ENRIQUE RAZON vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN G.R. No.

74306, March
16, 1992

FACTS:

Respondent, as administrator of the estate Juan Chuidian, filed an action for specific performance against
petitioner praying that the later be compelled to deliver the stock certificate representing the share holdings of
Juan Chuidian in E. Razon, Inc. (ERI).

During trial, petitioner testified that: (1) all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record of the
corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; (2) said shares are subject to the agreement between
defendants and incorporators; (3) petitioner distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian; (4) the shares of stock were
actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon; and (5) Thus, the stock certificate under the name of the
late Chuidian actually belongs to the petitioner with the understanding that he shall remain in possession thereof
until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders.

Trial court ruled that the real owner of the stocks is the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial
court. CA ruled that petitioner is disqualified from being a witness under the dead man’s statute (Section 20 (a) Rule
130). Petitioner, assailing CA’s decision, contends that: (1) dead man’s statute is inapplicable in this case; (2)
respondent did not object to his oral testimony; and (3) the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination
regarding such testimony.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not dead man’s statute disqualifies a defendant from testifying against the claims of an
administrator in relation to a transaction entered into by the deceased during his lifetime.

(2) Whether or not failure to object to a testimony on the ground of dead man’s statute rule constitutes as a waiver
to object to the admissibility of such testimony.

HELD:

(1) The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties
were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to
falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly
subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to
‘guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the
surviving party. The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the
administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of petitioner as defendant in an action
commenced by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc.
allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within
the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.

(2) Granting that the petitioner’s testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. It is also settled that the court cannot disregard
evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of
a party to object thereto.
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners who are the daughter and wife of the deceased Jacinto L.
Sunga, for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ
of Preliminary Attachment. Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

During trial Respondent testified that: (1) in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the
distribution of LPG in Manila; (2) for business convenience, respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the
business name of their partnership under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship; (3) upon Jacinto’s death,
petitioners took over the operations and control of the partnerhsip without respondent’s consent; (4) despite
respondent’s repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and restitution
of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply; and (5) on March 31, 1991, petitioner disbursed out
of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 representing partial payment of the former’s share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of
the business establishment.

The trial court, giving weight to Respondent’s testimony which was corroborated by another witness who work with
the deceased during his lifetime, ruled in favor of the Respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Petitioners assails the finding of the trial court and the CA and argued that these courts were proscribed
from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership
three years after Jacinto’s death. To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man’s Statute" or
"Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not dead man’s statute applies to a complainant/witness who is also a defendant due to
counterclaim of the original defendant.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. The "Dead Man’s Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule
can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: (1) the witness
is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted; (2) the action is against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; (3) the
subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person
of unsound mind; (4) the testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man’s Statute" to this case. First, petitioners filed a
compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man’s Statute."
Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up
the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to
defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought
against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man’s Statute" for the simple reason that she is not
"a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that
respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between respondent
and Jacinto. Petitioners’ insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor
because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor
of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent,
the latter being the party plaintiff.
TERESITA P. BORDALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME G.R. No. 112443, January 25,
2002

FACTS:

Lot 1242 was originally owned by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, the
property was extraj-judicially partitioned in the following manner: 1/3 to their grandchild Nicanor Jayme; 1/3 to their
daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez; and 1/3 to an unidentified party.

Petitioner, daughter of Elena, filed an application for issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot 1242. When the
application was granted and corresponding OCT was issued, petitioner subdivided the property into 6 lots and
disposed the two parcels thereof. Upon learning of the issuance of the Free Patent and OCT, as well as the
conveyances made by petitioner, respondents filed with RTC the instant complaint for annulment and
cancellation of the Free Patent and OCT against petitioner and purchasers.

Petitioner averred that Lot No. 1242 was acquired by her through purchase from her mother, who was in
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since 1947. However, on cross-examination, petitioner admitted that
the existence of the above-mentioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. She, however, identified one of the signatures
in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother.

The trial court, giving weight on the testimony of witnesses as to the existence of the extra-judicial partition and
finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free Patent and OCT, declared said patent and title
void and ordered its cancellation. CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. Thus, petitioner
filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the CA. Petitioner contends that the testimonies given by the
witnesses for private respondents which touched on matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not
have been admitted by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute.

ISSUE: Whether Dead Man’s Statute applies to disqualify the testimony of all witnesses attesting to the
existence of an agreement entered into by the deceased during her lifetime.

HELD:

Dead Man’s Statute finds no application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the
mouth of a witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal dealings
with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.

Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case is based, inter
alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and communications with
the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013

FACTS:

Josielene Lara Chan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre- marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his
answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.” Following up on this
point, on August 22, 2006 or before trial, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The
request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. RTC
sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. Josielene of course claims that the hospital records
subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as
privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the
patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover
the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not a motion for issuance of subpoena duces tecum may be done prior to the trial.

(2) Whether or not hospital records may not be the subject of a subpoena duces tecum before trial on the ground
of privilege communication.

HELD:

(1) Yes. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant
prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. But the right to compel the production of
documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”

Considering that hospital records may not be a subject for motion for production of documents, it can only
be offered during trial. Hence, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to
wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may
opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure.

(2) The answer is in the affirmative. The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means
that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be
examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule
is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and
give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide
the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and
narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting
his own health at great risk.

Disclosing hospital records would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests that the
physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow
access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient’s records.
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM v. ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA A.C. NO.
5921, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The
antecedent facts are as follows: (1) respondents law firm acts as the counsel in the unlawful detainer case
appealed to the sala of Judge Lacurom; (2) Judge Lacurom reversed the decision of the MTC and ruled against the
counsels’ client; (3) the losing party filed an MR signed by Velasco-Jacoba; (4) the MR contains scathing remarks
against the Judge; (5) Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held in contempt of court for the contents of her motion; (6) Velasco-Jacoba explained that she is
not the author of the motion as she merely signed the same as it was the practice between her and her husband,
her co-counsel in the law firm; (7) Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt; (8) Velasco-Jacoba
filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of Judge Lacurom; (9) Judge Lacurom issued another order
directing Jacoba (husband of Velasco-Jacoba) to explain why he should not be held in contempt; (10) Jacoba, in
his answer, denied that he prepared the motion; (11) as to against Velasco-Jacoba's statements implicating him,
Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence; (12) Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision finding
Jacoba guilty of contempt of court.

ISSUE: Whether or not marital privilege rule may be invoked against a statement made by one spouse against the
other without actually denying the contents of the statement.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. Jacoba’s Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his
wife's account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its
presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver applies to Jacoba who
impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
CLARITA J. SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA A.C. No. 5439, January 22, 2007

FACTS:

Samala filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for serving on two separate occasions as
counsel for contending parties. Records show that Valencia acted as counsel for Valdez in three separate cases.
In of the cases Valencia represented Valdez and Alba against Bayuga and Bustamante. However, on a subsequent
estafa case between Valdez and Alba, Valencia represented Valdez against Alba his previous client.

In his defense Valencia, respondent, avers that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter
charged respondent with estafa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of lawyer-client relationship allows a counsel to act as counsel against a
previous client.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. The termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that
the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment.
Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use
any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public policy and good
taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the
client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the
privileged communications of his client.
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE et al. vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
CITIZENS, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

FACTS:

Pursuant to his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed, Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring
petitioners as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as
vouchers from enforcing his orders.

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the relevancy or
materially of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in the Ombudsman's office.
Petitioners claimed that they cannot be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified. Disclosure of the documents in
question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and
its plantilla . . . will necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics
and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE: Whether or not privilege communication may be invoked against a subpoena duces tecum enjoining the
production of records relating to personal services funds on the ground that they are state secrets.

HELD:

For information to be accorded confidentiality on the ground that such are state secrets, the necessity of
according such treatment must be shown. Governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to
state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

Where there is a strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted, but even most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are
at stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege, made under the circumstances of this
case, will haw to prevail.

Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to
find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations unless it falls under statutorily-created
ones such as the Government's privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations
of laws.
OSCAR CONSTANTINO et al. vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO G.R. No. 181508, October 02, 2013

FACTS:

In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate properties of Pedro Constantino, Sr.,
i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm and another in 1992 involving the 240 sqm. The separate Deeds came
into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in
the entire estate of Pedro Sr.

Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro Jr., filed a complaint seeking to annul the 1992
extrajudicial settlement involving the 240sqm lot on the ground that they, who are also heirs of Pedro Sr., were
excluded thereto. On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against
them considering that the respondents’ already have their lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr. by virtue of the
1968 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents admitted that they executed
the 1968 Deed to partition the 192 sqm which is the share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in Pedro Sr.’s Estate.

RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto. On appeal, CA rule in favor of
respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed covering the 192 sq m lot which actually belongs to Pedro Jr.,
hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr. (herein respondent), did not adjudicate the 192
sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Petitioners now assails the erroneous
disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference

ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the parties.

HELD:

The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial
admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule
18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent
course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. A party who judicially admits a fact
cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with.

However, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one
to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute
the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial.
CAMBE VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 812 SCRA 537, DECEMBER 6, 2016

Facts
Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen.
Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De
Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint Resolution dated March 28,
2014 and the Joint Order dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-
13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the
crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and ( 6) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195
(sixteen [16] counts).

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of
public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years
2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla
-with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or
"kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the
PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implemeting
Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging from
40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the
legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his
PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request to the DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the
initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator. Upon release of
the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula
(Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-
controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals
of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the
approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of the
legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.

Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the
preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and
the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA
concerned, the head/official of which, in tum, would expedite the transaction and release of the
corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in
the project cost. Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank
accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the funds are in the account of the
JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal
of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for
accounting. Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to
her residence in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money
to Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture
fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity reports, and similar
documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they
were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi,
Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around
P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks"
amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and
Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always
been regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is
"no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and
all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.
Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-
Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all
forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the
alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one
(1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts
of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis,
and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the
charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla
amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described
above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold
amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his
motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition
precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him.

Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the
Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults
the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence
of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who
purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule.

Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014
Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly
committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to
prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Napoles's

Issues:
1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing
of the criminal complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct.

Rulings
1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in
relation to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of
Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it
should have no effect on the filing of the latter.

2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were
charged.
Probable Cause against Revilla.
The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the
forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself
requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that
made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and
the chosen NGO. All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla -directly implicate
him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator
of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the defining
feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators -may it be through project lists,
prior consultations or program menus -have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify
the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through
this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire
expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must
be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery) should be ventilated
in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature
cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the
genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must
conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as
to its authenticity. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported
handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A.
Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's
signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all
evei;its, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned
signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in
their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish,
were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -are, in
fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner
workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all
the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy:
Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is
apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they
were employees of JLN Corporation -the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their respective
capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial
transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF
funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on
independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless
of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does
not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is
not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are
independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present
controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted
aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of
Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on
several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds
allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally identified by the
whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.

In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same
reasons above-discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF
documents and whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to establish probable cause against Cambe at this
stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits .of his co-
respondents.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal
utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind
of the PDAF scam.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the
accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman,
this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it
has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities,
was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting
to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles
for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally divert PDAF
Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as
Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the offenders
in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the
primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable
for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This
proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. In this
case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the pillaging of Sen. Revilla's
PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable cause against all
petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to
commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with deliberate dispatch.
PAMPLONA VS CUETO, 856 SCRA 33

OCAMPO VS OCAMPO, SR. 830 SCRA 418

CONFESSIONS

PEOPLE VS DACANAY, 807 SCRA 130, NOVEMBER 7, 2016

PFEIDER VS PEOPLE, 827 SCRA 343

FRONTERAS VS PEOPLE, 776 SCRA 152

PEOPLE VS OPINIANO, 832 SCRA (2017)

CRUZ VS PEOPLE, 846 SCRA 189

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL SANTOS y NARCISO G.R. Nos. 100225-26, May 11, 1993

FACTS:

Santos was charged and convicted of murder and frustrated murder. On appeal, accused makes the
following assignment of errors: (1) his identification in the police line-up by the two witnesses is inadmissible
as he was not afforded his right to counsel; (2) he questions the trial court for admitting a sworn statement
by one Ronaldo Guerrero, a witness in another criminal case accused was also charged with the murder
which had taken place in the very same site where Bautista and Cupcupin were ambushed as such accused
contends that the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence, considering that the prosecution did
not present Ronaldo Guerrero as a witness during the trial.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not identification in the police line-up is not admissible on the ground that the accused was
not provided with a counsel.

(2) Whether the trial court may not admit a sworn statement of a witness taken from another criminal case
wherein the accused for both cases are one and the same.

HELD:

(1) There is "no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line- up. The customary
practice is, of course, that it is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course of a police line-
up and who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not questioned at all at that
stage. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record of this case which shows that in the course of the
line-up, the police investigators sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant Santos.

(2) Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “Evidence that one did or did not do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or

did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."

Trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for
proving knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner
of two (2) particular streets in Malabon was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers. As in
fact, both in the instant case, as well as the case where Guerrero’s testimony was originally presented, the
scene of the crime is one and the same.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES G.R. No. 133888, March 1, 2001

FACTS:

Herein accused was charged of raping his eldest daughter. The prosecution presented the victim as its
main witness, while, the defense presented a number of witnesses who testified to different occasion for
which the victim was caught lying.

After the trial, trial court, giving credence to the testimony of the victim, convicted the accused. On appeal,
the accused presented series of letters allegedly written by the victim to the defense counsel asking said
counsel to help her father be acquitted.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not a minor witness’ credibility may be assailed by proving that she lies on a number of
occasion

(2) Whether or not letters written by the witness after trial containing details that is contrary to testimony
made in open court constitutes recantation of said testimony.

HELD:

(1) NO. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like." While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods
committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are
not as serious as charging one’s own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

Furthermore, as a rule, findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed, for
the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the same. Lastly, jurisprudence dictates that testimonies
of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that
she has been

raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.

(2) An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony
given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.

Recantations are frowned upon by the courts because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR. G.R. No. 146030, December
3, 2002

FACTS:

Respondent Felipe Alejaga, Sr. filed Free Patent Application. In relation to the said application, Recio, Land
Inspector, submitted a report of his investigation to the Bureau of Lands. Less than 3 months after the
application, free patent was issued.

Sometime in April 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested for an investigation for irregularities in the
issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of respondent. Isagani Cartagena, Supervising Special
Investigator, submitted his Report. In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually
conducted an investigation and ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Thereafter, government instituted
an action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent.

Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner. In reversing the RTC, CA brushed aside as hearsay Isagani
Cartagena’s testimony that Land Inspector Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free
patent application of Felipe Alejaga Sr.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony based on a report which relates an admission of a third person who was
not presented as witness is inadmissible in evidence for being a hearsay.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person — the latter’s
knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith — and the former’s statements may then be regarded as
independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule. Recio’s alleged admission may be considered as
"independently relevant."

Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross- examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of his
testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions and
conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be
considered as independently relevant.

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a witness by
a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually made.
Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a
fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.

Since Cartagena’s testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony
was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioner, a sales representative at Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, was charged with estafa for failure to
account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company. During the trial,
prosecution, in order to prove that collectibles lawfully belonging to the company where misappropriated by
the accused, submitted the following documentary evidence: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner
to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each
customer with the corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the
confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and
formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive. Prosecution also presented Guivencan
to testify on the entries in the documentary evidence. Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection
on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay
because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness pertaining to entries in a document made by another person
constitutes hearsay and may not be admitted as evidence.

HELD:

Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that
she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite
for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.

The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined.

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth
of the fact asserted, the credit of the assert or becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion
can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter
asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For
example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the
complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief,
but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but
is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to
which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies.

Hence, as Guivencan’s testimony intends to prove an asserted fact, i.e., misappropriation on the part of the
accused through documentary evidence of which the witness has no personal knowledge, the same is
inadmissible for being a hearsay evidence.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE RULE

PEOPLE VS AGUIRRE, 845 SCRA

PEOPLE VS CALINAWAN, 817 SCRA 424, FEBRUARY 13, 2017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THEODORE BERNAL et al. G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997

FACTS:

Accused was charged with Kidnapping Openda, Jr. During trial, the prosecution, in order to prove that
accused has a motive in perpetrating the alleged crime, presented Enriquez, a common friend of both the
accused and the victim, as witness. Enriquez testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him that the latter is
having an affair with accused’s wife.

The trial court, giving credence to Enriquez’s testimony as well as testimony of other witnesses attesting to
the circumstances prior to the alleged abduction, convicted the accused. Accused assailing the decision of
the trial court and for admitting the testimony of Enriquez.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony made by a witness as to a statement made a deceased person that is
against the interest of the latter may be admissible in evidence as against a third person.

HELD:

Openda, Jr.’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in
evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-
in-interest and against third persons."

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit:" (1) that the declarant
is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the
time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest;
and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is
admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
HEIRS OF PETER DONTON VS STIER, 837 CRA 583

TIZON VS CAA, 276 SCRA

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON G.R. No. 124853, February 24,
1998

FACTS:

Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison. In her
complaint, she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes); (2)
MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo; (3) since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous,
implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family; and (4) that
FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's degree,
became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.

At trial on the merits, MONINA presented as documentary evidence letters written by Francisco’s relatives
as proof of her recognition as illegitimate daughter of the latter. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and held that Monina was able to establish her filiation as
FRANCISCO's

illegitimate daughter not just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record. Francisco elevated the
case before the SC and assailed the admissibility of the letters of his relatives.

ISSUE: Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is admissible in evidence as part of the
family reputation.

HELD:

NO. Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no
showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between
the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.

Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130, Section 40. Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like
may be received as evidence of pedigree. (emphasis supplied)

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored
clause which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted
as the authors thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored
phrase. What must then be ascertained is whether letter presented in this case as private documents, fall
within the scope of the clause "and the like" as qualified by the preceding phrase "entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engravings on rights and family portraits,"

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the
rule of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as "family possessions," or those
articles which represent, in effect, a family's joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.
These have been described as objects "openly exhibited and well known to the family," or those "which, if
preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family tradition." Plainly then, letters, as private
documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 40.
Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation,
it having been observed that: the weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general
repute, the common reputation in the family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material
element of evidence going to establish pedigree. Thus, matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in
the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in question is
marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community.
PEOPLE VS DIMAPILIT, 836 SCRA 514

PEOPLE VS SANTILIAN, 837 SCRA 71

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. JAIME J. RAMOS et al. G.R. No. 92740, March 23, 1992

FACTS:

Respondents filed an action for damages against petitioner alleging the following: (1) they are passengers
of PAL Flight No. 264 on September 24, 1985; (2) they check-in at least one (1) hour before the published
departure time; (3) no one was at the check-in counter until 30 minutes before departure; (4) upon checking-
in, they were informed that their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; (5)
they have to take the bus instead; and (6) they suffered damages due to the cancellation.

Petitioner disclaims any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of Respondent on said flight was
due to their having check-in late for their flight. During the trial, defendant presented the check-in counter
clerk at their Naga Branch on the date of respondent’s scheduled flight. The clerk testified that: (1) the
respondents were late and that he noted the time of check-in on their tickets; and (2) there were other
passengers who came late before the respondents. In relation to the testimony, two documentary evidence
were offered, namely: (1) the ticket bearing the notation “late 4:02” of the clerk; and (2) the passenger
manifest showing the other names of other passengers who were also late.

Respondent objected to the documentary evidence submitted and argued that those are self-serving.

ISSUE: Whether or not the entries made on a ticket by employees of a party in the course of their business
may not be given weight on the ground that the same is self-serving.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. The plane tickets of the private respondents with the notation "late 4:02"
stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon the check-in of private respondents
and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264 which showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go and
the private respondents are entries made in the regular course of business which the, private respondents
failed to overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.

Consequently, they carry more weight and credence. A writing or document made contemporaneously with
a transaction in which are evidenced facts pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is
ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness
as to such facts based upon memory and recollection Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as
against a written document that speaks a uniform language

Private respondents’ only objection to these documents is that they are self- serving cannot be sustained.
The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct accompanying or so nearly
connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which illustrate, elucidate, qualify or
characterize the act, are admissible as part of the res gestae.
PEOPLE VS CORPUZ, 856 SCRA 610
MEYNARDO SABILI, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORENCIO LIBREA G.R.
No. 193261, April 24, 2012

FACTS:

When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had
been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed
a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for
Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year
residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner presented as evidence his
barangay certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued
by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that
the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, “cannot be relied on.”
Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-
ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.

ISSUE: Whether or not barangay certificate is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it is not notarized.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry
was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by
the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an
updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite, it is the business of a
punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third requisite, the
BarangayCaptain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to
these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
SIMPLICIA CERCADO-SIGA vs. VICENTE CERCADO, JR. G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are
the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October
1929 in Pililla, Rizal. In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato
Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato
Matrimonial is a public 59 of 99

document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial
which should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document,
petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be
excluded from the requirement of authentication.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were
married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Binangonan, Rizal. In their Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private
document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso
facto make it a public document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private
document which tends to prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of
the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry
arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said
office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of
marriage.

HELD:

Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such
witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately
however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because
Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.

While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an
ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21,
Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more
than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might
reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if
the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is
found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily
accounted for.
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY G.R. No. 142943, April
3, 2002

FACTS:

Meralco team conducted their inspection at petitioner’s meter and found alleged meter tampering, they
immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply. During the inspection the following persons were
present, four (4) MERALCO inspection personnel and the secretary of appellees.

Plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. On the other hand, MERALCO filed a counterclaim with respect to the unpaid bills of
herein plaintiff. During the trial, MERALCO presented as witness its Senior Billing Computer Officer to testify
as to the unpaid bills of the plaintiff. The said testimony as corroborated with the documentary evidence
showing unpaid bills as well as the laboratory test results proving the tampering.

Trial court ruled that immediate disconnection was illegal due to lack of due process. On appeal, the CA
reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the complaint. CA likewise upheld respondent's
counterclaim for the billing differential representing the value of petitioners' used but unregistered electrical
consumption, which

had been established without being controverted. Petitioner elevated the case before the SC by way of
petition for review on certiorari. In their memorandum, petitioner assailed ruling upholding the validity of the
disconnection and denying their claim for damages. The petitioner did not questioned the computation of
the differential billing both during the trial as well as in their memorandum submitted before the SC. The
only defense presented by petitioner is that they cannot be held liable thereof because the bills are already
outstanding when they transferred to their residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not a party may be held liable for unpaid bills based on the uncontroverted documentary
and testimonial evidence.

HELD:

Yes. The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with Assumption of Mortgage does not
necessarily mean that they are no longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence
to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date of the said document. Lorna
Quisumbing herself admitted that they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own name.
Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises.

The evidence it presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the
differential.

Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been conducted by its experts, but it also
established the amount of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which
this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco's Senior Billing Computer Officer. His testimony was
corroborated by documentary evidence showing the account's billing history and the corresponding
computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations presented by
respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid
electrical consumption.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE G.R. Nos. 115338-39, September 16, 1997

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale on a complaint
initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario.

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of
Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision
was a conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants
Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and
had become final and executory.

On appeal, the OSG argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision
of the Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario
as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person,
particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment
and not of such offense in large scale.

ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court may adopt the findings of fact and decision of another court involving
the same parties and incidents.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. Trial court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the
Parañaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial
court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the
findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript
of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. 30 It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged
in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous
decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would
constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
HARRY L. GO, et al. vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., et al.
G.R. NO. 185527, July 18, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged before the MTC for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia.

The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that
he was being treated for lung infection. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the
motion. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition
for Certiorari before the RTC.

RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11The RTC held that Section 17,
Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since
there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused
to meet the witness against him face to face.

The prosecution elevated the case to the CA. CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness is a criminal case may be taken by way of oral deposition.
HELD:

The answer is in the negative. The procedure for testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution
witness is covered under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before
a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused
his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face.

The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge
to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the
use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN IBAÑEZ Y ALBANTE and ALFREDO NULLA Y IBAÑEZ G.R.
No. 197813, September 25, 2013

FACTS:

Appellants were all charged in an Information for Murder of Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog. The prosecution
presented the victim’s wife, Rowena and minor daughter, Rachel (10 years old) as witnesses. Rachel
testified that she saw the appellants killed her father. The defense, on the other hand, presented Aniceta
as witness whose testimony discredit that of Rachel. Aniceta testified testified that she and Rachel were
out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m. Thus, Rachel could not have witnessed the
murder of Wilfredo.

The trial court convicted the accused. The conviction was affirmed by the CA. Appellant, on appeal with the
SC, tried to further discredit Rachel’s testimony by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who had studied
only until the first grade of elementary school and could barely read, and did not know how to tell time.

ISSUE: Whether or not a child witness may be disqualified on the ground that she does not know how to
read and tell time.

HELD:

The answer is in the negative.e With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even
buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed
qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the
child's competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court
will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child. Thus,
petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight
and cannot overcome the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA G.R. No. 195244 June 22, 2015

FACTS:

That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and violence, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to
₱13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter;
that by reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO y BARRERA,
thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which directly caused her death.

Carl or Muymoy, 5-year old son of the victim, testified that on the night of the incident, he, his younger sister
Cheche, and his mother and father, were sleeping on the ground floor of their house. He saw appellant,
whom he calls "Nonoy," enter their house and stab her mother with a knife, while he (Carl) peeped through
a chair. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs. After his mother got
stabbed, his father chased the appellant. Carl saw blood come out of his mother’s lower chest. His father
then brought her to the hospital. Carl positively identified the appellant, a neighbor who often goes to their
house, as the one who stabbed his mother. On cross-examination, he related that the assailant took money
from his father’s pocket. He likewise admitted that he did not see very well the perpetrator because there
was no light.

Upon being asked by the trial court, Carl stated that although there was no light when his mother was
stabbed, he was sure of what he saw since there was light at their second floor, which illumined the ground
floor through the stairway.

Next to testify was Dennis, husband of the victim. He narrated that he and the victim were married for nine
years before the incident and that they have four children: Monica, 11 years old; Mary Joy, 9 years old;
Carl, 5 years old; and Cherry Ann, 7 months old. At about 9 p.m. on October 21, 2003, he and his wife were
sleeping downstairs in their sala, with their baby, while their other children slept upstairs. Their sala
measures 3 by 3 meters. At around 2 a.m., his son Carl woke up crying and went downstairs to sleep with
them. Fifteen to thirty minutes later, he heard someone shout "magnanakaw!" He turned on the light and
saw that their door was open. He got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not see anybody, he returned
and heard his wife moaning. He embraced and carried her and saw blood on her back. He shouted for help
and his brother-in law helped him bring the victim to the hospital where she eventually died. He spent
₱23,000.00 for the funeral and ₱44,500.00

for the wake and burial. On cross-examination, he admitted that he has no personal knowledge as to who
stabbed his wife since he did not actually see the perpetrator and that it was his son who saw the appellant.

Sharon, sister-in-law of the victim, testified that she and her husband were sleeping upstairs when they
were roused from their sleep at around 2 a.m. of October 22, 2003 by Dennis’ cry for help. She saw that
there was blood on the victim’s chest. After the victim was brought to the hospital, she noticed that the
victim’s children were trembling in fear and were crying. They got outside and went to the billiard hall in
front of their house. She took Carl and had him sit on her lap. Then Carl said, "Tita, sya pasok bahay namin"
pointing to someone but she did not see who it was since there were many people passing by. Later, the
police asked Carl whether he saw somebody enter their house and he answered yes and demonstrated
how his mother was stabbed. Carl also said that the person who stabbed his mother was present in the
vicinity. He then pointed to appellant and said " siya po yung pumaso k sa bahay namin." As a resident
there, appellant often goes to the billiard hall and sometimes watches the television at the house of the
victim.
PO1 Fabela also testified that after it was reported to him that there was a stabbing incident, he went to the
hospital then to the crime scene and interviewed the persons thereat. Later, Carl pinpointed and positively
identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his mother and robbed them of their money. Appellant was
arrested and brought to the police station.

In turn, the appellant denied the accusation. The RTC pronounced the Accused- appellant guilty of the
crime.

The appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the composite
crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose
recollections could only be the product of his imagination.

However, The Court of Appeals sustain such decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the robbery with homicide
was credible and competent considering that the identifying witness was Carl, a 5-year old?

HELD:

Yes, The Court states that the qualification of a person to testify rests on the ability to relate to others the
acts and events witnessed. Towards that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and
may not be witnesses in judicial proceedings, to wit:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons
who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. (l8 a)

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following persons cannot
be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are
incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting
which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can communicate
such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender,
educational attainment, or social status are not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as
he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of
Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds for disqualification.

That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the
testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every child is now presumed
qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the
child’s competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court
will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
LAVAREZ VS GUEVARRA, 822 SCRA 130
BOBBY “ABEL” AVELINO Y BULAWAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 181444, July 17,
2013

FACTS:

Herein accused was charged with murder. During the trial, the defense presented as one of its witness
Scene of the Crime Operative (SOCO) PSI Lito D. Cabamongan to testify on the possible position of the
gunman based on the wounds sustained by the victim. With Cabamongan’s testimony, the defense intends
to assail the testimony of the eye-witnesses, Manalangsang and Cañada, as to the position of the gunman.
Cabamongan’s testimony was offered as an ordinary witness.

On appeal, the CA sustained the conviction of the accused and disregarded the testimony of soco
Cabamongan. Aggrieved, petitioner now seeks to reverse his conviction, arguing that the CA erred in relying
on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Manalangsang and Cañada and disregarding the
inconsistencies between the statements of Manalangsang and the findings of the medico-legal and SOCO
PSI Cabamongan as to the position of the gunman.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert presented as an ordinary witness may be admitted as
evidence and be considered against testimony of eye- witnesses.

HELD:

No. Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and
(b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the
necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN G.R. Nos. 134074-75, January 16, 2001

FACTS:

Herein accused was charged with two (2) counts of rape. Complainant Nympha Lozada, who was 25 years
old at the time of the incidents in question, is considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade
only. During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha Lozada y
de Lara, complainant’s mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp
Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon. Accused was convicted by the trial court.

On appeal, Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental age
was not proven. He argues that an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a
psychiatric evaluation of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve. He
further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived. In this case, only the
mother of the complainant testified as to the latter’s metal age and fitness.

ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinary witness’ testimony on the mental fitness of the complainant who is a
mental retardate may be admissible in evidence.

HELD:

The answer is in the affirmative. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: the
opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding — (a) the identity
of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon
conversations or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact
bearing upon his mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first
testified to such conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.
In the case at bar, Virginia Lozada testified on the mental condition of her daughter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN G.R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000

FACTS:

Accused was charged with Robbery with Rape. During the trial, the accused was positively identified by the
victim as her assailant. The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime
charged; consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. Accused-appellant in his brief,
maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good
moral character, holding as he does the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian
who preaches the word of God.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be acquitted on the ground of his god moral character.

HELD:

An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good
moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such
"sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his
having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual
perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good
conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape.