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The Battle for Goose Green was a resounding success for the British forces in the Falklands
campaign, and one that was much publicised and exalted over in the media. However, when
the operation to take Goose Green was initiated, success was by no mean a clear cut thing.
Despite the attempts of popularist historical accounts to portray the Commander of the
operation, H.Jones as a hero, and the Battle itself as a flawless victory, issues cropped up
throughout the entire operation, revealing some deep-rooted problems within the command
structure of the British Army of the time. Conversely however, despite the jeopardy these
problems placed the operation in, the fact remains that it was a success, and this reveals
certain strengths and resilience that the Command structure and troops possessed.

However, to reveal the extent to which there actually were command flaws, one must first
separate the setbacks that arose because of command problems, from the issues that arose for
other reasons. For example, did certain problems occur because they were symptomatic of the
British in general, or just because of Jones¶s personals style of command? By analysing
various issues that cropped up in a chronological order, it should be possible be possible to
separate the command flaws themselves. After that, a brief evaluation of those flaws should
serve to determine the extent to which they affected the British Army of the period.

It is a well known fact that the operation on Goose Green was initially intended to be nothing
more than a raid to destroy the airfield, thus denying Argentine forces there access to easy air
supplies and reinforcements. However, the operation was cancelled due to intelligence
suggesting the Argentine garrison was expecting them, and Commander Thompson¶s
deciding that the helicopters necessary for the raid could be put to better use in other, more
important fields.1 That evening though, the destruction of several helicopters by Argentine
forces sinking their carrier, the Atlantic Conveyor, forced a re-evaluation of targets. Due to
political pressure for a breakthrough, the Goose Green plan was resurrected. Bar the original
objectives, and the hope for a moral lifting victory, there was no good strategical reason for
the plan to have been revived, let alone escalated from a raid to a full scale offensive. This in
itself could be seen to highlight how military action spurred by political pressures can be a
negative thing.

Due to a press blunder, the day before the attack, the BBC World Service announced that an
attack on Goose Green was imminent.2 Whilst this report actually originated from faulty
sources, rather than a leak, the fact that the Army decided to go ahead with their assault,
despite the element of surprise being lost, and the Argentine forces expecting them, could be
interpreted as an example of the inflexibility of the upper echelons of the Command structure.
Despite there still being no adequate strategical reason for the assault on Goose Green, the
fact that no change to the planning was made, and the assault plan carried forward
demonstrates how committed the British Command were to an already dubious plan of
action.

The Commander of the assault, H. Jones assembled his command staff before the operation to
explain the plan of attack. He laid out an incredibly intricate and complex Six Phase Plan of
assault, that many of the other field officers found confusing. His six phase plan predicted

1
Page 553, the Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume II, Sir Lawrence Freedman
2
Page 222, The Falklands War-the full story, The Sunday Times Insight Team
from one step to another how he wanted the battle to proceed, and what each unit should be
doing, but the plan was so complicated, many officers were baffled by their role in it. Not
only that, as they only discovered what exactly they were doing just before the assault, there
was insufficient time for each of them to check over the plan, and figure out exactly what
they were doing. This resulted in much confusion upon the field of battle itself. Many of the
supposed flaws of the command system revealed that day seem to be traceable directly back
to Jones himself. However, were they idiosyncrasies of Jones personally, or rather indicative
of the entire system? In order to assess which is the case, we must first take a brief look at
Jones and his command style, to see what, if any, responsibility he bears for issues that
occurred.

Many of the problems encountered in the proceedings of the operation to take Goose Green
are related to Jones. There is the ridiculously complicated plan, the lack of intelligence shared
amongst commanders, the attempted micromanaging of every aspect of the battle, the
repeated attempts to adhere to a plan that grew increasingly irrelevant, and finally, the
manner of his own death. Each of these points needs to be addressed accordingly.

The first, the over-complex plan does not seem to actually be directly attributable to him, and
more to the style in which the British Army conducted warfare. To compare, the German
school of warfare has two types of strategic command, that of ›
, and that of


. The first of the two describes a mode of warfare whereby a highly detailed
plan is laid out, and all officers need to simply adhere to the plan, and follow order without
any deviation. The second,

, describes a much more fluid style of command,
whereby local situations are conducted in the manner in which the presiding officer sees fit,
in order to accommodate for the fluidity of a battle, and to allow individual commanders to
use their initiative to exploit local situations. The problem with ›
, is that ,
µ›
   
 
  


  

    

  . The British school of
Infantry at the time adhered mainly to the former style, ›
, and made little to no
provision for the second style of warfare. Jones himself had recently come back from
instructing at the British School of Infantry, and his six phase plan is the kind of thing that
would have been instructed and taught at the time. As such, the blame for this issue can be
placed squarely at the feet of the Army in general, as opposed to Jones personally.

During the battle itself, various officers were kept in the dark as to the status of the battle, and
their position in it. This was exacerbated by radio failures, and the fact that the initial plan
was confusing, and officers were unsure as to how their, and other units were meant to
interact. However, this was far from standard in the British army, and more down to Jones
himself. To quote his second in command, Keeble, µ    

      
  

 
  
   
      

  
  › 
   
! "¶.

Throughout the battle, Jones attempted to micromanage everything. None of the officers or
NCO¶s were permitted to make any kind of overt action without first requesting his
permission, and he did was not the type to consult others for advice on his decisions. A good
example here would be of how he radioed the forward positions for a status report when the

3
Page 17, Not Mentioned In Despatches, Spencer Fitz-Gibbon
battle had yet to begin. Initially, this appears to be another case of it being solely Jones
responsible for this command error, however, closer examination suggests otherwise. The
only practical experience the unit had had recently up until this point was in Northern Ireland,
where micromanagement of operations was a necessity, rather than a luxury of time. When it
came to operations out in the field, the British Army was sorely lacking in practical
operational experience at unit and formation level. As such, it would appear that this was
simply a magnification of a lack of experience in the British Command, rather than solely
Jones¶s responsibility alone.

Throughout the battle, Jones kept attempting to adhere to his previously laid plan, long after
it had evidently gone awry. He relied heavily on his ability to predict in advance who is going
to do what at what times, and failed to account for how battle can require a change in
strategy. This over-reliance on intelligence led to him sculpting his battle plan around his
knowledge of the enemies positions, and imagining that they¶d stay there, rather than
anticipating Argentinian troop movements and redeployments.4When enemy troop
placements were not as planned, and enemy fortifications stronger than previously thought,
he simply kept up a broad offensive, and attempted to stick as close to the original, overly
complex plan as he could, resulting in the stagnation of the front, as individual commanders
lost track of where they were meant to be, and got bogged down. Due to his micromanaging,
and restrictive style of command, no breakthroughs seemed possible, and this was a situation
that persisted up until his death. There has been a popular habit historically speaking, of
treating his plan as the one that saved the day and guaranteed victory, but in reality, had
Keeble not changed the style of attack upon taking command, it¶s entirely possible that the
battle would have been lost. Now this particular flaw can be laid to Jones more than the
command system in general, however, in the sense that the British system of command
advocated›
 to an unrealistic extent, it can be recognised that it bore some small
responsibility for Jones¶s handling of the situation.

Finally, you have the manner of Jones¶s death itself, whereby him and his command squad
singlehandedly charged an enemy trench, before being shot down by a machine gunner in a
second, unseen trench. He precipitated this action through a belief that from where he was
standing, if he could take the trench above, and break the stalemate that had endured thus
turning the battle. In reality, he simply got shot down. This bold action stems from Para
training, where the soldiers are taught to be exceptionally aggressive, and that one squad can
be the balancing point of a battle where it is won or lost. However, the wisdom of the
commander himself blindly charging in is one that is oft-questioned. Whilst undoubtedly
brave, the tactical ramifications can be dire. In this regard, it can be questioned as to whether
the more elite soldiers, such as marines and paras are really suitable for general front line
action as opposed to standard soldiers. However, the fact that the chain of command held
steady, and Keeble successfully completed the mission, this point of view seems to be
suitably without merit. In that, the British style of command emerges in a positive light.

Having evaluated Jones and his actions, it becomes clear that the British style of warfare was
almost remniscient of WW1, with an obsession for positional warfare. Whilst some of the
negative issues that arose in the battle were solely due to him and his style of command,
many others were indeed symptomatic of British training and command style in general.

4
Page 12, Not Mentioned In Despatches, Spencer Fitz-Gibbon
When Keeble took over the battle, he instigated a much more Germanic style of warfare.
Keeble himself had spent two years working with German operational staff, and alter said
that he¶d learnt more there than he ever did in the rest of his tie with the British forces).
Having spent half an hour familiarising himself with the situation, he immediately abandoned
Jones¶s plan as unrealistic, and delegated all local command down to the senior officer or
NCO on the ground. He then adopted a þ 
 approach, whereby he concentrated
forces at a crucial location of the battle, in order to tip the balance and win the battle, rather
than Jones¶s much more generalised broader front of attack. This style of command was quite
dissimilar to the one advocated in the British School of Infantry, but it was however, highly
effective.

To conclude, The Battle for Goose Green revealed several highly telling flaws in the British
Command style, and the way in which their officers were trained. Many of the issues that
arose were a result of these flaws at their core, and had they been corrected, than the battle
would quite possibly have been less bloody and hard-fought. Had Keeble not been trained in
more unconventional styles of warfare, than a defeat would have been a more than likely
outcome. This highlights the fact that for certain situations, traditional British combat
doctrine would not suffice. The battle for Goose Green was an excellent indicator of these
flaws, and were no doubt recognised, and remedial training introduced(or so one would
hope).
 





5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands, Nick van der Bijl, Pen and Sword books 2003

The Falklands War-the full story, The Sunday Times Insight Team, Sphere Books 1983

No Picnic, Julian Thompson, Leo Cooper 1990

The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume II, Sir Lawrence Freedman,
Routledge 2005

Spearhead Assault, John Geddes, Arrow Books 2008

Not Mentioned In Despatches, Spencer Fitz-Gibbon