The Translation of Architecture, the Production of Babel

Author(s): Mark Wigley

Source: Assemblage, No. 8 (Feb., 1989), pp. 6-21
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3171012 .
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 Mark Wigley
The Translation of
Architecture, the
Production of Babel

MarkWigleyteachesarchitectural theory How then to translatedeconstructionin architecturaldis-

anddesignat PrincetonUniversity.He
wasthe associatecuratorof the show,and
coeditorof the catalogue,Deconstructivist
Architecture,Museumof ModernArt.
course? Perhapsit is too late to ask this preliminaryques-
tion. What is left to translate?Or, more important, what is
always left by translation?Not just left behind but left spe-
cifically for architecture.What remains of deconstruction
for architecture?What are the remains that can be located
only in architecture, the last resting place of deconstruc-
tion? The question of translationis, after all, a question of
survival. Can deconstructionsurvive architecture?

1.
It is now over twenty years since Derrida'sfirst books were
published. Suddenly his work has startedto surface in
architecturaldiscourse. This appearsto be the last dis-
course to invoke the name of Derrida. Its reading seems
the most distant from the original texts, the final addition
to a colossal stack of readings, an addition that marksin
some way the beginning of the end of deconstruction, its
limit if not its closure.
After such a long delay - a hesitation whose strategicnec-
cessity must be examined - there is now such haste to
read Derrida in architecture. But it is a readingthat seems
at once obvious and suspect. Suspect in its very obvious-
1. Max Ernst,"Marcelineand ness. Deconstruction is understoodto be unproblematically
Marie (of one voice): 'It seems architectural.There seems to be no translation,but just a
to me the sky is falling into my
heart ... . FromRdve d'une metaphoric transfer,a straightforwardapplication of theory
petite fille qui voulut entrer au from outside architectureto the practicaldomain of the
carmel, 1930 architecturalobject. The hesitation does not seem to have

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been produced by some kind of internal resistanceon the
part of that object. On the contrary,there is no evidence
of work, no task for the translator,no translation.Just a
literal application, a transliteration.Architectureis under-
stood as a representationof deconstruction, the material
representationof an abstractidea. The recent reception of
Derrida'swork follows the classical teleology from idea to
material form, from initial theory to final practice, from
presence to representation.Architecture,the most material
of the discourses, seems the most detached from the origi-
nal work, the most suspect of the applications, the last
application, the representationalornament that cannot
influence the tradition it is added to, a veneer maskingas
much as it reveals of the structurebeneath. The last layer,
just an addition, no translation. Yet.
But how to translate?Deconstruction is no more than a
subversionof the architecturallogic of addition which sets
into play a certain thought of translation.But one cannot
simply consider translationoutside and above either
deconstruction or architecture. The question immediately
becomes complicated. There is no hygienic startingpoint,
no superior logic to apply. There are no principlesto be
found in some domain that governs both deconstructive
discourse and architecturaldiscourse. Nevertheless, certain
exchanges are alreadyoccurring between them. Architec-
ture, translationand deconstructionare alreadybound
together, alreadydefining an economy whose pathological
symptoms can be studied. It is a matterof identifyingthe
logic of translationthat is alreadyin operation. Since there
is no safe place to begin, one can only enter the economy
and trace its convoluted geometry in order to describethis
scene of translation.
This can be done by locating that moment in each dis-
course where the other is made thematic, where the other
comes to the surface. The line of argumentthat surfaces
there can then be folded back on the rest of the discourse
to locate other layers of relations. These hidden layersare
not simply below the surface. They are within the surface
itself, knotted together to form the surface. To locate them
involves slippage along faultlines ratherthan excavation.
As there are no principles above or below the convoluted
folds of this surface, it is a matterof following some circu-
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assemblage 8
lar line of inquiry, of circulating within the economy,
within the surface itself.
2.
Translationsurfacesin deconstructivediscoursewhen
Derrida, following Walter Benjamin'sThe Taskof the
Translator, arguesthat translationis not the transference,
reproduction,or image of an original. The original only
survivesin translation.The translationconstitutesthe
original it is added to. The original calls for a translation
which establishesa nostalgiafor the innocence and the life
it never had. To answerthis call, the translationabuses the
original, transformingit.
we wouldhaveto substi-
. . . andforthe notionof translation,
a regulated
tute a notionof transformation: transformation of one
languageby another,of one textby another.We neverwill have,
and in factneverhavehad, a 'transport' of puresignifiedsfrom
one languageto another,or withinone andthe samelanguage,
thatthe signifyinginstrumentwouldleavevirginand untouched.
There is some kind of gap in the original which the trans-
lation is called in to cover over. The original is not some
organic whole, a unity. It is alreadycorrupted,alreadyfis-
sured. The translationis not simply a departurefrom the
original, as the original is alreadyexiled from itself. Lan-
guage is necessarilyimpure. Alwaysdivided, it remains for-
eign to itself. It is the translationthat producesthe myth of
purity and, in so doing, subordinatesitself as impure. In
constructingthe original as original, the translationcon-
structsitself as secondary,exiled. The supplementarytrans-
lation which appearsas a violation of the purity of the
work is actually the possibilityof that very purity. Its vio-
lence to the original is a violent fidelity, a violence called
for by the original preciselyto construct itself as pure. The
abuse of the text is called for by an abuse alreadywithin
the text. Translationexploits the conflict within the origi-
nal to present the original as unified.
Consequently, in translation,the text neither lives nor
dies, it neither has its original life-giving intention revived
(presentation)nor is it displaced by a dead sign (representa-
tion). Rather, it just lives on, it survives.This survivalis
organizedby a contractthat ensures that translationis nei-

ther completed nor completely frustrated.2The contract is
the necessarilyunfulfilled promise of translation. It defines
a scene of incomplete translation,an incompletion that
binds the languages of the original and the translation
together in a strangeknot, a double bind. This constitu-
tional bond is neither a social contract nor a transcenden-
tal contract above both languages. Neither cultural nor
acultural, it is other than cultural without being outside
culture. The negotiable social contractswithin which lan-
guage operatespresupposethis non-negotiable contract
which makes language possible, establishingthe difference
between languages while making certain exchanges
between them possible.
This translationcontract is not independent of the lan-
guages whose economy it organizes. It is inscribedwithin
both languages. Not only is the original alreadycorrupt,
alreadydivided, but translationis alreadyoccurringacross
those divisions. The gap between languagespasses through
each language. Because language is always alreadydivided,
inhabited by the other, and constantly negotiatedwith it,
translationis possible.' The translationwithin a language
makes possible translationoutside it. Which is to say that
one language is not simply outside the other. Translation
occurs across a gap folded within ratherthan between each
language. It is these folds that constitute language. The
contract is no more than the geometry of these folds, the
organizationof the gaps.
Consequently, any translationbetween architectureand
deconstruction does not occur between the texts of archi-
tectural discourse and those of philosophical discourse.4
Rather, it occupies and organizes both discourses. Within
each there is an architecturaltranslationof philosophy and
a philosophical translationof architecture.To translate
deconstruction in architecturaldiscourse is not, therefore,
to faithfully recover some original, undivided sense of
deconstruction.5Rather, it is one of the abuses of the texts
signed by Derrida that constitutes them as originals. To
translatedeconstruction in architecturaldiscourse is to
examine the gaps in deconstructivewriting that demand an
architecturaltranslationin order that those texts be consti-
tuted as deconstructive. The architecturaltranslationof
deconstruction is literally the production of deconstruction.
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Wigley
This production must be organizedby the terms of a
contract between architectureand philosophy which is
inscribed within the structureof both in a way that defines
a unique scene of translation.
3.
A preliminarysketch of this scene can be drawn by devel-
oping Heidegger'saccount of the relationshipbetween
architectureand philosophy. Heidegger examines the way
in which philosophy describesitself as architecture. Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason, for example, describesmeta-
physics as an "edifice"erected on secure foundationslaid
on the most stable ground. Kant criticizes previous philos-
ophers for their tendency to "complete its speculative struc-
tures as speedily as may be, and only afterwardsto enquire
whether these foundations are reliable."6The edifice of
metaphysicshas fallen apartand is "in ruins"because it
has been erected on "groundlessassertions"unquestion-
ingly inherited from the philosophical tradition. To restore
a secure foundation, the critique startsthe "thoroughprep-
aration of the ground"'with the "clearing,as it were, and
levelling of what has hitherto been wasteground."8The
edifice of metaphysics is understoodas a grounded
structure.
Heidegger argues that Kant'sattempt to lay the foundations
is the necessarytask of all metaphysics. The question of
metaphysics has always been that of the ground (grund) on
which things stand even though it has been explicitly for-
mulated in these terms only in the modern period inaugu-
rated by Descartes. Metaphysicsis no more than the
attempt to locate the ground. Its history is that of a succes-
sion of differentnames (logos, ratio, arche, etc.) for the
ground. Each of them designates"Being,"which is under-
stood as presence. Metaphysics is the identification
of the ground as "supportingpresence"for an edifice. It
searches for "thatupon which everythingrests, what
is always there for every being as its support."9For
Heidegger, metaphysics is no more than the determination
of ground-as-support.
Metaphysics is the question of what the ground will with-
stand, of what can stand on the ground. The motif of the
edifice, the grounded structure, is that of standingup.

Philosophy is the construction of propositionsthat stand
up. The ability of its constructsto stand is determined
by the condition of the ground, its supportingpresence.
Heidegger repeatedlyidentifies presence with standing. The
"fundamental"question of metaphysics(why there are
beings ratherthan nothing) asks of a being "on what does
it stand?"'1Standing up through construction makes visible
the condition of the ground.
But in Heidegger'sreading, constructiondoes not simply
make visible a ground that precedes it. The kind of ground
clearing Kant attempts does not simply precede that con-
struction of the edifice. The ground is not simply indepen-
dent of the edifice. The edifice is not simply added to the
ground; it is not simply an addition. For Heidegger,a
building does not stand on a ground that precededit and
on which it depends. Rather, it is the erection of the
building that establishesthe fundamentalcondition of the
ground. Its structuremakes the ground possible." The
ground is constituted ratherthan revealedby that which
appearsto be added to it. To locate the ground is necessar-
ily to construct an edifice. Consequently, philosophy'ssuc-
cessive relayingsof the foundation do not preservea single,
defined edifice.12 Rather, it is a matterof abandoningthe
traditionalstructureby removing its foundation.I3The
form of the edifice changes as the ground changes.
Having cleared the ground, Kant must reassessits load-
bearing capacity and "lay down the complete architectonic
plan" of a new philosophy in order to "build upon this
foundation."14 The edifice must be redesigned. Relaying
the foundations establishesthe possibilityof a different
edifice. For Heidegger, the laying of the foundation is the
"projectionof the intrinsic possibilityof metaphysics"'5
through an interrogationof the condition of the ground.
This interrogationis the projection of a plan, the tracingof
an outline, the drawing, the designing of an edifice, the
drawingof the design out of the ground. Interrogatingthe
condition of the ground defines certain architectoniclim-
its, certain structuralconstraintswithin which the philoso-
pher must work as a designer. The philosopher is an
architect, endlessly attemptingto produce a grounded
structure.
10
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assemblage 8
In these terms, the historyof philosophy is that of a series
of substitutionsfor structure.Every referenceto structureis
a referenceto an edifice erected on a ground, an edifice
from which the ground cannot simply be removed. The
motif of the edifice is that of a structurewhose free play is
constrainedby the ground. The play of representationsis
limited, controlled, by presence:"The concept of centered
structureis in fact the concept of a play based on a funda-
mental ground, a play constitutedon the basis of a funda-
mental immobility and a reassuringcertitude, which itself
is beyond the reach of play.16Philosophyis the attemptto
restrainthe free play of representationby establishingthe
architectonic limits providedby the ground. It searchesfor
the most stable ground in orderto exercise the greatest
control over representation.
The metaphorof groundedstructuredesignatesthe funda-
mental project of metaphysicsto produce a universallan-
guage that controls representation,a logos. Heidegger
identifies the original sense of the word logos as "gathering"
in a way that lets things stand, the standingof construc-
tion. The link between structureand presence organizes
traditionalaccounts of language. The means by which lan-
guage is grounded is always identifiedwith structure.
Metaphysicsmaintains its protocol of presence/presenta-
tion/representationwith an account of languagethat privi-
leges speech over writing. While speech is promotedas
presentationof pure thought, writing is subordinatedas
representationof speech. Speech is identified with struc-
ture which makes visible the condition of the ground it is
bonded to. Phonetic writing, as the representationof
speech, is identified with ornament that representsthe
structureit is added to. If writing ceases to be phonetic, if
it loses its bond with speech, it becomes representation
detached from pure presence, attachedto the structurelike
an ornament referringaway from the structure.The proto-
col of metaphysicssustainedby the traditionalaccount of
language as thought/speech/phoneticwriting/nonphonetic
writing is establishedby the architecturalmotif of ground/
structure/ornament.
Metaphysicsis dependent on an architecturallogic of
support. Architectureis the figure of the addition,
the structurallayer, one element supportedby another.

Metaphysics'sdeterminationof the ground-as-supportpre-
supposes a vertical hierarchyfrom ground through struc-
ture to ornament. The idea of support, of structure, is
dependent on a certain view of architecturewhich defines
a range of relationshipsfrom fundamental (foundational)to
supplementary(ornamental). With each additionallayer,
the bond is weaker. The structureis bonded to the ground
more securely than the ornament is bonded to the struc-
ture. But as the distance from the ground becomes greater,
the threat to the overall structurediminishes. The vertical
hierarchyis a mechanism of control that makes available
the thought of the ground-as-supportwhich is metaphysics.
Structuremakes present the ground. Structureis ground-
ing, submission to the authorityof presence. Ornament
either representsthe grounding of structureor deviates
from the line of support, detaching itself from the ground
in order to representthat which is other than the structure.
Philosophy attempts to tame ornament in the name of the
ground, to control representationin the name of presence.
The philosophical economy turns on the status of orna-
ment. It is the structure/ornamentrelationshipthat enables
us to think of support, and thereby, to think of the ground.
4.
The strategicimportance of the architecturalmetaphordis-
cussed above emerges when Heideggerexamines the status
of art. Metaphysics'sdeterminationof ground-as-support
also determines art as a merely representative"addition"to
a utilitarianobject, a "superstructure" added to the "sub-
structure"which, in turn, is added to the ground. The
architecturalmetaphor organizes this relationship:"It
seems almost as though the thingly element in the art work
is like the substructureinto and upon which the other,
authentic element is built."" It is the "support"to which
the artworkis added, the presentationof the ground to
which the artworkis added as a representation.
But it is not just the internal structureof the art object that
is understoodin these architecturalterms, it is also the
status of art as a discourse. Heidegger notes that metaphys-
ics treatsart itself as a superstructureadded to the substruc-
ture of philosophy. Metaphysicsunderstandsitself as a
grounded structureto which is attached the representa-
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Wigley
tional ornament of art. It subordinatesthe arts, and there-
fore architecture,by employing the verticalhierarchy
dependent on a certain understandingof architecture.Art
is subordinatedby being located furthestfrom the ground.
Architecture, then, plays a curious strategicrole. It is able
to pass between philosophy and art in a unique way. It is
involved in a kind of translation.The metaphorcirculates
between and within the two systems, complicating them as
it folds back on itself. A convoluted economy is sustained
by the descriptionof architectureas ornamentedstructure,
which enables art to be subordinatedto philosophy, even
while philosophy describes itself as architecture.Philos-
ophy describesitself in terms of that thing which it
subordinates.
Heidegger argues that art is actually "foundational"to the
philosophical traditionthat subordinatesit to the level of
ornament. This convolution is doubled in the case of
architectureitself. Metaphysicsorganizes itself around an
account of the object as grounded structure.It projectsan
account of architectureoutside itself which it then appeals
to as an outside authority. It literally producesan architec-
ture. As Derrida argues, in reading Kant'suse of the archi-
tectural metaphor, philosophy "representsitself as part of its
part, as an art of Architecture. It re-presentsitself, detaches
itself, dispatches an emissary,one part of itself outside itself
to bind the whole, to fill up or to heal the whole which
has suffereddetachment."'8It does so to cover up some
kind of gap, some internal division. Metaphysicsproduces
the architecturalobject as the paradigmof ground-as-
supportin order to veil its own lack of support, its
ungrounded condition. Philosophy representsitself as
architecture, it translatesitself as architecture,producing
itself in the translation.The limits of philosophy are
establishedby the metaphoricalstatus of architecture.
Philosophy drawsan edifice, ratherthan drawson an
edifice. It produces an architectureof groundedstructure
which it then uses for support, leaning on it, restingwithin
it. The edifice is constructed to make theory possible, then
subordinatedas a metaphor in order to defer to some
higher, non-material truth. Architectureis constructedas a
material reality in order to liberate some higher domain.
As material, it is but a metaphor. The most materialcon-
11

dition is used to establish the most ideal order, which is
then bound to reject it as merely material. The statusof
material oscillates. The metaphor of the ground, the bed-
rock, the base, the fundamental, invertsto become base in
the sense of degraded, material, less than ideal. The verti-
cal hierarchy inverts itself. In this inversion, architecture
flips from privilegedorigin to gratuitoussupplement, from
foundation to ornament.
Philosophy treats its architecturalmotif as but a metaphor
that can and should be discardedas superfluous.The fig-
ure of the grounded structureis but an illustration,a use-
ful metaphor that illustratesthe nature of metaphysicsbut
outlives its usefulness and must be abandonedin the final
form of metaphysics, a representationto be separatedfrom
the fundamental presentation,a kind of scaffoldingto be
discardedwhen the project is complete, a frame that traces
the outline of the building, a trace that lacks substancebut
is structurallynecessary, an open frame that is the very
possibilityof a closed structureto which it then becomes
an unnecessaryappendage. Scaffoldingis that piece of
structurewhich becomes ornamental. When philosophy
reflects upon its own completion, it defines architectureas
metaphorical. Metaphysicsis the determinationof archi-
tecture as metaphor.
But can architecturebe so simply discarded?The use of
the figure of structure"is only metaphorical, it will be
said. Certainly. But metaphor is never innocent. It orients
researchand fixes results. When the spatialmodel is hit
upon, when it functions, critical reflection restswithin
it."'9 The very attempt to abandon metaphorinvolves
metaphors. Even the concept that the metaphoricalcan
be detached from the fundamental is itself metaphorical.
Metaphysicsgrounds itself in the metaphorsit claims to
have abandoned. Metaphor "is the essential weight which
anchors discourse in metaphysics"20 ratherthan a superflu-
ous ornament. Metaphor is fundamental. The metaphorof
the grounded structurein particularcannot be discardedin
order to reveal the ground itself. The "fundamental"is an
architecturalmetaphor, so architecturecannot be aban-
doned in favor of the fundamental.
Thus, the criteriafora classification
of philosophical
metaphors
areborrowedfroma derivativephilosophicaldiscourse
.... They
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assemblage 8
are metaphorical,resistingeverymeta-metaphorics, the valuesof
a concept,foundation,andtheory.. . . Whatis fundamental
correspondsto the desirefora firmand ultimateground,a terrain
to buildon, the earthas the supportforan artificialstructure.2'
Philosophy can define only a part of itself as non-
metaphoricalby employing the architecturalmetaphor.
This metaphororganizesthe statusof metaphor.In so
doing, it organizesthe traditionof philosophy that claims
to be able to discardit. Architecturalfigurescannot be
detached from philosophicaldiscourse. The architectural
metaphor is not simply one metaphoramong others. More
than the metaphorof foundation, it is the foundational
metaphor. It is thereforenot simply a metaphor.
The architecturalmotif is bound to philosophy. The bond
is contractual, not in the sense of an agreementsigned by
two parties, but a logical knot of which the two partiesare
but a side effect. More than the terms of exchange within
and between these discourses, it produceseach discourseas
a discourse. The translationcontractbetween architecture
and philosophy worksboth ways. Each constructsthe other
as an origin from which they are detached. Each identifies
the other as other. The other is constructedas a privileged
origin which must then be discarded.In each there is this
moment of inversion.
This primal contract, which is neither a contingent, cul-
tural artifactnor an atemporal, aculturalprinciple, estab-
lishes the possibilityof a social contractthat separates
architectureand philosophyand constitutesthem as dis-
courses. The eventual status of architectureas a discipline
began to be negotiatedby the first texts of architectural
theory, which drew on the canons of the philosophical tra-
dition to identify the properconcern of the newly consti-
tuted figure of the architectwith drawing(disegno)that
mediates between the idea and the building, the formal
and the material, the soul and the body, the theoretical
and the practical.Architecture- architecturaldrawing-
is neither simply a mechanical art bound to the bodily
realm of utility, nor a liberal art operatingin the realm of
ideas, but is their reconciliation, the bridgebetween the
two. Architecturaltheory thus constructsarchitectureas a
bridge between the dominant oppositionsof metaphysics
and constitutes itself by exploiting the contractualpossibil-
12

ity alreadywritten into the philosophical traditionwherein
it describesitself as architecture.
It is not simply that architecturehas some familiar unam-
biguous material reality that is drawn upon by philosophy.
Rather, philosophy drawsan architecture,presentsa cer-
tain understanding,a certain theory, of architecture.The
terms of the contract are the prohibition of a different
description of the architecturalobject, or rather,the
dissimulation of the object.
To describe the privilegedrole of architecturein philoso-
phy is not to identify architectureas the origin from which
philosophy derives, but ratherto show that the condition
effected when philosophy infects itself from outside by
drawing on architectureis internal to architectureitself.
Architectureis cut from within, and philosophy unwit-
tingly appeals to architectureprecisely for this internal
torment.
The concern here is to locate certain discursivepractices
repressedwithin the pathological mechanisms of this econ-
omy, to trace the impact of another account of architecture
hidden within the tradition. Deconstruction is not outside
the tradition. It achieves its force precisely by inhabiting
the tradition, and thereby operatingin terms of the con-
tract. The question is, what relationshipdoes deconstruc-
tion assume with the account of architecturerepressedby
that tradition?
The translationof deconstructionin architecturedoes not
simply occur across the philosophy/architecturedivide. It is
occurring within each discourse. It is not a matterof sim-
ply generatinga new descriptionof the architecturalobject
in architecturaldiscourse but ratherof locating the account
of architecturealreadyoperativewithin deconstructivewrit-
ing. It is the difference between this account and that of
traditionalphilosophy that marksthe precise nature of
deconstruction'sinhabitation of philosophy. The limits of
deconstructionare establishedby the account of architec-
ture it unwittingly produces.
5.
As architectureis bound up into language,22this account
can be located precisely in the discussion of translation
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Wigley
itself. Inasmuch as deconstructiontamperswith the philo-
sophical ideal of translation, it tamperswith the ideal of
architecture.
Derrida'saccount of translationis organizedaround an
architecturalfigure:the tower of Babel. The failure of the
tower marksthe necessity for translation,the multiplicity
of languages, the free play of representation,which is to
say the necessity for controlling representation.The col-
lapse of the tower marksthe necessity for a certain con-
struction. The figure of the tower acts as the strategic
intersection of philosophy, architecture,deconstruction,
and translation.
The tower is the figure of philosophy because the dream of
Philosophy is the
philosophy is that of translatability.23
ideal of translation. But the univocal language of the
builders of the tower is not the language of philosophy;it
is an imposed order, a violent imposition of a single lan-
guage.24The necessity of philosophy is defined in the col-
lapse ratherthan in the project itself. As the desire for
translationproduced by the incompletion of the tower is
never completely frustrated,the edifice is never simply
demolished. The building project of philosophy continues
but its completion is foreverdeferred.
The tower is also the figure of deconstruction. Since
deconstructioninhabits philosophy, subvertingit from
within, it also inhabits the figure of the tower. It is lodged
in the tower, transformingthe representationof its con-
struction. Inasmuch as philosophy is the ideal of transla-
tion, deconstruction is the subversionof translation.25That
subversionis found within the conditions for philosophy,
the incompletion of the tower:"The deconstructionof the
Tower of Babel, moreover, gives a good idea of what
deconstruction is: an unfinished edifice whose half-
completed structuresare visible, letting one guess at the
scaffoldingbehind them."26Deconstruction identifies the
inability of philosophy to establish the stable ground, the
deferralof the origin which preventsthe completion of the
edifice by locating the untranslatable,that which lies
between the original and the translation.
But the tower is also the figure of architecture.The neces-
sity of translationis the failure of building that demands a
13

supplementation by architecture. Just as it is the precondi-
tion for philosophy, understoodas building (presentation),
translationalso marksthe necessity for architecture(repre-
sentation), but as a representationthat speaksof the
essence of building, an architecturethat representsthe
ground in its absence: "If the tower had been completed
there would be no architecture. Only the incompletion of
the tower makes it possible for architectureas well as the
multitude of languages to have a history."27The possibility
of architectureis bound up with the foreverincomplete
project of philosophy. Philosophy requiresthe account of
building as grounded and architectureas detached precisely
because of this incompletion. Structuralfailure produces
the need for a supplement, the need for a building/archi-
tecture distinction, the need for architecture.Architecture
is the translationof building that representsbuilding to
itself as complete, secure, undivided.
Since the tower is the figure of deconstruction, architec-
ture, and translation, the question shifts from identifying
the common ground between them, the identity, to locat-
ing the difference. The once discrete domains become
entangled to the extent that the task becomes to identify
the convoluted mechanism of translationthat producesthe
sense of separateidentities. This mechanism must be
embedded in the scene of translationwhich bears on the
status of structure.
Translation between the discoursesis made possible by a
breakdownin the sense of structurethat is the currency
within them. Derrida argues that the incompletion of the
tower is the very structureof the tower. The tower is
deconstructedby establishingthat "the structureof the
original is markedby the requirementto be translated"28
and that it "in no way suffersfrom not being satisfied, at
least it does not suffer insofar as it is the very structureof
the work."29There is a gap in the structurethat cannot be
filled, a gap that can only be covered over. The tower is
always already markedby a flaw inasmuch as it is a tower.
This is a displacement of the traditionalidea of structure.
Structureis no longer simply grounding. It is no longer a
vertical hierarchy, but a convoluted line. The structureis
no longer simply standing on the ground. The building
stands on an abyss.
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assemblage 8
This argument follows Heidegger'sattemptto dismantle
the edifice of metaphysicsin order to reveal the condition
of the ground on which it stood. In doing so, he raisesthe
possibilitythat the ground (grund) might actually be a con-
cealed "abyss"(abgrund)so that metaphysicsis constructed
in ignorance of the instabilityof the terrainon which it is
erected:"we move over this ground as over a flimsily cov-
ered abyss."3' Metaphysicsbecomes the veiling of the
ground ratherthan the interrogationof it.
Heidegger'slater work developed this possibilityinto a
principle. He argues that philosophy has been in a state of
ever since the translationof the ancient
"groundlessness"
Greek terms into the language of metaphysics.This trans-
lation substitutedthe original sense of ground with that of
the sense of ground as support, ground as supportingpres-
ence to which the world is added.31For Heidegger,meta-
physics is groundlesspreciselybecause it determines the
ground as support.The original sense of logos has been
lost. With metaphysics,the origin is seen as a stable
ground ratherthan an abyss. The "modern"crisis, the
groundlessnessof the age of technology, is producedby
philosophy'sancient determinationof the ground as sup-
port for a structureto which representationsare added.32
The crisis of representationis producedby the very attempt
to remove representationsin order to reveal the supporting
presence of the ground. Man is alienated from the ground
preciselyby thinking of it as secure.
Because of the very familiarityof the principle of ground-
as-support,"we misjudge most readilyand persistentlythe
deceitful form of its violence." Metaphysicsconceals this
violence. The architecturalmotif of the groundedstructure
is articulatedin a way that effects this concealment. The
vertical hierarchyis a mechanism of control that veils its
own violence.
Heideggerattemptsto subvertthis mechanism by rereading
the status of the architecturalmotif. He arguesthat the
thought of architectureas a simple addition to building
actually makes possible the thought of the naked ground as
support. Undermining the division between building and
architecturedisplaces the traditionalsense of the ground:
"But the nature of the erecting of buildingscannot be
understoodadequatelyin terms either of architectureor of
14
 Wigley

2. Hani Rashid,The Late 19C,1986

15

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engineering construction, nor in terms of a mere combina-
tion of the two."34The thought of that which is neither
building nor architecturemakes possible the original
ground that precedes the ground as support.The linear
logic of addition is confused. The building is not simply
added to the ground, the ornament is not simply added to
the structure, art is not simply added to philosophy. The
vertical hierachy of ground/structure/ornament is convo-
luted. The architecturalmotif undermines itself.
But while certain Heideggerianmoves subvertthe logic of
addition by displacing the traditionalaccount of architec-
ture, Heidegger ultimately contradictsthat possibility,
confirming the traditionallogic by looking for a stable
structure. Derrida argues that Heidegger is unable to aban-
don the tradition of ground-as-support.Indeed, he retains
it in the very account of translationhe uses to identify its
emergence.
At the verymomentwhen Heideggeris denouncingtranslation
into LatinWords,at the momentwhen, at any rate,he declares
Greekspeechto be lost, he also makesuse of a 'metaphor.' Of at The concern here is with the way deconstructioninhabits
leastone metaphor,thatof the foundationandthe ground.The
groundof the Greekexperienceis, he says,lackingin this'trans- ture. Deconstruction is neither unbuilding nor demolition.
lation.'WhatI havejusttoo hastilycalled'metaphor' concen-
tratesall the difficultiesto come:doesone speak'metaphorically' the
of the groundfor justanything?35
The thought of ground-as-supportis not just producedby a
mistranslation.It is itself no more than a certain account
of translation. Translation is understoodas presentationof
the ground, and mistranslationis understoodas loss of sup-
port, detachment from ground. The collapse of the tower
establishesthe necessity of translationas one of reconstruc-
tion, edification.36Heidegger'saccount of translation
undermines itself when dealing with the translationof the
original ground into the idea of the edifice. Heidegger
to
appears employ an account of translationsimilar to
Derrida'sinasmuch as he argues that the violation of the
is
original ground already there in the Greek original. But
then he attemptsto go beneath this sense in order to erase
the violation, and, in so doing, restoresa traditional
account of translation.37He rebuildsthe edifice he appears
to have undermined.
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assemblage 8
6.
Derrida departsfrom Heideggerpreciselyby following him.
He takes the Heideggerianline furtheruntil it folds back
on itself, transformingitself. "Deconstruction"is a "transla-
tion" of two of Heidegger'sterms:Destruktion, meaning
"not a destructionbut preciselya destructuringthat dis-
mantles the structurallayers in the system,"and Abbau,
meaning "to take apartan edifice in orderto see how it is
constituted or deconstituted."38Derridafollows Heidegger's
argument that this "destructuring" or "unbuilding"disturbs
a traditionby inhabiting its structurein a way that exploits
its metaphoric resourcesagainstitself.
The movementsof deconstruction do not destroystructures
from
the outside.Theyarenot possibleandeffective,norcan theytake
accurateaim, exceptby inhabitingthosestructures. Inhabiting
them in a certainway, becauseone alwaysinhabits,andall the
morewhenone doesnot suspectit. Operating necessarily
fromthe inside,borrowing all the strategicand economic
resourcesof subversionfromthe old structure,borrowing them
.. .39
structurally.
the structureof the edifice, that is, the structureof struc-
Rather, it is the "soliciting"of the edifice of metaphysics,
soliciting of structure"in the sense that Sollicitare, in
old Latin means to shake as a whole, to make tremble in
entirety."40Solicitation is a form of interrogationwhich
shakes structurein order to identify structuralweaknesses,
weaknessesthat are structural.
Derridadestabilizesthe edifice by arguingthat its funda-
mental condition, its structuralpossibility,is the conceal-
ment of an abyss. The edifice of metaphysicsclaims to be
stable because it is founded on the bedrockexposed when
all the sedimentarylayershave been removed. Deconstruc-
tion destabilizesmetaphysicsby locating in the bedrockthe
fracturesthat undermine its structure.The threatto meta-
physics is underground.The subversionof presence is an
undergroundoperation. Deconstructionsubvertsthe edifice
it inhabits by demonstratingthat the ground on which it is
erected is insecure:"the terrainis slipperyand shifting,
mined and undermined. And this ground is, by essence,
an underground."4'But the fissuresin the ground that
16

crack the structureare not flaws that can be repaired.
There is no more stable ground to be found. There is no
unflawed bedrock.
Consequently, deconstructionappearsto locate in meta-
physics the fatal flaw that causes its collapse. It appearsto
be a form of analysis that dismantles or demolishes struc-
tures. It appearsto be an undoing of construction. It is in
this sense that it is most obviously architectural.But this
obvious sense misses the force of deconstruction. Decon-
struction is not simply architectural.Rather, it is a dis-
placement of traditionalthought about architecture.
Now the conceptof de-construction itselfresemblesan architec-
turalmetaphor.It is oftensaidto havea negativeattitude.Some-
thinghas been constructed,a philosophicalsystem,a tradition,a
culture,and alongcomesa de-constructor and destroysit stone
by stone,analysesthe structureand dissolvesit. Oftenenough
this is the case. One looksat a system- Platonic/Hegelian - methodically
and examineshow it wasbuilt, whichkeystone,whichangleof
visionsupportsthe authorityof the system.It seemsto me, how-
ever,thatthis is not the essenceof deconstruction. It is not sim-
the
ply technique of an architectwho knows how to de-construct
whathas been constructed,but a probingwhichtouchesupon
the techniqueitself,uponthe authorityof the architectural meta-
phorand therebyconstitutesits own architectural rhetoric.De-
constructionis not simply- as its nameseemsto indicate- the
techniqueof a reversedconstructionwhenit is able to conceive
for itselfthe ideaof construction.One couldsaythatthereis
nothingmorearchitectural thande-construction, but also nothing
lessarchitectural.42
Deconstruction leads to a complete rethinkingof the sup-
plemental relationshiporganized by the architecturalmotif
of ground/structure/ornament.To disruptmetaphysicsin
this way is to disruptthe status of architecture.But it is not
to simply abandon the traditionalarchitectonic. Rather, it
demonstratesthat each of its divisions are radicallyconvo-
luted. Each distinction is made possible by that which is
neither one nor the other. The architecturallogic of addi-
tion is subvertedby demonstratingthat it is made possible
by precisely that which frustratesit.
This subversionof structuredoes not lead to a new struc-
ture. Flaws are identified in the structurebut do not lead
to its collapse. On the contrary,they are the very source of
its strength. Derrida identifies the constitutionalforce of
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Wigley
the weaknessof a structure, that is, the strengthof a cer-
tain weakness. Ratherthan abandoninga structurebecause
its weaknesshas been found (which would be to remain in
complicity with the ideal of a grounded structure),Derrida
displaces the architecturalmotif. Structurebecomes
"erectedby its very ruin, held up by what never stops eat-
ing away at its foundations."43Deconstruction is a form of
interrogationthat shakes structurein order to identify
structuralflaws, flaws that are structural.It is not the
demolition of particularstructures.It displaces the concept
of structureitself by locating that which is neither support
nor collapse.
Structureis perceivedthroughthe incidenceof menace,at the
momentwhen imminentdangerconcentrates our visionon the
keystoneof an institution,the stonewhichencapsulates boththe
and the of its existence.
Structurethen can be
possibility fragility
threatenedin orderto be comprehended more
clearlyand to revealnot only its supportsbutalso thatsecret
placein whichit is neitherconstructionnorruinbut lability.
This operationis called(fromthe Latin)soliciting.44
The edifice is erected by concealing the abysson which it
stands. This repressionproduces the appearanceof solid
ground. The structuredoes not simply collapse because it
is erected on, and fracturedby, an abyss. Far from causing
its collapse, the fracturingof the ground is the very possi-
bility of the edifice. Derrida identifies the "structural
necessity"of the abyss:
And we shallsee thatthisabyssis not a happyor unhappyacci-
dent. An entiretheoryof the structuralnecessityof the abysswill
be graduallyconstitutedin our reading;the indefiniteprocessof
supplementarity has alwaysalreadyinfiltratedpresence.. . . Rep-
resentationin the abyssof presenceis not an accidentof pres-
ence;the desireof presenceis, on the contrary,bornfromthe
abyss(the indefinitemultiplication)of representation,
fromthe
representation of the representation,
etc.45
The abyss is not simply the fracturingof the ground under
the edifice. It is the internal fracturingof the edifice, the
convolution of the distinction between building and archi-
tecture, structureand ornament, presentationand repre-
sentation. Architecturealways already inhabits and
underpins the building it is supposedlyattachedto. It is
this convolution that makes possible the thought of a
ground that precedes the edifice, a thought that subordi-
17

nates architectureas merely an addition. Architecture
makes possible its own subordinationto building.
Deconstruction is concerned with the untranslatable,the
remainderthat belongs neither to the original nor to the
translation, but neverthelessresideswithin both. Decon-
struction marksthe structuralnecessity of a certain failure
of translation. That is to say, the structuralneccessity of
architecture. Architecturebecomes the possibilityof build-
ing ratherthan a simple addition to it. Inasmuch as trans-
lation is neither completed nor completely frustrated,the
edifice of metaphysics is neither building nor architecture,
neither presentationof the ground nor detachment from it,
but the uncanny effacement of the distinction between
them, the distinction that is at once the contractualpossi-
bility of architecturaldiscourse and the means by which to
repressthe threat posed by that discourse. Deconstruction
traces architecture'ssubversionof building, a subversion
that cannot be resistedbecause architectureis the struc-
tural possibility of building. Building always harborsthe
secret of its constitutional violation by architecture.Decon-
struction is the location of that violation. It locates orna-
ment within the structureitself, not by integratingit in
some classical synthetic gesture, but, on the contrary,by
locating ornament'sviolation of structure,a violation that
cannot be exorcised, a constitutional violation that can
only be repressed.
7.
Such a gesture does not constitute a method, a critique, an
analysis, or a source of legitimation.46It is not strategic.It
has no prescribedaim. Which is not to say that it is aim-
less. It moves very precisely, but not to some end. It is not
a project. It is neither an application of something nor an
addition to something. It is, at best, a strangestructural
condition, an event. It is a displacement of structurethat
cannot be evaluated in traditionalterms because it frus-
tratesthe logic of grounding or testing. It is preciselythat
which is neccessaryto structurebut evades structuralanal-
ysis (and all analysis is structural);it is the breakdownin
structurethat is the possibilityof structure.
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assemblage 8
The repressionof certain constitutionalenigmas is the
basis of the social contractthat organizesthe discourse.
Ratherthan offeringa new account of the architectural
object, deconstructionunearthsthe repressivemechanisms
by which that figure of architectureoperates. Hidden
within the traditionalarchitecturalfigure is another:the
architecturalmotif is requiredby philosophy not simply
because it is a paradigmof stable structure;it is also
requiredpreciselyfor its instability.
For this reason, to translatedeconstructionin architecture
is not simply to transformthe condition of the architec-
tural object. As metaphysicsis the definition of architec-
ture as metaphor, the disruptionof architecture's
metaphoric condition is a disruptionof metaphysics.But
this is not to say that this disruptionoccurs outside the
realm of objects. The telologies of theory/practice,ideal/
material, etc. do not disappear.Rather, there is a series of
nonlinear exchanges within and between these domains,
exchanges which problematize, but do not abandon, the
difference. It is thereby possible to operatewithin the tradi-
tional descriptionof architectureas the representationof
structurein order to produce objects that make these enig-
mas thematic.
Such gesturesare neither simply theoretical, nor simply
practical. They are neither a new way of readingfamiliar
architecture,nor the means of producinga new architec-
ture. Objects are alreadybisected into theory and practice.
To translatedeconstructionin architecturedoes not lead
simply to a formal reconfigurationof the object. Rather, it
calls into question the condition of the object, its object-
hood; it problematizesthe condition of the object without
simply abandoning it. Deconstruction is a concern with
theoretical objects, objects whose theoreticalstatusand
objecthood are problematic, slipperyobjects that make the-
matic the theoretical condition of objects and the object-
hood of theory.
Such gesturesdo not simply inhabit the prescribed
domains of philosophy and architecture.While philosophi-
cal discourse and architecturaldiscoursedepend on an
explicit account of architecture,they have no unique
claim on that account. The translationcontract on which
those discoursesare based underpin a multiplicity of cul-
18

tural exchanges. The concern becomes the strategicplay of
the architecturalmotif in these exchanges. This cultural
production of architecturedoes not take the form specified
in the architecturaldiscourse;architecturedoes not occupy
the domain alloted to it. Ratherthan the object of a spe-
cific discourse, architectureis a series of discursivemecha-
nisms whose operationscan be traced in ways that are
unfamiliar to architecturaldiscourse.
Consequently, the status of the translationof deconstruc-
tion in architectureneeds to be rethought. A more agres-
sive reading is required, an architecturaltransformationof
deconstruction that drawson the gaps in deconstruction
that demand such an abuse, sites that alreadyoperatewith
a kind of architecturalviolence. There is a need for a
strong reading which locates that which deconstruction
cannot handle of architecture.
Possibilitiesemerge within architecturaldiscourse that go
beyond the displacement of architectureimplicit in
deconstructivewriting. To locate these possibilitiesis to
(re)producedeconstructionby transformingit. Such a
transformationmust operate on the hesitation deconstruc-
tion has about architecture, a hesitation that surfacespre-
cisely within its most confident claims about architecture.
Derrida writes:
The 'Towerof Babel'doesnot merelyfigurethe irreducible mul-
tiplicityof tongues;it exhibitsan incompletion,the impossibility
of finishing,of totalizing,of saturating,of completingsomething
on the orderof edification,architectural construction,systemand
architectonics. Whatthe multiplicityof idiomsactuallylimitsis
not only a 'true'translation,a transparent and adequateinter-
expression,it is also a structural
order,a coherenceof construct.
Thereis then (let us translate)
somethinglikean internallimitto
an incompleteness of the constructure.
It wouldbe
formalization,
easyand up to a certainpointjustifiedto see therethe translation
of a systemin deconstruction.47
This passageculminates symptomaticallyin a sentence that
performsthe classical philosophical gesture. Architectureis
at once given constitutive power and has that power frus-
tratedby returningits status to mere metaphor. Here the
tower, the figure of translation, is itself understoodas a
translation, the architecturaltranslationof deconstruction.
Which, in Derridean terms, is to say a figure that does not
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Wigley
simply representdeconstruction, but is its possibility.But
an inquiry needs to focus on why an architecturalreading
of deconstructionis "easy"and what is the "certainpoint"
beyond which it becomes unjustified, improper.A patient
reading needs to force the convoluted surface of decon-
structivewriting and expose the architecturalmotif within
it. But perhapseven such an abusive reading of Derrida is
insufficient. Inasmuch as deconstructionis abused in
architecturaldiscourse, its theory of translation,which is to
say its theory of abuse, needs to be rethought. Because of
architecture'sunique relationshipto translation, it cannot
simply translatedeconstruction. It is so implicated in the
economy of translationthat it threatensdeconstruction.
There is an implicit identity between the untranslatable
remainderlocated by deconstructionand that part of archi-
tecture that causes deconstructionto hesitate - the archi-
tecture it resists. Consequently, deconstructiondoes not
simply survive architecture.
Notes
This is the first part of a two-part Nicolas Abraham,"trans. Richard
study. The second part will be pub- Klein, Diacritics (Spring 1979).
lished in a subsequent issue of
4. Deconstruction is considered
Assemblage. here in the context of philosophy.
1. Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. While Derrida repeatedlyargues
Alan Bass (Chicago: University of that deconstruction is not philoso-
Press,1981),20.
Chicago phy, he also notes that it is not
2. "Atextlivesonly if it liveson nonphilosophy either. To simply
[sur-vit], and it lives on only if it is
claim that deconstruction is not
at once translatableand untranslat- philosophy is to maintain philoso-
able. . . . Totally translatable,it phy by appealing to its own defini-
as a text,as writing,as a
disappears tion of its other. It is to participate
in the dominant reading of Derrida
body of language [langue]. Totally
that resiststhe force of deconstruc-
untranslatable,even within what is
believed to be one language, it dies tion. That force is produced by
immediately. Thus triumphant identifying the complicity of the
translationis neither the life nor the apparentlynonphilosophical within
the philosophical tradition. Decon-
death of the text, only or alreadyits
struction occupies the texts of phi-
living on, its life after life, its life
after death." Jacques Derrida, "Liv- losophy in order to identify a non-
ing On: Border Lines," trans. James philosophical site within them.
Deconstruction cannot be consid-
Hulbert, in Deconstructionand
Criticism (New York:SeaburyPress, ered outside the texts of philosophy
1979),102. it inhabits, even as a foreigner.
3. Cf. Jacques Derrida, "Me - 5. "For if the difficulties of transla-
Psychoanalysis:An Introductionto tion can be anticipated . . . one
'The Shell and ithe Kernel' by should not begin by naively believ-
19

ing that the word 'deconstruction'
correspondsin French to some
clear and univocal signification.
There is already in 'my' language a
serious ('somber')problem of trans-
lation between what here or there
can be envisaged for the word, and
the usage itself, the reservesof the
word." Jacques Derrida, "Letterto a
JapaneseFriend," in Derrida and
Differance, ed. David Wood and
Robert Bernasconi (Coventry:
ParousiaPress, 1985), 1.
6. Immanuel Kant, Critique of
Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (London: MacMillan and
Co., 1929), 47.
7. Ibid., 608.
8. Ibid., 14.
9. Ibid., 219.
10. Martin Heidegger, An Intro-
duction to Metaphysics, trans. John
Macquarrieand Edward Robinson
(New York:Harperand Row,
1962), 2.
11. Cf. the Greek temple in "The
Origin of the Work of Art":"Truth
happens in the temple's standing
where it is. This does not mean
that something is correctly repre-
sented and renderedthere, but that
what is as a whole is brought into
unconcealedness and held therein."
Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of
the Work of Art," in Poetry, Lan-
guage, Thought, trans. Albert
Hofstadter(New York:Harperand
Row, 1971). The edifice is neither a
representationof the ground, nor
even a presentation, but is the pro-
duction of the world.
12. "[I]tis precisely the idea that it
is a matter of providinga founda-
tion for an edifice alreadycon-
structedthat must be avoided."
Martin Heidegger, Kant and the
Problemof Metaphysics, trans.
James S. Churchill (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1962), 4.
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13. "[T]he foundation of traditional
metaphysicsis shaken and the edi-
fice . . . begins to totter."Heideg-
ger, Kant and the Problemof
Metaphysics, 129.
14. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,
60.
15. Heidegger, Kant and the Prob-
lem of Metaphysics, 5.
16. Jacques Derrida, "Structure,
Sign and Play in the Discourse of
the Human Sciences," in Writing
and Difference, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago
Press, 1978), 279.
17. Heidegger, "The Origin of the
Work of Art," 19.
18. Jacques Derrida, "The Parer-
gon," trans. Craig Owens, October
9 (1979): 7.
19. Jacques Derrida, "Force and
Signification,"in Writing and
Difference, 17.
20. Ibid., 27.
21. Jacques Derrida, "White
Mythology:Metaphor in the Text of
Philosophy,"in Margins of Philoso-
phy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
Universityof Chicago Press, 1982),
224.
22. Not in the sense of the struc-
turalistconcern for architectureas a
kind of language, a system of
objects to which language theory
can be applied, but as the possibil-
ity of thought about language.
23. "With this problem of transla-
tion we will thus be dealing with
nothing less than the problem of
the very passageinto philosophy."
Jacques Derrida, Dissemination,
trans. BarbaraJohnson (Chicago:
Universityof Chicago Press, 1981),
72.
24. "Had their enterprisesuc-
ceeded, the universaltongue would
have been a particularlanguage
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
assemblage 8
imposed by violence, by force. It
would not have been a universal
language - for example in the
Leibnizian sense - a transparent
language to which everyone would
have access." Jacque Derrida, The
Ear of the Other, ed. Christie V.
McDonald (New York:Schocken
Books, 1985), 101. Cf. Jacques
Derrida, "Languagesand the Insti-
tutions of Philosophy,"Rechercheet
Semiotique/SemioticInquiry4, no.
2 (1984): 91-154.
25. "[A]ndthe question of decon-
struction is also through and
through the question of translation.
. . ." Derrida, "Letterto a Japanese
Friend," 6.
26. Derrida, The Ear of the Other,
102.
27. JacquesDerrida, "Architecture
Where the Desire May Live,"
Domus671 (1986):25.
28. JacquesDerrida, "Des Tours de
Babel," trans. Joseph F. Graham,
in Differencein Translation, ed.
Joseph F. Graham (Ithaca:Cornell
UniversityPress, 1985), 184.
29. Ibid., 182.
30. Heidegger,An Introductionto
Metaphysics,93.
31. This degeneratetranslationis
based on a degenerationthat
alreadyoccurredwithin the original
Greek, requiringa returnto a more
primordialorigin: "Butwith this
Latin translationthe original mean-
ing of the Greek word is destroyed,
this is true not only of the Latin
translationof this word but of all
other Roman translationsof the
Greek philosophical language.
What happened in this translation
from the Greek into the Latin is not
accidental and harmless;it marks
the firststage in the processby
which we cut ourselves off and
alienated ourselvesfrom the original
essence of Greek philosophy. ...
20
But it should be said in passing that
even within Greek philosophy a
narrowingof the word set in forth-
with, although the original meaning
did not vanish from the experience,
knowledge, and orientationof
Greek philosophy."Heidegger,An
Introductionto Metaphysics, 13.
32. "The perfection of technology
is only the echo of the claim to the
. . . completeness of the founda-
tion. . .. Thus, the characteristic
domination of the principle of
ground then determines the essence
of our modern technology age."
Martin Heidegger,"The Principle
of Ground," trans. Keith Hoeller,
Man and World7 (1974): 213.
33. Ibid.,204.
34. Martin Heidegger, "Building,
Dwelling, Thinking," in Poetry,
Language, Thought, 159.
35. JacquesDerrida, "Restitutions
of the Truth in Pointing," in The
Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chi-
cago: Universityof Chicago Press,
1987),290.
36. Note how Derrida argues that
the universityis "built"on the ideal
of translation(Derrida, Living On:
BorderLines, 93-94) in the same
way that he argues that it is "built"
on the ideal of ground as support
(Jacques Derrida, "Principleof
Reason:The Universityin the Eyes
of Its Pupils," Diacritics [Fall 1983]:
11-20).
37. "Beneaththe seemingly literal
and thus faithful translationthere is
concealed . . . a trans-lationwith-
out a corresponding,equally
authentic experience of what they
say. The rootlessnessof Western
thought begins with this trans-
lation." Heidegger,"The Origin of
the Work of Art," 23 (emphasis
added). "We are not merely taking
refuge in a more literal translation
 Wigley

of a Greek word. We are reminding losophemes subject to deconstruc- Figure Credits

ourselves of what, unexperienced tion." Derrida, "Letterto a Japanese 1. Max Ernst, Reve d'une petite
and unthought, underliesour famil- Friend," 4. fille qui voulut entrerau carmel,
iar and therefore outworn essence of English trans. Dorothea Tanning,
47. Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel,"
truth. .... Ibid., 52 (emphasis A Little Girl Dreams of Taking the
165.
added). Veil (New York:George Braziller,
38. Jacques Derrida, "Roundtable 1982).
on Autobiography,"trans. Peggy 2. Courtesy of the artist.
Damuf, in The Ear of the Other,
86. Of the word "deconstruction":
"Among other things I wished to
translateand adapt to my own ends
the Heideggerianword Destruktion
or Abbau. Each signified in this
context an operation bearing on the
structureor traditionalarchitecture
of the fundamental concepts of
ontology or of Western metaphys-
ics." Derrida, "Letterto a Japanese
Friend," 1.
39. Jacques Derrida, Of Gramma-
tology, trans. GayatriChakravorty
Spivak(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins
Press, 1976), 24.
40. Jacques Derrida, "Difference,"
in Margins of Philosophy, 21.
41. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc.
(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1977), 168.
42. Derrida, "Architecturewhere
the Desire May Live," 18.
43. Jacques Derrida, "Fors,"trans.
BarbaraJohnson, The Georgia
Review 31, no. 1 (1977): 40.
44. Derrida, "Force and Significa-
tion," 6.
45. Derrida, Of Grammatology,
163.
46. "[I]nspite of appearance,
deconstruction is neither an analy-
sis nor a critiqueand its translation
would have to take that into consid-
eration, it is not an analysis in par-
ticular because the dismantling of a
structureis not a regressiontoward
a simple element, towardan indis-
soluble origin. These values, like
that of analysis, are themselves phi-

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