1.

November 22, 2017

G.R. No. 204289
FERNANDO MANCOL, JR vs. DBP

MSr represented and negotiated on behalf of MJr in a bid held by DBP over a residential lot in
Calbayog City. During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally, to: (1) arrange and
effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax (CGT);
and (2) to get rid of the occupants of the subject property. After the full payment, DBP executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale. MJr then made a deposit with DBP for the payment of the CGT and documentary stamp
tax. DBP acknowledged the deposit and issued an O.R.
Years later, DBP reneged on its undertaking based on the oral agreement, returned to the
petitioner all the pertinent documents of the sale and issued a Manager's Check. MJr filed a Complaint for
damages for breach of contract against DBP before the RTC of Calbayog City. DBP answered that the terms
of the Deed of Absolute Sale stated no condition that DBP will work on the document of transfer and to
eject the occupants thereon. During trial, V testified that he was the one ordered by the DBP to bring the
necessary documents to BIR-Catbalogan. MSr testified that after the execution and delivery of the Deed
of Absolute Sale, DBP verbally agreed to facilitate the transfer of the title, the payment of the CGT, and to
cause the vacation of the occupants of the house and lot. Should the testimonies of witnesses, V and MSr
be given probative value to establish the alleged contemporaneous verbal agreement in the sale contract?

Suggested Answer:
No.
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own
personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on
what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and
may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard.
Guided by these precepts, V's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary
to petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal agreement
between petitioner and DBP. In fact, there was no such verbal agreement. As admitted by the MJr, the
alleged verbal agreement was entered into between DBP and MSr, by virtue of the SPA. V has no personal
knowledge of such fact.
2. November 22, 2017
G.R. No. 218570
BEN MANANGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

BM together with 5 unknown accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping one
another, all armed with assorted firearms, with intent to gain and by means of force and intimidation
against person, that is: by poking their firearms towards the persons of OD and members of his family and
at gun point, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stole cash money belonging to the said OD, against his
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner.
OD’s wife JD testified and positively identified BM stating that they heard BM, their nephew called
his husband from outside their house. When she opened the front door, the armed group of about six,
wearing masks, instructed her to cook. After eating, the remaining three wearing masks asked for their
money, threatening to kill them if they don’t heed. After giving the money, the armed group left. Another
family member FD testified as well as positively identified BM saying she helped JD cooked and confirming
facts stated by JD. Is the contention that BM’s participation in the act was proven based on lackadaisical
application of circumstantial evidence, correct?

Suggested Answer:
No.
Direct evidence is different from circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is evidence which, if
believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption. It is evidence from a
witness who actually saw, heard, or touched the subject of questioning. On the other hand, circumstantial
evidence is evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the factfinder draws
from the evidence established."
In this case, the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses constitute direct evidence that proved the
corpus delicti of the crime of robbery by a band because both were actually at the scene of the crime.
They saw with their own eyes that a group of armed and masked men led by the unmasked petitioner
entered their house, ate their food, robbed them and left. The prosecution proved the corpus delicti
because all of the elements of the crime of robbery by a band were proven beyond reasonable doubt. It
was proven that petitioner, a member of the band, was liable for his acts because the requisites for such
crime concurred.
3. November 22, 2017
G.R. No. 227069
HILARIO LAMSEN, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

AdC died leaving a parcel of a land to her nieces T and C as surviving heirs. When T looked for the
owner’s duplicate title of the subject property it was allegedly nowhere to be found. T executed an
affidavit of loss, which was annotated on the title on file with the RD. T also filed a petition for the issuance
of second owner's duplicate copy before the RTC. The petition was dismissed on the basis of the
opposition of L, who claimed that the original copy of the owner's duplicate title could not have been lost
because it was with him. L requested for a registration of a deed of sale involving the subject property but
later withdrew all the papers. T obtained a certified true copy of the deed of sale and submitted it to the
PNP for examination. Document Examiner II B confirmed that the subject deed was indeed falsified. L
interposed a defense of denial and added that the subject deed was executed, signed, and notarized by
spouses AdC and NT. Is the crime of falsification or forgery present as established by clear, positive and
convincing evidence?

Suggested Answer:
No.
The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature
and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the
following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically
present at the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an
expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best.
In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, B, to prove its allegation of falsification
or forgery. The prosecution failed to present the original copy of the subject deed in court, it likewise did
not provide ample proof that the same was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of L.
Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used to examine the questioned and standard
signatures of the spouses no valid comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering B's
declaration inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against L
4. November 8, 2017
G.R. No. 226158
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERA TO PENTECOSTES y CRONICO

L together with A the father of V, as well as 4 other people had a drinking spree at A’s house.
About 2 hours after the drinking ended, L was seen by AV and J carrying V on his back appearing to be
headed towards a nearby body of water. Later that day, with V still missing A her father began searching
for her with the help of some relatives and barangay tanod, but to no avail. The next day, V’s lifeless body
was recovered near the house of J. All those present during the drinking spree were summoned and
investigated by the police. But when L’s turn came, he ran away. V’s cause of death was declared as
drowning. L later gave inconsistent statements as his alibi denying his knowledge of V’s existence, only
knowing her with A asked for his help in searching for her but claimed he saw V with one of the people
drinking with him and A. Does the circumstantial evidence sufficiently prove L’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt?

Suggested Answer:
Yes.
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions; a
contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most crimes, by their very nature,
are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses. Thus, our rules on evidence and
jurisprudence allow the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence alone, provided that
the following requisites concur:
(i) there is more than one circumstance;
(ii) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(iii) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The facts of the case provide that L was positively identified as the last person seen with Vivian
before she disappeared, the records disclose that Vivian's cause of death was drowning as he was seen
by AV and J carrying V on his back appearing to be headed towards a nearby body of water and he fled
during the investigation. Thus, proving that the evidence presented constituted proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
5. November 29, 2017
G.R. No. 203121
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GOLEM SOTA and AMIDAL GADJADLI

J, a minor, was awoken by S and G demanding food from her father A in the middle of the night.
As G was carrying a pistol, A was willing to comply on the condition that the food be handed through an
opening on the wall. The group started to burn the house and demanded that A open the door. When A
refused the group started to fire at the house hitting A. J then escaped to her brother’s house nearby. The
day after, J together with her brothers, returned to the house and went to the police station after where
she executed her affidavit. Is J a credible witness?

Suggested Answer:
Yes.
Under Rule 130, Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -The
following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In the case at bar, J's young age had no bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened
that night. As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness.
6. November 7, 2017
G.R. No. 224162
JANET LIM NAPOLES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

The Office of the Ombudsman received a report of the NBI regarding its investigation for the crime
of Plunder for essentially misappropriating PDAF through NGOs. Cases for violations of RA No. 7080 were
filed against NPLS, JPE and JLR. Several witnesses as whistleblowers claimed that they personally received
instructions from Napoles to incorporate the NGOs, prepare the requirements for the release of the PDAF,
prepare and deliver the rebates to the middlepersons, and fabricate the liquidation documents, they were
competent witnesses on the subject of their respective testimonies. May the court rely on the testimonies
of the whistleblowers?

Suggested Answer:
Yes.
The ruling in United States v. Remigio is instructive in this regard:
The true doctrine which should govern the testimony of accomplices, or what may be variously
termed principals, confederates, or conspirators, is not in doubt. The evidence of accomplices is
admissible and competent. Yet such testimony comes from a “polluted source.” Consequently, it
is scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave suspicion. If not corroborated, credibility is
affected. Even then, however, the defendant may be convicted upon the unsupported evidence
of an accomplice. If corroborated absolutely or even to such an extent as is indicative of
trustworthiness, the testimony of the accomplice is sufficient to warrant a conviction. This is true
even if the accomplice has made previous statements inconsistent with his testimony at the trial
and such inconsistencies are satisfactorily explained.
In any case, a careful perusal of the court resolution reveals that it considered the prosecution's
other testimonial and documentary evidence, and discussed it in relation to one another. Among the
documents that the Sandiganbayan considered were the letters requesting for the release of former
Senator Enrile's PDAF, the incorporation documents of the NGOs, the liquidation documents for the PDAF-
funded projects, the SAROs itself, and the DV s issued by the implementing agencies to the NGOs under
the control of NPLS. In other words, the court did not rely solely on the testimonies of the whistleblowers.
Seeing as there were other available evidence lending credence to their testimonies, the court did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it considered the testimonies of the whistleblowers despite their
participation in the conspiracy itself. The mere fact that the whistleblowers were conspirators themselves
does not automatically render their testimonies incredible and unreliable.
7. November 7, 2017
G.R. No. 181796
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD OF THE CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE vs. REGINA N. CA
YANAN AND SPOl ROLANDO V. PASCUA

A group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pas, had forcibly
arrested Pab on Quezon City without any warrant of arrest. He has then been detained at the office of the
CIDG. Since then Pab had not been found or heard from and that despite repeated demands by her and
her relatives, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo. R filed a petition for writ of amparo
in the RTC alleging that Pab, her husband, was being illegally detained by the CIDG. Is the petition for the
issuance of writ of amparo meritorious?

Suggested Answer
Yes.
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the
allegations of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo, to wit:
Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
In this case, Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in support of her
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo. Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay executed before the NBI
whereby affiant, an eyewitness no less, detailed the events of the abduction of Pab was consistent and
credible in itself. Secondly, Pas himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pab, albeit asserting himself
as another victim of the same abduction. Thirdly, Pas’ version of being a victim of the same abduction
deserved no consideration. Fourthly, R presented other witnesses, to corroborate the allegation on the
occurrence of the abduction. Lastly, affiant's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay had no evidentiary
value for being general and bereft of any details.
8. December 6, 2017
G.R. No. 197475
MARK MONTELIBANO, V. LINDA YAP

A obtained a loan from B as additional capital for his business. A issued a check in the amount of
P2,612,500.00 as partial payment. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored. A was
charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. A failed to appear and the MTCC granted the
prosecution's motion to consider A's right to present evidence as waived. A filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order which was granted by the MTCC. A hearing was again set for the reception
of evidence for the defense. However, instead of presenting evidence, A filed a memorandum, asserting
that the prosecution failed to establish A's guilt beyond reasonable doubt because he was never identified
as the one who signed and issued the check. A alleged that he was not present in court when the sole
witness for the prosecution testified, such that the latter was not able to identify him. Did the prosecution
fail to personally identify the petitioner?

Suggested Answer:

NO.
The Court in numerous cases (Montelibano v. Yap, G.R. No. 197475, (2017); People v. Quezada,
425 Phil. 877, 883 (2002)) has already clarified that in-court identification is not essential where there is
no doubt that the person alleged to have committed the crime and the person charged in the information
and subject of the trial are one and the same.
In this case, there is no doubt as to the identification of A. A never denied that he is the person
indicted in the information, much less offered proof that he is not the same person being charged with
the offense. This is a patent acknowledgment that he is the person being charged with committing the
offense and subject of the trial. It is clear that A’s argument is untenable as there is no doubt to his
identification.
9. December 13, 2017
G.R. No. 224979
IVY LIM, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND BLUE PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC.

Ivy Aguas was accused of violating BP 22. During the Preliminary Conference, the parties admitted
that whenever the court refers to the name of Ivy Aguas, the name pertains to the accused, and stipulated
on the existence and due execution of the eleven (23) checks. Aguas was eventually convicted of the crime
however, she asserts in a petition for review on certiorari to the SC that she was out of the country that
day and could not have signed the same checks. Since she did not sign the checks in the presence of the
complainant on said date, then the subject checks could not have been properly authenticated in
accordance with the Rules on Evidence. Is Aguas’ contention meritorious?

Suggested Answer:

NO.
In the case of Lim v. People of the Philippines and Blue Pacific Holders, the court ruled that since
the Preliminary Conference Order contained a stipulation admitting the existence and due execution of
the eleven (11) checks with payee Blue Pacific Holdings, Inc and that Lim did not deny that the signature
on the 11 checks were hers nor claim that her signatures thereon were forged. She cannot complain that
unauthenticated checks cannot prove that she was the same person who issued them.
Similarly, Aguas cannot claim that the checks were unauthorized and should not be admitted as
evidence as she admitted during the preliminary conference the existence and due execution of the 23
checks. She cannot question such issuance at this stage. Aguas’ conviction should be upheld.
10. December 14, 2017
G.R. No. 215194
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RON ALDO DELOSO y BA GARES

X was charged with one count of rape committed against AAA, a fourteen-year-old girl and X’s
step-daughter. AAA testified that on September 16, 2009, at about 12:00 o'clock midnight, she, together
with her 11-year-old brother CCC were sleeping side by side in their room while X was sleeping in the
"sala." She was awakened when X removed her underwear. X then inserted his penis into her vagina.
When asked where was her brother, CCC, when X inserted his penis into her vagina, AAA clarified that X
first carried and transferred CCC somewhere at her feet's side. CCC, the twelve-year-old brother, also
testified that X opened the skirt of AAA, removed her panty and mounted on her making a push and pull
movement several times and holding her both hands, while AAA was crying. CCC testified that he was able
to wake up when X transferred him from beside AAA. When asked how he saw X raping AAA, CCC
answered that there was a light illuminated from their neighbor's house. X, for his defense, said that he
merely inserted his finger but not his penis into the vagina of AAA. Is the testimony of the witness credible?

Suggested Answer:

YES.
As reiterated in our ruling in People v. Leonardo:
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings, especially its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath.
These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing
the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
The element of carnal knowledge had been duly established by the testimonial evidence of AAA
and CCC who both positively identified X as the perpetrator and stated their testimonies devoid of
material inconsistencies. As to the element of intimidation, the settled rule that in cases where the rape
is committed by a close kin, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. In this case, X is AAA’s step-father.
Denial is inherently a weak defense. It cannot prevail over positive identifications, unless buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability (People v. Padua, 661 Phil. 366, 370 (2011)). Compared to AAA’s and
CCC’s testimonies, X’s mere denial should not prevail.
11. January 31,2018
G.R. No. 212994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS

A was charged with violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act PO3
B testified that the police organized a buy-bust operation with PO3 B as poseur-buyer. After the arrest,
the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from A. A was then brought to the police
station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were turned over to the investigator, SPO4 C, who
then marked these items with his initials. He also prepared the letter request for laboratory examination
of the sachets' contents. A was the sole witness for the defense. He recalled that he went to XY Shrine to
light candles and to pray. He then left on board a tricycle. Mid-transit, six (6) persons blocked the tricycle
and told him to disembark. He was brought to a house some five (5) meters away. PO3 B searched his
pockets but found nothing. About 30 minutes later, another man arrived and handed something to PO3
B. A was then brought to the police station and turned over to SPO4 C. Is conviction proper?

Suggested Answer:

NO.
Conviction in criminal actions requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence spells out this requisite quantum of proof:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on
the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved." (Macayan, Jr. y Malana v. People, 756 Phil. 202, 213-241 (2015)).
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt because it did not
comply with the element of corpus delicti, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended:
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected
public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
Compliance with Section 21's chain of custody requirements ensures the integrity of the seized
items. Non-compliance with them tarnishes the credibility of the corpus delicti around which prosecutions
under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve. Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim
that an offense against the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was committed.