Russian Federation Analysis

Final Term Submission Paper 1
Russian Federation and its growing influence in the Eastern Europe, West Asia and across
the globe: A Study of Russian Struggle to establish its supremacy
By- J.P Sambhava Ray- 1EPH (1934016)
CHRIST (Deemed to be University)
Bannerghatta Road Campus
School of Business Studies and Social Sciences
Submitted to- Prof. Dr. Shalini B.
School of Business Studies and Social Sciences, Economics and Political Science Cluster,
Bannerghatta Road Campus.

Abstract
The Russian federation has been a key contender of power and hegemony at an
international level. With more than 8000 nuclear warheads, way surpassing the United States of
America and the second largest military on globe, The Federation has been a key player in
international politics. Russia, is the key to many decisions in UN or any International
organisation due to its heavy strategic importance due to its massive power and the massive land
it owns.
Russian Federation, the shadow of the former communist fortress of Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic, has been struggling to re-establish the supremacy the USSR had from 1922-
1991, Russia wants to regain its former glory and establish the Russian Order.
In the following report, the following questions will be addressed-
1. WHY?
Why does Russia want to establish its supremacy? Is it for need of resources, or
prestige, is it the historical importance it lost as Soviet Union upon the dissolution
of the USSR; Here we will analyse, the Russian wish to establish itself as a
regional hegemonial power and an International power. Is Mr. Putin worried
about the spreading influence of NATO in eastern europe and with Ukraine
favouring NATO. Is it a need to fill the gargantuan power vacuum left by the
mighty Soviet Union. Here we would compare and contrast between the
governments of President Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir Putin, and the
contrast of their approach in politics in the region and across the globe.
2. WHERE?
We will also analyse the places/locations where the Russian Federation under Mr.
Putin has been functioning and focusing to gain influence and to manipulate or
digress the nations/states. The analysis of the location of warfare, the Russian
interest in the places of engagement, will make it very clear for us about the goals
and motives of the Russian state machinery and would provide the evidentiary
support to any conclusion we reach henceforth in the report. The primary focus
here will be-
a. Eastern Europe
b. West Asia
c. Former Soviet States
3. HOW?
We will then go on to analyse how the Russian govt. is expanding its influence, is
it through soft power, like culture, tradition, language, technology, industry, jobs,
films, TV and other influencing material at the disposal of the state to manipulate
the mass of the target nation or is it through military power, invasions,
interventions, skirmishes, air raids, flexing or showing-off power in some way or
other. The analysis will help us understand the methodology of post-Soviet Russia
to tackle the problems or to show dominance on smaller state and how
comparatively it is different from the show of dominance in soviet era.
4. STANCES
Being a foreign national to the Russian Federation, it would only be fair to present
stances both in favour and against Russian involvement in many of the conflicts,
and to analyse what nationstates support or reject the Russian involvement in any
incident and to analyse why they support or oppose the Russian stance on the
issue. Furthermore here i would present India’s stance on the Russian
involvements separately and analyse them as well to get a better look at the Indian
perspective on the issue.
Keywords: Russia, USSR, hegemony, Power, Supremacy, Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin
INTRODUCTION
During the Victory Day Parade in 2013, When Rossiya Sveshcenya was played for the 28th time
in the Red Square, Mr. Putin had mentioned very optimistically and with conviction that Russia
will not remain in the shadow of its former self and will rise like a phoenix from the ashes of its
glorious past and make a future even more glorious; who would have guessed that in nine
months the Kremlin would start its re-emergence bid with the alleged ‘annexation’ of Crimea
(The Kremlin claims referendums were held in Crimea which leaned towards Russian favour).
The Russian Federation post 2010 has been in quite a few warring ‘hotspots’. You see the
Russian standards in ISIS insurgency, Syrian Civil War, Russo-Ukraine skirmishes and conflict
(due to Donetsk and Luhansk) these are the contemporary issues. But if we see and analyse the
conflicts, their frequencies of occurrence and the period of occurrence, there we see a variation
during different administration era (addressed ahead).
Was the fall of the Red Flag from Kremlin and crawling up of the Russian state flag was a blow
enough for Russians to aspire for powers that they had earlier?
Is there any other motive behind the power snatching character that Russia has pulled out of
itself?
We will now delve into analysing what was behind and still is behind the Grand Iron Curtain (or
what remains of it).
Understanding Kremlin’s bid to Supremacy
As per records “In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost control over 5.3 million
km sq. of territory and 139 million citizens which included over 17% of the ethnic Russian
population. Invaluable natural resources, historical and cultural sights, and some of the most
advanced Soviet military infrastructure and equipment were also out of Moscow’s reach. The
world politics has turned to unipolarity from bipolarity. Russia was restricted with a shrinking
economy and transition policies to free market economy. Moscow was in a disastrous chaotic
economic situation after the collapse of communism. The Russian economy fell dramatically;
experiencing goods shortages in 1991 and 2500% hyperinflation in 1992.
In the 1990s, the dynamics of Russian foreign policies shifted considerably. In the Yeltsin era,
Russia gradually withdrew from its global military and political role to focus its foreign policy
on the transformation of the former superpower relationship with the United States and its
relationship with Europe, and on the development of relations with the other states immediately
on its borders. But Russia lost the capacity to continue providing financial aids to the other states
of the former Soviet Union and thus to maintain its economic attraction. At the same time, there
were NATO expansion and new European Union memberships were being made among nations
of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. There was again the threat of dissolution of Russian
territory. US led international investment started to get advantage of economic spaces in energy
sector in the Caspian Basin in Central Asia. Russia’s economy deteriorated more badly when
devolution occurred in 1998.
Russian energy power declined in the late 1980s and 1990s, due to low oil prices, the
dislocations of the collapse of the USSR, and the privatization of many oil companies. Oil
production decreased from 600 to 300 million tons per year between 1990 and 1995. However,
Russia’s ample resources and extensive network of pipelines ensured that its ‘petro-power’ was
ready to re-emerge under President Putin.

After a noticeable decline under Yeltsin (starting from Gorbachev), the Putin era saw a
resurgence of Russian power. Putin focused on recovery after a great economic depression.
Russia, having the world's largest energy resources, benefited positively from the increasing
energy prices due to prevailing international concern about energy security, instability in the
Middle East since 1999. This increase in prices gave great support to the Russian economy.
Since 1999, Russia’s annual GDP growth was averaged between 6 and 7 percent. The
government boasted a healthy budget surplus and record currency reserves.
Since 2000, having the advantage of improving economic power which was in chaotic condition
in Yeltsin era, Putin started to use soft power to influence neighboring states to implement its
regional policies and he also evaded from using its military power to ensure its geopolitical
position.
Russia has turned itself from a dead military superpower into a new energy superpower in Putin
Era by using soft power. Energy revenues no longer supported a massive military-industrial
complex as they did in the Soviet period. As Fiona Hill underlines, new oil wealth has been
turned more into butter than guns. Russian natural gas, technology, culture, consumer goods, and
job opportunities became a Russian power in Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. And
energy-rich countries like Kazakhstan benefited from the same oil price increase as Russia. As
Eurasian economies started to recover and grow, Russia’s neighbors began to look to it as a
market for their exports. Since then dependency on Russia grew increasingly. The emergence of
new transnational threats to US and Western interests, especially terrorism emanating from
Afghanistan and the Middle East, shifted international priorities. It was also evident that, with
the notable exception of the three Baltic states, none of the other states of the former Soviet
Union was likely to be a viable candidate for membership of either NATO or the EU in the near
term.” - Dr. Richard Sokolsky (Richard Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s
Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the
Ukraine crisis.)
Since 2012, Russia has been directing a complex, well-resourced, and, so far, fruitful battle to
extend its worldwide impact to the detriment of the United States and other Western nations.
Moscow has sought after a large group of targets, for example, tarnishing democracies and
undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order, particularly in spots of customary/traditional
U.S. impact; isolating Western political and security organizations; showing Russia's arrival as a
worldwide superpower; reinforcing Vladimir Putin's domestic authority and establishing the
absolute legitimacy of Russian govt. under him; and advancing Russian commercial, military,
socio-economic and energy interests. In spite of the fact that its remote activities are frequently
deft, Russia progressively intends to make a multipolar world in which it assumes an
increasingly hegemonial role or a grasp on international politics.

The Yeltsin Era (1991-1999)- In Brief
Returning back to the past; for a significant part of the post–Cold War, the United States and
Europe gave little consideration to Russia's endeavors to extend its political, monetary, and
military impact abroad. The West considered these to be as relics of the Cold War, basically
confined to Russia's immediate surrounding/neighborhood, but largely absent outside Russian
sphere (at that point, its neighbours) or ineffective in nature.
The impacts of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's internal turmoil, the immediate
incapacity of Russian authorities and the economic imbalance sharply constrained the Kremlin’s
interest and capacity to project its influence on a global scale and diminished the West’s interest
in Russian foreign policy and its global activities.
This was mostly the Yeltsin-era, the immediate successor of Mikhail Gorbachev. Mr. Boris
Yeltsin, the first President of the Russian Federation, though a conservative and a socialist at
heart was politically aligned to merge Russia with the progressive image of the west. In the
power vacuum created by the USSR, Russia was looking to construct a new state-structure and a
new identity which would set it aside from the Soviet Union., which was well reflected in the
Yeltsin-led govt’s foreign policies.
The Yeltsin-era was ‘nicknamed’ by nationalists as the era of stagnation, much worse than the
Brezhnev-era stagnation of Soviet Union. The economy was monopolised by the oligarchs and
few splinter groups controlled most of the industries. Yeltsin’s policies were not appreciated by
the people of the Russian Federation, while he was hailed as the harbinger of Democracy in the
west, there was some resentment in Russia against him, blaming him for being equivalently
responsible for dissolution of the great Union. The blunders of his administration was what
forced him out of power through 1999, giving way to a powerful man to power, making Mr.
Vladimir Putin, the second President of Russian Federation.

The Putin-Era (1999-2008)-In brief
The era of Yeltsin came to a very miserable end with Yeltsin’s approval amongst Russian being
lower than ever before, Yeltsin resigned as the President of the Federation on 31st December
1999; according to Russian Constitution, Mr. Putin was made acting President.
In the election that were held 3 months after the resignation, Mr. Putin emerged victorious with
53% of votes and was inaugurated as the 2nd President of the Russian Federation on 7th May
2000. Many of the Russian studies scholars or Soviet studies scholars believe, the 53% vote that
Mr. Putin received were from the Soviet sympathisers and the older population who still believed
in the ideals of the Union, with this Mr. Putin was swept into the office, with his nearest
opponent being 20 points behind him.
What Putin inherited was defined by Dr. Sokolsky as a ‘mess’ of an economy and an even bigger
‘mess’ of state machinery. As per reports of Russian SFSR and the upcoming Russian
Federation- “Right away, (Yeltsin) began implementing a number of radical economic reforms,
including- price liberalization, mass privatization, and stabilization of the ruble.
The privatization reforms would see 70% of the economy privatized by the middle of 1994 and
in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election, (Yeltsin) initiated a “loans-for-shares” program
that transferred ownership of some natural resource enterprises to some powerful businessmen in
exchange for loans to help with the government budget. These so-called “oligarchs” would use
some of their newly acquired wealth to help finance (Yeltsin’s) re-election campaign. Despite
(Yeltsin’s) reforms, the economy performed horribly through much of the 1990s. From about
1991 to 1998 Russia lost nearly 30% of its real gross domestic product (GDP), suffered
numerous bouts of inflation that decimated the savings of Russian citizens. Russians also saw
their disposable incomes rapidly decline. Further, capital was leaving the country en masse, with
close to $150 billion worth flowing out between 1992 and 1999.
In the midst of these negative indicators, Russia would manage to eke out 0.8% growth in 1997,
the first positive growth experienced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But just as things
were beginning to look optimistic, the financial crisis that began in Asia in the summer of 1997
soon spread to Russia causing the ruble to come under speculative attack. The currency crisis
would soon be exacerbated by the drop in oil prices at the end of the year, and in the middle of
1998, Russia devalued the ruble, default on its debt, and declare a moratorium on payments to
foreign creditors. Real GDP growth became negative again in 1998, declining by 4.9%.”
With this grave condition of the nation, in 2000, Mr. Putin took office. His first order of business
was to retrieve the Russian economy, improve living conditions and to revitalise all industrial,
military and energy sector. To summarise; During the Putin era, Russia has changed
considerably. The country has doubled its GDP, paid off its foreign loans almost four years early,
built up a one-party façade of democracy, deployed its energy resources as a means of coercive
diplomacy, reasserted its regional influence, and fought a war against Georgia. The following
report reiterates the same-
“While the 1998 financial crisis had immediate negative effects and severely damaged Russia’s
financial credibility, some argue that it was a “blessing in disguise” as it created the conditions
that allowed Russia to achieve rapid economic expansion throughout most of the next decade. A
significantly depreciated ruble helped stimulate domestic production leading to a spurt of
economic growth over the next few years with real GDP growth reaching 8.3% in 2000 and
approximately 5% in 2001.
Putin’s succession to power in 1999 and his reforms that helped to radically overturn the
economic stagnation and with the reversal of economic fortunes gained the new president
significant popularity, and he made it his goal to avoid the economic chaos of the previous
decade and move the country towards long-term growth and stability. Between 2000 and the end
of 2002, Putin enacted a number of economic reforms including simplifying the tax system and
reducing the number of tax rates. He also brought about the simplification of business
registration and licensing requirements, and the privatization of agricultural land.
Yet, in 2003, with reforms only partially implemented, Putin confiscated Russia’s largest and
most successful company, Yukos oil company. This event signaled the beginning of a wave of
takeovers of private companies by the state. Between 2004 and 2006, the Russian government
renationalized a number of companies in what were considered to be “strategic” sectors of the
economy. An estimate by the OECD claims that the government’s share of total equity market
capitalization sat at 20% by mid-2003 and had increased to 30% by early 2006.
With average real GDP growth of 6.9% per year, an increase of 10.5% in average real wages,
and growth of 7.9% in real disposable income all occurring within the period from 1999 to 2008,
Putin received a lot of credit for this era of “unprecedented prosperity.” However, much of
Russia’s economic success during that period coincided with the early 2000s rise in the price of
oil, one of the country’s most important resources.

In fact, while many expected the Russian economy to revert to its poor performance of the 1990s
following the export stimulus effects of the ruble devaluation, it has been argued that the chief
drivers of the post-crisis economic growth came from the natural resource sector, most notably
oil. Between 2001 and 2004, the natural resource sector contributed to more than a third of GDP
growth - with the oil industry being directly responsible for nearly a quarter of that growth.
Russia’s dependence on oil and other natural resources has been exacerbated by Putin’s return to
a more centrally planned economy. The takeover of Yukos and other key sectors of the economy
allowed Putin to construct a centralized management system that extracts economic rents from
oil and other natural resources in order to be channeled into the sectors of the economy deemed
most important. Rather than trying to direct and diversify the economy towards less resource-
dependent activities, Putin has made its key sectors even more addicted to those resources.”
Putin’s revertal to a Soviet style economy where companies were taken over by the state
machinery. But it was during his presidency that Russia, for the first time (since the dissolution
of Soviet Union) saw a positive growth in economy, the nation almost doubled its GDP, the
entire state was stabilised, the wars of this era were all won by Russia; The second Chechen war
(Russia regained control of Chechnya); The War of Dagestan (conclusive Russian Victory; led to
Second Chechen war); The Russo-Georgian War ( Conclusive Russian victory, expansion of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
From 2000-2008 Russia went from strength to strength and Mr. Putin gained an insane amount
of support, in 2004 elections Putin was re-elected to office with 71.9% of the total vote, gaining a
popularity which is quite rare in Russian state since Leonid Brehznev (Gen. Sec. of USSR). The
works of Mr. Putin are hailed across the nation as a harbinger of the former glorious times of
Russia. The public support erupted in favour of Putin pushing him again to the office of
President. Here we see the west resenting Putin while Russians hail him as a hero, which was
quite contrary to Yeltsin.
As per Russian constitution, A person cannot have three consecutive terms as President, Mr.
Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime Minister under Mr. Putin is put forward by Mr. Putin as a
Presidential candidate in 2008 while Mr. Putin himself went on as Prime Minister. Even during
the 2008-2012 Medvedev Administration, Putin was the one who pulled the strings of all state
machinery.
The Putin Era (2012-present)- In brief
After a four year stint as the Prime Minister of Russian Federation, Mr Putin returned to
Presidency of the Federation winning about 63.6% vote in the general election. On 7th May
2012, Mr. Putin took oath of the office for a 3rd time and became the 4th President of Russian
Federation, this time to change the Russian policies to a more aggressive form than ever before.
Immediately following his ascension, there was an immediate change in the policies of the
Russian govt. An immediate inflation of investment was seen in the military, oil and energy
sector, the Russian military spending went up by 8.6% in the second half of 2012 and went up to
9.1% in 2013 budget. “ Russia has engaged in a broad, sophisticated, well-resourced, and—to
many observers—surprisingly effective campaign to expand its global reach. To advance its
diverse objectives, Moscow has relied on a wide array of diplomatic, military, intelligence,
cyber, trade, energy, and financial tools to influence political systems, public attitudes, and elite
decision makers in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These objectives
include, first and foremost, undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order and the cohesion
of the West; enhancing Putin’s domestic legitimacy by demonstrating Russia’s status as a global
superpower; promoting specific Russian commercial, military, and energy interests; and
tweaking the United States’ nose in areas of traditional U.S. influence.”- Dr. Sokolsky
Russia, was now involving itself in International politics quite extensively, from trade deals to
MoUs to making new allies while alienating the West, Russia was building its international
presence at a rate unprecedented during Medvedev-era, Yeltsin-era or even during Soviet-era
(The era of Iron Curtain). Russia was now a world player and with the new powers of the
President invested on Mr. Putin, by the Re-written Russian Constitution, Mr.Putin was now one
of the most powerful men on Earth. With these powers, Russia has been at the crux of many
conflicts throughout the world from Crimea to Syria, eastern europe to Ukraine to Caucasus
(discussed in detail later). Through this Russia has validated its position in the world and
Russia’s continuous victories the pride of Russian people and their support for Mr. Putin’s govt.
Acc. to reports, In 2017 these statistics were published--
Similarities between Foreign Policy implementation (Yeltsin vs Putin)
Russia doesn’t require or prioritize world domination or being at the peak of power as it did in
Soviet times, but now it plans only to rebuild itself as a power of international importance with a
magnanimous presence in world politics. Russian foreign policy implementation of both
presidents is different from Soviet-Era and Tsarist-Era policies. For Moscow, in general Eurasian
politics are no longer priority. Ideology doesn’t exist and military power is hardly appealing.
‘Multipolarity’ is a key concept of Russia’s foreign policy both in Yeltsin and Putin era, which
aims to secure Russian position as a great power on the world arena and to help to keep the
balance of power. Russia is a member of the Mediator Quartet for the Israel- Palestine conflict
along with the United States, the United Nations and the EU, and it has become a participant in
the six-nation talks concerning North Korea’s nuclear programme with the USA, South Korea,
China and Japan. Russia has participated in the G-8 summits since 1997, both in two era. Both
presidents tried to utilize multipolar strategy in their foreign policies.
Russia both in Yeltsin era and especially in Putin era, gave special importance to the UN
Security Council, where it has a veto right with other 4 powerful member countries in world
politics. Russia within this platform opposed to the invasion of Iraq which was brought to the
table by the United States. In addition, Russia accepted the US intervention in Afghanistan in
2001. Cooperation against terrorism with US in Afghanistan improved relations and contributed
to the decision to accord Russia a seat on the G-8 and to create the NATO-Russia Council.
In order to exert influence and be recognized as a major power, Putin, as Yeltsin before him,
relies on so-called strategic partnerships with the most important western states, especially the
United States, the only indisputable superpower in the world. EU is the main trade partner of
Russia. The EU states were Russia’s main trading partners, and some of them are quite
dependent on Russian oil and gas. Russia prefers to develop relations with EU members
separately, with Germany, France, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, rather than as a group.
In addition, although that Russia left the vision of “Common European Home” aiming to share
common European values which was forwarded by Gorbachev, Europe is still the region where
Russia wants to see itself. Judged by any criterion-level of political commitment, economic
involvement, and security engagement, human and cultural contacts-Moscow’s world-view
continues to be overwhelmingly Westerncentric.

Differences in the Foreign Policies implementation (Yeltsin vs Putin)
Yeltsin, during its presidency, was dealing with chaotic economic conditions and a decreasing
public support and failing domestic reforms inside, while his successor Putin benefited from
economic rise, rising oil prices and successful domestic reforms. Energy power set a big
advantage both in domestic and foreign politics. Putin managed to use it as a foreign policy tool,
while being experienced improvements in economies of Russia and Eurasian countries.
In Yeltsin era, Russian interests were not purely aiming to enhance regional security but also to
restore the post-Soviet space under Russian leadership. Knowing that it was beyond Moscow’s
economic capacity, Yeltsin aimed to build common threat assessments as well as having strong
mutual ties between Russia and individual countries. Russian actions during Yeltsin can be better
understood as being opportunist.
Putin was more pragmatic. Putin ceased to thinking of a new reintegrated Eurasia. Russia
became a stronger actor in the international system but had no ambition to reassert itself as a
Cold War global power. Putin put Russia’s sovereign interests as a priority in foreign policy.
Putin was also more pragmatic in its assessment of threats than Yeltsin. For Putin, the key threats
do not come from the United States, but from terrorist activities and those nations falling behind
in economic development. Although the Kremlin is wary of US policies and intentions, it prefers
engaging with Western partners rather than the balancing tactics implemented in Yeltsin era.
Putin gave more importance to the use of soft power in the near abroad which means using co-
option rather than coercion in foreign policy. Soft power speaks to people and societies rather
than governments and elites. The absence of pro-Russian governments in Georgia, Ukraine and
elsewhere, the task of mobilising ties amongst people, rather than with governments, is seen as
especially important for preserving influence. This is a key lesson learned by the Kremlin from
its defeat during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Russia gave start to policies as a tool of soft
power such as spreading of Russian mass media, fostering the use of Russian language, giving
financial support to Russian diaspora, increasing economic interdependence and creation of a
special department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the
Kremlin. The Kremlin aimed to integrate Russia into regional structures and processes.
Soft power which speaks to people and societies, rather than governments and elites can be
divided into three components: political legitimacy, economic interdependence, and cultural
values. Relating political legitimacy aspect, Russia, in the Putin era, was considerably more
con¬dent than the Russia of Boris Yeltsin. According to the assessment of Economic
Development and Trade Minister GermanGref, the GDP almost tripled from 1999 to 2005 and it
continues to grow at an annual pace of 4 – 6%.
Putin conducted a marked “Asianization” of Russian foreign policy. Unlike Yeltsin, for whom
Asia served mainly to counterbalance the United States, Putin has pursued closer relations with
China, Japan, the Koreas, and the ASEAN member- states both for their own sake and as
building blocks in a larger challenge to American “unipolarity.” Ceasing the endeavors to
integrate Central Asia as a whole, gave importance to bilateral relations. Private sector was used
as a soft power. On the February 2003 an agreement were made to create a Common Economic
Space with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, to eliminate trade barriers and provide shared
energy transport policies.
In the security area, by the foundation of mutual security institution, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in 2010, Russia strengthened its counter terrorism and security policy in
Central Asia with members countries China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. In addition to this, Russia signed an alliance treaty with Uzbekistan In November
2005, concerning peace, security and stability in the region. In addition, Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia- created the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation (CSTO) in 2003, with the aim of fighting terrorism in the area. The Kremlin
stepped up efforts to integrate Russia into regional structures and processes. Bilateral “strategic
partnerships” have been supplemented by membership of, or increasing interaction with,
organizations such as APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and
the Organization of Islamic Conference.
In the area of economic interdependence, Putin increased its economic presence in the economies
of the former Soviet republics. Russia participated in energy privatization in the former Soviet
region, and as a result of bilateral negotiations, the Kremlin asserted control over the strategic
property and transportation of the former republics. As a result of soft politics conducted by
Putin, Turkmenistan has turned out to be an energy partner. Russia obtained the right to be the
main electricity provider in Georgia. Russia obtained a nuclear power station and became the
main gas provider in Armenia.
Finally, in the area of cultural values, Putin allocated more financial support for Russian
diasporas in the post-Soviet area. For instance, in 2003, the government allocated Ruble 210
million towards this goal, and in 2004 such funds grew by 20%. Russia has devised the ‘Russian
language’ federal programme led by Lyudmila Putin, the president’s wife.

Russian Interests and relating it to conflicts in which Russia is involved
1. Russian Interest in Eastern Europe
The Eastern Europe is the eastern part of Europe bordering to the Western border of the
Federation. The nations in this part of Europe are as follows-
a. Ukraine
b. Moldova
c. Belarus
d. Romania
e. Bulgaria
f. Lithuania
g. Estonia
h. Latvia
i. Poland
j. Slovakia
k. Czech Republic
l. Hungary
All these nations are the ones which were once under the influence of Soviet Union or were a
part of the Soviet Union - The Ukrainian SSR, Modovian SSR, Latvian SSR, Lithuanian SSR,
Estonian SSR, Byelorussian SSR (Belarus); The rest were a part of the Eastern bloc, the
signatories of the Warsaw pact.
Hence upon dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was essential to keep these states strongly
inclined to Russia, but under Mr. Yeltsin, the focus shifted to appeasing the west and to bring
Russia to wesyern standards, hence from 1990s many of satellite states which were under
Eastern bloc pre-1990 times ceded to NATO, Poland,Hungary, Czech Republic (1999);
Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (2004).

Russia was threatened by the speed at which states ceded to NATO; hence Russia under Mr.
Putin started spreading influence in the region, with monetary aid, military threats, insurgencies,
Russian culture (soft power), and in a bid to lessen the threat the Russians installed Pro-Russian
Govt. in many of these states like, Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania and Hungary.
Russia has been aggressively trying to stop Former Soviet States like Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus
from ceding to NATO, after the Baltic states (former Soviet States) ceded to NATO, The
Russian outfits and Pro-Russian organisations in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus started Pro-
Russian activity in the nations. But with fall of Pro-Russian govt. In Ukraine, Russia was worried
that Ukraine would tend to join NATO, hence in late December, after the Crimean authorities
protested against the Govt. in Kiev, and requested Russia to takeover Crimea, in early February
2014, Russia Invaded Crimea and by March 2014, Russia captured Crimea and incorporated it
with Russia.
Russian ‘Annexation’ of Crimea; Ukraine Crisis and Explanation
The Ukraine crisis is a power struggle between factions within Ukraine. One wants to align with
the European Union and the other with Russia. Ukraine had been an important contributor to the
Soviet Union's economy between 1920 and 1991.
The current crisis erupted on June 7, 2014, pro-West president Petro Poroshenko replaced pro-
Russia President Viktor Yanukovych. On September 12, 2014, Ukraine approved a trade deal
with the EU that removed export tariffs. It agreed to delay its implementation a year to avoid
Russian energy sanctions and even attacks. Ukraine President Poroshenko wanted to maintain
the cease-fire.
The current crisis erupted in March 2014, when Russian special forces occupied Ukraine's
Crimean peninsula. Russia claimed it was protecting its port access to the Black Sea. Russian
President Vladimir Putin Ukraine had planned to develop Crimea's natural gas reserves in two
years in a partnership with U.S. companies. If Ukraine had accomplished this, Russia would have
lost one of its largest customers.
Between 2014 and 2018, a military conflict between Ukrainian soldiers and Russian-backed
separatists has continued in eastern Ukraine. More than 10,000 people have been killed.
On November 25, 2018, Russian ships attacked and boarded three Ukrainian vessels in the
Crimean port of Azov near the Black Sea. It placed a freighter to block the port. It said Ukraine
has violated Russian waters. The two sides signed an agreement in 2003 to guarantee free
passage through the strait. In recent months, they've been harassing each other’s ships.
Critics at the United Nations Security Council meeting said Russia's attack was a violation under
international law. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization increased its military presence in the
area.
Explanation of the crisis
Putin's attack responded to the February 23 overthrow of his ally Viktor Yanukovych. The pro-
West faction of Ukraine's Parliament took over the government. The crisis occurred because
Yanukovych mismanaged the budget. He forced Ukraine to ask for financial help. It appealed to
the EU, then Russia. The political unrest occurred at this point. Those who wanted to be closer to
the EU objected when that solution was abandoned. Russia's military strike supported
Yanukovych's return to Kiev and closer ties to Russia.
In April 2014, Russia supported local rebels who took over city halls and police stations
throughout eastern Ukraine. That area is home to ethnic Russians who don't want to be part of
the EU. Those Russians were moved there 50 years ago by Joseph Stalin, who intended to
strengthen the Soviet Republic's hold on the area.
Earlier that month, NATO revealed satellite photos showing Russia's invasion of Ukraine's
eastern border. An EU emergency meeting added further sanctions on Russia's oil and banking
sectors. That occurred shortly after Russia sent a convoy of trucks over the border. They were
bearing aid to Ukraine's eastern cities, held by pro-Russian rebels. Several of those trucks
entered without approval.
Ukraine had also destroyed a convoy of Russian military vehicles. They were bringing arms to
the rebels. It was the first time that Ukraine attacked Russian forces directly.
A few days later, Ukraine reported that several military vehicles were near the Russian border at
the Crimean port of Azov. It claimed that Russia was creating a second front for the rebels.
Russia also wanted land access through southern Ukraine. It wanted a shorter route to Crimea.
In July, Russia built up its military force on the border. There were 19,000 to 21,000 troops, 14
advanced surface-to-air missile units, and 30 artillery batteries. It was a battle-ready force that
could launch an attack into eastern Ukraine at a moment's notice. Russia had already launched
rockets across the border in support of Ukrainian rebels.
Why Ukraine Is So Important to Putin?
Putin's standoff over Ukraine boosted his popularity rating in Russia to 80 percent. To maintain
this popularity, he will continue to hold onto Ukraine despite the cost. For example, it would cost
Russia more than $20 billion through 2020 to integrate Crimea.
Putin knows that NATO won't protect Ukraine since it is not a member. That emboldens him to
continue to attack.
Ukraine had been the second-most important contributor to the former Soviet Union's economy.
It provided one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output. It supplied heavy industrial equipment and
raw materials to industrial sites throughout the former USSR.
Sanctions after Russian occupation of Crimea
On July 29, 2014, the United States and the EU extended economic sanctions against Russia.
They wanted to convince Putin to stop supporting those in eastern Ukraine who want to break up
the country. The United States had proof that Russia supplied separatists that shot down a
Malaysia Airlines commercial jet over eastern Ukraine on July 17, killing 298 people.
The sanctions severely limit five out of the six major Russian banks' ability to obtain medium
and long-term financing from Europe. The United States also restricted technology exports to
Russia's deep-water Arctic offshore or shale oil production. Russia had already been ousted from
the Group of Eight.
As a result of U.S. sanctions, British Petroleum was worried about its profits. Bank of America
cut its exposure to Russia by 40 percent. Boeing and United Technologies started hoarding
titanium. Russia's VSMPO is the world's largest producer of this rare metal.
In response, Russia banned imports of U.S. and European foods for one year. This included $300
million of U.S. poultry products.
After the sanctions, foreign direct investment in Russia dropped by $75 billion. That's roughly 4
percent of the country's gross domestic product. Its stock market plummeted 20 percent. Its
currency, the ruble, fell 50 percent. To head off inflation, Russia's central bank raised interest
rates.
The sanctions created a recession in Russia. The International Monetary Fund cut its 2014
growth forecast for Russia from 3.8 percent to 0.2 percent. Even though Putin continues to be
popular at home, these sanctions are hurting the country's economy.
Other Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis
Russia is one of the emerging markets that suffered a currency meltdown in 2014. Forex traders
abandoned these markets when the Federal Reserve began tapering its quantitative easing
program. That reduced credit around the world.
Russia waged wars in Chechnya in the early 2000s. Putin annexed Ossetia in Georgia in 2008,
and the Western world didn't really intervene. He also successfully launched a cyber-attack on
Estonia. But Ukraine is larger and borders the EU directly.
Many small countries bordering Russia worried that if Ukraine falls, they would be next. The EU
is unlikely to defend them since it depends on Russia for half of its gas. Many European
businesses have profitable operations in Russia. Others sympathize with Putin, who is defending
Russia's borders from encroachment by NATO.
Insurgency In North Caucasus and Russian involvement
A series of suicide bombings ahead of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi has brought new attention to
Russia’s unstable North Caucasus region. The violence highlights governance and counterterrorism
challenges in a geographically and ethnically distinct region of the federation that has long harbored
separatist movements. Russia fought two wars against Chechen separatists in the first decade after the Soviet
Union’s collapse in 1991, losing the first and winning the second. In the latter conflict, the resistance’s
Chechen nationalist identity was superseded by an Islamist one that spanned the North Caucasus region. This
has fed a low-level insurgency that has enveloped the North Caucasus and targeted civilians elsewhere in
Russia. Human rights monitors say that heavy-handed, security-driven counterinsurgency campaigns have
diverted attention from the root causes of conflict, and analysts caution that rights abuses may radicalize a
new generation of insurgents.

Who inhabits the North Caucasus?
The North Caucasus region lies in the southwestern-most corner of the Russian Federation, and was
colonized by the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. It is bounded by the Black and Caspian Seas. Its
south borders the South Caucasian nations of Georgia and Azerbaijan. With ten million inhabitants, the
North Caucasus Federal District is the smallest of Russia’s eight federal districts, and the only one in which
ethnic Russians do not constitute a majority. Some forty ethnic groups reside in the region, making it one of
Russia’s most diverse. This area comprises six nominally autonomous, ethnically non-Russian republics—
from east to west, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-
Cherkessia—and Stavropol Krai, which, as a historic frontier territory rather than a republic, legally has less
authority devolved from Moscow. Just west of Karachay-Cherkessia lies Krasnodar Krai, where Sochi sits on
the Black Sea near the border with the disputed Georgian territory of Abkhazia.
Sunni Islam is the region’s dominant religion. Most Muslims there are practitioners of a local variant of
Sufism, or mystical Islam, which draws on the cultural heritages of the region’s ethnic groups and was first
brought to the North Caucasus in the eleventh century. While the Soviets suppressed Sufis, they now
collaborate with regional governments through eight spiritual boards, and are recipients of state support.
Salafism, which rejects the local customs Sufis incorporate into their religious practice, was brought to the
region in the early post-Soviet years by students who studied abroad in Arab universities. In principle, Salafis
reject a division between state and religious authority, calling for the implementation of sharia. Salafism’s
criticisms of regional governments as corrupt and Sufism as politically compromised, as well as its promise
of a more just order based on Islamic law, has attracted adherents.

For how long has the region been unstable?
Instability in the North Caucasus has its roots in centuries of imperial conquest and local resistance. Cossacks
began settling the region as agents of Russian expansion in the late eighteenth century, and the Russian
Empire waged the nearly half-century Caucasian War from 1817 to 1864. In Dagestan and Chechnya, the
Caucasian Imamate, an Islam-based resistance movement, unsuccessfully fought the invading Russian
military with guerrilla tactics. Russian forces ended the war after defeating Circassians, who hail from the
western Caucasus, in a battle fought just outside present-day Sochi.
The contemporary Islamist insurgency’s umbrella group is known as the Caucasus Emirate (Imirat Kavkaz).
Its leader, Doku Umarov, referred to the Winter Games as "Satanic dancing on the bones of our ancestors" as
he called on his followers to disrupt the Olympics with "maximum force" in a July 2013 video message.
Circassian organizations, which also opposed holding the Olympics at Sochi, have sought to use the
international spotlight of the Games to call for recognition of their mistreatment by imperial Russia. But they
condemned the 2013 Volgograd suicide attacks, which they feared could discredit their nationalist aims.
Soviet policies of the twentieth century further contributed to present-day instability. The Soviet Union
established autonomous republics for ethnic groups, codifying divisions in the North Caucasus and sowing
the seeds of interethnic rivalry. Some groups, forced into exile, found their land redistributed upon their
return, exacerbating interethnic tensions.
In the volatile years following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Russian president Boris Yeltsin moved to
rectify these Stalin-era injustices, but various ethnic groups mobilized to compete for resources and territorial
control. In Chechnya, former Soviet military officer Dzokhar Dudayev declared an independent nation-state,
the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, in 1991. In a bid to reassert Moscow’s authority, Russian forces under
Yeltsin invaded in December 1994 and bombarded the capital of Grozny. Chechens achieved de facto
independence after a year and a half of fighting, but at a heavy toll in lives and physical destruction.
Russia launched a new war in 1999 after Chechen Islamist Shamil Basayev, a rival of Chechnya’s secular
leadership, led an invasion of neighboring Dagestan. Vladimir Putin, seizing on alarm at the spread of the
insurgency to neighboring republics, led a scorched-earth campaign to defeat the rebels. He installed his own
puppet governor, Akhmad Kadyrov, to pacify Chechnya, and gave him free rein to stamp out what remained
of the insurgency," says Liz Fuller, an analyst at U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
How is it governed?
The North Caucasus republics have little political or fiscal autonomy. Putin, during his first stint as president
of Russia, reversed Yeltsin’s early federalist concessions to the republics. Regional officials are largely
appointed by the Kremlin, which diminishes their legitimacy and accountability, critics say. Putin, in his
third presidential term, reversed a reform initiated by his predecessor, Dmitry Medvedev, that provided for
the direct election of republics’ heads. They are once again chosen by assemblies that elect a leader from a
Kremlin-approved slate of candidates.
Chechnya remains the exception. The Kremlin formally ended counterterror operations of the second
Chechen war in 2009 and handed the republic’s leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, whose father Akhmad previously
held the position, broad latitude to stanch the insurgency. Kadyrov has since imposed as the state religion an
idiosyncratic form of Islam that is anathema to both secular Chechens and the growing Salafi population.
Unemployment and poverty are endemic to Chechnya despite the billions of dollars Moscow has provided
Kadyrov for reconstruction. Uneven development is also problematic: other republics have been deprived of
similar investment. "The North Caucasus has no advocate, and the nature of Moscow is that you need a
powerful advocate to open the purse strings," says Mark Galeotti, a scholar of Russian security affairs at New
York University.
State institutions are widely perceived as corrupt and illegitimate, and Sufis and Salafis have developed
parallel institutions to adjudicate disputes. Some courts implement adat, customary law that predates Islam’s
arrival to the region; others implement sharia. These operate legally in some republics, but underground in
Chechnya and Dagestan, the International Crisis Group reports.
Drivers of Conflict
● Ethnic: Groups seek autonomy, compete for resources, or have revanchist territorial aims, which can
manifest in violent conflict when political and legal channels cannot accommodate them. Police and
local officials considered biased or corrupt exacerbate these problems.
● Political: Following foiled separatist ambitions and the state’s massive, indiscriminate force, the
insurgency promises an alternative to what is seen as Russian impunity for abuse.
● Economic: Unequal development among republics, poor development within them, and endemic
corruption, unemployment, and clientelism drive residents to seek a more just order.
● Religious: Salafis are marginalized by Sufis, who see "Wahhabism" as foreign; regional governments
codify this discrimination.

What insurgent groups operate there?
Security experts remain focused on the Caucasus Emirate, an umbrella group comprising units (jamaats)
spread across the North Caucasus that has taken up the extremist Islamist mantle under its outspoken leader,
Umarov. A veteran of both Chechen wars, he declared CE’s establishment in 2007, calling for the "expulsion
of the infidels" from the "historical lands of Muslims." This marked the culmination of the insurgency’s
evolution from Chechen nationalism to Islamism spanning the North Caucasus. Over the following years, the
insurgency’s locus shifted to neighboring Dagestan.
Chechens trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and Osama bin
Laden’s network supplied fighters and funds to them during the second Chechen war. But similarities in the
groups’ rhetoric or ideologies shouldn’t be mistaken for common objectives or organizational linkage,
analysts say.
Though Umarov may have been killed in late 2013, analysts doubt this will have much bearing on the
insurgency’s activities: he is thought to be more of a figurehead than an operational commander, and the
jamaats function with relative autonomy.
What attacks are North Caucasus-based groups responsible for?
Basayev, who led Islamist separatists after major combat in the second Chechen war ended, is the tactician
thought responsible for massive hostage crises in the early 2000s. Demanding Russian withdrawal from
Chechnya, militants took nearly one thousand hostages for three days in a Moscow theater in October 2002.
At least 115 hostages were killed when Russian forces stormed the theater. Two years later, militants seized
1,100 people in Beslan middle school. More than three hundred were killed, including many children, when
Russian forces attacked the school.

The conflict’s first female suicide bombers emerged during this period. Russian and Western media dubbed
them "black widows," assuming they were seeking revenge on Russian security forces for killing their
military husbands. But experts caution that the phenomenon is overstated by the press.
Basayev remained a separatist leader until his death in 2006, but by then he had alienated much of his
Chechen base, the Economist reported at the time.
Beginning in 2008, the Caucasus Emirate began targeting security forces and other agents of the state within
the confines of the North Caucasus. But some of its highest-profile attacks have targeted Moscow’s
transportation infrastructure: in 2009, a high-speed train was derailed, killing twenty-eight; in 2010, two
women blew themselves up on the metro, killing forty and injuring eighty-eight; and in 2011, an Ingush man
killed at least thirty-seven at the Domodedovo Airport.
A suicide bombing on a Volgograd bus in October 2013 and twin bombings of a train station and trolley in
December rattled Russia as the Sochi games approached; they were the first terrorist attacks to take place in
Russia outside the North Caucasus since Domodedovo. Two ethnic Russians were implicated in the
December attacks.
What is Russia’s approach to counterinsurgency?
Security officials maintain broad authority to declare counterterrorist operations, which allow them to operate
with few restrictions. Rights groups still allege killings, disappearances, and torture by Russian security
forces, as well as collective punishment of families of suspects and excessive force that often causes civilian
casualties.
In Chechnya, where Kadyrov has largely unfettered power, security forces have taken a heavy-handed,
security-oriented approach, aiming to eradicate not just Salafi militants but the theology itself, according to
ICG. In "mop-up" operations that followed the combat period in the second Chechen war, security forces
detained or killed large numbers of civilians under the pretense of searching for rebel fighters, rights groups
allege. Enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions were endemic in the counterinsurgency
campaign that followed combat in the second Chechen war. They have since become the subject of cases
before the European Court of Human Rights, which has mandated compensation to victims’ families. (Russia
has not effectively implemented these judgments, Human Rights Watch says.)
Dagestani president Magomedsalam Magomedov pioneered a softer, law-enforcement-based approach to
root out extremism after his appointment in 2010. He induced young fighters to turn themselves in for
reintegration with the promise of lenient sentencing and economic incentives, liberalized policy toward
Salafis, and instituted inter-confessional dialogues.
In January 2013, Putin replaced Magomedov with Ramazan Abdulatipov, who reversed this relatively
tolerant approach. Salafis in Dagestan have been persecuted, and there are reports of mass arrests. The
rehabilitation commission has since been shut down.
Has it been effective? (Insurgency in N. Caucasus)
Violence in the North Caucasus has declined in recent years, according to the independent news site
Caucasian Knot, which documented 1,710 victims of the insurgency and counterinsurgency in 2010, and 986
in 2013.
While Dagestan bore the brunt of the violence in 2013, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, and Ingushetia all
saw dozens of casualties. Altogether, 127 members of the security forces and 104 civilians were killed in
2013. The hardline crackdown can likely be credited with much of the decline in violence, experts say, but
abuse by security forces likely aids the insurgency’s ability to mobilize the population.
Russian Involvement in the Syrian Civil War
President Donald Trump's decision last month to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria may be seen
as a win for Russia, but it is a victory which may yet include challenges in the longer term.
From Moscow's point of view, the decision to intervene militarily in the Syrian civil war has
been a success for a number of reasons. In effect, Russia took strategic advantage of an
international policy vacuum. The United States and its allies were bruised from interventions in
Afghanistan and Iraq which had made western public opinion wary of further military action in
the Middle East.
Russia saw an opportunity to act decisively, and took it. In the years since, this has paid off both
internationally and domestically. The challenge now is to consolidate those gains.
Internationally, Russia is now seen as a major player in the Middle East, if not the leading player.
By intervening when it did, Russia altered the course of the war--ensuring the survival of Bashar
al-Assad's presidency. All those countries which share borders with Syria, or which have also
become involved there, have to recognize Russian power. Russia has regained a leading role on
the international stage of the kind which Moscow has not enjoyed since the time of the Soviet
Union.
That is in itself significant for Russia's role in the world. It has also--initially, at least--been
beneficial domestically. it is difficult for outsiders to understand the humiliation which the
Russian population went through in the late Soviet, and early post Soviet, periods. A superpower
became a recipient of humanitarian aid.
When the last U.S. and U.K. ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Jack Matlock and Rodric
Braithwaite, spoke in London on the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the USSR, Braithwaite
noted, "We keep on failing to understand the nature of the trauma that hit all Russians in 1991".
Russia's return to a powerful global role has gone some way to reverse that sense of trauma. To
the extent that it has restored a sense of patriotic pride, it has brought domestic political benefit
to President Vladimir Putin. The military campaign there has been portrayed as an anti-terrorist
operation; Russia's presence proof that it stands by its allies. A survey conducted by the Levada
Center in the fall of 2015, after Russia's intervention, found a majority of those questioned in
favour of Russia's actions in Syria (although a similar survey in 2017 found respondents less
enthusiastic).
While President Assad's political survival now seems assured, much remains to be done to
ensure a stable future for Syria and its people. There are likely to be benefits here for Russian
business here, too--in the form of reconstruction contracts. Critics of Russian policy see future
pitfalls as a consequence of Russia's policy. As The Economist argued in a recent article, "Rather
than stitching Syria back together, Russia has let Mr Assad continue to tear it apart".
For those Russians who reflect upon their country's recent history, another military intervention
may come to mind: the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan. That sapped the Soviet Union's strength
as a superpower, and led to a population questioning those who led them. Current policy makers
in Russia are very much of an age to remember that--and it will no doubt never be too far from
their minds as they plan future strategy. Syria now is not Afghanistan in the 1980s, of course--for
one thing, Moscow's military presence is on nothing like the same scale--but the lessons learnt
then and after may also have a bearing on how Russia proceeds in the Middle East, Russia has in
fact flown its victory banner by securing the current regime of Syria and also by fighting the ISIS
in the region and in the meanwhile forcing the US to move its troops out of the Syrian sovereign
territory.
Russia’s lasting Influence on the Central Asia and former Soviet States
(in C. Asia)
Although Russia can no longer exercise hegemonic power or demand exclusive rights of
engagement, it is still the preponderant regional player in Central Asia.
Conventional wisdom holds that China and Russia have managed to reach a tacit understanding
over their respective roles in Central Asia. Some argue that, with Beijing effectively conceding
to Russia the leading role in an emerging security architecture, the threat of a renewed Great
Game in the region has been deferred. Others concur that, to many observers’ surprise, Central
Asia's independent states have not become objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, but
rather a major unifying element in SinoRussian relations. The two governments, they underscore,
cooperate more closely in Central Asia than in any other world region. A third group suggests
that based on the evidence available thus far, Russia and China have upended predictions of
greater competition and succeeded in transforming a potential source of tension into a means of
greater cooperation and mutual reassurance. More recently, thanks to Russia's involvement in the
Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts, and internal economic woes caused by the imposition of Western
sanctions and the decline in the price of oil, many leading observers believe Russia is neglecting
its ‘soft underbelly’ – Central Asia – and losing ground in the region.
In fact, there is neither a strong Sino-Russian confrontation nor a clear ‘division of labour’ in
Central Asia. In both security and cultural diplomacy, Russian President Vladimir Putin has
presided over a more proactive, assertive and, ultimately, effective policy in Central Asia.
Although this policy is still constrained significantly by Russia's limited financial and economic
means, Moscow has strengthened its influence, for the most part thanks to amiable relations with
the Central Asian strongmen who still almost completely dominate politics in their respective
countries.
Given the current power transition under way between Russia and China, a significant question
is whether Beijing has challenged, or is likely to challenge, Moscow's preponderance in Central
Asia. In the short run this is unlikely. It is all too easy to lapse into clichés about the inevitable
decline of Russia, the inexorable rise of China and the global retreat of the West as a public-
goods provider. Whereas China tends to avoid direct involvement in local politics, Russia's
preponderant strategic and cultural involvement in Central Asia has a direct bearing on the
political stability of the local regimes. The Central Asian domestic political environment is
affected by the larger context of Russian politics and foreign policy. In fact, as the scholars Rajan
Menon and Hendrik Spruyt have observed, the domestic stability of Central Asian states is
affected by a combination of the type of nationalism that prevails in political culture, the
robustness of local political institutions – and the effects of economic reform in Russia itself.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, for example, has been careful to make sure that
Kazakhstan's economic reforms proceed in step with Russia's, often sending to his legislature for
minor modification bills previously passed by the Russian parliament. Although Russia is no
longer in a position to exercise hegemonic power or demand exclusive rights of engagement, it is
still the preponderant regional player in Central Asia, and will remain so for the foreseeable
future. Russia remains the most important external actor, exercising leadership in the
management of regional security and skillful influence over Central Asian political elites.
Russian Use of Soft Power And How Effective It Has Been
The use of soft power by the Russian Federation is as extensive as its use of hard power. Since,
Mr. Putin took office in 2000, the focus was mainly on soft power and indirect influence of tbhe
Federation, like investment in education in Moldova, Belarus and Kazakhstan; industrial park
creation in Ukraine, Bulgaria and Tajikistan; Investment in rebuilding Afghanistan along with
Indian help.
But since 2012, the Russian policy is a strong amalgamation of Soft and Hard power to spread its
influence at a faster rate, Russia has been quite aggressive in its approach since Mr. Putin’s 3rd
Term as President, but nevertheless the Russian use of diplomacy and soft power have not been
downgraded even a little bit.
The Russian soft power amongst former Soviet state stems from the common heritage, soviet
sympathisers in all the former Soviet states, whom the Russian Federation utilises from time to
time to cause a ruckus in the state (allegedly), if any of them tend to move towards the West.
The common festivals shared by these states unites them in a common factor. The Orthodox
Christmas, which is extensively celebrated across eastern europe and Russia, where people from
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, East Poland, Serbia, North Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, East Latvia,
Estonia and other nations visit the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow to seek the sermon of
the Patriarch of the Orthodoxy, this is a great opportunity in favour of Russia to establish a
positive image of Russia in the minds of the people of Fraternal states.
Another festival Maslenitsa Festival is the arrival of spring festival celebrated widely in central
and Central-western Asia and some Eastern Europe states, like Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, North Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Mongolia (in parts), people show solidarity and friendliness in this time, the
pilgrimage or most visited sites of this time are St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod and
Novosibirsk, it is an extensive and an effective establishment of spreading Russian soft power.
The soft power skills used by Russian administration to legitimize Mr. Putin as the leader of
Russia and to showcase him to be a reincarnation of Pytor Veliky (Peter the Great), the Russian
state sponsored TV has been running multiple operations and giving it a shape of Pro-Putin
propaganda.
But the most Pro-Putin propaganda was not constructed by the state media but by the
entertainment industry with a song in the year 2008, ‘ A man like Putin’. The song was a tribute
to Putin who had just stepped down as the President after two terms and was at the time the
Prime Minister of Russia. The song goes on like-
(The following is a translation of the Russian song)

My boyfriend is in trouble once again:
Got in a fight, got drunk on something nasty
I've had enough and I chased him away
And now I want a man like Putin
One like Putin, full of strength
One like Putin, who won't be a drunk
One like Putin, who wouldn't hurt me
One like Putin, who won't run away!
I've seen him on the news last night
He was telling us that the world has come to crossroads
With one like him, it's easy to be home and out
And now I want a man like Putin
One like Putin, full of strength
One like Putin, who won't be a drunk
One like Putin, who wouldn't hurt me
One like Putin, who won't run away!
The song skyrocketed to the most sold album in Russia and with it skyrocketed the popularity of
Mr. Putin. The song was an instant hit with the general public and mostly teens. Hence the
Russian soft power tactics are really strong and when supported by the threat of hard power
towards the other state, this combination is a foolproof way to increase the Russian influence
exponentially.
The Stances of Nations towards Russia and its action
The stance towards Russian actions by any state could be categorized into three categories-
a. The Western stance
b. The Friendly stance
c. The Mixed/Undecided
The western stance, is the position or the stance taken by the countries which support, preach and
propagate the western philosophy of the western democracy, these states are the allies of the
United States and the NATO or are a beneficiary of these states. These stances tend to be
negative towards Russia and its actions, these states have condemned most of the actions of the
Russian Fed.
Ex: USA, UK, Turkey, Israel, etc.
The Friendly stance, is the position or the stance taken by the countries which are closely related
or allied to Russian Federation, these states are very close partners to the Federation and are of
the opinion that the west has done injustice to Russia and themselves, these states also tend to be
Russia’s major trading partners and support all the moves of the Russian govt. These states are
mostly Former Soviet states or Authoritarian states.
Ex: Iran, DPRK, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, etc.
The mixed or undecided are those states which are non-aligned in most of the matters, and may
or may not support the Russian cause at international forum, these states still maintain an
excellent relationship with the Russian state authorities, as they are still collaborative with Russia
and the west; These neutral countries are not a firm believer of taking sides and are mostly the
members of NAM.
Ex: Indonesia, South Africa, India, etc.
India’s relations with Russia(2012-present) and stances of both the nations towards each
other
The year 2014 was marked by new developments for both India and Russia: the former saw a
new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi took charge in May that year, and the
latter witnessed deteriorating ties with the West over Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis. By that
time, the impression had been created that Indo-Russia ties were stagnating as both countries not
only tried to define their own roles in a changing world, but also to assess the importance of their
bilateral relationship.
Despite the announcement in 2010 of the “special and privileged strategic partnership,” there
were clear signs of a drift in the relationship. The goal of reaching US$20 billion in trade by
2015 was not even close to being achieved. In contrast, India–US trade was recorded at
US$142.1 billion in 2018 and Russia-China trade had reached US$107.06 billion in the same
year.
Another indication of the relative stagnation of India-Russia ties was the fact that in 2014, the
US emerged as the top arms supplier to India, pushing Russia to second position. Additionally, in
2016, much to the consternation of Russia, India became a major defence partner of the US
(2016), it began the 2+2 dialogue (2018), and signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement (LEMOA, 2016) as well as the Communications Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA, 2018). For its part, Russia overturned its decades-old policy and after
2014 supplied China with advanced weapons systems including Sukhoi 35 and the S400 missile
defence system. It also engaged with Pakistan, much to the dismay of India, through the sale of
Mi-35 helicopters and engines for JF-17 Thunder, and began joint military exercises.
Given that the military-technical ties have formed the bedrock of the bilateral relationship, a
decline in the sector was a matter of concern. As analyst Dmitri Trenin has noted, the pattern of
the relationship had failed to evolve in the changing global scenario and the ties had not been put
on a “qualitatively new level.”
At the same time, however, the potential of the relationship was underscored by important
agreements on the construction of 12 nuclear power plants in India over the coming two decades,
the “localization of manufacturing” in India for Russian-designed nuclear power plants, and the
finalisation in 2014 and 2015 of the supply of crude oil by Rosneft to Essar and cooperation in
helicopter engineering. In 2016, crucial inter-government agreements were signed during the
annual summit. These agreements concerned the supply of S-400 Triumf Air Defence Missile
System, and four frigates (the deals were finalised in 2018), as well as the manufacture of Ka-
226T helicopter in India .
The year 2017 marked 70 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between India
and Russia. Various agreements were signed, though none of them big-ticket, during the annual
summit in 2017, including on the construction of third stage of Kudankulam nuclear power plant.
The first ever Tri-Services exercise under the annual INDRA format and India joining Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a full member were positive developments that year. In
terms of investment, the two countries had set a target of US$30 billion by 2025; the goal was
reached by 2017, and the new target is set at US$50 billion by 2025. There were no significant
arms deals signed in 2017. This development came in the backdrop of the cancelled Multi-role
Transport Aircraft and India pulling out of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project that had
begun in 2007.
In May 2018, it was announced that PM Modi will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin for an
informal summit at Sochi, the first interaction in such format with the Russian leader. Coming
just four months before the October
2018 annual bilateral summit, the Sochi summit was an acknowledgement of the need to address
the drift in the relationship. The two leaders issued a joint statement after the October summit
that contained concrete developments including the conclusion of the contract for the supply of
S-400, first meeting of NITI Aayog and Ministry of Economic Development, start of FTA talks
between Eurasian Economic Union and India, launch of single window service in Russia for
Indian companies, launch of Russia Plus in India to help Russian companies invest in India,
holding of the India-Russia Business Summit, setting up of the Far East Agency in Mumbai,
signing of the India-Russia Economic Cooperation: The Way Forward (March 2018), and the
beginning of LNG supply from Gazprom (contract with GAIL). There have been over 50
ministerial level visits since 2017.
The S-400 deal, despite the threat of it attracting Countering America’s Adversaries through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), was a sign of India’s desire to maintain its strategic autonomy as well
as build on its strong defence relationship with Russia. While overall, Russia remained India’s
top supplier of defence items between 2014 and 2018, the total exports had fallen by 42 percent
from 2009-13. Russia still commands 58 percent of total arms imports by India, followed by
Israel and the US at 15 and 12 percent, respectively.
However, divergences over foreign policy priorities are likely to continue in the future. The most
prominent of this is the Russian displeasure over the ideation of the “Indo-Pacific,” with Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov calling it an “artificially imposed construct” being promoted by the US,
Australia and Japan, to contain China. The remarks, made in February 2019, came despite the
fact that some months earlier in June 2018, PM Modi in his Shangri La speech made it clear that
the concept of Indo-Pacific for India is based on “inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality
and unity”. The two also have a divergence of opinion over Afghanistan, although intensive
discussions have led to certain clarity.
At the same time, there are areas of convergence between India and Russia that can provide a
way forward, like the proposal in the 2018 joint statement to “actively promote joint projects in
third countries” in areas “where there is a complementarity between them in terms of technology
and resources”(India and Russia are involved in the Rooppur nuclear plant project in Bangladesh
on a trilateral basis).
Moreover, the proposal of President Putin for a “more extensive Eurasian partnership involving
the EAEU and China, India, Pakistan and Iran”should be used by India to strengthen its presence
in Eurasia. The main challenge here would be from China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), which Russia has joined; it plans to link the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to the
BRI. India’s connectivity plans in the region, in the form of the International North–South
Transport Corridor (INSTC), have been languishing. Russia and India could jointly energise the
project.
The trade relationship needs active intervention to take advantage of policies like ‘Make in
India’. Concrete proposals in the areas already identified by the two countries need to be
implemented on a priority basis. These include start-ups, infrastructure, shipbuilding, river-
navigation, high-speed railways, space, food processing, and high-technology products (e.g.
space technology, aviation, new materials, agriculture, information and communication
technologies, medicine, pharmaceuticals, robotics, nanotechnology, supercomputing
technologies, artificial intelligence and material sciences).
India can also be of help to Russia in providing workforce in sectors like agriculture and
construction without engaging in permanent settlement. Given that the situation is particularly
acute in the Russian Far East due to the continued decline of the population (having declined by
24 percent between1991 and 2015), India can provide a solution to the demographic problem
apart from being a partner in investing in energy and other projects in the region. The two also
have the chance to cooperate on issues in various multilateral forums such as the United Nations,
BRICS, SCO, G20, and the East Asia Summit. However, even in these cases, diverging foreign
policy goals driven by factors beyond the bilateral dimension will continue to pose challenges to
the partnership in the coming years, as both countries seek to strengthen their positions at a time
of flux in the regional and global order.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Vladivostok (5th Sept) , Russia on a two-day visit to
participate in the 20th India-Russia annual summit and the fifth meeting of the Eastern Economic
Forum (EEF). The first Indian prime minister to visit the Russian Far East Region, Modi’s visit
was intended to give “a new direction, new energy and new speed” to relations between the two
countries. The EEF is a forum which since 2015 has been trying to push for the development of
business and investment opportunities in the Russian Far East Region and Modi’s presence there
as chief guest underscores the role this region can play in enhancing cooperation between India
and Russia in the region and beyond. The summit level meeting between Modi and Russian
President Vladimir Putin saw the two nations signing 25 pacts in areas ranging from
connectivity, oil and gas, deep-sea exploration, space, and energy.
Modi’s presence at the EEF is important at various levels. Russia’s Far East is a huge land mass
which is rich in resources but is sparsely populated and underdeveloped. With the centre of
gravity of global economics shifting to Asia, Putin is keen on focusing on the Far East and
develop it with the help pf Asian powers. So far Chinese dominance in Russian Far East has been
palpable, much to the discomfort of Moscow. And it is in this context Putin’s attempt to diversify
assumes importance so as to lessen Russia’s growing dependence on China. Indian investors will
also find much of value as they look at Russian Far East and explore investment opportunities
there. Last month, Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal led a delegation to
Vladivostok that included Chief Ministers of these States and representatives from about 140
companies. Modi’s visit has resulted in a proposal for a maritime route between Chennai and
Vladivostok, bypassing Europe, which would enable to transfer cargo between Chennai and
Vladivostok in 24 days in comparison to over 40 days currently taken to transport goods from
India to Far East Russia via Europe.
India’s economic ties with Russia have been struggling with bilateral trade hovering around $10
billion mark. Energy is one area which has the potential to provide ballast to their ties. After
having invested around $10 billion in acquiring stakes in hydrocarbon assets in Russia, Indian
energy companies are keen to invest in Russia’s upstream sector. A consortium of Indian oil
companies is reportedly making a play for a significant stake in the eastern cluster oil fields in
Russia. Russia’s Rosneft in 2017 completed a $12.9-billion acquisition of Essar Oil to enter
India, the world’s fastest-growing energy market. Russia and India are also becoming more
ambitious by pursuing projects in third countries such as the Rooppur nuclear power project of
Bangladesh.
Defence ties, of course, remain the cornerstone of India-Russia bilateral engagement. New
Delhi’s decision to go ahead with the purchase of S-400 missile defence system, worth over $5
billion, despite the threat of US sanctions, underscores the importance India continues to attach
to its defence engagement with Russia. Prime Minister Modi wants India and Russia to take
advantage of the low production cost in India to produce military equipment under joint venture
framework at cheaper rates for the third-world nations. This will have to be the future of India-
Russia defence engagement for them to become sustainable. There are also reports of a possible
military logistics support agreement, the Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS),
aimed at facilitating access to each others’ military facilities.
Despite concerns in India about growing closeness between Russia and Pakistan, Moscow stood
by India on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, arguing that “India’s decision (on Jammu and
Kashmir) is a sovereign decision which is as per its Constitution” and that “Moscow follows a
policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of countries.” After initially ignoring India, Russia
also made a course correction on Afghanistan, recognising that India’s involvement in
Afghanistan remains necessary if the war-torn nation is to see long term stability.
The challenge in front of India and Russia is that they need to transform a 20th century
partnership and make it fit for the 21st century. Global trends are evolving rapidly and major
powers are re-defining their ties with each other to match their contemporary requirements. New
Delhi and Moscow cannot be fixated on the past and can’t expect exclusionary bilateral ties from
each other. The good news is that the top leadership has recognised the challenge and is ready to
take corrective measures. The challenge is that this can’t be a one off measure. It will have to be
a continuous engagement to sustain the momentum created by regular outreach between the top
leaders.
Modi is right when he argues that the greatest achievement of the last 20 years in India-Russia
ties is “trust.” Both nations should build on this trust to carve out a modern, broad-based
partnership more in sync with contemporary realities.
CONCLUSION
We go back to the questions which we asked in the beginning of this paper, etching out the
answers and comments regarding the questions. The Russian Federation and its need of
international importance (not supremacy, as is made clear to me by the research) is one of the
historic needs after the vacuum left by the USSR and the power the Russian state once had over
all international entities is what the current state wants back.
To reassert its importance, The Russian Federation has seen it impossible to do so without being
a key player in many of the conflicts of international importance (Ukraine Crisis, Syrian Civil
War and Insurgency in Northern Caucasus). The Russian state now has engaged itself in many
conflicts and has asserted and made it clear to the world that Russia has re-emerged and will not
accept a unipolar world, Russian Federation will now leads the world to a new Multipolarity
where there is no hegemony of a particular state.
For this, Russia currently needs allies, the allies which will support the cause of the Russians in
all ways possible; Russia currently needs strong allies. Currently, Russia pursues a diplomacy
where it will have the support of nations but still walks alone during a crisis, due to this lack of
support the western powers are still able to choke the Russian economy with sanctions.
To alleviate itself and other states from this economic monopoly of West over them, Russia must
contemplate the formation of better alliances with economically stable states to improve the
economic conditions of their partners and their own economy. The Russian Federation hence will
be able to take on the west on the matters of economy and will not be deterred by the western
sanctions.
But even without these reforms, Russian Federation has still been very accomplished and
successful in asserting their dominance in International politics. Russia, though not at its highest
as it was during Soviet Union, but still it has come a far way since the Yeltsin era. The stagnation
of Yeltsin era has been well-put-away by the Putin administration. The Putin administration has
been a great hit with the Russian people with Putin’s approval at its peak was 88.7%
The re-election of Mr. Putin in 2018 general elections of Russia, with 77.6% of votes stand a
time-tested testimonial of his gigantic popularity among the Russian nationals, the govt. has been
able to establish its ethos amongst the people of Russia and through the well-structured soft
power among the people of the neighbouring states.
For now, only the future will tell how the conflicts and their consequences turn out for the
Russian Federation and its allies. The Russians going from strength to strength in the last 3 years
signals a good time ahead for Russia. The need for International dominance of Russia is still to
be fulfilled, the Russian still need allies like the US has in the form of NATO, the RUssian
counter to NATO, CSTO is not as efficient or effective in anyway, hence the Russians should
look for more reliable allies for the common motives and goals.
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33 Margit Feher and Veronika Gulyas, “Putin’s Hungary Visit Aimed at Cementing Ties With
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34 Lili Bayer, “Moscow Spooks Return to Hungary, Raising NATO Hackles,” Politico Europe,
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35 Chi-Kong Chyong and Vessela Tcherneva, “Europe’s Vulnerability on Russian Gas,”

European Council on Foreign Relations, March 17, 2015,
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36 Andrew Byrne and Neil Buckley, “EU Approves Hungary’s Russian-Financed Nuclear
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37 Dániel Hegedüs, “The Kremlin’s Influence in Hungary,” German Council on Foreign

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38 “Turkey, Russia Agree on Lifting All Trade Restrictions, Except for Tomatoes,” Daily Sabah,
May 3, 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2017/05/03/turkey-russia-agree-on-lifting-
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Turkstream Gas Pipeline Under Black Sea,” Deutsche Welle, May 7, 2017,
http://www.dw.com/en/russias-gazprom-starts-building-turkstream-gas-pipeline-under-black-
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39 Janusz Bugajski, “Russia Stifles Serbia,” Center for European Policy Analysis, June 20, 2016,
http://cepa.org/Europes-Edge/Russia-stifles-Serbia.
40 Jasmin Mujanović, “Russia’s Bosnia Gambit,” Foreign Affairs, September 6, 2017,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/bosnia-herzegovina/2017-09-06/russias-bosnia-gambit.
41 Roland Oliphant, “Montenegro Court Confirms Indictment of Russians Accused of

Involvement in Coup Plot, Telegraph¸ June 8, 2017,
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42 Dusan Stojanovic, “Putin Cheered in Serbia, Seeks Pipeline Backing,” Associated Press,
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Final Term Submission Paper 1

the globe: A Study of Russian Struggle to establish its supremacy

By- J.P Sambhava Ray- 1EPH (1934016)

CHRIST (Deemed to be University)

Bannerghatta Road Campus

School of Business Studies and Social Sciences

Submitted to- Prof. Dr. Shalini B.

Bannerghatta Road Campus.

international politics. Russia, is the key to many decisions in UN or any International

In the following report, the following questions will be addressed-

regional hegemonial power and an International power. Is Mr. Putin worried

here will be-

c. Former Soviet States

the mass of the target nation or is it through military power, invasions,

interventions, skirmishes, air raids, flexing or showing-off power in some way or

to tackle the problems or to show dominance on smaller state and how

comparatively it is different from the show of dominance in soviet era.

issue. Furthermore here i would present India’s stance on the Russian

perspective on the issue.

during different administration era (addressed ahead).

what remains of it).

Understanding Kremlin’s bid to Supremacy

experiencing goods shortages in 1991 and 2500% hyperinflation in 1992.

devolution occurred in 1998.

ready to re-emerge under President Putin.

government boasted a healthy budget surplus and record currency reserves.

undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order, particularly in spots of customary/traditional

deft, Russia progressively intends to make a multipolar world in which it assumes an

increasingly hegemonial role or a grasp on international politics.

The Yeltsin Era (1991-1999)- In Brief

Vladimir Putin, the second President of Russian Federation.

The Putin-Era (1999-2008)-In brief

opponent being 20 points behind him.

including- price liberalization, mass privatization, and stabilization of the ruble.

report reiterates the same-

significantly depreciated ruble helped stimulate domestic production leading to a spurt of

registration and licensing requirements, and the privatization of agricultural land.

renationalized a number of companies in what were considered to be “strategic” sectors of the

oil, one of the country’s most important resources.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia).

quite contrary to Yeltsin.

The Putin Era (2012-present)- In brief

presence at a rate unprecedented during Medvedev-era, Yeltsin-era or even during Soviet-era

Acc. to reports, In 2017 these statistics were published--

Similarities between Foreign Policy implementation (Yeltsin vs Putin)

magnanimous presence in world politics. Russian foreign policy implementation of both

presidents tried to utilize multipolar strategy in their foreign policies.

involvement, and security engagement, human and cultural contacts-Moscow’s world-view

continues to be overwhelmingly Westerncentric.

Differences in the Foreign Policies implementation (Yeltsin vs Putin)

while being experienced improvements in economies of Russia and Eurasian countries.

understood as being opportunist.

financial support to Russian diaspora, increasing economic interdependence and creation of a

continues to grow at an annual pace of 4 – 6%.

building blocks in a larger challenge to American “unipolarity.” Ceasing the endeavors to

energy transport policies.

partnerships” have been supplemented by membership of, or increasing interaction with,

the Organization of Islamic Conference.

main gas provider in Armenia.

language’ federal programme led by Lyudmila Putin, the president’s wife.

Russian Interests and relating it to conflicts in which Russia is involved

1. Russian Interest in Eastern Europe

Federation. The nations in this part of Europe are as follows-

signatories of the Warsaw pact.