ULTIMATE CASE DIGEST: attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower
court. We are not unaware of the undeniable fact that both
I. Election and Suffrage
Moya v. Del Fierro
ELECTION; APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS; TECHNICAL RULES
SHOULD NOT DEFEAT INTENTION OF VOTER. — AS long as
popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded,
suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised,
must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of
power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution in the
interest of good government and the common weal.
Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a
representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as
the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice
in his Government and whenever possible it is the duty of the
judiciary, when called upon to act in justiciable cases, to give it
efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is
the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and
appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality.
Counsel for both parties have called our attention to the
different and divergent rules laid down by this court on the
appreciation of ballot. It will serve no good and useful purpose
for us to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization
of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no
two cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or
legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this
connection that whatever might have been said in cases
heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be
permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention
is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence
aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the
system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the
suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of ballots
which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election
Code
Badelles v. Cabili
ELECTION LAW; ELECTION PROTEST; FAILURE TO ALLEGE
THEREIN THE DETAILS OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES AND
THAT THEY WOULD AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS;
SUCH FAILURE IS NOT A GROUND TO DISMISS AN ELECTION
PROTEST BASED ON IRREGULARITIES; INSTANT CASE. — A
greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have
admonished the lower court from asserting in an
uncompromising tone the absence of an allegation that the
protestants in both cases failed to allege, that if the facts
pleaded by them were proved the result would not have been
different. It is true the complaints could have been more
explicitly worded, but as they stood, the absence of such a
claim could not be so confidently asserted. Both protests were
dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility
petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or
precision in their terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness
and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections
conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged,
give rise to doubts, rational and honest, as to who were the
duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed,
would have to be accepted at their face value for the purpose
of determining whether there is a cause of action, a motion to
dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus
pleaded. We cannot in law and in conscience then sustain the
order of dismissal. Without the lower court having so
intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation
of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate
proceeding allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such
character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Dissenting opinion of CJ Puno in Tolentino v. COMELEC
II. COMELEC
III. Voters
Macalintal v. COMELEC
Section 2 of article v of the constitution is an exception to the
residency requirement found in section 1 of the same article. —
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the
Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise
as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even
intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age
abroad whose parents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines,
and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in
pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for
Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of
Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who
are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though
they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement
found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject
of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No.
9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor.
Absentee voting presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country;
required affidavit gives the absentee an opportunity to express
that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines. — Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d)
circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate
expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee
voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen
of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the
country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting
established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile
in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile
by his physical absence from this country. His having become
an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does
not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to
return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore,
under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express
that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d)
and 8(c) of the law.
People v. Corral
ELECTION LAW; SUFFRAGE; DISQUALIFICATION. — Under the
law a person is disqualified to vote who, since the 13th day of
August, 1898, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability
not having been removed by plenary pardon. (Administrative
Code, sec., 432.)
VIOLATION OF. — Whoever at any election votes knowing that
he is not entitled so to do incurs in criminal responsibility. (Sec.
2642 of the Administrative Code.)
STATUTORY NOT NATURAL RIGHT. — The modern conception
of the suffrage is not voting is a function of government. It is
right created by law, not a natural right.
A PRIVILEGE. — Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to
such person or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good. For reasons of public policy, certain classes of
persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the generally
excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.
RIGHT OF STATE. — The right of State to deprive persons of the
right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of
crime, is beyond question. The manifest purpose of such
restriction is to preserve the purity of elections. (9 R. C. L.,
1042.)
PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM CONVICTION. — The
presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold a
public office. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
DISQUALIFICATION IS FOR PROTECTION, NOT PUNISHMENT.
— The exclusion from the exercise of suffrage must be
adjudged a mere disqualification imposed for protection and
not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the
denial of a personal right. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)
DISQUALIFICATION; DURATION. — From the very nature of the
suffrage disqualification — which is imposed "for protection
and not for the punishment, the withholding of a privilege and
not the denial of a personal right" — the deprivation of
suffrage does not lapse at the expiration of the sentence of the
convict. (Administrative Code, sec. 432.)
PRESCRIPTION. — The disqualification for crime imposed by
law, having once attached and not having been subsequently
removed by a plenary pardon, is not wiped out only because
the ex-convict had once been allowed to vote.
IV. Registration of Voters
Is registration an additional qualification?
No. it is merely a regulation. It does not confer the right to
vote. It is merely a condition precedent to the exercise of said
right. (Yra v. Abano)
Is a COMELEC resolution denying the petition of certain youth
sectors to conduct a two-day special registration valid?
Yes. It is well-settled that the law does not require that the
impossible be done. A two-day special registration for new
voters would give rise to time constraints due to additional
pre-election matters. Accordingly, COMELEC acted within the
bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter. In
issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent simply performed
its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. (Akbayan
Youth v. COMELEC)
Is the biometrics requirement unconstitutional?
No. Its purpose is to establish a clean, complete and
permanent and updated list of voters through the adoption of
biometric technology. It is not an unconstitutional substantive
requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage. Biometrics
validation as a requirement is not a qualification to the
exercise of the right of suffrage but a mere aspect of a
registration procedure. (Kabataan Party List v. COMELEC)
V. Candidates
VI. Campaign, Election Propaganda etc.
Is Section 32 Of COMELEC Resolution 6250 Unconstitutional?
“All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or
paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or
name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person,
who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a
candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said
candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3
days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he
and said radio station, print media or television station shall be
presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.”
No. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that
its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning
and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to
equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on
one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the
other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue
advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity. (Chavez v. COMELEC)
Is there a prohibited premature campaigning in the
Philippines?
No. First, under the law a candidate is only considered as such
once he has filed his COC and the campaign period for such has
started.
In that sense, if a person is not yet a candidate in the legal
sense, engaging in partisan political activity in favor of or
against a person who has not filed a COC is not prohibited.
The beginning date when partisan political acts become
unlawful as to a candidate is when campaign period starts.
Before such time partisan political acts are lawful. (Penera v.
COMELEC)
Is section 5.4 of the fair elections act prohibiting publication of
survey results 15 days immediately preceding a national
election and 7 days before a local election unconstitutional on
the ground that it infringes freedoms of speech, expression
and press?
Yes. In SWS v. COMELEC, the SC held that such provision of law
is unconstitutional because of the following reasons:
a. It imposes prior restraint on the freedom of
expression
b. It is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period
c. The governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than the suppression
of freedom of expression.
Does Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime
limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the
press?
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-
based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here,
the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based”
airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute
a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially
so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such
a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the
aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we
consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he
conveys his message through his advertisements in languages
and dialects that the people may more readily understand and
relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would
greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself
– a form of suppression of his political speech. (GMA Network
v. COMELEC)
Are donations included in the computation of allowable
expenditures?
Yes. In E.R Ejercito v. COMELEC, the SC ruled that the
contributions of third parties or donations made with the
consent of the candidate are included in the computation of
allowable expenditure. There is no distinction between
“Contribution” and “Expenditure”. By virtue of the legal
requirement that contribution or donation should bear the
written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/ supporter/
donor certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer”. Where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we. There should be no distinction in the
application of a law where none is indicated.
Are personal opinions included in acts of election campaign?
No. It was held in Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, sponsored
messages are covered while personal opinions are not.
Are Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unconstitutional?
*posting an election campaign material during an election period in
PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation
of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable
for an election offense
YES. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are
content-neutral regulations, which are not within the
constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not
necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time,
space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only
repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of
the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial
distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals
and owners of private vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise
one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our
freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without
rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC)