SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B.

SOLIDUM, Branch Manager, Cubao Branch,

petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
“AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is not qualified to
be his beneficiary.”
The Facts
Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were married on April 29, 1964 in Manila.
Less than one (1) year after, in February 1965, Gloria left Antonio and contracted another marriage with a certain
Domingo Talens in Nueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him until 1983. They
had three children: Alain Vincent, Arlene, and Armine. In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went to the United States (US).
On May 8, 1986, she filed for divorce against Antonio with the Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana, California. On May
21, 1983, she executed a document waiving all her rights to their conjugal properties and other matters. The divorce
was granted on November 5, 1986.
On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one child, May-Ann
N. de los Santos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part, Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on
July 11, 1987, in the US. Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began receiving
monthly pension. He died of respiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began
receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999. On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for
Antonio’s death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary
of Antonio.
Issue: WHO is qualified then?

As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio was not
binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.15 The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen
and thus covered by the policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio. However,
although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to be his primary
beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.
Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two different
men. The first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage, when she contracted a second marriage to
Domingo Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained a divorce, and later
married an American citizen. In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary
of her deceased husband.

Petition is granted:
Since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not a qualified beneficiary. The fruit of their
union, May-Ann, was considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary beneficiary. May-Ann was
entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate children of Antonio in accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law. 8
However, considering that the legitimate children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only
remaining qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the benefit.
Applicable SSS Provisions:
The SS Law clearly and expressly provides who are the qualified beneficiaries entitled to receive benefits from the
deceased:
"Section 8. Terms Defined. – For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates
otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
 (k) Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or
legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided,
That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children
shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents
who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other
person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
SECTION 12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at least one hundred twenty (120)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement and who (1) has reached the age of sixty (60)
years and is already separated from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or (2) has reached the
age of sixty-five (65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly pension; Provided, That he
shall have the option to receive his first eighteen (18) monthly pensions in lump sum discounted at a
preferential rate of interest to be determined by the SSS.
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be
entitled to receive the monthly pension; Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries and he dies within
sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a
lump sum benefit equivalent to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance of the five-year
guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’ pension. (Emphasis added)

TAN VS. BALLENA (coverage)

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of Footjoy Industrial Corporation (Footjoy), a
domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing shoes and other kinds of footwear, prior to the cessation
of its operations sometime in February 2001. On 19 March 2001, respondent Amelito Ballena, 6 and one hundred thirty-
nine (139) other employees of Footjoy, filed a Joint Complaint-Affidavit 7 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Bulacan against the company and petitioners Tan and Domingo in their capacities as owner/president and
administrative officer, respectively.8
The Complaint-Affidavit alleged that the company did not regularly report the respondent employees for membership
at the Social Security System (SSS) and that it likewise failed to remit their SSS contributions and payment for their
SSS loans, which were already deducted from their wages. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit, 10 petitioners Tan and
Domingo blamed the economic distress that beset their company for their failure to timely pay and update the monthly
SSS contributions of the employees. They alleged that the company's dire situation became even more aggravated when
the buildings and equipment of Footjoy were destroyed by fire on 4 February 2001. 11 This incident eventually led to the
cessation of the company's operations. Because of this, some of the company's employees tried to avail themselves of
their SSS benefits but failed to do so. It was then that the employees filed their complaint. Petitioners Tan and Domingo
thereafter underlined their good faith and lack of criminal culpability when they acknowledged their fault and
demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations by executing a memorandum of agreement with the SSS.
DOJ favored herein Petitioners, thus, Respondents claimed that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that no probable cause existed to charge petitioners Tan, Domingo
and Lim with violations of the SSS Law; that the allegation of petitioners' failure to report respondents to the SSS for
coverage is not supported by evidence; and that charges [for the violation] of a special law such as the Social Security
Act can be overcome by a show of good faith and lack of intent to commit the same.
CA reversed the contention of DOJ. In reversing the DOJ resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that the agency acted
with grave abuse of discretion when it committed a palpable mistake in dismissing the charges against petitioners. The
appellate court found that petitioners were indeed remiss in their duty to remit the respondents' SSS contributions in
violation of Section 28(h) of the Social Security Law. The petitioners' claim of good faith and the absence of criminal
intent should not have been considered, as these were evidentiary in nature and should thus be more properly proved in
a trial. Furthermore, the appellate court declared that said defenses are unavailing in crimes punishable by a special law,
which are characterized as mala prohibita. In these crimes, it is enough that they were done freely and consciously and
that the intent to commit the same need not be proved.
RULING:
This Court finds no fault in the assailed actions of the Court of Appeals.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that there was indeed
probable cause to indict petitioners for the offenses charged.
In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such
as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.58 Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt
pointing to the guilt of the person. Only prima facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if
not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. 59 Therefore, matters of evidence are more appropriately presented
and heard during the trial.60
In the present case, petitioners were charged with violations of the SSS Law for their failure to either promptly report
some of the respondents for compulsory coverage/membership with the SSS or remit their SSS contributions and loan
amortizations. In support of their claims, respondents have attached unto their Joint Complaint-Affidavit a summary of
their unreported and unremitted SSS contributions,61 as gathered from the SSS Online Inquiry System, and a
computation of their unreported and unremitted SSS contributions. 62
On the part of the petitioners, they have not denied their fault in not remitting the SSS contributions and loan payments
of the respondents in violation of Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law. Instead, petitioners interposed
the defenses of lack of criminal intent and good faith, as their failure to remit was brought about by alleged economic
difficulties, and they have already agreed to settle their obligations with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement
to pay in installments. As held by the Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal intent for the
petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the respondents' contributions deserve scant consideration. The violations
charged in this case pertain to the SSS Law, which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses known as
mala prohibita.
The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has
the law been violated?63 When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. 64 Thus, the petitioners'
admission in the instant case of their violations of the provisions of the SSS Law is more than enough to establish the
existence of probable cause to prosecute them for the same.
Applicable SSS Provisions:
SEC. 9. Coverage. - (a) Coverage in the SSS shall be compulsory upon all employees not over sixty (60)
years of age and their employers: x x x Provided, finally, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as a
limitation on the right of employers and employees to agree on and adopt benefits which are over and above
those provided under this Act.
SEC. 10. Effective Date of Coverage. - Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first
day of his operation and that of the employee on the day of his employment: x x x.
SEC. 22. Remittance of Contributions. -- (a) The contribution imposed in the preceding section shall be
remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they
are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and
to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as
herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month
from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the
collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually in advance, the
contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon
separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to
his employer.
(b) The contributions payable under this Act in cases where an employer refuses or neglects to pay the same
shall be collected by the SSS in the same manner as taxes are made collectible under the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended. Failure or refusal of the employer to pay or remit the contributions herein
prescribed shall not prejudice the right of the covered employee to the benefits of the coverage.
The right to institute the necessary action against the employer may be commenced within twenty (20) years
from the time the delinquency is known or the assessment is made by the SSS, or from the time the benefit
accrues, as the case may be.
(c) Should any person, natural or juridical, defaults in any payment of contributions, the Commission may
also collect the same in either of the following ways:
1. By an action in court, which shall hear and dispose of the case in preference to any other civil
action; x x x.
SEC. 24. Employment Records and Reports. -
(b) Should the employer misrepresent the true date of employment of the employee member or
remit to the SSS contributions which are less than those required in this Act or fail to remit any
contribution due prior to the date of contingency, resulting in a reduction of benefits, the employer
shall pay to the SSS damages equivalent to the difference between the amount of benefit to which
the employee member or his beneficiary is entitled had the proper contributions been remitted to
the SSS and the amount payable on the basis of the contributions actually remitted:
SEC. 28. Penal Clause. -
 (e) Whoever fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Act or with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission, shall be punished by a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), or imprisonment
for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years, or both, at the
discretion of the court: Provided, That, where the violation consists in failure or refusal to register
employees or himself, in case of the covered self-employed, or to deduct contributions from the
employees' compensation and remit the same to the SSS, the penalty shall be a fine of not less Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) and imprisonment
for not less than six (6) years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years.
(f) If the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership,
corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the
penalties provided in this Act for the offense.
(h) Any employer who after deducting the monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his
employee's compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within thirty (30) days from
the date they became due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such contributions or loan
amortizations and shall suffer the penalties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the Revised
Penal Code.