G.R. No.

79060 December 8, 1989

ANICETO C. OCAMPO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

Facts:
* August 15, 1984, the desk officer of the U.P. Police Force received a telephone call;
the caller reported that somebody was constructing a house at the U.P. Arboretum.
Villanueva, Ladip and Ernesto were directed to investigate.
* They proceeded to said place and there they saw some people constructing a house.
They asked the carpenters who owned the house and were told that the accused, Aniceto
Ocampo, is the... owner. Aniceto Ocampo who was present at the time, was asked
whether he had a building permit. The accused admitted that he had no building permit,
although he claimed that he bought the parcel of land... on which his house was being
constructed from a certain Roberto Pael.
* The accused was informed that the land belongs to the University of the Philippines
and that he should stop the construction of his house. The accused complied.
* However, on August 24, 1984, the accused resumed the construction of his aforesaid
house. The aforenamed prosecution witnesses reminded the accused that he was
violating Presidential Decree No. 772.
* The accused was again told to stop the construction of his house. The accused ignored
the U.P. Police Squatter's Team, and insisted that he bought the land from Mr. Pael.
* Captain Madrigal, and executed an affidavit (Exh. "A") which they submitted to the
U.P. Legal Department... an information dated March 25, 1985, was filed against
Aniceto Ocampo charging him with violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-38997.
* Upon arraignment, accused-appellant (now petitioner) pleaded "not guilty".
* After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner waived the presentation of his evidence
and instead filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence) on the ground that the
prosecution did not present Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192689... to prove
ownership of the land in question and that it failed to prove that the land on which the
petitioner constructed his house belongs to the University of the Philippines.
* The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, arriving at the following
conclusion:
"The prosecution did not present in evidence Transfer Certificate of Title No.
192689 to prove that the land in question, indeed, belongs to the University of the
Philippines. The absence of this piece of evidence, in the considered... view of
this Court, did not cripple the fact that the accused, Aniceto Ocampo, is not the
owner of said property. And since there is no showing that the accused occupied
the lot in question and constructed his residential house... thereat with the
knowledge and/or consent of the owner thereof, the accused is a squatter within
the contemplation of Presidential Decree No. 772.

* Hence, petition for review on certiorari to reverse or set aside the judgement of public
respondent Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present evidence of ownership is not
a fatal defect in finding the accused?petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of squatting.
2.) Is the Motion to Dismiss filed by accused-petitioner a bar for him to present
evidence?

HELD:
1.)
The law involved in this case is Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise
known as the Anti-Squatting Law, which embraces three (3) elements, namely:
(a) accused is not the owner of the land;
(b) that he succeeded in occupying or possessing the... property through force,
intimidation, or threat or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
owner;
(c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the
owner. In the case at bar, all three (3) elements have been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented by the prosecution manifested that Aniceto Ocampo was not
the owner of the land on which he constructed his house and that he did so against the
owner's will or without its consent. Prosecution... witnesses testified that as early as
May, 1983, petitioner was told that the area is U.P. property; that he began constructing
his house without a permit from the owner; that petitioner had no building permit and
that he had been informed that he was violating the Anti-Squatting Law.
Besides, it was also confirmed that petitioner had never shown title to the land he
claims to have purchased from one Roberto Pael. Yet, he failed to present any deed of
sale or any title in his name.
This alleged sale is a defense which the petitioner could have successfully utilized to
his advantage but failed to substantiate it with evidence at the trial.
Neither did the petitioner exhibit any building or sanitary permit to the U.P.
Security Force or in court, such being attached only to his motion for reconsideration.
Worthy of note is the fact that such permits are both... dated June 26, 1985, which is
more than ten (10) months after the illegal construction took place and three (3) months
after the case had been filed against petitioner.
We concur with the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial court's decision which
maintained that the failure of the prosecution to present title to prove ownership by the
University of the Philippines of the land in question is not material in proving the guilt
of the... petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The ownership of U.P. is not in issue in this
case. Withal, the property has been widely and publicly known to be part of the U.P.
grounds. The crucial issue is the act of squatting of... the petitioner and his non-
ownership of the property, both of which have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2.)
As regard the second issue presented, the answer is in the affirmative
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
"Section 15. Demurrer to Evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case, the
court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its
own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on
motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.
"If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in
his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave
of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution."
The amendment to Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
took effect only on October 1, 1988, but the same was given retroactive effect in the
case of Bonalos vs. People, in its resolution dated, September 19,... 1988. Well-settled is
the rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent" (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil.
784; Alday vs. Canilon, 120 SCRA 522). The amendment would therefore apply in this
case.
In the case at bar, nowhere does the record show that accused-petitioner's demurrer to
evidence was filed with prior leave of court, the retroactive effect of the amendment
aforesated would therefore work against herein petitioner.
By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, accused-petitioner
waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the
case for Judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This is... exactly
what petitioner did, and he cannot now claim denial of his right to adduce his own
evidence. As the Solicitor General aptly opined, "petitioner gambled on securing an
acquittal, a gamble which he lost."
More than that, petitioner raises as issue whether his motion to dismiss bars him from
presenting his evidence, but nowhere in his petition does he endeavor to argue in his
favor. Such a question should have been raised by the petitioner in the court a quo and
on appeal yet he failed to do the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the public respondent is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.