EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., Respondents.

1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF
LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION.
— The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made
effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the people
their constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of public
concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of
some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required
therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the
supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
issuances intended only for the interval administration of a government agency or for particular
persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the
Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it

1
was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication."cralaw virtua1aw library

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw
library

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide
that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not
aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply
with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin
to operate.cralawnad

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
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the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of
the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of
the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication
in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged
the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary
for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down
a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as
we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.chanrobles law library

3
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we
do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187378 September 30, 2013

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR

ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,
vs.
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her
capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena
Municipality, Misamis Occidental,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which
reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.

The Facts

Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a non-governmental

organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and
conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. 5 In line with its
objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605
square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 2001 6which it rented out to the public and
became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, 7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and
Romeo Bulawin.
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On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and
Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL
for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1096,8 otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines,"
ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with
the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction
was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002, 9 but still the same remained unheeded.

It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal
Ordinance No. 02, Series of 200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry
of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; 11 and (b) the construction
of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local
government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was
submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a
joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including
Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress
thereto.13

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove
the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject
ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002.

On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, injunction and damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and
recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they
were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on
the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No.7160, 16 otherwise
known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP.
Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined. 17

In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since
they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and
property belonging to the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the
publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed
approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided
under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable.

The RTC Ruling

On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision 19 declaring the subject ordinance as
invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the
subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as
timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over
timberlands belong to the national government, through the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, to desist
from closing Capayas Island to the public. 21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the
structures they built thereon without valid building permits 22 since they were found to have no title
over the disputed property.23

Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 00284-MIN.

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision 24 granting respondents’ appeal.

5
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of
the SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56
of the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and
published in conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin board. 26 Moreover, public
consultations were conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed. 27 The
CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to
pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the
LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer sanctuaries. 29 Having
enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid. 30

On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no proprietary rights over
the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper. 31

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration 32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a Resolution 33 dated
March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable
against petitioners.34

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Section 56 of the LGC provides:

SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies
of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public
investment programs formulated by the local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may be considered
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power
conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its
action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it
has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the
mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already
elapsed from the time the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB; 36 hence, it
should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the
CA:

Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed
word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the
6
minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the
ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory construction that the parts of
a statute must be read together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and that such parts
shall not be construed as contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction
such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them,
reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute. 37

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject ordinance was not
published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC. 38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’
own evidence reveals that a public hearing 39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject
ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to
show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had
testified that they have complied with the publication and posting requirements. 40 While it is true that
he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any
controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment.
Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do.
In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the
presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of
the local government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal
lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said
public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation
essential to the oppositor’s cause of action:

However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented
any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the
ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public
hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise
failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in
the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that the ordinance making
it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as
required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this court upon the theory
that the ordinance in question was adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was
therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of
the cause showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board. Considering the
provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove ordinances
adopted by the municipal councils of the different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied with.

We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary.

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of
action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof.
Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to
discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment
thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality. 43 (Emphases supplied, citation
omitted)

All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the validity of the subject
ordinance.

In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title 44 to the property in dispute to be entitled to its
possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on
7
Capayas Island without building permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be
deemed as final and conclusive upon them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution
dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 187587. June 5, 2013.]

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,

INC., petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES — PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondent.

[G.R. No. 187654. June 5, 2013.]

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its

Board of Directors, petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES — PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J p:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision 1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City
for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later
on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation
No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and
reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services —
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and
Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition
under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
which reads:
"P.S. — This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos" 2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette 3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
8
 Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino)
issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiteratedProclamation No. 2476, as published,
but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No.
423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same
day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista
issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where
it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western
Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant toProclamation No. 2476; (2)
the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau's
facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants. 4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Western Bicutan. 5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution 6 granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner
Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. 7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could
not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering
that Proclamation No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative
powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment.
Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No.
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino's legislative power had
ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General stressed that
pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she
held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for
the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction. 8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would
be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied by
the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007. 10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed
Decision granting MSS-PVAO's Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007
issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No.
99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of
respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as
discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are
likewise DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 11 (Emphasis in the original)

9
 Both NMSMI 12 and WBLOAI 13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective
Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY
PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY
PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN
THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE
PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO
RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE
EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES. 14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS
INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION. 15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots),
their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation
No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included
when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies
in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and
effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided"
refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the
law's publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may
be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

10
 Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective
after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of
it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this
is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
xxx xxx xxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic
may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts
of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powerswhenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of
the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,"with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was

11
 the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
xxx xxx xxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking
in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten
note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never
had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "[t]he
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima
facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include
Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as
to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court
cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers,
Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that "[u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code, '[j]udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunaeexist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April
2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having
been rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services, G.R. Nos. 187587 &
187654, [June 5, 2013], 710 PHIL 317-327)

12
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007.]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his

official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati), petitioners, vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J p:

This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration. 3 AEDcIH
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner
revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and
difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real estate industry
to slowdown. 5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first quarter of 1997,
respondent suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228 that year. 6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes. 7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32. 8 Therefore,
respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. 9

13
 On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional
documents to support its claim. 10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review 11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. 12 It invoked Section 229 of
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229.Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. — No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any
sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a
claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been
paid under protest or duress. ASIETa
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration
of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That
the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where
on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears
clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to
claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. 13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13.When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty
days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for
the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days 14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return,
was filed beyond the reglementary period. 15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the
CA. 17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. 18 It ruled that
Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to
the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a
particular year is a leap year. 19 SIaHTD
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to
April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a
total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. 20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants. 22 Section 229 of the NIRCshould be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax
refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns. 23 Hence,
the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days, reckoned from the
time respondent filed its final adjusted return.

14
 The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-
year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of theNIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return. 24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it
is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 25 we ruled
that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 26
However, in 1987, EO 27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which
case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month
contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.
(emphasis supplied) CcAESI
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain." 28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up
to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month." 29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1,
2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1,
2008 until February 29, 2008. 30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and
abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be reasonably
reconciled with the previous one). 31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27.Repealing clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify
or designate the laws to be abolished. 32 Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all
laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled. 33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods
under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. TIaCAc
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on
April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
1
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
15
 6th calendar month September 15, to October 14, 1998
1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
2
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
18th calendar month September 15, to October 14, 1999
1999
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of
the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed
within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax
Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113
entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V.
Parcero. DISHEA
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., G.R. No. 162155, [August
28, 2007], 558 PHIL 182-192)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 183449. March 12, 2012.]

ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

16
PERALTA, J p:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated September 21,
2007 1 and May 19, 2008 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410 which
dismissed the petition for review filed by petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for being filed out of time,
and denied reconsideration thereof, respectively.
In an Information 3 dated June 5, 2003, petitioner was charged with the crime of Direct Assault
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December, 2002, at 1:00 early morning, more or
less, in Purok 10, Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and hack one JOSE B. RELLON,
an elected Punong Barangay, while in the performance of his duties, and accused fully
know that Jose B. Rellon is a Barangay Official, to the damage and prejudice of said
Jose B. Rellon.
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 148 of the revised Penal Code. 4
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. 5
Thereafter, trial ensued. IDAEHT
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense is summarized by the MTC as follows:
To substantiate the alleged commission of the crime of direct assault by the
accused, complaining witness Jose B. Rellon declared inter alia, that he has been the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte since the year
2002. On December 8, 2002, at about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning, he was at the
benefit dance sponsored by the Sangguniang Kabataan at Purok 4, Barangay Abilan,
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. He met accused Alfredo Montajes who uttered to him
the words "YOU'RE A USELESS CAPTAIN." Other words of similar import were
likewise uttered by the accused against him which he could no longer recall. After
uttering the said words, the accused then drew his bolo locally known
as "lagaraw" and approached him. He then moved backward, but the accused came
near to him and struck him once with the "lagaraw." Luckily, complainant was not hit
as he managed to move backward. Complainant's daughter named Vilma Dector and
his wife, approached him and brought him home. Many people, including two (2) CVO
(Rodelio Laureto and Victorio Trinquite), witnessed the incident.
During the mediation in the barangay hall, an investigation was conducted. The
accused, according to the complainant, asked for forgiveness from him which he
declined, as he was of the impression that the law must be applied and the accused
should instead ask for forgiveness in court.
As proof that the accused asked for forgiveness, complainant presented a
document (Exh. "B") to that effect.
Complainant had the incident blottered at the police station as evidenced by an
extract thereof.
On cross-examination, complainant testified that he went to the benefit dance
to stop it since it was already 1:00 o'clock in the early morning and the benefit dance
was still going on when it was supposed to end at 12:00 o'clock midnight as the permit
he gave was only up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. As a result of the stoppage of the
benefit dance, many persons got angry, and he heard that the house of the accused
was stoned which made the accused angry. In fact, he saw the accused murmuring as
his house was stoned by unknown persons. When the accused came near to him, the
former did not ask for assistance from him. aSIATD
Prosecution witness Rodelio Laureto corroborated the declaration of the
complainant that it was the accused who hacked the complainant with the use of
a "lagaraw," but failed to hit him.

17
 Accused Alfredo Montajes testified that in the evening of December 7, 2002, he
was at home listening to the disco as there was a benefit dance near their house. The
benefit dance started at 7 o'clock in the evening and ended at 1 o'clock in the early
morning of December 8, 2002 when it was stopped by Barangay Captain Jose Rellon.
It was then that trouble started because many of those who have paid but were not
anymore allowed to dance complained to the Barangay Captain and requested that
they be given one more music so that they could avail for what they have paid for on
that benefit dance, as they were not refunded with their payments. When this protest
went on, the CVO's reacted by clubbing them using their jackets. Then a stoning
incident followed. One of those hit by stones was his house. This made him wild
prompting him to get his "lagaraw" to look for the people responsible for stoning his
house. While looking for these persons along the road, he saw Barangay Captain
Jose Rellon who was then two (2) meters away from him, and he responded by telling
him that he was looking for those persons responsible for the stoning of his house.
The complainant wanted to get the "lagaraw" from him but he refused.
The accused explained, when confronted with a document (Exh. "B") wherein it
was stated that he asked for apology from the Barangay Captain during the barangay
level conciliation, that it was for the sole purpose of not elevating this case and that
they would settle amicably.
The accused also vehemently denied the accusation that he attacked the
barangay captain.
Defense witness Luis A. Cajeles, Jr., a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Abilan,
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, testified that at about 1:00 o'clock in the early dawn of
December 8, 2002, he heard of stoning and shouting, in fact the window grill of his
house was hit and he heard the people in panic. As abarangay kagawad assigned to
the Peace and Order Committee, he went out immediately from his house and went to
the road across the basketball court where the stoning was. He then saw accused
Alfredo Montajes holding a bolo. The accused was shouting that he was looking for
the persons who stoned his house. He also witnessed that the barangay captain
asked the accused why he was bringing a bolo and the accused replied that he was
looking for the persons who stoned his house. He did not know what else happened
because he tried to drive the teenagers to their homes, because it was already very
late in the evening. ISaCTE
On cross-examination, he declared that the accused asked for forgiveness
during the confrontation at the Barangay because of the disturbance he made to the
barangay captain and to the community because some people were in panic as he
was bringing a bolo, and not for attacking the Barangay Captain.
Anatolio Lozada Bangahon, another defense witness, testified that he saw the
accused coming out from his house carrying a bolo, and when he asked him why he
was bringing a bolo, the accused replied that he was going to look for the persons
who stoned his house. The accused was roaming around to look for the persons who
stoned his house, but he was not looking after the Barangay Captain. 6
On December 29, 2005, the MTC issued its Judgment 7 finding petitioner guilty of the crime of
direct assault. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALFREDO MONTAJES y JACA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Assault as defined and penalized
under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an
indefinite prison term of FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE DAY ofarresto mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE MONTHS AND TEN DAYS
of prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the offense charged. The
accused is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00)
Philippine Currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 8
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Butuan City, rendered its
Decision 9 dated January 23, 2007 affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.

18
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an Order 10 dated May 4,
2007. TEHIaD
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be motion) for extension of time to file petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an extended period of 15 days from May 21,
2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition
for review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the petition outright
for being filed out of time. In so ruling, the CA said:
As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007, Thus, the 15-day reglementary
period within which to file a petition for review expired on May 21, 2007 (Monday)
considering that the last day fell on a Saturday, May 19, 2007. It appears that
petitioner reckoned the extension from May 21, 2007 (Monday) and not from May 19,
2007 (Saturday). Petitioner should have reckoned the 15-day extension from May 19,
2007 and not from May 21, 2007. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension of time,
the extension should be counted from the last day which is a Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday. 11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 19, 2008.
Petitioner is now before us on the issue of whether the CA erred in denying due course to his
petition for review for being filed out of time.
Petitioner argues that he filed the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with
the CA pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court; that based on such provision, if the last
day to file a petition falls on a Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last
day of the reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a
Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the next working day which was May 21,
2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to
file the petition and not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. Nonetheless, petitioner asks for liberality in the
interest of justice taking into consideration the merit of his petition claiming that his conviction was not
supported by the evidence on record. Moreover, he claims that his petition for review was filed with
the CA on June 5, 2007, which was long before the CA dismissed the same on September 21, 2007
for being filed out of time. He prays that the CA resolutions be reversed and set aside and the CA be
directed to give due course to his petition and to resolve the case on the merits. HICSaD
We grant the petition.
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed
or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus
computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC dated
February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a
Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on Next Working Day is Granted) which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court]
applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the
next working day is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the
next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday,
Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the

19
 period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the
original expiration of the period.
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the
Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so
that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to
be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to
file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal
holiday. CSEHIa
In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc., 12 we said:
Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party desire to
file any pleading, even a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, and the last
day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on the next working
day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar.
However, according to the same circular, the petition for review
on certiorari was indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in case a motion for
extension is granted, the due date for the extended period shall be counted from the
original due date, not from the next working day on which the motion for extension
was filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty Commission, we had occasion to expound on
the matter. In that case, we held that the extension granted by the court should be
tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such
period.
In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for extension was
within the period provided by law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time.
Petitioner was granted an additional period of 30 days within which to file the petition.
Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006. Instead, he
did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late. 13
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing
any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court
sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. In this case, the original period for filing the
petition for review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed
the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his
motion for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within
which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on
the motion for extension, but instead issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the
petition for review for being filed out of time. aSIAHC
We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of time based on
our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day extension period prayed for should be tacked
to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. 14 Thus,
counting 15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the petition filed on
June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to
merit the liberal application of the rule in the interest of justice and fair play.
Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was long before the
CA issued its Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed
out of time. There was no showing that respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was
prejudiced by reason of such delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to be reversed in
the petition for review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting petitioner of direct
assault, hence, the petition involved no less than petitioner's liberty. 15 We do not find anything on
record that shows petitioner's deliberate intent to delay the final disposition of the case as he had filed
the petition for review within the extended period sought, although erroneously computed. These
circumstances should have been taken into consideration for the CA not to dismiss the petition
outright.
We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review does not
automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. 16 And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a

20
few days late, where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may
relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. 17
Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. 18 After all, the higher objective of procedural rule is to insure that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected. 19 Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on the merits and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to reinstate the Petition for Review filed by
petitioner in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410.
SO ORDERED. aEcADH
||| (Montajes v. People, G.R. No. 183449, [March 12, 2012], 684 PHIL 1-1

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174238. July 7, 2009.]

ANITA CHENG, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and

TESSIE SY, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J p:

This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order
dated January 2, 2006 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No.
05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows —
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of
which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against
respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang(BP Blg.) 22 before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-
969952 contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy. 3 On the other hand, the
Order in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of
the accused, the same is purely 'civil', not criminal in nature. 4
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its
Order 5 dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability
of accused respondents. cHCIDE
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18,
Manila, a complaint 6 for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452)
based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously
subject of the estafa andBP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order 7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of
21
P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of
Section l, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 8 which the court denied in its Order 9 dated
June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue —
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and
prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case
where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the
respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused
(respondents herein)? 10
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20,
1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should
not apply, as it must be given only prospective application. She further contends that that her case
falls within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal
action is deemed instituted with the latter —
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the
resolution of the civil aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than
a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for
further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the
accused amounting to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated
in a separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-
delicio pursuant to Article 31 11 of the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability fro damages may be had under Article 29 12 of the Civil
Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg.
22 proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents,
where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has
not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages
prior to the criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases. 13
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and theBP Blg. 22 cases, the action to
recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial
courts. This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 14 that then possible single
civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22,
simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing the prohibition against forum
shopping. 15 Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as
the complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly
instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other. 16 CSaITD
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of
crime beyond reasonable doubt — where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no
pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953
where the trial court declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature — produced
the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action
impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code. 17
However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the
dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also

22
elected that such civil action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of
the Rodriguez v. Ponferradaruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the
accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as
the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may petitioner's action to recover respondents' civil
liability be also allowed to prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states —
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by
the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not
apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights does not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. 18
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg.
22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be
stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the
Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the
Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner's rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to
a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for
failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable. 19 CDAEHS
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone,
are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered
to in order to attain this objective. 20
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be
left without a remedy to recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her.
This could prejudice even the petitioner's Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in
Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises,
William Sy and Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition
for an unreasonable length of time. 21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense
that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks
along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
23
 It is in this light that we find petitioner's contention that she was not assisted by a private
prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public
prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the
identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed
impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner's recourse pursuant to the
prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount
loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may
proceed requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal
within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the
civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg.
22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their
counsel. 22 But this rule admits of exceptions — (1) where the counsel's mistake is so great and
serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty
of gross negligence resulting in the client's deprivation of liberty or property without due process of
law. 23 Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioner's lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules
and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the Bar. 24 Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to
be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to
public service. 25 Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge
of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such
that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only
remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to
respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was
denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court's observation when it dismissed the
estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of
respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to
recover the loaned amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they
may now conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality
applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person
shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's expense. One condition for
invoking this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law. 26 DICcTa
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation
and application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the
best way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances
should not be barred by technicalities. 27 For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the
complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances
of cases, are incompetent to do so, 28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v.
Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby orderedREINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Cheng v. Spouses Sy, G.R. No. 174238, [July 7, 2009], 609 PHIL 617-630)

FIRST DIVISION
24
 [G.R. No. 150429. August 29, 2006.]

ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr.

Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD
INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC., respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the

Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 dated March 30, 2001 which affirmed
the Decision 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31, 1998 dismissing
petitioner's complaint for payment of disability and other benefits for lack of merit and the
Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner
Roberto G. Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga,a vessel registered and owned by its principal
and co-respondent, Barbership Management Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and
while petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache.
Petitioner experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was
determined that he had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral
aneurysm. 5 Petitioner underwent a brain operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in
Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent a second brain operation.
Owing to petitioner's physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. On
August 21, 1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the
examining physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has
been observed for 120 days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled." 6
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim
amicably by accepting the amount of US$13,200. 7Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his
signature in the Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one
RichardFamanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the release. ECaAHS
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC
OCW Case No. 6-838-97-L praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance
proceeds, moral damages and attorney's fees. On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner appealed
the decision with the NLRC. On March 31, 1998, the NLRC promulgated its decision 10 finding the
appeal to be without merit and ordered its dismissal. When the motion for reconsideration 11 was
denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. On December 2, 1998, we resolved to refer the case to
the Court of Appealspursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations
Commission. 13
On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
petition for review raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING
THE VALIDITYOF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE SINCE PETITIONER'S
CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID
AND UNENFORCEABLE.

25
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM OF THE
PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED
FOR UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because he
was permanently disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent
which makes the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
The petition lacks merit.
It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court's judicial review under Rule 45 of the 
Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in
labor cases where the doctrine applies with greater force. 14 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have
already determined the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they
are accorded not only great respect but also finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We reviewed the records of the case and we find
no reason to deviate from the findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only
gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. 16 If consent is given through any of the aforementioned
vices of consent, the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a
proper action in court. 18
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt
and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors
that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner's self-serving allegations, there is no proof on
record that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such
proof of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We agree with the
findings of the Court of Appeals that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner's
consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner has not
fully recovered his health at the time he signed the subject document, the same
cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept the agreement,
for his wife and another relative witnessed his signing. aDHScI
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by
petitioner in his appeal does not show on its face any violation of law or public policy.
In fact, petitioner did not present any proof to show that the consideration for the same
is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence to support the same,
the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide against the unreasonableness of the
consideration. 19
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as
ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the worker's right and that acceptance of the
benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain. Employer and employee,
obviously do not stand on the same footing. 21 However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as
against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that
the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking, 22 as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no
doubt as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. 23 We
have reviewed the terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same

26
to be clear and unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by petitioner's wife, Gloria
T. Famanila and one Richard T. Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED DOLLARS (US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS
(365,904.00),the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my full and complete
satisfaction ...I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, ...hereby remise, release and forever
discharge said vessel "HANSA RIGA",her Owners, operators, managers, charterers,
agents, underwriters, P and I Club, master, officers, and crew and all parties at interest
therein or thereon, whether named or not named, including but not limited to BARBER
SHIP MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC.
and ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all claims, demands, debts,
dues, liens, actions or causes of action, at law or in equity, in common law or in
admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising from and under the laws of the United
States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and/or any
other foreign country now held, owned or possessed by me or by any person or
persons, arising from or related to or concerning whether directly or indirectly,
proximately or remotely, without being limited to but including the said illness suffered
by me on board the vessel "HANSA RIGA" on or about 21st June 1990 at Portland,
Oregon and disability compensation in connection therewith.
This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all
liabilities of any character and/or claims or damages and/or losses and/or any other
liabilities whatsoever, whether contractual or statutory, at common law or in equity,
tortious or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related to or occurring as a
consequence of the illness suffered by me as Messman of the vessel "HANSA
RIGA",including but not limited to all damages and/or losses
consisting of loss of support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all
benefits of whatsoever nature and extent incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or
all damages and/or indemnities claimable in law, tort, contract, common law, equity
and/or admiralty by me or by any person or persons pursuant to the lawsof the United
States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and of all
other countries whatsoever.

I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand this instrument
which was read to me in the local dialect and I agree that this is a FULL AND FINAL
RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties and things referred to herein, and I further
agree that this release may be pleaded as an absolute and final bar to any suit or suits
or legal proceedings that may hereafter be prosecuted by me or by any one claiming
by, through, or under me, against anyof the persons or things referred to or related
herein, for any matter or thing referred to or related herein. 24
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties
are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law. 25 Further, dire necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release
since it has not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money claims against the
respondents is the three year period pursuant to Article 291of the Labor Code which provides that:
ART. 291. Money Claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred. SaIEcA
xxx xxx xxx
Since petitioner's demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim arising from his
employment, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared
permanently and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which gave rise to his entitlement to disability

27
benefits up to the time that he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three years have
elapsed thereby effectively barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30,
2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the Decision ofthe National Labor Relations
Commission dismissing petitioner's complaint for disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and the
Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Famanila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150429, [August 29, 2006], 531 PHIL 470-480)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-41171. July 23, 1987.]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO,

PATROCINIO BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner, vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO a
nd HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch II, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-55000. July 23, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR

N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO,
JOSEBORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO,
JR., heirs-appellants, vs. FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.

[G.R. No. L-62895. July 23, 1987.]

JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,

HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial
Court, Branch XV, Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the
Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-63818. July 23, 1987.]

DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Intestate

Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch
XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS
M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO
ESTENZO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-65995. July 23, 1987.]

PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and

JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO P.
BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Regional Trial Court of Cebu;
RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp.
Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

SYLLABUS

28
 1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; HEIRS ACQUIRE A RIGHT TO SUCCESSION FROM THE
MOMENT OF THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED; HEREDITARY RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED
PRIOR TO THE PARTITION OF THE ESTATE. — The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of
hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality
of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs
acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code. according to which the heirs
succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment
of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but
the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989
of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the
estate was issued only in 1969.
2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF HEREDITARY RIGHTS, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. — For a waiver
to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the
existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G.
No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or
advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311).
(Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
3. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO PASS
UPON THE VALIDITY OF THE WAIVER AGREEMENT; EXTENDS TO MATTERS INCIDENTAL
AND COLLATERAL TO THE EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS IN HANDLING SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE. — With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No.
916-R the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498.
Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial
court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of
the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers
in handling the settlement of the estate.
4. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; SUSPECION OF PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF A
TRIAL JUDGE MUST BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS; SHOULD INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM
HEARING A CASE AT THE VERY FIRST SIGN OF LACK OF FAITH AND TRUST TO HIS
ACTIONS WHETHER WELL-GROUNDED OR NOT. — The allegations of the private respondents
in their motion for inhibition, more specifically the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire
estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of
partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In the case of Bautista v.
Rebueno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated: ". . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust
and faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very
first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no
other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest
actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the
Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to
disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is
lived up to." In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound
reasons.
5. CIVIL LAW; ATTORNEY'S FEES; OBLIGATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL HEIRS AND NOT
THAT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED. — We agree with the petitioners' contention that
attorney's fees are not the obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired
their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the

29
 exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market value of the estate from which attorney's
fees shall be taken and paid should be deleted.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:

These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO, 916-R of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu.
G.R. No. 41171
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in
Parañaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in
the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for
the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased,
devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and
undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and
thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and
Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial, the
probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery. cdphil
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the will
was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera, et al. v. Crispin Borromeo, et
al. (19 SCRA 656).
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came
before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo.
The following petitions or claims were filed:
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a
petition for declaration of heirs and determination of heirship. There was no opposition filed
against said petition.
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for declaration as heir.
The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeofiled an opposition to this petition.
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, Ramon
Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila
Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs and
determination of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo.
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe BorromeoQueroz filed a claim.
Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of
Carlos Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following facts were
established:
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter having
predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children, namely,.
Jose Ma. Borromeo
Cosme Borromeo
Pantaleon Borromeo
Vito Borromeo

30
 Paulo Borromeo
Anecita Borromeo
Quirino Borromeo and
Julian Borromeo
2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all his brothers
and sisters predeceased him.
3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
a. Ismaela Borromeo, who died on Oct. 16, 1939
b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of
Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March
28, 1968. He had an only son - Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners
herein.
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
4. Aniceta Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only daughter,
Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following children:
a. Aniceta Ocampo Castro
b. Ramon Ocampo
c. Lourdes Ocampo
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose
Barcenilla, Jr.
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the
following children:
a. Marcial Borromeo
b. Carlos Borromeo, who died on Jan. 18, 1965, survived by his wife, Remedios
Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam.
c. Asuncion Borromeo
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.
The last three died leaving no issue.
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the
following children:
a. Exequiel Borromeo, who died on December 29, 1949
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following children:
aa. Federico Borromeo
bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
dd. Jose Borromeo
ee. Consuelo Borromeo
ff. Pilar Borromeo
gg. Salud Borromeo
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera.
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
31
 d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his children:
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
bb. Luz Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp
dd. Rosario Borromeo
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz.
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order
declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
3. Vitaliana Borromeo
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
5. Salud Borromeo
6. Asuncion Borromeo
7. Marcial Borromeo
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided
into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed
declared intestate heirs. LexLib
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera,
signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was
approved by the trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court
ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in
the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further
ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All
attorney's fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated portion.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir
under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the
heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and
that in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law
making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an
acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to
four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court
dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased
Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to
support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of
the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967,
supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong. Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo,
Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo,
Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam. In the
waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from
asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the

32
declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been executed before the distribution of the
estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for
lack of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared
heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to
Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of
Vito Borromeo.
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order
dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent FortunatoBorromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate
of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim
of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the decedent but a
claim for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the
decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private
respondent under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a
creditor of the heirs which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the private respondent under
the waiver agreement was filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only
sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of
partition (April 30, 1969), the approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum, the
existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled "Waiver of Hereditary Rights"
executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect
because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid
acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil
Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the
death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner
and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs,
their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by
Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devisees, and legatees to signify their
acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution
of the estate. LibLex
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the
Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or
repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the
person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He
points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories
to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their
rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the
waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of
hereditary rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it
partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court
because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. He further maintains that the probate
court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the
remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in
an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the
heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of
the death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the
Civil Code. according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or
less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of
the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
33
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and
Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in
1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to
be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v.
Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must
be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish
the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible
(67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not
have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights. Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967,
Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they
submitted a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed
to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real,
including all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31,
1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this
document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories
to the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased VitoBorromeo, entitled to share in the estate.
This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent
now purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and
offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the
majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be
distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On
June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment"
purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all
her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of
the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4)
On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the
aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the
heirs-assignors named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed
this document on March 24, 1969. LibLex
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R
the lower court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently,
several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs
of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising
jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling
the settlement of the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December 24, 1974, is
hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, dated December 24, 1974, declaring the waiver document
earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court certified this case to this Court as
the questions raised are all of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also question
the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action filed by claimant
Fortunato Borromeo.

34
 The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on July 31,
1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any hereditary right in the
intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary right was only acquired
and owned by them on April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of waiver of
hereditary right in the present case because there was no object, which is hereditary right, that
could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not
only null and voidab initio but was inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any formal
pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the waiver agreement and
without notice to the parties concerned, two things which are necessary so that the lower court
would be vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver
agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without
asking for the requisite pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December
24, 1974, which approved the validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend that this
constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights in favor of
Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the
inheritance and by virtue of the same act, they lost their rights because the rights from that
moment on became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need
for a person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is
required is that he is certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right
to the inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the
signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeowas already dead and they
were also certain of their right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the
appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all
oppositors to the waiver document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and
setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the claim as to
a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no question of title to property and, therefore, the probate
court can decide the question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in
this case, who are all declared heirs of the late VitoBorromeo are contesting the validity of the trial
court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate
of VitoBorromeo under the waiver agreement. cdphil
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be validated.
The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing intention to relinquish
hereditary rights, are not found in this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the eight (8)
intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to the respondent and to
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on
July 31, 1967, some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the
respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of
assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the deed of
assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial
court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement because the trial
court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895

35
 A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative of some
of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A
similar motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded
on the fact that there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the
estate since the order of partition and distribution had long become final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve the
aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo filed a petition for mandamus before the
Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to terminate and close Special Proceedings No.
916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to compel the
petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will
not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the
petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack
of merit. Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion filed on
April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of
the motion for inventory and accounting because the latter motion was filed only on March 2,
1979. He claimed that under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide
or resolve a case or matter within three months from the date of its submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already been
resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents previously set in his
court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the resolution and restraining order issued by
the Court of Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the
exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the
deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order dated August 15,
1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to
partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in
the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and
5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and reserved for attorney's fees. LLphil
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197,
Rollo, G.R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9) declared heirs the
properties due to the following circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to
segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as
beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement signed by the
heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R.
No. 41171);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his
accounting; and
4. The claim of Tarcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of
notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the properties of the estate.
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not yet distributed to some of the
declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending resolution of the waiver
agreement, this Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, to expedite the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and
ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of
the estate and to render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of several
properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:

36
 1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial court
dated December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of
Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from further
acting on any and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R because of the
affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818."
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and
bank deposits by the petitioner, as co-administrator of the estate, if he has not yet done so, as
required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all
deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra O. Borromeo filed a
motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, presided over by Judge
Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The
movants alleged, among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the
production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of
Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested buyers. Said motion was
granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October 2, 1978 which, however, became the
subject of various motions for reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended
that as owners they cannot be deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons advanced
by Atty. Antigua. In view of the motions for reconsideration, Atty. Antigua ultimately
withdraw his motions for production of titles.
"7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another incident
involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of herein movants Petra
O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam. In connection with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno
filed a pleading which the Hon. Presiding Judge considered direct contempt because,
among others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to
receive `fat commission' from the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno
was seriously in danger of being declared in contempt of court with the dim prospect
of suspension from the practice of his profession. But obviously to extricate himself
from the prospect of contempt and suspension, Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment
and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together, continued to
harass administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
xxx xxx xxx
"9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of the
Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
"10. There is now a clear tug of war between Atty. Antigua, et al. who are
agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual heirs, on the one
hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell their distributive
shares under the terms and conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern
of harassment has become apparent against the herein movants, especially Jose
Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed by Atty. Antigua et al. are the
pending motions for the removal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the
subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade into the privacy of
the personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the other matters mentioned in
paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are expected until the herein movants
shall finally yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for
an entirely independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said incidents.
37
 "11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of
this proceeding, including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable to be
misunderstood as being biased in favor of Atty. Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against
the herein movants. Incidents which may create this impression need not be
enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo).
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state
herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest in pursing
the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L.
Antigua.
"17. Evidently, the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot
be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees because the certificates
of title are already registered in their names. Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to sell,
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire
property based on the rationale that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn
interest more than the present income of the so called estate. Most of the heirs-
distributees, however, have been timid to say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs
led by petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse
the proposal to sell clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx
"20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun
motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents now pending in the court
below which smack of harassment against the herein petitioners. For, regardless of
the merits of said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper
for respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No.
916-R by reason of the following circumstances:
"(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as initiated
by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a brother of respondent.
"(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity of
the heirs-distributees, and petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the great
disappointment of respondent.
"(c) The shotgun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are clearly
intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose CuencoBorromeo in
order to pressure him into acceding to the proposed sale.
"(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by
failing to resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose
CuencoBorromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the other
lawyers were resolved by respondent after petitioners refused the proposed
sale." (pp. 41-43, Rollo).
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition for
certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further
cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the transmission of the
records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on April 11,
1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further
hearing the case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling. LLphil

38
 The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge Francisco
P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime before the latest
reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of
the judge to whom this case will be reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. They
contend that Judge Burgos has never shown unusual interest in the proposed sale of the entire
estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is
shown by the judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at
P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties
of the estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge
Burgos would have been unreasonable because his orders against the failure of Jose
Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of the estate were all
affirmed by the appellate court. They claim that the respondent court should also have taken
judicial notice of the resolution of this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement
and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the disqualification of
Judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the administration proceeding as he is the only
judge who is conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed, countered that
Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972,
yet Borromeo was singled out to make an accounting of what he was supposed to have received
as rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to
February, 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge
Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979.
During the conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-
distributees presumably to cover up the projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner
Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to file an inventory when he
has already filed one to account for cash, a report on which the administrators had already
rendered: and to appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge
Burgos. It was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the
Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the name of
Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees
Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with
the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance
of subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., Inc.; Register of
Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces
tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the
Manager of the bank, the Register of Deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu, and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty. Gaudioso V. Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of
Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty. Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L.
Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce all the owners' copies
of the titles in the court presided over by Judge Burgos.
Consequently, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding
Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on May 14, 1979, before
the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the private respondents' motion for
reconsideration and the motion to quash the subpoena.
It was further argued by the private respondents that if Judge Francisco P. Burgos is not
inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage of justice
because for the past twelve years, he had not done anything towards the closure of the estate
proceedings except to sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner

39
Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15
million pesos. cdrep
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more specifically the
insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs
objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be
avoided at all costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebueno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
". . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of
lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no
other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce
doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state
of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The
better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That
way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is
lived up to."
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound reasons. As earlier
stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further
hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is
not only valid but the issue itself has become moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all incidents
in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this petition and G.R. No. 63818. They
also pray that all acts of the respondents related to the said special proceedings after March 1,
1983 when the respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void
and without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs-distributees to the estate, of the
distributed properties already titled in their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending
inhibition case elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R
requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants who were individually
hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should be legally charged against
their respective clients and not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one and barred
by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the respondent
Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate. They claim that this
resolution, which was already final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the
Intermediate Appellate Court in its case — AC-G.R. No. SP-11145 — when it granted the petition
for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further
cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R as well as ordering the transmission of the records
of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on
March 1, 1983, which was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No.
63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the obligation of the
estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their respective lawyers. The portion,
therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of
40% of the market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should
be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No.
63818, we grant the petition.

40
 WHEREFORE, —
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24, 1974,
declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated
July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order are
hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document valid is
hereby SET ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P.
Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic. The
judge who has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately conduct
hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is
likewise disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be implemented;
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The issue seeking to restrain
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC;
(5) In G.R. No. 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate the close
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of
the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioner-administrator of the
estate as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market value of the
estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED.
The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired them, attorney's fees
according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which should not exceed more
than 20% of the market value of the property the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (Intestate Estate of the Late Borromeo v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, L-55000, L-62895, L-
63818, L-65995, [July 23, 1987], 236 PHIL 184-212)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010.]

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC

HEALTH-KUWAIT, petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J p:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of
its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA, 1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year
and are covered by Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on
February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondent's request for reconsideration, she returned to the
Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.
41
 On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
complaint 2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision 3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither
showed that there was just cause to warrant respondent's dismissal nor that she failed to qualify
as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered
petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion
of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision by
Resolution 4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution 5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their
principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the
immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait's Civil Service Laws.
Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision 6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners' contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and
that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the
law, a private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the
contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the
foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. ATcaHS
As to Ikdal's liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos' Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a
recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for
money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution 7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review oncertiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent's employment
contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law
and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and
the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in
deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules
relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations)
accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the
host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable,
given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did
not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot
likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministry's liability had not been judicially determined as
jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money
claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of
claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that
such foreign principal's liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and
solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their
foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures
them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.
Maguad 8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered
into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not
coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties
decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the
42
 contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends
up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will
render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment
of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class. 9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity
from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal's
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners' contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent's employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti
Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can
establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the
laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine ofprocessual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge. The Court's ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int'l. v. NLRC 10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g., specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being
the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi
Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of
Gran. HcACTE
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know
only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on
the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is
not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the  Revised Rules of Court which
reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to
in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part

43
 thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and
the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country's Civil Service Laws and Regulations
apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that
she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated
copy of the certificate of termination, 12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha
Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification
and Translation Unit; and respondent's letter 13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she
noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit
it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that
respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service
laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated
and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners
submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of
the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service
laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to
English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review and
certification and the same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however,
assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
Respecting Ikdal's joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too
following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz.:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages. cHDAIS
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for
any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, [October 11, 2010], 647 PHIL 43-52)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 185582. February 29, 2012.]

44
 TUNA PROCESSING, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD,
INC., respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:

Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but which collects
royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral award?
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, 1 petitioner Tuna Processing, Inc.
(TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, prays that the
Resolution 2 dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be
declared void and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In the assailed
Resolution, the RTC dismissed petitioner's Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award 3 against respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, 4 on the ground that
petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue. 5
The Antecedents
On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the "licensor"), co-
patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian
Patent No. ID0003911 (collectively referred to as the "Yamaoka Patent"), 6 and five (5) Philippine
tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna
Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the
"sponsors"/"licensees") 7 entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), 8 pertinent provisions
of which read:
1. Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of U.S. Patent No.
5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No.
ID0003911 . . . wishes to form an alliance with Sponsors for purposes of
enforcing his three aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those
patents, and collecting royalties. TcIaHC
The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned patents in order to
practice the processes claimed in those patents in the United States, the
Philippines, and Indonesia, enforce those patents and collect royalties in
conjunction with Licensor.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto agree to the
establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. ("TPI"), a corporation established in the
State of California, in order to implement the objectives of this Agreement.
5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the United States,
which will be used exclusively to deposit funds that it will collect and to disburse
cash it will be obligated to spend in connection with the implementation of this
Agreement.
6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and Licensor. Licensor
shall be assigned one share of TPI for the purpose of being elected as member
of the board of directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the
Sponsors according to their respective equity shares. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement 10 dated 15 January
2003 and an Agreement to Amend Memorandum of Agreement 11 dated 14 July 2003.
Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including respondent
Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged on their
obligations. 12 Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for
45
Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case against
respondent. 13 Pertinent portions of the award read:
13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to the
Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to be paid
by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX DOLLARS
AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10).
(A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due
assessments, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum
of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY
FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS ($229,355.90) which is 20%
of MOA assessments since September 1, 2005[;]
(B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT TPI in
fulfilling the objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT KINGFORDshall
payCLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)
[;] 14 and
(C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of the YAMAOKA 619
PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE
MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS
($1,250,000.00). . . .
xxx xxx xxx 15
To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awardbefore the RTC of Makati City. The
petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M. Alameda.
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. 16 After the court denied the
motion for lack of merit, 17 respondent sought for the inhibition of Judge Alameda and moved for
the reconsideration of the order denying the motion. 18 Judge Alameda inhibited himself
notwithstanding "[t]he unfounded allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in the
motion." 19 Judge Cedrick O. Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the ground that the
petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. 20
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.
Issue
The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo was correct in so dismissing
the petition on the ground of petitioner's lack of legal capacity to sue.
Our Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines expressly provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. — No foreign corporation
transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns,
shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any
court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid
cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo dismissed the petition. Thus:
Herein plaintiff TPI's "Petition, etc." acknowledges that it "is a foreign
corporation established in the State of California" and "was given the exclusive right to
license or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent" and "was assigned the exclusive right to
enforce the said patent and collect corresponding royalties" in the Philippines. TPI
likewise admits that it does not have a license to do business in the Philippines.
46
 There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has been doing
business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued by the concerned
government agency of the Republic of the Philippines, when it collected royalties from
"five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,] namely[,] Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia
Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and
respondent Philippine Kingford, Inc." This being the real situation, TPI cannot be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceedings in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines." A priori, the "Petition, etc." extant of the
plaintiff TPI should be dismissed for it does not have the legal personality to sue in the
Philippines. 21
The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition and
enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with Republic Act No.
9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), 22 the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards drafted during the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law), 23 as none of these specifically
requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have legal capacity to sue. It anchors
its argument on the following: cCSHET
In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a ground not
found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004], New York
Convention, or Model Law. It is for this reason that TPI has brought this matter before
this most Honorable Court, as it [i]s imperative to clarify whether the Philippines'
international obligations and State policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of
dispute resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical considerations not found in
the relevant laws. 24
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, the New York
Convention and the Model Law on the other?
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature and applicability of
the Corporation Code of the Philippines, a general law, viz-Ã -viz other special laws. Thus,
in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr., 25 this Court rejected the application of the Corporation Code and
applied the New Central Bank Act. It ratiocinated:
Koruga's invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In
an earlier case with similar antecedents, we ruled that:
"The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types
of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks
and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof.
As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail — generalia
specialibus non derogant." (Emphasis supplied) 26
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council, 27 this Court held:
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing for the
formation, organization and regulation of private corporations. On the other hand, RA
6657 is the special law on agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the
latter shall prevail — generalia specialibus non derogant. 28
Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in
this case as the Act, as its title — An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute
Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute
Resolution, and for Other Purposes — would suggest, is a law especially enacted "to actively
promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their
own arrangements to resolve their disputes." 29 It specifically provides exclusive grounds
available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award. 30
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, a municipal law, applies in the
instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss compliance with international obligations under
the New York Convention and the Model Law. After all, both already form part of the law. DaIACS
47
 In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 incorporated the New York
Convention in the Act by specifically providing:
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention. — The New York Convention
shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the said
Convention.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award. — A party to a foreign
arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for recognition and enforcement of
the arbitral award in accordance with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New York
Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by the regional trial court.
It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit:
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. —
International commercial arbitration shall be governed by the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (the "Model Law") adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 . . . ."
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines have legal
capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We
answer in the affirmative.
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 provides that the opposing party
in an application for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award may raise only those
grounds that were enumerated under Article V of the New York Convention, to wit:
Article V
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond
the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized
and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
48
Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of the party seeking
the recognition and enforcement of the award.
Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 31 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support this
position. CAcEaS
Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that "[a]ny party to a foreign arbitration may petition
the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award." The contents of such petition are
enumerated in Rule 13.5. 32 Capacity to sue is not included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local
arbitral awards or arbitrations in instances where "the place of arbitration is in the
Philippines," 33 it is specifically required that a petition "to determine any question concerning the
existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement" 34 available to the parties
before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for "judicial relief from the ruling of the
arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction" 35 after arbitration
has already commenced should state "[t]he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or
respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued." 36
Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award,
we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that bars foreign corporations not licensed to do
business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters into a
contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to
arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration,
conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract, participate in the
arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Although not on all fours with the instant
case, also worthy to consider is the wisdom of then Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in
her Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 37 to wit:
. . . Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining adherents in
legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested mechanism can simply be
ignored by an aggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the
very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts. 38
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not
because it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has
certainly erased any conflict of law question.
Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the court a quo correctly
observed that the Model Law, not the New York Convention, governs the subject arbitral
award, 39 petitioner may still seek recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court,
since the Model Lawprescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing recognition or
enforcement. 40
Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the
Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in accordance
with the provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004.
II
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise unmeritorious.
First. There is no need to consider respondent's contention that petitioner TPI improperly
raised a question of fact when it posited that its act of entering into a MOA should not be
considered "doing business" in the Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity to sue. We
reiterate that the foreign corporation's capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as
the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
Second. Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Resolution dated 21 November 2008 dismissing the case. We have, time and again,
ruled that the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari under Rule
45. 41
Third. While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts,
which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants the outright dismissal of the case, 42 we opt to
relax the rules following the pronouncement in Chua v. Ang, 43 to wit: IEaATD

49
 [I]t must be remembered that [the principle of hierarchy of courts] generally
applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations. Cases which depend on
disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not
triers of facts. 44 A strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason
behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the present case, where the issues are
not factual but purely legal. In these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say
so that we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the unique
circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the legal issues outright. 45
Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein raised should be
seriously considered. 46 Surely, there is a need to take cognizance of the case not only to guide
the bench and the bar, but if only to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and
uphold the policy of the State embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the
party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the
State shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog
court dockets. . . .
Fourth. As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of the foreign arbitral award,
we leave its determination to the court a quo where its recognition and enforcement is being
sought.
Fifth. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court of origin a copy of the
motion for time to file petition for review on certioraribefore the petition was filed with this
Court. 47 We, however, find petitioner's reply in order. Thus:
26. Admittedly, reference to "Branch 67" in petitioner TPI's "Motion for Time to
File a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45" is a typographical error. As
correctly pointed out by respondent Kingford, the order sought to be assailed
originated from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61.
27. . . . Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61,
a copy of petitioner TPI's motion was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, Branch 61. 48 cHECAS
All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone, precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation,
Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-6533 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to Branch 61 for further proceedings. STEacI
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tuna Processing, Inc. v. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, [February 29, 2012], 683 PHIL
276-294)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST

COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM
PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-
appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors-appellant.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.A. Bellis, et al.
50
 Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J .R. Balonkita for appellees People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

SYLLABUS

1. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; LAW APPLICABLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE

INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION OF AN ALIEN; SCOPE OF ARTS. 16 (2) AND
1039, CIVIL CODE. — Article 16, par. 2, and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
2. ID.; LEGITIMATES; FOREIGN NATIONALS. — It is evident that whatever public policy
or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimates, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For its has chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGNER'S WILL; CASE AT BAR. — Appellants point out that the
decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
— arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in the Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil., 867) case, a provision in a foreigner's will
to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
his national law, is illegal and void for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters
that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The
parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos G. Bellis.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J p:

This is a direct appeal to us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally,
he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items
have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin
G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.

51
 Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15,
1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and
to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares
of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120.000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament
— divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's
final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June
11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
— Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and
a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law
rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless,
if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of
law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
"Art 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
"However", intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
52
 "Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."
Appellants would however counter that Article 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws, or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code aforequoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of
Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine
law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing
a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since
the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
||| (Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, [June 6, 1967], 126 PHIL 726-733)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23145. November 29, 1968.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D.

TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee, vs. BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED,INC., oppositor-appellant.

Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.

Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa for oppositor-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; WHEN

ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION IS PROPER. — The ancillary administration is proper, whenever
a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered
53
 in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
heirs (Johannes v. Harvey, 43 Phil. 175). Ancillary administration is necessary or the reason for
such administration is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any
effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in
a foreign state has no authority in the Philippines.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SCOPE OF POWER AND AUTHORITY OF AN ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR. — No one could dispute the power of an ancillary administrator to gain control
and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Such a
power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors (Rule 84,
Sec. 3, Rules of Court. Cf Pavia v. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70; Liwanag v. Reyes, L-19159, Sept. 29,
1964; Ignacio v. Elchico, L-18937, May 16, 1967; etc.). It is a general rule universally recognized
that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly extends to the assets of a decedent
found within the state or country where it was granted, the corollary being "that an administrator
appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country" (Leon
and Ghezzi v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 90 Phil. 459).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Since, in the case at bar, there is a refusal,
persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of
stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring
the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law
on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled. Any other view
would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled
discretion of a party or entity.
4. CORPORATION LAW; CORPORATIONS; CONCEPT AND NATURE. — A corporation is
an artificial being created by operation of law (Sec. 2, Act No. 1459). A corporation as known to
Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of
the state acting according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and
privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to
yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called
upon to do so. A corporation is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though it
were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate
from its individual stockholders (1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, pp. 19-20)

DECISION

FERNANDO, J p:

Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator, the

County Trust Company of New York, United States of America, of the estate of the deceased
Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation,
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, the lower court, then
presided by the Honorable Arsenio Santos, now retired, issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this
tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well
as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost
for all purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of
Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing in her
name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and
(3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by
said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this
Court." 1
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary administrator,
the County Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The order challenged represents a
response and expresses a policy, to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem,

54
addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies, with full and ample
support from legal doctrines of weight and significance.
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two stock
certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being in the possession of the
County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate
of the deceased 2 Then came this portion of the appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero
Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila;
Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator; and on January 22, 1963, he was
substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciliary
administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them
was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. On January 27, 1964, the Court
of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to
`produce and deposit' them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The
domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary
administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of
stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. be declared [or] considered as lost." 3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is
immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates in question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the
said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary
administrator, the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A.. . . ." 4
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be
declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe
certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its
appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged
order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by the
willful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court decree.
How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the
realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on willful defiance, if it
had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or
tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a
solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being buttressed by indisputable
principles and supported by the strongest policy considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the
judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled the
atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of the domiciliary
administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its appearance through counsel on June 27,
1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15, 1963. Thus did the lower
court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what was decreed. For
without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a blatant
disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously ordained
by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed, insofar as this matter was
concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary
administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of
the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy
the claims of local creditors. 5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is a
"general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly
"extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted," the
corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country." 6

55
 It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier
case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his
domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is
granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while
any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because
a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the
country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no
authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies,
leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs." 7
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares .. standing in her name in
the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc.." be respected is equally beyond question. For
appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as
immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue 8 finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even
appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so
minded.
2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive fashion for
the legality of the challenged order, how does appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose to
carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would
assign as the basic error allegedly committed by the lower court its "considering as lost the stock
certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade
Perkins, . . ." 9 More specifically, appellant would stress that the "lower court could not `consider
as lost' the stock certificates in question when, as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge knew,
and does know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that the said stock certificates are in existence
and are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator in New York." 10
There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That certainly does
not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order. Since there is a refusal, persistently
adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of
appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there
was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to
issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to
depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which
thus far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant
would not be heard to contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a mere
scrap of paper, the court issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did not
correspond exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in such a
conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again to borrow from Frankfurter, "that
fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important
part in its development." 11
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state that fictions "were
devices to advance the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and at times offensive." 12 Some of them
have persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the adopted
child, the constructive trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of `as if' today." 13 He
likewise noted "a class of fictions of another order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought,
but which at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis have brought it to the light." 14
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions as such
played in the law. There should be then on the part of the appellant a further refinement in the
catholicity of its condemnation of such judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for the
56
employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation of a valid judicial order
being disregarded with apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that this
particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its
invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be followed in
case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the event of a contest or
the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly
lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the "final
decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]." 15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such a by-
law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in
question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is
concerned, "it is immaterial . . . who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates . . ." Even
if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the
command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a statute, to
which, however, the judiciary must yield deference, when appropriately invoked and deemed
applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law would be accorded
such a high estate in the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but yield to its alleged
controlling force.
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless the
appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its by-laws does not impress us. Its
obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such
apprehension of a possible court action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in
the circumstances as they have developed gives substance to such a fear. Gossamer possibilities
of a future prejudice to appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful exercise of judicial authority.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with
implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by
operation of law . . ." 16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. As
Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing its
existence through creation by a sovereign power. 17 As a matter of fact, the statutory language
employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College decision, defined a
corporation precisely as "an artificial being invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law." 18
The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation is not in
fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though it were a person by process of fiction, or
by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.. It owes
its existence to law. It is an artificial person created by law for certain specific purposes, the extent
of whose existence, powers and liberties is fixed by its charter." 19 Dean Pound's terse summary,
a juristic person, resulting from an association of human beings granted legal personality by the
state, puts the matter neatly. 20
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to
quote from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state
recognition and concession." 21 A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature
without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law. It is
logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that
of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state
organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of
persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than the
other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate Court Action to enforce its rights.
Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty under the law
as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.

57
 To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer
upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to argue
that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its very existence; it is to contend
that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at will. So
extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 22 it was shown that in a
guardianship proceeding then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans Administration
filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor under guardianship,
alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider the deceased father as
not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a determination arrived at by its main office in the
United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of such order, the
Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his decisions "final and conclusive on
all questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to examine the matter anew,
"except a judge or judges of the United States court." 23 Reconsideration was denied, and the
Administrator appealed.
In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are of the
opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the
appellant, make the decisions of U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on
claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case,
where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference
between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the
conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States
courts), and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and
submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or
treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party,
conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and
render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and
conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if through
the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the
force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien
entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the
honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant
Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity
of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does
not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the
necessity of a negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed. It is
always easy to conjure extreme and even oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It does not
settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the result arrived at, the just solution
obtained, grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its correspondence
with what a sense of realism requires. For through the appealed order, the imperative requirement
of justice according to law is satisfied and national dignity and honor maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the
Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appellant
Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
||| (Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. L-23145, [November 29, 1968], 135 PHIL 237-250)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149177. November 23, 2007.]

58
 KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,
LTD., petitioners, vs. MINORU KITAMURA, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution 2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure
projects of foreign governments, 3 entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with
respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. 4 The
agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year
starting on April 1, 1999. 5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of
the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's
consultancy contract with the Philippine Government. 6
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this time
for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement (BBRI) Project. 7Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's
Appendix 3.1. 8
On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its
International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of
automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the
substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's
expiry. 9 cDSAEI
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a
negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted
that respondent's contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate
for the renewal of the ICA. 10
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent
consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. 11
For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and
executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could
only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus. 12
In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the
replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project. 13
On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. Frank 14 that
matters connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the
place of performance, 15 denied the motion to dismiss. 16 The trial court subsequently denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 17 prompting them to file with the appellate court, on
August 14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60205]. 18 On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds —
for lack of statement of material dates and for insufficient verification and certification against
forum shopping. 19 An Entry of Judgment was later issued by the appellate court on September
20, 2000. 20
Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September 19, 2000, still
within the reglementary period, a second Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 already stating
therein the material dates and attaching thereto the proper verification and certification. This
59
second petition, which substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 60827. 21 DTESIA
Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the assailed April
18, 2001 Decision 22 finding no grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable
to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in
issue. The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex
loci solutionis. 23
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in the assailed
July 25, 2001 Resolution. 24
Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners instituted the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari 25 imputing the following errors to the appellate court:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO BY AND
BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN THE JAPANESE
LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE
OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONIS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT[S] IN
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS. 26
The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject matter
jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving
contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles
of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule,"
or forum non conveniens.
However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural matters raised
by the respondent.
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
60205 has already barred the filing of the second petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827
(fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the first one) and the instant petition for review
thereof. cDEICH
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the
petition's defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal without
prejudice. 27 The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said case due to defects in the
formal requirement of verification 28 and in the other requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court on the statement of the material dates. 29 The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners
can re-file the petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification and
certification — as they, in fact did — and stating therein the material dates, within the prescribed
period 30 in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules. 31
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the merits
and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed
action had not been commenced. In other words, the termination of a case not on the merits does
not bar another action involving the same parties, on the same subject matter and theory. 32
Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res judicata effect,
and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and certification of the
second certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed on procedural
grounds, 33 petitioners are no longer required by the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-
forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the status of the
aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of non-forum
shopping about any event that will not constitute res judicataand litis pendentia, as in the present
case, is not a fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire
proceedings, considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are no longer
present. 34
60
 The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner Hasegawa is only
authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon, thecertiorari petition filed with the CA and not
the instant petition. True, the Authorization 35 dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the
secondcertiorari petition and which is also attached to the instant petition for review, is limited in
scope — its wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given the authority to sign for and act on behalf of
the company only in the petition filed with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to
the instant petition for review. 36 In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally applied
the Rules or even suspended its application whenever a satisfactory explanation and a
subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have been made. 37 Given that petitioners herein
sufficiently explained their misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply 38 an updated
Authorization 39 for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in the instant petition, the Court
finds the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules.
However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in the
verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to which we agree, Hasegawa is truly
not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case. The aforesaid September 4, 2000
Authorization and even the subsequent August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by
Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the company's board of directors. In not a
few cases, we have ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no
person, not even its officers, can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the
board. 40 Considering that Hasegawa verified and certified the petition only on his behalf and not
on behalf of the other petitioner, the petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman. 41 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter that demands strict
observance of the Rules. 42 While technical rules of procedure are designed not to frustrate the
ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the proper and orderly disposition of
cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. 43 CSTDIE
Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to
question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition
for certiorari ormandamus. The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse
decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. 44 While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, 45 petitioners' case does not fall among them.
This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the
respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by
Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local
courts have no substantial relationship to the parties 46 following the [state of the] most significant
relationship rule in Private International Law. 47
The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they
elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss 48 filed with the trial court,
petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the
applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan,
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. 49 While not abandoning this
stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the
defense of forum non conveniens.50 On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped
their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and introduced their new
argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. 51
Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the basis of the
change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo. 52 We only pointed out
petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws
principles.
To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are
involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be
initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be
enforced? 53 HDTISa
61
 Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. 54 Jurisdiction
considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the
case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state
constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often
coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant
contacts" for the other. 55 The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to
enter a judgment. 56
In this case, only the first phase is at issue — jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has
various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the
subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing which is the subject of the litigation. 57 In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign
authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner
prescribed by law. 58 It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 59 To succeed in its
motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim, 60 the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it
because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims. 61
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is
not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case
No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation
and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. 62 What they rather raise as grounds to
question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationisand lex
contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. DCASIT
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" 63 or the law of the
place where a contract is made. 64 The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the
"law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed." 65 It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract 66 and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. 67Under the "state of the
most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court
should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made,
was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. 68 This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. 69
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a
dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. 70 They determine which
state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts
problem. 71 Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules
are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that
they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application
of the conflict of laws rules. 72 Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the
proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. 73
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought
before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing
of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction
over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3)
assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States. 74 The court's power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and
the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by
62
 foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns. 75 EASIHa
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, 76 be used to deprive the trial
court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section
1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground. 77 Second, whether a suit should
be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 78 In this case, the RTC
decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a
matter of defense. 79
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil
case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are
inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, [November 23, 2007], 563 PHIL 572-590)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162894. February 26, 2008.]

RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE,

JR., respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J p:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against
petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent
Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired
respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects
in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992,
respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for
the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows. 3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney
C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and
breach of employment contract. 4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent's money claims. 5 Upon appeal
by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent's
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but
was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and
executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, 7 docketed
as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as

63
well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint
essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to
negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI.
The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and
functioned as one company.
In its Answer, 8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent's claim, it was a foreign
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any
arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied
combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said
companies. 9 Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written
agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales
Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut. 10 Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of
compulsory counterclaim. 11
On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing Based on
Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment 12 seeking the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the
same. Pending the resolution of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken
before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago. 13
In an Order 14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner's omnibus motion.
The trial court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, assuming the same to be
admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the
principle offorum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment
on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. 15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the order, which motion was opposed by
respondent. 17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001, 18 the trial court denied petitioner's motion. Thus,
it filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with the Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ
of certiorari and a writ of injunction to set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13
September 2000 and 31 July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further
proceedings. 20
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision 21 denying the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in the
assailed Resolution issued on 10 March 2004. 22
The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined itself to the
allegations in the complaint and should have also considered evidence aliunde in resolving
petitioner's omnibus motion, it found the evidence presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of
Walter Browning, insufficient for purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the other on the
issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named as defendants in the case had
indeed merged together based solely on the evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that
the issue should be threshed out during trial. 23 Moreover, the appellate court deferred to the
discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming jurisdiction on the
ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON
CONVENIENS. 24
Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Ceferino
Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent, manifested that the lawyer handling the
case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations with the law firm even before the filing of the
instant petition and that it could no longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent
64
despite diligent efforts. In a Resolution 25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court resolved to
dispense with the filing of a comment.
The instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a
valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute — namely, the
parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines — that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, 26 the Court outlined three consecutive phases
involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances 27 where the Court held that
the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the
following requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as
to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to
enforce its decision. 28
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and
the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of
the country where the case is filed. 29
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution
and the law 30 and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 31 Civil Case No.
1192-BG is an action for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the
nature of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein
respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court. 32
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws
of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign
tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law
are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to
this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law
which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. 33 The choice of law stipulation
will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. 34 Petitioner's averments of the
foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of
defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court's desistance. 35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its
conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In
the same manner, the Court defers to the sound discretion of the lower courts because their
findings are binding on this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to state a
cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of

65
 allegation in the pleading. 36 As a general rule, the elementary test for failure to state a cause of
action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. 37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to function as
one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter Browning rebutted this allegation.
On this score, the resolution of the Court of Appeals is instructive, thus:
. . . Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as well as other
documents produced in the hearing shows that these evidencealiunde are not quite
sufficient for us to mete a ruling that the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing and
conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors, Inc. (REC) assumed
the warranty obligations of defendant Rust International in the Makar Port Project in
General Santos City, after Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed by
REC. Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise meager to
preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International, Inc., Rust International[,] Inc.
and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have combined into one company, so much so that
Raytheon International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held liable for
the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid commissions. Neither these
documents clearly speak otherwise. 38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether petitioner, BMSI
and RUST merged together requires the presentation of further evidence, which only a full-blown
trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Raytheon International, Inc. v. Rouzie, Jr., G.R. No. 162894, [February 26, 2008], 570 PHIL 151-
160)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.]

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding

Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A.
TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson-Willis for petitioner.

Aqsa Law Firm and Abbas & Associates for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Senator Mamintal Tamano married private respondent Zorayda in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained subsisting until his death. Prior to his death, Tamano also married petitioner
Estrellita in civil rites. After the death of the Senator, Zorayda joined by her son filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that the RTC of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss
and ruled that the case was properly cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD
No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied;
hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. The case was, however, referred to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, likewise, denied the motion to dismiss. The petitioner now comes
before the Supreme Court reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
66
 As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code. Contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable herein. Assuming that indeed
petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the
general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. The petition herein was denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
denying the motion to dismiss was affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980; JURISDICTION OF

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS. — Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial
Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations.
Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be
no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. In the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned
that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita
never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That
she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in herMotion for
Reconsideration. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and
try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano
were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but
only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
2. CIVIL LAW; PD NO. 1083; DOES NOT DIVEST REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION UNDER SEC. 19, PAR. (6) OF BP BLG. 129. — Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently,
the shari'a courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested
of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides — Sec.
19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction: . . . (6) In
all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions . . . . STcAIa

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano. cda
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib)
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it
was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves

67
as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and
fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was
not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C.
Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the
marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, 1 hence, it was
only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise contended
that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear
and try the instant case was vested in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code, and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of
Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the
instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding
judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995
order denying reconsideration thereof.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the
Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriageahead of the
other consolidated cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of shari'a courts only when filed in places where there areshari'a courts. But in places where there are
no shari'a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial
Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari'a court and not
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 3 Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over
all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. 4 Personal actions, such as the
instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff . 5 There should be no question by now that what
determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations made by theplaintiff in this case. 6 In the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano
were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to
Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to
Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. llcd
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the
instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were
likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but
only upon the allegations of the complaint. 7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 8
Petitioner argues that the shari'a courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art.
13, Title, II, PD No. 1083, 9 which provides —
Art. 13. Application. — (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.

68
 (2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall
apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential
requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation,
guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary
dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of
marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental
authority, and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by
this Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case.
Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same
would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction
under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides —
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions . . .
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court — Br. 89, Quezon City,
denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case
be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until terminated.
SO ORDERED. llcd
||| (Tamano v. Ortiz, G.R. No. 126603, [June 29, 1998], 353 PHIL 775-781)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193902. June 1, 2011.]

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 193908. June 1, 2011.]

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, petitioner, vs. SAMSON R. PACASUM,

SR., respondent.

[G.R. No. 194075. June 1, 2011.]

SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. MARIETTA D.

ZAMORANOS, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J p:

69
 These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D.
Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by
petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075. SHECcD
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites.
Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982.
Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto
Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce
by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari'a Circuit District Court, 1st
Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as
follows:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D.
Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground
that the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to
exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance withPresidential Decree No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein
respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their
divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983.
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully
convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to
the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more
possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the 
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted.
Consequently, the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman
and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.
Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province,
Philippines. TAcSCH
(signed)
HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Presiding Judge 3
Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had
previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr.
(Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in
Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their
marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before
Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos' first marriage to De
Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr.,
Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour
and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and
Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October
18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary
custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases against
Zamoranos, to wit:

70
 1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended
the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a)
Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to De
Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos' first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon
City, presided over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and
Pacasum's marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasum's marriage was bigamous and void ab initio;
and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to
their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the community property
in favor of the children; and (iii) her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed
on October 25, 2004. CAacTH
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos' dismissal from service and disbarment
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Bureau
of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative
cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision,
Pacasum's appeal from the CSC's dismissal of the administrative case was still pending
resolution.
Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum
contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004. 4
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiñones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, finding prima
facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy. 5 Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305. 6
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutor's February 2, 2005
resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily
suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of
Iligan City at the time, issued a resolutions granting Zamoranos' motion for reconsideration and
dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos. 7
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of
the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15, 2005. 8 Posthaste,
Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the
dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos. 9
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued a
resolution granting Pacasum's Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29,
2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor. 10 Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and
Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing
of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated
February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice. 11 Unfortunately for
Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May
17, 2006. 12 DCSTAH
Zamoranos' second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was likewise
denied.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos,
dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found
that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage, whose
marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines:
From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of
[Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a
bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between
[Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between
Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with the
wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first
71
husband in accordance with PD 1083, . . . their marriage is dissolved and
consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover,
the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de
Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being
unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage
entered into by them under PD 1083.
Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on
December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or
change the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by
[Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to
Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and
Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and
also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined
marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between the
parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage and
unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaqdissolved the marriage between
[Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083. . . . .
Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides . . .:
"Application
The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines."
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and
her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslin Code and
divorce proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Shari'a Circuit Court.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides . . .: aDHCcE
"Jurisdiction — The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
xxx xxx xxx
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or
have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
a) Marriage;
b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
xxx xxx xxx"
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any
civil courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the
Shari'[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum]
against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service
Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and
simple harassment.
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so
hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for
annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, . . . . It is the Shari'a Circuit Court
that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the
nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted.
The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
72
 SO ORDERED. 13
On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of
Pacasum's appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments. 14
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of
Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy against
Zamoranos. 15
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the offense-charged.
Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil
Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her
marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be
dismissed. 16 cHATSI
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos' Motion to
Quash the Information. Zamoranos' motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. 17
Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal of the
December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously adverted to, the CA
dismissed Zamoranos' petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail
the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:
A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary
remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the interior
court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to
a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To
prosper, a petition for certiorarimust clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is
narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at
will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of
judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit
in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where the acts
complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos'] Motion to
Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect
thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009,
which first denied [Zamoranos'] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained
the factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said
motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City's] stance in upholding the sufficiency
of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to
be well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of
petitioner's motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. 18
Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CA's dismissal of Zamoranos'
petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and Pacasum. HCEcAa
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two counsels,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail the same CA Decision.
However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate contusion and superfluity, we have
allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R.
No. 193902 to remain.

73
 Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusion's made by
the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under
Islamic rites;
2. Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge Laguio
did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083;
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos' divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed their
marriage ties;
4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first
husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by theMuslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari'a Circuit Court."
5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and
6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No.
1083 because it is the Shari'a Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos' petition, raises
a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that
Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who
entered into a second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos' petition for certiorari; and
2. Whether the RTC's, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA's separate factual findings that
Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 19 SDHCac
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts — acts which courts have no power or
authority in law to perform. 20
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an
interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal. 21
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when
such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith
to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. 22
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain
situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of the following
exceptions (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened
and substantial justice"; 23 (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; 24 and (e) when the
cases "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof." 25 The first four of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed an error
of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos' motion to quash.
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of
judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous
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marriage. In that case, the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2,
Iligan City; dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was
the Shari'a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. The
provision reads:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition
or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate. (Emphasis
supplied.) cDTHIE
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are:
(1) The former judgment or order must be final;
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action. 26
The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. Suffice it to
state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was not a judgment on the merits.
The lower court simply dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found
that the Shari'a Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims
who wed under Islamic rites.
Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy, should have
taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos
is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under
Islamic law. In fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman
validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
1. Affidavit of Confirmation 27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who
solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath
that:
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized
to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;
2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties
are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman
and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in
Isabela, Basilan;
3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam
Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the
subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1093; registered [by] the Shari'a Circuit Court in
the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in order, I
accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Shari'a Circuit Court;
4. Satisfied that their marriage and subsequent divorce were in accordance with
Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;

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 5. In June of 1993 the old Capitol building, where the Shari'a Circuit Court was
housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects and
office equipments of the Shari'a Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire; HCETDS
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact; and
7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal
purposes it may serve.
2. Certification 28 issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed the
divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
3. Affidavit 29 executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of Court of
Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzman's divorce agreement
by the latter. Judge Usman's affidavit reads, in pertinent part:
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia's Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian;
2. The first time that a Sharia's Circuit court was established in the Island Province of
Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding
Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharia's Circuit
Court;
3. The Sharia's Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the old
Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia's Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in
1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in
Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the
confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia's Circuit Court were lost by reason of
the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements of
fact.
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of
the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman,
under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are
governed by P.D. No. 1083. HaTSDA
True, the Shari'a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under
the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct when it declared that:
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or
body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083)
created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction.
Neither court was Nested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the 
Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083that divested the Regional Trial
Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has
jurisdiction over this case. 30
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasum's claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed
by civil law. This is Obviously far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos' Muslim status should
have been apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second
marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the
RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated
the validity of Zamoranos and De Guzman's marriage before the Shari'a Circuit Court and had
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by
Zamoranos and De Guzman.
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 Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her liberty was
already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.
In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement and effective participation of
the National Cultural Communities . . ., [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions,
beliefs and interests in the formulation and implementation of its policies."
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction
over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and
the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos. cHCSDa
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II.
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Article 3. Conflict of provisions. —
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
application, the former shall prevail.
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws
or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out
the former.
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing
herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali's Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the subject matter of Muslim personal laws
expound thereon:
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any
provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For
example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Penal
Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent
marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage
is solemnized "in accordance with" theMuslim Code, the provision of the Revised
Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict
between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another special law or
laws of local application. The latter should be liberally construed to carry out the
provision of the Muslim Code. 31
On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:
TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 13. Application. —
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall
apply. EcIaTA
xxx xxx xxx
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage. —
xxx xxx xxx
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 Section 3. Subsequent Marriages. —
xxx xxx xxx
Article 29. By divorcee. —
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed
an 'idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is
pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.
xxx xxx xxx
Chapter Three
DIVORCE (TALAQ)
Section 1. Nature and Form. —
Article 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of the
marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of
all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
xxx xxx xxx
Article 46. Divorce by talaq. —
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of
his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained
from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular shall
constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the
prescribed 'idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall
have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed 'idda by resumption of
cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the
repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).THacES
xxx xxx xxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq: or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as soon as
it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract
another marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with
Article 78 of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole
dower in case the talaq has been effected after, the consummation of the
marriage, or one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give
support in accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements,
shall be dissolved and liquidated.
For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali's Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or
Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is
likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called
combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and
the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are
Muslims, this Muslin Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the
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 application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims
and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the Civil Code of the
Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code. 32
Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the effects of
irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of matrimonial
bond, entitling one to remarry. 33
It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by
an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari'a Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was
valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City, is without jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No.
194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal
Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy isGRANTED. AaECSH
SO ORDERED.
||| (Zamoranos v. People, G.R. Nos. 193902, 193908 & 194075, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 447-470)

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