Sociological Analysis I985, 46, 4:367-376

Legitimation Power And Religion

In Modern Society
Nikos Kokosalakis
University of Liverpool

This paper suggests that a focus on the relation between religion, power and legitimation in mod-
ern society may provide fruitful theoretical directions for the sociology of religion and mitigate
against the epistemological problems which the discipline has inherited from traditional sociological
perspectives. Such an approach raises the question of the relationship of religion and politics in the
context of the modern nation state and involves an examination o[ the nature of the cultural and
moral framework within which power structures and power relations operate in modero society.

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The almost universal separation of church and state in western societies does not necessarily imply
a corresponding separation between religious culture and politics. There is now sufficient evidence
to suggest that the sociology of religion cannot continue to treat processes of legitimation and the
secularization of political power in modero society as unproblematic issues.

Introduction
Uneasiness about the status and the theoretical foundations of the sociology of reli-
gion has been growing amongst its practioners for sometime. Recently Richard Fenn
(1982), in considering the state of the art, has suggested that the problem has now
reached the level of epistemological crisis. Although I share his views I believe that the
problem may lie even deeper than he suggests and has in fact to be located in the epis-
temological foundations of the classical sociological perspectives from within which the
sociologists of religion operate. However, my intention here is not to engage in discus-
sion concerning fundamental epistemological issues. Rather, I wish to suggest that a
focus on the relationship between legitimation, power and religion I in modern society
may lead to fruitful theoretical directions. I am aware that the subject is exceptionally
broad and complex but the historical relationship between religion and power and
developments in this area, in various parts of the world over the last twenty years, sug-
gest that it cannot be a peripheral issue for the sociology of religion.
It is now a truism to say that in modern society, by and large, the legitimation of polit-
ical power is no longer linked to traditional theologies and explicit religious symbolism
as was clearly the case up to the 19th century. Yet, for the purpose of assessing the theo-
retical connection between religion and power in modern society, starting from the sep-
aration of religion and politics is misleading. Indeed, such separation implies that con-
temporary power struggles and power relations generally operate outside any religio-
ideological and ethical context. Moreover assessing the question of legitimation and the
function of religion in modern society from the standpoint of social and functional dif-
ferentiation, as N. Luhmann (1969, 1977) does for instance, is bound to attenuate the

1I define religion with D. Martin (1978:12) as: "an acceptance of a tevel of reality beyond the observable
world known to science, to which are ascribed meanings and purposes completing and transcending those
of the purely human realm."

367
368 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

link between religion and political institutions. Similarly, sociologists of religion who
follow Weber and view the operations of the modern state and power relations generally
in the context of bureaucratic zweckrational type of action also preclude any connection
between religion and power. Because of such theoretical positions, debates on legitima-
tion and on secularization seem to treat the nature of state ideology and political moral-
ity as rather unproblematic issues and certainly irrelevant to the sociology of religion.
Yet if we view religion and its relation to power within the wider perspective of the rela-
tion of culture and polity, as Geertz (1975, 1977) for instance does, then power must
always be legitimized within a symbolic cultural and value laden frame of reference. It
is this latter theoretical perspective which I propose to adopt during the discussion.
In social theory generally, power has rarely been accorded the centrality it deserves
in our search for understanding the dynamics of social formations and transformations.
In both functionalism and Marxism, power is treated asa secondary concept as it is the

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economy which, "in the last analysis," determines the polity. Weber's theory of domina-
tion in modern society on the other hand, which treats power a s a central issue, is
derived from his view of bureaucracy and is, as Momsen (1974) suggests, rather one-
dimensional. Giddens (1981:49), thus, remarks critically that there is a prevalent ten-
dency in all schools of sociological thought "to reduce power to a secondary characteris-
tic of social life." My own view is that power should be a central if not the central con-
cept in sociology and the analysis of power relations and power structures in society one
of the main preoccupations of its practitioners. Theoretically and epistemologically such
an approach, without substituting power determinism for economic, cultural or func-
tional determinism, could lead to fruitful directions in sociology generaUy and the soci-
ology of religion in particular. It is from the perspective that this paper attempts to raise
the question of the relation of legitimation, power and religion in modern society. The
possible connections of religious culture to the values of civil society and to the develop-
ment of the nation state and nationalism clearly demand that the assumed total and
final separation between religion and politics in modern society be re-examined. For
there is plenty of evidence to show that national societies become related to religious
cultures and traditions as the economic and power structure of these societies become
interdependent at a global level.

Some General Remarks Concerning the Relation of Religion and Power

It should be stated very emphatically that the sociology of religion never really carne
to grips with the full theoretical significance of the dialectical relationship between
power, authority and religion. The dynamic relationship between religion and politics
has in fact been obscured by the classical theories and the typologies of church, sect,
cult etc., first drawn by Troeltsch, and then adopted by the mainstream sociology of
religion.
Despite Weber's immense historical scholarship, the sociology of religion, which has
built on his ideas, has not been comparative enough either transhistorically or transcul-
turally. Also, major religious movements such as the rise of Christianity and the Refor-
mation have not been analysed sufficiently, even by Weber himself, in a power political
context. Historians (M. Finley ed. 1974:210-287) point out, for Ÿ that the inter-
mittent waves of the persecutions of Christians by the Roman authorities gathered
 LEGITIMATION POWER AND RELIGIONIN MODERN SOClETY 369

momentum proportionately to the degree that the new cult posed a challenge to the
legitimacy of the Roman Empire. Thus the major charge against the Christians through-
out the persecutions was that of being "godless," and irreverent and defiant of the sacral-
ity and authority of the Emperor. Indeed, the whole process of the growth of early
Christianity from a small millenarian movement to a universal church by the 4th cen-
tury is incomprehensible outside the dialectic of religion and power. Also the differen-
tial pattern of the rise and spread of the Reformation in the various parts of Europe is
closely related to the attitudes and allegiance of local princes and local lords to Papal
authority and power. Similarly the idea of the "millennium" which has been errupting
periodically throughout history is the metaphor par-excellence which embodies the dia-
lectic of religion and power. In Islam, of course, where there is no institutionalized
church, the religious and political spheres are hardly separable.

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In modern society the separation of religion and politics and the consequent separa-
tion of Church and State has led to the assumption that, although legitimation and
power are closely related, religion has little or nothing to do with either. Yet, it can be
argued, that the total separation of the religious and the political spheres is neither final
nor irreversible and contemporary developments seem to justify that view. The relation
of religion and political ideology not only in the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Latin
America and in the Islamic world but also in the West invites the sociologist to re-
examine the issue. Christel Lane's studies (1978, 1981) on religion and the political ritu-
als and symbolism of power in the Soviet Union are particularly revealing. By analysing
"the Rites of Rulers," Lane (1981) is able to show the precise legitimating mechanisms
in Soviet society and their connection to what she calls the 'political religion' of Marx-
ism Leninism. The same complex of ideology, power and legitimation informs the stance
of the Soviet state against the Christians and other religions in Soviet society. Lane also
shows that in Soviet society the formal power structures and the general ideology pro-
duce symbolic functions which underpin and promote the legitimacy of the power of
the Soviet state. At the same time, since the rituals and symbols which promote legiti-
mation are not naturally emergent at the grass roots of society but they are largely stage
managed by the state machine, the legitimacy of the ideology and the authority of the
state is called into question. However, Bialer (1983:418-429) has argued that the poten-
tial tension between ideology and the legitimation of power in Soviet society remains
covert primarily because over the years a body of elite has managed to create a substan-
tive basis of mass acceptance. Also the legitimacy of the regime is reinforced by the con-
vergence of traditional and comtemporary Russian nationalism. For these and other im-
portant reasons religion in the Soviet Union does not forman immediate oppositional
force to the state.
The situation is quite different in the Polish case. As Touraine (1983) has clearly dem-
onstrated, the Solidarity movement related directly to the question of the legitimacy of
the state on the one hand and to the values of the church on the other, which in this
case are inseparable from those of Polish ethnic identity. It is the church rather than
the state which embodies and articulates that identity and commands the loyalty of the
masses. By implication the church is a powerful institution in Polish society.
In the Third World, in Latin America and in the Islamic countries in particular, the
connection of political power and religion, as everybody knows, is even more explicit.
370 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSlS

Although these societies are not modern, in the sense that advanced industrial societies
are, their social and political institutions operate in a modern social context.
Even in the west, there are signs that religious values and ideologies are not totally
unrelated to processes of legitimation. In the U.S.A. for instance, although church and
state have always been constitutionally separated, religion and politics have always
maintained close links. The recent revival of Evangelicalism, therefore, should not be
seen a s a passing phase in American culture b u t a s a more serious aspect of legitimation
in American politics. In Britain too, where the historical relation between church and
state is radically different to that of the U.S.A., church functionaries have made more
"political interventions" over the last two years than over the last twenty put together.
This scatty evidence in no way calls into question the fact that modern politics are
primarily secular politics but it does imply that the relation of power, legitimation and

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religion is by no means a dead issue.

Legitimation and Power

The concept of legitimation which is derived from classical sociology is somewhat in-
adequate for the analysis of power in modern society. Weber's conception of legitimate
domination, for instance, excludes in principle any evaluation of the uses of power. As
Mornsen (1974:83) puts it "in the context of Weber's sociological theory of 'legitimate
rule' there was no room for illegitimate forros of domination." Even in his celebrated
concept of charisma no distinction can be drawn "between the genuine charisma of re-
sponsible democratic leaders, as for instance Gladstone or Rooselvet and the pernitious
charisma of personalities like Kurt Eisner or Adolf Hitler" (ibid, p.91). This conception
of legitimacy by Weber is inseparable from his view of power (macht) which he analyses
n o t a s a relation amongst agents b u t a s a capacity of x over y.
But it is not just the Weberian perspective which lacks sensitivity in this area. Most
sociologists abstain from attributing to the concepts of legitimacy and power their evalu-
ative dialectical character. Parsons' view of legitimation and power, for example, is en-
tirely one-dimensional. This is clearly shown by his definition of power which is: "the
generalized capacity to serve the performance of binding obligations by units in a system
of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their
bearing on collective goals." (Parsons 1963:237). Power in this structural functionalist
perspective is portrayed to operate exclusively in terms of consensus and social integra-
tion. The theory clearly ignores power asa relationship amongst agents and sees ir oper-
ative only in terms of social systems. Giddens (2982:199), thus following Garfinkel, sug-
gests that in Parsons' theory of power human beings appear "only as cultural dopes."
Conflict theorists, of different persuasions such as Dahrendorf (1959) and C. Wright
Mills (1956), also discuss power primarily in terms of capacity. What all these theories
have in common is that they conceive legitimation and power as totally desacralized,
demystified and unproblematic areas of social life. Yet it is at least questionable whether
power has lost entirely its age old mystifying character. S. Lukes (1974) and more re-
cently Giddens (1981:49-88, 1982:197-214) have challenged these approaches and have
suggested that power should be analysed in the context of social relations.
The concept of legitimacy carries with it an evaluative, even oppositional dimension.
Clearly to know what is or passes as legitimate presupposes to know what it is or could
be non-legitimate and vice versa. By implication to legitimise is to uphold a position or
 LEGITIMATION POWER AND RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY 371

to justify power relations as right and just. Indeed, most current definitions of the term
carry such connotations. Thus, Berger and Luckmann (1967:111) define legitimation as
"a process of explaining and justifying. ''2 Habermas too, who looks at the political di-
mensions of the concept states that: "Legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to
be recognised." Paul Lewis (1983:431), in discussing the Polish case, begins by saying that
"legitimacy may be defined as that political condition in which power holders are able
to justify their holding of power in terms other than those of the mere power holding."
Legitimation then always involves a process of justification of power and its uses in
terms other than the de facto holding of power.
The contestable character of legitimation derives from the fact that the uses and func-
tions of power always involve participating agents. These may be either individual or
social actors such as state institutions, churches, trade unions, etc. As Giddens (1982:

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199) argues, the dialectic of social control logically demands that power operates in the
context of agency. Indeed, he says, "an agent who does not participate in the dialectic
of control ipso facto ceases to be an agent." Moreover the process of legitimation of
power always involves these agents in a web of reciprocal rights and obligations.
Now rights and obligations are moral concepts which as Hume has argued cannot be
"the off-spring of reason." Rather, such concepts belong to the realm of culture, ideology
and values. Certainly at the level of power relations ideology is called upon to justify
the uses, the structures and the relations of power. In modern societies especially the
state ideology must justify the uses of power in the context of economic relations. Ex-
ploitation thus as Giddens (1981:60) suggests "is most aptly conceptualized in relation
to domination or power."
In modern societies then, the immense complexity of power and economic structures
and the very inequalities of power, wealth and status as well as the social cleavages of
class, race, gender etc., generate the problem of legitimation a s a contestable ongoing
process. I agree with Bryan Wilson (1982:54) when he says that "in modern times state
power has steadily become either self-justifying or is legitimized at least rhetorically, by
reference to the will of the people." Yet the question of the ideological foundations of
state power still remains. It could be argued that the justification of state power rests
on ideotogies like nationalism, the pursuit of democracy, humanitarian values etc. How-
ever, the strong residual element of religion, which clearly exists even in western socie-
ties, can still perform basic legitimizing or oppositional functions within such ideologies.
It seems, for instance, that the present revivial of religion in America suits perfectly well
American nationalism. In Britain, on the other hand, the comments of the clergy on
the humanitarian and moral qualities of state policies are also questioning the moral
legitimacy of these policies. In Third World and some socialist societies of course, such
connections between religion and power are by far more immediate and explicit.

Legitimation and Modern Culture

The question of the dichotomy between traditional and modern societies in terms of
the typology Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft, which is so prevalent in classical sociology, re-
mains an unsettled theoretical issue. Sociologists, however, continue to assume a radical

2Berger and Luckmann (1967:110-146) deal with the concept of legitimation from a broad perspective of
the sociologyof knowledge. My concern here is to narrow the concept down to a power political perspective.
372 SOCIOLOGICALANALYSIS

break between tradition and modernity and perceive modern societies as primarily tech-
nocratic and largely secular. Legitimation also is understood to be a matter of abstract,
rationalized and technocratic, administrative procedures. The evidence, of course, that
this is the case is very strong and cannot be easily refuted. But these sociological percep-
tions have been also reinforced by the tension which exists between the private and the
public domain and has been characteristic of modernity throughout. Few, in fact, would
argue against the view that the relationship of individual to society has been undergoing
a crisis for some time. Indeed, many social analysts have depicted that crisis very co-
gently in various ways and contexts. Bell (1973, 1975), for instance, sees a serious dis-
junction between private and collective values. In a similar vein Coleman (1974) and
Fenn (1980) have perceived a conflict at the normative basis of authority between indi-
vidual identity and collective actors. Fenn (1980:123) thus, states that: "As societies

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have become more internally complex, the bases of personal identity have become dis-
tinct from the symbolic bases of institutions." Thomas Luckmann also, has advanced
a similar argument in his book The Invisible Religion where he concludes that the process
"contains a serious danger of motivating mass withdrawal into 'the private sphere' while
'Rome Burns.' "
Now, it is precisely because of the serious danger involved in this process, for both
the individual and society, that the legitimation of the public domain may not be just
a matter of technical administrative procedures. In fact, if we assume that power always
operates in a meaningful symbolic context, as Geertz and the symbolic interactionists
for example do, then legitimation carries with it moral and ideological implications
which are irreducible to formal rationality. In this sense a completely secular public do-
main is impossible since it is always underpinned by values, beliefs and ideology. More-
over since power, in the last analysis, is exercised over individuals by individuals the
separation of the private and public domain can never be complete. If this theoretical
appreciation is correct then both conflict theorists and structural functionalists can be
challenged when they assume the cultural bases of legitimation in modern society as ra-
tionalist and/or unproblematic.
Habermas (1976, 1979), for example, who sees the modern state as being involved in
"legitimation crisis," operates with a Marxist conception of ideology. Consequently he
assumes the legitimising ideology and political culture of state institutions as false con-
sciousness (Wuthnow et al 1984:222). This inevitably leads him to the very paradox that
Mannhein encountered and which Geertz (1975:196) suggested could be avoided only
by "the perfection of a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing with meaning." How-
ever, complex epistemological questions concerning ideology aside, Habermas' concep-
tion of modern culture is placed in sharp dichotomy between technology (in the broad
sense) and truth. But science, technology and bureaucracy do not necessarily produce
"systematically distorted communication" as he argues it to be the case. They may dis-
tort communication and produce false consciousness according to their use and in the
case of legitimation of power according to their political use. Technology thus may facili-
tate political propaganda, as was the case in Nazi Germany and many other instances,
but technology in itself is morally neutral. Culture and technology are dialectically re-
lated but neither in itself determines the other. Habermas' approach to modern culture
 LEGITIMATION POWER AND RELIGIONIN MODERN SOCIETY 373
and legitimation, in short, suffers from the same problems which are inherent in Marx-
ism, in conflict theory, and the materialist perspective at large. Consequently his view
of modern culture is an entirely secular one (Wuthnow et al 1984:231). At least as far
as legitimation is concerned, religion has no role to play in modern society.
But structural functionalists too who, following Parsons, view the question of legitima-
tion in terms of concensus and social integration arrive at similar conclusions about the
role of religious culture in modern politics. Bellah's ideas on legitimation for example
are intended to be questioning and cricical of modern American politics. In fact his
greatly controversial essay on civil religion (1970:168-189) was written primarily in
order to question American policy in Vietnam. Similarly his Book The Broken Covenant
(1975) and his more recent essay (1981:3549), Religion and Legitimation in the American
Republic, were written partly to clarify misunderstandings of his concept of civil religion
but primarily in order to express his misgivings about the quality and character of con-

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temporary civil and political American values. The following statement is revealing and
is worth quoting. "One would almost think the Lord has intended to chastise us before
each of our centennial celebrations so that we would not rise up too high in our pride.
Before the centennial he sent us Grant. Before the bicentennial, Nixon (in whom we
can perhaps discern the dim face of despotism that awaits u s - not a despotism of swasti-
kas and brownshirts but of gameplans and administrative efficiency). It is not a moment
of self-congratulation, but sober reflection about where we have come from and where
we may be going" (1981:49). Here again, the problem is not one concerning ideology
and the uses of power but one "of gameplans and administrative efficiency."
Bellah's analysis of legitimation in the context of recent American politics then, al-
though unlike Parsons' is questioning and critical, it too suffers from the theoretical limi-
tations of the functionalist evolutionist perspective. Bellah's critique of contemporary
American political orientations derives more from his high moral sensitivity and less
from the analytical insights which are forthcoming from his theoretical approach. His
critique, in fact, is based on what he sees as the collapse of the high republican spirit
which has been so prevalent in American political history. In the past, that spirit was
underpinned by highly moral Protestant values which were articulated by great Ameri-
can leaders like Lincoln, Washington and Jefferson although sometimes these values
were embodied in the national community as "civil millennialism." At present that spirit
is at best missing and at worst abused by corrupt political leaders. More recently (1983)
Bellah has argued that the separation of religious culture and politics in America is now
almost complete and references to God and religious values by President Reagan and
other politicians are cynical political ploys.
Whether politicians generally and President Reagan in particular believe in their reli-
gious utterances is I think beside the point. I believe that Reagan at least takes religion
seriously. But be that as it may, the national, millenialist overtones of some of his public
pronouncements are unmistakable. Let me quote from one of his speeches at Dallas
(August 1984) during the Republican Convention when he was nominated to run for
president for a second term: "We are in the midst of a springtime of hope for America.
Greatness lies ahead of us. Four years ago we raised a banner of bold colours. We pro-
claimed a dream of an America that would be a shining city on a hill. We carne together
374 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

in a national crusade to make America great again and to make a new beginning. Now
it is all coming together." Any linguistic analyst would find it very hard to classifv state-
ments of this kind as rationalist, secular or administrative language.
But there are further empirical and theoretical problems involved in the analysis of
legitimation and modern culture. Both conflict theorists and the functionalists, under-
estimate the significance of diverse historical traditions as legitimizing forces in different
modern societies. If we assume, as we must, that all modern industrial societies share,
in one way or other and in varying degrees in the crisis of legitimation, then the crisis
in Poland seems to me to be substantively different from that of the Soviet Union. Fur-
thermore, the difference can be located in the different dialectical relationship between
power and tradition in the two societies. Similarly, legitimation processes in Japan can
be said to be different from those operative in the U.S.A. to the extent that such pro-

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cesses are underpinned by different cultural traditions. With regard to secularization
these points have been, I think, forcefully made by D. Martin (1978) but their relevance
to the problem of legitimation has not been sufficiently appreciated by the sociological
community.
All those who perceive modern culture in exclusively technocratic, procedural, evolu-
tionist and rationalist terms lose sight of the specific but crucial historical factors which
inform specific nationalist ideologies in modern societies. Consequently they tend to
underestimate the continuing tensions between tradition and modernity and the crucial
role of nationalism as a legitimising factor. A cursorv look at the various troublespots
of the globe during the last ten years leaves no doubt that in all these conflicts specific
cultural historical and national factors are at play justas muchas or even more than
international ones. This is undeniably the case with Northern Ireland, the Middle East,
Poland, etc. I have argued elsewhere (1982, 1982a) that both Greek and Jewish ethnic
identity continue as always to be defined by indigenous historical cultural and religious
factors. In Israel and the diaspora, Orthodox Judaism has been strengthened propor-
tionately to the growing significance of the state of Israel and the strengthening of the
boundaries of identity of world Jewry. The rallying of public opinion behind the British
Government's policy during and after what has been called the Falklands crisis is clearly
indicative that patriotic myths are by no means dead.
In an internationalist age then, it is simply not true that nation states have ceased
to look back in history in order to substantiate their claims to legitimacy or that govern-
ments cannot stengthen that legitimacy by appealing to national sentiment. Gellner
(1983:56) believes that: "in a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and
openly, spurning the camouflage." He argues, however, that modern nationalism is
based on the general culture of universal literacy. That view fails to account for the im-
portant fact that the cultural content between one nationalism and another may be
and, in most cases, is significantly different. What has come to be known as the 'national
interest' is n o t a blanket legitimizing term but involves in each particular case specific
configurations of cultural, political and economic forces.
A linguistic analysis of the meaning of modern political culture and ideology could
show that it is justas full of myth and ritual as perhaps any traditional religious lan-
guage. Ir could in fact be argued that the metaphor of salvation is not altogether absent
from modern political culture. No matter how bureaucratic and rationalist modern po-
 LEGITIMATION POWER AND RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY 375

litical procedures are the fact remains t h a t politicians will always s h r o u d their claims
to legitimacy in a symbolic language w h i c h often carries with it overt religious refer-
ences. If I m a y be allowed to quote President Reagan again, in arguing the case for com-
pulsory prayers in A m e r i c a n schools he said, "Religion a n d politics are necessarily re-
lated and this has worked to our benefit as a nation."
T h e point I am trying to make is that the cultural break between tradition an modern-
ity as far as power a n d its legitimation is concerned may not be, after all, as radical as
classical a n d m o d e r n sociology has assumed. Let me quote C. Geertz (1977:167-8) who
expresses very eloquently what I want to say. "Thrones may be out of fashion, and pag-
eantry too; but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself
and advance its claims, and so does opposition to it. A world wholly demystified is a
world wholly dipoliticized; and t h o u g h W e b e r promised us b o t h of these, specialists

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without spirit in a bureaucratic i r o n c a g e - t h e course of events since, with its Sukarnos,
Churchills, N k r u m a h s , Hitlers, Maos, Roosevelts, Stalins, Nassers, a n d De Gaulles, sug-
gest that what died in 1793 (to the extent t h a t it did) was a certain view of the affinity
between the sort of power t h a t moves m e n a n d the sort that moves m o u n t a i n s , not t h a t
there is one." In a secular age a completely secular politics may not be possible after all.
The reason is quite simple. M o d e r n bureaucracies c a n n o t dispense either with the prob-
lem of the relationship of individual a n d society or with the problem of meaning and
morality any more t h a n traditional cultural a n d political systems could. Thus, the legiti-
matio n of power of the m o d e r n state, no m a t t e r how much it m a y actually be a matter
of p r o c e d u r e s - a n d largely it i s - i t c a n n o t be j u s t a matter of procedures. It is also a
question of meaning, values and political purpose, as well a s a question of participation
of the individual in society.

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