3.
AGUSTIN VS EDU filed a complaint for injunction praying that the Secretary of
Facts: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners,
users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be
installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is
disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the
Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued
Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and
subsequent administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process,
equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police
power.
Issue: Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and
the subsequent Administrative Order issued is
unconstitutional
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the
petition. The statutes in question are deemed not
unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of
police power as such was established to promote public
welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is
based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its
premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on
traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was
issued in consideration of a growing number of road
accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and
highways.
4.ARANETA VS GATMAITAN
FACTS: The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities
near the San Miguel Bay, between
the provinces of Camarines Sur an"Camarines Norte,
manifested in a resolution that they condemn the operation
of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the
President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel
Bay area. In another resolution, the same League of Mayors
prayed that the
President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay a
rea. In response to the pleas, the President issued
EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay but the
EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a
resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur
recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during
the typhoons season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued
reviving EO 22. Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators
Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries
be enjoined from enforcing said executive order and to
declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the
trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be
banned from San Miguel Bay by executive proclamation and
held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the President has authority to issue
Eos 22, 66 and 80
2. Whether or not the said EOs were valid as it was not
in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to
the President.
Held: YES. Under sections 75 and 83 of the fisheries law, the
restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine
waters come within the powers of the Secretary of
agriculture and Natural Resources. However, as the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources exercises its functions
subject to the general supervision and control of the
President of the Philippines, the President can exercise the
same power and authority through executive orders,
regulations, decrees and proclamations
upon recommendation of the Secretary concerned. Hence,
Eos 22, 66 and 80 restricting and banning of trawl fishing
from San Miguel Bay are valid and issued by authority or law.
5. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD
Facts: Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 36
of RA 9165, a.k.a. the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002.
Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, particularly those who are charged with offenses
punishable by a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day of
imprisonment.
On December 23, 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486,
which provides the rules on the mandatory drugs testing of
candidates for public office. It requires the COMELEC offices
and employees concerned to submit two separate lists of
candidates: one for those who complied with the mandatory
drug testing and the other of those who failed to comply.
It was Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who opposed such resolution,
contending that it was unconstitutional as it imposes an
additional qualification for senators.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment
to the Constitution on the qualifications of Senators.
HELD: Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is
the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. The provision “[n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
6. People vs Rosenthal
FACTS: Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders
and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company. The main
objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine,
market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil
products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the
RTC in two cases of selling their shares to individuals without
first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license
from the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No.
2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.
The shares are said to be speculative because their value
materially depended upon a promise of future promotion and
development of the oil business, rather than on actual
tangible assets. On appeal, Rosenthal & Osmena argued that
Act 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes
undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular
Treasurer.
Issue: Whether there is undue delegation of legislative
authority to the Insular Treasurer.
Held: The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer
to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or
cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or
permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the
person, partnership, association or corporation applying
therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and
this requirement, construed in relation to the other
provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall
be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act
2581 have been complied with.
Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer
to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon
a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In
view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the
public against “speculative schemes which have no more
basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of
stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold
mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, the Supreme
Court held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient
standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision
on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits.
Also, Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the
Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot be
contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any
restraining influence.
The maxim “delegatus non potest delegare” has been made
to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments,
giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of “subordinate legislation”, in practically all modern
governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of
the authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown
general principles, the safest is to decide each case according
to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome
legislative purpose intended to be achieved.
The Supreme Court upheld the assailed decision.
7. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA)
FACTS: Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in
an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a complaint for
damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA,
based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter
which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the
family of an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines
questioned the validity of the memorandum circular.
Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the
case.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a
violation of non-delegation of powers
HELD: SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular,
Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no
authority to promulgate the regulation, and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject
to delegation.
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the
latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
(There are two accepted tests to determine whether or
not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has
been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive
order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices.")
1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for
issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition. The NMAT was conducted and administered as
previously scheduled.
Issue: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382,
as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which
forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to
establish the necessary standard to be followed by the
delegate, the Board of Medical Education
Held: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency
like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and
highly abstract. The standard may be either expressed or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose
of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly
the legislative objective is public safety.
In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1
of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation
of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same
Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered
together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the non-delegation principle.

8. TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought admission into colleges or

schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However,
the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents,
and administered by the private respondent, the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial

Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The
petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section
5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition
for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT
and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April