Alavado, City of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230

Public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children born unto them after the celebration of the
questioned marriage, and a statement of such marriage in subsequent document were held to be competent evidence as proof of said
marriage . A review of the records of this case failed to disclose any evidence whatsoever which will overthrow the aforementioned
presumption in favor of claimant's marriage to the deceased Alavado

Arroyo v. CA, 203 SCRA 753

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the
offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our
law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a
matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of
marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most
fundamental kind.

Gayon v. Gayon, SCRA 104

Inasmuch as a sister-in-law, nephew or niece is not included in the enumeration contained in Article 217,Civil Code, which should be
construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and
plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

Wainwright v. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78

Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future support is prescribed, then the
conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the
present suit. It need not be alleged in the complaint.

Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
No motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court and neither was
such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.Therefore the rule on deemed waiver of the
non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent.

Salazar v. Felias & Other Heirs of Nivera

The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for being the family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's
hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and proven.

Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the
land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties.[34] It cannot be seized by creditors except
in certain special cases

However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the
court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely
allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption
must be set up and proved.

In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by the
owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely
possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.

it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence
proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed
(i) duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by
the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual
value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural areas.

Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home.

Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated December 23, 2013, and her Petition for Annulment of Judgment
dated June 22, 2006, that she is, and has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.[41] Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas'
petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija... the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC Branch 55 in the case for
recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the 1950s.

This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her family home.

Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot defeat the
binding nature of a final and executory judgment. Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch 55 must perforce be
given effect.

Modequilio v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766

It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

Siari Valley v. Lucasan, 109 Phil 294

The reason why a family home constituted after a debt had been incurred is not exempt from execution is to protect the creditor against a
debtor who may act in bad faith by resorting to such declaration just to defeat the claim against him. If the purpose is to protect the creditor
from fraud it would be immaterial if the debt incurred be undisputed or inchoate, for a debtor acting in good faith would prefer to wait until
his case is definitely decided before constituting the family home. Indeed, it may result, as in this case, that the Supreme Court may affirm the
judgment of the lower court. If the contention of respondent be sustained a debtor may be allowed to circumvent this provision of the law to
the prejudice of the creditor. This the Court cannot countenance. Hence, we are persuaded to conclude that the money judgment in question
comes within the purview of the word debt used in Article 243 (2) of the new Civil Code.
Spouses De Mesa v. Acero, Jr. G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal
right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume
or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97

Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place especially if the
testimony is uncorroborated. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife are presumed married.

De la Purrta v. CA, 161 SCRA 661

As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down
the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel,
like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity. The same must be said of Exhibits A, A-1, B and B-
1,which are pictures of Jewel and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove
paternity, and much less would it prove violation of complainant’s person and honor

Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282

If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or
be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice
of the child in the community.

Naldoza, Republic, 112 SCRA 658

Mother’s desire to change her children’s surname should not be the sole consideration for the change.—To allow them, at their mother’s behest,
to bear only their mother’s surname (which they are entitled to use together with their father’s surname) and to discard altogether their
father’s surname, thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily,
the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother’s desire should not be the sole consideration. he reasons adduced for eliminating
the father’s surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the
minors’ parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That
would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records; Minors entitled to know their parentage; Minor when he
fully appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself and wants to use his mother’s surname only is qualified to apply
for change of surname.

Mangulabnan v. IAC, 185 SCRA 760

An illegitimate child like the minor Alfie in this case whose father, the private respondent herein, is married and had no legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is
not required before support may be granted. There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is derived
and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by affidavits.
Osmena de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222
Plaintiffs may use the surname of their father as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that they are legitimate children; but we cannot
agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more, grants monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over the
surname of their father. In other words, said article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it cannot be
interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were correct,
they can stop countless inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."

In Re Petition for Cancellation… of Tinitigan

The Court held that since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in
June 2008 and August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname
of their mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname
should have been “Barcelote” and not “Tinitigan.”

The Court did not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates were the express recognition of the children’s filiation by Tinitigan,
because they were not duly registered in accordance with law i.e. the subject birth certificates of the illegitimate children were not signed by
their mother.

Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, 16 states:

Section 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. -The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof,
the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall
be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician,
or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child. (first paragraph)

xxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother
if the father refuses. (fourth paragraph)

The first paragraph of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 assumes that the newborn child is legitimate since our law accords a strong presumption in
favor of legitimacy of children. On the other hand, the fourth paragraph of Section 5 specifically provides that in case of an illegitimate child,
the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. The fourth
paragraph of Section 5 specifically applies to an illegitimate child and likewise underscores its mandatory character with the use of the word
“shall.”

Mother must sign the birth certificate of her illegitimate child; otherwise, the same is void

Thus, it is mandatory that the mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the
father recognizes the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the
child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus, this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents. The
mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody
of the illegitimate child.

Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the mother did not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no authority
to register the subject birth certificates.

Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent with the provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of
illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it
should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.

Accordingly, the Court declared the subject birth certificates void and order their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory
provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother’s surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the signature
of the mother in her children’s birth certificates.

Andal v. Macaraig, 69 Phil 165

Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up
from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse,yet that is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnalintercourse. There
are cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to
sexual intercourse.

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73

During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no concrete or substantial proof that was presented to
establish physical impossibility of access between Elizabeth and Crispin.Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province,
therefore there is still the possibility of access to one another.

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless
physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption has not been overcome by adequate and
convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.

Jao v. CA, 152 SCRA 359

Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that the man is not the father of the child but not necessarily that a man is the father of a
particular child. Blood tests are conclusive as to non-paternity and inconclusive to paternity.

Amurao v. CA, 168 734

Whether or not the petitioner made an admission of paternity under the terms of the trial court's order dated September 26, 1977, thereby
binding himself to give support to his child, the private respondent herein, is a finding of fact which this Court may not review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
Chua Keng Giap v. PAC, 18 SCRA 18
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say — as
indeed she has said these many years--that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.

Lim v. IAC, 166 SCRA 451

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim
their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a
child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563, March 7, 2002

The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then
the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour.

Gotardo v. Buling
there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance... between the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima facie case exists
if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of
evidence shifts to... the putative father.[36] We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual... relations
with other men at the time of conception.

In this case,... the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had
been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo... corroborated her testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.

On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date
than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in

September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and
insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The... petitioner's denial
cannot overcome the respondent's clear and categorical assertions.

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical... attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final
judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the... resources or means of the giver and the necessities
of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and
the resources or means of the person obliged to... support.

Perla v. Baring
Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for
support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal
certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. A certificate of
live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity.
Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Heirs Roldan v. Heirs Roldan
The parties concede that there is no record of Leopolda's birth in either the National Statistics Office or in the Office of the Municipal Registrar
of Kalibo, Aklan. The RTC and the CA then referred to other means to prove the status of Leopoldo: his Certificate of Baptism and his Marriage
Contract. Since both documents indicate Natalia as the mother of Leopoldo, the courts a quo concluded that respondent heirs of Leopoldo
had sufficiently proven the filiation of their ancestor to the original owner of Lot No. 4696. For this reason, the RTC and the CA maintained
that the heirs of Leopoldo are entitled to an equal share of the property, together with the heirs of Gilberto and heirs of Silvela.

We disagree.

Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, which referred to our
earlier rulings in Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System and Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that because
the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, that document has scant evidentiary value. The canonical
certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the priest may certify, i.e., the administration of the sacrament. In other words, a baptismal
certificate is "no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which
require separate and concrete evidence."

In cases that followed Fernandez, we reiterated that a baptismal certificate is insufficient to prove filiation. But in Makati Shangri-La Hotel
and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, this Court clarified that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove kinship "if considered alongside other
evidence of filiation." Therefore, to resolve one's lineage, courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a canonical
record. By way of example, we have considered the combination of testimonial evidence, family pictures, as well as family books or charts,
alongside the baptismal certificates of the claimants, in proving kinship.

In this case, the courts below did not appreciate any other material proof related to the baptismal certificate of Leopoldo that would establish
his filiation with Natalia, whether as a legitimate or as an illegitimate son.

The only other document considered by the RTC and the CA was the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate, his
Marriage Contract also lacks probative value as the latter was prepared without the participation of Natalia. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, we
held that even if the marriage contract therein stated that the alleged father of the bride was the bride's father, that document could not be
taken as evidence of filiation, because it was not signed by the alleged father of the bride.

The instant case is similar to an issue raised in Paa v. Chan.30 The claimant in that case relied upon baptismal and marriage certificates to
argue filiation. The Court said:

As regards the baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio Chan, the same are not competent evidence to prove that he was the
illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a Chinese father. While these certificates may be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified - which in this case were the baptism and
marriage, respectively, of Leoncio Chan - but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk and/or citizenship.

All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which merely stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate to
prove his filiation with the property owner. Moreover, by virtue of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA could not have justly concluded
that Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were entitled to a one-third share of the property left by Natalia, equal to that of each of her
undisputed legitimate children Gilberto and Silvela. As held in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, a baptismal certificate is certainly not
proof of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA erred in presuming the hereditary rights of Leopoldo to be
equal to those of the legitimate heirs of Natalia.

Reyes v. CA, 135 SCRA 439

The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses,
otherwise she may be penalized; and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor
or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child. Since any of the certificates of birth presented were not signed by Francisco
Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in
a public instrument.

Castro v. CA, 173 SCRA 658

Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be signed by the father and mother. It was
Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have
known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved
for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during
the reglementary period to do so.r jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise she may be penalized.

Mendoza v. IAC, 152 SCRA 445

Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in some other public document. In the case at bar, the only document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was
recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu
City, stating therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya.10 However, Philippine jurisprudence is consistent
and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.

Ramos v. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284

It is true that the acknowledgment of the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a record of birth, will or other public document (Art. 131, Old Civil
Code). But the record of Civil Case No. 217, which is relied upon by the defendants to support their defense of res judicata, indubitably shows
that the plaintiffs were treated as acknowledged natural children of Martin Ramos. The reasonable inference is that they were in the
continuous possession of the status of natural children of Martin Ramos, as evidenced by his direct acts and the acts of his family. Even the
lower court, after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the intestate proceeding as acknowledged natural children, had no choice but to reaffirm
that same holding in its 1961 decision in this case.
Lim v. CA, 65 SCRA 160
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of
1889. Such contract is not a written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and
certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting
parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites
of a public document of recognition. Be it remembered that recognition, under the Civil Code of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn."

Ranas v. Ranas, 64 SCRA 260

Mendoza v. CA, . September. 24. 1991

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through
others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and
care.
The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the
respondent court observed, that this could have been because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take
his illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente
Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the
latter. We also note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of one's status. No less
significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been
sufficiently established. The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and intermittent.

Vda de Alberto v. CA, 173 SCRA 436

A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.

Baluyot v. Baluyot, 166 SCRA 606

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased during his lifetime as his
spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth, although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no
authentic writing presented nor any statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners were recognized by the deceased.

Paterno v. Paterno, 186 SCRA 630

True, certain inconsistencies may be noted in the testimony given by the witnesses for the private respondents, but it is on the whole
unanimous and consistent as to the really crucial fact that Dr. Paterno treated and acted towards said respondents, from their birth onward,
in a manner only a real father would and leaving little doubt that he recognized and considered them as in truth his children. The simple
denials of the widow, petitioner Jacoba T. Paterno, do not suffice to refute such proof.
Ara & Garcia v. Pizarro & Rossi
While the private respondent has admitted that he has none... of the... documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically
the... same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the

"private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself), he... insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous
possession... of the status of an illegitimate child," which is now also admissible... as evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967... until

1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been... using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and
the... petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of... attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another
one by

Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the copra... business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he...
was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons

Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum... to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
petitioners he... was given a share in his deceased father's estate.

It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also... allowed... to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the

Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a... judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,...
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the... testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule

130 of the Rules of Court.

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that,... since... he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article

172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged... father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175
reads... as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period... specified in

Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of

Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the... lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be... allowed... at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous... possession
of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged... filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or... special laws.
The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already... dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged son's... illegitimate
filiation.

Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that... petitioner Garcia's Certificate of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a... late
registration of his birth is a record of birth appearing in the... civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.

True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence... of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a... birth certificate, a high
degree of proof is needed.[55]

However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent... us from according it the same weight as any other birth
certificate.

There is a reason why birth certificates are... accorded such... high evidentiary value.

urther, the birth must be registered within 30 days from... the time of birth.

The immediacy of the... reporting, combined with the participation of disinterested attendants... at birth, or of both parents, tend to ensure
that the report is a... factual reporting of birth. In other words, the circumstances in which... registration is made obviate the possibility that
registration is caused... by ulterior motives. The law provides in the case of illegitimate... children that the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly... by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father... refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named
as... parents.

National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93 also... contemplates that reports of birth may be made beyond the 30-day period:

A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the... putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation.

Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration... of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth... certificates.

Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a... final judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a...
putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public document... or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent...
concerned.[64]

However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of... filiation.

The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with

Josefa and petitioners' relatives, and testimonies do not show that

Josefa is their mother. They do not contain any acts, declarations, or... omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones pertaining to...
her filiation with petitioners.
Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal

Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of Live Birth... obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they... do not
show any act, declaration, or omission on the part of Josefa.

Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The same may be said... of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may have been in the...
photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition,... none of the evidence presented constitutes an admission of filiation...
under Article 172 of the Family Code.

Gapusan v. CA, 185 SCRA 160

Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form
prescribed by the Civil Code. It provides that a voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing." Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows
that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at any time before her
mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement
of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and
therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition, after having
reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that
she was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter.

People v. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811

It is, of course, also true that the record does not show the identity and personal circumstances of the child born out of the rape of Filomena.
Even so, the Court correctly sentenced the accused "to acknowledge and support her off-spring" considering the provisions of Article 345 of
the Revised Penal Code:

Article 345. Civil Liability of Persons Guilty of Crimes against Chastity. — Persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction shall also be
sentenced:

(2) to acknowledge the off-spring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing;
(3) in every case to support the off-spring.

and Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Article 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;

People v. Rizo, 189 SCRA 265

We note, however, that the trial court has ordered the defendant-appellant to recognize the offspring John Paul Valencia as his legitimate son
despite the fact that said accused is a married man. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That portion of the judgment appealed from,
ordering the accused to recognize the child John Paul Valencia as his legitimate son, should, therefore, be eliminated.

Demsey v. RTC, 164 SCRA 364

As part of the civil liability in its judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize Christina Marie as his natural child. This should
not have been done. The recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal
prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition was not specifically and fully heard and tried,
the trial court committed reversible error when it ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case.

Mendoza v. CA, supra.

People v. Barranco, 177 SCRA 103 (Filipino language was used in original)

Subalit mayroong pagkakamali ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito na kilalanin ng nahahabla bilang anak ang bunga ng
kanyang kasalanan. Ang nahahabla ay may-asawa. Hindi maaari na kilalanin ang batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng isang may-
asawa. Subalit may katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata ayon sa batas.

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250

Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.
The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 99, March 15, 1996

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In
that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the
civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the
petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void
for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

Republic v. CA & Bobiles, January. 24, 1992

Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations
and subsequent confirmatory testimony
in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of
rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of
the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must
meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Santos v. Aransanzo, 16 SCRA 344

Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent by the
guardian ad litem suffices.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge, 159 SCRA 369

Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground
for disqualification to adopt.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having
one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency,
however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life,
and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.

Nieto v. Magat, 136 SCRA 533

The fact that the petitioners reside temporarily in Guam does not disqualify them from adopting the minor child? A reading of Articles 27
and 28 of P.D. No. 603 gives a negative answer.

Duncan v. CFI, 69 SCRA 298

The parental consent required by law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their child. Thus, where the natural
and unwed mother turned over her three-day old child to another person and from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in
court, she is considered to have abandoned her child and her consent to the adoption is no longer necessary.

Cang v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, September 25, 1998

From the provisions of teh law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane
or hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent of the parents or one of the
parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.

Bobanovic v. Moniks, 142 SCRA 485

The Ministry of Social Services and Development did not appeal the order granting the adoption. Moreover, in all its pleadings, the MSSD has
not once insinuated that the Social Worker’s report was in any way erroneous, incorrect or faulty. Respondent seems only to stubbornly
insist and maintain that the prerogative to make a case study pertains exclusively to the MSSD. Neither has it shown any specific fact or
circumstance warranting the denial of the travel clearance. Absent any proof that prejudice would be caused to the Adam Christopher if he
joins his adoptive parents, the MSSD should be faulted for declining to issue the travel clearance.

Pardo de Tavera v. Cacdac, 167 SCRA 686

It may be that respondent Trial Court had not complied strictly with the provisions of P.D. No. 603 on adoption. As it had reasoned out,
however, it was satisfied with the Case Study Report submitted by the Court Social Worker. Prior to Executive Order No. 91, amending the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, the MSSD did not have the exclusive authority to make a case study in adoption cases. The Court evaluated the
Report of its social Worker and found that it was based on "very honest insight and opinion based on personal interviews and home study
painstakingly made ..." The objections which the MSSD have (sic) against the petitioners Gordon are all reflected in "... the case study report
and such have been passed upon by the Court in its decision granting the adoption" (P. 30, Rollo). The MSSD did not allege that the Social
Worker Report was faulty or incorrect. It thus appears that the objective of trial custody had been substantially achieved, which is, "to assess
the adjustment and emotional readiness of the adopting parents for the legal union"

In re Adoption of Edwin Villa, 21 SCRA 399

The fact alone that petitioner wife and minor are siblings should not prevent the adoption.There is no express provision in law that disallows
relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one another.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, supra

In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child; Provision that
no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.—In all
cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall
be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this
criterion.

In Re: Habeas Corpus of Angelie Cervantes, 1169 SCRA 579

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.
The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound together
to support each other. In this issue, the husband’s duty is to pay for the medical services rendered to his wife, not the father nor the mother
in law.
Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110
HUSBAND AND WlFE; ALLOWANCE FOR SUPPORT;RlGHT OF HUSBAND TO ESTABLISH ADULTERY AS DEFENSE AGAINST AN ACTION FOR
SUPPORT "PENDENTE LITE".—The Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of
determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an
action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous
relations, for in that case, it would not be the' child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this defense
should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully
into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertian the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable
it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803

Adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support.The alleged adultery must be established by competent evidence. .However, it is
doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente lite – she is asking for support to be taken from their conjugal property,
not Manuel’s personal funds.

Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause
for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of the
petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one
who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give
support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under
Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite. What has been said above, of course, is not meant
to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the
Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the subject of
support pendente lite.

Abella v. Cabanero
Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further, that, the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a
natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered
in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular
case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and
prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly,
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that
generally applicable in other cases . . .

The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior
decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to
compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs . . .; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother ... In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance
are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the
same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will
only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of
filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.

Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for her child. An
action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought before a court with the
proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not run afoul of any
rule. To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v. Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of action. This also serves
the interest of judicial economy—avoiding multiplicity of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted pleading
of their cause.

Thus, it was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible to entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without
her and petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the
minutiae of petitioner's claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of judicial proceedings have been taxing enough for a mother and her
daughter whose claim for support amounts to a modest P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner initiated her action, her daughter was a
toddler; she is, by now, well into her adolescence. The primordial interest of justice and the basic dictum that procedural rules are to be
"liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding"
impel us to grant the present Petition.

Meglar v. People
The deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against women and children. In this case, the courts
a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA
had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide
BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a
third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB.
Canonizado v. 127SCRA 610
With regard to the issue of payment of current support, Article 303 of the New Civil Code provides that the obligation to give support shall
also cease "when the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a
way that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence;" When any of the above circumstances occurs, the support stops since the
recipient no longer needs it for subsistence. It does not mean, however, that the obligation to give or the right to ask for support also ceases
permanently because the lack of a need for it may only be temporary. In other words, the above circumstances do not affect the right to
support between spouses but only the action to make it demandable, such right being born from the law and created as such by the marriage
tie. It subsists throughout the period that the marriage subsists.

A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to increase or decrease but its demandability may
also be suspended or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist.

Hontiveros v. IAC, 132 SCRA 745

While the petitioner would have US believe in his reply that the private respondent is unfit to take care of his child, it is too late in the day to
do so because under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Tribunal What the petitioner should have done
is to bring out the questions of fact in Special Proceedings Nos. 9788. It is just too bad that the case for custody was dismissed for lack of
interest on the part of the petitioner.Clearly, the private respondent has a clear legal right under Article 17 of P.D. 603 to the custody of her
minor child, there being no compelling reason to the contrary.

Unson v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183

Criterion in awarding custody of a minor child to one of the parents. — It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in all controversies regarding
the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that
criterion.

Custody of minor child not awarded to the wife who has immoral influence over the child; Reasons.—With this premise in view, the Court
finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to
say immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral and
social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been
tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own
correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her
sister’s mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father, properly concerned
with the moral well being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than petitioner’s in this case. Under the
circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds no alternative than to grant private
respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child in question.

Decisions of Supreme Court on custody of minor children always open to adjustment as circumstances demand.—Anyway, decisions even of
this Supreme Court on the custody of minor children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand
in the light of the inflexible criterion We have mentioned above. We deem it a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge to
have acted precipitably in issuing his order of December 28, 1979 here in question.

Exconde v. Capuno, 101 PHIL. 843

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means”, while, on the other hand, gives them the “right to correct and punish them in moderation”. The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage which Delfin failed to prove.

Palisoc v. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548

The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their
duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether
at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher or
in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.

Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA, 315

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when
the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that
he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because
none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

Salvosa v. IAC, 166 SCRA 274

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability is that so long as
the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the students) remain
in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.” Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at
attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, 376 SCRA 473, February 6, 2002

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva
was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may
not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 602
After Petitioner gave birth to a child, she left said child to the care of the doctor that helped Petitioner to give birth. Petitioner never visited
the said child, nor gave any money for support. After instituting an action claiming custody of the said child, the court held in favor of the
respondent who took care of said child since birth. Supreme Court stated: “While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of
her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the
latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may
be ordered separated from the mother.”

Luna v. IAC, 167 SCRA 7

In child custody cases, execution of final judgment of appellate courts awarding custody to child’s biological parents may be stayed where
during hearings on execution the child manifests that she will kill herself and escape if given to custody of her biological parents. This means
that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children.Since, in this
case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake.

Lindain v. CA,. 212 SCRA 725

Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his minor children does not have the power to dispose
of or alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of
the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and management. Hence, the power to
sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in
good faith as they knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial approval. Further, the minors' action for
reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

Chua v. Carandang, 27 SCRA 791

She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years,
before she brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were
powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any extent to be
reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner — once informed, as she alleged, and her child was in the custody of the
Cabangbangs — should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she
lifted not a finger.. Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over their children.