence of the intention to prejudice the
same should be determined either by the presumption established by Article 1387 6 or by the proofs
presented in the trial of the case. 7 In any case, the presumption of fraud established by this article is
not exclusive. 8 To repeat, an independent action is necessary to prove that the contract is
rescissible.

Under Article 1389 of the Civil Code, an accion paulina 9 the action to rescind contracts made in favor
of creditors, must be commenced within four years.

Clearly, the rights and defenses which the parties in a rescissible contract may raise or set up cannot
properly ventilated in a motion but only in a full trial.

The appellate court did not err in holding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
resolving these matters through mere motion of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD,
Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al., which has modified
the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent
Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and
Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At
the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming
in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman
filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its
answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in
his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
following:

a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;

b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;

c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;

d) Costs of suit.

The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.

The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]

 Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its
now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and,
instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any
liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:

a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and

e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.[2]

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the
train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency
to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the
victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been
hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate
court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the
application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October
2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS

OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS

ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO

ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.[3]

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of
the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of
negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins
assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could
not have been foreseen or prevented.The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and
that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to
exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety
of passengers.[4] The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:

Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.

Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.

The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. [5] Such duty of a common carrier to provide
safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage.[6] The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and [8] by simple proof of
injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of
its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure.[9] In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident
occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of
the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent
firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under
the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the Civil
Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been
shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier,
on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes
the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil
Code can well apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract.[16] Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort
to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad,
this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link
(Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin,
has not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification
in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable
act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between
the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can
be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.[18] It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but
only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability.No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147791 September 8, 2006

CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY &
INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the March 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 46896, which affirmed with modification the February 9, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, finding Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
(BLTB) and Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) liable for damages.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.
Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached
their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South
Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in
front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and
extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical Center where the
doctors diagnosed their injuries to be as follows:

Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella

Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd

Lacerated wound, chin
Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3

Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher

Extensive lacerated wounds, right leg posterior aspect popliteal area

and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg.
Fracture, open comminuted, both tibial4

Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan,
Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1)
that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively,
were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3) that BLTB allowed
its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave
danger; (4) that they suffered actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella and
P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental
anguish, besmirched reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social humiliation;
(6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give respondents their due, observe honesty and good
faith which entitles them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to a reasonable
amount of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-party complaint against Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (Phoenix).7

On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees
liable for damages, the dispositive portion of which, states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

In the Complaint –

1. In favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo,
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and Espiridion
Payunan, Jr., ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees or a total
of P89,254.43;

2. In addition, defendant Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines and

defendant Espiridion Payunan, Jr., shall pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos to plaintiff Rebecca Estrella;

3. On the counterclaim of BLTB Co. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo –

Dismissing the counterclaim;

4. On the crossclaim against Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines

(now PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. –

Dismissing the crossclaim;

5. On the counterclaim of Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now

PNCC) –

Dismissing the counterclaim;

6. On the crossclaim against BLTB –

Dismissing the crossclaim;

7. On the Third Party Complaint by Construction and Development Corporation of the

Philippines against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Incorporated –

Dismissing the Third Party Complaint.

SO ORDERED.8

The trial court held that BLTB, as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or has acted negligently. BLTB's inability to carry respondents to their destination gave
rise to an action for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to rebut the presumption of
negligence made it liable to respondents for the breach.9

Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned bumped the BLTB bus from
behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time of the
incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the presumption that CDCP was negligent either in
the selection or in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut thus making it and its driver
liable to respondents.10

Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the trial court, respondents moved that
the decision be reconsidered but was denied. Respondents elevated the case 11 to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the amount of damages, the
dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated October 7, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 13, Manila is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:

1. The interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages of P79,354.43 should
commence to run from the time the judicial demand was made or from the filing of the
complaint on February 4, 1980;

2. Thirty (30) percent of the total amount recovered is hereby awarded as attorney's fees;

3. Defendants-appellants Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (now

PNCC) and Espiridion Payunan, Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants Rebecca Estrella
and Rachel Fletcher the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) each as exemplary
damages and P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.

SO ORDERED.12

The Court of Appeals held that the actual or compensatory damage sought by respondents for the
injuries they sustained in the form of hospital bills were already liquidated and were ascertained.
Accordingly, the 6% interest per annum should commence to run from the time the judicial demand
was made or from the filing of the complaint and not from the date of judgment. The Court of Appeals
also awarded attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the total amount recovered based on the retainer
agreement of the parties. The appellate court also held that respondents are entitled to exemplary
and moral damages. Finally, it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the claim of CDCP against
Phoenix had already prescribed.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

RESPONDENTS BLTB AND/OR ITS DRIVER WILFREDO DATINGUINOO SOLELY LIABLE
FOR THE DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HEREIN RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND
ESTRELLA.

II
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING
EXCESSIVE OR UNFOUNDED DAMAGES, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LEGAL INTEREST TO
RESPONDENTS FLETCHER AND ESTRELLA.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

RESPONDENT PHOENIX LIABLE UNDER ITS INSURANCE POLICY ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION.

The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are
solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents; (2) whether the damages, attorney's fees and
legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and unfounded; (3) whether CDCP can recover under
its insurance policy from Phoenix.

Petitioner contends that since it was made solidarily liable with BLTB for actual damages and
attorney's fees in paragraph 1 of the trial court's decision, then it should no longer be held liable to
pay the amounts stated in paragraph 2 of the same decision. Petitioner claims that the liability for
actual damages and attorney's fees is based on culpa contractual, thus, only BLTB should be held
liable. As regards paragraph 2 of the trial court's decision, petitioner claims that it is ambiguous and
arbitrary because the dispositive portion did not state the basis and nature of such award.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that petitioner is also at fault, hence, it was properly joined as
a party. There may be an action arising out of one incident where questions of fact are common to all.
Thus, the cause of action based on culpa aquiliana in the civil suit they filed against it was valid.

The petition lacks merit.

The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.13 In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible.
Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an
employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.14 In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual
damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established that
Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the police
investigator.

It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,15 that the owner of the other vehicle which collided
with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. We held, thus:

The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus
on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver
of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas
Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of
the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's
heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
 Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177,
that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he
was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. x x x

xxxx

As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out
their claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of
breach of contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of
action and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of action so long as
private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is
clear from the cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the
driver, thus justifying the holding that the carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable
because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce the same injury.16 (Emphasis
supplied)

In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint
and several" obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close that
each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation. In Lafarge Cement
v. Continental Cement Corporation,17 we reiterated that joint tort feasors are jointly and severally
liable for the tort which they commit. Citing Worcester v. Ocampo,18 we held that:

x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis
of the present action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort
feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable
with his tort feasors. x x x

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. x x x

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons
injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one
sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared to that of the others. x x x

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x

A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of
the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all. x x x
 Of course the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that
others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning
others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and
severally.19

Petitioner's claim that paragraph 2 of the dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is ambiguous
and arbitrary and also entitles respondents to recover twice is without basis. In the body of the trial
court's decision, it was clearly stated that petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and
solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to respondent Fletcher and
P25,000.00 to respondent Estrella.20 Moreover, there could be no double recovery because the
award in paragraph 2 is for moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for actual damages and
attorney's fees.

Petitioner next claims that the damages, attorney's fees, and legal interest awarded by the Court of
Appeals are excessive.

Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.21 The award of moral
damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of P80,000.00 must be reduced since
prevailing jurisprudence fixed the same at P50,000.00.22 While moral damages are not intended to
enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate
to the suffering inflicted.23

The Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral and compensatory
damages.24 Article 2231 of the Civil Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may
be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.25 In this case, petitioner's driver was driving
recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus. Petitioner, who has direct and primary liability
for the negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals,26 we held, thus:

ART. 2229 of the Civil Code also provides that such damages may be imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as
a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. Exemplary Damages are imposed not
to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.

Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National
Labor Relations Commission,27 that:

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and
extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to
a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this
compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by

the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases
provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208,
Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed
that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part
thereof.28 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation as they may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary damages
are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.29

Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the complaint,
we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,30 that when an obligation, regardless of
its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor
can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages,31 subject to the following rules, to wit –

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated
in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum
to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.32 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the legal interest of 6% shall begin to run on February 9, 1993 when the trial court
rendered judgment and not on February 4, 1980 when the complaint was filed. This is because at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the amount of the damages to which plaintiffs may be entitled
remains unliquidated and unknown, until it is definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the
court and only upon presentation of proof thereon.33 From the time the judgment becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction.

Anent the last issue of whether petitioner can recover under its insurance policy from Phoenix, we
affirm the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:

As regards the liability of Phoenix, the court a quo correctly ruled that defendant-appellant
CDCP's claim against Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of P.D. 612, as
amended, which provides:
 Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to this chapter shall,
without any unnecessary delay, present to the insurance company concerned a written
notice of claim setting forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries sustained as
certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be filed within six months
from date of the accident, otherwise, the claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit
for recovery of damage due to loss or injury must be brought in proper cases, with the
Commissioner or Courts within one year from denial of the claim, otherwise, the
claimant's right of action shall prescribe. (As amended by PD 1814, BP 874.)34

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written notice of claim must be filed within six
months from the date of the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six months from
the date of the accident, its claim has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 46896 dated March 29, 2001, which modified the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 13, in Civil Case No. R-82-2137, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioner is
held jointly and severally liable to pay (1) actual damages in the amount of P79,354.43; (2) moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each for Rachel Fletcher and Rebecca Estrella; (3) exemplary
damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each for Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher; and (4) thirty
percent (30%) of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees. The total amount adjudged shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of judgment of the trial court until finality of this
judgment. From the time this Decision becomes final and executory and the judgment amount
remains unsatisfied, the same shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS G.R. No. 179446

SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

GLODEL BROKERAGE
CORPORATION and
R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 10, 2011

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
August 24, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822, entitled R&B
Insurance Corporation v. Glodel Brokerage Corporation and Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.,
which held petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. (Loadmasters) liable to respondent Glodel
Brokerage Corporation (Glodel) in the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity
which R&B Insurance Corporation (R&B Insurance) paid to the insured-consignee, Columbia Wire and
Cable Corporation (Columbia).

THE FACTS:

On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to
insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001,
the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier
10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date.

Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the
pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of
Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants
in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its
employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper
cathodes were to be delivered to Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined
for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered
in Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6) trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five
(5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes,
failed to deliver its cargo.

Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper
cathodes.Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity
in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance
paid Columbiathe amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103040. It
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed
that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be
held legally liable for the loss.[2]

On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision[3] holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss
of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against
R&B Insurance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the plaintiff having established by

preponderance of evidence its claims against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the latter:

1. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P1,896,789.62

as actual and compensatory damages, with interest from the date of
complaint until fully paid;

2. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the amount equivalent to

10% of the principal amount recovered as and for attorneys fees
plus P1,500.00 per appearance in Court;

3. To pay plaintiff R&B Insurance Corporation the sum of P22,427.18 as

litigation expenses.
 WHEREAS, the defendant Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc.s counterclaim for
damages and attorneys fees against plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

With costs against defendant Glodel Brokerage Corporation.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.

On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed decision which reads in part:

Considering that appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the

latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise
be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED in that

the appellee Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount
of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held
liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation.

Appellant Glodels appeal to absolve it from any liability is herein DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court
presenting the following

ISSUES

1. Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the

fact that the latter respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it
(Loadmasters)?

2. Under the set of facts established and undisputed in the case, can petitioner
Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel?[6]

To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot
be considered an agent of Glodel because it never represented the latter in its dealings with the
consignee. At any rate, it further contends that Glodel has no recourse against it for its (Glodels) failure
to file a cross-claim pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Glodel, in its Comment,[7] counters that Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the
latter was grossly negligent in the transportation of the subject cargo. With respect to Loadmasters
claim that it is already estopped from filing a cross-claim, Glodel insists that it can still do so even for
the first time on appeal because there is no rule that provides otherwise. Finally, Glodel argues that its
relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the transporter (Loadmasters) is only hired for
the specific job of delivering the merchandise. Thus, the diligence required in this case is merely
ordinary diligence or that of a good father of the family, not the extraordinary diligence required of
common carriers.

R&B Insurance, for its part, claims that Glodel is deemed to have interposed a cross-claim against
Loadmasters because it was not prevented from presenting evidence to prove its position even without
amending its Answer. As to the relationship between Loadmasters and Glodel, it contends that a
contract of agency existed between the two corporations.[8]

Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful
claim or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or
claim, including its remedies or securities.[9] Doubtless, R&B Insurance is subrogated to the rights of
the insured to the extent of the amount it paid the consignee under the marine insurance, as provided
under Article 2207 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received
indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or
breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the
rights of the insured against the wrong-doer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the
loss or injury.

As subrogee of the rights and interest of the consignee, R&B Insurance has the right to seek
reimbursement from either Loadmasters or Glodel or both for breach of contract and/or tort.

The issue now is who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount
of the indemnity it paid Columbia.

At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to
determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services
to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in
the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as
distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement
and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.[10] The distinction is significant in the
sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed
principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.[11]

In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between
Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and
exclusively rendered services to Glodel.

In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier.[12]

In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article
1732. In its Memorandum,[13] it states that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of customs brokering. It cannot be
considered otherwise because as held by this Court in Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v.
Transport Venture, Inc.,[14] a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation
of goods being an integral part of its business.

Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article
1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure
of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and
preserving their own property or rights.[15] This exacting standard imposed on common carriers in a
contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of the shipper who is at the mercy of
the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. [16] Thus, in case of loss of the
goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. [17] This
presumption of fault or negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has
observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.

With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that
the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the
possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. [18]
 Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and
severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil
Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the
consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct
contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc.
v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc. [19] where this Court held that a tort
may arise despite the absence of a contractual relationship, to wit:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee
against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of
action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and
careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even
assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in the rights of Del
Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal
and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Courts
consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability
for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In
the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising
from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by
which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite
the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao
Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to
establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict. [Emphases supplied]

In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides:

ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.
 It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose
employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As
employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who
acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises
a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[20] To avoid liability for
a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee.[21] In this regard, Loadmasters failed.

Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure
that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the
designated destination. It should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by
taking precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the
cargoes.Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is
unavailing.

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there exists no principal-agent relationship between
Glodel and Loadmasters, as erroneously found by the CA. Article 1868 of the Civil Code provides: By
the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The elements of a
contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2)
the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a
representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. [22]

Accordingly, there can be no contract of agency between the parties. Loadmasters never
represented Glodel. Neither was it ever authorized to make such representation. It is a settled rule that
the basis for agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of the principal on
matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as if they were
personally executed by the principal. On the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to
appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there
must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it.[23] Such mutual intent is not obtaining in
this case.

What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer
is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the
resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence
of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to
one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far
Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals,[24]

X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an

efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person
was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because
it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in
combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole injury.Where their concurring negligence resulted in
injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. [Emphasis supplied]

The Court now resolves the issue of whether Glodel can collect from Loadmasters, it having
failed to file a cross-claim against the latter.

Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract
of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot
succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not
properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be liable
for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a
compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred.[25] Thus, a cross-claim cannot
be set up for the first time on appeal.

For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid
on equitable grounds. Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.[26] The Court
cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 24, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is MODIFIED to read as follows:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs
Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable
to respondent R&B Insurance Corporation for the insurance indemnity it paid to consignee
Columbia Wire & Cable Corporation and ordering both parties to pay, jointly and severally,
R&B Insurance Corporation a] the amount of P1,896,789.62 representing the insurance
indemnity; b] the amount equivalent to ten (10%) percent thereof for attorneys fees; and
c] the amount of P22,427.18 for litigation expenses.

The cross-claim belatedly prayed for by respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation

against petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners,
vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101,
DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by
VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS, President/Chairman, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated March 1, 2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their
petition for certiorari and denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their
complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle
collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van,
which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a two-month old
baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil action,
no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
promulgated on December 17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and
its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to
their reservation to file a separate civil action.[3] They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper service of summons,
prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping
of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its
officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate
action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal
action. As there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely
two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already
prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause
of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding
the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to be
dismissed on the ground of prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of the complaint as
summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal department without mentioning her
designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based
on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10)
years from the finality of the judgment.[6] The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article
1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular
accident.[7] As regards the improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the
complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error
in the choice or mode of appeal.[8] The appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
reasoning that even if the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal was available to petitioners
and they failed to allege that the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance
of certiorari in lieu of appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing obligation arising from the criminal
liability of private respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint
arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of
discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and
concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore
the Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate
grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private respondents
for which no civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a separate
civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They point out that the averments in the complaint
make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such,
the prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not
ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that the subsidiary liability
of the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where
the civil aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil
case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of Appeals via certiorari was
improper as petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point
out several other procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification
against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed order of the trial
court; and non-indication of the full names and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14, 2002, while private respondents filed
a Rejoinder[12] dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.[13] Such civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential damages.[14] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability
arising from the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover damages from the
accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in
a separate action in order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third,
when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
 Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, which governed the
institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in
court for trial.

Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of
the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its
decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil
action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron
Transit and its President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek
to recover private respondents civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading
of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause
of action was based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from the time
the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioners claim
that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners
were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence,
the offended party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under
the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as
a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or
(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.[15] Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double
recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for
them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the
prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company[16] was decided upon a similar set of facts.
Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property. The plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action.
The driver was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate
civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon
finding that the action was instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on the subsidiary
liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier
civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement
of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties
of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling
force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition
of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the
merits, considering petitioners allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss[17] and
motion for reconsideration[18] of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to recover civil
liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives
the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same
litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender.[19] However, since the stale action for
damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners
to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue
damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for
obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the order of dismissal of
the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep,
however, should be exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their
fundamental objective of securing substantial justice. [20] We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the
indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction based solely on a
technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.[21]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing the present action
and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated
February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed
in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily
liable to pay damages and attorney’s fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478,
owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with
plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to
the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City,
docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among
those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos.

In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:

1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue
and the identities of the vehicles involved;

2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;

3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;

 4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the
medical certificate;

5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;

6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a
ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs)4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.

Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his
brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her
husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her
husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went
to her husband’s hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil.net

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court
Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought. 8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark
other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since
the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.

For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN9 of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked
and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.

Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.

The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying
it was the former who caused the smash up.

The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the
process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At
the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep
following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the
jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine
Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After
that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion
of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it
could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He testified that the
jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped
the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to
the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case
and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for
the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.12

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.13

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.14

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN’s AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT’S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL’s DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court, we
granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De
Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan
and Liwayway Calaunan.15

In their Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of the Court of
Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge17 of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.

On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted in evidence for failure
of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d)
the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case;
and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.22

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for a
testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-
examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI’s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers
uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against
their employees.23

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies of
the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it
does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted.24 Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same
were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.26 Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence
the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in
the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue
that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not
be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused
be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI’s argument that it will be denied due process when the TSNs
of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to
be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation
to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the
TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply
with Section 47.

In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,28 admitted in
evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioner’s assertion
that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial
of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to
the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to
object based on said ground.

Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find
such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 29

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how
the accident occurred is more credible than respondent’s version. They anchor their contention on the
fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic’s acquittal in the civil case.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or based
on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in causing
the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations
read:

"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-
described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway
heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the
same;
 "5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described
motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No.
353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had
apparently lost control of his vehicle;

"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was forced
off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its driver’s side on a
ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe valued at
EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to
be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;

"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiff’s frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and
until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made
an integral part hereof;

"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence
of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a
fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;

"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x" 31

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?

In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:

To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the
bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his
having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x

We do not agree.

The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the
control of accused-appellant.

xxxx

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.32

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained
of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 33

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime
– a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code.34 It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.35

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In
this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-
delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code.36 An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case37 based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard that
of respondent’s. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondent’s jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.

As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the
Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.39

After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which
was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has
this say:

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would
be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicle.

In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case
No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it
was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he
should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also
apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator
CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on
the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement
and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between the jeep and the
bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan
given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep
of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the
Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15,
1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day
difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain the
possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as
between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter should
prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the unreliability of the statement of
Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said
affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the
jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.

xxxx

If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having
been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very
fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants. 40

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is
caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct
and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents
to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employee.43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it
argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.44

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,45 it was explained that:

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended
for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach
or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent
compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has
been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work.
The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything
more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:

From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of
its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There
is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In
regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been
negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly
the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does
not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack
of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules
and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know
and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the
drivers?

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as
actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his
jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances,
must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.49 The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award
of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law. 51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award
of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall be
lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan
(Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On
the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as
Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of
March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas
RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the
Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such
error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same
in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
 The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the
accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the
aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On
the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real
aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very
private complainant in the criminal case.[4]

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground
of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that
if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict
is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal
case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil
action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party
in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is
no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is
not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of
whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it
is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1
of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing
the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. [8] Forum-
shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action
and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the
rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on
the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the
law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules
for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as amended
in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same
act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to
the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
provided as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as
follows:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action. [10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence.Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the
criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The
rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced, the
separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case
of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine
the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action
which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,
filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil
action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in
the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section
3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows
the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil
action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
offended party may bring such an action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the
offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the Court
held that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer
with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal
aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated
and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to
address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
states that any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the
accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil
case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This
is only fair for two reasons.First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the
criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing
to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is
proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping
is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case
may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always
been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly
provides that the independent civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission. The
Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts,
one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and
irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while
the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled
rule that -x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent.[14]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.