RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B.

AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952

REGISTERED VOTERS vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. G.R. No. 174153,
October 25, 2006.

THE CASE

These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to
amend the 1987 Constitution.

FACTS

Lambino and Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution.

The Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No.
6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group claims that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified
the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections
1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government.

The Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

RULING OF THE COMELEC

The COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition
for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.

The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on

Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals
to amend the Constitution. Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of
certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and to compel the
COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition.

CONTENTION OF THE LAMBINO GROUP

The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.

Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that
case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the
sovereign people."

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 PRAYER OF THE BINAY GROUP (OPPOSITION-IN-INTERVENTION)

Binay Group prays that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show
cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of
signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago.

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes
with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling.
The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules
"as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative."

Supporting intervenors uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. While, opposing intervenors hold the
contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Group's petition.

RULING

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the Commision on Elections.

1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on direct proposal by the people.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that
allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x

The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such
proposal. The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."

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Essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people.

This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a

petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face
of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of
such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that
every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements

in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.

In this case, the Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a
copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet when they filed their Memorandum.

The signature sheet submitted by the Lambino Group to the Court does not contain the
full text of the proposed changes to the Constitution; instead, the signature sheet
merely asks whether the people approve a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
"petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the
initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that the Lambino Group circulated,
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed with the COMELEC.

Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the petition during the
signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted that only 100,000 copies could
be confirmed to have been printed as these were printed by Lambino himself. With only
100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a
great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed
the signature sheets.

The conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories
the full text of the proposed changes. The failure to so include the text of the proposed
changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition."

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Having proved that majority of the signatories were not able to see the full text of the
of the proposed changes proposed signing, they could not have known the full nature
and effect of the proposed changes which include three controversial amendments:

1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members,
who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine
the expiration of their own term of office;

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people
the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as
a gigantic fraud on the people.

In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it

dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition."

The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing

revision through initiatives.

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the

Constitution and not to its revision.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by

the people through initiative x x x.

Based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers intentionally

made a distinction between amendments and revisions. It was the intent, as is written,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention can propose revisions while a people’s
initiative is limited only to the proposal of amendments.

Distinction between an amendment and a revision.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering
the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.

There are two tests to determine whether a change is an amendment or a

revision.

Two-Part Test:

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Quantitative Test - asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions
as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

Qualitative Test - the main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.

Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI
on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions
in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the

three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced
into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of government.

The proposed changes by the Lambino Group significantly alter the basic plan of
government as it would effectively alter the separation of powers through the abolition
of the Office of the President and merging of the legislative and executive, and alter the
system of checks and balances within the legislature through the abolition of one
chamber of Congress.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily
apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as
set forth in the Constitution.

In sum, there is no doubt that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional
because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the
scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."

2. A revisit of Santiago v. Comelec is not necessary.

There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution.

Even if it is assumed RA 6735 is valid, contrary to the ruling in Santiago, the outcome of
the Lambino Group’s petition would not change because the present initiative
must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before
complying with RA 6735. In this case, the petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.

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Lambino group violated Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the
"petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories."

The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty.
Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition
and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado,
Petitioners." Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not
even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as
valid.

Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1)
subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x."

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violated the above section. The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces
more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to
the electorate.

Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.

4. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Lambino Group's initiative.

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely
followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition
warrants outright dismissal.

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 MAGALLONA VS ERMITA

FACTS:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in

which the government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening
one baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and
Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the

constitutionality of RA 9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the
Constitution and it opens the country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of
other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security and of the
Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be
prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and

2. Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional

RULING:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:

The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the
citizens who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy
sought.

2nd Issue:

The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory
tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III.
SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result
of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from
the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must

7
for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the
treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522
resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA
9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime
space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is

consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part
of the archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated
that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the
legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been
claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other
hand they had to consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the
nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of
the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s
delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the
internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters
to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters
to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal
or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with
its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles
of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of
innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies
concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside
the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit
its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If
the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to
determine the passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was
necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the
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Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit
the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will
weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its
maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

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THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO,
ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR. G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008 , CARPIO
MORALES, J.

FACTS

Peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the MILF1 began in 1996. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in
Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and
agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect.
With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001
simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."

On August 5, 2008, GRP and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective
peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF did not materialize upon
motion of petitioners, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro

The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that:

 The BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its “internal
waters,” defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the
BJE area;
 The BJE shall also have “territorial waters,” which shall stretch beyond the BJE
interal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south
east and south west of mainland Mindanao;
 Within these territorial waters, the BJE and the “Central Government” shall
exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources;
 The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters
between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through
production sharing and economic cooperation agreement;
 The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with
foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those
countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include
aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental
cooperation agreements;

1
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of
the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then
headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the
manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.
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  The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the
Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary
steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like
those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN;
 The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production
pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE;
 The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts
or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements
(MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land
tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued
by the present ARMM.

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the
ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain
municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001
plebiscite.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on

public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later
initialed the MOA-AD
2. Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional

RULING

1. Respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public

consultation and the right to information.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to
the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has
categorically ruled:

x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations

leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the
passing of a statute. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
people's will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure
is the design for feedback mechanisms.

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Presidential Adviser on Peace Process Esperon committed grave abuse of
discretion

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from
their total environment.

2. The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently

worded:

1. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

2. The MOA-AD would not comply with Article X Section 20 of the Constitution
3. Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected
4. The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM
5. The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with IPRA
6. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity
of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE
is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of
Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of
the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region."

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional

12
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph
2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the
ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion
in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in
contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview.
That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then
was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of

the Constitution.
On the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD
would require an amendment that would expand the Article X, Section 20 of the
Constitution. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of
said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the
BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the
Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE
with treaty-making power. Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who
has that power.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme
envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected.
The constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development." An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there
may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status
which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is
certainly not conducive to national unity.

The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with R.A. 9054 or the Organic Act of the
ARMM
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the
definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. The use of the term
Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic
Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other
indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro
people and Tribal peoples.

The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with IPRA.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs),
under the IPRA, they have the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in
matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. The MOA-AD, an instrument
recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut
mechanisms ordained in said Act, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.

Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency
the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-
AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In

13
proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying
with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly
transcended the boundaries of their authority.

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land."

International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples,"

understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In
considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally
secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination
is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired
a status beyond ‘convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."
REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:

"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination

126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-
determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and
cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right
to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the
form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only
the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances. x x x

External self-determination can be defined as in the following

statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as

The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free

association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a peopleconstitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.

127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved

within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing
states. The various international documents that support the existence of a
people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of
the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to
prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of
relations between sovereign states.

Even if the UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (UN DRIP) were considered as part of the law of the
land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice
to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with
other laws unnecessary.

Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now
be regarded as embodying customary international law, the obligations enumerated
therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through
the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the

14
MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope,
allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.

There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee
indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8
presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples
against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally
performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous
people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the
protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of
States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous
peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26
thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy,
does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an
associated state

Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding
international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in
conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding
agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine
government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro
people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.

The MOA-AD would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition,

representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur.
These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the
status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the
prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.

In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created
an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the
amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign
dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The
Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a
treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in
municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in
depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.

xxxx

An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and

obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a
breach determined under international law which will also provide principle
means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor
obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An
agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which brings to an end an
internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of
restoration of peace that the international community acting through
the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert

15
 it to an international agreement which creates an obligation
enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law.

xxxx

A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be

ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed
conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring
States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an
international instrument.”

Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and
international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest
in it a binding character under international law.

In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply
with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its
Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people.

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the Nuclear Tests Case criteria cited in Australia vs.
France, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the
same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as
a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international
organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of
the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as
facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties
to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and
international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as
to create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal
effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international
intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international
law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing
amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered,
as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their
brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino
people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

16
 MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO et al. vs.SCOTT H. SWIFT et al.

G.R. No. 206510, 16 September 2014, J. Villarama Jr.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

THE CASE:

Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the
Tubbataha Reefs.

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty."

Thereafter, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of
South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one
was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Tubbataha reef is a protected area system under the National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS) and was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one
of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs
and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an
important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species.

On April 17, 2013, the petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
filed the present petition against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US
7th Fleet Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and
Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises
Co-Director collectively referred to as "US respondents"; President Benigno S. Aquino
III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and other government officials collectively referred to as the "Philippine respondents."

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude
as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which
17
events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also
seek a directive from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal
suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file the present petition;
2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the US
respondents; and
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

RULING:

1. Yes, the petitiones have legal standing.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."

Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls
for more than just a generalized grievance."

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the "public right" of
citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors

and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a
citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses
the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature."16

2. None. This court has jurisdiction no has jurisdiction over the US

respondents.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity
or non-suability of the State,17is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil")
from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule
of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs.24
18
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

3. No, the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA does not apply in this
case.

The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the
US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits
of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the
Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction, so that if an american soldier commits an offense in the Philippines, he shall
be tried by Philippine courts under Philippine laws. The waiver did not include the
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.

We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has
become moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or
restrained had already been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this
Court. But insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate
the coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident
are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion
of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the
fact that the US and Philippine governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and
discuss the matter of compensation for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The
US Embassy has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts
in assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.

19
 Republic of the Philippines, represented by Raphael P.M. Lotilla, Secretary,
Department of Energy, Margarito B. Teves, Secretary, Department of Finance,
and Romulo L. Neri, Secretary, Deparment of Budget and Management,
Petitioners v. Provincial Government of Palawan, represented by Governor
Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170867
4 December 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:

On 11 December 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the

Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract No. 38, with Shell
Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated, as Contractor, for
the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area known as “Camago-
Malampaya” (Project) located offshore northwest of Palawan.

Under the Contract, the Republic was entitled to 60% of the net proceeds from the sale
of petroleum (including natural gas) produced from petroleum operations, while the
Service Contractor, was entitled to 40% of the net proceeds.

On 17 February 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.

381 (A.O. 381) which, in part, stated that the Province of Palawan (Respondent) was
expected to receive about US$2.1 Billion from the estimated US$8.1 Billion total
government share from the Malampaya project.

On 10 June 1998, DoE Secretary Francisco L. Viray wrote Palawan Governor Salvador
P. Socrates, requesting for the deferment of payment of 50% of Palawan’s share in the
project for the first seven years of operations.

Thereafter, the Provincial Government of Palawan (Respondent) asserted its claim over
40% of the National Government’s share in the proceeds of the project.

It argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled
to said share under Section 290 of the Local Government Code.

On 7 May 2003, the Respondent filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa against DoE Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., DoF Secretary
Jose Isidro N. Camacho and DBM Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin (Department
Secretaries).

It sought judicial determination of its rights under A.O. No. 381, R.A. 7611 (The
Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), Section 290 of the Local
Government Code, and Provincial Ordinance No. 474.

It further asked the RTC to declare that the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir is
part of the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan and that the
Respondent was entitled to receive 40% of the National Government’s share in the
proceeds of the Project.

On the other hand, the Republic argued that the Respondent was not entitled to 40%
share because the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is outside its territorial jurisdiction.

20
It argued that Palawan’s territorial jurisdiction is limited to its land area and to the
municipal waters within 15km from its coastline. It denied being estopped by the acts of
government officials who earlier acknowledged Palawan’s share in the proceeds of the
project.

On 9 February 2005, while the case is pending before the RTC, the Department
Secretaries, with authority from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, executed an
Interim Agreement with the Province of Palawan.

The agreement provided for the equal sharing between the Republic and the Province
of Palawan of 40% of the funds already remitted to the Republic under Service Contract
No. 38 and funds to be remitted to the Republic until the final and executory judgment
of the Civil Case filed, or 30 June 2010.

However, the Respondent claimed that the Republic failed to fulfill their commitments
under the Interim Agreement.

On 16 December 2005, the RTC decided in favor of the Province of Palawan.

The RTC held that it was “unthinkable” to limit Palawan’s territorial jurisdiction to its
landmass and municipal waters considering that the Local Government Code
empowered them to protect the environment.

Applying the principles of decentralization and devolution of powers to local government

units, as recognized in the 1987 Constitution, the RTC ruled that the State’s resources
must be shared with the LGUs.

Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the Tan v. COMELEC, Municipality of Paoay v. Manaois
and Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA were inapplicable.

The RTC further declared that the Regalian Doctrine could not be used by the
Department Secretaries as a shiled to defeat the Constitutional provision giving LGUs an
equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of national wealth
within their respective areas. The doctrine, as ruled by the RTC, is subject to this
Constitutional limitation and the 40% LGU share set by the LGC.

Lastly, the RTC ruled that the Republic legally acknowledged Palawan’s claim to the
proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya project and it was “too late in the day for [it] to
take a 180 degree turn.”

On 16 February 2006, the Republic challenged the RTC’s decision before the Supreme
Court through a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 170867.

On 25 July 2007, while the case is pending before the Supreme Court, the Republic and
the Respondent entered into a Provisional Implementation Agreement (PIA), that
allowed 50% of the disputed 40% of the Net Government share in the proceeds of
Service Contract No. 38, to be utilized for the immediate and effective implementation
of development projects for the people of Palawan.

Hence, on 1 December 2007, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 683, which authorized
the release of funds to the implementing agencies pursuant to the PIA, without
prejudice to any ongoing discussion or the final judicial resolution of Palawan’s claim of
territorial jurisdiction over the area.

21
On 7 February 2008, a petition for certiorari, questioning the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 683 was filed before the CA by Arigo, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers.

They argued that the PIA is contrary to the Constitution and the Local Government
Code.

However, the CA dismissed the petition of Arigo, et. al., because of failure to submit
relevant documents and for being filed prematurely, considering that it has same
essential facts and issues in G.R. No. 170867.

On 23 June 2009, the Supreme Court, consolidated G.R. No. 185941 with G.R. No.
170867.

ISSUE:

Whether the national wealth, in this case the Camago-Malampaya reservoir, is within
the Province of Palawan’s “area” for it to be entitled to 40% of the government’s share
under Service Contract No. 38.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court declared that under existing law, the Province of Palawan is
not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project.

The Supreme Court ruled that the LGU’s territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land
area, unless clearly expanded by Congress.

Here, the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project is not within the land area of
Respondent. Therefore, it is not within its territorial jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that Area as delimited by law and not exercise of
jurisdiction as basis of the LGU’s equitable share. An LGU’s territorial jurisdiction is not
necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or assertion of powers. To hold otherwise may
result in condoning acts that are clearly ultra vires.

It may lead to, in the words of the Republic, LGUs “rushing to exercise its powers and
functions in areas rich in natural resources (even if outside its boundaries) with the
intention of seeking a share in the proceeds of its exploration” – a situation that “would
sow conflict not only among the LGU and the National Government but worse, between
and among LGUs.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that an LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction over
an area simply because its government has exercised a certain degree of authority over
it.

Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that
creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU’s exercise of authority, but by
physical boundaries as fixed in its charter.

In this case, there is no law clearly granting the Province of Palawan territorial
jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya reservoir.

22
Furthermore, The Supreme Court laid down the rules that the State cannot be estopped
by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents; the UNCLOS did not confer
on LGUs their own continental shelf; and LGU’s share cannot be granted based on
equity.

23