However, perhaps the most important incentive driving Moscow’s activity in Syria is

the potential to use the crisis as a means to pressure the West to accept the annexation
of Crimea and remove economic sanctions on Russia?
http://natoassociation.ca/russias-global-strategy-moscows-motivations-in-ukraine-and-syria/

In Syria, neither is true. Russia is taking a calculated risk in a

military effort, the outcome and length of which is uncertain, but it
ties into a political strategy.
Russia is risking its helicopter pilots in direct assaults on Syrian
rebel positions with tactical aviation providing closer support. The
air campaign is still limited to 34 aircraft and a squadron of
helicopters, but its operational tempo has spiked sharply,
straining maintenance and increasing the chances of mechanical
failure. Russia is willing to take risks, on Assad’s behalf.
Among Russian ground units, only the artillery seems engaged in
fighting, while the rest are dedicated to base defense. Russia
seems set to build a much larger base in Syria, signaling the
intent for a permanent military presence, and perhaps a separate
military command to be deployed there. That is an important
infrastructure investment by Moscow, demonstrating that no
matter what happens to Assad, Russia will have to be reckoned
with in Syria and can quickly ramp up its presence.
The broader political objectives of the intervention are now
clearer as well. First, Russia seeks to destroy anti-Assad forces,
leaving no alternatives apart from the Syrian Army and jihadists.
For the United States, that effectively will make the already
dubious notion of supporting moderate forces in Syria impossible.
This, in turn, will mean Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states may
have to go it alone in this proxy war, a problem more manageable
for Russia and Iran. As a result, Russia will accomplish its goal:
ensure that the Syrian regime is the only legitimate and viable
actor in Syria worth backing. In the process of crafting its own
anti-ISIL coalition with Iraq and Iran, Moscow is attempting to
legitimate Assad’s forces and in effect rebrand his regime. Assad
may be beyond the pale for President Obama, but the next
president might prefer such a formulation over the alternative of
intervening in Syria.
https://warontherocks.com/2015/10/the-russian-intervention-in-syria-policy-options-and-exit-
strategies/

Projecting the effects of Russia’s Syria campaign beyond the Middle East
was always the Kremlin’s goal.
The conflict was always perceived as a tool to showcase ambitions that
assert Russia as a global power.

It could also allow Moscow to reach out to European leaders in France and Germany, as well
as the European Union’s foreign-policy chief, by persuading them to embrace their own
version of a political settlement.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/01/what-putin-really-wants-in-syria-russia-assad-strategy-
kremlin/

Putin using Syria conflict to turn

Turkey into Moscow’s proxy -
analysis
Turkey’s growing asymmetric dependence on Russia is raising the question of
whether Ankara is becoming a Russian proxy, allowing Moscow to gain further
leverage in its global contest with the United States and NATO, the Conversation
website said.
https://ahvalnews.com/russia-turkey-iran/putin-using-syria-conflict-turn-turkey-moscows-proxy-
analysis#

Russia’s actions in Syria are connected with the country’s Ukrainian activities. The
two theaters of Russian activity are not isolated situations, but two sides of Putin’s
global geopolitical strategy
While Ukraine served as a buffer against the West in Europe, Assad’s regime serves
as a buffer for Russia against Islamic extremism and U.S political influence in the
Middle East. ISIS and other terrorist groups represent a significant threat to Moscow,
particularly in the Russian Caucasus, home to a large population of discontented
Muslims who could be radicalized and driven to launch terrorist attacks within Russia.
The Caucasus has proven to be a lucrative recruiting ground for ISIS, as law
enforcement officials estimate that there are at least 2000 militants fighting for ISIS
who have come from the region.
Within Russian borders, Islamic State is also steadily building up its own militant
organization, specifically in the southern region of Dagestan, declaring the so-
called Dagestan Governorate of the Islamic State in June while making daily threats
promising a terror attack within the Russian heartland. ISIS has also become an even
more pressing security issue for Russia after the recent downing of a Russian
passenger aircraft over the Sinai, pushing Putin to take a more aggressive stance
against the terrorist group. Along with ISIS, moderate U.S.-backed groups like the
Free Syrian Army are also problematic for Moscow, as a FSA victory in the country
would replace the friendly Assad regime with a ruling party aligned with the West and
likely opposed to Russian interests in the Middle East.
Another motivating factor in Russia’s intervention is the protection of the Russian
naval base in the Syrian port of Tarsus. Much like the base in Sevastopol, the Tarsus
base is crucial for Russian power projection, as it serves as the Russian navy’s only
repair and refueling station in the Mediterranean, allowing Russian ships to conduct
operations in the region without having to make the long trip back to Sevastopol for
maintenance.
However, perhaps the most important incentive driving Moscow’s activity in Syria is
the potential to use the crisis as a means to pressure the West to accept the annexation
of Crimea and remove economic sanctions on Russia.
The Paris attacks have provided an opening for Putin to take advantage of the fear of
terrorism to trade increased aggression against ISIS in Syria for the removal of
sanctions. Recently, French President François Hollande has indicated the need to
work with Russia to form a coalition against ISIS, and spoke optimistically about the
eventual end of sanctions. Capitalizing on France’s desire for an alliance, Putin has
ordered his forces to coordinate airstrikes with Russia’s “French allies,” looking to
cement military ties with Paris in the Middle East and erode European support for the
renewal of sanctions.
In sum, Russia’s global strategy is centered on aggressively countering threats to
Russia’s political buffer states in Ukraine and Syria, while also maintaining Russia’s
ability to project power abroad from its key naval facilities. Through his attempts to
leverage Russia’s military role in the Middle East to force the West to work in concert
with Moscow, Putin has shown that he recognizes Russia must reintegrate within the
world community to spare its economy the ill effects of crippling sanctions.
http://natoassociation.ca/russias-global-strategy-moscows-motivations-in-ukraine-and-syria/