Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. v.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission

G.R. L-8110 – June 30, 1956
J. Bengzon

Topic: Degrees of Negligence

Petitioners: Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc.

Respondents: The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, The Heirs of Pedro Mamador and Geronimo
Ma. Coll

DOCTRINE: There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not
negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. The violation
of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is NOT negligence per se, but it may be evidence of
negligence.

SUMMARY: The Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc. questions by certiorari the order of Workmens’
Compensation Commissioner confirming the referee’s award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro
Mamador for his accidental death.

FACTS:
 August 23, 1951 (6:00 AM): Mamador boarded a truck belonging to Marinduque Iron Mines
Agents Inc.
o The truck was driven by Procopio Macunat, employed by the corporation.
o On its way to their place of work at the mine camp in Talantunan, while trying to overtake
another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree.
o Mamador died as a result; others were injured.
 Procopio Macunat (driver) was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
Mamador.
o He has paid nothing however, to the heirs of Mamador.
 The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner confirmed the referee’s award of compensation to
the heirs of Mamador for his accidental death. (The company must also pay Mamador’s heirs)

ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N the proceedings before the Commission are valid [YES]
 PETITIONER: Challenges the validity of the proceedings before the Commission, asserting
that it had not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
 SC: The petitioner’s grievance does not rest on any sound basis
o He was given notice (giveri notiee), and therefore had the chance to examine (and
cross-examine) the witnesses against him.
o The statute even permits the Commissioner to take testimony without notice (Sec 48
Act 3428) provided that such ex parte evidence is reduced to writing and that the
adverse party is afforded the opportunity to examine and rebut the same.
 SC: Besides, here is no showing that the failure to cross-examine the witnesses prejudiced the
petitioner’s position.

2. W/N the liability of the employer is affected by the indemnity granted by the criminal case
[NO]
 PETITIONER: The claim is barred by section 6 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law –
Macunat (driver) was already prosecuted and required to indemnify the deceased = so this is
already the option chosen by the heirs; employer no longer needs to indemnify them.
 o The result of the Criminal Case constituted an election by the heirs to sue the third
person, thus having the effect of releasing the employer.
 SC: It is decided that in Nava v. Inchausti:
o Indemnity granted to the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person” does not
affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation.
 SC: The argument of the petitioners that the heir already selected one of the remedies (and
therefore is barred from the other remedy against the employer) cannot be sustained.
o All the widow promised was to forego the offender’s criminal prosecution. She did not
promise to waive the civil action for damages

3. (IMPORTANT ISSUE) W/N the violation of employer’s prohibition on stealing rides

constitutes negligence – thus precluding the recovery under the law [NO]

 PETITIONER: Claims that the violation of the prohibition was the laborer’s “notorious
negligence” which, under the law, precludes recovery.

 SC: The Commission has not declared that the prohibition was known to Mamador.
o Even if supposing Mamador knew the prohibition, the Court explains that no ordinary
prudent man would board the truck knowing the existence of danger.
o There is not even the slightest insinuation of Mamador’s desire to end his life.
o Even so, in the presence of doubt, the same must be resolved in the favor of Mamador.

 SC (impt ratio): Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is NOT
NEGLIGENCE, ordinarily
o It couldn’t be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se.
o Petitioner argues that there was “notorious negligence” in this particular instance
because there was an employer’s prohibition.
o BUT, there is practical unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule
promulgated by a Commission or board is NOT negligence per se, but it may be
evidence of negligence.
o The laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence – the prohibition had
NOTHING to do with personal safety of riders.

 SC: Even granting that there was negligence, it was surely NOT “notorious negligence”
o The Court interpreted notorious negligence as the same thing as “gross” negligence.
o Gross negligence may be defined as =
 the conscious indifference to consequences;
 pursuing a course which would naturally and probably result in injury;
 utter disregard of consequences

RULING: The award for compensation is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.