1

REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO-HAMANO to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack
Topic: Void Marriages; Psychological Incapacity of respect for his wife and child, which characterizes a very immature
Nature of the Case: Petition for declaration of nullity on the ground person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to Toshio’s mental
of psychological incapacity incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
Doctrines:
 · Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time The Sol gen appealed to the CA but the same was denied.
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if Lolita exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. CA concluded that
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
to his family, and to “observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
 · Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
mutual help and support” pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
Philippines.
psychological illness.
 · As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse The CA emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs.
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed
psychological, not physical, illness. marriage,” the husband being a Japanese national.
 · Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
could have been done through an expert witness. incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations.
Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder
Facts:
on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
On January 14, 1988, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio were
married in Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
Issue/s:
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
WON respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage,
Hamano to perform his marital obligations
Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate
the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
Ruling: No
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
see her and their child.
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need
ground of psychological incapacity.
for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
The prosecutor filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the
identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness.
parties. The trial court granted respondent’s motion to present her
This respondent did not do.
evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family.
She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that: It is clear from the
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned
records of the case that Toshio failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of
his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in
the petitioner and father to his daughter. He remained irresponsible and
Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference,
 2
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do
not apply here because the present case involves a “mixed marriage,” the
husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to
be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision
dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
MARCOS V. MARCOS, 343 SCRA 755, OCTOBER 19, 2000
FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos
and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They later
on became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the
EDSA revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military
service. He engaged to different business ventures but failed. She always
urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to
engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have
sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on
their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would
leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. She did
not want him to stay in their house anymore so when she saw him in their
house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A.
Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation. The court a quo found Wilson
to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards Brenda and their children. RTC granted the
petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of
respondent to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of
evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity
HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not
a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless,
the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that
his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.
 3
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST
[G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with
Article 148.
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an
office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for
bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition
for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally
was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for
his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of
the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be
registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial
court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not
having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property
relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:
1. YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be
void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly
falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
2. YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling
under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only
the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
 4
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally
x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the
CA is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property
covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were
in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name
of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
“married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is
required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together
and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
Spouses Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126376. November 20, 2003
FACTS:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the
parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as
of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all
surnamed JOAQUIN. The married Joaquin children are joined in
this action by their respective spouses. Sought to be declared null and void
ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6 parcels of land executed
by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor
of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title
issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the
aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their
complaint, aver that the purported sale of the properties in litis was the
result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of
the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale
RULING:
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of
the Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their
parents’ properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’
death. While still living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of
their properties. In their overzealousness to safeguard their future
legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the lots to their
siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While the sale of
the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the
lots taken from the estate.
 5
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. being
the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s
wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned
the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden
Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage
is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to
be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear
not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
Morigo v. People
G.R. No. 145226, 6 February 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost
contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was
then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete
was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in
good faith.
ISSUE:Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from
the bigamy case.
RULING:
No. considering that the first marriage was void ab initio makes Morigo
acquitted in the Bigamy case.
As provided by Art. 3, part 3 of the Family Code “A marriage ceremony
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age”. “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.” As provided by Art. 4. Given these 2
articles, Morigo’s first marriage is considered void ab initio.
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was
no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing
officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner
does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit
bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
 6

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial
NOLASCO, respondent. court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993. respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded
belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
Facts: decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to
form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional
Trial Court a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Issue:
Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
prayed that respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. dead.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-
General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did
not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage annulled in the
same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on
marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first
met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one
of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica
Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they
returned to respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent
married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search
for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a “well-founded
belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a
marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish
that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife
was already dead that would sustain the issuance of
a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and
both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.

He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife

with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while
working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed
him that Janet Monica had left Antique.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself
whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that
all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet
Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he
inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the

presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to
her reappearance.
 7

G.R. No. 184621 : December 10, 2013 absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA (2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
CANTOR, Respondent. dead.

FACTS: HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is overruled.

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They CIVIL LAW - existence of well-founded belief
lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan
Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must
couple had a violent quarrel. Thereafter, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
his whereabouts. essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
husbands declaration of presumptive death. She claimed that she had a where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead. Despite inquiries from her in Article 391, Civil Code;
mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her
neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she
went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court. absentee is dead; and

The RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
Jerry presumptively dead. declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.Republic v.
Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993
The CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of
the Philippines affirmed in toto the latters order, thus: In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on
her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry by inquiries and through the
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court . patients directory when she went to the hospital.
It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial
proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of
final and executory (hence, not appeal able under Article 247 of the Family diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons: (1) the
Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not
oncertiorari. purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital
visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him; (2) she did
Likewise, petitioner posited that the respondent did not have a well- not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
founded belief to justify the declaration of her husbands presumptive authorities to look for him;
death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent
search for her missing husband pursuant to the strict standard under (3) she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and
Article 41 of the Family Code. friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these
persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named;
ISSUES: (4) there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondents
claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting
1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husbands
 8
whereabouts.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more
imperative if we consider the States policy to protect and
strengthen the institution of marriage. Since marriage serves as
the familys foundationand since it is the states policy to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage
should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties.
In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying
rationale to uphold the sanctity of marriage.Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, November 19, 1991.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent
Doctrine:
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Facts:
On October 21, 1985 the respondent and Maria Dulce Javier got married.
This was the first marriage of the respondent which was not judicially
declared as nullified before the second marriage contracted by the
respondent with the petitioner which was celebrated on January 25, 1996.
It was also alleged that there is a third marriage contracted by the
respondent with some Julia Hernandez.
On February 25, 1998, the petitioner filed bigamy, a criminal case, against
his husband respondent. Thereafter, the respondent initiated a civil action
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
grounds that this was celebrated without a marriage license which is a
formal requisite for a valid marriage. The respondent also contends of his
ignorance of the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
before contracting in a new marriage. Thus, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
suspended the proceedings of the criminal case pending the decision of the
civil case.
The petitioner then files this case for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent can invoke his ignorance of the
requirement under Article 40 of the Family Code.
Held:
No, the respondent cannot invoke his ignorance of the requirement for the
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting a new
marriage.
Article 3 of the Civil Code states that, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. Thus, the respondent is presumed to have a
conclusive knowledge of the requisites of a valid marriage since the Family
Code is already in effect and force during the celebration of his second
marriage with the petitioner.
Hence, the decision of the RTC in suspending the criminal case pending the
civil case was reversed because it is wrong to invoke ignorance of a law
which is already in effect and force like the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
HELD:
Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent
cannot be permitted to use his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON
485 SCRA 376 (2006)
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption
arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on
the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the
first marriage had not been dissolved.
Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15
years later, a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed
before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, which has been granted.
Bailon, subsequently, contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque
and designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the
former.
SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly
pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal
department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted
during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage with Alice.
Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death
benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before
any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.
 9
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and
respondent Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the
absent spouse of Bailon
HELD:
The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse
endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the
second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be
filed.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is
terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the
absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent
marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent
marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the
subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee‘s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be
regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is
terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law,
Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s marriage prior to the former‘s death in 1998,
Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
BOLOS V. BOLOS
634 SCRA 429, [October 20, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15
March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article
36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the
petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent
Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order
declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed
by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they
were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations
to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders
of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to
marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According
to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such
that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by
the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo,
in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable
 10
because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,”
is applicable to the case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room
for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds
Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase
“under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC
decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ,
Respondent. G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
FACTS:
In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on
petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits
to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.
However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011
decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage
on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD:
YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held
that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed
the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just
given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v.
CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to
the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be
so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of
the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to
enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
 11
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next
one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth
diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence
must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional
mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no
legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the
party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in
the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an
aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value
only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s
findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would
justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological
and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court
deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The
position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but
should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to
such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment,
least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of
the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent
within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were
largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should
not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of
the petitioner’s factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to
expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature
of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of
parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not
have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at
the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties
and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her
children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them
to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong
playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young
children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to
her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling.
 12
Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every
occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her
children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty
as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19,
2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L.
OLAYBAR. G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014.
FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her
marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed
that she did not know the alleged husband; She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in
the wife portion thereof.
During trial, She completely denied having known the supposed husband,
but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage
as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadel's
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document examiner
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was
forged. The RTC decided in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L.
Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision
on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary
proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not
be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36
of the Family Code.
ISSUE: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage, be undertaken in a Rule
108 proceeding?
HELD: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 225 Phil. 408 the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of
the appropriate adversarial proceeding."An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may
be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or
motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The
procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of
all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person
in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that
the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
 13
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013.
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial
court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage
to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling
the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of. DENIED.
FERNANDO AQUINO VS CONCHITA DELIZO G.R. NO. L-15853 JULY
27, 1960
Facts of the Case:
Fernando Aquino filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
requesting a review of his case which was dismissed in the Court of
Appeals. This was regarding the annulment of his marriage to Conchita
Delizo.
Fernando Aquino claims that Conchita Delizo allegedly concealed that
she was pregnant by another man, since she gave birth to a child four
months after their marriage. Delizo defended by saying that she and
Fernando Aquino conceived the child out of wedlock.
At the trial both parties were represented by their lawyers; only
Fernando Aquino testified and presented their marriage certificate as the
only documentary evidence. Conchita Delizo, on the other hand, did not
appear or present any evidence.
Fernando Aquino’s complaint for annulment of marriage was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue: Will the concealment of pregnancy, as alleged by Fernando Aquino,
be a grounds for the nullity of his marriage to Conchita Delizo?
Ruling:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and
is a ground for annulment of marriage as stated in Article 46 (2) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, which says “concealment by the wife of the
fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
her husband.” Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally
plump” or fat. It is only on the 6 thmonth of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent.
In the following circumstances, the decision is set aside and the case is
remanded to the court a quo for new trial without costs.
 14

Mencianovs San JoseG.R. No. L-1967 May 28, 1951 3. Did MatildeMenciano have in her possession and illegally disposed of the
cash, jewels, and certain properties above mentioned?
Facts:
Held:
MatildeMenciano, in her behalf and in behalf of the minors Carlo
MagnoNeri and Faustino Neri, Jr., filed a motion for declaration of heirs, 1. Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2 applications
alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri San Joseto for a marriage
whom she was marriedon September 28, 1944, before Rev. Father Isaias
Edralin, S. J. She claims that before the marriage the deceased and she license, dated September 28, 1944, the first one, signed by the deceased
lived together as husband and wife, there having been no impediment to to marryMenciano and the other one, signed by Menciano to marry the
their marriage. She further claims that as a result of their cohabitation deceased; the certificate
before the marriage the child Carlo MagnoNeri was born on March 9, 1940
and was later baptized, said child having enjoyed the status of a
for immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by the
recognized natural child and that their second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was
Acting Local Civil
born on April 24, 1945; and that Carlo MagnoNeri was legitimized by the
subsequent matrimony of his parents and Faustino Neri, Jr., is a legitimate
child born in lawful wedlock. Registrar and the deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract signed by
thedeceased and Menciano as contracting parties, Rev. Isaias Edralin as
solemnizing officer,and the witnesses L. B. Castaños and Samson Pañgan.
On an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose, theexecutrix of the
The 4 documents are official andpublic; there validity can be successfully
estate of the deceased and Rodolfo Pelaez, the designated universal heir in
assailed only by strong, clear, and convincing oral testimony. In this case,
the will of the deceased dated December 19, 1940, denied the substantial
the oral evidence presented by the defendants is notconvincing so as to
allegations of the abovementioned motion for declaration of heirs and
declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures ofthe
further alleged in substance that the deceased, was suffering from senile
deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone that they could
dementia from the year which became worse from September 9, 1944.
not havebeen written by a man who is almost unconscious and physically
They also claimedthat the marriage between said deceased and
and intellectuallyincapacitated, as the defendants witnesses represent him
MatildeMenciano, was in violation of the legal provisions and requisites, for
to have been. Also, the testspertaining to testamentary capacity were
the deceased was deprived of his free will due to his age, sickness, and
applied to show the capacity to contractmarriage of the deceased.
bombardment, and Menciano, taking advantage of the deceased's
Although the said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no
condition, by intrigue and threat of abandoning him, forced Neri by means
reason why it should not be applied to the capacity to contract
of deceit (dolo) and threat to marry her; and that the deceased was
marriage,which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did
sterile, unable to procreate, and was impotent and congenitally sterile, the
not err in declaring validthe marriage of the deceased and Menciano.
same as his brothers Anastasio, Filomeno, Pedro, and his sister Conchita,
who had no children. The defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum
of P286,000 in cash, and for jewels and certain properties, which, as 2. Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the deceased and
alleged, were retained and illegally disposed of by MatildeMenciano. Menciano. The requisite

Issues:
1. Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and
MatildeMenciano valid?
2. Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo MagnoNeri the legitimate
children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and MatildeMenciano?
for potency being met, the necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino
Neri, Jr., is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased with
Menciano in lawful
wedlock.Carlo MagnoNeri was born on March 9, 1940, that is, before the
marriage. Both the deceased Faustino and MatildeMenciano free to marry
without any legal impediment. However, the court declared that Carlo
MagnoNeri has not been acknowledged as a natural child and,
 15

consequently, cannot be legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his HELD:

parents.
3. No. the trial court correctly reachedthe conclusion that such allegation
has not been substantiated. The testimonies ofmother and son- Paz Neri
San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the sum of money arecontradictory.
Withregard to the jewels, no satisfactory evidence was presented to prove
that Mencianomisappropriated them.
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA,
respondent
G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married
on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the
petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties
were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement
where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the
husband wanted to marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on
the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew
that the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged
in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service
was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then
declared in default for failing to answer the said petition. Just over a
month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and declared
the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the
Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule
9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment
of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger
of collusion, says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration
of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”
“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot
declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting
attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.”
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent
ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper
of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the
motion to declare petitioner in default.”
The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and
not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.”

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as
void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that
the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never
received summons on the case, hence depriving her of her right to be
heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she now comes to
the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.