5. Sec.
241
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST v. GUERRERO
February 19, 2003 | Carpio, J. | Petition for Review under Rule 45| Judicial Notice
PETITIONER: Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., and/or Chemical Bank
RESPONDENT: Rafael Ma. Guerrero
SUMMARY: Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against
petitioner Bank regarding his bank account. The Bank claimed that his account is
governed by New York law which does not permit any claim except actual
damages. The Bank moved for a partial summary judgment which was supported
by an affidavit by a NY Atty. claiming that the governing law is New York law
as stipulated by Guerrero’s bank account. SC ruled that there is a need for a trial
as the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and allegations were disputed.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice and must be alleged and proven.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Bank
for allegedly: (a) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank; (b) a returned check worth USS18,000.99
due to signature verification problems; and (c) unauthorized conversion of
his account.
2. The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New
York and this law does not permit any claim except actual damages. The
Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss the
claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages.
3. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
claim that Guerrero’s bank account stipulated that the governing law is New
York law and that this law bars all of the claims except actual damages. The
Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated the Walden affidavit.
4. CA: Even if the Walden affidavit is used for purpose of summary judgment,
the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rule 132,
ISSUE: WoN there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial—YES.
RULING: Petition DENIED. There being substanstial triable issues, motion for
partial summary judgment is denied.
RATIO:
1. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Walden affidavit shows that the
facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and
there   are   substantial   triable   issues   necessitating   a   formal   trial.
Resolution   of   whether   a   foreign   law   allows   only   the   recovery   of   actual
damages is a question of fact  as far as the trial  court  is concerned since
foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.
 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.   Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven. The conflicting allegations as to whether New
York   law   or   Philippine   law   applies   to   Guerreros   claims   present   a   clear
dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the
merits. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law
on damages not only because it is self­serving but also because it does not
1 SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in 
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced 
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the 
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the 
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be 
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice 
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by 
the seal of his office.
 state the specific New York law on damages.  contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion
for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed
to file an opposing affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New
York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing
affidavit.
ISSUE:
 WON the Walden Affidavit was sufficient proof of the New York law and
jurisprudence relied upon by the Bank in its Motion for PSJ? – NO.
HELD:
 NO. The Walden Affidavit failed to prove New York law and jurisprudence. The
SC denied the Bank’s petition for lack of merit.
 The CA considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents
defined in Rule 132 Sec 19 and 24 of the Rules of Evidence, which should be
followed in proving foreign law.
 SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
 SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the
record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
It Was Not Mandatory for Guerrero to Submit an Opposing Affidavit to the Walden
Affidavit
The Walden Affidavit Failed to Prove New York Law and Jurisprudence
 The Bank’s motion for PSJ as supported by the Walden Affidavit does not
demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the
pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial triable issues
necessitating a formal trial.
 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York
law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on
material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
 The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v.
Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These
cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines
and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other
hand, the Walden Affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never
testified in open court. The Walden Affidavit cannot be considered as proof of
New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it
does not state the specific New York law on damages.
 The Walden Affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal interpretation
and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence
without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden Affidavit of various
U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of
the U.S. courts.
 While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the
Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on
proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
 The Bank failed to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign
law and decisions of foreign courts. The Walden Affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only
alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the
matters at issue.
 Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing affidavit
to the Walden Affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of Rule 35 Sec 3 of the
 old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit
mandatory. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit
because his complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Bank’s motion
and the Walden affidavit. A party should not be made to deny matters already
averred in his complaint.
 There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a
quo correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment. There is a
need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is
guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws.
CRESCENT PETROLEUM,
6.
LTD., Petitioner, vs. M/V "LOK
MAHESHWARI," THE
SHIPPING CORPORATION
OF INDIA, and PORTSERV
LIMITED
G.R. No. 155014 November 11,
2005
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an
oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by
respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
India and principally owned by the Government of India. It
was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant
Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in
turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to
Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further
sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv).
Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized
and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested
petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Canada that is engaged in the business of selling
petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of
oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker
fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and
confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile
dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of
the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent
received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00
and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted
with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine
Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the
physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk
delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544
inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel
at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The
Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged
and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk
issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the
US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner
Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of
Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent
issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to
"Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners,
and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok
Maheshwari’" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with
instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1,
1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made
but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to
petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the
bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred
additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking
fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the
port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the
RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with
prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and
SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of
attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00.
Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary
restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to
respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or
Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28,
1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneer’s letter of
undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to
discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court
granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was
approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise
jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws
on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies
furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for
supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether
such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise
jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the
supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and
proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases,
which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the
law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to
determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional
directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law
should be applied. The following factors were
considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the
flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4)
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of
contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law
of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury
claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters
arising under maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s
insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship
Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien
exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of
Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of
the forum. All other elements are foreign – Canada is the
place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of
the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of
the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner.
Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not
promote the public policy behind the enactment of the
law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening
up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a
maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled
to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum
shopping. In light of the interests of the various foreign
elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most
significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a
Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the
orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which
physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the
place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the
supplies were delivered in Canada.
Second. P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 is
inapplicable following the factors under Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. Like the Federal Maritime Lien Act of the U.S., P.D. No.
1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 was enacted primarily to
protect Filipino suppliers and was not intended to create a lien from a
contract for supplies between foreign entities delivered in a foreign port.
Third. Applying P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and
rule that a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy
behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping
industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a
maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime
lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping.
Finally. The submission of petitioner is not in keeping with the
reasonable expectation of the parties to the contract. Indeed, when the
parties entered into a contract for supplies in Canada, they could not
have intended the laws of a remote country like the Philippines to
determine the creation of a lien by the mere accident of the Vessel's
being in Philippine territory.
7. Edi-Staffbuilders Inc. (EDI) v. NLRC and Eleazar Gran
G. R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007, J. Velasco, Jr.
FACTS:
Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI
(another recruitment agency) to work for OAB, in Riyadh, KSA.
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his
employment was terminated through OAB's letter, based on: (1)
non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment
agency primarily on the salary and contract duration; (2) Non-
compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment
agency, OAB; and (3) insubordination or disobedience to Top
Management Order and/or instructions (i.e. non-submittal of
daily activity reports despite several instructions). Gran received
from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final
pay, and thereafter, executed a declaration releasing OAB from
any financial obligation.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a
complaint, against ESI/EDI and OAB inter alia, with the NLRC -
NCR, Quezon City, for underpayment of wages/salaries and
illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of
incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience.
RULING:
EDI failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed
due to incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience. In
illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law
and jurisprudence that the employer should prove that the
dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations
among and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the
foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment
contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law
between the parties hence, should be respected. The
employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that
Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination
procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci
intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should
govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment
of Gran.
However, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The
foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only
domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for EDI, it did not prove
the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes
into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded,
is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours. Thus, Philippine labor laws was applied in this case.
According to Philippine laws, incompetence may be shown by
weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion.
However, EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how
EDI found Gran incompetent. Likewise, in order to justify willful
disobedience, it must be determined whether the order violated
by the employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and pertains to the duties which he had been engaged
to discharge. In the case at bar, EDI failed to show that the
order of the company which was violated—the submission of
"Daily Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a
Computer Specialist. An allegation of incompetence should have
a factual foundation.
Hence, petition is denied.
8. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September
25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue
of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At
that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their
son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter.
CRIME CHARGED: violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of
R.A. No. 9262 (VAWC)
RTC: DISMISSED on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an ALIEN.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his
minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor
child.
SC HELD:
*Note: petition was allowed to be directly appealed to the SC
without violating hierarchy of courts since the petition involves
purely questions of law.
1. YES. Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which
provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner
contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not
excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor
child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient
and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor
son, are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by
reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner for
any financial support.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely
on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions
of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such
that they are governed by their national law with respect to family
rights and duties
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland
or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of
his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he
is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case,
it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces
the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the
non-compliance therewith.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the
national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to
support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by
law, said law would still not find applicability for the reason that
when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a
sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child
to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent
may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for
unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioner’s son.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of
the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:
"[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties
herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting,
but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of
R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime. The act of
denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still
ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.
PETITION GRANTED, CASE REMANDED TO RTC.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland
or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of
his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not
obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law,
the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he
is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity
to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and
prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws
do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262)
because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines and
committed the offense here.
C. Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law
1. YAO KEE VS. AIDA SY-GONZALES
[G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988.]
Facts:
Sy Kiat was a Chinese national who died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City
where he was then residing. He left behind real and personal properties here in
the Philippines worth P300,000.00.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed
a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that:
a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;
b) that Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of
her children to him; and
d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of the deceased
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun
Chen who alleged that:
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19,
1931 in China;
 b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao
Kee; and,
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and
desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat
Probate Court (PC): held in favor of the petitioners (Yao Kee et al.) and
appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix.
CA: modified the PC’s decision by declaring that:
a) Respondents as acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego
b) Legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China
had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China
Issue:
W/N the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was conclusively proven valid in
accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China.
Ruling:
No.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which
states that:
Art. 71.All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
This Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2)
the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).].
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With
respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
Sec. 45.Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses,
skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of
a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus:
Sec. 25.Proof of public or official record. — An official record or
an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by
the seal of his office.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to
the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching
cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the
foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Furthermore, well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved
as any other fact.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours. Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines when her
alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated, it therefore follows that her marriage
to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

2.