POLICE POWER
exceeding five days in any one month, in apprehending
THE UNITED STATES vs. Luis TORIBIO
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; SLAUGHTER OF
LARGE CATTLE. —Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147
construed.—Where the language of a statute is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to
give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted,
and a construction should be rejected which would tend
to render abortive other provisions of the statute and
to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain
by its enactment.
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. —The provisions of
Act No. 1147 prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter
of carabaos for human consumption which are fit for
"agricultural work and draft purposes," held to be a
reasonable and justifiable exercise of the sovereign
police power of the State, under the conditions existing
in these Islands.
APPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY TO
PUBLIC USE. —These provisions held not to
constitute an appropriation of private property
interests to a "public use" so as to bring them within
the principles of the exercise by the State of the right
of eminent domain and to entitle the owners to
compensation, being no more than a just restraint of an
injurious private use of property.
CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING USE OF THE
POLICE POWER.—"To justify the State" in the
exercise of its sovereign police power "it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference; and, second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
(Lawton vs. Steele, 152 U. S., 133, 136.)
THE UNITED STATES vs. SILVESTRE
POMPEYA
PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE; LEGISLATIVE
POWER; MUNICIPAL PATROLS. —The Philippine
Legislature has power to legislate upon all subjects,
affecting the people of the Philippine Islands, which
has not been delegated to Congress or expressly
prohibited by the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902). (Gaspar vs. Molina, 5 Phil. Rep., 197; U.
S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. Rep., 7.) Under said general power
the Philippine Legislature has a right to require able-
bodied male residents of the different municipalities,
between the ages of 18 and 50, to assist, for a period not
ladrones, robbers, and other lawbreakers, and
suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the
protection of the municipality, not exceeding one day of
each week. And also, to require each householder to
report certain facts enumerated in the law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWERS IN
GENERAL. —The police power of the state has been
variously defined. It has been defined as the power of
the government, inherent in every sovereign,
and cannot be limited ;the power vested in the
legislature to make such laws as they shall judge to be
for the good of the state and its subjects; the power to
govern men and things, extending to the protection of
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within the
state; the authority to establish such rules and
regulations for the conduct of all persons as may be
conducive to the public interest. The police power of the
state may be said to embrace the whole system of
internal regulations by which the state seeks, not only
to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against
the state, but also to establish, for the intercourse of
citizen with citizen, those rules of good manners and
good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a
conflict of rights, and to ensure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is
reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of the
rights of others.
CRIMINAL LAW; SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.
—Held: That the complaint presented in the present
case was not sufficient to show that the defendant was
guilty of a violation of Act No. 1309. The complaint in a
criminal case must state every fact necessary to make
out an offense. The complaint must show on its face
that if the facts alleged are true, an offense has been
committed. It must state explicitly and directly every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute an
offense. If the statute exempts certain persons, or class
of persons, from liability, then the complaint must
show that the person charged does not belong to that
class.
LAO H. ICHONG vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE
POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE. —Police power is
far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to
limit its sweep. It derives its existence from the very
existence of the State itself and does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-
extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such
it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
1
Especially is it so under a modern democratic
framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions;
the field and scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight.
GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF
APPLICATION.—The constitutional guarantees in
Section I, Article III, of the Constitution, which embody
the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).
LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD. —The conflict
between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is
the essence, or the indispensable means for the"
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license
and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life,
liberty or property, provided there is due process of law;
and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the
law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation
must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction or classification has been made, there must
be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
CLAUSE; WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY
LEGISLATION. —The equal protection of the law
clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who
do not (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION
AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG
PERSONS; CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR
CLASSIFICATION. —The power of the legislature to
make distinctions and classifications among persons is
not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the
law’s clause. The legislative power admits of a wide
scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is
without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and
valid ground for classification.
NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL
TRADE; CLASSIFICATION IN REPUBLIC ACT No.
1180 ACTUAL, REAL AND REASONABLE. —The
classification in the law of retail traders into nationals
and aliens is actual, real and reasonable. All persons of
one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that
the classification is patently unreasonable and
unfounded. Hence, it is the duty of this Court to declare
that the legislature acted within its legitimate
prerogative and it cannot declare that the act
transcends the limits of equal protection established by
the Constitution.
TEST OF REASONABLENESS. —The law in question
is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the
desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the national
economy from alien control and dominance. It is not
necessarily unreasonable because it affects private
rights and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The
test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness
or adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. Judged by
this test, the disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered
not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 TOLERANT AND
REASONABLE. —A cursory study of the provisions of
the law immediately reveals how tolerant and
reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made
prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of
those already engaged in the occupation to continue
therein during the rest of their lives; and similar
recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied
only to persons upon conviction of certain offenses.
ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS OF
A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF
2
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. —If political
independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people,
then economic independence is none of less legitimate.
Freedom and liberty are not real and positive, if the
people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race
or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles
of foreign economic control and domination is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue.
It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks
to bring it about can infringe the constitutional
limitation of due process. The attainment of a
legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond
the limits of legislative authority.
NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MANIFESTED IN
THE CONSTITUTION. —Nationalistic tendency is
manifested in various provisions of the Constitution.
The nationalization of the retail trade is only a
continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid
down as a primary objective of the Constitution, it
cannot therefore be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the
provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid
or unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO
JUDICIAL REVIEW. —The exercise of legislative
discretion is not subject to judicial review. The Court
will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor
pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of
the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably
more than the legislative power.
TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT
SHOWN IN TlTLE OR PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC
ACT No. 1180.—What Section 21(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title
completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public
of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its
operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297). A cursory consideration of the title and
the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not
and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea
of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms
express the two main purposes and objectives of the
law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have
always been included within the term "regulation".
USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE OF BILL. —
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the
title of a bill; the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The above rule was
followed when the title of the Act in question adopted
the more general term "regulate" instead of
"nationalize" or "prohibit".
PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVE
REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL. —One purpose of
the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and
study of the legislators or of the public. In case at bar
it cannot be claimed that the legislators have not been
apprised of the nature of the law, especially the
nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of the
law, and a great many of the persons affected by the
prohibition in the law conducted a campaign against its
approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed.
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS
NOT VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180;
TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR
AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW. —The law
does not violate international treaties and obligations.
The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations,
1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty
of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees
equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon
the same terms as the nationals of any other country".
But the nationals of China are not discriminated
against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special
rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that
the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law (U.S. vs.Thompson, 258, Fed. 257,
260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the
scope of the police power of the State
(Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).
3
WALTER LUTZ vs. J. ANTONIO ARANETA
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; TAXATION; POWER OF
STATE TO LEVY TAX IN AID AND SUPPORT OF
SUGAR INDUSTRY. —As the protection and
promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public
concern, the Legislature may determine within
reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection
and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
discretion must be allowed full play, subject only to the
test of reasonableness; and it is not contended that the
means provided in section 6 of Commonwealth Act No.
567 bear no relation to the objective pursued or are
oppressive in character. If objective and methods
arealike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why
the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the
implement of the state’s police power.
POWER OF STATE TO SELECT SUBJECT OF
TAXATION. —It is inherent in the power to tax that a
state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it
has been repeatedly held that “inequalities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe 110 constitutional
limitation.
ERMITA-MALATE vs. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
Constitutional Law; Municipal
Corporations; Presumption as to constitutionality of
ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—
An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality or city and
with all the facts and circumstances which surround
the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed
to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the
ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence
to rebut its validity is unavoidable. Where there was no
factual foundation laid for overthrowing an ordinance
which is not void on its face, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail.
Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels,
etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of
hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police power
measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals.
As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity
resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to
unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry. —On the
legislative organs of the government, whether national
or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power,
which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of certain constitutional guarantees, the
exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person, is
subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the
courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees. —
Municipal license fees can be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-
useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue
purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are
incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a
fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing the amount of license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in
this class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have,
as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon
the number of persons who might otherwise engage in
non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an
important factor in the determination of the amount of
this kind of license fee.
Discretion in fixing license fees. —Much discretion is
given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The
mere fact that some individuals in the community may
be deprived of their present business or a particular
mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of
the police power. Persons licensed to pursue
occupations which may in the public need and interest
be affected by the exercise of the police power embark
in those occupations subject to the disadvantages
which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal
infirmity. —There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform
in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance,
or any governmental action for that matter, from
4
imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of
justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize
an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather
serious pro portions as an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. What should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in
the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
public morals.
Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels,
etc.— The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City
of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel,
motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like,
to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases
full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. The
prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary,
because there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and
the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every
regulation of conduct amount to curtailment of liberty,
which cannot be absolute.
Public interest; Government interference. —The policy
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest. If the liberty invoked were freedom of
the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.
— What makes a statute susceptible to a charge that it
is void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty
is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the
doing of an act that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and diff er as to its
application.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, vs. HON. ROMEO F.
EDU
Constitutional Law; Police power construed.—The
broad and expensive scope of the police power, which
was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as
“nothing more or less than, the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice
Laurel in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.
Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all
kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’
Shortly after independence in 1948; Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence
being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ x x
x The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.”
Due process; Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring the
installation of early warning devices to vehicles is not
repugnant to the due process clause. Conjectural claims
of petitioner as to number of nighttime vehicular
collisions cannot be a basis for setting aside a
requirement of law that was promulgated after a careful
study by the Executive Department. —Nor did the
Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely solely on
such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed
out in his Answer: “The President certainly had in his
possession the necessary statistical information and
data at the time he issued said letter of instructions,
and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by
petitioner’s naked assertion that early warning devices
‘are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime
vehicular accidents’ because allegedly only 390 or 1.5
per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents
that occurred in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12
of petition). Petitioner’s statistics is not backed up by
demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this
Honorable Court: ‘Further: “It admits of no doubt
therefore that there being a presumption of validity,
the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here” ’ * * *. But even assuming the
verity of petitioner’s statistics, is that not reason
enough to require the installation of early warning
devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that
could mean that death of 390 or more Filipinos and the
deaths that could, likewise result from head-on or
frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?” It is quite
manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of
Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful
study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for
5
alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give
sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the
broadest permissible limits of a pleader’s well-known
penchant for exaggeration.
The “early-warning device” requirement on vehicles is
not expensive redundancy. Said device is universally
recognized.—The rather wild and fantastic nature of
the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor
General thus: “Such early warning device requirement
is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1)
‘blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front
and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted
two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because:
Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under
adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,
any motorist from this country or from any part of the
world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early
warning device installed on the roads, highways or
expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that
somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which
is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other
built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will
not immediately get adequate advance warning
because he will still think what that blinking light is
all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion
or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus
increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.”
There is nothing in Letter of Instruction No. 229 which
compels car owners to purchase the prescribed early
warning device. Vehicle owners can produce the device
themselves with a little ingenuity. —Nor did the other
extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go
unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General:
“There is nothing in the questioned Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative
Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle
owners to purchase the early warning device
prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor
vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their
motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device
in question, procuring or obtaining the same from
whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and
practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device
so long as the same substantially conforms with the
specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and
administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning
device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make
manufacturers and dealers of said devices ‘instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners’ as petitioner
so sweepingly concludes.
Courts do not pass upon the wisdom of statutes. —It
does appear clearly that petitioner’s objection to this
Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power,
the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but
on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he
entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, to put it at
its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate
word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating “that this
Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, ‘does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.
Delegation of Powers; To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation of power, the legislature must set defined
standards. In the case at bar the clear objective is public
safety. —The alleged infringement of the fundamental
principle of non-delegation of legislative power is
equally without any support in well-settled legal
doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint
himself with authoritative pronouncements from this
Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such
an assertion. An excerpt from the aforecited decision of
Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: “To avoid the
taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature
itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be heard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be affected, It is the criterion
by which legislative purpose may fee carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental roles and regulations. The
standard may be either express or implied. If the
former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the
Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is public
safety.
International Law; The 2968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with the character
of “generally accepted principles of international law”
which under the Constitution the Philippines adopts as
part of the law of the land.—The petition itself quoted
these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
6
Instruction: “[Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals
and the United Nations Organization (U.N.);
[Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No.
207, recommended the enactment of local legislation
for the installation of road safety signs and devices: * *
*:” It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of
Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: “The Philippines * * * adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, * * *: The 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of
such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the
principle of international morality.
Teehankee, J., dissenting:
Constitutional law; Land Transportation
Law; Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum
Circular No. 32 issued by the Land Transportation
Commission is oppressive and discriminatory because
it requires vehicle owners to purchase a specific
E.W.D.—It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory
to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and
more effective and efficient E.W.D.’s such as “a)
blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,
b) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor
vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers on motor vehicles . . . .” to purchase the
E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative
order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.
Public necessity for issuance of Administrative Order
No. 1 has not been shown. —The public necessity for
the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid
refutation has been made of petitioner’s assertion that
the “E.W.D.’s are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of
the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in
1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end
collisions,” as to require the purchase and installation
of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles
throughout the country.
The E.W.D. requirement in too burdensome on the
public.—The big financial burden to be imposed on all
motorists is staggering, and petitioner’s assertion that
“as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles
all over the country requiring E.W.D.’s and at the
minimum price of P56.00 per set, this would mean a
consumer outlay of P48,451,872.00, or close to P50
million for the questioned E.W.D.’s stands
unchallenged.
No effort was made to show that there can be other less
expensive and practical device. —No real effort has
been made to show that there can be practical and less
burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled
vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps “kinke” which can be placed
just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the
highways.
There is no imperative need for imposing such a blanket
requirement on all vehicles. —There is no imperative
need for imposing such a blanket requirement on all
vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they
have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in
their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated
trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the
deplorable highway accidents due to stalled vehicles,
establishing an honest and foolproof systems of
examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so
as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a
sustained education campaign to instill safe driving
habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much
less than the P50 million burden that would be imposed
by the challenged order.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
Local Governments; Constitutional Law; An ordinance
of Quezon City requiring memorial park operators to set
aside at least six percent (6%) of their cemetery for
charity burial of deceased persons is not a valid exercise
of police power, and one that constitute taking of
property without just compensation.—There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of
a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
—The expropriation without compensation of a
portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section
12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in
a proper place subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the
7
Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
Panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in
such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its
own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. This has
been the law and practise in the past. It continues to
the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment
of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners
of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are
very clear from said requirements which are intended
to insure the development of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay
by the subdivision developer when individual lots are
sold to homeowners.
SEBASTIAN LOZANO, vs. CARMEN MARTINEZ
and JOSE DE VEGA
HABEAS CORPUS; PETITION FOR WRIT BY
FATHER, TO OBTAIN POSSESSION OF A CHILD
UNDER TEN YEARS OF AGE, IN POSSESSION OF
THE MOTHER.—Where a husband and wife are living
separate the question which one of them is entitled to
the possession of their child under ten years of age is a
matter within the sound discretion of the court, in
accordance with the provisions of section 771 of Act No.
190.
ESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have
authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality of
legislative measures. —This Court has declared that
while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty
in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply
means that the resolution of such cases may be made
in the first instance by these lower courts.
Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting
idea of fair play. —The closed mind has no place in the
open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play
to hear "the other side" before an opinion is formed or
a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the
other half must also be considered if an impartial
verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is
indispensable that the two sides complement each
other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the
correct ruling after examination of the problem not
from one or the other perspective only but in its
totality. A judgment based on less that this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary
or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance
or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
insolence of power.
The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to
public welfare. —In the light of the tests mentioned
above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao,
as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct
relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen
in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-
cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at
least seven years old if male and eleven years old if
female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm
work or breeding and preventing their improvident
depletion.
The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one
province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and
disposal without a prior court hearing is violative of due
process for lack of reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for
being confiscatory.—But while conceding that the
amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as
the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz.,that there be a lawful method. We
note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
—Even if a reasonable relation between the
means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
8
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case,
the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed
by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such
trial is prescribed, and the property being transported
is immediately impounded by the police and declared,
by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
—We also mark, moreover, the questionable
manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The
phrase "may see fit"is an extremely generous and
dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and
even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the said officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is none.
Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen?
Only the officers named can supply the answer, they
and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit,
and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there
is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep
it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
—To sum up then, we find that the challenged
measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated
is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only
where a problem needs immediate and urgent
correction. —It has already been remarked that there
are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement
for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process
is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases
accepted, however, there is a justification for the
omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected
and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case
before us, there was no such pressure of time or action
calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to
require their instant destruction. There certainly was
no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of
justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights
safeguarded to him under the Constitution.
Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,
Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the
violation thereof should have been pronounced not by
the police only but by a court of justice, which alone
would have had the authority to impose the prescribed
penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
A police officer who confiscated carabaos being
transported in violation of E.O. 626-A is not liable for
damages even if said Executive Order were later
declared unconstitutional. —We agree with the
respondent court, however, that the police station
commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos
is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive
order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at
that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It
would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive
order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility
alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact,
and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the
competence, for all their superior authority, to question
the order we now annul.
PHIlLIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
EXPORTERS, INC vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.
DRILON
Constitutional Law; Labor Laws: Deployment Ban of
Female Domestic Helper; Concept of Police Power. —
The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
the common good. It is not capable of an exact
9
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits."
Police power constitutes an implied limitation on the
Bill of Rights. —It constitutes an implied limitation on
the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted
in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights
itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of
individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will." It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
Equality before the law under the Constitution;
Requirements o fa valid classification, satisfied. —The
petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no
question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," but it does not thereby make
an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of
the same class. The Court is satisfied that the
classification made—the preference for female
workers—rests on substantial distinctions.
Valid Discrimination between female and male contract
workers under Department Order No. justified. —The
same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In
the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps
for isolated instances, our men abroad have been
afflicted with an identical predicament. The petitioner
has proffered no argument that the Government should
act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court,
of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic
notion that men are superior to women. What the
Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-
treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon
some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the
Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable
indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence
this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the
same thing as far as men are concerned. There is
simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice
it to state, then, that insofar as classification are
concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are
borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified.
Department Order No. 1 does not impair the right to
travel. —The consequence the deployment ban has on
the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the
requirements of "public safety, "as may be provided by
law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its
basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to
the respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking
authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner
assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its
impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the
right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto.
No merit in the contention that Department Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power
since the Labor Code itself vests the DOLE with rule-
making powers. —Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does
not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with
rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.
"Protection to Labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. —Protection to labor" does not
signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that
such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
its sons and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under
these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to
ensure that our toiling expatriates have adequate
protection, personally and economically, while away
from home. In this case, the Government has evidence,
an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of
the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part
of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on
deployment.
Non-impairment clause must yield to the demands and
necessities of State's power of regulation to provide a
decent living to its citizens. —The petitioner's reliance
10
on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation
"in policy and decision making processes affecting their
rights and benefits" is not well taken. The right granted
by this provision, again, must submit to the demands
and necessities of the State's power of regulation. The
non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by
the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and
enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from
restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez
faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic-way of life. This Court understands the grave
implications the questioned Order has on the business
of recruitment. The concern of the Government,
however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of Government
regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a
decent living to its citizens. The Government has
convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent.
We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with
a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN
THE PHILIP-PINES, INC vs. SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry. —In
addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent
conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court who took part in the
deliberations and voted on the issue during their
session en banc. And as established by judge-made
doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself.
Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of
President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.—The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by
President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it
on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to
promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229,
the same was authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted
above.
Pres. Aquino’s loss of legislative powers did not have the
effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her
when she possessed it; Reasons. —The said measures
were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987,
when the Congress of the Philippines was formally
convened and took over legislative power from her.
They are not “midnight” enactments intended to pre-
empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued
on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22,
1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures
ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power
for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless
modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared
invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso
facto become inoperative simply because of the
dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the
same token, President Aquino’s loss of legislative
power did not have the effect of invalidating all the
measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.
Appropriation Law defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure; Reasons. —That fund, as
earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground
that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly,
however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure
even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for
that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law
is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.
The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main
objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention limits. —
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because
they do not provide for retention limits as required by
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer
tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now
in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most
controversial provisions. This section
declares: Retention Limits.—Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no
case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following
11
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years
of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the
area originally retained by them thereunder, further,
That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time
of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents. —The argument that E.O. No.
229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill
shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title,
deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title
of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents
and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.
Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require
action only but not specific action. —Finally, there is
the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No.
78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act,
especially by a specific department of the government.
That is true as a general proposition but is subject to
one important qualification. Correctly and
categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie
to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself
but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In
other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is
imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs,
if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will
intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy
of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely
ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If
the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For example, if
an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an
unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular
question to the great detriment of all parties concerned,
or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause
when the law clearly gave it
jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case to
require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause.
Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned
under Police Power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose is not compensable. —There are traditional
distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application
of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example,
where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for
its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the
power being exercised was eminent domain because
the property involved was wholesome and intended for
a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building
on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished
for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not compensable,
unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police power,
deprivation, excess of the maximum area under power
of eminent domain. —The cases before us present no
knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that
the measures under challenge merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of
the police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative.
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise
not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain.
Equal Protection of the Law; Classification
defined; Requisites of a valid classification. —
Classification has been defined as the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same
particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally
to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all
these requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Definition of Equal Protection. —Equal protection
simply means that all persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
12
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners
have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that
not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing
land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is
no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except only where
its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights.
Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the police
power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject
and method. —It is worth remarking at this juncture
that a statute may be sustained under the police power
only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and
the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the
public generally as distinguished from those of a
particular class require the interference of the State
and, no less important, the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian
reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself,
we may say that the first requirement has been
satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity
of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional
goal.
Eminent Domain, defined. —Eminent domain is an
inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon
payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously,
there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may
be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the
owner is unwilling to sell or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power
of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of
the property owner. Private rights must then yield to
the irresistible demands of the public interest on the
time-honored justification, as in the case of the police
power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
Requirements for a proper exercise of power of eminent
domain. —But for all its primacy and urgency, the
power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as
indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that “private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation” and in the abundant jurisprudence that
has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the
power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Concept of political question. —A becoming courtesy
admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political
departments when they decide what is known as the
political question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: The term
“political question” connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
“those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.” It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Just Compensation, defined. —Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been
repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is
not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word
“just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word
“compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample.
Requirements of compensable taking.—As held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is
compensable taking when the following conditions
concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private
property; (2) the entry must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry must be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property
must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the
utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.
Determination of Just Compensation addressed to the
courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other
branch. —To be sure, the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the courts of
justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or
official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a
challenge to several decrees promulgated by President
Marcos providing that the just compensation for
property under expropriation should be either the
assessment of the property by the government or the
sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was
lower.
13
The Court declares that the content and manner of the
just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not
violative of the Constitution. —With these
assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the
content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is
not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind
admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this
Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need
for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as
the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform
achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations
of our peasant masses during all these disappointing
decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said
section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmer’s hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That
is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and
that is not what we shall decree today.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Theory that payment
of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money; Other modes of payment.—
Accepting the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully
in money, we find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the
total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas
of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive
upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the
land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily
because the small landowner will be needing it more
than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger
balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are “negotiable
at any time.” The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of
stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax
credits, and other things of value equivalent to the
amount of just compensation.
CARP Law repeats the requisites of registration but
does not provide that in case of failure or refusal to
register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that
given by the provincial or city assessor for tax
purposes.—The complaint against the effects of non-
registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not
seem to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4
of the Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the
CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration
as embodied in the earlier measure but does not
provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or
refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall
be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax
purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the
just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of
the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the
manner provided for in Section 16.
Recognized rule that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation. —The recognized
rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated
shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence
on this settled principle is consistent both here and in
other democratic jurisdictions.
CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those
granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits; Case at
bar. —In connection with these retained rights, it does
not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by
the petitioners with the Office of the President has
already been resolved. Although we have said that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need
not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there
are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the
administrative level, especially the claim that the
petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do
not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of
their petition. Obviously, the Court cannot resolve
these issues. In any event, assuming that the
petitioners have not yet exercised their retention
rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that
they are entitled to the new retention rights provided
for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.
DECS vs. ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Defined; Proper
Exercise of; Case at bar. —We see no reason why the
rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case
at bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic
preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with
more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter
cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in
the regulation of the medical profession. There is no
need to redefine here the police power of the State.
Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised
if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
14
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust
their lives and health; Three flunk rule, intention of—
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power
requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and
a lawful method. The subject of the challenged
regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of
the State to ensure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method
employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant
to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or
oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he
does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. —
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor,
he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer
the bridge to one’s ambition. The State has the
responsibility to harness its human resources and to
see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less bad, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a
manner that will best promote the common good while
also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the
equal protection clause is not well-taken; Reasons. —
The contention that the challenged rule violates the
equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does
not have to operate with equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. There can be no question that a
substantial distinction exists between medical
students and other students who are not subjected to
the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical
profession directly affects the very lives of the people,
unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not
require more vigilant regulation. The accountant, for
example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not
be similarly treated. There would be unequal
protection if some applicants who have passed the tests
are admitted and others who have also qualified are
denied entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among equals.
CARLOS SUPERDRUG vs. DSWD
Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 (R.A. No.
9257); Taxation; Being a tax deduction, the discount
given by drugstores in favor of senior citizens does not
reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis but merely
offers a fractional reduction in taxes owed.—Based on
the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax deduction
scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners for the
discount privilege accorded to senior citizens. This is
because the discount is treated as a deduction, a tax-
deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross
income and results in a lower taxable income. Stated
otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law to
reduce the income prior to the application of the tax
rate to compute the amount of tax which is due. Being
a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes
owed on a peso for peso basis but merely offers a
fractional reduction in taxes owed. Theoretically, the
treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the
net income of the private establishments concerned.
The discounts given would have entered the coffers and
formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; The permanent
reduction in the drugstores’ total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property
for public use or benefit, which constitutes compensable
taking for which the owners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation; Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator; A tax
deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior
citizen discount—as such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation.—The permanent
reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy
corresponding to the taking of private property for
public use or benefit. This constitutes compensable
taking for which petitioners would ordinarily become
entitled to a just compensation. Just compensation is
defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure
is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
word just is used to intensify the meaning of the
word compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample. A tax
deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the
senior citizen discount. As such, it would not meet the
definition of just compensation.
Police Power; The State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon
private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing
a government program. —This raises the question of
whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare
of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private
establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program. The Court believes so. The
Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize
the contribution of senior citizens to nation-building,
15
and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers
them an integral part of our society.
R.A. No. 9257 is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object; When the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property
rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must
yield to general welfare; Police power as an attribute to
promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of property owners that
they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, a
questioned provision is invalidated.—The law is a
legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition
but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
described as “the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs.” It is “[t]he powers vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.” For
this reason, when the conditions so demand as
determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property
rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare. Police power as an attribute to
promote the common good would be diluted
considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they
will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect
of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity
which every law has in its favor.
It is unfair for drugstore owners to criticize the law
because they cannot raise the prices of their medicines
given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry.
—It is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because
they cannot raise the prices of their medicines given
the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It
is a business decision on the part of petitioners to peg
the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below
acquisition cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a
result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a
property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for
being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to
raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to
competition.
While the Constitution protects property rights,
petitioners must accept the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in
the operations of a business which may result in an
impairment of property rights in the process. —The
Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution
protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of
police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process. Moreover, the right to
property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of
the Constitution provides the precept for the protection
of property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation of
contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a
reminder that the right to property can be relinquished
upon the command of the State for the promotion of
public good.
Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued
implementation of the same would be unconscionably
detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from
quashing a legislative act. —The success of the senior
citizens program rests largely on the support imparted
by petitioners and the other private establishments
concerned. This being the case, the means employed in
invoking the active participation of the private sector,
in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law,
is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient
proof that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary,
and that the continued implementation of the same
would be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners,
the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Separation of
Powers; Words and Phrases; Standing or locus standi
is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court
sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action
challenged to support that party’s participation in the
case.—Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party
to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and
harm from the law or action challenged to support that
party’s participation in the case. More importantly, the
doctrine of standing is built on the principle of
separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary
interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of
16
the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of
government.
The general rules on standing admit of several
exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
suits, third party standing and, especially in the
Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.
—The requirement of standing is a core component of
the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution. The constitutional component of standing
doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are
not susceptible of precise definition. In this
jurisdiction, the extancy of “a direct and personal
interest” presents the most obvious cause, as well as
the standard test for a petitioner’s standing. In a
similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three
constitutional standing requirements of injury,
causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984). Nonetheless, the general rules on
standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party
standing and, especially in the Philippines, the
doctrine of transcendental importance.
Third-Party Standing; American jurisprudence is
replete with examples where parties-in-interest were
allowed standing to advocate or invoke the
fundamental due process or equal protection claims of
other persons or classes of persons injured by state
action. —The concept of third party standing as an
exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991),
the United States Supreme Court wrote that: “We have
recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on
behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a “sufficiently
concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the
third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the
third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the
petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They
rely on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be threatened by
the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence
in constitutional litigation of such special interest
groups in our nation such as the American Civil
Liberties Union in the United States may also be
construed as a hindrance for customers to bring suit.
American jurisprudence is replete with examples
where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to
advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or
equal protection claims of other persons or classes of
persons injured by state action. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the United States
Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to
challenge a reproductive health statute that would
penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the
constitutional protections available to their patients.
The Court held that: “The rights of husband and wife,
pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely
affected unless those rights are considered in a suit
involving those who have this kind of confidential
relation to them.”
Overbreadth Doctrine; In overbreadth analysis,
challengers to government action are in effect permitted
to raise the rights of third parties—generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly
restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights; Motel
operators have a right to assert the constitutional rights
of their clients to patronize their establishments for a
“wash-rate” time frame.—Assuming arguendo that
petitioners do not have a relationship with their
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter,
the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In
overbreadth analysis, challengers to government
action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the
freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies
when a statute needlessly restrains even
constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the
petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping
intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We
can see that based on the allegations in the petition,
the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus
recognize that the petitioners418have a right to assert
the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize
their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances;
Requisites for Validity. —The test of a valid ordinance
is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must
be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
Police Power; Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response as the conditions warrant.—Police power,
while incapable of an exact definition, has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
17
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as
the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the
concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding
right to protect itself and its people. Police power has
been used as justification for numerous and varied
actions by the State. These range from the regulation
of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and
cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years
of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has
rarely been denied.
Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to
the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes
even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
—The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if
not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for
illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall
within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and
all means for their achievement. Those means must
align with the Constitution, and our emerging
sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people.
The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive
theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes even, the
political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Judicial Review; Courts; If the Court were animated by
the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that
motivate many political decisions,419judicial integrity
is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is
merely the third political branch of government.—Even
as we design the precedents that establish the
framework for analysis of due process or equal
protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited
by a due deference to the co-equal branches of
government as they exercise their political functions.
But when we are compelled to nullify executive or
legislative actions, yet another form of caution
emerges. If the Court were animated by the same
passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate
many political decisions, judicial integrity is
compromised by any perception that the judiciary is
merely the third political branch of government. We
derive our respect and good standing in the annals of
history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of
the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end
than through the development of rigorous and
sophisticated legal standards through which the courts
analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process; The
purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals. —The primary constitutional
question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty
and property of individuals. The due process guaranty
serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property; Substantive due process
completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause—it inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.—The due process guaranty has
traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related
but distinct restrictions on government, “procedural
due process” and “substantive due process.” Procedural
due process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the
established process when it makes an intrusion into
the private sphere. Examples range from the form of
notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If due
process were confined solely to its procedural aspects,
there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary
government action, provided the proper formalities are
followed. Substantive due process completes the
protection420envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.
The question of substantive due process, moreso than
most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in
progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms; The due process
clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to determine the proper
metes and bounds for its application.—The question of
substantive due process, moreso than most other fields
of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal
thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally
awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more
rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The
vitality though of constitutional due process has not
been predicated on the frequency with which it has
been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the
libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the
prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process
clause has acquired potency because of the
18
sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its
application.
Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; “Strict Scrutiny,”
“Rational Basis,” and, “Intermediate Review,”
Explained. —The general test of the validity of an
ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best
tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test
laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote 4 of
the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the
judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is
a discrimination against a “discrete and insular”
minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.”
Consequently, two standards of judicial review were
established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process,
and the rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation. A third standard, denominated as
heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted
by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), after the
Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971). While the test may have first been articulated
in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States
since been applied in all substantive due process cases
as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational
basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws
or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a
legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined,
and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on
the421presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest. In terms
of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the
quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental
freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection. The United States Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect
fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access
and interstate travel.
Liberty; Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a
fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten
Commandments-style enumeration of what may or
what may not be done, but rather an atmosphere of
freedom where the people do not feel labored under a
Big Brother presence as they interact with each other,
their society and nature, in a manner innately
understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or
injury to others.—One might say that the infringed
rights of these customers were are trivial since they
seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these
are not the sort of cherished rights that, when
proscribed, would impel the people to tear up
their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not
shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those “trivial” yet
fundamental freedoms—which the people reflexively
exercise any day without the impairing awareness of
their constitutional consequence—that accurately
reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.
Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental
right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-
style enumeration of what may or what may not be
done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the
people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence
as they interact with each other, their society and
nature, in a manner innately understood by them as
inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
Police Power; A reasonable relation must exist between
the purposes of the police power measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.—That the
Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive of422private rights. It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these
requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held
in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in
any way meant to take it away from the vastness of
State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity.
19

Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Urban decay is
a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a
common problem confronted by the modern metropolis
wherever in the world—the solution to such perceived
decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from
offering a legitimate product, rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to
sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals
that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.—The
Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness
of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, and it is
skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city—
the Pearl of the Orient—as a modern-day Sodom or
Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped
in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila
will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big
cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of
mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common
problem confronted by the modern metropolis
wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived
decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from
offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to
sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals
that would bring a new grandeur to Manila. The
behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact
already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance
can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes
can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by
charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare—the State
is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens.—We reiterate
that individual rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State
is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However, well-
intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of
the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more
than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of
public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens
deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided
that such measures do not trample rights this Court is
sworn to protect. The notion that the promotion of
public morality is a function of the State is as old as
Aristotle. The advancement of moral relativism as a
school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of
morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on
which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable
that a society with relatively little shared morality
among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an
adequate accommodation of different interests.
Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies
not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of
what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition
that the individual liberty to make the choices in our
lives is innate, and protected by the State.—The oft-
quoted American maxim that “you cannot legislate
morality” is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law,
since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more
accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance
with public attitudes about right and wrong. Our penal
laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions,
and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has
seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong
distinction, but also the advent of fundamental
liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the
fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free
societies not with any more extensive elaboration on
our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our
recognition that the individual liberty to make the
choices in our lives is innate and protected by the State.
Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are
under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the
embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their
expression of consent to do so when they take the oath
of office, and because they are entrusted by the people
to uphold the law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE SITON
Constitutional Law; Police Power; The power to define
crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is
legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign
power of the state to maintain social orders as an aspect
20
of police power.—The power to define crimes and
prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in
nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state
to maintain social order as an aspect of police power.
The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that
no constitutional rights have been abridged. However,
in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute
a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with
reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so
that he may have a certain understandable rule of
conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This
requirement has come to be known as the void-for-
vagueness doctrine which states that “a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of
law.”
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the
right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.—Under the Constitution,
the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Thus, as with any other act or offense, the
requirement of probable cause provides an
acceptable limit on police or executive authority that
may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or
arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2).
The fear exhibited by the respondents,
echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is
placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or
search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional
requirement of probable cause, which is one less than
certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or
possibility.
Probable Cause; The requirement of probable cause
cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of
punishment, for absent this requirement, the
authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. —The
requirement of probable cause cannot be done away
with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for,
absent this requirement, the authorities are
necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion
are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of
the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of
the peace officers making the arrest.
Criminal Law; Vagrancy; Vagrancy must not be so
lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally
offensive. —Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal
protection clause; neither does it discriminate against
the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order
laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor
or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under
such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or
cause alarm and apprehension in the community.
Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral
conduct. Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to
be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public
order crime which punishes persons for conducting
themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly
society finds unusual, under such conditions that are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable
concern for the safety and well-being of members of the
community.
Constitutional Law; Vagrancy; We agree with the
position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202
(2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. —We
agree with the position of the State that first and
foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional
question, it is elementary that every court must
approach it with grave care and considerable caution
bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid
and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor
of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to
avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are
valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.
The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
21
Criminal Law; Vagrancy; As an obvious police power
measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a
constitutional light. —It must not be forgotten that
police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It
has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary, and its scope is vast and pervasive,
reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2)
must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK vs. DSWD
Constitutional Law; Courts; Judicial Review;
Requisites of Judicial Review.—When the
constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review
may be availed of only if the following requisites
concur: “(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate
case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial
interest on the part of the party raising the [question
of constitutionality]; (3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question
of constitutionality] is the lis mota of the case.”
An actual case or controversy exists when there is “a
conflict of legal rights” or “an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution.”—An actual
case or controversy exists when there is “a conflict of
legal rights” or “an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution.” The Petition must
therefore show that “the governmental act being
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.” In this case, the tax deduction scheme
challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on
them. Thus, it cannot be denied that there exists an
actual case or controversy.
Taxation; Tax Deductions; Police Power; Thus, even if
the current law, through its tax deduction scheme
(which abandoned the tax credit scheme under the
previous law), does not provide for a peso for peso
reimbursement of the 20% discount given by private
establishments, no constitutional infirmity obtains
because, being a valid exercise of police power, payment
of just compensation is not warranted.—The present
case, thus, affords an opportunity for us to clarify the
above-quoted statements in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation, 456 SCRA 414 (2005) and Carlos
Superdrug Corporation, 526 SCRA 130 (2007). First,
we note that the above-quoted disquisition on eminent
domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation is obiter
dicta and, thus, not binding precedent. As stated
earlier, in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, we ruled
that the BIR acted ultra vires when it effectively
treated the 20% discount as a tax deduction, under
Sections 2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, despite the clear
wording of the previous law that the same should be
treated as a tax credit. We were, therefore, not
confronted in that case with the issue as to whether the
20% discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain. Second, although we adverted to Central
Luzon Drug Corporationin our ruling in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation, this referred only to
preliminary matters. A fair reading of Carlos
Superdrug Corporation would show that we
categorically ruled therein that the 20% discount is a
valid exercise of police power. Thus, even if the current
law, through its tax deduction scheme (which
abandoned the tax credit scheme under the previous
law), does not provide for a peso for peso
reimbursement of the 20% discount given by private
establishments, no constitutional infirmity obtains
because, being a valid exercise of police power,
payment of just compensation is not warranted. We
have carefully reviewed the basis of our ruling
in Carlos Superdrug Corporation and we find no cogent
reason to overturn, modify or abandon it. We also note
that petitioners’ arguments are a mere reiteration of
those raised and resolved in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation. Thus, we sustain Carlos Superdrug
Corporation.
Police Power; Eminent Domain; “Police Power” and
“Eminent Domain,” Distinguished. —Police power is
the inherent power of the State to regulate or to
restrain the use of liberty and property for public
welfare. The only limitation is that the restriction
imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive. In other
words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must
have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method
of accomplishing the goal. Under the police power of the
State, “property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government.” The State “may interfere
with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as]
the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary.”
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent
power of the State to take or appropriate private
property for public use. The Constitution, however,
requires that private property shall not be taken
without due process of law and the payment of just
compensation.
Same; In the exercise of police power, a property
right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is
merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote
public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable
taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not
required. —In the exercise of police power, a property
22
right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property
is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote
public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable
taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not
required. Examples of these regulations are property
condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious
purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be
demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be
destroyed in the interest of public morals) as well as
zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for
purposes injurious to the health, morals or safety of the
community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory into
residential and industrial areas). It has, thus, been
observed that, in the exercise of police power (as
distinguished from eminent domain), although the
regulation affects the right of ownership, none of the
bundle of rights which constitute ownership is
appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.
Eminent Domain; In the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, property interests are appropriated and
applied to some public purpose which necessitates the
payment of just compensation therefor. —In the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, property
interests are appropriated and applied to some public
purpose which necessitates the payment of just
compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and
possession of the property are transferred to the
expropriating authority. Examples include the
acquisition of lands for the construction of public
highways as well as agricultural lands acquired by the
government under the agrarian reform law for
redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries.
However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title
or total destruction of the property is not essential for
“taking” under the power of eminent domain to be
present. Examples of these include establishment of
easements such as where the land owner is perpetually
deprived of his proprietary rights because of the
hazards posed by electric transmission lines
constructed above his property or the compelled
interconnection of the telephone system between the
government and a private company. In these cases,
although the private property owner is not divested of
ownership or possession, payment of just compensation
is warranted because of the burden placed on the
property for the use or benefit of the public.
Police Power; It may not always be easy to determine
whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain.—It may not always be
easy to determine whether a challenged governmental
act is an exercise of police power or eminent domain.
The very nature of police power as elastic and
responsive to various social conditions as well as the
evolving meaning and scope of public use and just
compensation in eminent domain evinces that these
are not static concepts. Because of the exigencies of
rapidly changing times, Congress may be compelled to
adopt or experiment with different measures to
promote the general welfare which may not fall
squarely within the traditionally recognized categories
of police power and eminent domain. The judicious
approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects
of the challenged governmental act and decide, on the
basis thereof, whether the act is the exercise of police
power or eminent domain. Thus, we now look at the
nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if
it constitutes an exercise of police power or eminent
domain.
Senior Citizen Discount; The 20% discount is intended
to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their
age, are less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone
to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of
subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. —The 20%
discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior
citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully
employed, more prone to illnesses and other
disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing
basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also
that the discount serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent the productive years of their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the
nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of
honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law. As
to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a
regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services
relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens,
for which the Constitution affords preferential concern.
In turn, this affects the amount of profits or
income/gross sales that a private establishment can
derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject
regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the
profitability of a private establishment. However, it
does not purport to appropriate or burden specific
properties, used in the operation or conduct of the
business of private establishments, for the use or
benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter,
but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services
relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross
sales that such private establishments may derive
from, senior citizens.
Statutes; Because all laws enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality, courts will uphold a law’s validity if
any set of facts may be conceived to sustain it. —
Because all laws enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality, courts will uphold a law’s validity if
any set of facts may be conceived to sustain it. On its
face, we find that there are at least two conceivable
bases to sustain the subject regulation’s validity absent
clear and convincing proof that it is unreasonable,
23
oppressive or confiscatory. Congress may have
legitimately concluded that business establishments
have the capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or
income/gross sales due to the 20% discount without
substantially affecting the reasonable rate of return on
their investments considering (1) not all customers of a
business establishment are senior citizens and (2) the
level of its profit margins on goods and services offered
to the general public. Concurrently, Congress may
have, likewise, legitimately concluded that the
establishments, which will be required to extend the
20% discount, have the capacity to revise their pricing
strategy so that whatever reduction in profits or
income/gross sales that they may sustain because of
sales to senior citizens, can be recouped through higher
markups or from other products not subject of
discounts. As a result, the discounts resulting from
sales to senior citizens will not be confiscatory or
unduly oppressive.
A court, in resolving cases before it, may look into the
possible purposes or reasons that impelled the
enactment of a particular statute or legal provision. —
A court, in resolving cases before it, may look into the
possible purposes or reasons that impelled the
enactment of a particular statute or legal provision.
However, statements made relative thereto are not
always necessary in resolving the actual controversies
presented before it. This was the case in Central Luzon
Drug Corporation, 456 SCRA 414 (2005), resulting in
that unfortunate statement that the tax credit “can be
deemed” as just compensation. This, in turn, led to the
erroneous conclusion, by deductive reasoning, that the
20% discount is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain. The Dissent essentially adopts this theory and
reasoning which, as will be shown below, is contrary to
settled principles in police power and eminent domain
analysis.
Police Power; Indeed, there is a whole class of police
power measures which justify the destruction of private
property in order to preserve public
health, morals, safety or welfare. —The Dissent
discusses at length the doctrine on “taking” in police
power which occurs when private property is destroyed
or placed outside the commerce of man. Indeed, there
is a whole class of police power measures which justify
the destruction of private property in order to preserve
public health, morals, safety or welfare. As earlier
mentioned, these would include a building on the verge
of collapse or confiscated obscene materials as well as
those mentioned by the Dissent with regard to property
used in violating a criminal statute or one which
constitutes a nuisance. In such cases, no compensation
is required. However, it is equally true that there is
another class of police power measure which do not
involve the destruction of private property but merely
regulate its use. The minimum wage law, zoning
ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the
operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the
working hours to eight, and the like would fall under
this category. The examples cited by the Dissent,
likewise, fall under this category: Article 157 of the
Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18 of the Social Security
Law, and Section 7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These
laws merely regulate or, to use the term of the Dissent,
burden the conduct of the affairs of business
establishments. In such cases, payment of just
compensation is not required because they fall within
the sphere of permissible police power measures. The
senior citizen discount law falls under this latter
category.
It is a basic postulate of our democratic system of
government that the Constitution is a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign
powers to the State for the common good.—That there
may be a burden placed on business establishments or
the consuming public as a result of the operation of the
assailed law is not, by itself, a ground to declare it
unconstitutional for this goes into the wisdom and
expediency of the law. The cost of most, if not all,
regulatory measures of the government on business
establishments is ultimately passed on to the
consumers but that, by itself, does not justify the
wholesale nullification of these measures. It is a basic
postulate of our democratic system of government that
the Constitution is a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State
for the common good. All persons may be burdened by
regulatory measures intended for the common good or
to serve some important governmental interest, such
as protecting or improving the welfare of a special class
of people for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. Indubitably, the one assailing the
law has the heavy burden of proving that the regulation
is unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, or has gone
“too far” as to amount to a “taking.” Yet, here, the
Dissent would have this Court nullify the law without
any proof of such nature.
Senior Citizen Discount; Prior to the sale of goods or
services, a business establishment may be subject to
State regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen
discount, which may impact the level or amount of
profits or income/gross sales that can be generated by
such establishment.—Prior to the sale of goods or
services, a business establishment may be subject to
State regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen
discount, which may impact the level or amount of
profits or income/gross sales that can be generated by
such establishment. For this reason, the validity of the
discount is to be determined based on its overall effects
on the operations of the business establishment.
24
Eminent Domain; Taking; It should be noted though
that potential profits or income/gross sales are relevant
in police power and eminent domain analyses because
they may, in appropriate cases, serve as an indicia
when a regulation has gone “too far” as to amount to a
“taking” under the power of eminent domain.—It
should be noted though that potential profits or
income/gross sales are relevant in police power and
eminent domain analyses because they may, in
appropriate cases, serve as an indicia when a
regulation has gone “too far” as to amount to a “taking”
under the power of eminent domain. When the
deprivation or reduction of profits or income/gross sales
is shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory, then the challenged governmental
regulation may be nullified for being a “taking” under
the power of eminent domain. In such a case, it is not
profit or income/gross sales which are actually taken
and appropriated for public use. Rather, when the
regulation causes an establishment to incur losses in
an unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory manner,
what is actually taken is capital and the right of the
business establishment to a reasonable return on
investment. If the business losses are not halted
because of the continued operation of the regulation,
this eventually leads to the destruction of the business
and the total loss of the capital invested therein. But,
again, petitioners in this case failed to prove that the
subject regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory.
Police Power; Senior Citizen Discount; The State has, in
the past, regulated prices and profits of business
establishments. In other words, this type of regulatory
measures is traditionally recognized as police power
measures so that the senior citizen discount may be
considered as a police power measure as well. —The
State has, in the past, regulated prices and profits of
business establishments. In other words, this type of
regulatory measures is traditionally recognized as
police power measures so that the senior citizen
discount may be considered as a police power measure
as well. What is more, the substantial distinctions
between price and rate of return on investment control
laws vis-à-vis the senior citizen discount law
provide greater reason to uphold the validity of the
senior citizen discount law. As previously discussed,
the ability to adjust prices allows the establishment
subject to the senior citizen discount to prevent or
mitigate any reduction of profits or income/gross sales
arising from the giving of the discount. In contrast,
establishments subject to price and rate of return on
investment control laws cannot adjust prices
accordingly.
Constitutional Law; There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits Congress from regulating
the profits or income/gross sales of industries and
enterprises without franchises. On the contrary, the
social justice provisions of the Constitution enjoin the
State to regulate the “acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition” of property and its increments. —There is
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Congress
from regulating the profits or income/gross sales of
industries and enterprises without franchises. On the
contrary, the social justice provisions of the
Constitution enjoin the State to regulate the
“acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition” of
property and its increments. This may cover the
regulation of profits or income/gross sales of all
businesses, without qualification, to attain the
objective of diffusing wealth in order to protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity.
Thus, under the social justice policy of the
Constitution, business establishments may be
compelled to contribute to uplifting the plight of
vulnerable or marginalized groups in our society
provided that the regulation is not arbitrary,
oppressive or confiscatory, or is not in breach of some
specific constitutional limitation.
Statutes; A law, which has been in operation for many
years and promotes the welfare of a group accorded
special concern by the Constitution, cannot and should
not be summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that
it reduces the profits or income/gross sales of business
establishments.—We maintain that the correct rule in
determining whether the subject regulatory measure
has amounted to a “taking” under the power of eminent
domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National
Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172 (1968), and followed
in Carlos Superdrug Corporation, 526 SCRA 130
(2007),consistent with long standing principles in
police power and eminent domain analysis. Thus, the
deprivation or reduction of profits or income/gross sales
must be clearly shown to be unreasonable, oppressive
or confiscatory. Under the specific circumstances of
this case, such determination can only be made upon
the presentation of competent proof which petitioners
failed to do. A law, which has been in operation for
many years and promotes the welfare of a group
accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot
and should not be summarily invalidated on a mere
allegation that it reduces the profits or income/gross
sales of business establishments.311
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Police Power; Eminent Domain; View that when
police power is exercised, there is no just compensation
to the citizen who loses his private property. When
eminent domain is exercised, there must be just
compensation. —As regards Carlos Superdrug
Corporation, 526 SCRA 130 (2007), a second look at the
case shows that it barely distinguished between police
25
power and eminent domain. While it is true that police
power is similar to the power of eminent domain
because both have the general welfare of the people for
their object, we need to clarify the concept of taking in
eminent domain as against taking in police power to
prevent any claim of police power when the power
actually exercised is eminent domain. When police
power is exercised, there is no just compensation to the
citizen who loses his private property. When eminent
domain is exercised, there must be just compensation.
Thus, the Court must clarify taking in police power and
taking in eminent domain. Government officials cannot
just invoke police power when the act constitutes
eminent domain.
Same; Same; View that taking under the exercise
of police power does not require any compensation
because the property taken is either destroyed or placed
outside the commerce of man; In order to be valid, the
taking of private property by the government under
eminent domain has to be for public use and there must
be just compensation.—Clearly, taking under the
exercise of police power does not require any
compensation because the property taken is
either destroyed or placed outside the commerce
of man. On the other hand, the power of eminent
domain has been described as — x x x ‘the highest and
most exact idea of property remaining in the
government’ that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method in the nature of a forced
purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the state for public use
or to meet public exigency. It is said to be an essential
part of governance even in its most primitive form and
thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that “private property
should not be taken for public use without just
compensation.” This proscription is intended to provide
a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as
well the individual against whose property the power
is sought to be enforced. In order to be valid, the taking
of private property by the government under eminent
domain has to be for public use and there must be just
compensation.
Eminent Domain; View that the taking of property
under Section 4 of R.A. 7432 is an exercise of the power
of eminent domain and not an exercise of the police
power of the State. —In Section 4 of R.A. 7432, it is
undeniable that there is taking of property for public
use. Private property is anything that is subject to
private ownership. The property taken for public use
applies not only to land but also to other proprietary
property, including the mandatory discounts given to
senior citizens which form part of the gross sales of the
private establishments that are forced to give
them. The amount of mandatory discount is
money that belongs to the private establishment.
For sure, money or cash is private property
because it is something of value that is subject to
private ownership. The taking of property under
Section 4 of R.A. 7432 is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain and not an exercise of the police power
of the State. A clear and sharp distinction should
be made because private property owners will be
left at the mercy of government officials if these
officials are allowed to invoke police power when
what is actually exercised is the power of
eminent domain.
View that Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
speaks of private property without any distinction. It
does not state that there should be profit before the
taking of property is subject to just compensation. —
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution speaks of
private property without any distinction. It does not
state that there should be profit before the taking of
property is subject to just compensation. The private
property referred to for purposes of taking could be
inherited, donated, purchased, mortgaged, or as in this
case, part of the gross sales of private establishments.
They are all private property and any taking should be
attended by a corresponding payment of just
compensation. The 20% discount granted to senior
citizens belongs to private establishments, whether
these establishments make a profit or suffer a
loss. In fact, the 20% discount applies to non-profit
establishments like country, social, or golf clubs
which are open to the public and not only for exclusive
membership. The issue of profit or loss to the
establishments is immaterial. Just compensation is
“the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator.”
Senior Citizen Discount; View that in the case of the
senior citizen’s discount, the private establishment is
compensated only in the equivalent amount of 32% of
the mandatory discount. There are no services rendered
by the senior citizens, or any other form of
payment, that could make up for the 68% balance of the
mandatory discount. Clearly, the private
establishments cannot recover the full amount of the
discount they give and thus there is taking to the extent
of the amount that cannot be recovered. —Article 157 is
a burden imposed by the State on private employers to
complement a government program of promoting a
healthy workplace. The employer itself, however,
benefits fully from this burden because the health of its
workers while in the workplace is a legitimate concern
of the private employer. Moreover, the cost of
maintaining the clinic and staff is part of
the legislated wages for which the private employer
is fully compensated by the services of the
employees. In the case of the senior citizen’s discount,
26
the private establishment is compensated only in the
equivalent amount of 32% of the mandatory discount.
There are no services rendered by the senior citizens,
or any other form of payment, that could make up for
the 68% balance of the mandatory discount. Clearly,
the private establishments cannot recover the full
amount of the discount they give and thus there is
taking to the extent of the amount that cannot be
recovered.
View that the State cannot compel private
establishments without franchises to grant
discounts, or to operate at a loss, because that
constitutes taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.—The State cannot compel
private establishments without franchises to grant
discounts, or to operate at a loss, because that
constitutes taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. The State can take over
private property without compensation in times of war
or other national emergency under Section 23(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution but only for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as
Congress may provide. Under its police power, the
State may also temporarily limit or suspend business
activities. One example is the two-day liquor ban
during elections under Article 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code but this, again, is only for a limited
period. This is a valid exercise of police power of the
State.
Police Power; View that the State has the power to
regulate the conduct of the business of private
establishments as long as the regulation is
reasonable, but when the regulation amounts to
permanent taking of private property for public
use, there must be just compensation because the
regulation now reaches the level of eminent domain.—
Any form of permanent taking of private property is
an exercise of eminent domain that requires the State
to pay just compensation. The police power to
regulate business cannot negate another
provision of the Constitution like the eminent
domain clause, which requires just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private
property for public use. The State has the power
to regulate the conduct of the business of private
establishments as long as the regulation is
reasonable, but when the regulation amounts to
permanent taking of private property for public
use, there must be just compensation because the
regulation now reaches the level of eminent
domain.
Senior Citizen Discount; View that due to the patent
unconstitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 7432, as
amended by R.A. 9257,providing that private
establishments may claim the 20% discount to senior
citizens as tax deduction, the old law, or Section 4 of
R.A. 7432, which allows the 20% discount as tax
credit, is automatically reinstated.—Due to the patent
unconstitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 7432, as
amended by R.A. 9257, providing that private
establishments may claim the 20% discount to senior
citizens as tax deduction, the old law, or Section 4 of
R.A. 7432, which allows the 20% discount as tax credit,
is automatically reinstated. Where amendments to a
statute are declared unconstitutional, the original
statute as it existed before the amendment remains in
force. An amendatory law, if declared null and void, in
legal contemplation does not exist. The private
establishments should therefore be allowed to claim
the 20% discount granted to senior citizens as tax
credit.
VELASCO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Police Power; View that Sec. 4 of RA 9257 is no more
than a regulation of the right to profits of certain
taxpayers in order to benefit a significant sector of
society. It is, thus, a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. —Indeed, the practice of allowing taking of
private property without just compensation is an
abhorrent policy. However, I do not agree that such
policy underpins Sec. 4 of RA 9257. Rather, it is my
humble opinion that Sec. 4 of RA 9257 is no more than
a regulation of the right to profits of certain taxpayers
in order to benefit a significant sector of society. It is,
thus, a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Senior Citizen Discount; View that the right to profit, as
distinguished from profit itself, is not subject to
expropriation as it is of a mercurial character that
denies the possibility of taking for a public purpose.—
The right to profit, as distinguished from profit itself,
is not subject to expropriation as it is of a mercurial
character that denies the possibility of taking for a
public purpose. It is a right solely within the discretion
of the taxpayers that cannot be appropriated by the
government. The mandated 20% discount for the
benefit of senior citizens is not a property already
vested with the taxpayer before the sale of the product
or service. Such percentage of the sale price may
include both the markup on the cost of the good or
service and the income to be gained from the sale.
Without the sale and corresponding purchase by senior
citizens, there is no gain derived by the taxpayer. This
nebulous nature of the financial gain of the seller
deters the acquisition by the state of the “domain” or
ownership of the right to such financial gain through
expropriation. At best, the State is empowered
to regulate this right to the acquisition of this
financial gain to benefit senior citizens by ensuring
27
that the good or service be sold to them at a price 20%
less than the regular selling price.
View that the imposition of price control is recognized
as a valid exercise of police power that does not give
businessmen the right to be compensated for the amount
of what they could have earned considering the demand
of the market. The effect of RA 9257 is not dissimilar to
a price control law. —Time and again, this Court has
recognized the fundamental police power of the State
to regulate the exercise of various rights holding that
“equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.” This
Court has, for instance, recognized the power of the
State to regulate and temper the right of employers to
dismiss their employees. Similarly, we have sustained
the State’s power to regulate the right to acquire and
possess arms. Contractual rights are also subject to the
regulatory police power of the State. The right to profit
is not immune from this regulatory power of the State
intended to promote the common good and the
attainment of social justice. As early as the first half of
the past century, this Court has rejected the doctrine
of laissez faire as an axiom of economic theory and has
upheld the power of the State to regulate businesses
even to the extent of limiting their profit. Thus, the
imposition of price control is recognized as a valid
exercise of police power that does not give businessmen
the right to be compensated for the amount of what
they could have earned considering the demand of the
market. The effect of RA 9257 is not dissimilar to a
price control law.
View that RA 9257 has to be sure not obliterated the
right of taxpayers to profit nor divested them of profits
already earned; it simply regulated the right to the
attainment of these profits. The enforcement of the 20%
discount in favor of senior citizens does
not, therefore, partake the nature of “taking” in the
context of eminent domain. —The fact that the State
has not fixed an amount to be deducted from the selling
price of certain goods and services to senior citizens
indicates that RA 9257 is a regulatory law under the
police power of the State. It is an acknowledgment that
proprietors can and will factor in the potential
deduction of 20% of the price given to some of their
customers, i.e., the senior citizens, in the overall
pricing strategy of their products and services. RA 9257
has to be sure not obliterated the right of taxpayers to
profit nor divested them of profits already earned; it
simply regulated the right to the attainment of these
profits. The enforcement of the 20% discount in favor of
senior citizens does not, therefore, partake the nature
of “taking” in the context of eminent domain. As such,
proprietors like petitioners cannot insist that they are
entitled to a peso-for-peso compensation for complying
with the valid regulation embodied in RA 9257 that
restricts their right to profit.
View that as it is a regulatory law, not a law
implementing the power of eminent domain, the
assertion that the use of the 20% discount as a deduction
negates its role as a “just compensation” is mislaid and
irrelevant.—As it is a regulatory law, not a law
implementing the power of eminent domain, the
assertion that the use of the 20% discount as a
deduction negates its role as a “just compensation” is
mislaid and irrelevant. In the first place, as RA 9257 is
a regulatory law, the allowance to use the 20%
discount, as a deduction from the gross income for
purposes of computing the income tax payable to the
government, is not intended as compensation. Rather,
it is simply a recognition of the fact that no income was
realized by the taxpayer to the extent of the 20% of the
selling price by virtue of the discount given to senior
citizens. Be that as it may, the logical result is that no
tax on income can be imposed by the State. In other
words, by forcing some businesses to give a 20%
discount to senior citizens, the government is likewise
foregoing the taxes it could have otherwise earned from
the earnings pertinent to the 20% discount. This is the
real import of Sec. 4 of RA 9257. As RA 9257 does not
sanction any taking of private property, the regulatory
law does not require the payment of compensation.
BERSAMIN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Police Power; Senior Citizen Discount; View that the
imposition of the discount does not emanate from the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, but from the
exercise of police power.—The petitioners’ claim of
unconstitutionality of the tax deduction scheme under
the Expanded Senior Citizens Act rests on the premise
that the 20% senior citizen discount was enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain. Like the Majority, I cannot sustain the claim
of the petitioners, because I find that the imposition of
the discount does not emanate from the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, but from the exercise of
police power.
Eminent Domain; View that the State’s exercise of the
power of eminent domain is not without limitations, but
is constrained by Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, which requires that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation,as
well as by the Due Process Clause found in Section
1, Article III of the Constitution.—The State’s exercise
of the power of eminent domain is not without
limitations, but is constrained by Section 9, Article III
of the Constitution, which requires that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation, as well as by the Due Process Clause
28
found in Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
According to Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA
336 (1974), the requisites of taking in eminent domain
are as follows: first, the expropriator must enter a
private property; second, the entry into private
property must be for more than a momentary
period; third, the entry into the property should be
under warrant or color of legal authority; fourth, the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
and, fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
View that the essential component of the proper exercise
of the power of eminent domain is, therefore, the
existence of compensable taking. —The essential
component of the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain is, therefore, the existence
of compensable taking. There is taking when — [T]he
owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his
property; when there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of his property or
when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There
is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator enters
private property not only for a momentary period but
for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of
devoting the property to a public use in such a manner
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, “is nothing
without the inherent rights of possession, control and
enjoyment.” Where the owner is deprived of the
ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its
value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking
within the Constitutional sense.
Senior Citizen Discount; View that the nature and
effects of the 20% senior citizen discount do not meet all
the requisites of taking for purposes of exercising the
power of eminent domain as delineated in Republic v.
Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974), considering
that the second of the requisites,that the taking must be
for more than a momentary period, is not met.—The
nature and effects of the 20% senior citizen discount do
not meet all the requisites of taking for purposes of
exercising the power of eminent domain as delineated
in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974),
considering that the second of the requisites, that the
taking must be for more than a momentary period, is
not met. I base this conclusion on the universal
understanding of the term momentary, rendered
in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi thusly: “Momentary”
means, “lasting but a moment; of but a moment’s
duration” (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI,
page 596); “lasting a very short time; transitory; having
a very brief life; operative or recurring at every
moment” (Webster’s Third International Dictionary,
1963 edition.) The word “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of (real) property should be
construed to mean “a limited period” — not indefinite
or permanent.319
View that under the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the
20% senior citizen discount is a special privilege
granted only to senior citizens or the elderly, as defined
by law, when a sale is made or a service is rendered by
a covered establishment to a senior citizen or an
elderly.—In concept, discount is an abatement or
reduction made from the gross amount or value of
anything; a reduction from a price made to a specific
customer or class of customers. Under the Expanded
Senior Citizens Act, the 20% senior citizen discount is
a special privilege granted only to senior citizens or the
elderly, as defined by law, when a sale is made or a
service is rendered by a covered establishment to a
senior citizen or an elderly. The income or revenue
corresponding to the amount of the discount granted to
a senior citizen is thus unrealized only in the event that
a sale is made, or a service is rendered to a senior
citizen. Verily, the discount is not availed of when there
is no sale or service rendered to a senior citizen.
View that the amount corresponding to the
discount, instead of being converted to income of the
covered establishments, is retained by the senior citizen
to be used by him in order to promote his well-being, to
recognize his important role in society, and to maximize
his contribution to nation-building.—The 20% senior
citizen discount forbids a covered establishment from
selling certain goods or rendering services to senior
citizens in excess of 80% of the offered price, thereby
causing a diminution in the revenue or profits of the
covered establishment. The amount corresponding to
the discount, instead of being converted to income of
the covered establishments, is retained by the senior
citizen to be used by him in order to promote his well-
being, to recognize his important role in society, and to
maximize his contribution to nation-building. Although
a form of regulation of or limitation on property right
is thereby manifest, what the law clearly and primarily
intends is to grant benefits and special privileges to
senior citizens.
View that police power,insofar as it is being exercised by
the State, is depicted as a regulating, prohibiting, and
punishing power. It is neither benevolent nor generous.
Unlike traditional regulatory
legislations, however, the Expanded Senior Citizens
Act does not intend to prevent any evil or destroy
anything obnoxious. Even so, the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act remains a valid exercise of the State’s
police power. —Police power, insofar as it is being
exercised by the State, is depicted as a regulating,
prohibiting, and punishing power. It is neither
29
benevolent nor generous. Unlike traditional regulatory
legislations, however, the Expanded Senior Citizens
Act does not intend to prevent any evil or destroy
anything obnoxious. Even so, the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act remains a valid exercise of the State’s
police power. The ruling in Binay v. Domingo, 201
SCRA 508 (1991), which involves police power as
exercised by a local government unit pursuant to the
general welfare clause, proves instructive. Therein, the
erstwhile Municipality of Makati had passed a
resolution granting burial assistance of P500.00 to
qualified beneficiaries, to be taken out of the
unappropriated available existing funds from the
Municipal Treasury.
LEONEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion:
Police Power; Senior Citizen Discount; View that the
imposition of a discount for senior citizens affects the
price. It is thus an inherently regulatory function. —The
imposition of a discount for senior citizens affects the
price. It is thus an inherently regulatory function.
However, nothing in the law controls the prices of the
goods subject to such discount. Legislation interferes
with the autonomy of contractual arrangements in that
it imposes a two-tiered pricing system. There will be
two prices for every good or service: one is the regular
price for everyone except for senior citizens who get a
twenty percent (20%) discount. Businesses’ discretion
to fix the regular price or improve the costs of the goods
or the service that they offer to the public — and
therefore determine their profit — is not affected by the
law. Of course, rational businesses will take into
consideration economic factors such as price elasticity,
the market structure, the kind of competition
businesses face, the barriers to entry that will make
possible the expansion of suppliers should there be a
change in the prices and the profits that can be made
in that industry. Taxes, which include qualifications
such as exemptions, exclusions and deductions, will be
part of the cost of doing business for all such
businesses.
Constitutional Law; View that the Supreme Court does
not decide constitutional issues on the basis of inchoate
losses and uncertain burdens. —Losses, therefore, are
not guaranteed by the change in legislation challenged
in this Petition. Put simply, losses are not inevitable. On
this basis alone, the constitutional challenge should
fail. The case is premised on the inevitable loss to be
suffered by the petitioners. There is no factual basis for
that kind of certainty. We do not decide constitutional
issues on the basis of inchoate losses and uncertain
burdens. Furthermore, income and profits are not
vested rights. They are the results of good or bad
business judgments occasioned by the proper response
to their economic environment. Profits and the
maintenance of a steady stream of income should be the
reward of business acumen of entrepreneurship.
Courts read law and in doing so provide the givens in a
business environment. We should not allow ourselves
to become the tools for good business results for some
businesses.
Taxation; View that the power to tax also allows
Congress to determine matters as whether tax rates will
be applied to gross income or net income and whether
costs such as discounts may be allowed as a deduction
from gross income or a tax credit from net income after
tax. —The power to tax is “a principal attribute of
sovereignty.” Such inherent power of the State anchors
on its “social contract with its citizens [which] obliges
it to promote public interest and common good.” The
scope of the legislative power to tax necessarily
includes not only the power to determine the rate of tax
but the method of its collection as well. We have held
that Congress has the power to “define what tax shall
be imposed, why it should be imposed, how much tax
shall be imposed, against whom (or what) it shall be
imposed and where it shall be imposed.” In fact, the
State has the power “to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation x x x
[w]hether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind
of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be
raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption
of validity x x x.” This means that the power to tax also
allows Congress to determine matters as whether tax
rates will be applied to gross income or net income and
whether costs such as discounts may be allowed as a
deduction from gross income or a tax credit from net
income after tax.
View that while the power to tax has been considered the
strongest of all of government’s powers with taxes as the
“lifeblood of the government,” this power has its limits.
—While the power to tax has been considered the
strongest of all of government’s powers with taxes as
the “lifeblood of the government,” this power has its
limits. In a number of cases, we have referred to our
discussion in the 1988 case of Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Algue, 158 SCRA 9 (1988), as follows: Taxes
are the lifeblood of the government and so should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance. On the other
hand, such collection should be made in accordance
with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very
reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary
to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose
of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good,
may be achieved. x x x x It is said that taxes are what
we pay for civilized society. Without taxes, the
government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive
30
power to activate and operate it. Hence, despite the
natural reluctance to surrender part of one’s hard-
earned income to the taxing authorities, every person
who is able to must contribute his share in the running
of the government. The government, for its part, is
expected to respond in the form of tangible and
intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the
people and enhance their moral and material values.
This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation
and should dispel the erroneous notion that it is an
arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of
power. But even as we concede the inevitability and
indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all
democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not,
then the taxpayer has a right to complain and the
courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesome
power of the tax collector, he may still be stopped in his
tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here,
that the law has not been observed.
Constitutional Law; View that the Constitution
provides for limitations on the power of taxation.
First, the rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable; Second, taxes must neither be confiscatory
nor arbitrary as to amount to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. —The Constitution
provides for limitations on the power of taxation. First,
“[t]he rules of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.”
This requirement for uniformity and equality means
that “all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class [shall] be taxed at the same rate.” The tax
deduction scheme for the 20% discount applies equally
and uniformly to all the private establishments covered
by the law. Thus, it complies with this
limitation. Second, taxes must neither be confiscatory
nor arbitrary as to amount to a “[deprivation] of
property without due process of law.” In Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. v.
Executive Secretary Romulo, 614 SCRA 605 (2010),
petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the
Minimum Corporate Income Tax (MCIT) alleging
among others that “pegging the tax base of the MCIT
to a corporation’s gross income is tantamount to a
confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net
income, is not ‘realized gain.’”
View that while the main opinion held that the 20%
senior citizen discount is a valid exercise of police
power, it explained that this is due to the absence of any
clear showing that the discount is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory as to amount
to a taking under eminent domain requiring the
payment of just compensation.—The ponencia is,
however, open to the possibility that eminent domain
will apply. While the main opinion held that the 20%
senior citizen discount is a valid exercise of police
power, it explained that this is due to the absence of
any clear showing that the discount is unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory as to amount to a taking
under eminent domain requiring the payment of just
compensation. Alalayan v. National Power
Corporation, 24 SCRA 172 (1968), and Carlos
Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and
Development, 526 SCRA 130 (2007), were cited as
examples when there was failure to prove that the
limited rate of return for franchise holders, or the
required 20% senior citizens discount, “were arbitrary,
oppressive or confiscatory.” It found that petitioners
similarly did not establish the factual bases of their
claims and relied on hypothetical computations.
Eminent Domain; View that eminent domain has been
defined as “an inherent power of the State that enables
it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.”—
Eminent domain has been defined as “an inherent
power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire
private lands intended for public use upon payment of
just compensation to the owner.” Most if not all
jurisprudence on eminent domain involves real
property, specifically that of land. Although Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, the rules governing expropriation
proceedings, requires the complaint to “describe the
real or personal property sought to be expropriated,”
this refers to tangible personal property for which the
court will deliberate as to its value for purposes of just
compensation. In a sense, the forced nature of a sale
under eminent domain is more justified for real
property such as land. The common situation is that
the government needs a specific plot, for the
construction of a public highway for example, and the
private owner cannot move his land to avoid being part
of the project. On the other hand, most tangible
personal or movable property need not be subject of a
forced sale when the government can procure these
items in a public bidding with several able and willing
private sellers.
View that in Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de
Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974), the Supreme Court laid
down five (5) “circumstances that must be present in the
‘taking’ of property for purposes of eminent domain.”—
In Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi, 58
SCRA 336 (1974), this Court also laid down five (5)
“circumstances [that] must be present in the ‘taking’ of
property for purposes of eminent domain” as
follows: First, the expropriator must enter a private
property. x x x. Second, the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period. x
x x. Third, the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority. x x x. Fourth, the
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
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x x x. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. x x x.
The requirement for “entry” or the element of “oust[ing]
the owner” is not possible for intangible personal
property such as profits.
View that profits are considered as “future economic
benefits” which, at best,entitles petitioners only to an
inchoate right.This is not the private property referred
in the Constitution that can be taken and would require
the payment of just compensation.—Profits are not only
intangible personal property. They are also inchoate
rights. An inchoate right means that the right “has not
fully developed, matured, or vested.” It may or may not
ripen. The existence of profits, more so its specific
amount, is uncertain. Business decisions are made
every day dealing with factors such as price, quantity,
and cost in order to manage potential outcomes of profit
or loss at any given point. Profits are thus considered
as “future economic benefits” which, at best, entitles
petitioners only to an inchoate right. This is not the
private property referred in the Constitution that can
be taken and would require the payment of just
compensation. Just compensation has been defined “to
be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which
the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by
reason of the expropriation.”325
Police Power; Senior Citizen Discount; View that when
the 20% discount is given to customers who are senior
citizens, there is a perceived loss for the establishment
for that same amount at that precise moment.
However, this moment is fleeting, and the perceived loss
can easily be recouped by sales to ordinary citizens at
higher prices. —When the 20% discount is given to
customers who are senior citizens, there is
a perceived loss for the establishment for that same
amount at that precise moment. However, this moment
is fleeting, and the perceived loss can easily be
recouped by sales to ordinary citizens at higher prices.
The concern that more consumers will suffer as a result
of a price increase is a matter better addressed to the
wisdom of the Congress. As it stands, Republic Act No.
9257 does not establish a price control. For non-profit
establishments, they may cut down on costs and make
other business decisions to optimize performance.
Business decisions like these have been made even
before the 20% discount became law and will continue
to be made to adapt to the ever changing market. We
cannot consider this fluid concept of possible loss and
potential profit as private property belonging to private
establishments. They are inchoate. They may or may
not exist depending on many factors, some of which are
within the control of the private establishments. There
is nothing concrete, earmarked, actual or specific for
taking in this scenario. Necessarily, there is nothing to
compensate.
View that in the exercise of its police power and in
promoting senior citizens’ welfare, the government “can
impose upon private establishments the burden of
partly subsidizing a government program.”—Article
XIII was introduced in the 1987 Constitution to
specifically address Social Justice and Human Rights.
For this purpose, the state may regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
and its increments, viz.: Section 1. The Congress shall
give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
and its increments. Thus, in the exercise of its police
power and in promoting senior citizens’ welfare, the
government “can impose upon private establishments
[like petitioners] the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program.”
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY
OF MALAY, AKLAN
Remedial Law; Actions; Special Civil Actions;
Declaratory Relief; An action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder. —An action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of the rights arising
thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties
under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in
the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and
not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof, it may be entertained before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it
refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately available;
and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation
of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission
of wrongs.
Certiorari; Requisites for Certiorari to Prosper. —
For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must establish
the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: 1.
The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2. Such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
32
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 3. There
is no appeal or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
“Judicial Function” and “Quasi-Judicial Function,”
Distinguished.—To contrast, a party is said to be
exercising a judicial function where he has the power
to determine what the law is and what legal rights of
the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is “a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies x x x required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature.” In the case at bench, the assailed
EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayor’s finding
that Boracay West Cove’s construction, expansion, and
operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a
finding of illegality required the respondent mayor’s
exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the
special writ of certiorari may lie.
Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; It is inadequacy, not
the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari.—In a
litany of cases, We have held that it is inadequacy, not
the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the
danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy
is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not
mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of
appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside
for being patently void for failure of the trial court to
comply with the Rules of Court.
Civil Law; Nuisance; Words and Phrases; Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or
anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property.—Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines “nuisance” as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or
anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health
or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4)
obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property.
No Build Zones; In establishing a no build zone through
local legislation, the Local Government Unit (LGU)
effectively made a determination that constructions
therein, without first securing exemptions from the local
council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to
public safety.—In establishing a no build zone through
local legislation, the LGU effectively made a
determination that constructions therein, without first
securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as
nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. No
build zones are intended for the protection of the public
because the stability of the ground’s foundation is
adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The
ever-present threat of high rising storm surges also
justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the
shoreline. Indeed, the area’s exposure to potential geo-
hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the
residents of Malay, Aklan should be afforded.
Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and
nuisance per accidens.—As jurisprudence elucidates,
nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and
nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a
nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety,
and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under
the undefined law of necessity. The second is that
which depends upon certain conditions and
circumstances, and its existence being a question of
fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon
in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance.
No Build Zones; Had it not been constructed in the no
build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the
necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is
correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to the
Court’s mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.—In the
case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as
a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is
generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure,
which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or
surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular
incident –– its location –– and not its inherent qualities
that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it
not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay
West Cove could have secured the necessary permits
without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the
hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still
a nuisance per accidens.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
accidens, however, the Supreme Court (SC) still finds in
this case that the Local Government Unit (LGU) may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This
is because, in the exercise of police power and the
33
general welfare clause, property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government. —Despite the
hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, we still find in this case that the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This
is because, in the exercise of police power and the
general welfare clause, property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise
stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.
Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given
powers not only relative to its function as the executive
official of the town; it has also been endowed with
authority to hear issues involving property rights of
individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon.—One such piece of legislation is the
LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing
laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the
town; it has also been endowed with authority to hear
issues involving property rights of individuals and to
come out with an effective order or resolution thereon.
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal
of illegally constructed establishments for failing to
secure the necessary.
Petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary
permits, clearances, and exemptions before the
construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet
Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. —In the case at bar,
petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary
permits, clearances, and exemptions before the
construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet
Cove’s hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner
declared that the application for zoning compliance
was still pending with the office of the mayor even
though construction and operation were already
ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer
be denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131.
Mandamus; Instead of taking the law into his own
hands, petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent mayor
to exercise discretion and resolve the controversy
pending before his office.—Instead of taking the law
into his own hands, petitioner could have filed, as an
alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the
controversy pending before his office. There is indeed
an exception to the rule that matters involving
judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ
of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel
action in those matters, when refused. Whether or not
the decision would be for or against petitioner would be
for the respondent mayor to decide, for
while mandamus may be invoked to compel the
exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion
to be exercised in a particular way. What would have
been important was for the respondent mayor to
immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be able to
go through the motions that the zoning clearance
application process entailed.
Illegal Constructions; Under the law, insofar as illegal
constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing,
order their closure and demolition. —Petitioner opted
to defy the zoning administrator’s ruling. He
consciously chose to violate not only the Ordinance but
also Sec. 301 of PD 1096, laying down the requirement
of building permits, which provides: Section
301. Building Permits. —No person, firm or
corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of
the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair,
move, convert or demolish any building or structure or
cause the same to be without first obtaining a building
permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in
the place where the subject building is located, or the
building work is to be done. This twin violation of law
and ordinance warranted the LGU’s invocation of Sec.
444(b)(3)(vi) of the LGC, which power is separate and
distinct from the power to summarily abate
nuisances per se. Under the law, insofar as illegal
constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after
satisfying the requirement of due notice and hearing,
order their closure and demolition.
No Build Zones; The hotel’s incident that qualified it as
a nuisance per accidens — it’s being constructed within
the no build zone — further resulted in the non-issuance
of the necessary permits and clearances, which is a
ground for demolition under the Local Government
Code (LGC). Under the premises, a court order that is
required under normal circumstances is hereby
dispensed with. —Given the presence of the
requirements under Sec. 444 (b)(3)(vi) of the LGC,
whether the building constituted a nuisance per se or a
nuisance per accidensbecomes immaterial. The hotel
was demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but
because it failed to comply with the legal requirements
prior to construction. It just so happened that, in the
case at bar, the hotel’s incident that qualified it as a
nuisance per accidens –– its being constructed within
the no build zone –– further resulted in the non-
issuance of the necessary permits and clearances,
which is a ground for demolition under the LGC. Under
34
the premises, a court order that is required under then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause
normal circumstances is hereby dispensed with. of this debacle — compliance.

Forestlands; Forestlands, although under the

management of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), are not exempt from the
territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of
government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
—The rights granted to petitioner under the FLAgT
are not unbridled. Forestlands, although under the
management of the DENR, are not exempt from the
territorial application of municipal laws, for local
government units legitimately exercise their powers of
government over their defined territorial jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the conditions set forth in the FLAgT and
the limitations circumscribed in the ordinance are not
mutually exclusive and are, in fact, cumulative.

National Building Code; Petitioner has no valid reason

for its failure to secure a building permit pursuant to
Sec. 301 of the National Building Code (NBC).—Aside
from complying with the provisions in the FLAgT
granted by the DENR, it was incumbent on petitioner
to likewise comply with the no build zone restriction
under Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which was
already in force even before the FLAgT was entered
into. On this point, it is well to stress that Sections 6
and 8 of the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from
complying with the restrictions since these provisions
adverted to grant exemptions from the ban on
constructions on slopes and swamps, not on the no
build zone. Additionally, the FLAgT does not excuse
petitioner from complying with PD 1096. As correctly
pointed out by respondents, the agreement cannot and
will not amend or change the law because a legislative
act cannot be altered by mere contractual agreement.
Hence, petitioner has no valid reason for its failure to
secure a building permit pursuant to Sec. 301 of the
National Building Code.

Demolition; No Build Zones; Based on law and

jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments. —Based on law and jurisprudence, the
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order
the closing and demolition of establishments. This
power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, we
believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the
LGU under Sec. 17(b)(2)(ii), as above quoted, which is
subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the
building to be demolished is located within a forestland
under the administration of the DENR is of no moment,
for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an
issue on environmental protection, conservation of
natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological
balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure.
Rather than treating this as an environmental issue
35