Filing # 96235601 E-Filed 09/24/2019 06:23:48 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1D19-3106

_________________________________________________________________

LEONARDO LYNCH,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT,

Respondent.
_________________________________________________________________

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

_________________________________________________________________

RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

_________________________________________________________________

ASHLEY MOODY
Attorney General
BILAL AHMED FARUQUI
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar Number 15212
Office of the Attorney General
General Civil Litigation Section
State Programs Bureau
PL – 01 The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
(850) 414-3757
Bilal.Faruqui@myfloridalegal.com
Maia.Rogers@myfloridalegal.com
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS .................................................................................. iii
BACKGROUND .................................................................................................1

ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................3
I. The requirements for mandamus relief. .......................................................3
II. Mr. Lynch cannot establish that FDLE has a clear legal duty to issue a final
decision because the administrative process has not been completed. .....4
III. Mr. Lynch cannot establish that FDLE has a clear legal duty to file a final
decision with the agency clerk because such a decision would not be a
final order, as defined by section 120.52(7), Florida Statutes (2019).......7
IV. This Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the Petition because
granting the Petition would be detrimental to the public interest. ..........12
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .........................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................16

ii
 TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page(s)

Cases

Adams v. State, 560 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)................................................4

D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ........................................................................14

Fair v. Davis, 283 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973) ..................................................4

Freedom Life Ins. Co. Of Am. v. State, Dept. Of Fin. Services, Office of Ins.

Regulation, 891 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) ..................................................8

Greer v. State, Dept. of Law, Enf’t, 704 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ................8

KKP Holdings, LLC v. Russell, 1 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ........................4

Lynch v. Florida Dep’t of Law Enf’t, 1D19-252, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1752, 2019

WL 2943305 (Fla. 1st DCA July 9, 2019).............................................................2

Mitchell v. State, Dept. of Law, Enf’t, 704 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ............8

Physicians Health Care Plans, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 845 So. 2d

222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)........................................................................................8

Reno v. State, Dept. of Law, Enf’t, 704 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) .................8

Rowell v. State, Florida Dept. of Law, Enf’t, 700 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)

..........................................................................................................................8, 12

Seratech, Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 866 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA

2003) ......................................................................................................................8

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Solomon v. Sanitarians’ Registration Bd., 155 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1963) ................4, 9

Sowell v. State, 136 So. 3d 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ..............................................7

State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of Lakeland, 150 So. 508 (Fla. 1933)......................3

State ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1970)..........................................12

State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 164 So. 199 (Fla. 1935)...............................................13

State ex rel. Mann v. Burns, 109 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) .........................13

Students for Online Voting v. Machen, 24 So. 3d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)...........7

Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004) ............................................................12

Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1996) .............................................................11

Statutes

18 U.S.C. §922 ...........................................................................................................1

§120.52, Fla. Stat. (2019)................................................................................ 7, 8, 12

§790.06, Fla. Stat. (2019).........................................................................................11

§790.065, Fla. Stat. (2018).................................................................... 1, 5, 9, 10, 11

§943.059, Fla. Stat. (2019)...................................................................................9, 10

Rules

Fla. R. App. P. 9.100 ............................................................................................1, 16

Regulations

28 C.F.R. §25.10 ........................................................................................... 6, 11, 12

Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-6.009 ..................................................................... 5, 9, 11

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Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-7.007 ..............................................................................10

Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-8.001 ..........................................................................6, 11

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §7.09 ..................................................................................11

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §22.05 ................................................................................13

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §33.13 ................................................................................13

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 Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(j), the Florida

Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) hereby responds to this Court’s

September 6, 2019 Order to Show Cause why the August 26, 2019 Petition for Writ

of Mandamus (“Petition”) should not be granted and avers as follows.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Leonardo Lynch (“Mr. Lynch”), attempted to purchase a firearm and,

upon receipt of a request for a criminal history record check and review of records,

FDLE informed the firearm dealer that Mr. Lynch was prohibited from purchasing

a firearm. Mr. Lynch appealed the non-approval to purchase a firearm. (Ex. 1)

On December 20, 2018, in response to the appeal, FDLE sent Mr. Lynch a letter

informing him that his attempted purchase of a firearm was denied because his

identifying information matched a record in the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) National Instant Check System (NICS), which indicated that, pursuant to Title

18 United States Code Section 922 and section 790.065, Florida Statutes, Mr. Lynch

was ineligible to purchase a firearm due to mental competency or court ordered

substance abuse treatment. (Ex. 2) The December 20 letter informed Mr. Lynch that

he should contact the record owner, New York State Division of Criminal Justice

Services, if he believed that he was not the subject of the record, if he believed that

there was an error in the record, or if he sought relief from firearm disability based

on the record. The letter also indicated that Mr. Lynch would be able to re-appeal
the non-approval if he provided the appropriate documentation from the jurisdiction

that owned the record disqualifying him from purchasing a firearm.

Mr. Lynch pursued an appeal of the December 20 letter in this Court. FDLE

filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that this Court lacked jurisdiction to

review the letter because the letter was not a final order or quasi-judicial order

because FDLE was merely attempting to comply with a legislative mandate to

perform a ministerial act. FDLE alternatively argued that, even if the FDLE was not

performing a ministerial act, the letter was not a final order because it did not dispose

of the case, because it did not indicate that judicial review was available, and because

it was not filed with the agency clerk. (Ex. 3)

This Court dismissed Mr. Lynch’s appeal of the December 20 letter because,

“assuming the letter would otherwise be appealable, the appeal is premature because

the order has not been rendered” because it was not filed with the agency clerk.

Lynch v. Florida Dep’t of Law Enf’t, 1D19-252, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1752, 2019 WL

2943305, *1 (Fla. 1st DCA July 9, 2019) (citations omitted). This Court stated, “To

the extent FDLE fails to render an appealable order, Mr. Lynch’s recourse is through

the filing of a petition for mandamus.” Id. (citations omitted). However, this Court

declined to address whether the letter was a final agency action. Id.

Mr. Lynch’s counsel subsequently inquired whether FDLE would be filing the

December 20 letter with the agency clerk. On August 21, 2019, FDLE responded

2
that it had not filed the letter with the agency clerk because a non-approval to

purchase a firearm was a ministerial act rather than a discretionary agency action

and because, even if it was not a ministerial act, the December 20 letter was not a

final action on the matter because FDLE remained willing to address the non-

approval for Mr. Lynch to purchase a firearm but had not received the necessary

additional information from Mr. Lynch. (Ex. 4) The August 21 letter reiterated that

Mr. Lynch may challenge the accuracy of the NICS record by filing an appeal

directly with the FBI, may seek correction of the record or restoration of firearms

rights from the State of New York, or may obtain additional records from the State

of New York and that, if Mr. Lynch provided FDLE additional information received

from the FBI or the State of New York, his non-approval could be affected.

Mr. Lynch subsequently filed the instant Petition, which requests this Court to

compel FDLE to issue a final decision regarding his non-approval to purchase a

firearm and to file the decision with the agency clerk.

ARGUMENT

I. The requirements for mandamus relief.

“A writ of mandamus is a common-law writ used to coerce the performance of

any and all official duties where the official charged by law with the performance of

such duty refused or failed to perform the same.” State ex rel. Buckwalter v. City of

Lakeland, 150 So. 508, 511 (Fla. 1933). The act sought to be compelled must be

3
ministerial, rather than discretionary. See Solomon v. Sanitarians’ Registration Bd.,

155 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1963). “Entitlement to the extraordinary writ of mandamus

requires the petitioner to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to the

performance of the particular action sought, the respondents have a clear legal duty

of performance, and no other adequate remedy exists.” Adams v. State, 560 So. 2d

321, 322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (citations omitted).

“A necessary prerequisite to obtaining mandamus relief is a showing that the

petitioner has made an express, distinct demand for performance of the requested act

to the respondent official.” KKP Holdings, LLC v. Russell, 1 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2009) (citations omitted). Moreover, mandamus ordinarily “will not lie in

absence of a showing that the administrative official has refused to perform the duty

sought to be coerced upon application or request made therefor in accordance with

the laws which establish or create the duty which is sought to be coerced.” Fair v.

Davis, 283 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).

II. Mr. Lynch cannot establish that FDLE has a clear legal duty to issue a final
decision because the administrative process has not been completed.

Mr. Lynch requests this Court to compel FDLE “to issue a final decision and

file said decision with the agency clerk.” (Pet., p. 24) However, FDLE cannot issue

a final decision regarding the non-approval for Mr. Lynch to purchase a firearm.

FDLE was unable to resolve Mr. Lynch’s appeal of the non-approval after he

questioned the accuracy of the disqualifying record because it was not provided
4
necessary additional information. Moreover, FDLE remains willing to address the

non-approval if the necessary additional information is provided. Since Mr. Lynch

has not pursued the next step of seeking correction, rights restoration, or additional

records from the agency responsible for the disqualifying record, the administrative

process has not yet been completed.

Section 790.065(6), Florida Statute (2018), provides that any person denied the

right to purchase a firearm may request a criminal history records review and

correction in accordance with rules promulgated by the FDLE. The rule promulgated

by the FDLE provides that a potential buyer wishing to appeal a non-approval must

complete and provide an appeal form to the FDLE within 60 days or, as an

alternative, may appeal directly to FBI in accordance with federal regulations. See

Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-6.009(8). Rule 11C-6.009(8) provides that the FDLE will

process the appeal request using the procedures described in Rule 11C-8.

After receiving Mr. Lynch’s appeal of the non-approval to purchase a firearm,

FDLE informed him about the record that disqualified him from purchasing a

firearm and directed him to contact the authority responsible for reporting the record.

The response by FDLE was compliant with both State and Federal regulations.

According to the rules promulgated by FDLE:

If after reviewing the record, the individual believes that the record is incorrect
or incomplete, it is the individual’s responsibility to contact the agency
submitting that part of the record in question. It then will be the responsibility
of that agency to determine the merit of the assertion, to make any and all
5
 corrections or deletions that may be required, and to notify FDLE of any
corrections or deletions.

Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-8.001(5) (emphasis added). Moreover, the non-approval

by the FDLE was based on a record in NICS. According to the rules promulgated by

the United States Department of Justice:

If the individual wishes to challenge the accuracy of the record upon which
the denial is based, or if the individual wishes to assert that his or her rights to
possess a firearm have been restored, he or she may make application first to
the denying agency, i.e., either the FBI or the POC. If the denying agency is
unable to resolve the appeal, the denying agency will so notify the individual
and shall provide the name and address of the agency that originated the
document containing the information upon which the denial was based. The
individual may then apply for correction of the record directly to the agency
from which it originated. If the record is corrected as a result of the appeal to
the originating agency, the individual may so notify the denying agency,
which will, in turn, verify the record correction with the originating agency
(assuming the originating agency has not already notified the denying agency
of the correction) and take all necessary steps to correct the record in the
NICS.

28 C.F.R. §25.10(c) (emphasis added). Thus, even if Mr. Lynch chooses an appeal

to the denying agency (FDLE) as his administrative remedy, he must still ultimately

seek correction with the reporting agency to complete the administrative process and

exhaust his administrative remedies.

Since Mr. Lynch questioned the accuracy of the record that disqualified him

from purchasing a firearm, FDLE was unable to resolve his appeal of his non-

approval to purchase a firearm, Mr. Lynch failed to pursue the next step in the

administrative process, and FDLE remains willing to address the non-approval, Mr.

6
Lynch cannot demonstrate that the administrative process has been completed.

Therefore, he cannot establish that he has a clear legal right to the issuance of a final

decision or that FDLE has a clear legal duty to issue a final decision.

III. Mr. Lynch cannot establish that FDLE has a clear legal duty to file a final
decision with the agency clerk because such a decision would not be a final
order, as defined by section 120.52(7), Florida Statutes (2019).

Furthermore, even if FDLE could issue a final decision in this matter, Mr. Lynch

cannot establish that FDLE has a clear legal duty to file such a decision with the

agency clerk. FDLE acknowledges that it has a clear legal duty to file “final orders,”

as defined by section 120.52(7), Florida Statutes (2019), with the agency clerk. See

Sowell v. State, 136 So. 3d 1285, 1287-88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that

Department of Revenue was required to file a probable cause review document with

the agency clerk because it was a final agency action); Students for Online Voting v.

Machen, 24 So. 3d 1273, 1273–74 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that agency that

issued a final order was required to file it with the agency clerk). However, any

action by the FDLE in this matter would not be a “final order,” as defined by section

120.52(7), and Mr. Lynch has neither alleged that FDLE has a clear legal duty to file

documents that are not final orders with the agency clerk nor identified any legal

authority that suggests that such a clear legal duty exists.

Any action by FDLE in this matter would not be a “final order” because the

FDLE is merely attempting to comply with a legislative mandate to perform a

7
ministerial act and is not otherwise acting on its own authority. In Rowell v. State,

Florida Dept. of Law Enf’t, 700 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the Second

District Court of Appeal held that a letter informing Rowell that a certificate of

eligibility to have her criminal history sealed could not be issued in her case was

neither a final agency action under section 120.52 nor a quasi-judicial order because

“FDLE was merely complying with—or trying to comply with—a legislative

mandate to perform a ministerial act and was not otherwise acting on its own

authority.” The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as premature, because

Rowell was required to first pursue a remedy in the trial court. Id. at 1243-44.

This Court has subsequently relied on the authority of Rowell to dismiss appeals

against FDLE. See Reno v. State, Dept. of Law Enf’t, 704 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA

1998); Mitchell v. State, Dept. of Law Enf’t, 704 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998);

Greer v. State, Dept. of Law Enf’t, 704 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). This Court

has also relied on the authority of Rowell to dismiss appeals against other agencies.

See Freedom Life Ins. Co. Of Am. v. State, Dept. Of Fin. Services, Office of Ins.

Regulation, 891 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Seratech, Inc. v. Agency for Health

Care Admin., 866 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Physicians Health Care Plans,

Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 845 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Thus,

this Court has previously adopted the reasoning in Rowell.

8
 The legislature has mandated that the FDLE must review available records to

determine whether there are any records related to a potential buyer of a firearm that

would disqualify the buyer from purchasing a firearm and then must inform the

relevant party of the results of the records review. See §790.065(2), Fla. Stat. (2018).

This is similar to the legislative mandate for the FDLE to review records to

determine whether to issue a certificate of eligibility for sealing of a criminal history

record, see §943.059(2), Fla. Stat. (2019), which was held to be a ministerial act.

Since the function of the FDLE under section 790.065 is similar to its function under

section 943.059, its actions pursuant to section 790.065 are also ministerial.

“A ministerial duty is one which is positively imposed by law to be performed

at a time and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated by

the law itself absent any authorization of discretion to the agency.” Solomon v.

Sanitarians' Registration Bd., 155 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 1963) (citation omitted).

Under section 790.065, FDLE is required to make its determination based on criteria

that is specifically delineated in the statute. FDLE does not exercise any discretion

because it does not decide what criteria disqualifies a potential purchaser of a

firearm. Moreover, FDLE cannot exercise discretion to correct or update a record

because that responsibility lies with the agency reporting the record.

Mr. Lynch argues that the use of the terms “determine” and “decision” in section

790.065 and Rule 11C-6.009 indicate that FDLE exercises discretion. (Pet., p. 16)

9
However, FDLE also “determines” whether an applicant’s criminal record meets the

eligibility requirements for sealing the record, which has been held to be a ministerial

act. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-7.007(4) (“If the application packet is complete,

the Department will review the submitted information and the subject's criminal

history record to determine if the specified record meets the requirements for sealing,

which are listed in Section 943.059, F.S.”). Thus, use of the terms “determine” or

“decision” do not establish that FDLE exercises discretionary authority.

Mr. Lynch also argues that the fact that the FDLE allows internal appeals of

non-approvals to purchase firearms indicates that FDLE exercises discretion. (Pet.,

p. 16) However, FDLE also permits internal appeal of determinations that a criminal

record does not meet the eligibility requirements for sealing, which has been held to

be a ministerial act. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-7.007(5) (“If the specified

criminal history record does not meet the requirements for sealing, the Department

will send the subject a letter stating the reason for ineligibility with an explanation

of appeal rights.”). Thus, the availability of an appeal also does not establish that

FDLE exercises discretionary authority.

Moreover, section 790.065, similar to section 943.059, does not refer to a right

to a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes. Conversely, the statute

for licenses to carry concealed weapons or firearms explicitly provides that an

individual denied a license has the right to a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120. See

10
§790.06(6)(c)(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“If the Department of Agriculture and Consumer

Services denies the application, it shall notify the applicant in writing, stating the

ground for denial and informing the applicant of any right to a hearing pursuant to

chapter 120.”). The lack of such language in section 790.065, in contrast with the

inclusion of the language in another section of the same chapter of the statutes,

indicates that the legislature did not consider the determination of whether an

individual is prohibited from purchasing a firearm to be an exercise of discretionary

authority by FDLE. See Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) (“As a

fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, courts should avoid readings that would

render part of a statute meaningless. Furthermore, whenever possible courts must

give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions

in harmony with one another.”) (citations omitted).

Mr. Lynch argues that he would be denied any judicial review if the non-

approval by the FDLE is considered a ministerial act. However, Mr. Lynch has

multiple avenues to pursue relief from the non-approval through the administrative

process or judicial review. First, Mr. Lynch may seek correction of the record or

relief from firearms disability through the New York State Division of Criminal

Justice Services. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-8.001(5); 28 C.F.R. §25.10(c); N.Y.

Mental Hyg. Law §7.09(i)-(j). Second, Mr. Lynch may seek correction of the record

through the FBI. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 11C-6.009(8); 28 C.F.R. §25.10(d). Third,

11
Mr. Lynch may bring an action against the appropriate New York agency or against

the United States for an order directing that the contested information be corrected

or that the firearm transfer be approved. See 28 C.F.R. §25.10(f). Finally, if Mr.

Lynch can show that he has a clear legal right to purchase a firearm by establishing

that the NICS record is erroneous, Mr. Lynch may file a mandamus petition, or other

appropriate action, in the trial court to attempt to compel FDLE to approve his

purchase of a firearm or to otherwise resolve the matter. See Rowell, 700 So. 2d at

1244-45; 28 C.F.R. §25.10(f). Therefore, both administrative review and judicial

review of the Mr. Lynch’s non-approval are available.

Since a non-approval to purchase a firearm is merely a ministerial act, such a

decision is not a final order as defined by section 120.52(7), Florida Statutes (2019).

Since Mr. Lynch has not identified any legal authority that suggests that agencies

are required to file ministerial decisions or documents that are not “final orders” with

the agency clerk, Mr. Lynch cannot establish that FDLE has a clear legal duty to file

a decision regarding non-approval to purchase a firearm with its agency clerk.

IV. This Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the Petition because
granting the Petition would be detrimental to the public interest.

“It is well settled that mandamus is a discretionary writ that is awarded, not as a

matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and upon equitable

principles.” State ex rel. Haft v. Adams, 238 So. 2d 843, 844 (Fla. 1970); see also

Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1257 (Fla. 2004) (“Since the nature of an
12
extraordinary writ is not of absolute right, the granting of such writ lies within the

discretion of the court. Therefore, extraordinary writs may be denied for numerous

and a variety of reasons, some of which may not be based upon the merits of the

petition.”). “Every proceeding in mandamus must be determined upon its own

setting of facts and the peremptory writ will not be granted where it would serve no

useful purpose, or where it would work a hardship or injustice or be detrimental of

the public interest.” State ex rel. Mann v. Burns, 109 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 1st DCA

1959); see also State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 164 So. 199, 206 (Fla. 1935) (holding

that, even if relator had a clear legal right for which mandamus was a proper remedy,

the writ should not be granted if it would result in disorder, confusion, and

disturbance). This Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the Petition

because granting a writ of mandamus would be detrimental to the public interest.

FDLE cannot resolve Mr. Lynch’s appeal of his non-approval to purchase a

firearm without receiving additional information related to the record that

disqualifies him from purchasing a firearm. FDLE is unable to obtain additional

information about the record because it is from a New York proceeding and it cannot

be released to FDLE because it is a confidential mental health or substance abuse

record. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§22.05(b); 33.13(c). Mr. Lynch was informed

that he could pursue correction of the record, obtain relief from the firearm disability,

or obtain additional information about the record through the State of New York and

13
provide additional information to FDLE. Mr. Lynch was also informed that he could

challenge the accuracy of the record through the FBI. Mr. Lynch may also contest

the accuracy or validity of the record by bringing a civil action against the

appropriate New York agency, the United States, or FDLE. However, Mr. Lynch

inexplicably refuses to pursue any of these adequate remedies.

The public has a safety interest in preventing convicted felons and the mentally

ill from possessing firearms. Hence, the Second Amendment does not proscribe laws

prohibiting possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill or imposing

conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms. See D.C. v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). Granting the requested writ of mandamus would

remove the responsibility of a potential firearm purchaser to pursue correction of or

relief from a mental health adjudication and transform an FDLE non-approval of a

firearm purchase into an appealable final agency order, even though FDLE is only

mandated to perform the ministerial function of reviewing available records and

applying legislatively created criteria. This could create a loophole where potentially

dangerous mentally ill or unstable individuals would be able to illegally purchase

firearms because FDLE is unable to obtain details of the records of their mental

health adjudications. Such a situation would be detrimental to the public’s safety

interest. Therefore, this Court should exercise its discretion not to grant the Petition

even if it determines that the Petition may be granted.

14
 CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court deny

the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

ASHLEY MOODY
Attorney General

/s/ Bilal Ahmed Faruqui

BILAL AHMED FARUQUI
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Florida Bar Number 15212
Office of the Attorney General
General Civil Litigation Section
State Programs Bureau
PL – 01 The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
(850) 414-3757
Bilal.Faruqui@myfloridalegal.com
Maia.Rogers@myfloridalegal.com
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that, on September 24, 2019, I electronically filed this

document by using the Florida Courts E-Filing Portal and that I served a copy of this

document through the E-Filing Portal upon the following:

Eric J. Friday
Kingry & Friday
1919 Atlantic Boulevard
Jacksonville, Florida 32207
service@ericfriday.com
efriday@ericfriday.com
Counsel for Petitioner
15
 /s/ Bilal Ahmed Faruqui
Bilal Ahmed Faruqui

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that this response was computer generated using Times

New Roman 14-point font in compliance with Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(l).

/s/ Bilal Ahmed Faruqui

Bilal Ahmed Faruqui

16